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GSMA · Specification

SGP.21v3.1

RSP Architecture

Defines a common architecture framework for remote provisioning and management of embedded UICCs in consumer eSIM devices, supporting interoperability across operators and deployment scenarios.

Version
v3.1
  1. v3.12023-12-01
  2. v3.02022-03-28
  3. v2.72026-04-24
  4. v2.62024-09-20
  5. v2.52022-11-18
  6. v2.42021-08-03
  7. v2.32021-06-30
  8. v2.22017-09-01
  9. v2.12017-02-27
  10. v2.02016-08-23
  11. v1.02015-12-23
Issued
2023-12-01
Source
Original PDF

A formatted version of this document is not available yet; the text below is extracted clause by clause, so tables and figures may be incomplete.

Overview

This document sets out an architecture framework for remote SIM provisioning and management of embedded UICCs in consumer-market eSIM devices. It describes the system roles, eUICC and device requirements, interfaces, and components including the SM-DP+, Local Profile Assistant, and SM-DS. It also covers profile handling, eligibility checks, certification, security, and operational procedures for downloading and managing profiles. The framework is intended to support global interoperability across operators and deployment scenarios.

  • eUICC
  • eSIM
  • SM-DP+
  • LPA
  • SM-DS
  • NFC

Overview generated automatically from the document's scope and outline. The document text is authoritative.

Changes since v3.0

35 clauses modified, 2 clauses added, 1 clause removed

Compared automatically clause by clause from the extracted text of both versions; differences only in layout, spacing or table cells are ignored. The documents are authoritative.

1.4 Definition of Termsmodified

… the UICC. GSMA Certificate Issuer A Certificate Authority accredited by GSMA. Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU- ICCID T E.118 … [14][14].[14]. IC Dedicated Software As defined in BSI-CC-PP-0084 [40]. A non-GSMA CI that issues digital public key Certificates for a Independent eSIM CA specific region, company or group of companies for eSIM purposes. Integrated … g an interoperable description format Profile Package that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile as defined by Trusted Connectivity Alliance … [5][5].[5]. The functional element within the Profile Policy Management Profile Policy Enabler system that interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules. A policy control s … r the purpose of Test Profile testing the Device and the eUICC. A test Profile is not intended to store any Operator Credentials. According to NIST SP 800-53r4 … [18][18][18],[18], a mechanism by which an End User (through an input Device) can communicate directly with the security functions of the information system with Trusted Link the necessary Trusted Link confidence to support the system security policy. This mechanism can only be activated by the End User or the security functions of the information system and … …

1.6 Referencesmodified

…pen Mobile API Specification [20] SGP.03 NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1 [21] SGP.05 Embedded UICC Protection Profile [22] FS.08 FS.08 SAS-SM Standard … v3.1 or higher [23] [Void] [Void] [24] SGP.22 SGP.22 RSP Technical Specification - Version 3.0 SGP.25 RSP eUICC for Consumer Device Protection [25] SGP.25 Profile [26] SGP.14 … orm Card Specification v2.2 – Amendment [30] SCP11 F, v1.0 [31] EMVCo_Sec EMVCo Security Evaluation Process 5.1 – June 2016 [32] FS.09 FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology … v8.0 or higher [33] 3GPP TS 31.111 USIM Application Toolkit [34] ETSI TS 102 223 Smart Cards; Card Application Toolkit (CAT) ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 IT Security techniques – Digi … Works: Smartcard-Web-Server, Version [38] Smartcard_Web_Server- 1.2.1 – 13 Sep 2013 V1_2_1-20130913-A [39] GSMA TS.06 IMEI Allocation and Approval Process [40] … BSI-CC-PP-0084[Void] Common[Void] Criteria Protection Profile Recommendation for Key Derivation Using [41] NIST[Void] SP[Void] 800-108 Pseudorandom Functions Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and [42] BSI[Void] TR-02102-1[Void] Key Lengths [43] ANSSI[Void] RGS[Void] v2 B1 Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 Annexe B1 JIL-Application-of- Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and [44] Attack-Potential-to- Similar Devices Smartcards-v2-9Smartcards-v3-1 Version 2.9,3.1, JanJun 20132020 Guideline for Using Cryptographic Standards in the [45] NIST[Void] SP[Void] 800-175B Federal Government: Cryptographic Mechanisms SOG-IS Smartcards and similar devices CC supporting [46] SOG-IS[Void] documents[Void] at this link: https://www.sogis.eu/uk/supporting_doc_en.html [47] SGP.23 RSP Test Specification [48] TS.37 Requirements for Multi SIM Devices [49] 3GPP TS 33.102 3G security; Security architecture 3GPP System Architecture … d general model [54] TS.43 GSMA PRD, Service Entitlement Configuration GlobalPlatform Device Technology Device API Access [55] GPD_SPE_068 Control - Version 1.0 … Security Evaluation of Integrated eUICC [56] SGP.08 based on PP-0084 Security Evaluation of Integrated eUICC [57] SGP.18 based on PP-0117

1.7 Conventionsmodified

… NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [6] and clarified by RFC8174 … [52][52],[52], when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. “FFS” or “For Further Study” means that it will be covered in the next version of SGP.21.

3.5 Certificate Issuermodified

…usted root for the purpose of authentication of the entities of the system. The Certificate Issuer communicates with the SM-DP+, SM-DS and the EUM CIS2 through … the interfaces ESci that are out of scope of this specification according to SGP.14 [26]. Table 5: Certificate Issuer Role

4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overviewmodified

…sioning of Embedded UICC Technical specification [8]. Profiles are provisioned based on the security framework defined in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification … [9][15].[9]. To SM-DP+ To SM-DP+ To Operator To SM-DS the Device To LPA in To UIMe ES6 ES8+ ES25 ES11 ES9+ ES10a,b,c eUICC Telecom Operating Framework System ISD-P ISD-P Pr… …

4.2.24 CI – SM-DP+/SM-DS/EUM (Esci)added

ESci is the interface between the CI and the SM-DP+ / the SM-DS / the EUM, used by the SM-DP+, SM-DS and EUM to request a certificate and to retrieve the certificate revocation status. This interface is out of scope of this specification.

4.3 eUICC Requirementsmodified

…the UICC. EUICC5 The eUICC SHALL be able to contain zero or more Profiles. EUICC6 [Void] The behaviour of a NAA USIM, ISIM or CSIM within a Profile on an eUICC … EUICC7 SHALL be identical to a removable UICC NAAs USIM, ISIM or CSIM. EUICC7Req no. Description Note: No changes to existing 3GPP/3GPP2 USIM, CSIM and ISIM specifications are expected. EUICC8 The eUICC SHALL support Milenage [11][12] and TUAK [10] algorithm EUICC8sets. sets[10][10]. EUICC9 The EUM Keyset shall be issued by the EUM. Req no. Description If any Profile Management operation does not complete successfully, the EUICC10 eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request. The eUI … C29 disabled state. The eUICC SHALL always report its eSVN in the first communication during EUICC30 the commencement of each session with the SM-DP+ or SM-DS. … Req no. Description The EUM SHALL install an eUICC Certificate in the eUICC to authenticate EUICC31 the eUICC. The EUM SHALL install an EUM Certificate in the eUICC to verify the EUICC32 eUICC Certificate. Req no. Description EUICC33 The eUICC SHALL have a means to authenticate itself to the SM-DS. EUICC34 [Void] Upon Profile deletion, the eUICC SHALL ensure a complete deletion of al … ALL be signed by EUICC48 the eUICC. Each Notification SHALL be protected against re-play attacks and signed by EUICC49 the eUICC. EUICC50 [Void] EUICC51 [Void] … Req no. Description The Profile SHALL be able to contain a list of zero or more Notification EUICC52 Receivers for each type of Notification. EUICC53 [Void] The EID SHALL NOT be modifiable. The EID SHALL NOT be affected by EUICC54 any of the procedures, including the change of eUICC Private keys. Req no. Description An Integrated eUICC SHALL conformbe tocertified theaccording additionalto requirementsSGP.08 defined[56] or EUICC55 SGP.18 [57] as described in AnnexSGP.24 J.[27]. EUICC56 The Integrated eUICC SHALL be based on an Integrated TRE. An Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to execute the test cases defined in EUICC57 SGP.23 [47]. The Integrated eUICC SHALL allow the SM-DP+ to identify the type of the Integrated TRE including its component configuration (e.g. use of internal or EUICC57a Remote Memory, use of other optional components), its manufacturer, in addition to the RSP OS provider. The Integrated TRE SHOULD have priority access to Remote Memory in EUICC57b cases of shared resource contention. The Integrated eUICC Test Interface SHALL be compatible with commonly EUICC57c used interfaces for smartcard testing. For the purpose of integration and/or end-to-end testing, a Field-Test EUICC58 eUICC MAY contain certificates that chain up to the GSMA CI. The eUICC MAY provid … thentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ mutual authentication between eUICC and SM-DS. An eUICC MAY support SM2, SM3 and SM4 cryptographic algorithms, defined in … [35][35][35][35],[35], [36] and [37] for mutual authentication and data EUICC63 encryption EUICC63 between the SM-XX and eUICCs. Note: TLS is used between the LPA and the SM-XX and is not considered in this requirement. A non-removable eUICC MAY support Multi … n runtime EUICC67 environment facilitating interoperability, e.g. Java Card. The application runtime environment(s) SHALL be explicitly indicated to the SM-DP+. … Req no. Description The Enabled/Disabled state of a Profile SHALL remain unchanged when the eUICC undergoes the following operations outside of an ‘Enable Profile’ or ‘Disable Pro… …

4.4.1 Eligibility Check Requirementsmodified

…ity Check Information. The eUICC SHALL indicate cryptographic algorithms and their respective ELG10 key lengths supported in the Eligibility Check Information. … Req no. Description The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information the list of ELG11 supported CIs. ELG12 [Void] The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Info … ility Check Information if it is a ELG16 Field-Test eUICC. The eUICC SHALL declare which LPA Mode is being used during the ELG17 secure session with the SM-DP+. … Req no. Description The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it ELG18 supports eUICC OS Update. The eUICC SHALL declare permitted Profile Policy Rules in th… …

4.5 Device Requirementsmodified

…ssible by the End User via alternate forms out of scope of this specification (e.g. printed in the Device’s packaging, accessible via a support web site etc.). … Req no. Description If an eUICC is within the Device packaging, then the EID SHOULD be printed in machine readable form on the Device packaging. If the EID is DEV3 not printed in m … only be determined by the bearer availability. DEV4 Note: The Companion Device MAY use any connectivity method available to connect to the SM-DP+. DEV5 [Void] … Req no. Description The implementation of the Remote SIM Provisioning specification in the DEV6 Device SHALL NOT impact the potential use of the SIM Lock mechanism defined in 3GPP TS 22.022 [16][16].[16]. DEV7 [Void] DEV8 [Void] A Device that supports an embedded UICC without an LPA in the DEV9 eUICC, SHALL provide LPA functions. A Device that supports only an e … sable the mechanism described in DEV12. Implementation is OEM specific. DEV13 Note: The mechanism described in DEV12 should be enabled by default. DEV14 [Void] … IMEIs SHALL be assigned by the Device Manufacturer to and used by DEV15 the[Void] Device in compliance with TS.06 [39]. There SHALL be a means on the Device for the End User to access the DEV16 ICCID of the enabled Operational Profile(s). The EID and/or the Device Information Cod … d by the Device Manufacturer to and used by DEV18 the Device in compliance with TS.06 [39]. There SHALL be a means for the Device supporting LDS to present the … DEV19 associated Root SM-DS address(es). The presentation is DEV19Req no. Description implementation specific (e.g., it could be displayed on the screen, or printed on the Device itself or packaging of the Device). If both the Device and its eUI… …

4.5.2 Devices with Integrated eUICCmodified

Req no. Description Access to any Remote Memory used by the TRE to store software and data asDIE1 defined in GS01 SHALL be protected against attacks on availability (e.g. DIE1 Denial of Service, memory corruption, tampering) by other Device components. All Integrated TRE software and data stored in Remote Memory outside the DIE2 SoC, per GS01SoC SHALL be protected against access by non Integrated TRE components. Table 13: Device with Integrated eUICC Requirements

4.6.2 eUICC Memory Reset Requirementsmodified

…regardless of their Profile Policy Rules and of their state. Strong Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to initiate eUICC Memory MEM3 Reset. In addition to … MEM3MEM3,MEM3, other secure means MAY be provided to perform the eUICC Memory Reset function. The same level of security as MEM4 is MEM4 offered by the LUI based reset function SHALL apply. User Intent and Confirmation Request SHALL apply. Table 15: eUICC Memory Reset Requirements

4.8 Profile Metadata Requirementsmodified

…dy used in a different context outside of this specification and could be blank. META5 The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile. … Req no. Description The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of META6 the META6 Profile. The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description META7 of the Profile defined by the Operator or Mobile Service Provider. … clude a message that is to be META11a displayed to the End User when the Profile contains a Profile Policy Rule. It SHALL NOT be stored after Profile download. … Req no. Description All Profiles SHALL be uniquely identified in the Profile Metadata as META12 Operational, Provisioning or Test Profile. An Operator, potentially on behalf of a M … ormat(s) best suited for presentation on the user META15 interface. Best fitting icons are intended to be shown during Profile download, Profile selection etc. … Req no. Description The HR icon solution SHALL provide an option to allow the HR icon(s) to be META16 provided during the Profile download procedure. The Profile Metadata SHALL inc … the original Profile Download procedure. The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include an optional field for the META18 estimated installed size of the Profile. … Req no. Description The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include a list of Managing SM- META19 DP+(s). The Profile Metadata SHALL include an optional field to allow for the META2… …

4.9 NFC Requirementsmodified

An NFC Device and an NFC eUICC SHALL be compliant with the following list of requirements: Req no. Description NFC1 An NFC Device SHALL be compliant with GSMA TS 26 [17][17][17].[17] . Req no. Description In combination with an enabled Operational NFC Profile, the NFC eUICC NFC2 SHALL support all requirements as specified in the SGP.03 GSMA NFC UICC Requirements… …

4.10.2 SM-DP+ Requirementsmodified

…otected in terms of integrity, authenticity and confidentiality. Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected SMDP11 through encryption. … Req no. Description On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile SMDP12 creation and storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure deletion procedures (l … o the connecting party) After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound Profile Package to the LPA, the transport encryption procedure SHALL … SMDP16 be renewed. SMDP16 If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more than a configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction Req no. Description SHALL be terminated and the Mobile Service Provider and the supporting Operator SHALL be notified. The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols S … ing them that a specific Bound Profile Package download is SMDP25 starting. Such notifications MAY be forwarded by the Operator to the Mobile Service Provider. … Req no. Description The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an Eligibility Check Information report and other relevant information (e.g. Activation Code, ICCID, etc.) SMDP26 to the Mobile Service Provider and the supporting Operator ahead of/prior to the eUICC Bound Profile Package download. Before a Profile download, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to check SMDP26a whether the eUICC has enough memory to install the Profile. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to perform Event Registrations to the SM- SMDP27 DS that is requested by the Operator. It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to indicate to the Operator lists of Root SM-DSs and AlternateAlternative SM-DSs to which the SM-DP+ can perform SMDP27a the (cascade)(possibly cascaded) Event Registration associated with an SMDP27a RSP operation. Note: This could be part of the static configuration between the SM-DP+ and the Operator. It SHALL be possible for the Operator to determine and indicate to the SM-DP+SM-DP+, liststhe ofSMDP27b Root SM-DSsSM-DS andto Alternatewhich SM-DSsthe toSM-DP+ whichperforms the SM-(possibly SMDP27bcascaded) DP+Event hasRegistration associated with an RSP operation. It SHALL be possible for the Operator to performindicate to the (cascade)SM-DP+ that an SMDP27c Event Registration associatedbe withcascaded anand RSPindicate operation.the Alternative SM-DS to be used. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to request an Alternative SM-DS not to SMDP28 propagatecascade an Event Registration to a specific Root SM-DS. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Profile delete Notification to the SMDP29 Mobile Service Provider and the supporting Operator owning a Profile when a related delete Notification is received from the eUICC. Req no. Description The SM-DP+ SHALL support the following states for a Profile Package, triggered by the Profile Owner: SMDP30 A Profile Package is not released for Profile Packag … a Field-Test eUICC from a SMDP38 Certified eUICC through eUICC Eligibility Check Information. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to be instructed by the Profile Owner to … SMDP39 reject an RSP operation to Field-Test eUICCs. SMDP39Req no. Description Note: The mechanism is out of the scope of this document and it is left to implementation. The SM-DP+ SHALL NOT perform an RSP operation to a Field-Test SMDP40 … n are implementation-dependent. In the Event Registration, the SM-DP+ SHALL indicate to the SM-DS SMDP47 the RSP operation type (i.e., Profile download or RPM). … Req no. Description In the Event Registration, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to provide to the SM-DS information that can be used by the LPA to identify the target SMDP48 Profile(s) up… …

4.11.3 LPA Requirementsmodified

…HALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Operational LPA12 Profiles on the eUICC and relevant associated information through the Profile Metadata. … Req no. Description The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’ SHOULD be supported. When supported, this operation SHALL allow the End User to edit a def … ndor-specific methods to distinguish Profiles on the LUI SHOULD be provided by the LPA. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile via Default SM-DP+’ … LPA16a SHALL be supported and available to the End User if a Default SM-DP+ is Req no. Description populated. This operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to the eUICC using the Default SM-DP+ address(es) configured on the LPA16a eUICC or the Device. Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced. Note: The presentation of Profile management operations to the End User on the LUI is OEM specific. … Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to the eUICC. At least … threethese mechanisms SHALL be supported by the LPA depending on the LPA17 type of Device where technically capable: Profile download from default SM-DP+ Profile download … and install a new Profile to the eUICC by contacting a Root SM-DS fetched by the LPA to retrieve LPA17b pending events. Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced. … Req no. Description The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile via Activation Code’ SHALL be supported and available to the End User. This operation SHALL allow the LPA to … LUI is OEM specific. For example, two Profile management operations could be combined within one menu item. LPA18 [Void] LPA19 [Void] LPA20 [Void] LPA21 [Void] … Req no. Description LPA22 [Void] LPA23 [Void] LPA24 [Void] LPA25 [Void] LPA26 [Void] When enforced, any Confirmation Request SHALL allow the End User to cancel LPA27 the Local Prof … t to the SM-DP+. Over such connection, ES8+ and ES9+ interfaces can be established. The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another … LPA36 Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally LPA36Req no. Description shared Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over such connection, ES8+, and ES9+ interfaces can be established. The LPA SHALL be … oid] Prior to downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHALL check the condition for whether the Enabled Profile, if any, has enabled POL RULE1. If this is the case, … LPA46 a dedicated message SHALL be displayed identifying the consequences to the End User. Examples of information that may be displayed would be: Req no. Description Enabling of the new Profile will not be possible because the currently Enabled Profile cannot be disabled. LPA46 The Profile name of the Enabled Profile. For more information, the End User should contact the Profile Owner of this Profile. With displaying this message, the … e Confirmation Requests, the single step SHALL use the Strong Confirmation Request. The Local Profile Management Operations ‘enable’ (LPA9), ‘disable’ (LPA10), … LPA51 and ‘delete’ (LPA11) SHALL be able to trigger a Notification to the Notification LPA51 Receivers of the respective Profile being managed to indicate that this Req no. Description operation was actioned. These Notifications are sent on a best effort basis and SHALL NOT impact otherwise the operation. The LPA SHALL provide a Trusted Link f … 8 Operational Profile is installed; in addition other triggers MAY be provided. Event based triggers MAY be disabled by the End User. LPA59 [Void] LPA60 [Void] … Req no. Description Error/retry handling of the LPA polling mechanism SHOULD be implemented LPA61 e.g. advise the End User to retry or automatically retry as appropriate. The corre … firmation SHALL be enforced. LPA65 [Void] LPA66 [Void] If the SM-DP+ stops the Profile download procedure, the LPA SHALL notify the LPA67 End User. LPA68 [Void] … Req no. Description As part of the process of downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHOULD offer the LPA69 choice to the End User to enable or not enable the new Profile. The LUI SHO… …

4.12.4 SM-DS functionsmodified

…ent Registration Process by which an Event Record received from an SM-DP+ is stored. Event Deletion Process by which an SM-DP+ can delete its own Event Record. … Function name Description Provides the presence of registered Event Records, upon Event Event Checking Checking request from any enquiring LDS. Provides all registered Event Records, upo… …

4.12.5 SM-DS Requirementsmodified

…rations from any authorised and authenticated SM-DP+(s) having a valid SMDS4 Certificate. any authorised and authenticated SM-DS(s) having a valid Certificate. … Req no. Description The SM-DS SHALL only accept Discovery Requests authenticated by the SMDS5 eUICC via the corresponding LDS. The SM-DS and the SM-DP+ as well as connected SM-DSs … 2 the served eUICC. The SM-DS SHALL NOT have any contact with the Profile Packages SMDS13 e.g. SHALL NOT store or process any Profile Package, or RPM commands. … Req no. Description The SM-DS SHALL provide the same data regardless of the status of SMDS14 the Device that queries it (i.e. consistent in time and in geographic location). The SM … eration requests a specific event to be returned, in which case only that Event SHALL be sent. An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an Event Record to an LDS either … SMDS22 by a Root SM-DS or via any Alternative SM-DS selected by the SM- ReqSMDS22 no. Description DP+. If an Alternative SM-DS is selected, the Event Record to the LDS SHALL come from this Alternative SM-DS. SMDS23 [Void] A Root SM-DS SHALL be managed by the … port none, one, or multiple kinds of Push Services SMDS34 available in the industry. If a Push Service is supported by the SM-DS, SMDS35 and SMDS36 SHALL apply. … Req no. Description If requested by the LDS as per LDS8, the SM-DS SHALL return the SMDS35 indication whether it accepts or rejects the request. If accepted by the SM-DS as per SM… …

4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirementsmodified

…sm used for the update of a Profile Policy Rule SHALL be POL7 atomic. POL8 The set of Profile Policy Rules SHALL be extensible for future releases. POL9 [Void] … Policy no. Description A Profile Policy Rule SHALL be enforced whenever a Profile state change is POL10 attempted. Downloading and installing a Profile in a non-MEP-capable eUICC with … Remote Profile Management RequirementsFigure 32. Note 2: The setting of Profile Policy Rules on the ES9+ interface is a potential feature for a future release. … Policy no. Description Before a Profile is installed with Profile Policy Rules, the End User SHALL be able to be notified if needed about the Profile Policy Rules and if notified, the … fication. POL19 [Void] Allowing the installation of a Profile with Profile Policy Rules SHALL be POL20 subject to compliance with local regulatory requirements. … Profile Policy Rules MAY be configured for Profiles only if the Profile Owner can be identified in the Metadata. POL21 NOTE: POLPPE requirements depend on the identification of the Profile Owner. Table 30: Profile Policy Management Requirements

4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirementsmodified

…ing the initial Device setup provided that there is no installed Operational Profile. The OEM or EUM is responsible for setting the content of the RAT. The RAT … containsMAY acontain: A set of entries that are mandatory for all eUICCs. In addition optional entries MAY be included: For Profile Policy Rules that are optional to implement (e.g. POL4), the RAT contains additional entries permitting the use of thesespecific Profile Policy Rules.Rules, The RAT may also contain Operator-specific entries that provide exceptions to the requirement to obtain AuthenticatedStrong User Confirmation prior to download and installation of a Profile that contains specific Profile Policy Rules. Policy no. Description The Rules Authorisation Table ( … rement, a RAT SHALL be able to POLPPE7 support a specific configuration which MAY forbid any Profile Owner to set a specific Profile Policy Rule. POLPPE8 [Void] … Policy no. Description Where the RAT allows the Profile Policy Rules for the Profile being POLPPE9 installed, installation SHALL proceed as stated in POL14. The RAT SHALL be able to … …

4.14.1 eUICC Certification Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description CERTEU1 The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS UP certifiedaccredited [13][13][13].[13]. The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance CERTEU2 with GSMA SGP.22 [24]. Req no. Description The eUICC SHALL be certified according to the Protection Profile CERTEU3 defined by the GSMA [25]. The EUM compliance to CERTEU1 and the eUICC product CERTEU3a … orage, isolation of Profiles, and Telecom Framework. The eUICC Protection Profile SHALL be equivalent to the eUICC CERTEU5 Protection Profile defined in SGP.05 … [21][21][21].[21] . The Evaluation Assurance Level of the eUICC Protection Profile CERTEU6 SHALL be (at least) EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 (EAL 4+) [44]. The eUICC … ey corresponding to its Certificate (CERTEU9). Any eUICC Certificate(s) modification SHALL be end-to-end protected CERTEU10a between the eUICC and issuing EUM. … Req no. Description CERTEU11 [Void] If the eUICC private key(s) are modifiable, it SHALL use the mechanism defined in the GlobalPlatform specification with a minimum CERTEU12 secur … D be certified according to CERTEU16 EMVCo Security Evaluation process [31]. Field-Test eUICCs SHALL use a certified hardware according to CERTEU17 SGP.24 [27]. … Req no. Description An eUICC certified according to SGP.24 [27] SHALL be eligible to be CERTEU18 issued with an eUICC certificate that chains up to GSMA CI. The eUICC SHALL provid… …

4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description The SM-DP+ provider SHALL be required to declare product (SM-DP+) CERTDP1 compliance with GSMA SGP.22 [24]. The SM-DP+ SHALL be certifiedaccredited according to GSMA FS.08 SAS-SM CERTDP2 Standard [22] and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology [32]. SM-DP+ elements SHALL use Hardware Security Modules (HSM) for cryptogra … SM-DP+ SHALL implement operating system hardening CERTDP5 mechanisms. The SM-DP+ SHALL implement separation of control, user and CERTDP6 administrative planes. … [Void] CERTDP7 Note: Based on CERTDP2, this is covered by SAS-SM. [Void] CERTDP8 Note:[Void] Based on CERTDP2, this is covered by SAS-SM. The private key of SM-DP+ Certificates used for mutual authentication CERTDP9 and Profile Binding with CERTDP9 eUICC SHALL be protected and stored in HSM according to CERTDP3. Req no. Description The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to mitigate CERTDP10 against Denial of Service attacks. [Void] CERTDP11 Note: Based on CERTDP2, this is covered by SAS-SM.[Void] The SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) for authentication and Profile CERTDP12 binding SHALL chain to eSIM CA(s). The SM-DP+ SHALL support at least one eSIM CA f… …

4.14.4 SM-DS Certification Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description The SM-DS provider SHALL be required to declare product compliance CERTDS1 with GSMA SGP.22 [24]. The SM-DS SHALL be certifiedaccredited according to GSMA FS.08 SAS-SM CERTDS2 Standard [22] and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology [32]. The SM-DS SHALL implement isolation of privileges (Log, Audit, CERTDS3 Operation, and Administration). The SM-DS SHALL implement operating system hardening CERTDS4 mechanisms. Req no. Description The SM-DS SHALL implement separation of control, user and CERTDS5 administrative planes. [Void] CERTDS6 Note: Based on CERTDS2, this is covered by SAS-SM. [Void] CERTDS7 Note: Based on CERTDS2, this is covered by SAS-SM.[Void] The SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) for authentication SHALL chain to CERTDS8 eSIM CA(s). The SM-DS SHALL support at least one eSIM CA for the purpose of the C… …

4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management Requirementsmodified

…L stop. The eUICC Authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key CERTPK7 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop. … Req no. Description The eSIM CA(s) SHALL revoke the Public Key Certificate of any entities CERTPK8 (SM-DP+, SM-DS, EUM) if it is compromised (e.g. private key theft). The eUICC SHA … of these applicable verifications fail, the TLS Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as invalid. The eUICC, LPA, SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL have knowledge of … CERTPK11 revoked Public Key Certificates. CERTPK11Req no. Description Note: This requirement also applies to TLS Certificates that chain to either an eSIM CA or a public trusted CA. It SHALL be possible for the Profile Owner to e… …

4.16 Enterprise Requirementsmodified

…oad of an Enterprise Profile when a ENT12 Profile with POL RULE1 set is already installed. For an Enterprise Capable Device, there SHALL be a mechanism for the … ENT13 End User to allow or disallow the installation of an Enterprise Profile with ENT13 Enterprise Rules. This mechanism SHALL only be in effect if there is no Enterprise Profile with Enterprise Rules already installed. It SHALL be possible for th… …

4.18.3.4 SM-DP+ Requirementsmodified

…-SMDP-X6, the response indicating success SHALL be able to DC-SMDP-X9 include a Mobile Service Provider Message to be displayed to the End User. With regard to … DC-SMDP-X8,DC-SMDP-X8DC-SMDP-X6, the response indicating that the old Device has to delete the Profile SHALL be able to additionally indicate whether the old Device is allowed to request the recovery of the deleted Profile, for the case where the Profile has been deleted but there is a permanent error in DC-SMDP-X10 installing the prepared DC-SMDP-X10 Profile on the new Device. NOTE: A permanent error indicates that Profile installation failed due to an error processing the prepared Profile in the eUICC exce… …

5.4.2 Remote Profile Management Requirementsmodified

…to support RPM1 the RPM requirements defined in this document. The Profile SHALL be able to include information of zero, one or several RPM2 Managing SM-DP+(s) … (META19)(META19META18) that are authorised to perform RPM operations on the Profile. Only the Profile Owner, or another Profile Owner explicitly pre-authorised, RPM3 SHALL be able to… …

B.1.4.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Mobile Service Providermodified

Figure 46: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Mobile Service Provider Procedure: Steps 1-14 in Figure 46Figure 46: Activation Code with EID provided to the Mobile Service Provider 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Mobile Service Provider without knowledge o… …

J [Void]added

J Integrated eUICC Security Requirements (Normative)removed

J.1 [Void]modified was General Security Requirements

Req no. Description An Integrated TRE MAY use a Remote Memory within the Device, dedicated GS01 to the Integrated TRE, to store software and data. All Integrated eUICC software and data which are stored outside the Integrated TRE SHALL be protected by the Integrated TRE in order to ensure GS02 their confidentiality, their integrity, and software side channel protection. This includes protection against side-channel attacks such as cache-timing attacks. All Integrated TRE software and data, including context, SHALL only be GS03 stored in protected memory as requested in paragraph 36 in BSI-CC-PP- 0084 [40]. All Integrated TRE software and data stored outside an Integrated TRE GS04 SHALL be protected against replay attacks. The Integrated TRE internal instruction and data buses SHALL be isolated GS05 from the rest of the SoC. The other SoC components SHALL have no access to the Integrated TRE GS06 internal buses. The Integrated TRE SHALL be the only entity to expose TRE data outside the GS07 Integrated TRE. The Integrated TRE SHOULD have priority access to Remote Memory as GS08 defined in GS02 in cases of shared resource contention All the credentials used to protect the data stored in the Remote Memory, GS08a dedicated to the Integrated TRE as per requirements GS02 and GS03GS03, SHALL only be stored and used in the Integrated TRE. The Integrated TRE SHALL be isolated from all other SoC components such GS09 that no other SoC components can have access to assets inside the Integrated TRE. The Integrated TRE SHALL have a hardware and software protection means GS10 that controls the access to every function of the Integrated TRE (e.g. cryptographic unit). The Integrated TRE SHALL process/execute its data/software in a dedicated GS11 secure CPU contained within the Integrated TRE. The Integrated TRE SHALL be resistant against hardware and software side- GS12 channel attacks (e.g. DPA, cache-timing attacks, EMA etc.). All Integrated TRE software and data SHALL be exclusively processed within GS13 the Integrated TRE. The Integrated TRE SHALL include in its security target the following threats for software and data managed by the TRE, but stored outside the TRE: GS14 leakage probing manipulation Req no. Description The protection of software and data stored in Remote Memory as defined in GS15 GS02 SHALL be managed by the Integrated TRE using means which are independent of the Remote Memory implementation. All cryptographic processing used by the Integrated TRE SHALL be GS16 contained within the Integrated TRE. All security mechanisms within the Integrated TRE SHALL withstand state of GS17 the art attacks. If Remote Memory outside the SoC is used, the combination of Integrated GS18 TRE and Remote Memory SHALL implement mechanisms protecting access to Remote Memory. Integrated TRE implementations using Remote Memory outside the SoC GS19 SHALL implement mechanisms protecting the integrity of Remote Memory contents as defined in GS02. Table 54: General Security Requirements PP-0084 Security IC +IC Dedicated Software Device SoC Integrated TRE Secure CPU Cryptographic Processing ... ... Instruction and data buses Remote Memory Isolation/Firewall/ Protection Function Access Control Remote Memory (optional) Volatile Non-Volatile +Augmentation for Remote Memory/Isolation Figure 53: Example of Optional Remote Memory Usage Note: IC Dedicated Software including its authentication by the TRE, is covered by BSI-CC- PP-0084 [40] and is not required to be augmented by this annex.

J.2 [Void]modified was Security Certification Requirements

Req no. Description An Integrated TRE together with the RMPF SHALL be evaluated according to BSI-CC-PP-0084 [40] augmented with the requirements defined in this SC01 annex. Note: The requirements relating to Remote Memory and to RMPF are only applicable when that type of memory is used by the Integrated TRE. Evidence of Isolation (for example GS05, GS06, GS07, GS09) SHALL be SC02 assessed during evaluation. Evidence of proper Life Cycle management of the Integrated TRE SHALL be SC03 assessed during evaluation. Table 55: Security Certification Requirements

J.3 [Void]modified was Conformance Claims

Req no. Description CC01 The Integrated TRE SHALL claim in its security target, that it comprises of Security IC and IC Dedicated Software regarded as a Security Integrated Circuit which implements all functional aspects specified by the BSI-CC-PP- 0084 [40] Protection Profile augmented with the requirements defined in this Annex. CC02 The Integrated TRE SHALL provide resistance to attackers with “high” attack potential as defined by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 in [44]. CC03 The Integrated TRE SHALL be evaluated against the requirements, methods of attacks and evaluation documents for smartcards and similar devices published by SOG-IS [46]. Table 56: Conformance Claims

J.4 [Void]modified was Security Objectives

BSI-CC-PP-0084 [40] defines security problems related to the Security IC being evaluated and corresponding security objectives. Within BSI-CC-PP-0084 [40], the definitions do not take into account the implementation of the TRE within a SoC and the use of Remote Memory. In particular, Integrated TRE has to include additional security problems and objectives in its security target. The security target shall include the following in its security objectives: Req no. Description The Integrated TRE SHALL define, in its security target, a security objective to protect software and data managed by the TRE and stored outside the SO01 TRE against: leakage probing Req no. Description manipulation Table 57: Security Objectives

J.5 [Void]modified was Security Functional Requirements

Req no. Description An Integrated TRE that uses Remote Memory SHALL implement a Remote IESFR01 Memory Protection Function (RMPF) to protect software and data to be stored in Remote Memory, outside the TRE. IESFR02 The RMPF SHALL reside in the Integrated TRE. The RMPF SHALL ensure the following security properties: (1) confidentiality (2) integrity and (3) replay-protection. Note: these properties are intended to cover a range of possible attacks, IESFR03 including replay of commands on the Remote Memory, rollback of data stored in the Remote Memory, cloning the content of a Remote Memory from another device, swapping or corrupting data within the Remote Memory, etc. The RMPF SHALL use keys that are either: IESFR04 derived from a secret TRE-unique seed(s), or; randomly generated within the Integrated TRE TRE-unique seed(s) used by RMPF SHALL be generated using a certified IESFR05 random number generator as required by BSI-CC-PP-0084 [40]. TRE-unique seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be generated inside the IESFR06 TRE. The entropy of the TRE-unique seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be at IESFR07 least 256 bits. IESFR08 Randomly generated keys used by the RMPF shall be at least 256 bits. The key derivation mechanism used by the RMPF SHALL be compliant with NIST SP 800-108 [41][41] and SHALL use: a block cipher with security strength equivalent to or greater than IESFR09 AES-256, or a hash function with security strength equivalent to or greater than SHA-256, IESFR10 The keys used by the RMPF SHALL be protected by the TRE. IESFR11 Seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be restricted to the RMPF. Confidentiality Requirements The RMPF SHALL provide confidentiality based on encryption using a cipher with security strength equivalent to, or greater than AES-256 and using a IESFR12 suitable mode of operation approved by NIST in NIST SP 800-175B [45][18] or recommended by BSI in BSI TR-02102-1 [42] or recommended by ANSSI RGS v2 B1 [43]. Integrity and Authenticity The RMPF SHALL use a cryptographic integrity mechanism with security IESFR13 strength equivalent to, or greater than SHA-256. Req no. Description The RMPF SHALL provide authentication using a MAC of at least 128 bits based on a block cipher using a cipher with security strength equivalent to or greater than AES-256, or IESFR14 on a hash function with security strength equivalent to or greater than SHA-256, and using a mode of operation approved by NIST in NIST SP 800-175B [45] or recommended by BSI in BSI TR-02102-1 [42] or recommended by ANSSI RGS v2 B1 [43][43]. IESFR12 and IESFR14 MAY also be provided in combination by an IESFR15 authenticated encryption mode fulfilling both requirements. Replay protection IESFR16 The RMPF SHALL detect any replay attack on the Integrated TRE. The Integrated eUICC SHALL be resistant to replay attacks on the data IESFR17 stored in Remote Memory. The Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to verify that the data received from the Remote Memory is not unsolicited. Note: Solicited data received from the Remote Memory is data that the IESFR18 Integrated eUICC did intend to retrieve at runtime from Remote Memory and/or retrieved data that the Integrated eUICC was able to verify according to the requirements set in this Annex. The RMPF SHALL NOT process data if it is unable to detect a replay attack. Note: Such a situation may arise e.g. if the RMPF uses a counter to detect IESFR19 replay attacks and the counter expired or became unreliable for any other reason. Test Interface The Integrated eUICC Test Interface SHALL NOT affect the security IESFR20 requirements defined in this annex. The Integrated eUICC Test Interface SHALL be compatible with commonly IESFR21 used interfaces for smartcard testing. Table 58: Security Functional Requirements

J.6 [Void]modified was Identification Requirement

Req no. Description The Integrated eUICC SHALL allow the SM-DP+ to identify the type of the Integrated TRE including its component configuration (e.g. use of internal or ID01 Remote Memory, use of other optional components), its manufacturer, in addition to the RSP OS provider. Table 59: Identification Requirement

K.2.1 Use Case 1 – Using installed Profiles in Dual-SIM modemodified

…the Operational Modes as defined in GSMA TS.37 [48]) and has chosen which mobile line will be providing the active mobile data connection to the Device. Figure … 54:53: High Level Diagram of Multi-SIM Device with two Enabled Profiles

K.2.2 Use Case 2 – Activating another Profile on an existing logicalmodified

…ty configuration change. The User selects Profile #1 for disabling. The Device disables Profile #1. The Device enables Profile #3 on logical baseband A. Figure … 55:54: High Level Diagram of Multi-SIM Device with two Enabled Profiles

L Document Managementmodified

… 2 maintenance release ISAG GSMA Carmen Kwok, V2.4 03/08/21 Phase 2 maintenance release ISAG GSMA Carmen Kwok, V3.0 28/03/22 Includes Phase 3 content ISAG GSMA … DetailedCarmen DocumentKwok, HistoryV3.1 Version01/12/23 AdditionsPhase V3.03 eSIMWG1maintenance SGP.21release CR0047r1ISAG ProfileGSMA PrinciplesDetailed eSIMWG1Document SGP.21History CR0048r1Version RolesDate eUICCAdditions manufacturerV3.1 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0049r1CR3101r1 RolesClarify DeviceSM-DP+ manufacturer eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0050r1 Roles Operator and Service Provider Editorial eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0051r1 Roles Subscriber and End User eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0054r1 General Interface requirements Agreedfor partsMultiple of04/04/22 eSIMWG1Draft SGP.211 CR0055r1 Eligibility check (Part 1) eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0056r1 eUICC OS update feature eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0010r2 Integrated eUICC eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0041r1 RMPF_Conditional eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0059r1 Test Profile Requirements eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0061r1 HR icon Requirements eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0108r1 SM-DS -04/08/22 pt1Corrections eSIMWG1to SGP.21‘Error! CR0097r1Reference Javanot Cardfound’ support eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0107r3CR3103r3 DifferentAdoption Rootof SM-DSPP0117 eSIMWG1_3S SGP.2104/08/22 CR0117r1ProtectionProfile_and Rootreferencing SM-DSSGP.08 address location eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0120 EUICC40 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0135r3 Multiple SM-DS requirements eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0128r3 Device Change Overview eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0130r5 Device Change High Level Procedure Editorial - Removed yellow highlight from EUICC1 as per eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0010r2 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0131R01 - Terms and RequirementsSGP.09 forV3.1 Device Change eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0089r1CR3104R01 SM-DP+Duplication Note:of SMDP48 voided in CR, however requirement wasDEV15 not– inDraft SGP.212 V2.204/08/22 soDEV18 no04/08/22 change has been made. eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0152r1CR3105r2 DeviceInappropriate ChangePOL4 useexample cases04/08/22 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0155r1CR3107 ProfileCERTDP9 packagealignment statuswith queryFS.18 eSIMWG106/09/22 SGP.21 CR0132r05 - Requirements for Device Change request eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0133r05CR3108r1 - Requirements for Device Change response eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0137r05 - MEP-related Requirements eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0015r2 Adding Profile sizePolicy indicationEnabler inCleaning ProfileV3.1 metadataDraft eSIMWG13 SGP.21 CR0148r3 Get current size of installed profile eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR00162CR3109r1 AlignEdit META11aDIE1 withand SGP.22DIE2, V3.0 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0136r5 MEP Use Cases eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0166r1 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC requirements - GREEN eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0168 NFC requirements - GREEN eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0170 AC requirements - GREEN eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0171r1 Editorial CR pt 1 - GREEN eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0172r1 Editorial CR pt 2 - GREEN eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0159r4 Requirements for Device Change response pt 2 Withdrawn CR0087r2 LPAe pt1 – Voided DEV8 Withdrawn CR0104 SMDS2 Requirement – Voided SMDS2 Withdrawn CR0018r1 Allow extensibility and innovationfix pt2number – Voided ESeu1, LPA1. LPA45 voided in Draftref 1306/09/22 (missed[57] this).V3.1 eSIMWG105/10/22 SGP.21 CR0181 Certification Requirements - GREEN eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0092R01CR3110R0 SetNote NicknameRemoval eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0145 Cleanup of SM-DS wording eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0126R01 Operator vs SP cleanup in diagramsCERTDP eSIMWG1and SGP.21CERTDS CR0156r5Draft ES124 EnhancementsV3.1 eSIMWG130/11/22 SGP.21 CR0063R06 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0072r2CR3111R02 AAC eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0077r7 RPM part 1 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0174r2 LPAe pt 2 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0190r2 Editorial change of GS02 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0197r1 Default SM-DP+ Address Updated Figure eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0139 Remote Primary Device eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0140r2 Internet Proxy at Remote Primary Device eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0074r4 Enterprise eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0065r1 Explain IESFR19 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0083r7 Device Requirements eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0093r2 LPA15 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0090r4 Editorial pt 2 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0080r2 Policy Rules eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0201 Align v3CI tointerfaces v2.3with onSGP.22 ieUICCDraft eSIMWG15 SGP.21 CR0200 LPA61 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0195r2CR3114R02 RPM - Implicit disabling eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0196r2 RPM - LUI requirements eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0209r1 Editorial clean-upmodifications PPR4 references eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0138R03 - MEP Requirements - PPR1 handling eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0016r6 Clarify Profile Metadata extensibility eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0198r2 Requirements on Profile recovery for Device Change eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0194r3 Authorisation of RPMsome operationsV3.1 eSIMWG103/01/23 SGP.21 CR0202r2 Device Change for multiple Profiles - use case eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0203r3 Device Change for multiple Profiles - requirements eSIMWG1related SGP.21 CR0158r4 eUICC OS Update interface Use Cases eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0225r1 Enterprise MEP Requirement eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0226r1 Device Change clarification eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0134r5 Routing Discovery event to correctSAS DSDraft endpoint6 eSIMWG103/01/23 SGP.21 CR0176r9 Requirements for enhanced Discovery Service eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0229r1CR3115R00 Added abbreviations eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0219r3 Align EUICC55CI withinterfaces SGP.22 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0237r00 - Device Change procedure figure update eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0221r4 Device Information Code eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0079r4 Certification Requirements eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0241r1 eUICC Testing Requirements eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0238 Multiple Enabled Profiles for Removable eUICC is FFS eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0240 Changes from v2.3 CRs eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0084r4 Activation Code eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0182r2 Certification Requirements pt2 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0220r5 Certification Requirements eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0246 Enterprise Principles eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0039R01 Rename SP to MSP (Includes minor fixes to Figures in 4.12.2.1,4.11.2 4.12.2.2 and 4.17.1 – MSP added between End User and Operator) eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0075r3CR3119R01 eUICC Requirements eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0260 eUICC Requirement - EUICC47 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0253r1 Comments on Basic Principles eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0210r2 eUICC Memory Reset - part 2 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0082r2 APDU API eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0081r5 LPA Proxy eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0235 Alignment of Strong Confirmation definition with SGP.21 v2.3 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0261 Fix Profile Metadata extensibility eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0071r7 NFC eUICC def eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0164r11 eUICC OS Update Interface description eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0146r2 Revisit of PK certificates definitions eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0257r1 Comments on Added abbreviations eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0266r1 eUICC OS Update Figure 3 update eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0267 Removal of AAC from SGP.21 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0085r5 eUICC Memory Reset eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0234r5 Requirements for LocalSM-DP+ Device Change eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0091r1 Primary and Companion Device Feature – Ignored LPA72 in thismemory CR21/02/23 asV3.1 itcomparison nobefore longerprofile existsdownload inDraft this7 draft.21/02/23 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0232r2CR3116R03 CommentsClarify onthe RPM eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0228r8 Comments on Certificate Issuer role eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0153R05 Discrete eUICC definition eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0263r2 Comments on APDU Access API eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0272 Editor’s note resolution on Device Change reqs in Section 4.18.3 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0273 Editor’s note resolution on Device Change use cases in Annex K eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0279r1 Alternative - Optional support of theSM-DS Device21/02/23 ChangeEditorial: requirementsRepeated eSIMWG1reference SGP.21corrections CR0276r1V3.1 Remove02/10/23 editor’s note from DEV17 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0204CR3127R01 EditorialPPR Clean-up - Removing ReM references eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0239r1 Additional Enterprise MEP requirement eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0259r2 Comments on Referencesnon-IMSI eSIMWG1profiles SGP.21Draft CR0258r38 CommentsV3.1 on04/10/23 AddedUpdated termsGSMA eSIMWG1PRD SGP.21cover CR0192r2sheet ES12Draft Enhancements – SMDPX5 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0121r2 ESapp Inclusion eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0280r1 Definitions clean up eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0281r1 Remove TBD in SMDP27c eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0122r11 eUICC Interoperable Running Environment eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0283 Profile state persistency requirements eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0183r1 ELG25 eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0275r7 RPM with SEP and MEP - simplified alternative eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0264r4 Comments on LPA API Access Control eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0073r6 End User Intent eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR0287 Fix ed note in ENT49 Other Information Type Description Document Owner Carmen Kwok Editor / Company Carmen Kwok, GSMA It is our intention to provide a quality product for your use.… …

Contents
  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 1.1 Overview
  3. 1.2 Scope
  4. 1.3 Intended Audience
  5. 1.4 Definition of Terms
  6. 1.5 Abbreviations
  7. 1.6 References
  8. 1.7 Conventions
  9. 2 Principles
  10. 2.1 Basic Principles
  11. 2.2 Profile Requirements
  12. 3 Roles
  13. 3.1 eUICC Manufacturer
  14. 3.2 [Void]
  15. 3.3 Operator and Mobile Service Provider
  16. 3.4 [Void]
  17. 3.5 Certificate Issuer
  18. 4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture
  19. 4.1 eUICC Architecture
  20. 4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
  21. 4.2 Interfaces
  22. 4.2.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
  23. 4.2.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)
  24. 4.2.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
  25. 4.2.5 SM-DP+ – LPD (ES9+)
  26. 4.2.6 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
  27. 4.2.7 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)
  28. 4.2.8 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)
  29. 4.2.9 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)
  30. 4.2.10 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)
  31. 4.2.11 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)
  32. 4.2.12 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)
  33. 4.2.13 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)
  34. 4.2.14 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)
  35. 4.2.15 General Interface Requirements
  36. 4.2.16 (D)PCMP – LPR (ES20)
  37. 4.2.17 LUI in the eUICC – UIMe (ES25)
  38. 4.2.18 Device Application – LPR (ES21)
  39. 4.2.19 Device Application – LPA (ES22)
  40. 4.2.20 LPR – eUICC (ESaa)
  41. 4.2.21 eUICC – eUICC OS Manager (ESosup)
  42. 4.2.22 OEM – eUICC OS Manager (ESoem)
  43. 4.2.23 Device Application – Operator (ESapp)
  44. 4.2.24 CI – SM-DP+/SM-DS/EUM (Esci)
  45. 4.3 eUICC Requirements
  46. 4.4 Eligibility Check
  47. 4.4.1 Eligibility Check Requirements
  48. 4.5 Device Requirements
  49. 4.5.1 Device Capability Requirements
  50. 4.5.2 Devices with Integrated eUICC
  51. 4.5.3 Device Information Code Requirements
  52. 4.6 Device Initialisation
  53. 4.6.1 Device Reset Requirements
  54. 4.6.2 eUICC Memory Reset Requirements
  55. 4.6.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements
  56. 4.7 Profile Requirements
  57. 4.7.1 Test Profile Requirements
  58. 4.8 Profile Metadata Requirements
  59. 4.9 NFC Requirements
  60. 4.10 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+)
  61. 4.10.1 SM-DP+ Overview
  62. 4.10.2 SM-DP+ Requirements
  63. 4.10.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements
  64. 4.11 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)
  65. 4.11.1 LPA Overview
  66. 4.11.2 Operational LPA Modes
  67. 4.11.3 LPA Requirements
  68. 4.11.4 LDS Requirements
  69. 4.11.5 LPA API Requirements
  70. 4.11.6 APDU Access API Requirements
  71. 4.12 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)
  72. 4.12.1 SM-DS Overview
  73. 4.12.2 SM-DS Implementation
  74. 4.12.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelines
  75. 4.12.4 SM-DS functions
  76. 4.12.5 SM-DS Requirements
  77. 4.12.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedure
  78. 4.12.7 Discovery Request Procedure
  79. 4.13 Profile Policy Management
  80. 4.13.1 Introduction
  81. 4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirements
  82. 4.13.3 Policy Rules
  83. 4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirements
  84. 4.14 Certification
  85. 4.14.1 eUICC Certification Requirements
  86. 4.14.2 Device Compliance Requirement
  87. 4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification Requirements
  88. 4.14.4 SM-DS Certification Requirements
  89. 4.14.5 LPA Certification Requirements
  90. 4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management Requirements
  91. 4.15 eUICC OS Update
  92. 4.15.1 eUICC OS Update Information
  93. 4.16 Enterprise Requirements
  94. 4.17 LPA PRoxy
  95. 4.17.1 LPA PRoxy Overview
  96. 4.17.2 LPR Procedures
  97. 4.17.3 LPA PRoxy Requirements
  98. 4.18 Device Change Support
  99. 4.18.1 Overview
  100. 4.18.2 Device Change Procedure
  101. 4.18.3 Device Change Support Requirements
  102. 5 Operational Procedures
  103. 5.1 LPA Initiated Download
  104. 5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirements
  105. 5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedure
  106. 5.2 Profile Download with Activation Code
  107. 5.2.1 Activation Code Requirements
  108. 5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure
  109. 5.3 Local Profile Management
  110. 5.3.1 Local Profile Management Procedures
  111. 5.4 Remote Profile Management
  112. 5.4.1 Overview on RPM commands retrieval
  113. 5.4.2 Remote Profile Management Requirements
  114. 5.4.3 Remote Profile Management Procedures (Informative)
  115. A [Void]
  116. B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)
  117. B.1 Profile Production Procedure
  118. B.1.1 Profile Description Definition
  119. B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generation
  120. B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generation
  121. B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile
  122. B.2 Profile preparation with dynamic interaction between the SM-DP+ and the Operator
  123. C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)
  124. D [Void]
  125. E LPA Settings (Informative)
  126. F Certifications Chain and Security Model (Normative)
  127. G LPA Integrity (Normative)
  128. H [Void]
  129. I [Void]
  130. J [Void]
  131. J.1 [Void]
  132. J.2 [Void]
  133. J.3 [Void]
  134. J.4 [Void]
  135. J.5 [Void]
  136. J.6 [Void]
  137. K Use Cases (Informative)
  138. K.1 Device Change Support
  139. K.1.1 Use Case 1 – Device Change normal case
  140. K.1.2 Use Case 2 – Device Change normal case multiple Profiles
  141. K.2 Multiple Enabled Profiles
  142. K.2.1 Use Case 1 – Using installed Profiles in Dual-SIM mode
  143. K.2.2 Use Case 2 – Activating another Profile on an existing logical
  144. K.3 eUICC OS Update Interface
  145. K.4 Multiple Root Discovery Services
  146. K.4.1 Use Case 1 – Resolving the Discovery Server address followed by
  147. K.5 Enhanced SM-DS function SM-DS Event detection
  148. K.5.1 Use Case 1 – Immediate process of Event with Push Service
  149. K.5.2 Use Case 2 – Reducing unnecessary Event Retrieval transactions by
  150. L Document Management
   RSP Architecture
                SGP.21 V3.1
1st December 2023

Security Classification: Non-Confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other than those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association.

Copyright Notice Copyright © 2023 GSM Association

Disclaimer The GSMA makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document. The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.

Compliance Notice The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSMA Antitrust Compliance Policy.

This Permanent Reference Document is classified by GSMA as an Industry Specification, as such it has been developed and is maintained by GSMA in accordance with the provisions set out GSMA AA.35 - Procedures for Industry Specifications.

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This document provides an architecture approach as a proposed solution for the Remote SIM Provisioning of eSIM Devices across all markets.

This version focuses on eSIM Devices for the consumer market.

1.2 Scope

The aim of this document is to define a common architecture framework to enable the Remote SIM Provisioning and management of the Embedded UICC (eUICC) in Devices. The aim of this architecture framework is to provide the basis for ensuring global interoperability for Remote SIM Provisioning between Operators in different deployment scenarios.

1.3 Intended Audience

Technical experts working within Operators, SIM solution providers, Device vendors, standards organisations, network infrastructure vendors, Mobile Service Providers and other industry bodies.

1.4 Definition of Terms

Term                          Description
                              Information stored on the eUICC that defines whether applications
                              on the Device are denied or allowed access to applications on the
Access Rules
                              eUICC as specified by Global Platform Secure Element Access
                              Control [15].
                              Information issued by a Mobile Service Provider to a Subscriber or
Activation Code               an End User. It is used by the End User to request the download
                              and installation of a Profile.
                              The part of the Activation Code information provided by the Mobile
Activation Code Token
                              Service Provider which refers to a Subscription.
                              SM-DS used in cascade mode with a Root SM-DS to redirect Event
                              Registration from an SM-DP+ to that Root SM-DS or used directly
Alternative SM-DS
                              to perform Event Registration from an SM-DP+ for an installed
                              Profile.
                              A privileged assignment as defined in GlobalPlatform Card
Authorised Management
                              Specification [9].
                              A Protected Profile Package which has been cryptographically
Bound Profile Package
                              linked to a particular eUICC.
Certificate or Public Key
                              A certificate as defined in RFC.5280 [1][1][1].
Certificate
                              An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM
                              Provisioning and certified according to the GSMA compliance
Certified eUICC               programme defined in SGP.24 [27].
                              Note: Unless stated otherwise, the word eUICC in this specification
                              refers to a Certifed eUICC.
Term                            Description
                                A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for the
Companion Device
                                purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.
                                A code entered by an End User required by the SM-DP+ to validate
Confirmation Code
                                the request to download a Profile.
Confirmation Code Required      A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is required
Flag                            or not.
                                Refers to the hierarchy of User Intent and Confirmation Request,
                                where:
                                  • User Intent is the first and lowest level
Confirmation Level
                                  • Simple Confirmation is the second level
                                  • Strong Confirmation is the third and highest level
                                Note: For examples of implementation, please refer to Annex C.
                                Describes a request for Strong Confirmation or a Simple
Confirmation Request
                                Confirmation as defined in this specification.
                                A privileged assignment as defined in GlobalPlatform Card
Delegated Management
                                Specification [9].
                                Identifier of a third party platform used to delegate the management
Delegated Platform Identifier
                                of a Profile.
Delegated Profile Content       Platform delegated by the Profile Owner and used for the same
Management Platform             purpose as the Profile Content Management Platform: to manage
(DPCMP)                         the contents of an installed Profile.
                                User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a
Device
                                mobile network. E.g. a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset.
Device Application              An application installed in a Device.
                                Given that one or more Profiles related to their respective
                                Subscriptions are installed in an old Device, the process for
Device Change
                                installing one or more Profiles related to the same Subscriptions to
                                a new Device.
Device Change
                                Set of rules that apply to a Profile to support Device Change.
Configuration
                                A set of Device-related information used for Remote SIM
Device Information Code         Provisioning operations (e.g. for Profile preparation between the
                                SM-DP+ and the Operator).
                                An entity responsible for manufacturing Devices. The Device
Device Manufacturer             Manufacturer MAY be responsible for the selection and insertion of
                                eUICCs in Devices.
                                A mode hidden from the End User that allows access to and use of
Device Test Mode
                                Test Profiles.
                                A Profile in a state where all files and applications (e.g. NAA)
Disabled Profile
                                present in the Profile are not selectable.
                                An interrogation of the Discovery Service by a Device for Event
Discovery Request
                                Records that are registered for its eUICC.
                                An eUICC implemented on discrete standalone hardware, including
Discrete eUICC
                                its own dedicated volatile and non-volatile memory.
Term                            Description
                                Procedure operated between the eUICC and the SM-DP+ to enable
                                the SM-DP+ and the Operator or Mobile Service Provider to
Eligibility Check
                                validate the eligibility of an eUICC and the Device for the
                                installation of a Profile using information sent by the eUICC.
                                The information set sent from the eUICC to the SM-DP+ to allow
Eligibility Check Information
                                eligibility checking of the combination of an eUICC and a Device.
                                A Profile in a state where all files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) are
Enabled Profile
                                selectable.
End User                        The person using the Device.
                                Information that pertains to the identity of an End User e.g.
End User Data                   personal details, name, address, biometric characteristics,
                                assigned identification numbers, etc.
                                A business, organisation, or government entity that subscribes to
                                mobile services to be utilised by its workforce in support of the
Enterprise                      business or activities of the Enterprise. The Enterprise, as the
                                Subscriber, owns the relationship with the Mobile Service
                                Provider(s).
                                A Device that supports the installation and enforcement of
Enterprise Capable Device
                                Enterprise Rules.
                                An Operational Profile for which the Subscriber is an Enterprise.
Enterprise Profile
                                This Profile may include restrictions on the End User of the Device.
                                A rule stored in an Enterprise Profile that can be used by the Profile
Enterprise Rule                 Owner to restrict End User controllability for enabling and installing
                                Profiles on Enterprise Capable Devices.
                                eSIM is the top level generic descriptor applied to the Devices and
eSIM
                                eUICCs that support Remote SIM Provisioning.
eSIM CA                         A GSMA Certificate Issuer or an Independent eSIM CA.
eSIM Products                   eUICC, Devices, and Servers defined in this specification.
                                A UICC which enables the remote and/or local management of
eUICC                           Profiles in a secure way.
                                Note: The term originates from “embedded UICC”.
                                Mechanism used by the SM-DP+ or SM-DS to authenticate the
eUICC Authentication
                                eUICC.
                                A Certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC.
eUICC Certificate
                                This Certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate.
eUICC Eligibility Check         The information set sent from the eUICC to the SM-DP+ to allow
Information                     eligibility checks.
                                Defines the eUICC Type which is either removable or non-
eUICC Form Factor Type
                                removable.
eUICC Manufacturer (EUM)        The eUICC Manufacturer provides eUICC products.
                                An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a factory
eUICC Memory Reset
                                state.
                                A mechanism to correct existing features on the eUICC by the
eUICC OS Update
                                original OS manufacturer.
Term                          Description
                              The eUICC OS Manager is a Device component that consolidates
eUICC OS Manager
                              the functions dealing with the eUICC OS Update.
eUICC Test Memory Reset       An action that deletes all post-issuance Test Profiles on an eUICC.
                              A Certificate chaining to an eSIM CA, of a GSMA accredited EUM
EUM Certificate
                              which can be used to verify eUICC Certificates.
EUM Keyset                    Keyset used by the EUM to update ECASD content.
                              Public key included in the EUM Certificate (called PK.EUM.ECDSA
EUM Public Key
                              in SGP.22 [24]).
                              Key used by the EUM to sign eUICC Certificates (called
EUM Private Key
                              SK.EUM.ECDSA in SGP.22 [24]).
                              A request for a Profile download or an RPM operation which is set
Event                         by an SM-DP+ on behalf of a Mobile Service Provider or an
                              Operator, to be processed by a specific eUICC.
                              A process for the LDS to query the SM-DS to determine the
Event Checking
                              presence of Event Records registered for an eUICC.
                              Unique identifier of an Event for a specific EID generated by the
Event-ID
                              SM-DP+/SM-DS.
                              The set of information stored on the SM-DS for a specific Event, via
                              the Event Registration procedure. This information consists of
Event Record                  either:
                                • the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DP+ address or
                                • the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DS address
                              A process notifying the SM-DS on the availability of information on
Event Registration
                              either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC.
                              A process for the LDS to retrieve Event Records for an eUICC from
Event Retrieval
                              an SM-DS.
                              A pre-production eUICC whose functional or security certifications
Field-Test eUICC
                              are not yet completed by the EUM.
Form Factor                   Physical manifestation of the UICC.
GSMA Certificate Issuer       A Certificate Authority accredited by GSMA.
                              Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU-
ICCID
                              T E.118 [14].
                              A non-GSMA CI that issues digital public key Certificates for a
Independent eSIM CA           specific region, company or group of companies for eSIM
                              purposes.
Integrated eUICC              An eUICC implemented on an Integrated TRE.
Integrated eUICC Test
                              An external interface for the purpose of testing eUICC functionality.
Interface
                              A TRE implemented inside a System-on-Chip (SoC), optionally
Integrated TRE
                              making use of remote volatile and/or non-volatile memory.
International Mobile          Unique identifier owned and issued by Operators as defined in
Subscriber Identity           3GPP TS 23.003 [3] Section 2.2.
Term                            Description
                                An application that can be downloaded, installed, executed and
                                removed on any eUICC compliant with technical requirements of a
Interoperable Application       runtime environment (resources, APIs, version, ...), regardless of its
                                Form Factor, its Manufacturer, Device type, Device Manufacturer,
                                Operator, and Mobile Service Provider.
                                A Security Domain on the UICC as defined by GlobalPlatform Card
Issuer Security Domain
                                Specification [9].
                                The process that associates a Protected Profile Package with a
                                specific eUICC so that a Profile Download including Bound Profile
                                Package generation can be triggered.
Link Profile
                                Note: This is normally an offline process, binding is an online
                                process happening during the communication between the SM-
                                DP+ and the eUICC.
                                A functional element in the Device or in the eUICC that provides
Local Profile Assistant (LPA)
                                the LPD, LDS and LUI features.
                                Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated
Local Profile Management
                                on the ESeu interface.
                                Local Profile Management Operations are enable Profile, disable
Local Profile Management        Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory
Operation                       Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, set/edit nickname, add Profile,
                                and edit default SM-DP+ address.
                                In case of MEP: logical connection between an endpoint in the
Logical Interface
                                Device and an Enabled Profile or another logical secure element.
                                Assurance that the LPA has not been compromised or affected.
                                The assurance SHALL be provided to the various Remote SIM
LPA Integrity                   Provisioning entities to ensure that the LPA can be trusted to
                                execute the actions requested
                                Note: This could be linked with a certification process.
                                Defines the operational LPA Mode which is either LPA in the
LPA Mode
                                eUICC or in the Device.
                                A component of the Device used as a proxy between an Operator
LPA Proxy                       authorised platform and the corresponding Profile to manage the
                                Profile’s content.
                                An SM-DP+ that is authorised by the Profile Owner to perform RPM
Managing SM-DP+
                                on the Profile to the eUICC on which their Profile resides.
                                Reference data for an RSP Server which could be an Activation
MatchingId
                                Code Token or the EventID.
                                A Device where more than one enabled Profile can be used on the
MEP-capable Device
                                same eUICC.
                                An entity providing access capability and communication services
Mobile Network Operator
                                to Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure.
                                The Mobile Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers
                                either as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale
Mobile Service Provider
                                agreement with an Operator. The Mobile Service Provider could
                                also be the Operator.
Term                          Description
                              An entity providing access capability and communication services
Mobile Virtual Network        to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure but does
Operator                      not have an allocation of spectrum. This refers to an MVNO with
                              own IMSI range and core network.
                              Application residing in a Profile providing authorisation to access a
Network Access Application
                              network.
                              Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [4] network. This
Network Access Credentials
                              MAY include data such as Ki/K and IMSI stored within a NAA.
NFC Device                    A Device compliant with GSMA TS.26 [17].
                              An eUICC supporting the contactless functionalities defined in
NFC eUICC
                              SGP.03 [20].
NFC Profile                   A Profile containing contactless applications.
Non-Enterprise Capable        A Device that does not support the enforcement of Enterprise
Device                        Rules.
                              An arbitrary random number generated for one time use, employed
Nonce
                              for cryptographic communication.
                              A report about a Profile download or Remote/Local Profile
Notification                  Management Operation processed by the eUICC or about the
                              progress of such an operation.
                              A list defined in the Profile containing SM-DP+s that are to receive
Notification Receivers
                              Notifications concerning that Profile.
                              A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an
                              eUICC for the purpose of providing services by a Mobile Service
                              Provider. The Profile SHALL be in support of a Subscription with
Operational Profile
                              the relevant Mobile Service Provider and allow connectivity to a
                              mobile network. Applications MAY be included to provide non-
                              telecommunication services.
                              A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a
Operator                      company providing wireless cellular network services. An Operator
                              owns one or more IMSI ranges.
                              A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network
Operator Credentials          Access Credentials, OTA Keys for Remote File/Application
                              management, and authentication algorithm parameters.
                              The credentials included in the Profile used in conjunction with OTA
OTA Keys
                              Platforms.
                              A platform for remote management of UICCs and the content of
OTA Platform
                              enabled Profiles on the eUICCs.
Policy Enforcement            A function that executes Policy Rules to implement a policy.
                              Defines the atomic action of a policy and the conditions under
Policy Rule
                              which it is executed.
                              Address configured in a Profile indicating where the Device needs
Polling Address
                              to connect to retrieve RPM Events for this Profile.
                              A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a
Primary Device
                              Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.
Term                          Description
                              A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an
Profile
                              eUICC for the purpose of providing services.
Profile Content Management    Platform owned by the Profile Owner, used to manage the content
Platform (PCMP)               of an enabled Profile.
                              The description of a Profile in a format specific to the Mobile
Profile Description           Service Provider or Operator; example formats could be an Excel
                              table, xml format, or plain text.
                              A combination of local and remote management operations (enable
Profile Management            Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, list Profile information, and
                              query Profile Metadata)
Profile Management            Encompasses all the procedures applied during the lifetime of a
Lifecycle                     Profile.
Profile Management            An operation related to the content and state update of a Profile in
Operation                     a dedicated ISD-P on the eUICC.
                              Information pertaining to a Profile used for the purpose of Local
Profile Metadata
                              Profile Management and Remote Profile Management.
                              The entity that controls the operations that can be performed upon
Profile Owner                 its Profile. With the exception of Test Profile, this is always a Mobile
                              Service Provider or an Operator.
                              A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format
Profile Package               that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile as
                              defined by Trusted Connectivity Alliance [5].
                              The functional element within the Profile Policy Management
Profile Policy Enabler
                              system that interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules.
                              A policy control system that allows the Mobile Service Provider to
Profile Policy Management     implement, manage and enforce its subscription terms and
                              conditions associated with the installed Profile.
                              Defines a qualification for or enforcement of an action to be
Profile Policy Rule
                              performed on a Profile when a certain condition occurs.
                              A Profile Package which has been cryptographically protected for
Protected Profile Package
                              storage but not linked to a particular eUICC.
                              Defines an implementation-independent set of security
                              requirements and objectives for a category of products or systems
                              which meet similar consumers’ needs for IT security. A Protection
Protection Profile
                              Profile is intended to be reusable and to define requirements which
                              are known to be useful and effective in meeting the identified
                              objectives.
                              A service which is provided by a combination of a push server and
Push Service                  a push client on the Device, to send a push notification from an
                              SM-DS to an LDS.
Remote Memory                 Volatile or non-volatile memory residing outside of the TRE
Remote Profile Management     Profile Management operations performed by a Managing SM-DP+
(RPM)                         at the request of the Profile Owner.
                              The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, and deleting of a
Remote SIM Provisioning
                              Profile on an eUICC.
Term                          Description
Replay Attack                 An attack based on previously used or outdated data.
                              A Certificate used to authenticate other entities within the Remote
Root Certificate
                              SIM Provisioning framework.
                              A globally identified central access point for finding Events from
Root SM-DS
                              one or more SM-DP+(s).
Security Domain               As defined in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].
                              A secure and non-interceptable mechanism by which the End User
Simple Confirmation
                              confirms their action, e.g. by selecting Yes/No, OK/Cancel.
                              A privileged assignment as defined in GlobalPlatform Card
Simple Mode
                              Specification [9].
                              A Certificate chaining to an eSIM CA of a GSMA accredited SM-
SM-DP+ Certificate
                              DP+.
                              A Certificate chaining to an eSIM CA of a GSMA accredited SM-
SM-DS Certificate
                              DS.
                              Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as
SMDPid                        part of the SM-DP+ Certificate.
                              Note: This is referred to as the smdpOid in SGP.22 [24].
                              A secure and non-interceptable mechanism to guarantee a higher
                              level of User Intent than Simple Confirmation by which the End
Strong Confirmation
                              User confirms their action, e.g., by inputting PIN or fingerprint,
                              repeating Simple Confirmation, entering Confirmation Code, etc.
                              An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a
Subscriber
                              Subscription with a Mobile Service Provider.
                              Information that pertains to the identity of a Subscriber such as
                              contract details, authentication credentials, cryptographic keys etc.
Subscriber Data
                              Note: In many instances, the Subscriber is also the End User and
                              therefore Subscriber Data is likely to include End User Data.
                              A Subscription describes the commercial relationship between the
Subscription
                              Subscriber and the Mobile Service Provider.
                              Prepares Profile Packages, secures each with a Profile protection
                              key, stores Profile protection keys in a secure manner as well as
                              the Protected Profile Packages in a Profile Package repository, and
Subscription Manager Data     links the Protected Profile Packages to specified EIDs.
Preparation+ (SM-DP+)         The SM-DP+ binds Protected Profile Packages to the respective
                              EID and securely downloads these Bound Profile Packages to the
                              LPA of the respective eUICC. The SM-DP+ is also capable of
                              performing Remote Profile Management.
Subscription Manager          This entity is responsible for providing addresses of one or more
Discovery Service (SM-DS)     SM-DP+(s) to an LDS.
                              A security module consisting of hardware and low-level software
Tamper Resistant Element      providing resistance against software and hardware attacks,
(TRE)                         capable of securely hosting operating systems together with
                              applications and their confidential and cryptographic data.
Term                          Description
                              A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an
                              eUICC to provide connectivity to test equipment for the purpose of
Test Profile
                              testing the Device and the eUICC. A test Profile is not intended to
                              store any Operator Credentials.
                              According to NIST SP 800-53r4 [18], a mechanism by which an
                              End User (through an input Device) can communicate directly with
                              the security functions of the information system with the necessary
Trusted Link                  confidence to support the system security policy. This mechanism
                              can only be activated by the End User or the security functions of
                              the information system and cannot be imitated by untrusted
                              software.
User Intent                   Describes the acquisition of the End User input.

1.5 Abbreviations

Abbreviation                  Description
AC                            Activation Code
AID                           Application Identifier
APDU                          Application Protocol Data Unit
API                           Application Programming Interface
ARA-M                         Access Rule Application - Master
ARF                           Access Rule File
AuC                           Authentication Centre
BSS                           Business Support Services
CA                            Certificate Authority
CASD                          Controlling Authority Security Domain
CAT                           Card Application Toolkit
CC                            Confirmation Code
CI                            Certificate Issuer
CREL                          Contactless Registry Event Listener
CRS                           Contactless Registry Services
DNSCurve                      Domain Name System Curve
DNSSEC                        Domain Name System Security Extensions
DPCMP                         Delegated Profile Content Management Platform
DPI                           Delegated Platform Identifier
ECASD                         eUICC Controlling Authority Security Domain
EID                           Embedded UICC Identifier
eSVN                          embedded UICC Specification Version Number
ETSI                          European Telecommunications Standards Institute
eUICC                         Embedded UICC
EUM                           eUICC Manufacturer
Abbreviation                  Description
FASG                          Fraud and Security Group
FFS                           For Further Study
FIFO                          First In First Out
GSMA                          GSM Association
GSMA CI                       GSMA Certificate Issuer
HLR                           Home Location Register
HR                            High Resolution
HTTP                          Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ICCID                         Integrated Circuit Card Identifier
IMEI                          International Mobile Equipment Identity
IMSI                          International Mobile Subscriber Identity
ISD-P                         Issuer Security Domain - Profile
ISD-R                         Issuer Security Domain - Root
ISIM                          IP Multimedia Services Identity Module
ISO                           International Standards Organisation
ITU                           International Telecommunications Union
LDS                           Local Discovery Service
LPA                           Local Profile Assistant
LPD                           Local Profile Download
LPR                           LPA PRoxy
LUI                           Local User Interface
M4M                           Mifare4Mobile
MEP                           Multiple Enabled Profiles
MNO-SD                        Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain
MSISDN                        Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number
MSP                           Mobile Service Provider
NAA                           Network Access Application
NFC                           Near Field Communication
OCR                           Optical Character Recognition
OS                            Operating System
OTA                           Over The Air
PCMP                          Profile Content Management Platform
PFS                           Perfect Forward Secrecy
PPR                           Profile Policy Rule
PPSE                          Proximity Payment System Environment
QR Code                       Quick Response Code
RAM                           Remote Application Management
RAT                           Rules Authorisation Table
Abbreviation                  Description
RFM                           Remote File Management
RMPF                          Remote Memory Protection Function
RPM                           Remote Profile Management
RSP                           Remote SIM Provisioning
SEAC                          (Global Platform) Secure Element Access Control
SAS                           Security Accreditation Scheme
SCP                           Secure Channel Protocol
SCWS                          Smart Card Web Server
SD                            Security Domain
SIM                           Subscriber Identity Module
SM-DP+                        Subscription Manager - Data Preparation +
SM-DS                         Subscription Manager - Discovery Service
SoC                           System-on-Chip
SSD                           Supplementary Secure Domain
TRE                           Tamper Resistant Element
UIMe                          User Interface Module for LPAe
URL                           Uniform Resource Locator
USIM                          Universal Subscriber Identity Module

1.6 References

Ref          Document Number            Title
                                         X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
      [1]     RFC 5280
                                         Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
                                         UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical
      [2]     ETSI TS 102 221
                                         characteristics
                                         Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+);
      [3]     3GPP TS 23.003             Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS);
                                         Numbering, addressing and identification
                                         The international identification plan for public networks
      [4]     ITU E.212
                                         and Subscriptions
                                         Trusted Connectivity Alliance: eUICC Profile Package -
      [5]     TCAPP
                                         Interoperable Format Technical Specification
                                         “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
      [6]     RFC 2119                   Levels”, S. Bradner
                                         http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
      [7]     3GPP TS 21.133             3G security; Security threats and requirements
                                         GSMA Remote Provisioning Architecture for
      [8]     SGP.02
                                         Embedded UICC Technical specification
      [9]     GPC_SPE_034                GlobalPlatform Card Specification with its Amendments
Ref          Document Number            Title
                                         Specification of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1:
   [10]       3GPP TS 35.231
                                         Algorithm Specification
                                         Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set;
   [11]       3GPP TS 35.205
                                         Document 1: General
                                         Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set;
   [12]       3GPP TS 35.206
                                         Document 2: Algorithm Specification
                                         FS.04 - Security Accreditation Scheme for UICC
   [13]       EUM SAS
                                         Production – Standard
   [14]       ITU-T E.118                The International Telecommunication Charge Card
                                         GlobalPlatform Device Technology Secure Element
   [15]       GPD_SPE_013
                                         Access Control - Version 1.1
                                         Personalisation of Mobile Equipment - Mobile
   [16]       3GPP TS 22.022
                                         functionality specification
   [17]       TS.26                      GSMA NFC Handset Requirements
                                         Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information
   [18]       NIST SP 800-53r4
                                         Systems and Organisations – Revision 4
   [19]       OMAPI                      SIMalliance Open Mobile API Specification
   [20]       SGP.03                     NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1
   [21]       SGP.05                     Embedded UICC Protection Profile
   [22]       FS.08                      FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3.1 or higher
   [23]       [Void]                     [Void]
   [24]       SGP.22                     SGP.22 RSP Technical Specification - Version 3.0
                                         SGP.25 RSP eUICC for Consumer Device Protection
   [25]       SGP.25
                                         Profile
   [26]       SGP.14                     SGP.14 GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy v1.1
   [27]       SGP.24                     RSP Compliance Process
   [28]       SCP02                      GlobalPlatform Card Specifications V2.3, Appendix E
                                         GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.2 – Amendment
   [29]       SCP03
                                         D, v1.1.1
                                         GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.2 – Amendment
   [30]       SCP11
                                         F, v1.0
   [31]       EMVCo_Sec                  EMVCo Security Evaluation Process 5.1 – June 2016
   [32]       FS.09                      FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v8.0 or higher
   [33]       3GPP TS 31.111             USIM Application Toolkit
   [34]       ETSI TS 102 223            Smart Cards; Card Application Toolkit (CAT)
                                         ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 IT Security techniques – Digital
   [35]       SM2 algorithm              signatures with appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm
                                         based mechanisms
                                         ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 IT Security techniques – Hash-
   [36]       SM3 algorithm
                                         functions – Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions
Ref          Document Number            Title
                                         ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/AMD1:2021 Information
                                         technology – Security techniques – Encryption
     [37]     SM4 algorithm
                                         algorithms – Part 3: Block ciphers – Amendment 1:
                                         SM4
              OMA-TS-
                                         OMA SpecWorks: Smartcard-Web-Server, Version
     [38]     Smartcard_Web_Server-
                                         1.2.1 – 13 Sep 2013
              V1_2_1-20130913-A
     [39]     GSMA TS.06                 IMEI Allocation and Approval Process
     [40]     [Void]                     [Void]
     [41]     [Void]                     [Void]
     [42]     [Void]                     [Void]
     [43]     [Void]                     [Void]
              JIL-Application-of-        Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
     [44]     Attack-Potential-to-       Similar Devices
              Smartcards-v3-1            Version 3.1, Jun 2020
     [45]     [Void]                     [Void]
     [46]     [Void]                     [Void]
     [47]     SGP.23                     RSP Test Specification
     [48]     TS.37                      Requirements for Multi SIM Devices
     [49]     3GPP TS 33.102             3G security; Security architecture
                                         3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security
     [50]     3GPP TS 33.401
                                         architecture
     [51]     3GPP TS 33.501             Security architecture and procedures for 5G System
                                         Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119
     [52]     RFC 8174                   Key Words
                                         https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174
                                         Information technology — Security techniques —
     [53]     ISO 15408-1:2009           Evaluation criteria for IT security – Part1: Introduction
                                         and general model
     [54]     TS.43                      GSMA PRD, Service Entitlement Configuration
                                         GlobalPlatform Device Technology Device API Access
     [55]     GPD_SPE_068
                                         Control - Version 1.0
                                         Security Evaluation of Integrated eUICC
     [56]     SGP.08
                                         based on PP-0084
                                         Security Evaluation of Integrated eUICC
     [57]     SGP.18
                                         based on PP-0117

1.7 Conventions

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [6] and clarified by RFC8174 [52], when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

“FFS” or “For Further Study” means that it will be covered in the next version of SGP.21.

2 Principles

This section contains the principles related to the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning system for the Embedded UICC.

The solution based on the requirements described within this document has to be provided in a non-discriminatory manner.

2.1 Basic Principles

All parties either implementing or operating systems based on these specifications should be aware that any data items passed between system elements that can be used to identify an individual can be classified as personal data (as defined in the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679). Responsibility for the management of Personal Data and compliance with any necessary legislation lies with implementing and operating organisations, according to each organisation’s respective legal status with respect to the data processes (i.e. whether the entity acts as a data controller or as a data processor).

Principle no.         Description
                      Existing standards and specifications SHALL be used where possible for
BAS1
                      the specification of the eUICC and related provisioning systems.
                      GlobalPlatform specifications SHALL be used as a framework of choice for
BAS2
                      the implementation of the eUICC.
                      The overall security of the eUICC in combination with the related
                      management processes SHALL at all times and under all circumstances be
BAS3
                      at least equivalent to the current removable UICC and its provisioning
                      processes.
                      The architecture of the eUICC and its Remote SIM Provisioning system
BAS4                  SHALL comply with the requirements of 3GPP TS 33.102 [49], 3GPP TS
                      33.401 [50] and 3GPP TS 33.501 [51].
                      The architecture SHALL support a level of security with respect to the
                      protection of Operator Credentials which is at least equivalent to the
                      present levels of security. This applies in particular to:
BAS5
                         • the confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication
                           parameters;
                         • the integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI).
                      The architecture SHALL support a level of security for all Profile content
BAS6                  which is at least equivalent to the current state of the art level of security of
                      the UICC.
                      The architecture SHALL NOT compromise the security and privacy of
                      Subscriber Data, nor the security and privacy of End User Data. Examples
BAS7
                      depending on territory include identities that can be used for tracking such
                      as ICCID, MSISDN, EID, IMSI, Ki etc.
                      Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of this document.
                      However, any data which could be used to identify an individual SHALL be
BAS8
                      treated as personal data and subject to local regulations e.g. the EID,
                      ICCID, IMEI, IMSI etc.
Principle no.         Description
                      The RSP Session SHALL prevent sending IMEI and EID information to a
BAS9
                      non-authenticated RSP Server.
BAS10                 The SM-DP+ acts on behalf of the Profile Owner.

Table 1: Basic Principles

2.2 Profile Requirements

Req no.              Description
PRO1                 [Void]
PRO2                 [Void]
PRO3                 A Profile SHALL be uniquely identified by its ICCID.
                     An Enabled Profile in combination with an eUICC SHALL be able to carry all
PRO4
                     logical characteristics of a UICC.
                     Once the Profile is enabled, all relevant UICC characteristics or features as
PRO5                 described in ETSI 102 221 [2] specifications SHALL apply, with the
                     exceptions as defined within this specification.
                     It SHALL be possible to delete Profiles only when in a disabled state, with
PRO6                 the exception of eUICC Memory Reset, and eUICC Test Memory Reset
                     functions.
PRO7                 [Void]
PRO8                 A Profile SHALL be either an Operational Profile or a Test Profile.

Table 2: Profile Requirements

3 Roles

3.1 eUICC Manufacturer

Role no.             Description
                     The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the initial cryptographic
EUM1
                     configuration and security architecture of the eUICC.
EUM2                 [Void]
                     Relevant parts of the eUICC Manufacturer’s products and processes are
EUM3
                     certified by a GSMA-specified certification process.
                     The EUM issues the eUICC Certificate to allow:
                        • eUICC Authentication and proof of certification to other entities;
EUM4
                        • authenticated keyset establishment between an SM-DP+ and an
                          eUICC.
EUM5                 [Void]
EUM6                 Field-Test eUICCs SHALL be tracked by the EUM.

Table 3: eUICC Manufacturer Role

3.2 [Void]

3.3 Operator and Mobile Service Provider

This section describes the characteristics of the Operator and Mobile Service Provider roles relevant to this architecture and its operation. Other characteristics exist but are considered out of scope. Note: The commercial and support system interfaces needed between the Mobile Service Provider and the supporting Operator (e.g. for Profile ordering and distribution) are out of scope.

Role no.             Description
OPE1                 The Operator has access to an SM-DP+ via the ES2+ interface.
                     In the event that a Subscriber has selected a Mobile Service Provider, that
OPE2                 Mobile Service Provider will initiate the provisioning of a Profile Package.
                     The details of this are out of scope.
                     The Operator, potentially on behalf of the Mobile Service Provider, specifies
OPE3                 the Profile characteristics and any features and applications analogous to
                     removable UICCs.
                     The Operator potentially on behalf of a Mobile Service Provider, is able to
OPE4                 use an OTA Platform via the ES6 interface to manage the content of its
                     Enabled Profile in the eUICC (RAM, RFM).

Table 4: Operator Role

3.4 [Void]

3.5 Certificate Issuer

Role no.             Description
                     A Certificate Issuer issues Certificates for Remote SIM Provisioning system
CIS1                 entities and acts as a trusted root for the purpose of authentication of the
                     entities of the system.
                     The Certificate Issuer communicates with the SM-DP+, SM-DS and the EUM
CIS2                 through the interfaces ESci that are out of scope of this specification
                     according to SGP.14 [26].

Table 5: Certificate Issuer Role

4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture

This section contains the functional description of the Remote SIM Provisioning system architecture for the Embedded UICC.

Figure 1: Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture

4.1 eUICC Architecture

4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview

This section describes the internal high-level architecture of the eUICC. The eUICC architecture is similar to that used in the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC Technical specification [8]. Profiles are provisioned based on the security framework defined in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].

                                                                          To SM-DP+
                             To SM-DP+
To Operator

To SM-DS

                                                                                            the Device
                                                                                            To LPA in
                                                         To UIMe
ES6                            ES8+                   ES25 ES11 ES9+ ES10a,b,c
eUICC
                                                                                                                                                                     Telecom
Operating                                                                                                                                                           Framework
System
                     ISD-P                                                 ISD-P                                                                           Profile Policy
                                                                                                                LPA in the
                                                                                                                                                             Enabler
                                                                                                                 eUICC
                     MNO-SD                                            MNO-SD                                                                                     Profile
                                                                                                                            LPA
                                                                                                              ISD-R       Services                               Package
                                                                                                                                                                Interpreter
File System
                       File System
Applets
                                     Applets
CASD
                                                                                        CASD
NAAs
                           NAAs
SSD
SSD
                      ECASD
Operator Disabled Profile                        Operator Enabled Profile

Figure 2: Schematic Representation of the eUICC

4.1.1.1 ECASD

The Embedded UICC Controlling Authority Security Domain (ECASD) is responsible for the secure storage of credentials needed to support the required security domains on the eUICC.

There SHALL only be one ECASD on an eUICC. The ECASD SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during the eUICC manufacturing as described in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].

The ECASD SHALL contain the following:
   •             eUICC private keys for creating signatures.
   •             Associated Certificates for eUICC Authentication.
   •             The Certificate Issuers’ (CI) root public keys for verifying SM-DP+ and SM-DS
                 Certificates.
   •             eUICC Manufacturers’ (EUMs) keyset for key/Certificate renewal.

Additionally, the ECASD SHALL provide security functions used during key establishment and eUICC Authentication.

4.1.1.2 ISD-R

The ISD-R is responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.

4.1.1.3 ISD-P

The ISD-P is a secure container (security domain) for the hosting of a Profile. The ISD-P is used for Profile download and installation in collaboration with the Profile Package interpreter for the decoding/interpretation of the received Bound Profile Package.

The ISD-P is the on-card representative of the SM-DP+.

4.1.1.4 MNO-SD

The MNO-SD is the on-card representative of the Operator which issued the Profile. It contains the Operator’s Over-The-Air (OTA) Keys and provides a secure OTA channel.

4.1.1.5 Profile Policy Enabler

The eUICC Operating System (OS) service which offers Profile Policy Rules validation and enforcement.

4.1.1.6 Telecom Framework

The telecom framework is an operating system service that provides standardised network authentication algorithms to the NAAs hosted in the ISD-Ps. Furthermore, it offers the capability to configure the algorithms with the necessary parameters.

4.1.1.7 Profile Package Interpreter

The Profile Package interpreter is an eUICC operating system service that translates the Profile Package data into an installed Profile using the specific internal format of the target eUICC.

4.1.1.8 LPA Services

The LPA services provide necessary access to the services and data required by the LPA functions for the following:

1.    The Root SM-DS address.
2.    The optionally stored default SM-DP+ address(es).
3.    Facilitates the reception of the Bound Profile Package in transfer from the LPA.
4.    Provides information regarding the installed Profiles and their Profile Metadata.
5.    Provides Local Profile Management
6.    Supports Remote Profile Management operations
7.    Provides functions for the LPA to authenticate and interact with the SM-DS.
8.    Ensures access to the EID is restricted to only the LPA.

4.2 Interfaces

Figure 3: Interfaces on the eUICC Architecture with the LPA in the Device

Configuration

4.2.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)

The ES2+ interface is used by the Operator to order Profiles for specific eUICCs as well as other administrative functions.

4.2.2   [Void]

4.2.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)

ESeu is the interface between the End User and the LUI.

The ESeu interface is used to support the following requirements:

Req no.                 Description
ESeu1                   [Void]
                        All Local Profile Management Operations of the LPA defined in Section
ESeu2                   4.11.3 SHALL be explicitly initiated or authorised by the End User or
                        Device owner.
                        The ESeu interface SHALL support the triggering and confirmation of the
ESeu3                   Profile download and installation operation and Local Profile Management
                        Operations requested by the End User.

Table 6: End User to LUI (ESeu) Interface Requirements

4.2.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)

The ES6 interface is used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services.

4.2.5 SM-DP+ – LPD (ES9+)

The ES9+ interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the LPD, and for RPM and ReM.

4.2.6 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)

The ES8+ interface provides a secure end-to-end channel between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC for the administration of the ISD-P and the associated Profile during download and installation.

4.2.7 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)

The ES12 interface allows the SM-DP+ to register Event Records with the SM-DS and to delete its Event Records.

4.2.8 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)

The ES11 interface allows the LDS to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC.

4.2.9 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)

ESeum is the interface between the EUM and the eUICC.

This interface is out of scope of this specification.

4.2.10 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)

The ES10a interface is used by the LPA in the Device to get the configured addresses from the eUICC for Root SM-DS, and optionally the default SM-DP+(s).

4.2.11 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)

The ES10b interface is used by the LPD in the Device and the LPA services to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.

4.2.12 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)

The ES10c interface is used

•between the LUI in the Device and the LPA services for Local Profile Management by the End User.

•between the LPR in the Device and the LPA services to retrieve Metadata that would be needed for Profile content management through LPA Proxy.

4.2.13 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)

In the case of deployments with cascaded SM-DSs, the ES15 interface is used to connect the SM-DSs.

4.2.14 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)

This connection will be provided either by:

•     An internet connectivity available or provided on the same Device where the LPA
      resides
      or
•     An internet connection shared from another Device via a local go-between connection

Figure 4: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to the

SM-DP+

Figure 5: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to the

SM-DP+ with a Remote Primary Device

4.2.15 General Interface Requirements

Req no.             Description
INT1                All interfaces from the eUICC SHALL indicate the eSVN.
INT2                The behaviour of all interfaces SHALL support the indicated eSVN.
                    The SM-DP+ and SM-DS SHALL use the capabilities indicated by the eUICC
INT3
                    to determine its response to the eUICC.
                    All communicating entities involved in Remote SIM Provisioning SHALL be
INT4                mutually authenticated. The Device and the eUICC are considered as one
                    entity in this context.

Table 7: General Interface Requirements

4.2.16 (D)PCMP – LPR (ES20)

The ES20 interface is used by the PCMP or DPCMP to manage Profile contents through the use of the LPA as a proxy.

4.2.17 LUI in the eUICC – UIMe (ES25)

The ES25 interface is used between the LUI in the eUICC and the UIMe to transfer End User related interaction. This interface uses one of the following options:

•The LUI uses CAT commands (e.g. CAT menu navigation) as defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [34] and the UIMe is the CAT interpreter. Besides the support of these commands, there are no additional requirements for the UIMe.

•The LUI uses SCWS as defined by OMA SpecWorks [38] and the UIMe is a browser. Besides the support of these commands, there are no additional requirements for the UIMe.

•The LUI uses a limited set of specific CAT Envelopes and the UIMe is a tailored application.

The following specific requirement applies for ES25:

Req no.          Description
                 If the LUI in the eUICC uses specific CAT Envelopes defined in SGP.22
ES25 REQ1
                 [24], then the UIMe SHALL fulfil the requirements related to the LUI.

Table 8: LUI in the eUICC – UIMe (ES25) Interface Requirements

4.2.18 Device Application – LPR (ES21)

The ES21 interface is used for exchanges between the LPR and a Device Application to trigger from the Device Application, a Profile content management session between a (D)PCMP and a Profile, or to send Notifications to the Device Application.

4.2.19 Device Application – LPA (ES22)

The ES22 interface is an LPA API used for exchanges between the LPA and a Device Application.

4.2.20 LPR – eUICC (ESaa)

The ESaa interface is used between the LPR in the Device and the Profile of the eUICC for Profile content management through the use of the LPA as a proxy.

4.2.21 eUICC – eUICC OS Manager (ESosup)

The eUICC OS Manager communicates with the eUICC through the ESosup interface. The ESosup interface delivers to the eUICC the commands to perform the eUICC OS Update. The implementation of the eUICC OS Manager and the ESosup are out of the scope of this specification

4.2.22 OEM – eUICC OS Manager (ESoem)

ESoem is the interface betweem OEM and the eUICC OS Manager. This interface can be used to receive the eUICC OS Update package(s) from the OEM and to dispatch it to the eUICC OS Manager in charge of the eUICC OS Update. The implementation of this interface is out of the scope of this specification but it has to deliver, together with the eUICC OS Update package(s), a minimum set of information.

4.2.23 Device Application – Operator (ESapp)

The ESapp interface is used for exchanges between a Device Application and the Operator. The exchanges are triggered by the Device Application.

GSMA PRD Specification TS.43 [54] is an example for the protocol to use on the ESapp interface.

4.2.24 CI – SM-DP+/SM-DS/EUM (Esci)

ESci is the interface between the CI and the SM-DP+ / the SM-DS / the EUM, used by the SM-DP+, SM-DS and EUM to request a certificate and to retrieve the certificate revocation status.

This interface is out of scope of this specification.

4.3 eUICC Requirements

Req no.                Description
                       The eUICC SHALL be a discrete or integrated tamper resistant component
                       consisting of hardware and software, capable of securely hosting
EUICC1                 applications as well as confidential and cryptographic data.
                       Note: Wherever a distinction is required, the former is referred to as
                       Discrete eUICC, and the latter as Integrated eUICC.
EUICC2                 A removable eUICC is packaged in a standardised ETSI Form Factor [2].
EUICC3                 The Discrete eUICC SHALL be either removable or non-removable.
                       The behaviour of the eUICC with an Enabled Profile SHALL be equivalent
EUICC4
                       to the UICC.
EUICC5                 The eUICC SHALL be able to contain zero or more Profiles.
EUICC6                 [Void]
                       The behaviour of a NAA USIM, ISIM or CSIM within a Profile on an eUICC
EUICC7
                       SHALL be identical to a removable UICC NAAs USIM, ISIM or CSIM.
Req no.               Description
                      Note: No changes to existing 3GPP/3GPP2 USIM, CSIM and ISIM
                      specifications are expected.
EUICC8                The eUICC SHALL support Milenage [11][12] and TUAK [10] algorithm sets.
EUICC9                The EUM Keyset shall be issued by the EUM.
                      If any Profile Management operation does not complete successfully, the
EUICC10
                      eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request.
                      The eUICC SHALL contain an ECASD security domain as well as an ISD-R
EUICC11
                      security domain installed and personalised during manufacture.
                      It SHALL NOT be possible to delete or disable the ECASD after eUICC
EUICC12
                      manufacture.
                      The ISD-R SHALL be responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the
EUICC13
                      lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.
                      The ISD-R SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during eUICC
EUICC14
                      manufacturing as described in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].
EUICC15               The eUICC SHALL support an eUICC Memory Reset.
                      If the eUICC supports Test Profiles, the eUICC SHALL support eUICC Test
EUICC16
                      Memory Reset.
                      The eUICC SHALL support the eUICC Profile Package Interoperable Format
EUICC17
                      Specification as defined by Trusted Connectivity Alliance [5].
                      An ISD-R SHALL:
EUICC18                 • NOT be deleted or disabled;
                        • NOT be able to perform any operations inside an ISD-P.
EUICC19               An eUICC MAY provide LPA functions.
EUICC20               An ISD-P SHALL be created by the ISD-R at the request of the SM-DP+.
                      Communication between the eUICC and the SM-DP+ SHALL be protected
EUICC21
                      in authenticity, integrity and confidentiality.
EUICC22               The eUICC SHALL NOT export Profiles installed on the eUICC.
                      The eUICC SHALL enforce an isolation of Profiles and prevent Profiles from
EUICC23               operating outside of their execution environment i.e. Profile SHALL run in a
                      sandbox.
                      The integrity of the Bound Profile Package SHALL be ensured during its
EUICC24
                      installation on the eUICC.
EUICC25               [Void]
                      Profile keys and algorithm parameters SHALL NOT be extractable from the
EUICC26
                      eUICC.
                      All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a robust tamper-
EUICC27
                      resistant way and be resistant to side-channel attacks.
EUICC28               [Void]
                      A downloaded Profile Package SHALL be installed on the eUICC in a
EUICC29
                      disabled state.
                      The eUICC SHALL always report its eSVN in the first communication during
EUICC30
                      the commencement of each session with the SM-DP+ or SM-DS.
Req no.               Description
                      The EUM SHALL install an eUICC Certificate in the eUICC to authenticate
EUICC31
                      the eUICC.
                      The EUM SHALL install an EUM Certificate in the eUICC to verify the
EUICC32
                      eUICC Certificate.
EUICC33               The eUICC SHALL have a means to authenticate itself to the SM-DS.
EUICC34               [Void]
                      Upon Profile deletion, the eUICC SHALL ensure a complete deletion of all
EUICC35
                      data related to the Profile.
                      The eUICC SHALL only accept Profile Management operations sent from
EUICC36
                      the LPA (in either the eUICC, or the Device), and from Managing SM-DP+s.
                      The eUICC SHALL reject any Profile Management operations that are in
EUICC37
                      conflict with the Profile Policy Rules of the respective Profile.
                      If any Bound Profile Package download or installation does not complete
EUICC38               successfully, the eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it
                      received the request.
EUICC39               [Void]
                      The eUICC SHALL be able to store one or more default SM-DP+
EUICC40
                      address(es).
EUICC41               The eUICC SHALL be able to store one or more Root SM-DS addresses.
                      A removable eUICC SHALL have at least one Root SM-DS address
EUICC41a
                      configured.
                      The eUICC SHALL be able to send a delete Notification to the LPA to notify
EUICC42
                      the Notification Receivers that the Profile has been deleted.
                      In EUICC42, if connectivity is not available to send the Notification of
EUICC43               deletion to the Notification Receivers, each Notification SHALL be retained
                      and sent as soon as connectivity becomes available again.
                      The delete Notification process SHALL also be executed for each deleted
EUICC44
                      Profile in case of eUICC Memory reset.
                      The eUICC SHOULD support Java Card. If supported, the specifics of these
EUICC45               functions and features SHALL be explicitly referenced within the technical
                      specification (SGP.22 [24]).
                      The eUICC SHALL support USIM Toolkit functions and GlobalPlatform
EUICC46               features. The specifics of these functions and features SHALL be explicitly
                      referenced within the technical specification (SGP.22 [24]).
                      An eUICC SHALL support at least two elliptic curves preloaded by the EUM
EUICC47
                      during eUICC manufacturing.
                      Each Notification SHALL be uniquely identifiable and SHALL be signed by
EUICC48
                      the eUICC.
                      Each Notification SHALL be protected against re-play attacks and signed by
EUICC49
                      the eUICC.
EUICC50               [Void]
EUICC51               [Void]
Req no.               Description
                      The Profile SHALL be able to contain a list of zero or more Notification
EUICC52
                      Receivers for each type of Notification.
EUICC53               [Void]
                      The EID SHALL NOT be modifiable. The EID SHALL NOT be affected by
EUICC54
                      any of the procedures, including the change of eUICC Private keys.
                      An Integrated eUICC SHALL be certified according to SGP.08 [56] or
EUICC55
                      SGP.18 [57] as described in SGP.24 [27].
EUICC56               The Integrated eUICC SHALL be based on an Integrated TRE.
                      An Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to execute the test cases defined in
EUICC57
                      SGP.23 [47].
                      The Integrated eUICC SHALL allow the SM-DP+ to identify the type of the
                      Integrated TRE including its component configuration (e.g. use of internal or
EUICC57a
                      Remote Memory, use of other optional components), its manufacturer, in
                      addition to the RSP OS provider.
                      The Integrated TRE SHOULD have priority access to Remote Memory in
EUICC57b
                      cases of shared resource contention.
                      The Integrated eUICC Test Interface SHALL be compatible with commonly
EUICC57c
                      used interfaces for smartcard testing.
                      For the purpose of integration and/or end-to-end testing, a Field-Test
EUICC58
                      eUICC MAY contain certificates that chain up to the GSMA CI.
                      The eUICC MAY provide a means by which the Profile Owner of an
EUICC59               Enabled Profile can request the LPA to check for Events (Root SM-DS(s))
                      or pending RSP operations (Default SM-DP+(s)).
                      The eUICC MAY provide a means by which the Profile Owner of an
EUICC60               Enabled Profile can request the LPA to check for Events or pending RSP
                      operations on the Polling Address configured in the Enabled Profile.
EUICC61               The eUICC SHALL support the ‘set/edit nickname’ function.
                      The eUICC SHALL support at least one eSIM CA for:
                          •    Profile binding
EUICC62
                          •    mutual authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+
                          •    mutual authentication between eUICC and SM-DS.
                      An eUICC MAY support SM2, SM3 and SM4 cryptographic algorithms,
                      defined in [35], [36] and [37] for mutual authentication and data encryption
EUICC63               between the SM-XX and eUICCs.
                      Note: TLS is used between the LPA and the SM-XX and is not considered
                      in this requirement.
                      A non-removable eUICC MAY support Multiple Enabled Profiles (MEP).
EUICC64
                      NOTE: Support of Multiple Enabled Profiles on a removable eUICC is FFS.
                      The eUICC MAY provide a means by which the LPA is able to determine
EUICC65
                      the current estimated size of an installed Profile.
EUICC66               An eUICC SHOULD support Interoperable Applications.
                      An eUICC implementing EUICC66 SHALL support an application runtime
EUICC67               environment facilitating interoperability, e.g. Java Card. The application
                      runtime environment(s) SHALL be explicitly indicated to the SM-DP+.
Req no.               Description
                      The Enabled/Disabled state of a Profile SHALL remain unchanged when
                      the eUICC undergoes the following operations outside of an ‘Enable Profile’
                      or ‘Disable Profile’ procedure:
EUICC68                    •   Powering down or powering up the eUICC
                           •   Removing the eUICC from the Device
                           •   Inserting the eUICC in the Device (whether the same Device or a
                               different Device)

Table 9: eUICC Requirements

4.4 Eligibility Check

Eligibility Check enables an SM-DP+ to validate the eligibility of an eUICC and the Device for the installation of a Profile using information sent by the eUICC. The set of information sent by the eUICC to the SM-DP+ for Eligibility Checking purposes is referenced herein as the Eligibility Check Information. Some Eligibility Check parameters MAY be required due to Device capabilities which must be supported by the Profile/eUICC and delivered as part of the Eligibility Check Information set.

Note: Device capability refers to a Device feature or service-enabling function provided by the Device that MAY have a direct effect on the content of the Profile or the procedure used to download the Profile, and consequently requires support from the eUICC.

4.4.1 Eligibility Check Requirements

Req no.                 Description
                        The eUICC SHALL indicate the specification versions it is supporting.
ELG1                    This parameter SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the
                        Eligibility Check.
                        The eUICC SHALL include the available memory in the Eligibility Check
ELG2
                        Information.
                        The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it is
ELG3
                        unable to accept an additional Profile.
                        The eUICC SHALL provide a valid current Certificate to the SM-DP+
ELG4
                        signed by the EUM.
ELG5                    The eUICC SHALL provide an identification of the EUM.
                        The eUICC SHALL provide the current OS version in the Eligibility Check
ELG6
                        Information.
                        The eUICC SHALL provide in the Eligibility Check Information, Device
ELG7                    enabler information relating to services that may require Profile support
                        (e.g. NFC enablers).
                        Eligibility Check Information SHALL be integrity and authenticity
ELG8
                        protected by the eUICC before it is sent to the SM-DP+.
                        The eUICC SHALL indicate the application runtime environment version
ELG9
                        and libraries versions supported in Eligibility Check Information.
                        The eUICC SHALL indicate cryptographic algorithms and their respective
ELG10
                        key lengths supported in the Eligibility Check Information.
Req no.                 Description
                        The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information the list of
ELG11
                        supported CIs.
ELG12                   [Void]
                        The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it is a
ELG13
                        NFC eUICC.
ELG14                   [Void]
                        An eUICC SHALL provide information indicating if it is a Discrete eUICC
ELG15
                        or an Integrated eUICC.
                        An eUICC SHALL indicate in the Eligibility Check Information if it is a
ELG16
                        Field-Test eUICC.
                        The eUICC SHALL declare which LPA Mode is being used during the
ELG17
                        secure session with the SM-DP+.
                        The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it
ELG18
                        supports eUICC OS Update.
                        The eUICC SHALL declare permitted Profile Policy Rules in the Eligibility
ELG19
                        Check Information.
ELG20                   The Eligibility Check Information MAY include the Device’s IMEI.
                        Eligibility Check Information SHALL include the Device Type allocation
ELG21
                        code.
                        Eligibility Check Information SHALL include the Device radio access
ELG22
                        technologies, including release.
                        The eUICC SHALL declare the eUICC Form Factor Type in the Eligibility
ELG23
                        Check Information.
                        Eligibility Check Information SHALL include the Device letter class(es)
ELG24
                        according to 3GPP TS 31.111 [33] and ETSI TS 102 223 [34].
                        When the Device is Enterprise Capable, this SHALL be indicated in the
ELG25
                        Eligibility Check Information
                        There SHALL be a means to retrieve the certifications (functional and
ELG26
                        security) of the eUICC.

Table 10: Eligibility Check Requirements

Note: It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and could be used for the Eligibility Check procedure.

4.5 Device Requirements

Req no.                  Description
                         The Device SHALL conform to the terminal requirements within ETSI TS
DEV1
                         102 221 [2] with the exceptions as defined in this specification.
                         When technically feasible, the EID SHALL be accessible by the End
                         User in a defined human readable format via the Device (e.g. On a
                         Primary Device, printed on the Device itself, displayed on the screen
DEV2
                         etc.), otherwise, the EID SHALL be accessible by the End User via
                         alternate forms out of scope of this specification (e.g. printed in the
                         Device’s packaging, accessible via a support web site etc.).
Req no.                  Description
                         If an eUICC is within the Device packaging, then the EID SHOULD be
                         printed in machine readable form on the Device packaging. If the EID is
DEV3                     not printed in machine readable form, a mechanism SHOULD be
                         provided to retrieve the EID from the other information on the packaging
                         (e.g. a database of correspondence between EIDs and IMEIs)
                         Bearer connection of the Companion Device to the SM-DP+ SHALL only
                         be determined by the bearer availability.
DEV4
                         Note: The Companion Device MAY use any connectivity method
                         available to connect to the SM-DP+.
DEV5                     [Void]
                         The implementation of the Remote SIM Provisioning specification in the
DEV6                     Device SHALL NOT impact the potential use of the SIM Lock
                         mechanism defined in 3GPP TS 22.022 [16].
DEV7                     [Void]
DEV8                     [Void]
                         A Device that supports an embedded UICC without an LPA in the
DEV9
                         eUICC, SHALL provide LPA functions.
                         A Device that supports only an embedded UICC with an LPA in the
DEV10
                         eUICC, MAY provide LPA functions.
                         If the Device supports Device Test Modes, the Device SHALL support
DEV11                    eUICC Test Memory Reset. eUICC Test Memory Reset can only be
                         requested by the End User when the Device is in Device Test Mode.
                         Where technically feasible, the Device SHALL implement a mechanism
                         allowing the End User to protect the access to the Device and its Profile
                         Management Operations with personal data. Implementation is OEM
DEV12
                         specific.
                         Note: This can be achieved by the implementation of a Device PIN lock,
                         fingerprint, password, facial recognition (etc.)
                         The End User SHOULD be able to enable/disable the mechanism
                         described in DEV12. Implementation is OEM specific.
DEV13
                         Note: The mechanism described in DEV12 should be enabled by
                         default.
DEV14                    [Void]
DEV15                    [Void]
                         There SHALL be a means on the Device for the End User to access the
DEV16
                         ICCID of the enabled Operational Profile(s).
                         The EID and/or the Device Information Code SHOULD be accessible by
                         the End User in a defined machine readable format (e.g. OCR, QR
DEV17
                         Code, etc.) via the Device (e.g. On a Primary Device, printed on the
                         Device itself, displayed on the screen etc.).
                         IMEIs SHALL be assigned by the Device Manufacturer to and used by
DEV18
                         the Device in compliance with TS.06 [39].
                         There SHALL be a means for the Device supporting LDS to present the
DEV19
                         associated Root SM-DS address(es). The presentation is
Req no.                  Description
                         implementation specific (e.g., it could be displayed on the screen, or
                         printed on the Device itself or packaging of the Device).
                         If both the Device and its eUICC supports MEP, then each Enabled
DEV20
                         Profile SHALL be associated with a different IMEI.
                         If the eUICC supports EUICC64, it SHALL be possible to enable more
DEV21
                         than one profile on the same eUICC for a MEP-capable Device.
                         There MAY be a means to store one or more default SM-DP+
DEV22
                         address(es) in the Device.

Table 11: Device Requirements

4.5.1 Device Capability Requirements

Req no.               Description
                      There SHALL be a mechanism that is able to provide the Device capabilities
DEVCAP1
                      to the SM-DP+.

Table 12: Device Capability Requirements

4.5.2 Devices with Integrated eUICC

Req no.               Description
                      Access to any Remote Memory used by the TRE to store software and data
DIE1                  SHALL be protected against attacks on availability (e.g. Denial of Service,
                      memory corruption, tampering) by other Device components.
                      All Integrated TRE software and data stored in Remote Memory outside the
DIE2                  SoC SHALL be protected against access by non Integrated TRE
                      components.

Table 13: Device with Integrated eUICC Requirements

4.5.3 Device Information Code Requirements

Req no.               Description
                      The Device Information Code SHALL include a field listing the available
DEV-IC1
                      EID(s).
                      The Device Information Code SHALL be able to include a field listing the
DEV-IC2
                      available TAC(s) or IMEI(s).
                      The Device Information Code SHALL be able to include a field for the SM-
DEV-IC3               DS FQDN(s) where SM-DS Events can be registered by the SM-DP+ on
                      behalf of the Mobile Service Provider.
                      The Device Information Code SHALL be able to include additional
DEV-IC4
                      proprietary information e.g. Device brand,
                      In case of multiple EIDs, the Device Information Code SHALL be able to
DEV-IC5
                      indicate which EID has to be used for SM-DS Event Registration.

4.6 Device Initialisation

4.6.1 Device Reset Requirements

Req no.               Description
                      It SHALL be possible for the End User to perform a Device reset without
FAC1
                      affecting the status of the eUICC.
                      The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the
FAC2
                      eUICC Memory Reset.
                      The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the
FAC3
                      eUICC Test Memory Reset.

Table 14: Device Reset Requirements

4.6.2 eUICC Memory Reset Requirements

Req no.                 Description
MEM1                    [Void]
                        eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Operational Profiles on the
MEM2
                        eUICC regardless of their Profile Policy Rules and of their state.
                        Strong Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to initiate eUICC Memory
MEM3
                        Reset.
                        In addition to MEM3, other secure means MAY be provided to perform
                        the eUICC Memory Reset function. The same level of security as is
MEM4
                        offered by the LUI based reset function SHALL apply. User Intent and
                        Confirmation Request SHALL apply.

Table 15: eUICC Memory Reset Requirements

4.6.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements

Req no.               Description
                      eUICC Test Memory Reset SHALL delete all post-issuance installed Test
MEMT1
                      Profiles on the eUICC regardless of their state.
                      Simple Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to enable eUICC Test
MEMT2
                      Memory Reset.
                      If Test Profiles are not supported, then eUICC Test Memory Reset is not
MEMT3
                      required.

Table 16: eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements

4.7 Profile Requirements

4.7.1 Test Profile Requirements

Req no.                   Description
                          It is OPTIONAL for the eUICC to support the requirements of Test
TPRO1                     Profiles described in this section. If Test Profiles are not supported, it
                          SHALL NOT be possible to download Test Profiles into the eUICC.
                          Test Profiles SHALL NOT be able to authenticate to an Operator’s
                          mobile network using Operator Credentials. The eUICC SHALL ensure
TPRO2                     that such Profiles cannot be used to connect to any Operator’s mobile
                          network even if authentication information is contained in the Test
                          Profile.
TPRO3                     A Test Profile SHALL be installed in its own individual ISD-P.
TPRO4                     Test Profiles MAY be pre-installed on the eUICC.
                          Test Profiles SHALL only be visible and usable when the Device is in
TPRO5
                          Device Test Mode.
                          It SHALL be possible to download, install, enable, disable or delete Test
TPRO6                     Profiles in the eUICC only in Device Test Mode with the exception of
                          the eUICC Memory Reset operation.
                          Test Profiles, as with any other Profile, SHALL be managed through a
TPRO7
                          certified SM-DP+.
                          The enabling of a Test Profile SHALL override the ‘Disabling of this
TPRO8
                          Profile is not allowed’ (POL RULE1) Profile Policy Rule.
                          When the Device Test Mode is deactivated, the LPA SHALL disable
TPRO9
                          any enabled Test Profile.
                          When the Test Profile is disabled, the eUICC SHALL enable the
TPRO10
                          Operational Profile that was previously enabled, if any.
                          The Device Test Mode activation SHALL be obfuscated from the End
TPRO11
                          User.
                          When exiting Device Test Mode, an End User notice SHALL be
TPRO12                    presented to prompt the tester to perform an eUICC Test Memory
                          Reset.
                          Table 17: Test Profiles Requirements

Note: The Device MAY implement a mechanism for connecting an external SIM card for the purpose of testing in the context of Device repair, without affecting the state of the eUICC.

4.7.2    [Void]

4.8 Profile Metadata Requirements

Req no.              Description
META1                All Profiles SHALL have associated Profile Metadata.
                     Unless specified otherwise in the below requirements, the Profile Metadata
META2
                     SHALL be stored in the eUICC.
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL be accessible irrespective of the state of the
META3
                     Profile.
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the Mobile Service Provider
                     name.
META4
                     Note: EFSPN is already used in a different context outside of this
                     specification and could be blank.
META5                The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile.
Req no.              Description
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of the
META6
                     Profile.
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description
META7
                     of the Profile defined by the Operator or Mobile Service Provider.
META8                [Void]
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL always be available to the LPA. The display to
META9
                     the End User is implementation-specific.
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL include an OPTIONAL field to allow the display
META10               of an icon defined by the Operator or Mobile Service Provider for the
                     respective Profile.
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include a copy of the Profile Policy
META11
                     Rules associated to the Profile.
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include a message that is to be
META11a              displayed to the End User when the Profile contains a Profile Policy Rule. It
                     SHALL NOT be stored after Profile download.
                     All Profiles SHALL be uniquely identified in the Profile Metadata as
META12
                     Operational, Provisioning or Test Profile.
                     An Operator, potentially on behalf of a Mobile Service Provider SHALL be
                     able to access and update the following Profile Metadata of its Profile using
                     the ES6 interface if the Profile is Enabled:
                       • Mobile Service Provider name
                       • Short description of the Profile
                       • Icon of the Profile
                       • HR icon reference
                       • List of Managing SM-DP+ and their respective authorisations to update
                         individual Profile Metadata items
META13                 • Profile Owner OIDs that are allowed to implicitly disable this Profile by
                         RPM ‘Enable’
                       • Polling Address
                       • Profile Policy Rules (unset only)
                       • Enterprise ID (access only)
                       • Enterprise Name
                       • Enterprise Rules
                       • Device Change Configuration of the Profile
                     The content of the respective Profile SHALL reflect the updated Profile
                     Metadata.
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL include an OPTIONAL field (named HR icon
META14               reference) that enables access to high resolution icons. The icons MAY be
                     hosted by the SM-DP+ that handles the Profile.
                     The HR icon reference SHALL allow the LPA to retrieve one or several icons
                     for a Profile in the format(s) best suited for presentation on the user
META15
                     interface. Best fitting icons are intended to be shown during Profile
                     download, Profile selection etc.
Req no.              Description
                     The HR icon solution SHALL provide an option to allow the HR icon(s) to be
META16
                     provided during the Profile download procedure.
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL include an OPTIONAL field for Device Change
                     Configuration of the Profile. This field SHALL include OPTIONAL sub-fields
                     for:
                       • The address of the SM-DP+ that processes Device Change request
                       • The Activation Code to be used by the new Device for Device Change
META17                 • An indication of whether the Profile has to be deleted before the
                         Activation Code is made available for the new Device, where the
                         Activation Code is either from the present sub-field or what was used to
                         trigger the original Profile Download procedure
                     Note: If an Activation Code is present in the sub-field, then it supersedes the
                     Activation Code that was used to trigger the original Profile Download
                     procedure.
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include an optional field for the
META18
                     estimated installed size of the Profile.
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include a list of Managing SM-
META19
                     DP+(s).
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL include an optional field to allow for the
META20
                     inclusion of the Enterprise ID.
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL include an optional field to allow for the
META21
                     inclusion of the Enterprise Name.
                     The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include additional proprietary
META22               information. The additional proprietary information SHALL include a field for
                     uniquely identifying the issuer of the additional proprietary information.
META23               With regard to META22, the eUICC SHALL ignore fields it does not support.
META24               With regard to META22, the LPA SHALL ignore fields it does not support.
                     The information defined in META22 SHALL NOT impact the functionalities
META25               and Profile Management Operations defined in this specification that are not
                     Vendor specific.
                     The information defined in META22 SHALL NOT impact the interoperability
META26               of the solution defined in this specification (incl. Devices, Profiles and SM-
                     DP+).
                     With regard to META22, the eUICC SHALL store the additional proprietary
META27
                     information in its memory if indicated by the Profile Owner
                        Table 18: Profile Metadata Requirements

4.9 NFC Requirements

An NFC Device and an NFC eUICC SHALL be compliant with the following list of requirements:

Req no.                 Description
NFC1                    An NFC Device SHALL be compliant with GSMA TS 26 [17] .
Req no.                 Description
                        In combination with an enabled Operational NFC Profile, the NFC eUICC
NFC2                    SHALL support all requirements as specified in the SGP.03 GSMA NFC
                        UICC Requirements Specification [20].
NFC3                    [Void]
NFC4                    [Void]
NFC5                    [Void]
NFC6                    [Void]
                        If the NFC eUICC is compliant with M4M, the eUICC SHALL reset all the
NFC7                    M4M virtual cards associated to that Profile when a Profile containing
                        M4M applications is disabled.
NFC8                    [Void]
NFC9                    [Void]

Table 19: NFC Requirements

4.10 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+)

4.10.1 SM-DP+ Overview

The SM-DP+ is responsible for the creation, generation, management and the protection of resulting Profiles upon the input/request of the Operator on behalf of served Mobile Service Providers. It is also responsible for the delivery of a Profile within a Bound Profile Package, making the Bound Profile Package available for the secure delivery. In addition, the SM-DP+ is responsible for requesting the creation of the ISD-P in the eUICC into which the Profile will be installed. The SM-DP+ will also be the off-card entity that will be responsible for the lifecycle management of the ISD-P that was created at its request. This is performed via the distinct functions listed below.

Figure 6: SM-DP+ Functions

Function name         Description
                      Creates Profile Packages (i.e. Personalised Profiles, including (IMSI, Ki,
Profile Package       ICCID,…)) from Profile Descriptions agreed with Operators. This can be an
Generation            off-line batch or real time process.
Profile Package       Secures each Profile Package according to the security process creating
Protection            the Protected Profile Package.
Profile Package       Binds the Protected Profile Package to a target eUICC using the security
Binding               process thus creating the Bound Profile Package.
Profile Package       Temporarily stores Protected Profile Packages or Bound Profile Packages
Storage               for subsequent delivery to the eUICC.
Profile Package       Securely transmits and installs the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC
Delivery              through the LPA.
SM-DS Event
                      Notifies the SM-DS of a pending operation for a specific eUICC.
Registration
                      Profile Management operations (Enabling, Disabling, deleting, list Profile
Remote Profile        information, query, update Metadata) within the eUICC managed by the
Management            Managing SM-DP+. RPM command authorisation is enforced by the
                      eUICC.

Table 20: SM-DP+ Function Descriptions

4.10.2 SM-DP+ Requirements

Req no.                  Description
SMDP1                    [Void]
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to initiate the request for ISD-P creation as
SMDP2
                         part of the Bound Profile Package delivery.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL establish an end-to-end secure channel to the
SMDP3
                         eUICC to download and install Bound Profile Packages on the eUICC.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL link a Protected Profile Package for binding to a
SMDP4
                         specific eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the linked
SMDP5
                         Protected Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any
SMDP6
                         Certified eUICC.
                         Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound
SMDP7
                         Profile Package delivered by the SM-DP+.
                         Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP+ after completing all
SMDP8
                         production steps, Profile Package Protection, and binding.
                         Communication session between the SM-DP+ and the LPA SHALL be
SMDP9
                         terminated by the SM-DP+ after execution of intended Operation(s).
                         End-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC
SMDP10                   involved in the Profile download and installation SHALL be protected in
                         terms of integrity, authenticity and confidentiality.
                         Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected
SMDP11
                         through encryption.
Req no.                  Description
                         On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile
SMDP12                   creation and storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure
                         deletion procedures (logically and physically).
                         SM-DP+/eUICC communication SHALL incorporate Perfect Forward
SMDP13
                         Secrecy (PFS).
                         The transport used for the Bound Profile Package SHALL implement
SMDP14
                         anti-replay mechanisms between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL check the information referenced by the digital
SMDP14a
                         identification in ELG26.
                         Connectivity to the SM-DP+ SHALL be aborted and an explicit error
                         message SHALL be triggered by the SM-DP+ upon failure to verify
SMDP15                   authenticity or failure to verify the information referenced by the digital
                         identification in ELG26 of the connecting party. (No message SHALL be
                         sent to the connecting party)
                         After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound
                         Profile Package to the LPA, the transport encryption procedure SHALL
                         be renewed.
SMDP16                   If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more
                         than a configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction
                         SHALL be terminated and the Mobile Service Provider and the
                         supporting Operator SHALL be notified.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols
SMDP17
                         whenever available (e.g. DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.).
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC
SMDP18                   Profile Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by
                         Trusted Connectivity Alliance [5].
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on
SMDP19
                         demand.
SMDP20                   It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL send a confirmation of the successfully completed
SMDP21                   download and installation of a Profile to the Mobile Service Provider and
                         the supporting Operator.
                         There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between any
                         SM-DP+ and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the
                         Profile. Such a mechanism SHALL either be ordered by the Operator or
SMDP22
                         be performed by the Operator itself. If such deletion mechanism is used,
                         there will be no off-card entity responsible for managing the ISD-P of the
                         installed Profile.
SMDP23                   The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid.
SMDP24                   The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Notification to the Operator
                         informing them that a specific Bound Profile Package download is
SMDP25
                         starting. Such notifications MAY be forwarded by the Operator to the
                         Mobile Service Provider.
Req no.                  Description
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an Eligibility Check Information
                         report and other relevant information (e.g. Activation Code, ICCID, etc.)
SMDP26
                         to the Mobile Service Provider and the supporting Operator ahead
                         of/prior to the eUICC Bound Profile Package download.
                         Before a Profile download, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to check
SMDP26a
                         whether the eUICC has enough memory to install the Profile.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to perform Event Registrations to the SM-
SMDP27
                         DS that is requested by the Operator.
                         It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to indicate to the Operator lists of
                         Root SM-DSs and Alternative SM-DSs to which the SM-DP+ can
                         perform the (possibly cascaded) Event Registration associated with an
SMDP27a
                         RSP operation.
                         Note: This could be part of the static configuration between the SM-DP+
                         and the Operator.
                         It SHALL be possible for the Operator to indicate to the SM-DP+, the
SMDP27b                  Root SM-DS to which the SM-DP+ performs the (possibly cascaded)
                         Event Registration associated with an RSP operation.
                         It SHALL be possible for the Operator to indicate to the SM-DP+ that an
SMDP27c                  Event Registration be cascaded and indicate the Alternative SM-DS to
                         be used.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to request an Alternative SM-DS not to
SMDP28
                         cascade an Event Registration to a specific Root SM-DS.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Profile delete Notification to the
SMDP29                   Mobile Service Provider and the supporting Operator owning a Profile
                         when a related delete Notification is received from the eUICC.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL support the following states for a Profile Package,
                         triggered by the Profile Owner:
SMDP30
                           • A Profile Package is not released for Profile Package download.
                           • A Profile Package is released for Profile Package download.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to select the elliptic curve parameter in the
SMDP31
                         Profile download procedure.
SMDP32 (FFS)             [Void]
SMDP33 (FFS)             [Void]
SMDP34 (FFS)             [Void]
SMDP35 (FFS)             [Void]
                         A SM-DP+ SHALL support all sets of elliptic curve parameters for the
SMDP36
                         CAs that it uses.
                         If a Profile Package is not yet released for download then the LPA
SMDP37
                         SHALL be informed by means of a specific error code.
                         An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to distinguish a Field-Test eUICC from a
SMDP38
                         Certified eUICC through eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to be instructed by the Profile Owner to
SMDP39
                         reject an RSP operation to Field-Test eUICCs.
Req no.                  Description
                         Note: The mechanism is out of the scope of this document and it is left
                         to implementation.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL NOT perform an RSP operation to a Field-Test
SMDP40
                         eUICC if it has been instructed so by the Profile Owner as per SMDP49.
                         The Managing SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Notification to the
SMDP41                   Profile Owner informing them that a requested RPM command is about
                         to be executed.
                         Only a Managing SM-DP+ SHALL be allowed to perform RPM on a
SMDP42
                         Profile.
                         If RPM is supported by the Managing SM-DP+, the LPA and the eUICC:
                         the Managing SM-DP+ SHALL establish a secure channel to the eUICC
SMDP43                   to perform Remote Profile Management (RPM) providing authentication,
                         authorisation, and integrity checking. Ciphering SHALL be provided
                         between the SM-DP+ and the LPA.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Profile enabled Notification to
SMDP44                   the Mobile Service Provider and the supporting Operator owning a
                         Profile when a related enabled Notification is received from the eUICC.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Profile disabled Notification to
SMDP45                   the Mobile Service Provider and the supporting Operator owning a
                         Profile when a related disabled Notification is received from the eUICC.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL provide means for the Operator to query about the
SMDP46                   current status of a Profile Package. The search criteria and level of
                         details of the returned information are implementation-dependent.
                         In the Event Registration, the SM-DP+ SHALL indicate to the SM-DS
SMDP47
                         the RSP operation type (i.e., Profile download or RPM).
                         In the Event Registration, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to provide to the
                         SM-DS information that can be used by the LPA to identify the target
SMDP48                   Profile(s) upon Event Retrieval.
                         Note: See BAS7 and the text at the beginning of Basic Principles 2.1 for
                         privacy requirements to be covered.
                         The information in SMDP48 SHALL NOT disclose to the SM-DS any
SMDP49
                         private or confidential data of the target Profile.
                         In the Event Registration, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to provide the
SMDP50                   Mobile Service Provider Name to the SM-DS to be forwarded to the LPA
                         upon Event Retrieval.
                         The SM-DP+ SHOULD ensure that repeated Profile or RPM download
SMDP51                   attempts due to expired/outdated Event Records are prevented (as per
                         SMDP52 and SMDP53).
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL request the deletion of the associated Event
SMDP52
                         Record (if any) of a successful Profile or RPM download.
                         The SM-DP+ SHOULD request the deletion of the associated Event
SMDP53                   Record (if known) of an expired/outdated Profile or RPM download
                         attempt.

Table 21: SM-DP+ Requirements

4.10.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements

Req no.                Description
DF1                    [Void]
                       The default SM-DP+ address(es) in the eUICC or Device SHALL be
DF2
                       accessible by the LPA to establish a connection to an SM-DP+.
                       The default SM-DP+ address(es) in the eUICC or Device MAY be left
DF3
                       blank.
DF4                    [Void]
DF5                    [Void]

Table 22: Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements

4.11 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)

Figure 7: End User Interaction and Interfaces between a Primary and Companion

Device, where the Companion Device MAY have a UI

4.11.1 LPA Overview

This role exists both within the Device in conjunction with LPA Services provided by the eUICC, and within the eUICC with the LPA function provided by the eUICC. It provides four distinct functions, the Local Discovery Service (LDS), the Local Profile Download (LPD), the Local User Interface (LUI), and the LPA PRoxy (LPR) as described below. Whilst the eUICC

alone cannot provide any of these functions without Device interaction, the specific level of interaction will depend upon the capability within the Device. The way this variability is implemented across different Devices and Device types is for further study.

Figure 8: LPA Functions

Function name               Description
Local Discovery
                            Where required, the LDS is responsible for retrieving pending Event
Service
                            Records from the SM-DS.
(LDS)
                            This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound Profile
Local Profile               Package in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile Package
Download                    from the SM-DP+ to the LPD in a single transaction, and (ii) the onward
(LPD)                       transfer of the Bound Profile Package into the eUICC in segments.
                            This function will depend on network, Device, and eUICC capabilities.
Local User Interface        This function allows the End User to perform Local Profile Management
(LUI)                       on the Device. User Intent SHALL be enforced.
                            This plays a proxy role for the efficient management of Profile contents
LPA PRoxy (LPR)             from a Profile Content Management Platform, or a Delegated Profile
                            Content Management Platform.

Table 23: LPA Function Descriptions

4.11.2 Operational LPA Modes

When there is an LPA in the Device and in the eUICC, then the LPA to be used is specified by the Device settings:

•     LPA in the Device
•     LPA in the eUICC

4.11.2.1 LPA in the eUICC

LPA functions are provided by the eUICC.

Figure 9: LPA in the eUICC

4.11.2.2 LPA in the Device

LPA functions are provided by the Device.

Figure 10: LPA in the Device

4.11.3 LPA Requirements

Req no.           Description
LPA1              [Void]
LPA2              [Void]
                  Security between the LUI and the associated display or input applications on
LPA3
                  the Device SHALL be provided according to current industry best practices.
                  Access to the LUI SHALL be protected according to current industry best
LPA4
                  practices.
                  All Local Profile Management Operations SHALL require User Intent except
LPA5
                  where otherwise noted in this specification.
LPA6              [Void]
LPA7              [Void]
LPA8              The LPA SHALL protect Profile Metadata from unauthorised access.
                  The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘enable’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA9
                  operation SHALL allow the End User to select the Profile to be enabled.
LPA10             The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘disable’ SHALL be supported.
                  The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘delete’ SHALL be supported. This
                  operation SHALL allow the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the
LPA11
                  eUICC. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for
                  the deletion of the Profile. Strong Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                  The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This
                  operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Operational
LPA12
                  Profiles on the eUICC and relevant associated information through the Profile
                  Metadata.
Req no.           Description
                  The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’
                  SHOULD be supported. When supported, this operation SHALL allow the End
                  User to edit a default SM-DP+ address. Simple confirmation SHALL be
LPA13
                  enforced. If the LPA does not support 'edit default SM-DP+ address', alternative
                  vendor-specific methods to edit a default SM-DP+ address SHALL be provided
                  to the End User.
                  The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be
                  supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as
LPA14             described in Section 4.6.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of
                  consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. Strong Confirmation SHALL be
                  enforced.
                  The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Test Memory Reset’ SHALL
LPA15             execute the eUICC Test Memory Reset as described in Section 4.6.3. Simple
                  Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                  The Local Profile Management Operation ‘set/edit nickname’ SHOULD be
                  supported. When supported, this operation SHALL allow the End User to add or
                  modify a nickname for the selected Profile. The operation SHALL NOT modify
LPA16
                  the Mobile Service Provider name. If the LPA does not support ‘set/edit
                  nickname’, alternative vendor-specific methods to distinguish Profiles on the
                  LUI SHOULD be provided by the LPA.
                  The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile via Default SM-DP+’
                  SHALL be supported and available to the End User if a Default SM-DP+ is
                  populated. This operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new
                  Profile to the eUICC using the Default SM-DP+ address(es) configured on the
LPA16a            eUICC or the Device.
                  Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                  Note: The presentation of Profile management operations to the End User on
                  the LUI is OEM specific. For example two Profile management operations could
                  be combined within one menu item.
                  The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile’ SHALL be supported.
                  This operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to
                  the eUICC.
                  At least these mechanisms SHALL be supported by the LPA depending on the
LPA17             type of Device where technically capable:
                     • Profile download from default SM-DP+
                     • Profile download via SM-DS service discovery
                     • Profile download with Activation Code
                  Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                  An LPA with an LDS SHALL support the Local Profile Management Operation
                  ‘add Profile via SM-DS’ and make it available to the End User.
LPA17a            Note: The presentation of Profile management operations to the End User on
                  the LUI is OEM specific. For example, two Profile management operations
                  could be combined within one menu item.
                  Operation in LPA17aLPA17 SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new
                  Profile to the eUICC by contacting a Root SM-DS fetched by the LPA to retrieve
LPA17b
                  pending events.
                  Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
Req no.           Description
                  The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile via Activation Code’
                  SHALL be supported and available to the End User. This operation SHALL
                  allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to the eUICC with the use
                  of an Activation Code.
LPA17c
                  Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                  Note: The presentation of Profile management operations to the End User on
                  the LUI is OEM specific. For example, two Profile management operations
                  could be combined within one menu item.
                  If RPM is supported by the LPA and the eUICC: the Local Profile Management
                  Operation ’update Profile’ SHOULD be supported and available to the End
                  User. This operation SHALL trigger Event retrieval(s) from the Polling Address
                  (Managing SM-DP+/SM-DS address) stored in the selected Profile to retrieve
LPA17d
                  RPM operations for this specific Profile.
                  Note: The presentation of Profile management operations to the End User on
                  the LUI is OEM specific. For example, two Profile management operations
                  could be combined within one menu item.
LPA18             [Void]
LPA19             [Void]
LPA20             [Void]
LPA21             [Void]
LPA22             [Void]
LPA23             [Void]
LPA24             [Void]
LPA25             [Void]
LPA26             [Void]
                  When enforced, any Confirmation Request SHALL allow the End User to cancel
LPA27
                  the Local Profile Management Operation.
                  It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI of a Companion Device allowing input
LPA28
                  from an End User interface on the Primary Device.
LPA29             [Void]
LPA30             [Void]
                  A point-to-point secure link initiated by the End User and offering confidentiality
LPA31             and integrity SHALL be established between the Companion and Primary
                  Device for any input executed from the Primary Device.
LPA32             [Void]
                  The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure
LPA33
                  measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI.
LPA34             [Void]
                  The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the
LPA35             internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+.
                  Over such connection, ES8+ and ES9+ interfaces can be established.
                  The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another
LPA36
                  Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally
Req no.           Description
                  shared Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+.
                  Over such connection, ES8+, and ES9+ interfaces can be established.
                  The LPA SHALL be able to determine if connectivity to the SM-DP+ is available
LPA37
                  by any means.
                  The LPA SHALL be able to notify the End User that there is no connection to
LPA38             the internet and or no connection to the SM-DP+ in order to allow the End User
                  to enable or troubleshoot required connectivity.
LPA39             [Void]
LPA40             There SHALL be at most one active LPA per eUICC.
LPA41             [Void]
LPA42             [Void]
LPA43             [Void]
LPA44             The LPA SHALL be able to read the Profile Policy Rules.
LPA45             [Void]
                  Prior to downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHALL check the condition for
                  whether the Enabled Profile, if any, has enabled POL RULE1. If this is the case,
                  a dedicated message SHALL be displayed identifying the consequences to the
                  End User. Examples of information that may be displayed would be:
                     • Enabling of the new Profile will not be possible because the currently
                       Enabled Profile cannot be disabled.
LPA46                • The Profile name of the Enabled Profile.
                     • For more information, the End User should contact the Profile Owner of
                       this Profile.
                  With displaying this message, the End User SHALL be able to decide on
                  whether to continue the download or to cancel the operation.
                  This dialogue MAY be combined with the regular User Intent for confirming a
                  Profile download.
                  The communication between the End User interface of the Primary Device and
LPA47             the LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be protected (confidentiality, integrity
                  and authentication).
LPA48             [Void]
                  Confirmation Requests for consecutive Local Profile Management Operations
                  MAY be achieved in one step as long as the different actions of the separate
                  operations are clearly explained and offered to the End User. For instance,
LPA49             upon installation of a new Profile, the LPA MAY propose ‘add Profile’ and
                  ‘enable’ into one single step with a single confirmation only (e.g. “Do you want
                  to install Profile ‘ProfileName’ on your Device and enable it? Yes / No / Install
                  only”)
                  When consecutive operations are achieved in one single step (LPA49), the
                  highest level of confirmation SHALL be applied - i.e. in the case of two
LPA50
                  operations having respectively Strong and Simple Confirmation Requests, the
                  single step SHALL use the Strong Confirmation Request.
                  The Local Profile Management Operations ‘enable’ (LPA9), ‘disable’ (LPA10),
LPA51             and ‘delete’ (LPA11) SHALL be able to trigger a Notification to the Notification
                  Receivers of the respective Profile being managed to indicate that this
Req no.           Description
                  operation was actioned. These Notifications are sent on a best effort basis and
                  SHALL NOT impact otherwise the operation.
                  The LPA SHALL provide a Trusted Link from the End User to the eUICC
LPA52
                  through the LUI.
                  The End User SHOULD be able to configure the LPA such that the automatic
LPA53
                  Event Record retrieval from the SM-DS is disabled.
                  The LPA SHALL be able to read any SM-DS and SM-DP+ addresses
LPA54
                  configured in the eUICC.
LPA55             [Void]
                  LPA Integrity SHALL be ensured using the best practice methods on the
LPA56
                  targeted platform. See Annex G.
                  The polling mechanism in the LPA SHALL have two types of triggers; those that
LPA57
                  are event based, and those that are End User initiated.
                  Event based triggers for polling SHOULD include Device power-up when no
LPA58             Operational Profile is installed; in addition other triggers MAY be provided.
                  Event based triggers MAY be disabled by the End User.
LPA59             [Void]
LPA60             [Void]
                  Error/retry handling of the LPA polling mechanism SHOULD be implemented
LPA61             e.g. advise the End User to retry or automatically retry as appropriate. The
                  corresponding confirmation needs to be enforced in the retry cases.
                  As part of the initial Device setup, if no Operational Profile is already installed,
                  means SHALL be provided to the End User to retrieve pending Profiles. This
                  includes means such as checking for pending Profiles from Default SM-DP(s)+
                  if configured, pending profiles registered to Root/Alternative SM-DS(s), and/or
LPA62             using Activation Codes provided by the Mobile Service Provider.
                  Simple Confirmation is required.
                  Note: This is implementation dependent and retrieval does not need to happen
                  exactly during the initial Device setup if the End User, as an example, is
                  informed on how to retrieve these Profiles after the setup.
                  The End User SHALL always be able to manually request the retrieval of any
                  waiting Event Record via the LPA if there are no default SM-DP+ addresses.
LPA63
                  Note: This may be achieved through the combination with existing operations –
                  e.g. pressing “add Profile” would contact the server to retrieve an Event.
                  The Mobile Service Provider name SHALL be given in the signalling information
                  from the SM-DP+ to the LPA when initiating the download of a Profile and shown
LPA64
                  to the End User before the Profile is downloaded.
                  Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
LPA65             [Void]
LPA66             [Void]
                  If the SM-DP+ stops the Profile download procedure, the LPA SHALL notify the
LPA67
                  End User.
LPA68             [Void]
Req no.           Description
                  As part of the process of downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHOULD offer the
LPA69
                  choice to the End User to enable or not enable the new Profile.
                  The LUI SHOULD provide a local configuration option that allows the End User
LPA70
                  to turn on/off RPM operations.
                  The LPA MAY provide a means by which the eUICC can request the LPA to
LPA71             check for Events or pending RSP operations as described by EUICC55 and
                  EUICC56.
                  An LPA with an LDS SHALL retrieve one or more Root SM-DS addresses,
LPA72
                  either stored on the eUICC or stored within the Device.
                  It SHALL NOT be required for the LPA to maintain state for any transactions
LPA73
                  from the SM-DS(s) except the cascade Event Retrieval(s).

Table 24: LPA Requirements

4.11.4 LDS Requirements

Req no.                 Description
                        The LDS SHALL be able to read out the root SM-DS address configured
LDS1                    in the eUICC and the Alternative SM-DS address configured in the
                        installed Profiles.
                        The LDS MAY support the Event Checking procedure. If the Event
LDS2                    Checking procedure is supported by the LDS, requirements LDS3 to
                        LDS6 SHALL apply.
                        The Event Checking procedure SHALL provide a means for the LDS to
                        query the SM-DS to determine the presence of any Event Records
LDS3
                        registered for an eUICC, without requiring the eUICC and SM-DS to
                        perform the common mutual authentication procedure.
                        During the Event Checking procedure, the LDS SHALL provide the SM-
                        DS an information for identifying the eUICC in order to check the
LDS4
                        presence of Event Record(s) registered for that eUICC, without
                        compromising the privacy of the EID.
                        There SHALL be a means for the LDS to determine whether the SM-DS
LDS5                    supports the Event Checking (e.g. by a pre-configuration by the OEM or
                        by a response from the SM-DS).
                        If both the LDS and the SM-DS support Event Checking, the LDS
LDS6                    SHOULD perform the Event Checking procedure prior to the Event
                        Retrieval against that SM-DS.
                        The LDS MAY support a Push Service. If a Push Service is supported by
LDS7
                        the LDS, requirements LDS8 and LDS9 SHALL apply.
                        There SHALL be a means for the LDS to request an SM-DS to be notified
LDS8
                        about Events registered for the eUICC.
                        With regard to LDS8, the request SHALL include the information for
LDS9                    identifying the corresponding eUICC and the information about the Push
                        Service to be used by the SM-DS for the notification.
                                Table 25: LDS Requirement

4.11.5 LPA API Requirements

This section describes requirements for an Application Programming Interface offered by the LPA in the Device. API requirements for the LPA in the eUICC are FFS.

4.11.5.1 LPA API Access Control Requirements

Req no.                     Description
                            A Device supporting an LPA API SHALL provide a mechanism which
LPAAPIAC1
                            can authorise applications’ access to LPA API.
                            The Device MAY refer to GP SEAC [15] or GP DAC [55] to
LPAAPIAC2
                            implement the LPA API access control mechanism.

Table 26: LPA API Access Control Requirements

4.11.6 APDU Access API Requirements

This section describes requirements for an APDU access interface on the Device. This interface MAY be provided by some other Device component external to the LPA (e.g. a smart-card interface) provided that when it is used with an eUICC it satisfies the following requirements.

Req no.                    Description
                           A Device MAY support the APDU Access API requirements in this
APDUAPI1                   section. NFC Devices SHALL support the APDU Access API
                           requirements in this section.
                           If the Device supports APDU Access API as per requirement
APDUAPI2                   APDUAPI1, the Device SHALL provide a mechanism by which
                           authorised applications can send APDUs to the Enabled Profile.
                           The Device SHALL authorise applications by retrieving and enforcing
APDUAPI3                   Access Rules of the corresponding Profile as specified in the
                           GlobalPlatform SEAC specification [15].
                           The Access Rules for the Enabled Profile SHALL be stored as part of
APDUAPI4
                           the Profile.
                           Within the Enabled Profile only the contents of the Profile itself SHALL
APDUAPI5
                           be accessible to authorised applications.

Table 27: APDU Access API Requirements

4.12 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)

4.12.1 SM-DS Overview

The role of the SM-DS is to provide mechanisms that allow an SM-DP+ to inform the LDS within any Device that an SM-DP+ wishes to communicate with it. The purpose of the SM- DS to LDS communication SHALL be informing the LDS of a pending Event

The principle of operation remains the same for all use cases. The SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration message for a target Device to an SM-DS.

In a simple deployment, only the Root SM-DS is configured on the eUICC. The Root SM-DS address is unique and filled in the eUICC. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM-

DS using the same logical location. When the Root SM-DS has an Event-ID for the target Device it will respond with the SM-DP+ address, or if there is no Event-ID the response will be a null response.

In a deployment with cascaded SM-DSs, the SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration to an Alternative SM-DS, which may not be configured as the Root SM-DS on the eUICC. This Alternative SM-DS will cascade the Event Registration to the Root SM-DS. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM-DS and will receive the Alternative SM-DS address. It will then request the Event from the Alternative SM-DS, which will respond with the SM-DP+ address.

Figure 11: Alternative SM-DS Event Registration

Figure 12: Device to Root SM-DS Event Discovery

Figure 13: Alternative SM-DS Event Discovery

4.12.2 SM-DS Implementation

Two configurations of the SM-DS MAY exist: • A Root SM-DS • An Alternative SM-DS

Figure 14: SM-DS Implementation

Figure 14 shows both configurations. The Root SM-DS is configured at the time of Device manufacture and is invariant.

4.12.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelines

The following statements SHOULD be considered when defining a technical implementation:
   • A competitive environment on the supply of SM-DS services SHOULD be favoured by
       the approach.
   • There SHOULD be no single-points-of-failure.
   • Implementation SHOULD inherently provide both vertical and horizontal
       performance/scalability.
   • There SHOULD be no need for pre-registration of Devices or eUICCs at a certain
       SM-DS.

4.12.4 SM-DS functions

The SM-DS has four distinct functions:

Figure 15: SM-DS Functions

Function name            Description
Event Registration       Process by which an Event Record received from an SM-DP+ is stored.
Event Deletion           Process by which an SM-DP+ can delete its own Event Record.
Function name            Description
                         Provides the presence of registered Event Records, upon Event
Event Checking
                         Checking request from any enquiring LDS.
                         Provides all registered Event Records, upon Discovery Request from
Event Retrieval
                         any enquiring LDS.

Table 28: SM-DS Function Descriptions

4.12.5 SM-DS Requirements

Req no.                  Description
                         The SM-DS SHALL enable a LDS to discover its own Event Records
SMDS1
                         registered by SM-DP+(s) or by Alternative SM-DS(s).
SMDS2                    [Void]
                         All Discovery Requests and Event Registrations SHALL be processed
SMDS3
                         by any Root SM-DS in a non-discriminatory manner.
                         The SM-DS SHALL accept Event Registrations from
                           • any authorised and authenticated SM-DP+(s) having a valid
SMDS4                        Certificate.
                           • any authorised and authenticated SM-DS(s) having a valid
                             Certificate.
                         The SM-DS SHALL only accept Discovery Requests authenticated by the
SMDS5
                         eUICC via the corresponding LDS.
                         The SM-DS and the SM-DP+ as well as connected SM-DSs SHALL be
SMDS6
                         mutually authenticated.
                         The SM-DS SHALL NOT have visibility of any data that may be used to
SMDS7
                         compromise the End User´s privacy.
                         The SM-DS SHALL support multiple concurrent Event Registrations per
SMDS8                    eUICC and SHALL present to the LDS all currently valid Event Records
                         in the same order as they were received by the SM-DS (first in, first out).
                         As per SMDS8, the valid Event Records SHALL be filtered by the RSP
SMDS8a
                         operation type provided by the LDS (if any).
                         The SM-DS SHOULD protect itself to avoid becoming a point of injection
SMDS9
                         for DoS or spam attacks.
                         Subscriber Specific data and Profile related contents SHALL NOT be
SMDS10
                         stored within the SM-DS.
                         The SM-DS SHALL NOT allow the harvesting of any information such
SMDS11                   as Mobile Service Provider, Operator, EIDs, Device Manufacturers,
                         Devices, etc.
                         The SM-DS SHALL only return to the LDS, the Event Records related to
SMDS12
                         the served eUICC.
                         The SM-DS SHALL NOT have any contact with the Profile Packages
SMDS13                   e.g. SHALL NOT store or process any Profile Package, or RPM
                         commands.
Req no.                  Description
                         The SM-DS SHALL provide the same data regardless of the status of
SMDS14                   the Device that queries it (i.e. consistent in time and in geographic
                         location).
                         The SM-DS SHOULD NOT significantly impact the end-to-end
SMDS15
                         provisioning time.
SMDS16                   The SM-DS SHALL provide defence against Denial of Service attacks.
                         All communications to, from and between entities of the SM-DS SHALL
SMDS17
                         be encrypted and integrity protected.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event Records
SMDS18
                         registered on the SM-DS.
                         An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event
SMDS19                   Records registered on the Root SM-DS (In response to an SM-DP+
                         delete operation defined in SMDS18).
                         An Alternative SM-DS SHALL propagate the Event Record to the Root
SMDS20
                         SM-DS if requested by the SM-DP+.
                         If there are multiple Event Records registered on the SM-DS for one
                         eUICC, these SHALL all be sent as a single response unless the
SMDS21
                         discovery operation requests a specific event to be returned, in which
                         case only that Event SHALL be sent.
                         An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an Event Record to an LDS either
                         by a Root SM-DS or via any Alternative SM-DS selected by the SM-
SMDS22
                         DP+. If an Alternative SM-DS is selected, the Event Record to the LDS
                         SHALL come from this Alternative SM-DS.
SMDS23                   [Void]
                         A Root SM-DS SHALL be managed by the GSMA. This Root SM-DS
SMDS24
                         MAY be used as a default Root SM-DS.
SMDS25 (FFS)             [Void]
SMDS26 (FFS)             [Void]
SMDS27 (FFS)             [Void]
SMDS28 (FFS)             [Void]
SMDS29 (FFS)             [Void]
SMDS30 (FFS)             [Void]
SMDS31 (FFS)             [Void]
                         The SM-DS MAY support the Event Checking procedure. If the Event
SMDS32                   Checking procedure is supported by the SM-DS, SMDS33 SHALL
                         apply.
                         Upon the request from an LDS for Event Checking, the SM-DS SHALL
SMDS33                   provide the information to the LDS whether it has any Event registered
                         for the corresponding eUICC.
                         The SM-DS MAY support none, one, or multiple kinds of Push Services
SMDS34                   available in the industry. If a Push Service is supported by the SM-DS,
                         SMDS35 and SMDS36 SHALL apply.
Req no.                   Description
                          If requested by the LDS as per LDS8, the SM-DS SHALL return the
SMDS35
                          indication whether it accepts or rejects the request.
                          If accepted by the SM-DS as per SMDS35, the SM-DS SHALL notify the
SMDS36                    LDS about the Event Registration using the Push Service, whenever an
                          Event is newly registered for the eUICC.

Table 29: SM-DS Requirements

4.12.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedure

The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with the Root SM-DS and an Alternative SM-DS (cascade mode).

Figure 16: Event Registration/Deletion Procedure

4.12.6.1 Event Registration Procedure

Starting Condition:

a.       The SM-DP+ has an Event Registration action waiting for a target eUICC identified by
         the EID.
Procedure:
1.       The SM-DP+ establishes a secure connection to an Alternative SM-DS of the
         Profile Owner´s choice.
2.       The SM-DP+ notifies the Alternative SM-DS about an Event Registration action.
3. to 4. The Alternative SM-DS registers and confirms the Event Registration.
5.       The Alternative SM-DS establishes a secure connection to the Root SM-DS.
6.       The Alternative SM-DS informs the Root SM-DS that for the given EID, an Event
         Record is waiting at the Alternative SM-DS.
7.       The Root SM-DS registers the Event Registration.
8.       The Root SM-DS confirms the receipt of the information.

4.12.6.2 Event Deletion Procedure

Starting Condition:

a.       The SM-DP+ has an Event Deletion action waiting for a target eUICC identified by the
         EID
Procedure:
1.       The SM-DP+ establishes a secure connection to an Alternative SM-DS of the Profile
         Owner´s choice.
2.       The SM-DP+ notifies the Alternative SM-DS about an Event Deletion action.
3. to 4. The Alternative SM-DS deletes the Event Record and confirms the Event Deletion.
5.       The Alternative SM-DS establishes a secure connection to the Root SM-DS.
6.       The Alternative SM-DS informs the Root SM-DS that for the given EID, an Event
         Record has to be deleted.
7.       The Root SM-DS deletes the Event Record.
8.       The Root SM-DS confirms the deletion of the Event Record.

4.12.7 Discovery Request Procedure

The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with an Alternative SM-DS and the
Root SM-DS (cascade mode).     #

Figure 17: Discovery Request Procedure

Procedure:
1. to 3. In order to generate a Discovery Request, the LDS requests the eUICC to generate
         its Authentication information which contains (at least) the eUICC-Certificate and is
         signed by the eUICC.
4. to 5. The LDS establishes a secure communication to the Root SM-DS.
6.       The Root SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by checking the eUICC
         Authentication information.
7.       In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record is waiting, it delivers back:
            a. The address of the SM-DP+, where an action is waiting.
                or
            b. The rest of the following actions:
                     i. The address of the Alternative SM-DS, where an Event Record can be
                        retrieved.
                    ii. The LDS establishes a secure connection to the Alternative SM-DS.
                   iii. The Alternative SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by
                        checking the eUICC Authentication information.
                   iv. In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record has been
                        received, it delivers back the address of the SM-DP+, where an action
                        is waiting.
8.      The LPA establishes a connection to the SM-DP+ and the waiting action can be
        performed.

4.13 Profile Policy Management

4.13.1 Introduction

The Profile Policy Management function provides mechanisms by which Mobile Service Providers are able to reinforce the conditions or policies (operational and business) under

which services are provided to the Subscriber. In some instances this MAY also include the enforcement of the policies set by the Subscriber.

Profile Policy Management MAY also be applied with other already existing Policy Enforcement technologies which are also subject to agreement by the Subscriber.

The realisation of the Profile Policy Management function is based on two key elements. The first element is the Profile Policy Enabler which is contained within the eUICC. The second element is a set of defined Profile Policy Rules which are required for the actual enforcement of specific policies.

4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirements

Policy no.           Description
POL1                 A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only be configured within a Profile.
POL2                 Each Profile MAY have Profile Policy Rules associated to itself.
POL3                 A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only apply to the Profile that contains it.
POL4                 [Void]
                     Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be able to resolve any Profile Policy Rule
POL5
                     conflict.
                     The updating of a Profile’s Policy Rules SHALL be restricted to the Profile
POL6
                     Owner.
                     The mechanism used for the update of a Profile Policy Rule SHALL be
POL7
                     atomic.
POL8                 The set of Profile Policy Rules SHALL be extensible for future releases.
POL9                 [Void]
                     A Profile Policy Rule SHALL be enforced whenever a Profile state change is
POL10
                     attempted.
                     Downloading and installing a Profile in a non-MEP-capable eUICC with the
POL11                Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of this Profile is not allowed’ (POL RULE1)
                     SHALL only be possible if no other Operational Profile is currently installed.
                     Downloading and installing a Profile with the POL RULE1 in an MEP-capable
POL11a
                     eUICC SHALL NOT be allowed.
                     The LPA and the eUICC SHALL prevent the downloading and installation of
POL12                a Profile containing Profile Policy Rules that conflict with the Profile Policy
                     Rules of the already installed Profiles.
                     A Profile Owner SHALL be able to unset the Profile Policy Rules of its Profile
POL13
                     using the ES6 interface.
                     If RPM is supported by the Managing SM-DP+, the LPA and the eUICC: a
                     Profile Owner SHALL be able to unset the Profile Policy Rules of its Profile
                     via a Managing SM-DP+ using the ES9+ interface.
POL13a               Note 1: For details refer to Section 5.4.2 Remote Profile Management
                     RequirementsFigure 32.
                     Note 2: The setting of Profile Policy Rules on the ES9+ interface is a
                     potential feature for a future release.
Policy no.           Description
                     Before a Profile is installed with Profile Policy Rules, the End User SHALL be
                     able to be notified if needed about the Profile Policy Rules and if notified, the
POL14
                     installation SHALL thereafter be conditional on End User Strong
                     Confirmation.
                     The request for End User consent for the installation of Profile Policy Rules
POL15                and Profile download MAY be combined into a single prompt therefore
                     requiring a single confirmation by the End User.
                     Where End User consent is required for the download of the Profile which
                     includes Policy Rules, the Mobile Service Provider SHALL be able to provide
POL15a               a message for the End User that MAY be displayed by the Device.
                     Note: Consideration should be made for the display of lengthy text on a
                     Device with a limited display.
                     Profile Policy Rules SHALL be enforced by the Profile Policy Enabler in the
POL16
                     eUICC.
                     The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL only support the Profile Policy Rules
POL17
                     defined in this specification.
                     The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL be capable of supporting all the Profile
POL18
                     Policy Rules as defined in this specification.
POL19                [Void]
                     Allowing the installation of a Profile with Profile Policy Rules SHALL be
POL20
                     subject to compliance with local regulatory requirements.
                     Profile Policy Rules MAY be configured for Profiles only if the Profile Owner
                     can be identified in the Metadata.
POL21
                     NOTE: POLPPE requirements depend on the identification of the Profile
                     Owner.

Table 30: Profile Policy Management Requirements

4.13.3 Policy Rules

Policy no.            Description
                      The Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL only
POL RULE1
                      be supported by non MEP-capable eUICCs.
                      The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be
POL RULE2
                      supported.
POL RULE3             [Void]

Table 31: Policy Rules Requirements

4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirements

The Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) contains the description of the Profile Policy Rules (PPR) that can be set in a Profile to be installed in that eUICC. The RAT is defined at eUICC platform level and is used by the Profile Policy Enabler (PPE) and the LPA to determine whether or not a Profile that contains PPRs is authorised and can be installed on the eUICC.

The RAT is provisioned at eUICC manufacturing time; or during the initial Device setup provided that there is no installed Operational Profile. The OEM or EUM is responsible for setting the content of the RAT.

The RAT MAY contain:

•A set of entries permitting the use of specific Profile Policy Rules,

•Operator-specific entries that provide exceptions to the requirement to obtain Strong Confirmation prior to download and installation of a Profile that contains specific Profile Policy Rules.

Policy no.               Description
                         The Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) SHALL be stored in the Profile
POLPPE1
                         Policy Enabler in the eUICC.
                         The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL enforce the contents of the installed
POLPPE2
                         RAT at (and only at) Profile installation time.
                         The RAT SHALL allow multiple Profile Owners to have Profile Policy Rules
POLPPE3
                         enabled in their Profiles.
                         The RAT SHALL be able to support specific configurations which allow a
POLPPE4
                         set of, or all, Profile Policy Rules for any Profile Owner.
                         The RAT SHALL only be installed at pre-issuance or during the initial
POLPPE5
                         Device setup provided there are no Operational Profiles installed.
POLPPE6                  The RAT SHALL NOT be affected by the eUICC Memory Reset function.
                         To support identifiable regulatory requirement, a RAT SHALL be able to
POLPPE7                  support a specific configuration which MAY forbid any Profile Owner to set
                         a specific Profile Policy Rule.
POLPPE8                  [Void]
                         Where the RAT allows the Profile Policy Rules for the Profile being
POLPPE9
                         installed, installation SHALL proceed as stated in POL14.
                         The RAT SHALL be able to support a setting to display the consequences
POLPPE10                 of the Profile Policy Rules to the End User and require Strong
                         Confirmation before the download of the Profile.
                         The OEM or EUM SHALL be responsible for provisioning the RAT into the
POLPPE11
                         eUICC.
                         A RAT MAY be configured in the eUICC. If the RAT is not present, the
POLPPE12
                         eUICC SHALL regard this as a RAT with no entry.

Table 32: Profile Policy Enabler Requirements

4.14 Certification

4.14.1 eUICC Certification Requirements

Req no.                     Description
CERTEU1                     The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS UP accredited [13].
                            The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance
CERTEU2
                            with GSMA SGP.22 [24].
Req no.                   Description
                          The eUICC SHALL be certified according to the Protection Profile
CERTEU3
                          defined by the GSMA [25].
                          The EUM compliance to CERTEU1 and the eUICC product
CERTEU3a                  compliance to CERTEU2 and CERTEU3 SHALL be referenced via a
                          digital identification associated to the eUICC product.
                          The eUICC SHALL be certified according to the compliance
CERTEU3b
                          programme defined in SGP.24 [27].
                          The eUICC Protection Profile SHALL at least include the following
CERTEU4                   elements: ISD-R, Profile storage, isolation of Profiles, and Telecom
                          Framework.
                          The eUICC Protection Profile SHALL be equivalent to the eUICC
CERTEU5
                          Protection Profile defined in SGP.05 [21] .
                          The Evaluation Assurance Level of the eUICC Protection Profile
CERTEU6                   SHALL be (at least) EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and
                          ALC_DVS.2 (EAL 4+) [44].
                          The eUICC public key Certificate used for authentication SHALL
CERTEU7
                          contain the EID.
                          The eUICC public key Certificate(s) SHALL contain the technical
CERTEU8                   reference of the product, for example the Common Criteria certification
                          [53] report number.
CERTEU9                   The EUM Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL chain to eSIM CA(s).
                          The eUICC Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by the EUM using its EUM
CERTEU10
                          Private Key corresponding to its Certificate (CERTEU9).
                          Any eUICC Certificate(s) modification SHALL be end-to-end protected
CERTEU10a
                          between the eUICC and issuing EUM.
CERTEU11                  [Void]
                          If the eUICC private key(s) are modifiable, it SHALL use the
                          mechanism defined in the GlobalPlatform specification with a minimum
CERTEU12
                          security level corresponding to the AES algorithm using key length of
                          128 bits.
                          If the eUICC’s EUM Certificate is updatable, then the eUICC SHALL
CERTEU13
                          support a secure mechanism to update its EUM Certificate.
                          If the digital identification stored on the eUICC as defined in ELG26 is
CERTEU13a                 updatable, then the eUICC SHALL support a secure mechanism to
                          update this digital identification.
                          If the eUICC’s CI public keys are updatable, then the eUICC SHALL
CERTEU14
                          support a secure mechanism to update its CI public keys.
                          If the eUICC’s Certificate is updatable, then the eUICC SHALL support
CERTEU15
                          a secure mechanism to update its eUICC Certificate.
                          Where appropriate, the eUICC SHOULD be certified according to
CERTEU16
                          EMVCo Security Evaluation process [31].
                          Field-Test eUICCs SHALL use a certified hardware according to
CERTEU17
                          SGP.24 [27].
Req no.                   Description
                          An eUICC certified according to SGP.24 [27] SHALL be eligible to be
CERTEU18
                          issued with an eUICC certificate that chains up to GSMA CI.
                          The eUICC SHALL provide a means to uniquely identify its
CERTEU19
                          certification(s).

Table 33: eUICC Certification Requirements

4.14.2 Device Compliance Requirement

Req no.                 Description
CERTDEV1                The LPA SHALL comply with SGP.24 [27].
                        The certification process for Integrated TRE using Remote Memory
                        residing outside the SoC as per DIE1 SHALL cover the Integrated TRE,
CERTDEV2
                        internal and external SoC interfaces used for Integrated eUICC
                        implementation, and Remote Memory residing outside the SoC.
                        The certification process for Integrated TRE implementions SHALL
                        ensure that software and data stored in Remote Memory residing
CERTDEV3
                        outside the SoC as per DIE1 are protected against confidentiality,
                        integrity, and availability attacks.
                        The certification process for Integrated TRE implementions SHALL
CERTDEV4                ensure that any interfaces between the Integrated TRE and the SoC are
                        protected against confidentiality and integrity attacks.

Table 34: Device Compliance Requirement

4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification Requirements

Req no.                  Description
                         The SM-DP+ provider SHALL be required to declare product (SM-DP+)
CERTDP1
                         compliance with GSMA SGP.22 [24].
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL be accredited according to GSMA FS.08 SAS-SM
CERTDP2
                         Standard [22] and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology [32].
                         SM-DP+ elements SHALL use Hardware Security Modules (HSM) for
                         cryptographic related operations (key storage, derivation, cryptographic
CERTDP3                  operations).
                         Note: This is to be covered by the SAS documents “HSM certified
                         according to FIPS 140-2 level 3 or higher”
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL implement privileges isolation (Log, Audit,
CERTDP4
                         Operation, and Administration).
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL implement operating system hardening
CERTDP5
                         mechanisms.
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL implement separation of control, user and
CERTDP6
                         administrative planes.
CERTDP7                  [Void]
CERTDP8                  [Void]
                         The private key of SM-DP+ Certificates used for Profile Binding with
CERTDP9
                         eUICC SHALL be protected and stored in HSM according to CERTDP3.
Req no.                  Description
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to mitigate
CERTDP10
                         against Denial of Service attacks.
CERTDP11                 [Void]
                         The SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) for authentication and Profile
CERTDP12
                         binding SHALL chain to eSIM CA(s).
                         The SM-DP+ SHALL support at least one eSIM CA for the purpose of
CERTDP13
                         the operations listed in CERTDP12.

Table 35: SM-DP+ Certification Requirements

4.14.4 SM-DS Certification Requirements

Req no.                  Description
                         The SM-DS provider SHALL be required to declare product compliance
CERTDS1
                         with GSMA SGP.22 [24].
                         The SM-DS SHALL be accredited according to GSMA FS.08 SAS-SM
CERTDS2
                         Standard [22] and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology [32].
                         The SM-DS SHALL implement isolation of privileges (Log, Audit,
CERTDS3
                         Operation, and Administration).
                         The SM-DS SHALL implement operating system hardening
CERTDS4
                         mechanisms.
                         The SM-DS SHALL implement separation of control, user and
CERTDS5
                         administrative planes.
CERTDS6                  [Void]
CERTDS7                  [Void]
                         The SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) for authentication SHALL chain to
CERTDS8
                         eSIM CA(s).
                         The SM-DS SHALL support at least one eSIM CA for the purpose of the
CERTDS9
                         operations listed in CERTDS8.

Table 36: SM-DS Certification Requirements

4.14.5 LPA Certification Requirements

Req no.                  Description
                         There SHALL be a certification process for all the LPA elements
CERTLPA1
                         communicating with Remote SIM Provisioning entities.
CERTLPA2                 [Void]
CERTLPA3                 [Void]
CERTLPA4                 The LPD SHALL authenticate the SM-DP+ during the TLS session.
CERTLPA5                 The LDS SHALL authenticate the SM-DS during the TLS session.
                         The LPA SHALL accept Certificates signed by a GSMA CI for SM-DP+
CERTLPA6
                         and SM-DS authentication used in TLS session.

Table 37: LPA Certification Requirements

4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management Requirements

Req no.                  Description
CERTPK1                  The eUICC SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+.
CERTPK2                  The LPD SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+.
CERTPK3                  The LDS SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS.
                         The LDS authentication of an SM-DS using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK4                  Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication
                         SHALL stop.
                         The LPD authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK5                  Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication
                         SHALL stop.
                         The SM-DP+ authentication of an eUICC using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK6                  Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication
                         SHALL stop.
                         The eUICC Authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK7                  Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication
                         SHALL stop.
                         The eSIM CA(s) SHALL revoke the Public Key Certificate of any entities
CERTPK8
                         (SM-DP+, SM-DS, EUM) if it is compromised (e.g. private key theft).
                         The eUICC SHALL support at least one eSIM CA for the purpose of the
CERTPK9
                         operations listed in EUICC62.
                         A Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:
                            • it has a valid signature
                            • it is signed by a GSMA CI, or by an Independent eSIM CA, or a
                              trusted chain of Certificates up to a GSMA CI or an Independent
                              eSIM CA. Certificate Path validation SHALL follow the process
CERTPK10                      defined in RFC 5280 [1].
                            • it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in the trust chain has
                              been revoked
                            • it has not expired
                         If any of these applicable verifications fail, the Public Key Certificate
                         SHALL be considered as invalid.
                         A TLS Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:
                            • it has a valid signature
                            • it is signed by an eSIM CA or a public trusted CA, or a trusted
                              chain of Certificates up to an eSIM CA or to a public trusted CA.
                              Certificate path validation SHALL follow the process defined in
CERTPK10a                     RFC 5280 [1].
                            • it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in its trust chain has
                              been revoked
                            • it has not expired
                         If any of these applicable verifications fail, the TLS Public Key
                         Certificate SHALL be considered as invalid.
                         The eUICC, LPA, SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL have knowledge of
CERTPK11
                         revoked Public Key Certificates.
Req no.                  Description
                         Note: This requirement also applies to TLS Certificates that chain to
                         either an eSIM CA or a public trusted CA.
                         It SHALL be possible for the Profile Owner to ensure that the
                         Certificates of the SM-DP+ servers used during the Profile Management
CERTPK12
                         Lifecycle of a Profile (e.g. download of a Profile, RPM) chain to a
                         specific eSIM CA Certificate.
CERTPK13                 The eUICC SHOULD support at least one GSMA CI.
                         The use of the Independent eSIM CA Certificate SHALL NOT
CERTPK14                 compromise any operations that use the Certificate provided by the
                         GSMA CI.

Table 38: Public Key Certificates Management Requirements

4.15 eUICC OS Update

At the time of writing this specification it is understood that other industry bodies may be developing standards that will define harmonised and more robust methods of updating UICC operating system software. Accordingly, readers of this specification are advised that the publishers reserve the right to explicitly amend features in this specification related to software update in future versions.

There may need to be some industry procedures to manage eUICC OS Updates that affect installed Profiles.

Note: Such a mechanism cannot be included in the RSP Test Specification, nor can it be restricted by the Protection Profile.

Req no.            Description
                   An eUICC SHOULD support a mechanism to allow an eUICC OS Update. This
OSUpd1
                   mechanism SHALL be secure.
                   If such a mechanism is used, the eSIM Products for which the compliance is
OSUpd2             affected by the eUICC OS update SHALL maintain compliance as specified in
                   SGP.24 [27].
                   If such a mechanism is used, after applying an eUICC OS Update, the eUICC
OSUpd3             OS Manager SHALL receive the status of the execution of the eUICC OS
                   Update.

Table 39: eUICC OS Update Requirements

4.15.1 eUICC OS Update Information

If the eUICC support a mechanism to allow an eUICC OS Update, the Device needs to know some information in order to properly schedule the eUICC OS Update and to handle the eUICC services.

To perform the eUICC OS Update and manage the End User interactions according to the Device Manufacturer’s choice of user experience, the following information are needed:

•The Device needs to know if an eUICC OS Update is available for its eUICC; and also which supplier is providing the eUICC OS Update. When and how this detection is performed is out of scope of this specification.

•Before the eUICC OS Update is applied to the eUICC, the Device needs to know if the update will impact the eUICC services, and whether eUICC reboot(s) will be needed.

•At the end of the eUICC OS Update, the Device needs to have a confirmation that the eUICC OS Update is finished and a status to know if it was successful or not.

These information are provided to the eUICC OS Manager delivered over the ESoem interface.

The management of the eUICC OS Update itself (including the deployment process, the way the Device triggers the eUICC OS Update, the retry policy in case of failure (if applicable) and the internal management inside the eUICC) is out of scope of this specification.

Req no.                  Description
                         The eUICC OS Update package(s) SHALL have associated eUICC OS
INFOOS1
                         Update information.
                         The eUICC OS Update information SHALL include a field for the
INFOOS2
                         identification of the EUM which provides the eUICC OS Update
                         The eUICC OS Update information SHALL include a field for the the
INFOOS3                  version of the GSMA SGP.22 specification [24] supported by the eUICC
                         after the OS Update.
                         The eUICC OS Update information SHALL include the impact of the
INFOOS4
                         eUICC OS Update on the eUICC services.
                         The eUICC OS Update information SHALL indicate if eUICC reboots will
INFOOS5
                         be needed during or after the eUICC OS Update

Table 40: eUICC OS Update Information Requirements

4.16 Enterprise Requirements

The requirements contained in this section are intended to be used solely in support of the
Subscriptions obtained by the Enterprise for its internal use as part of its business
operations.
These requirements are to be considered as complementary to the consumer solution.
The following principles apply to Enterprise:
   •   An Enterprise can request the installation and management of Profiles from more
       than one Profile Owner on the eUICC
   •   The Enterprise can request the Profile Owner to remotely manage (enable, disable,
       delete) their own Profiles, on Enterprise Capable Devices.
Req no.                 Description
                        Enterprise Capable Device requirements SHALL only apply to Devices
ENT1                    owned by an Enterprise. Implementation and/or related processes are
                        Device Manufacturer specific.
                        It is Optional for the Device, the eUICC and the SM-DP+ to support the
ENT2
                        Enterprise requirements defined in this document.
                        It SHALL NOT be possible to associate more than one Enterprise to a
ENT3
                        Device at any point in time.
                        The Enterprise SHALL be able to request that only Enterprise Profiles can
                        be installed on an Enterprise Capable Device; this has no impact on other
                        already installed Profiles.
ENT4
                        When MEP is supported by both the Device and its eUICC, this
                        requirement SHALL only be enforced if the number of non-Enterprise
                        Profiles that can be enabled according to ENT14 is zero.
                        Where both the Enterprise Capable Device and its eUICC support
ENT5                    Multiple Enabled Profiles (MEP), it SHALL be possible to enable more
                        than one Enterprise Profile on that Device.
                        Only the Profile Owner, acting on behalf of the Enterprise, SHALL be able
ENT6                    to set Enterprise Rules for its Enterprise Profile(s), at the Profile ordering
                        phase.
                        For an Enterprise Capable Device, it SHALL be possible for the
                        Enterprise to control whether the End User can locally: enable any Profile,
ENT7
                        enable only Enterprise Profiles, or enable only the specific Enterprise
                        Profile. Strong Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                        When receiving a request to:
                            •   restrict the End User to Enterprise Profiles only and a non-
ENT8                            Enterprise Profile is already enabled, or
                            • restrict the End User to the specific Enterprise Profile and a
                                different Profile is enabled,
                        the eUICC SHALL reject the requested restriction.
                        A globally unique identifier and associated Enterprise name SHALL be
ENT9
                        provided in the Profile Metadata of the Enterprise Profile.
                        The download and installation of the Enterprise Profile SHALL require
ENT10                   user confirmation in response to a prompt indicating the type of Profile
                        and the associated consequences of installing this Enterprise Profile.
                        On a Non-Enterprise Capable Device:
                            •   It SHALL be possible for an Enterprise Profile without Enterprise
                                Rules to be installed and used.
ENT11                       •   It SHALL NOT be possible to install an Enterprise Profile with
                                Enterprise Rules
                            •   It SHALL NOT be possible to update Enterprise Rules of an
                                installed Enterprise Profile
                        The eUICC SHALL reject the download of an Enterprise Profile when a
ENT12
                        Profile with POL RULE1 set is already installed.
                        For an Enterprise Capable Device, there SHALL be a mechanism for the
ENT13
                        End User to allow or disallow the installation of an Enterprise Profile with
                        Enterprise Rules. This mechanism SHALL only be in effect if there is no
                        Enterprise Profile with Enterprise Rules already installed.
                        It SHALL be possible for the Enterprise to indicate the number of non-
ENT14                   Enterprise Profiles that can be enabled on the Enterprise Capable Device
                        when MEP is supported by both the Device and its eUICC.

Table 41: Enterprise Requirements

4.17 LPA PRoxy

4.17.1 LPA PRoxy Overview

Figure 18: LPA PRoxy Architecture (with LPA configuration in the Device)

The LPR is a “LPA PRoxy” acting as an intermediary between a Profile Content Management Platform hosted by the Profile Owner and the Enabled Profile of the eUICC to improve performance, in the same way the LPD is used between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC for Profile download purposes.

While the Profile Content Management Platform of the Profile Owner has the role of managing the content of the Profile, it might redirect the LPR towards a Delegated Profile Content Management Platform used by a third party to manage a subset of the Profile that

has been delegated. This is applicable in Simple Mode, Delegated Management, or Authorised Management.

The Device Application may be used to trigger the LPR and may receive status regarding the information exchanged between the Management Platform and the eUICC.

The LPA Proxy MAY be implemented partially outside the LPA.

4.17.2 LPR Procedures

The figure below shows the expected behavior of the LPR and its involvement in the end to end processes. In addition, it highlights the optional use of a Delegated Platform Identifier (DPI) during triggering that allows redirection to a Delegated Profile Content Management Platform. The following management modes SHALL be supported: Simple Mode, Delegated Management, or Authorised Management.

Three methods may trigger the connection request from the LPA to the Profile Content Management Platform

•     An automatic triggering after the enabling of a Profile (this mode is configured in the
      Profile to be activated or not activated)
•     An RPM command sent from a SM-DP+ to the LPA
•     A specific API command sent from a Device Application to the LPA

Figure 19: LPA Proxy Procedure

Start Conditions:
    a.      A Profile which requests the automatic trigger of the LPR procedure is enabled;
            an optional parameter DPI may be attached to this request to signify an expected
            connection to a Delegated PCMP.
            OR
b.      A RPM Profile update command which triggers the LPR procedure is received
        from the SM-DP+; an optional parameter DPI may be attached to this request to
        signify an expected connection to a Delegated PCMP.

OR

c.      A specific API command sent from a Device Application to the LPA to trigger the
        LPR procedure to initiate a Profile content management session (Card Content
        Management Session); an optional parameter DPI may be attached to this
        request to signify an expected connection to a Delegated PCMP.
Procedure:
   1.       The LPR requests the ICCID and the PCMP endpoint URI associated to the
            Profile Content Management Platform from the eUICC.
   2.       The eUICC sends the ICCID of the Enabled Profile and the PCMP address to the
            LPR.
   3.       The LPR connects to the PCMP, with the DPI as a parameter if provided during
            the initialisation of the LPR Procedure. This step is followed by step 4 (sending
            the lists of C-APDU from the PCMP) or 10 (sending the URI of a Delegated
            PCMP) or 18 (end of processing).

Note: Steps 4 to 9 MAY be skipped if the PCMP requests a redirection to the DPCMP

4.       The PCMP provides a list of Command APDUs (C-APDUs) and the AID of the
         targeted application of the Enabled Profile.
5.       The LPR opens a logical channel to the AID of the targeted application of the
         Enabled Profile.
6.       The LPR transmits the list of C-APDUs to the targeted application of the Enabled
         Profile within the MNO-SD.
7.       The targeted application sends back the list of Response APDU (R-APDU) to the
         LPR.
8.       The LPR closes the logical channel.
9.       The LPR sends the list of R-APDUs to the PCMP, and in addition, the DPI
         parameter if provided during the LPR procedure initialisation request.
         Additionally, this step is equivalent to step 3: the LPR connects to the PCMP,
         with the DPI as a parameter, if provided during the initialisation of the LPR
         procedure.
         This step is followed by step 4 (sending a new list of C-APDUs from the PCMP)
         or 10 (sending the URI of a Delegated PCMP) or 18 (end of processing).

Note: Steps 10 to 17 MAY be skipped if the DPI parameter is not provided during the LPR procedure initialisation request.

10.      The PCMP provides the address of the DPCMP to the LPR to initialise the
         redirection.
11.      The LPR connects to the DPCMP address.
12.      The DPCMP provides a list of Command APDUs (C-APDUs) and the AID of the
         targeted application of the Enabled Profile.
13.      The LPR opens a logical channel to the AID of the targeted application of the
         Enabled Profile.
14.      The LPR transmits the list of C-APDUs to the targeted application of the Enabled
         Profile within the MNO-SD
15.      The targeted application sends back the list of Response APDUs (R-APDUs) to
         the LPR.
16.      The LPR closes the logical channel,
17.      This step is equivalent to step 3: The LPR connects to the PCMP, with the DPI
         as a parameter if provided during the initialisation of the LPR Procedure.
         This step is followed by step 4 (sending the lists of C-APDU from the PCMP) or
         10 (sending the URI of a Delegated PCMP) or 18 (end of processing).

Note: Step 18 is used by the PCMP to end the processing

18.      The PCMP sends an acknowledgement to the LPR about the end of processing.
   Note: When initialising the connection between the LPR and the PCMP or the DPCMP, a
   HTTPs session SHALL be established between the LPR and respectively the PCMP and
   DPCMP based on a public key of the Root Certificate stored in the Device which
   includes authentication using the TLS Certificate, and may check for the presence of the
   adequate platform identifier in the TLS Certificate used for the TLS session.
End Condition:
      a.    The contents of the Enabled Profile have been updated according to updates
            received from either the PCMP, the DPCMP or both.

The following flow highlights the specific use of Notifications sent from the LPR to a specific Device Application(s). These Notifications can be used to inform the End User about the progress of the Profile management process.

Figure 20: Device Application Interaction with a LPA PRoxy

Start Conditions:
   a. One of the triggers to start a connection between a (D)PCMP and the eUICC has
      been initiated.
   b. A Device Application has been registered to receive Notifications during the Profile
      content management session.
Procedure:
    1.      The LPR requests the ICCID and the (D)PCMP endpoint URI associated to the
            Profile Content Management Platform from the eUICC.
    2.      The eUICC sends the ICCID of the Enabled Profile and the (D)PCMP address to
            the LPR.
    3.      The LPR connects to the (D)PCMP.
    3.1     The LPR sends a Notification about the operation status to the registered Device
            Application.
    4.      The (D)PCMP provides a list of Command APDUs (C-APDUs) and the AID of the
            targeted application of the Enabled Profile.
    4.1     The LPR sends a Notification about the operation status to the registered Device
            Application
    5.      The LPR opens a logical channel to the AID of the targeted application of the
            Enabled Profile.
    6.      The LPR transmits the list of C-APDUs to the targeted application of the Enabled
            Profile within the MNO-SD.
    6.1    The LPR sends a Notification about the operation status to the registered Device
           Application
    7.      The targeted application sends back the list of Response APDU (R-APDU) to the
            LPR.
    8.      The LPR closes the logical channel.
End Condition:
   c. The application of the Enabled Profile has been updated according to updates
      received from the (D)PCMP. The Device Application has been notified during the
      procedure execution.

4.17.3 LPA PRoxy Requirements

Req no.               Description
                      It is OPTIONAL for the Device, the eUICC, and the SM-DP+ to support
LPAPR1
                      the LPA Proxy requirements defined in this document.
                      The LPR SHALL be able to forward APDUs remotely sent from a Profile
                      Content Management Platform or from a Delegated Profile Content
LPAPR2
                      Management Platform to any application on the Enabled Profile.
                      Note: The mechanism cannot address a Disabled Profile
                      A mechanism allowing the LPR to connect to a Profile Content
LPAPR3
                      Management Platform address, each time the Profile is Enabled, SHALL
Req no.               Description
                      exist. This mechanism SHALL be executed on a best effort basis and
                      SHALL NOT impact otherwise the pending RSP operations.
                      The DPI used for redirection from a PCMP to a DPCMP, SHALL be able
LPAPR4
                      to be included in the Profile.
                      The Profile Content Management Platform address and the configuration
LPAPR5                (LPAPR3/deactivated) of the mechanism described in LPAPR3 SHALL
                      be included in the Profile.
                      The mechanism described in LPAPR3 SHALL be activated/deactivated
LPAPR6
                      by the Profile Owner.
                      It SHALL be possible for the PCMP to request redirects to some
                      Delegated Profile Content Management Platform(s).
                      A redirection MAY happen at any point of time during the data exchange
LPAPR7
                      between the PCMP and the LPR.
                      The PCMP internal routing logic MAY use the DPI parameter, if
                      provided, the ICCID and any other contextual data.
                      The identifier parameter for the routing to a Delegated Profile Content
LPAPR8
                      Management Platform, called the DPI, SHALL be globally unique.
                      The protocol used between the LPR and its Profile Content Management
                      Platform SHALL be able to transport all types of SCP designed to
LPAPR9
                      address the Enabled Profile through logical channels. E.g. this may
                      include SCP03 [29] and SCP11 [30].
                      When triggered, the LPR SHALL connect to the PCMP address retrieved
                      from the Enabled Profile. If the triggering method includes a DPI as a
LPAPR10               parameter, this parameter SHALL be added to the PCMP address. If a
                      DPI parameter is filled in the Enabled Profile, this parameter SHALL also
                      be added to the PCMP address.
                      The capability to use mobile network data for the LPA Proxy MAY be
LPAPR11               enabled/disabled by the End User.
                      The Default state SHALL be ‘enabled’.
                      The Device SHALL provide a means to Device Application to interact
LPAPR12               with LPA Proxy through this API. The requirements about this API are
                      detailed in LPAPR13 to LPAPR17.
                      The access to the LPA Proxy API by a Device Application SHALL be
LPAPR13
                      authorised by the Profile Owner of the Enabled Profile.
                      The Device SHALL offer a means for Device Applications to detect
LPAPR14
                      whether the LPA Proxy is deployed on the Device or not.
                      A triggering Device Application SHALL be able to register interest for
LPAPR15
                      receiving Notifications during the triggered session.
                      The LPA Proxy SHALL be able to send Notifications to the triggering
                      Device Application. These Notifications SHALL either
                          •   be contained in the command sequence retrieved from the
LPAPR16
                              Profile Content Management Platform (e.g. for task overview
                              message, initialisation or end of the process)
                          •   or generated locally (e.g. error Notifications)
Req no.               Description
                      The LPA SHOULD provide a mechanism to allow a Device Application
LPAPR17               to get progress or result information about an LPA Proxy operation
                      which it requested through an API.

Table 42: LPA Proxy Requirements

4.18 Device Change Support

This section describes use cases and requirements for the Device Change support.

4.18.1 Overview

An End User subscribes to a mobile service with a Mobile Service Provider, and installs one or more Profiles in their Device. After a while when the End User needs to use their Subscriptions on another Device, they can perform a Device Change process in order to install one or more Profiles related to their Subscriptions in the new Device.

The underlying mechanism for the Device Change process is based upon the download of the Profiles from the SM-DP+(s) as in the general Profile download procedure. As such, the Mobile Service Providers may need to update their backend systems such as HSS/AuC and BSS with respect to the newly installed Profiles, where the details are out of scope of the specification.

4.18.2 Device Change Procedure

Figure 21: Device Change Procedure

Start Conditions:
    a) The End User has an old Device containing one or more Profiles. The End User
        gets a new Device
    b) The old Device still has connectivity.
Procedure:
   1. The End User provides User Intent 'Device Change', indicates which Profiles they
      intend to move and optionally provides information (e.g. EID) of the new Device to
      the old Device.
   2. The old Device prepares Device Change of the installed Profiles that the End User
      wants to move, and optionally deletes the installed Profiles based upon the Mobile
      Service Providers’ configurations. This step can involve SM-DP+(s) and/or Mobile
      Service Providers servers. This may include an Eligibility Check for Device Change.
   3. The End User provides User Intent 'Add Profile' to the new Device.
      Steps 4 to 5 are repeated for every Profile the End User wants to move in the new
      Device. If the installation of one of the Profile fails during the Device Change
      operation with more than one Profile, the End User has to confirm to continue the
      Device Change procedure with the other Profiles.
   4. The new Device downloads and installs a Profile from the SM-DP+.
   5. (Optional) The Mobile Service Provider updates the backend system such as
      HSS/AuC and BSS.
   6. The Profiles can now be enabled using one of the mechanisms described in this
      specification.

4.18.3 Device Change Support Requirements

4.18.3.1 General Requirements

Req no.          Description
                 There SHALL be a means to ensure that the Profile prepared for the Device
DC1              Change is only downloaded to the target Device/eUICC intended by the initiator
                 (e.g. End User).
                 With regard to DC1, a Mobile Service Provider SHALL be able to enforce the
DC2
                 means if it wants.

Table 43: General Device Change Support Requirements

4.18.3.2 LPA Requirements for the old Device

Req no.          Description
                 It is OPTIONAL for the LPA to support the Device Change requirements as
DC-LPA-X1
                 defined in this section.
                 The LPA supporting Device Change SHALL support the Local Profile
                 Management Operation 'Device Change'. This operation SHALL allow the End
DC-LPA-X2
                 User to initiate Device Change for the selected Profile.
                 Strong Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                 The LPA supporting Device Change SHALL be able to request the Device
DC-LPA-X3
                 Change to the SM-DP+ specified in the installed Profile.
Req no.          Description
                 Note: This operation will be performed for every Profile that the End User wants
                 to move.
                 With regard to DC-LPA-X3, the Device Change request SHALL identify the
DC-LPA-X4
                 installed Profiles the End User wants to move.
                 The LPA supporting Device Change SHALL be able to process the Device
DC-LPA-X5
                 Change response(s).
                 With regard to DC-LPA-X5, the LPA SHALL be able to provide the relevant
DC-LPA-X6
                 information for the new Device to download the prepared Profile Package(s).
                 With regard to DC-LPA-X6, the LPA SHALL be able to provide the information
DC-LPA-X7        via the LUI (e.g., in a text or QR code format). Additional mechanisms (e.g., via
                 USB, Bluetooth, etc.) MAY be provided and are Device manufacturer specific.
                 If indicated by the SM-DP+ as per DC-SMDP-X8, if the deletion of an installed
DC-LPA-X8        Profile is requested, the LPA SHALL delete this Profile.
                 Strong Confirmation SHALL be enforced in such a case.
                 With regard to DC-LPA-X8 and DC-SMDP-X4, in consideration of the network
                 connectivity lost due to the Profile deletion, there SHALL be a means for the LPA
DC-LPA-X9
                 to deliver the Delete Notification of the deleted Profile to the SM-DP+ via the
                 information provided to the new Device as per DC-LPA-X6.
                 The LPA SHOULD display the Mobile Service Provider Message, if it is included
DC-LPA-X10
                 as per DC-SMDP-X9.
                 If the Profile has been deleted from the old Device as per DC-LPA-X8 and if it is
DC-LPA-X11       allowed as per DC-SMDP-X10, the End User MAY request, via the LPA, the SM-
                 DP+ to recover the deleted Profile on the old Device.
                 The LPA supporting Device Change SHALL be able to allow the End User to
DC-LPA-X12
                 move one or more Profiles installed in the eUICC.

Table 44: LPA Requirements for the old Device

4.18.3.3 LPA Requirements for the new Device

Req no.          Description
                 The LPA supporting Device Change SHALL be able to download the Profile
DC-LPA-Y1        prepared for the Device Change by using the information provided as per DC-
                 LPA-X6.
                 With respect to DC-LPA-X9, if the LPA is unable to immediately deliver the
DC-LPA-Y2        Delete Notification to the Notification Receivers, it SHALL be retained and sent
                 before completing the Device Change procedure.
                 If the installation of one Profile fails during the movement of more than one
DC-LPA-Y3        Profile from the old Device, the LPA SHOULD ask the End User if they want to
                 continue the Device Change operation.

Table 45: LPA Requirements for the new Device

4.18.3.4 SM-DP+ Requirements

Req no.          Description
                 It is OPTIONAL for the SM-DP+ to support the Device Change requirements as
DC-SMDP-X1
                 defined in this section.
Req no.          Description
                 The SM-DP+ supporting Device Change SHALL be able to notify the Mobile
DC-SMDP-X2
                 Service Provider of the progress of the Device Change.
                 On reception of the Device Change request, the SM-DP+ supporting Device
DC-SMDP-X3
                 Change SHALL be able to prepare a suitable Profile for the new Device.
                 With regard to DC-SMDP-X3, if a Profile with the same Network Access
                 Credentials is used, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to ensure that the Profile in the
DC-SMDP-X4
                 old Device is deleted before the new Device downloads the prepared Profile
                 Package.
                 With regard to DC-SMDP-X3, if a Profile with the same Network Access
DC-SMDP-X5       Credentials is used, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to ensure that the Profile in the
                 old Device is deleted before the Profile in the new Device becomes usable.
                 On reception of the Device Change request, the SM-DP+ SHALL respond with
DC-SMDP-X6
                 the processing result of the request on behalf of the Mobile Service Provider.
                 With regard to DC-SMDP-X6, the response indicating success SHALL be able to
DC-SMDP-X7       provide information for the new Device to download the prepared Profile
                 Package.
                 With regard to DC-SMDP-X6, the response indicating success SHALL be able to
DC-SMDP-X8       indicate whether the old Device has to delete the Profile that was identified in the
                 Device Change request.
                 With regard to DC-SMDP-X6, the response indicating success SHALL be able to
DC-SMDP-X9
                 include a Mobile Service Provider Message to be displayed to the End User.
                 With regard to DC-SMDP-X8DC-SMDP-X6, the response indicating that the old
                 Device has to delete the Profile SHALL be able to additionally indicate whether
                 the old Device is allowed to request the recovery of the deleted Profile, for the
                 case where the Profile has been deleted but there is a permanent error in
DC-SMDP-X10      installing the prepared Profile on the new Device.
                 NOTE: A permanent error indicates that Profile installation failed due to an error
                 processing the prepared Profile in the eUICC except following temporary errors:
                     •     Insufficient memory for the Profile, or
                     •     Interruption during the Profile installation
                 If the End User requests the recovery of the Profile on the old Device as per DC-
                 LPA-X1 and if the SM-DP+ received a notification from the new Device indicating
DC-SMDP-X11      that there was a permanent error in installing the prepared Profile on the new
                 Device, the SM-DP+ SHALL provide the old Device with a Profile for the
                 recovery.

Table 46: SM-DP+ Requirements

5 Operational Procedures

5.1 LPA Initiated Download

5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirements

Req no.                  Description
LID1                     [Void]
LID2                     [Void]

Table 47: LPA Initiated Download Requirements

5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedure

This following procedure describes the Events that are part of the Profile Package download and installation procedure initiated by the LPA.

Figure 22: Profile Download Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.         The Subscriber has completed the Subscription process to the selected
               Mobile Service Provider offer.
    b.         The Profile ordering process related to this Subscription has been completed
               (i.e. an assigned Protected Profile Package is stored on the SM-DP+).
Procedure:
    1.         The LPA initiates Profile Package download and identifies the address of the
               SM-DP+ where the Profile is stored and available for download (via e.g. URL,
               QR code, manual input, etc.) as well as other information provided (e.g.
               Token, SMDPId, Confirmation Code).
    2.         The LPA authenticates the SM-DP+ through establishing a TLS connection
               with the SM-DP+, and verifying the SMDPid if such information has been
               provided.
    3. to 4. The LPA gets an eUICC challenge
    5. to 6. The LPA sends the eUICC challenge and any other relevant information to the
               the SM-DP+.
    7. to 9. The SM-DP+ signs the eUICC challenge, and generates a DP_Challenge to
               be sent back to the eUICC.
    10.        The LPA sends the material received by the SM-DP+ and the AC Token to
               the eUICC; the eUICC checks the SMDPid and authenticates the SM-DP+.
    11.        The eUICC sends back a signed set of information including the
               DP_Challenge, the AC Token, the EID and its Certificate to the LPA.
    12.        The End User confirms the download of the Profile, optionally with the display
               of the Profile name of the Mobile Service Provider.
    13.        The LPA sends the set of information received in Step 11 from the eUICC to
               the SM-DP+.
    14.        The SM-DP+ verifies the signature; the eUICC is authenticated.
    15. to 16. OPTIONAL: The Eligibility Check and Profile binding functions are performed
               by the SM-DP+.
    17. to 22. OPTIONAL
    17.        The Mobile Service Provider and Operator is notified about the Profile
               Package that is about to be downloaded.
    18.        If the Mobile Service Provider or Operator has been notified, it MAY request to
               stop the download process by indicating an error code to the SM-DP+.
    19.        If the Mobile Service Provider or Operator sends an error code to the SM-
               DP+, the SM-DP+ stops the download process and indicates the error code to
               the LPA.
    20.        The LPA notifies the End User with an appropriate message.
    21. to 22. The SM-DP+ MAY receive information from the Operator to prepare the
               appropriate Profile Package.
    23. to 25. The Bound Profile Package is sent to the eUICC and installed on the eUICC.
    26.        The Profile Package download report is sent from the SM-DP+ to the Mobile
               Service Provider and Operator.
End Condition:
a.       The Profile is installed in the eUICC in a Disabled state

5.2 Profile Download with Activation Code

5.2.1 Activation Code Requirements

Req no.              Description
                      Where used, the Activation Code SHALL trigger the download of a Bound
AC1
                      Profile Package from a specific SM-DP+.
                      The Activation Code SHALL comprise of the following parameters:
                        • SM-DP+ address
                        • Activation Code Token (Includes OPTIONAL Confirmation Code
AC2
                          Required Flag)
                        • SMDPid (OPTIONAL)
                        • Reference to eSIM CA Certificate (OPTIONAL)
                     The Activation Code Token SHALL be able to include a parameter indicating
                     whether a Confirmation Code is required or not.
                     If such a Confirmation Code is required, the LPA SHALL ask the End User
AC3                  to input a Confirmation Code. The SM-DP+ SHALL verify the Confirmation
                     Code before delivering the Bound Profile Package.
                     Note: How the Confirmation Code is created and provided to the End User is
                     out of scope of this specification.
                     The Activation Code SHALL be verified by the SM-DP+ before delivering the
AC4
                     Bound Profile Package.
                     The Activation Code input in the LPA by the End User SHALL support at
AC5                  least manual typing and, if a camera is available on the Device, QR code
                     scanning.
AC6                  [Void]
AC7                  [Void]
                     Following the Activation Code procedure, the Profile Package download
AC8
                     procedure SHALL be used.
                     The Activation Code procedure SHALL preserve eco-system security,
AC9
                     privacy and validation of User Intent.
                     The Activation Code procedure SHALL be used for the sole purpose of
                     downloading a Profile package to the targeted eUICC. The Activation Code
AC10
                     procedure SHALL prevent sending IMEI and EID information to a non-
                     authenticated SM-DP+.
                     The Activation Code SHALL uniquely identify the SM-DP+. It SHALL be
AC11                 possible for the Activation Code to be uniquely linked to an individual Mobile
                     Service Provider.
                     The Activation Code request to the SM-DP+ SHALL be extended by the
AC12
                     eUICC with the EID after the specific SM-DP+ has been authenticated.

Table 48: Activation Code Requirements

5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure

The Activation Code procedure defines a common functionality which allows the Subscriber or the End User on behalf of the Subscriber to “activate” a Device by means of requesting the download of an Operational Profile from the Device itself.

Figure 23: Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure

Start Conditions:
    1.      A Subscription has been established by the Subscriber.
2.     Activation Code material and optionally a Confirmation Code has been provided
       to the SM-DP+ (Step 1), and an Activation Code has been provided to the End
       User and optionally a Confirmation Code (side channel) (Step 2).
Procedure:
   3.       The End User inputs the Activation Code to the LPA through the LUI.
   4.       The LPA parses the Activation Code parameters to recognise the SM-DP+
            address, the Activation Code Token, the LPA Mode and optionally the SMDPid.
            In addition, the LPA MAY parse in the Activation Token the information that a
            Confirmation Code is required.
   5.       If the Confirmation Code parameter in the Activation Code Token is set to
            “require Confirmation Code”, the End User is prompted to input a Confirmation
            Code provided to them by the issuing Mobile Service Provider.
   6.       The Activation Code download procedure is initiated by the LPA. The LPA
            requests a nonceeUICC from the eUICC.
   7.       The eUICC creates a nonceeUICC associated with the supported eUICC
            Specification Version Number (eSVN).
   8.       The eUICC transmits the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to
            the LPA.
   9.       The LPA sends the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to the SM-
            DP+.

Note: Prior to step 9, a HTTPs session SHALL be established between the LPA and the SM-DP+ based on a public key of the Root Certificate stored in the Device which includes authentication using the TLS Certificate and checking for the presence of the SMDPid in the TLS Certificate used for the TLS session.

10.     Upon receiving the nonceeUICC and the associated eSVN, the SM-DP+ creates
        nonceSMDP and signs both the nonceSMDP and the nonceeUICC.
11.     The SM-DP+ sends the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the LPA.
12.     The LPA collects the Activation Code parameters as well as the Device
        information needed for the Eligibility Check procedure and optionally the
        Confirmation Code and transmits them with the signed nonceeUICC and
        nonceSMDP to the eUICC.
13.     If configured in the Activation Code, the eUICC and the LPA checks whether the
        SMDPid configured in the AC and the SMDPid within the SM-DP+ Certificate for
        the Profile installation (called CERT.DPauth in SGP.22 [24]) are the same (in
        case of failure, the download SHALL NOT proceed). If configured in the
        Activation Code, the eUICC and the LPA checks whether the eSIM CA
        Certificate, and the eSIM CA Certificate linked with the SM-DP+ for the Profile
        installation (called CERT.DPauth in SGP.22 [24]) are the same (in case of
        failure, the download SHALL NOT proceed).
14.     The eUICC checks the signature attached to the nonceeUICC. The SM-DP+ is at
        this stage authenticated by the eUICC. The eUICC generates key material that
        will be used for the session key establishment. The eUICC signs a set of
        information with the eUICC private key which includes:
        a. The nonceSMDP
        b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the
            preparation of the Bound Profile Package
        c. Activation Code parameters
        d. The Device and eUICC information
        e. Optionally the Confirmation Code
15.     The eUICC sends the signed set of information to the LPA in addition to:
        a. The nonceSMDP
        b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the
            preparation of the Bound Profile Package
        c. Activation Code parameters
        d. The Device and eUICC information
        e. The eUICC Certificate which includes the EID
        f. The EUM Certificate
        g. Optionally the Confirmation Code
16.     The LPA sends the whole set of information received from the eUICC to the SM-
        DP+.
17.     The SM-DP+ checks the EUM Certificate with the CI Public Key. The SM-DP+
        checks the signature of the nonceSMDP; the eUICC is at this stage
        authenticated by the SM-DP+.
18.     The SM-DP+ proceeds with the eligibility check based on the transmitted
        information (EID, Device information, eUICC information, eSVN).
19.     The SM-DP+ checks the Activation Code parameters and optionally the
        Confirmation Code to retrieve the referenced Profile Package.
20.     The Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC:
         a. The SM-DP+ establishes session keys with the eUICC.
         b. A Bound Profile Package is prepared on the basis of the eUICC session key
             material and is downloaded and installed on the eUICC.
         c. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and the
             Mobile Service Provider and Operator is notified by the SM-DP+.
         d. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged by the
             eUICC to the LPA which notifies the End User of the status.
End Conditions:
      a) A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a
         Disabled state.
      b) The LPA MAY offer the Profile for enablement by the End User.

5.3 Local Profile Management

5.3.1 Local Profile Management Procedures

5.3.1.1 Enable Profile

This procedure performs the enabling of a target Profile. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.

Figure 24: Enable Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.     The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC.
    b.     The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
    c.     The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
           Management.
Procedure:
    1.     The End User makes a Profile enable request on the LPA.
    2.     User Intent is verified.
    3.     The LPA sends a Profile enable operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the
           eUICC.
If another Profile is currently enabled, then steps 4 through 6 are performed;
otherwise, execution of the procedure continues at step 7.
4.    The ISD-R checks if applied Profile Policy Rules on the currently Enabled Profile
      permit the Profile to be disabled
5.    If there is a conflict with Profile Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and
      informs the End User via the LPA.
6.    The currently Enabled Profile is disabled
7.    The target Profile is enabled.
8.    The ISD-R informs the LPA of the enabling of the Profile.
9.    The End User is informed via the LPA.
10.   The ISD-R generates and stores enable Notifications for all Notification Receivers
      configured in the Profile Metadata of the target Profile. If this procedure caused
      another Profile to be disabled, then the ISD-R also generates and stores disable
      Notifications for all Notification Receivers configured in that Profile.
11.   All enable and disable Notifications on the eUICC are delivered.
End conditions:
    a.    The target Profile is enabled.

5.3.1.2 Disable Profile

Profile disabling can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.

Figure 25: Disable Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC.
    b.    The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
    c.    The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
          Management.
Procedure:
    1.    The End User makes a Profile disable request on the LPA.
    2.    User Intent is verified.
    3.    The LPA sends a Profile disable operation to the ISD-R on the eUICC.
    4.    The ISD-R checks if applied Profile Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the
          Profile to be disabled.
    5.    If there is a conflict with Profile Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and
          informs the End User via the LPA.
    6.    The ISD-R disables the target Profile.
    7.    The ISD-R informs the LPA of the disabling of the Profile.
    8.    The End User is informed via the LPA.
    9.    The ISD-R generates and stores disable Notifications for all Notification Receivers
          configured in the Profile Metadata.
    10.   All disable Notifications on the eUICC are delivered.
End conditions:
    a.    The target Profile is disabled.

5.3.1.3 Delete Profile

Profile deletion can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.

Figure 26: Delete Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    The target Profile is disabled.
    b.    The target Profile has been chosen by the End User
    c.    The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
          Management.
Procedure:
    1.    The End User makes a Profile deletion request on the LPA.
    2.    User Intent is verified.
    3.    The LPA sends a Profile deletion operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on
          the eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
    4.    The ISD-R checks if applied Profile Policy Rules permits the Profile to be deleted.
    5.    If there is a conflict with Profile Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and
          informs the End User via the LPA.
    6.    The ISD-R erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P.
    7.    The ISD-R informs the LPA of the Profile deletion.
    8.    The Profile Metadata for the target Profile is erased.
 9.    The End User is informed via the LPA.
10.    The ISD-R generates and stores delete Notifications for all Notification Receivers
       configured in the Profile Metadata.
11.    All delete Notifications on the eUICC are delivered.
End conditions:
    a.    The target Profile is deleted.

5.3.1.4 Add/Update Profile Nickname

Add/update nickname will allow the Subscriber or End User to attribute a nickname to a Profile for ease of use. Note that adding or changing a nickname SHALL NOT affect any other data or other Profile Metadata for that Profile.

Figure 27: Add/Update Profile Nickname Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    User Intent has been verified.
    b.    The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
    c.    The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
          Management.
Procedure:
    1.    The End User requests the update of the nickname on the LPA.
    2.    The LPA updates the Profile Metadata of the target Profile with the End User’s
          choice of nickname in the eUICC.
End conditions:
    a.    Profile Metadata of the target Profile has been updated with the End User’s choice
          of nickname.

5.3.1.5 Query Profile Metadata

This procedure will allow the End User to query the Profile Metadata of the Profiles accessible to the End User. The result SHALL display all (or parts of) the Profile Metadata for the selected Profile on the eUICC at the time of querying. No changes are made to any data on the eUICC as a result of this procedure.

Figure 28: Query Profile Metadata Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    The LPA is authenticated to eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
          Management.
    b.    The list of Profiles accessible to the End User is displayed by the LPA (LUI).
Procedure:
    1.    The End User selects a Profile to query.
    2.    The LPA receives a query request from the End User.
    3.    The LPA requests Profile Metadata from the eUICC.
    4.    The LPA displays the Profile Metadata to the End User on the LUI.
End conditions:
    a.    No change to Profile Metadata.

5.3.1.6 eUICC Memory Reset

This procedure performs the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC including its associated Profile Metadata. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.

Note: A similar procedure will apply to perform the eUICC Test Memory Reset of the eUICC.

Figure 29: eUICC Memory Reset Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
          Management.
    b.    The eUICC Memory Reset option is displayed by the LPA (LUI).
Procedure:
    1.    The End User makes an eUICC Memory Reset request on the LPA (LUI).
    2.    User Intent is verified.
    3.    The LPA (LUI) displays a message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ to
          the End User.
    4.    The End User confirms the conformity with the consequences to the LPA.
    5.    The LPA sends an eUICC Memory Reset operation to the eUICC.
    6.    The eUICC deletes the Profiles on the eUICC even if one is an Enabled Profile
          including the Profile Metadata associated with it.
    7.    The eUICC informs the LPA of the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC.
    8.    The End User is informed via the LPA (LUI).
    9.    The eUICC generates and stores delete Notifications for all Notification Receivers
          configured in the Profile Metadata of every Profile.
    10.   All of the delete Notifications on the eUICC are delivered as soon as connectivity
          is available.
End conditions:
    a.    The Profiles are deleted from the eUICC.

5.3.1.7 Add Profile with Activation Code

This procedure will allow the Subscriber to add a single Profile. This procedure will not enable the downloaded Profile, nor disable an Enabled Profile. Network connectivity is assumed. The download can be initiated by the input of an Activation Code.

Figure 30: Add Profile with Activation Code Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    User Intent has been verified.
    b.    The download of a new Profile is allowed on the eUICC.
    c.    The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Profile
          download.
Procedure:
    1.    The End User obtains an Activation Code to add a Profile to their Device.
    2.    The LPA requests the End User to enter the Activation Code.
    3.    Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure as described in Section 5.2.2
          starts.
End conditions:
    a.    The Profile has been installed on the End User’s Device.
    b.    Profile Metadata has been updated from the Profile.

5.3.1.8 Edit SM-DP+ Address

This procedure will allow the End User to edit a default SM-DP+ address on the eUICC or Device.

Figure 31: Edit SM-DP+ Address

Start conditions:
      a.     The End User is willing to edit the default SM-DP+ address
Procedure:
      1.     The End User edits an SM-DP+ Address via the LPA.
      2.     Simple Confirmation from the End User is required.
      3.     Depending on the storage location of the selected SM-DP+ Address:
              a. If the address is stored in the eUICC, the LPA sends the default SM-DP+
                 address for storage in the LPA Services.
              b. If the address is stored in the Device, the LPA updates the default SM-DP+
                 address for storage in the Device.
      4.     The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions:
      c.     The target default SM-DP+ Address is edited in the LPA Services or the Device.

5.4 Remote Profile Management

This section describes the overall mechanisms, requirements and flow diagrams for Remote Profile Management operations. Remote Profile Management operations are actions performed by Managing SM-DP+(s) at the request of the Profile Owner. These operations include enabling, disabling, and deleting Profiles as well as listing Profile information and

updating specific Profile Metadata. Profile Owners will also be able to update the list of Managing SM-DP+(s) that are authorised to perform Remote Profile Management operations.

5.4.1 Overview on RPM commands retrieval

Different mechanisms are defined to retrieve the RPM commands:

Option 1: The Root SM-DS is reached.

Option 2: An Alternative SM-DS is reached.

Option 3: One Managing SM-DP+ configured in the Profile is reached.

Figure 32: The different options to achieve RPM command retrieval

5.4.2 Remote Profile Management Requirements

Req no.                 Description
                        It is OPTIONAL for the Device, the eUICC, and the SM-DP+ to support
RPM1
                        the RPM requirements defined in this document.
                        The Profile SHALL be able to include information of zero, one or several
RPM2                    Managing SM-DP+(s) (META19META18) that are authorised to perform
                        RPM operations on the Profile.
                        Only the Profile Owner, or another Profile Owner explicitly pre-authorised,
RPM3                    SHALL be able to request the SM-DP+ to perform RPM operations for
                        this specific Profile.
                        The eUICC SHALL only accept RPM operations on a Profile from a
RPM4
                        Managing SM-DP+ configured in the Profile.
                        A Profile Owner SHALL be able to replace, add and remove Managing
RPM5
                        SM-DP+(s) to/from its Profile.
Req no.                 Description
                        RPM SHALL support the Profile Management operations ‘enable’,
RPM6                    ‘delete’, ‘list Profile information’, ‘disable’, ‘update Metadata’, ‘Contact
                        PCMP’, and unset Profile Policy Rules.
                        The RPM ‘Enable’ command SHALL only be executed if the Profile can
                        be enabled without implicitly disabling a currently Enabled Profile.
RPM7
                        (See RPM13 for chaining an RPM ‘Disable’ and an RPM ‘Enable’
                        command.)
                        With regard to RPM7, if an RPM 'Enable' command is issued to an MEP-
                        Capable Device, the LPA MAY provide the eUICC with information which
RPM8
                        of the available Logical Interface(s) to be used for executing the RPM
                        'Enable'.
                        RPM operations SHALL be applicable to Enabled as well as Disabled
                        Profiles, with the exception of RPM operation ‘Delete’ which only applies
RPM9
                        to Disabled Profiles and RPM operation ‘Contact PCMP’ which only
                        applies to Enabled Profiles.
                        The execution of an RPM operation SHALL at least require the following
                        level of End User confirmation:
                          • No user confirmation: List Profile Information, Update Metadata,
                            unset Profile Policy Rules, Contact PCMP
RPM10
                          • Simple Confirmation: Disable Profile, Enable Profile
                          • Strong Confirmation: Delete Profile
                        Note: It is up to the Device to inform the End User about the consequences
                        of deleting a Profile.
                        It SHALL be possible to store and configure a Polling Address in each
                        Profile to check for RPM operations.
                        The Polling Address, if configured, SHALL be one of the following:
RPM11
                          • A reference to a Root SM-DS
                          • A single Managing SM-DP+ configured in this Profile
                          • An Alternative SM-DS
                        The eUICC SHALL support operations for an Operator to list Profile(s)
RPM12                   information on the eUICC. The following parameter SHALL be returned:
                        List of own Profiles including state and Profile Metadata
                        A mechanism SHALL be supported to allow the execution of a set of RPM
                        operations together originating from a single Managing SM-DP+, with a
                        particular ordering of the RPM operations attached to this set of
RPM13                   operations.
                        E.g. a set of RPM operations constituted by an RPM disable operation
                        followed by an RPM delete operation or an RPM disable operation
                        followed by an RPM enable operation.
                        If the mechanism in RPM13RPM18 is used, the set of RPM operations
RPM14                   SHALL NOT start before the complete reception of the set of RPM
                        operations.
                        There SHALL be a mechanism to configure the continuation upon the
RPM15
                        result of each operation in the set of RPM operations.
Req no.                 Description
                        Remote Profile Management operations ‘enable’, ‘disable’, and ‘delete’
                        and ‘unset Profile Policy Rules’ SHALL be able to trigger a Notification to
RPM16                   the Notification Receivers of the respective Profile being managed to
                        indicate that this operation was actioned. These Notifications are sent on
                        a best effort basis and SHALL NOT impact otherwise the operation
                        The eUICC SHALL support the operation ‘update Metadata’ to update
                        Profile Metadata via a Managing SM-DP+ on request of the Profile
                        Owner.
RPM17                   Only the Profile Metadata listed in META13 SHALL be able to be
                        modified.
                        The content of the respective Profile SHALL reflect the updated
                        Metadata.
                        The Profile Owner SHALL be able to configure, per RPM operation, any
                        Managing SM-DP+ configured in the Profile as authorised to execute that
                        operation.
RPM18
                        Note: e.g. If the Profile Owner configures an Enterprise SM-DP+ as a
                        Managing SM-DP+, then the Enterprise can perform the authorised RPM
                        operations.
                        The mechanism RPM18 SHALL be able to be configured within the
RPM19                   setting of the Profile Package or after the issuance of the Profile through
                        the ES6 interface (Operator-eUICC interface).
                        RPM SHALL support a command ‘Contact PCMP’ sent from a Managing
RPM20                   SM-DP+ to the LPA to initiate a connection to the Profile Content
                        Management Platform address configured in the Enabled Profile.
                        While the LPR is executing an RPM command as identified in RPM20,
RPM21                   the LPA SHALL suspend any other RPM commands until the proxy
                        session is complete.
                        The RPM command described in RPM20 SHALL be able to configure a
RPM22                   DPI to request a redirection to a Delegated Profile Content Management
                        Platform
                        RPM SHALL be authorised only by the Profile Owner. This MAY be at the
RPM23
                        request of another party (e.g., MVNO, enterprise, etc.).

Table 49: Remote Profile Management Requirements

5.4.3 Remote Profile Management Procedures (Informative)

5.4.3.1 Common RPM Procedure - Command Independent

The following sequence diagram shows the common part of the overall RPM procedure. The sequence is focused on pure functional requirements and intentionally leaves out technical aspects like security and authentication. Security measures are assumed for any communication as required - these should be incorporated during technical elaboration as a cross-cutting concern.

For the avoidance of doubt, Notifications and Policy rules also apply to Remote Profile Management operations.

Figure 33: Common RPM Procedure

Procedure:

 1.    The Operator sends the RPM command to the connected SM-DP+.
 2.    The SM-DP+ registers the Event Record on the SM-DS to be retrieved by the LDS.
 3.    The SM-DP+ informs the Operator that the RPM Event Record has been registered
       on the SM-DS.
4a.    With Discovery Service (SM-DS): An End User triggered request via the LPA to
       establish if there is an Event Record for RPM waiting on an SM-DS.
Without Discovery Service: An End User triggered request via the LPA to establish
if there is an Event for RPM waiting on an SM-DP+.
4b.    Alternatively, it can be started on specific events detected by the Device
 5.    The LPA requests a Polling Address for pending operations from the eUICC.
 6.    The Polling Address is sent from the eUICC to the LPA.
 7.    The LPA sends a query with its EID to the Polling Address. If the contacted peer is
       an SM-DS, the SM-DS returns the Event-ID for that EID.
 8.    The SM-DP+ looks up the pending operations for the specific EID, and sends them
       to the LPA.
       For each received package, the LPA SHALL do the following:
9.     Based upon the operation type the LPA obtains the appropriate level of End User
       confirmation.
10.    The LPA then sends the received RPM command package to the eUICC.
11.    The package is decrypted and verified by the eUICC.
12.    The eUICC verifies whether the command package originates from one of the target
       Profile’s Managing SM-DP+s.
13.    The command is executed according to its operation-specific sequence (see
       sections 5.4.3.2, 5.4.3.3, 5.4.3.4, 5.4.3.5, 5.4.3.6, 5.4.3.7).
14.    For each command, the eUICC generates and stores Notifications for all
       configured Notification Receivers for the command.
15.    The eUICC informs the LPA that the RPM procedure is complete and if appropriate
       the response information.
16.    The LPA informs the SM-DP+ that the RPM procedure is complete and if
       appropriate the response information.
17.    All pending Notifications on the eUICC are delivered.

5.4.3.2 RPM Operation: Enable Profile

The command “Enable Profile” results in an Enabled (active) Profile comparable to the insertion of a removable SIM card. Prior to execution of this command by the eUICC, a check is performed to ensure that no Profile from another Mobile Service Provider is currently enabled.

Figure 34: RPM Operation – Enable Profile

5.4.3.3 RPM Operation: Disable Profile

The command “Disable Profile” results in a Disabled (inactive) Profile comparable to the removal of a removable SIM card.

Figure 35: RPM Operation – Disable Profile

5.4.3.4 RPM Operation: Delete Profile

The command “Delete Profile” results in the deletion/removal of a Disabled Profile comparable to the destruction of a removable SIM card.

Figure 36: RPM Operation – Delete Profile

5.4.3.5 RPM Operation: List Profile Information

The command "List Profile Information" returns a list of Profiles owned by the Operator/Mobile Service Provider including state and Profile Metadata to the Managing SM- DP+ that issued the command. This command does not require local End User confirmation.

Figure 37: RPM Operation – List Profile Information

5.4.3.6 RPM Operation: Unset Profile Policy Rule

The command “unset Profile Policy Rule” results in the unsetting of a Profile Policy Rule from a Disabled or Enabled Profile. This command does not require a local End User confirmation.

Figure 38: RPM Operation – Unset Profile Policy Rule

5.4.3.7 RPM Operation: Contact PCMP

The command “contact PCMP” results in the initialisation for a connection to the PCMP server configured in the Enabled Profile. If an optional parameter DPI is provided in the RPM command and/or configured in the Enabled Profile, they will be attached during the connection to the PCMP to signify an expected connection to a Delegated PCMP.

Figure 39: RPM Operation – Contact PCMP

A [Void]

B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)

B.1 Profile Production Procedure

This section describes a generic implementation. It should be regarded as an example only; specific implementation MAY be required to address specific security concerns.

Within the eUICC, the current functionality of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Just as with current UICCs, Profiles are the responsibility of the Operator and Profile production is performed upon their request and permission (if not produced by the Operators themselves).

The same Operator procedures as in the current UICCs SHALL apply.

Figure 40: Profile Production Procedure

Profile Production consists of three steps:

•   Profile Description definition: The SM-DP+ creates and registers a Profile
    Description based on the Operational Profile Description.
•   Operator Credentials generation: The Operator asks the SM-DP+ to generate
    Operator Credentials that will be used in the next step. This procedure is OPTIONAL
    and will not be used if the Operator wants to generate the Operator Credentials
    during Protected Profile Package generation.
•     Protected Profile Package generation: The Profile Packages will be created,
      protected and stored. This step (batch type of operation or real time process) is only
      performed after an order with the respective Operator.
•     Contract conclusion and Link Profile: At the end of the contract conclusion, an
      Activation Code is delivered to the End User and the Profile MAY be allocated for this
      contract.

Note: The generation of the Bound Profile Package is part of the Profile download with Activation Code procedure in Section 5.2.2.

B.1.1 Profile Description Definition

The Profile Description definition MAY comprise of the following sequence:

Figure 41: Profile Description Procedure

Start Condition:
    a.      Contractual relationship between the Operator and the SM-DP+.
Procedure:
    1.      The Operator defines its different Profile types (identified by a [non-standardised]
            Profile Description ID) which contains the Network Access Application like USIM,
            file structure, data and applications, etc.
    2.      The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Descriptions based on the Operators input with
            the corresponding Profile Description ID.
    3.      The SM-DP+ confirms the Profile Description definition e.g. by sending the
            corresponding Profile Description ID.

Note: An Operator can define multiple Profile Descriptions with the SM-DP+

End Condition:
    a.      The Operator is able to order Protected Profile Packages based on Profile
            Description IDs.

B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generation

This procedure allows the Operator to allocate a set of Operator Credentials on the SM-DP+ without associating them to a specific ProfileDescriptionID. Operator Credentials generation MAY comprise of the following sequence:

Figure 42: Operator Credentials Generation

Start Condition:

a.    IMSI, ICCID and other resources have been allocated by the Operator.

Procedure:

18.   The Operator provides the IMSI, ICCID, type of credential to be created (e.g.
      Milenage [11][12], TUAK [10] etc.) and other resources that MAY already be
      allocated to the SM-DP+. It asks the SM-DP+ to securely generate and store a set
      of Operator Credentials.
19.   The SM-DP+ securely generates and stores a set of Operator Credentials based
      on the Operator’s input with the corresponding IMSI, ICCID and other resources
      provided.
20.   The SM-DP+ confirms the generation of Operator Credentials and provides them
      to the Operator.

B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generation

The Protected Profile Package Generation MAY comprise of the following sequence:

This procedure MAY apply between the Profile Description definition, and the Contract conclusion and Link Profile, depending on whether the Protected Profile Package is created on demand or prepared in advance.

Figure 43: Protected Profile Package Generation Procedure

Start Conditions:
    a.    Profile Description definition
Procedure:
    1.    The Operator orders the Protected Profile Package generation by providing the
          SM-DP+ with the Profile Description ID and some corresponding Operator input
          data (credentials e.g. ICCID, IMSI).The Operator input data required for Protected
          Profile Package generation (IMSI, ICCID, K/Ki, OTA Keys, PIN, PUK, etc.) is
          either created by the Operator (and provided to the SM-DP+) or by the SM-DP+
          (and provided to the Operator).
    2.    The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Packages.
    3.    The SM-DP+ creates the Protected Profile Packages.
    4.    The SM-DP+ stores the Protected Profile Packages (securely).
    5.    The SM-DP+ confirms the Protected Profile Package generation, and eventually
          sends the additional Operator input data created by the SM-DP+.
    6.    The Operator registers the Operator data in the Operator systems like HLR/AuC
          and BSS.
End Condition:
    a.       The ordered Protected Profile Packages are available at the SM-DP+. The
             Operator is able to activate these Subscriptions and a Profile download can be
             triggered upon binding to an EID.

B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile

The Activation Code has to be provided to the End User in order to achieve the Profile download procedure. The contract conclusion and Link Profile procedure describes different scenarios to link a contract with the Activation Code process. The following options are described below:

•Activation Code with known EID: The EID is given by the Subscriber to the Mobile Service Provider during the conclusion of the contract.

•Activation Code with unknown EID: The EID is not given by the Subscriber to the Mobile Service Provider during the conclusion of the contract. The EID is only provided to the SM-DP+ during the Profile download procedure and is given back from the SM-DP+ to the Mobile Service Provider.

•Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator: The EID is not immediately given by the Subscriber during the contract conclusion, but provided in step two to the Mobile Service Provider.

The contract reference MAY be, but not necessarily, any Activation Code parameter (e.g. token), ICCID or the IMSI.

In any case, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to allocate and link a Profile to the corresponding eUICC during the Profile download procedure.

B.1.4.1 Activation Code with Known EID

Figure 44: Activation Code with Known EID Procedure

Procedure: Steps 1-12 in Figure 44: Contract conclusion with known EID

1.        The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Mobile Service Provider and
          provides the EID during this process.
2. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator prior to Profile download
          procedure’: The Operator allocates the Profile and sends the EID, IMSI and
          ICCID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the different parameters and
          confirms this to the Operator.
6. to 10. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+ prior to Profile download
          procedure’: The Operator sends the EID, the IMSI and the Profile Description
          ID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates an ICCID to a corresponding
          Profile, links the different parameters and confirms the allocated ICCID and
          the link to the Operator.
11. to 12. The Mobile Service Provider confirms the contract conclusion to the
          Subscriber with the corresponding information (contract reference).

End Condition:

a.       The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
         Mobile Service Provider.
b.       The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

B.1.4.2 Activation Code with Unknown EID

Figure 45: Activation Code with Unknown EID Procedure

Procedure: Steps 1-9 in Figure 45: Contract conclusion without EID

1.       The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Mobile Service Provider without
         knowledge of the target eUICC (EID).
2.       Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
         Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
         template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
         (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator.
6. to 7. Alternatively ‘On-demand ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The operator sends
         the Profile templates (IDs) allowed for this Activation Code. When the LPA
         starts the Profile download process, the SM-DP+ will allocate the ICCID of the
         most convenient Profile ID type for the Device and eUICC features.
8. to 9. The Mobile Service Provider confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber
         with the corresponding information (contract reference).

End Condition:

a.          The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
            Mobile Service Provider.
b.          The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

B.1.4.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Mobile Service Provider

Figure 46: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Mobile Service Provider

Procedure: Steps 1-14 in Figure 46Figure 46: Activation Code with EID provided to the Mobile Service Provider

1.           The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Mobile Service Provider without
             knowledge of the target eUICC (EID).
2.           Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
             Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5.     Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
             template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
             (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator.
6. to 7.     The Mobile Service Provider confirms the contract conclusion to the
             Subscriber with the corresponding information (contract reference).
8. to 9.   After the Subscriber has chosen the Device/eUICC, the EID is provided
           together with the contract reference to the Mobile Service Provider.
10. to 12. The Operator requests the linking of the eUICC (EID) and Profile (ICCID) by
           the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the EID and the ICCID and confirms this to
           the Operator.
13. to 14. The Mobile Service Provider confirms the linking of the EID to the
           corresponding contract to the Subscriber.
End Condition:
    a.         The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
               Mobile Service Provider.
    b.         The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

B.2 Profile preparation with dynamic interaction between the SM-DP+ and the Operator

This section describes a process which might be used to prepare a Profile with dynamic interaction between the SM-DP+ and the Operator through the ES2+ interface. This function could be used by the SM-DP+ for activation decisions when conditions are required from the Operator side. The dynamic interaction is described in the following procedure:

Figure 47: Profile preparation with dynamic interaction between the SM-DP+ and the

operator

Procedure:

1.          The Operator initialises an activation reference or request for its creation by the
            SM-DP+, called MatchingID. This MatchingID may be optionally linked to a
            specific EID and associated in addition to a Confirmation Code (CC).
2.          The SM-DP+ acknowledges the generate order, and may send back a
            MatchingID if not provided by the Operator during the initialisation phase.
3.          The Mobile Service Provider is able to generate an Activation Code associated
            to the MatchingID, and communicate it to the End User with in addition a
            Confirmation Code if desired.
4.          At some point of time, the End User requests the installation of a Profile based
            on the Activation Code and eventually the Confirmation Code received from the
            Mobile Service Provider.
5.         Handle order Notification is used by the SM-DP+ for activation decisions when
           conditions can’t be taken by the SM-DP+. EID, TAC, IMEI (if available), Eligibility
           Check Information and MatchingID are transferred to the Operator and Mobile
           Service Provider.
6.         The Operator is able to select a particular ICCID and/or a Profile type, sent back
           to the SM-DP+ through a DownloadOrder. Additional information elements may
           be exchanged between the Operator and the SM-DP+ through the
           DownloadOrder.
7.         The SM-DP+ may respond with information elements to the Operator and Mobile
           Service Provider.
8.         The SM-DP+ selects the adequate Profile.
9.         The Operator confirms the download order by calling the ConfirmOrder function
           of the SM-DP+ with its relevant input data. MatchingID and ICCID are provided
           back to the SM-DP+.
10.        After the Operator performs a relevant operation on its back-end (e.g.
           provisioning of HLR), the releaseProfile function is used to release the Profile in
           order to allow the End User to start the download and installation procedure.
11.        The SM-DP+ initialises the download of the Profile.
12. to 15. Different Notifications to the Operator and Mobile Service Provider of the
           progress of a pending Profile download process may be provided at several
           points.

C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)

This annex provides an example diagram for the implementation of Local Profile Management Operations and describes how the different Confirmation Levels MAY be applied.

                     Example flow for Device & LPA Strong Confirmation
                                access PIN setup / settings
 Unpack Device
                                  Power on & start setup
(new from factory)

Manual setup

              Set / enable
  No
(skip)
             device access
               code / ID?                  First Access to LPA
                                           (no installed profiles)
                      Yes
                                   Enter & confirm
                                       PIN / ID
                                                                                        Manual user
Device access                       Device access                                         setup
    open                             restricted
                                                                             Set
                                                               No                          Yes
                                                                           device
                    Enable & Set LPA                                        lock?
  No
                  access (SC) for eUICC
(skip)
                     management?
                         Yes                                              No
                                                                   Device
                     Lock separately                              lock set?
                                             No
                       from device         (flag)                         Yes
                          lock?
                                                            Enter device PIN /
                         Yes (flag)                          code to confirm
                     Enter & confirm
                       SC PIN / ID
                                                                     Code
                                                                    correct?         No
                         LPA lock
                    restricted / SC set                             Yes
                                                                          LPA / SC set device
LPA access open                                                             lock restricted
  (no SC set)
                                     SC required
                                                          Yes           SC as required on
                                     on each SC
                                                         (flag)         each LUI operation
                                       event?
                                       No    (flag)
SC inherited from
  prior SC input
                                     Notes:
                                     SC: Strong Confirmation
Stop                                 Device access code (PIN / ID) refers
                                     to device unlock mechanism

Figure 48: Example Flow for Device & LPA Strong Confirmation Access PIN Setup /

Settings

D [Void]

E LPA Settings (Informative)

Figure 49: LPA Settings

F Certifications Chain and Security Model (Normative)

Figure 50: Certificate Exchange

Security Model The Security Model defines the trust relationships between all the active components of the eUICC ecosystem with an LPA in the Device. The figure below shows only the end-to-end logical links where cryptographic keys and sensitive data are sent. The different links define the end-to-end trust relationship between entities. We distinguish a hierarchy of seven trust links with link 1 being the most significant and link 7 being the least significant. If trust link 1 is broken, all trust links will be broken as a result. If trust link 2 is broken, trust link 1 remains intact however all other Trusted Links are compromised or broken.

Figure 51: Trusted Link with LPA in the Device

Figure 52: Trusted Link with LPA in the eUICC

Trust        Description             Interfaces   Possible               Impact of loss of
link                                 involved     compromises            trust link
TL1          Trust introduced onto   Out of       The CI public key,     The trust of the entire
             the eUICC by the        scope        the EUM’s              security model is
             issuing EUM to enable                Certificate,           breached and all
             future remote                        the EUM’s keyset,      eUICCs issued under
             management and                       the eUICC keys, the    the model cannot be
             authorisation by the                 OS, and the Security   trusted.
             SM-DP+ and possibly                  Domains.
             the EUM: eUICC keys
             (EUM & CI keyset
             eUICC Certificates).
Trust        Description                 Interfaces   Possible               Impact of loss of
link                                     involved     compromises            trust link
TL2          Trust placed in the CI’s    Out of       The EUM and SM-        Loss of Operator
             verification of the         scope        DP+ Certificates.      trust on the EUM and
             EUM, SM-DP+, and                                                SM-DP+
             the resulting Certificate
             issuance.
TL3          Trust placed in the         ES2+         The eUICC              Loss of Operator
             activities for eUICC        ES8+         Certificate or         trust on the eUICC
             eligibility and remote                   eligibility check      and/or SM-DP+.
             attestation from the                     failure.
             ISD-R on the target
             eUICC to the Operator
             via the SM-DP+.
             Provides eUICC
             Certificate, EID,
             reference to its
             certification and EUM
             to the Operator and
             SM-DP+.
TL4          Trust placed in the         ES2+         SM-DP+ Certificate     Loss of Operator
             activities for Profile      ES8+         eUICC Certificate or   trust on the SM-DP+
             data transfer from the                   eligibility check      and/or eUICC.
             Operator via the SM-                     failure.
             DP+ to the ISD-R on
             the target eUICC.
             Protects the Profile
             and associated
             credentials and keys
             (NAAs, OTA keys,
             ISD-R access, ISD-P
             SD creation …) with
             only the Operator, SM-
             DP+ and the eUICC.
TL5          Trust placed in the         ES2+         SM-DP+ Certificate     Operator loss of trust
             information exchange                                            on SM-DP+.
             between the Operator
             and the SM-DP+ for
             Link Profile requests.
TL6          Trust placed in the         ESeu         LPA security           eUICC loss of trust
             mechanisms provided                                             on LPA.
             by the LPA: Local
             Profile Management,
             Local Profile
             Management
             Operations
Trust        Description                Interfaces    Possible                 Impact of loss of
link                                    involved      compromises              trust link
TL7          Trust placed in the        ES9+          LPA security or SM-      SM-DP+ loss of trust
             TLS session                              DP+ security.            on LPA (in the
                                                                               Device or the eUICC)
                                                                               or LPA loss of trust
                                                                               on the SM-DP+.
TL8          Trust in the discovery     ES11          LDS security or SM-      LDS loss of trust on
             process                                  DS security.             the SM-DS and vice
                                                                               versa.
TL9          Trust in the discovery     ES11          eUICC security or        SM-DS loss of trust
             process                                  SM-DS security.          on the eUICC and
                                                                               vice versa.
TL10         Trust in the UI            ESeu          Device security          Loss of trust on the
                                                                               Device

Table 50: Trusted Link Descriptions

Compromised Impacted               Description       Impact of loss of         Countermeasures
element     Links                                    trust
eUICC              TL1, TL3,       The eUICC         The eUICC can no          Revoke the Certificate
                   TL4, TL9,       keys and          longer be trusted.        of the eUICC.
                   TL10            EUM’s Keyset.     MNO and SM-DP+
                                                     loss of trust on eUICC.
CI                 TL2             The EUM, SM-      Loss of Operator trust    Repair/Replace CI.
                                   DS, and SM-       in the EUM, SM-DS         Generate new CI
                                   DP+               and SM-DP+.               Certificate and new
                                   Certificates.                               Certificate for the
                                                                               EUM, SM-DS and SM-
                                                                               DP+ following the SAS
                                                                               process.
                                                                               Remote repair of
                                                                               already issued
                                                                               eUICCs: new CI public
                                                                               key.
EUM                TL1, TL2        Loss of SAS       Loss of trust from the    New SAS for the
                                   certification.    Operator and SM-DP+       EUM. Remote repair
                                                     on the EUM and its        of already issued
                                                     eUICCs.                   eUICCs: new EUM
                                                                               Certificate, new
                                                                               eUICC Certificate.
SM-DP+             TL3, TL4,       Loss of SAS       Loss of trust from the    New SAS for the SM-
                   TL5, TL7,       certification.    Operator, LPA, SM-DS      DP+. New SM-DP+
                   TL8                               and eUICC on the SM-      Certificate.
                                                     DP+.
Compromised Impacted              Description        Impact of loss of        Countermeasures
element     Links                                    trust
SM-DS             TL8             Loss of SAS        Loss of trust from the   New SAS for the SM-
                                  certification.     Operator, LPA, SM-       DS. New SM-DS
                                                     DP+ and eUICC on the     Certificate.
                                                     SM-DS.
LPA               TL6, TL7,       LPA security       Loss of trust from the   LPA repair by the
                  TL8             failure.           SM-DP+, SM-DS and        Device Manufacturer.
                                                     eUICC on the LPA.
Device            TL11            Device             Loss of trust in the     LUI in the eUICC self-
                                  security failure   Device UI                protected with User
                                                                              Intent capture
                                                                              mechanisms (i.e.
                                                                              Captcha Code)

Table 51: Impact of Compromising Trusted Links and Countermeasures

The signer is responsible for the revocation of the Certificates it has signed. This section describes how the new Certificates are pushed to concerned entities according to the security model.

•   SM-DP+ trusts the CI
•   EUM trusts the CI
•   eUICC trusts the EUM and the CI
Req no.                Description
                       The new SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-
CERT1
                       DP+ by an eSIM CA upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
                       The new SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-DS
CERT2
                       by an eSIM CA upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
                       The new EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the EUM by an eSIM CA
CERT3
                       upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
                       The EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the
CERT4                  EUM
                       Note: See details in section 4.1.1.1.
                       The CI Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the EUM
CERT5
                       Note: See details in section 4.1.1.1.
CERT6                  Certificates SHALL be revocable.
                       Neither the End User nor any other party SHALL be able to prevent
CERT7
                       Certificate revocation.
                       The End User SHALL NOT be allowed to use Remote SIM Provisioning
CERT8
                       functions with revoked Certificates.
                       The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+ SHALL be revoked if required
                       (e.g. loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM
CERT9
                       Provisioning certification requirements. Refer to ‘SGP.14 Section 5.9.1
                       Circumstances for Revocation [26]’ for details).
Req no.              Description
                     The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS SHALL be revoked if required (e.g.
                     loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning
CERT10
                     certification requirements. Refer to ‘SGP.14 Section 5.9.1 Circumstances
                     for Revocation [26]’ for details).
                     The Public Key Certificate of the EUM SHALL be revoked if required (e.g.
                     loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning
CERT11
                     certification requirements. Refer to ‘SGP.14 Section 5.9.1 Circumstances
                     for Revocation [26]’ for details).

Table 52: Certificate Requirements

G LPA Integrity (Normative)

The LPA and its interfaces with the eUICC SHALL be protected using industry best security practices.

For cases where the LPA is in the Device, the LPA integrity SHALL be guided by the following Device classes:

Device class         Description                              Example of Devices
                     Devices with an open operating           Smartphones, Tablets, Laptops,
                     system where mechanisms such as          Advanced Wearables
Advanced             secure boot and platform signing of
                     applications are available and used
                     to protect the LPA.
                     Devices without possibility to install   Connected sensors, Simple
                     applications. The attack surface of      Wearables, Single use case
                     the LPA is minimal due to the locked     Devices
Basic                down nature of these Devices.
                     Simple mechanisms to ensure that
                     the LPA is not compromised SHALL
                     be taken.

Table 53: Device Classes

H [Void]

I [Void]

J [Void]

J.1 [Void]

J.2 [Void]

J.3 [Void]

J.4 [Void]

J.5 [Void]

J.6 [Void]

K Use Cases (Informative)

K.1 Device Change Support

K.1.1 Use Case 1 – Device Change normal case

The End User has an old Device containing one Profile and wants to install a Profile pertaining to the same Subscription in a new Device they bought. The old Device is working correctly and still has connectivity, perhaps through a Wi-Fi connection.

The End User starts the Device Change procedure on the old Device, inserting all the needed informations to perform the change. After that, the End User configures the new Device, preparing it for the Profile installation in the context of the Device Change. The Profile is downloaded and installed in the new Device and the Mobile Service Provider may perform the update of its backend system such as HSS/AuC and BSS with respect to the Profile installed in the new Device. The Mobile Service Provider or the End User may delete the Profile on the old Device.

The Profile downloaded and installed in the new Device can be a new Profile or the same Profile previously downloaded in the old Device.

At the end of the Device Change procedure the End User has their new Device configured with the Profile associated to the Subscription, and the old Device is no longer able to access the mobile service provided by using the old Profile.

K.1.2 Use Case 2 – Device Change normal case multiple Profiles

The End User has an old Device containing several Profiles and wants to install these Profiles pertaining to different Subscriptions in a new Device they have bought. The old Device is working correctly and still has connectivity, perhaps through a Wi-Fi connection. The End User starts the Device Change procedure on the old Device, inserting all the needed information to perform the change. After that, the End User configures the new Device, preparing it for the Profile’s installation in the context of the Device Change. The Profiles are downloaded and installed in the new Device and the Mobile Service Providers may perform the update of their backend system such as HSS/AuC and BSS with respect to the Profiles installed in the new Device. The Mobile Service Providers or the End User may delete the Profiles on the old Device. The Profiles downloaded and installed in the new Device can be new Profiles or the same Profiles previously downloaded in the old Device. At the end of the Device Change procedure, the End User has its new Device configured with the Profiles associated to their Subscriptions, and the old Device is no longer able to access the mobile service provided by using the old Profiles.

K.2 Multiple Enabled Profiles

The present section describes use cases wherein the Embedded UICC has a number profiles which are simultaneously used by the Device to provide connectivity to the End User.

K.2.1 Use Case 1 – Using installed Profiles in Dual-SIM mode

The End User has two mobile subscriptions: one for personal use and one for business use.
Each subscription offers incoming/outgoing voice calls, incoming/outgoing text messages
and mobile data.
The End User owns an eUICC-capable Device supporting two simultaneous device cellular
connections e.g., Dual-SIM Dual Standby or Dual-SIM Dual Active modes. These
Operational Modes are defined in GSMA TS.37 [48].
The End User installs two profiles onto the same eUICC from the LUI:
   •    Profile #1 is associated with the personal subscription, and
   •    Profile #2 is associated with the business subscription.

Once successfully installed onto the eUICC, the End User activates from the device settings menu Profile #1 and Profile #2. The End User is able to receive voice calls and text messages simultaneously (and within the limits set by the Operational Modes as defined in GSMA TS.37 [48]) and has chosen which mobile line will be providing the active mobile data connection to the Device.

Figure 53: High Level Diagram of Multi-SIM Device with two Enabled Profiles

K.2.2 Use Case 2 – Activating another Profile on an existing logical

          baseband
The eUICC comprises three profiles, of which:
   •    Profile #1 and Profile #2 are enabled from the eUICC perspective and active on
        respectively logical baseband #A and #B.
   •    Profile #3 is disabled from the eUICC perspective

The User decides to enable Profile #3. The device interface indicates to the User that either Profile #1 or Profile #2 has to be disabled to allow this connectivity configuration change. The User selects Profile #1 for disabling.

The Device disables Profile #1. The Device enables Profile #3 on logical baseband A.

Figure 54: High Level Diagram of Multi-SIM Device with two Enabled Profiles

K.3 eUICC OS Update Interface

Device Manufacturers may have several eUICC providers for their Devices.
When an update of an eUICC OS is available and there is a decision to deploy this update
into eUICCs present in the field, the Device Manufacturers obtains the secured eUICC OS
update to be sent to the eUICC, from the relevant EUM.
Different types of update could be available depending on their impacts to the services and
the End User. In some cases there is no impact at all for the services and for the End User,
in some other cases there may be temporary impact on some services which may not be
available during the update process, and finally in some cases the impact may be
permanent.
In all these cases, the Device Manufacturer needs some information about the eUICC OS
update in order to properly schedule the update and to inform the End User about what may
happen during the update.
A typical use case for the eUICC OS Update may consist of several actions that rely on the
information provided to the Device Application (e.g. the LPA or an eUICC OS Update agent)
in charge of the eUICC OS Update.
   •    The Device needs to know if an eUICC OS update is available (or not) for its eUICC.
        In case of the same Device with multisource eUICC supplier, it is important to know
        which supplier is providing the eUICC OS Update.
   •    Before the eUICC OS update is applied to the eUICC, the Device needs to know if
        the eUICC OS update will impact or not the services, and whether the eUICC needs
        to be rebooted.
   •    At the end of the eUICC OS update, the Device needs to have a confirmation that the
        eUICC OS update is finished and a status to know if it was successful or not.

With this information, the Device will be able to schedule the eUICC OS update and to build a consistent user experience to avoid service issues to the End User.

In addition to the above field use case, Device Manufacturers may also use the eUICC OS update mechanism for refurbishment in production line or for repair center use cases. In such cases, the Device Application will need the same information as those needed for a field eUICC OS update. However this information may be used in a different way to take into account the specifics of a production/repair center environment (e.g. no End User involved).

K.4 Multiple Root Discovery Services

K.4.1 Use Case 1 – Resolving the Discovery Server address followed by

          Profile download process.
Basic flow:
   • The Device is manufactured for a particular region of the world and wherein a
       number of Root Discovery Servers are available and supported by these regional
       Mobile Service Providers.
   • The Device is shipped to this region.
   • The Device is sold via a non-operator channel to the End User.
   • The End User brings the Device to their Mobile Service Provider for activation (either
       physical location or online).
   • The End User provides to the Mobile Service Provider the necessary information to
       determine the target Root SM-DS(s) to which the Device is connected.
   • Upon successful verification of the provided information, the Mobile Service Provider
       performs the Profile download preparation and subscription activation process with
       their SM-DP+, wherein the Mobile Service Provider will transmit the relevant
       information for contacting the target Discovery Server (e.g. SM-DS address, etc.) and
       the Device-specific information for the download process (e.g. EID).

K.5 Enhanced SM-DS function SM-DS Event detection

In the SM-DS mechanism defined in version 2, the Device is unaware of when and whether an Event is registered at the SM-DS, so the Device needs to periodically perform the entire Event Retrieval procedure with the SM-DS without any advance information. Due to this situation, the following problems may be incurred.

1.   The Device is not notified about the exact timing of an Event Registration. Therefore,
     the Device cannot contact the SM-DS right after an Event is registered. This may
     lead to a significant delay on the timing between the Event Registration and the
     Event Retrieval.
2.   Some Root SM-DS may need to support billions of Devices in the field, thus suffering
     from a significant computational overhead to perform a lot of mutual authentications
     involving HSM. Each Device performs the full mutual authentication with the SM-DS
     even if there is no Event that has been registered for that Device.

K.5.1 Use Case 1 – Immediate process of Event with Push Service

If a Mobile Service Provider or SM-DP+ wants to perform a time-critical remote management (e.g. run-time consumer care service), the SM-DS can notify the LDS of an Event Registration by sending a push notification to the Device.

When the LDS receives a push notification, the Device performs the Event Retrieval procedure with the SM-DS that sent the push notification. In this way, the Event Record can be delivered to the Device as soon as the the Event is registered at the SM-DS.

K.5.2 Use Case 2 – Reducing unnecessary Event Retrieval transactions by

         Event Checking
The Device can perform the Event Checking procedure with the SM-DS to check the
presence of any Event that has been registered for that Device. As a response to the
Device’s inquiry, the SM-DS returns to the Device the response indicating the presence of
any registered Event(s) for the eUICC. If the Device receives the response containing the
presence of registered Event, the eUICC starts to perform the Event Retrieval procedure
with the SM-DS. By doing so, the Device always receives the Event Record(s) as a result of
the Event Retrieval procedure, and hence any unnecessary Event Retrieval procedure can
be avoided.

L Document Management

Document History
 Version      Date       Brief Description of Change         Approval           Editor /
                                                             Authority          Company
                         First Release with amendments                          Carmen Kwok,
 V1.0         03/12/15                                       PSMC
                         from Security review.                                  GSMA
                                                                                Carmen Kwok,
 V2.0         15/07/16   Includes Phase 2 content            PSMC
                                                                                GSMA
                                                                                Carmen Kwok,
 V2.1         29/02/17   Phase 2 maintenance release         Technology Group
                                                                                GSMA
                                                                                Carmen Kwok,
 V2.2         31/08/17   Phase 2 maintenance release         RSPLEN
                                                                                GSMA
                                                                                Carmen Kwok,
 V2.3         24/03/21   Phase 2 maintenance release         ISAG
                                                                                GSMA
                                                                                Carmen Kwok,
 V2.4         03/08/21   Phase 2 maintenance release         ISAG
                                                                                GSMA
                                                                                Carmen Kwok,
 V3.0         28/03/22   Includes Phase 3 content            ISAG
                                                                                GSMA
                                                                                Carmen Kwok,
 V3.1         01/12/23   Phase 3 maintenance release         ISAG
                                                                                GSMA
Detailed Document History
 Version Date             Additions
 V3.1                     eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3101r1 Clarify SM-DP+ requirements for Multiple
            04/04/22
 Draft 1                  SM-DS
            04/08/22      Corrections to ‘Error! Reference not found’
                          eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3103r3 Adoption of PP0117 _3S
            04/08/22
                          ProtectionProfile_and referencing SGP.08 and SGP.09
 V3.1
                          eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3104R01 Duplication of requirement DEV15 –
 Draft 2    04/08/22
                          DEV18
            04/08/22      eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3105r2 Inappropriate POL4 example
            04/08/22      eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3107 CERTDP9 alignment with FS.18
            06/09/22      eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3108r1 Profile Policy Enabler Cleaning
 V3.1
 Draft 3                  eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3109r1 Edit DIE1 and DIE2, and fix number in ref
            06/09/22
                          [57]
 V3.1
            05/10/22      eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3110R0 Note Removal in CERTDP and CERTDS
 Draft 4
 V3.1
            30/11/22      eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3111R02 Align CI interfaces with SGP.22
 Draft 5
                          eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3114R02 Editorial modifications of some
 V3.1       03/01/23
                          requirements related to SAS
 Draft 6
            03/01/23      eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3115R00 Align CI interfaces in 4.11.2 and 4.17.1
                          eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3119R01 Requirement for SM-DP+ in memory
           21/02/23
V3.1                      comparison before profile download
Draft 7    21/02/23       eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3116R03 Clarify the use of SM-DS
           21/02/23       Editorial: Repeated reference corrections
V3.1
           02/10/23       eSIMWG1 SGP.21 CR3127R01 PPR on non-IMSI profiles
Draft 8
V3.1
           04/10/23       Updated GSMA PRD cover sheet
Draft 9
Other Information
 Type                              Description
 Document Owner                    Carmen Kwok
 Editor / Company                  Carmen Kwok, GSMA

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© GSM Association. Converted automatically from the published PDF; layout, figures and tables may differ from the original. The authoritative version is the original: https://www.gsma.com/esim/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/SGP.21-V3.1.pdf.