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GSMA · Specification

SGP.21v2.7

RSP Architecture

Defines a common architecture for remotely provisioning and managing eUICCs in consumer devices to enable mobile network access and interoperability.

Version
v2.7
  1. v3.12023-12-01
  2. v3.02022-03-28
  3. v2.72026-04-24
  4. v2.62024-09-20
  5. v2.52022-11-18
  6. v2.42021-08-03
  7. v2.32021-06-30
  8. v2.22017-09-01
  9. v2.12017-02-27
  10. v2.02016-08-23
  11. v1.02015-12-23
Issued
2026-04-24
Source
Original PDF

A formatted version of this document is not available yet; the text below is extracted clause by clause, so tables and figures may be incomplete.

Overview

This document sets out an architecture framework for remote SIM provisioning and management of eUICCs in consumer devices. It describes the roles of industry participants and the architecture, requirements, interfaces and operational procedures for components including the eUICC, device, LPA, SM-DP+ and SM-DS. It also covers profile handling, security and certification, with informative material on risks and implementation examples. The framework aims to support interoperable provisioning across operators and deployment scenarios.

  • eUICC
  • LPA
  • SM-DP+
  • SM-DS
  • NFC
  • Remote SIM Provisioning

Overview generated automatically from the document's scope and outline. The document text is authoritative.

Changes since v2.6

98 clauses modified, 6 clauses added, 1 clause removed

Compared automatically clause by clause from the extracted text of both versions; differences only in layout, spacing or table cells are ignored. The documents are authoritative.

1.4 Definition of Termsmodified

| Term | Description | Activation Code | Information issued by an Operator/Service Provider to an End User. It is used by the End User to request for the download and installation of a Profile. | Activation Code Retrieval | The process for the LPA to retrieve from the SM-DP+ the Activation Code that is associated with a specific Profile currently installed on the eUICC. This process is associated with the Local Profile Management Operation, 'retrieve Activation Code'. | Activation Code Token | A part of the Activation Code information provided by the Operator/Service Provider to refer to a Subscription. | Alternative SM-DS | SM-DS used in cascade mode with a Root SM-DS to redirect Event Registration from a SM-DP+ to the Root SM-DS or direct Event Registration from a SM-DP+ for an installed Profile. |Application Developer An entity that develops Interoperable Applications. Bound Profile Package | A Protected Profile Package which has been cryptographically linked to a particular eUICC. | Certificate or Public Key Certificate | A certificate as defined in RFC.5280 [1][1][1] and GlobalPlatform Certificate specifications GPC_SPE_034 [9]. |Term Description Certified eUICC | An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM Provisioning and certified according to the GSMA compliance programme defined in SGP.24 [38]. | NOTE: Unless stated otherwise, the word eUICC in this specification refers to a Certified eUICC. | Companion Device | A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. | Confirmation Code | A code entered by an End User required by the SM-DP+ for the download of a Profile. | Confirmation Code Required Flag | A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is required Flag or not. | Confirmation Level | Refers to the hierarchy of User Intent and Confirmation Request, where: | - User Intent is the first and lowest level | - Simple Confirmation is the second level | - Strong Confirmation is the third and highest level | NOTE: For examples of implementation, please refer to 0. | Confirmation Request | Describes a request for Strong Confirmation or a Simple Confirmation as defined in this specification. | Device | User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a mobile network. E.g. a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset. | Device Manufacturer | An entity responsible for manufacturing Devices. The Device Manufacturer MAY be responsible for the selection and insertion of eUICCs in Devices. | Device Test Mode | A mode hidden from the End User that allows access to and use of Test Profiles. | Disabled Profile | The state of a Profile where all files and applications (e.g. NAA) present in the Profile are not selectable. | Discovery Request | An interrogation of the Discovery Service by a Device for Event Records that are registered for its eUICC. | Discrete eUICC | An eUICC implemented on discrete standalone hardware, including its own dedicated volatile and non-volatile memory. | A Discrete eUICC can be removable or non-removable. | eUICC | A UICC which enables the local management of Profiles in a secure way. | NOTE: The term originates from “embedded UICC”. |eUICC OS Update A mechanism to correct existing features on the eUICC by the original OS manufacturer. Enabled Profile | The state of a Profile when its files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) are selectable. | End User | The person using the Device. |Term Description End User Data | Information that pertains to the identity of an End User e.g. personal details, name, address, biometric characteristics, assigned identification numbers, etc. | eUICC Authorisation | Used by the SM-DS to authenticate the eUICC. | eUICC Certificate | A Certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC. | This Certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate. | eUICC Eligibility Check Information | The information set sent from the eUICC to the SM-DP+ to allow Information eligibility checks. | eUICC Manufacturer (EUM) | The eUICC Manufacturer provides eUICC products. | eUICC Memory Reset | An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a factory state. | eUICC Test Memory Reset | An action that deletes all post-issuance Test Profiles on an eUICC. | EUM Certificate | A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited EUM which can be used to verify eUICC Certificates. | Event | A Profile download which is set by an SM-DP+ on behalf of an Operator, to be processed by a specific eUICC. | Event-ID | Unique identifier of an Event for a specific EID generated by the SM-DP+/SM-DS.SM- |DP+/SM-DS. Event Record | The set of information stored on the SM-DS for a specific Event, via the Event Registration procedure. This information consists of either: | - the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DP+ address or | - the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DS address | Event Record Query | A query to the SM-DS (Root or Alternative) executed to verify Event Registration success or determine that an Event Record still exists. | Event Registration | A process notifying the SM-DS on the availability of information on either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC. | Field-Test eUICC | A pre-production eUICC whose functional or security certifications are not yet completed by the EUM. | Form Factor | Physical manifestation of the UICC. | GSMA Certificate Issuer | A Certificate Authority accredited by GSMA. | ICCID | Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU-T E.118 [14]. | Integrated eUICC | An eUICC implemented on an Integrated TRE. | Integrated eUICC Test Interface | An external interface for the purpose of testing eUICC functionality. |Interface Integrated TRE | A TRE implemented inside a larger System-on-Chip (SoC), optionally making use of remote volatile and/or non-volatile memory. | International Mobile Subscriber Identity | Unique identifier owned and issued by Operators as defined in Subscriber Identity 3GPP TS 23.003 [3] Section 2.2. |Term Description Interoperable Application An application that can be downloaded, installed, executed and removed on any eUICC compliant with technical requirements of a runtime environment (resources, APIs, version, ...), regardless of its Form Factor, its Manufacturer, Device type, Device Manufacturer, Operator, and Mobile Service Provider. Link Profile | The process that associates a Protected Profile Package with a specific eUICC so that a Profile Download including Bound Profile Package generation can be triggered. | NOTE: This is normally an offline process, binding is an online process happening during the communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC. | Local Profile Assistant (LPA) | A functional element in the Device or in the eUICC that provides the LPD, LDS and LUI features. | Local Profile Management | Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated on the ESeu interface. | Local Profile Management Operation | Local Profile Management Operations are enable Profile, disable Operation Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, set/edit nickname, add Profile, edit default SM-DP+ address, and retrieve Activation Code. | LPA Integrity | Assurance that the LPA has not been compromised or affected. The assurance SHALL be provided to the various Remote SIM Provisioning entities to ensure that the LPA can be trusted to execute the actions requested | NOTE: This could be linked with a certification process. | LPA Mode | Defines the Operation LPA Mode which is either LPA in the eUICC or in the Device. | LPA Procedures | Refers to processes that trigger Local Profile Management Operations. |Minimum Security Level As defined in ETSI TS 102 226 [42] Mobile Network Operator | An entity providing access capability and communication services to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure. | Mobile Virtual Network Operator | An entity providing access capability and communication services to Operator its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure but does not have an allocation of spectrum. | Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) | A method of authentication in which an End User is only granted (MFA) access after successfully presenting several separate pieces of evidence to an authentication mechanism – typically at least two of the following categories: knowledge (something they know), possession (something they have), and inherence (something they are). | Network Access Application | Application residing in a Profile providing authorisation to access a network. | Network Access Credentials | Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [4] network. This MAY include data such as Ki/K and IMSI stored within a NAA. |Term Description NFC Device | Device with NFC capability. | NFC eUICC | eUICC with NFC capability. | Nonce | An arbitrary random number generated for one time use, employed for cryptographic communication. | Notification | A report about a Profile download or Local Profile Management Operation processed by the eUICC. | Notification Receivers | A list of SM-DP+ defined in the Profile containing SM-DP+s that are to receive Notifications concerning the Profile. | Operational Profile | A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC for the purpose of providing services by the Operator. The Profile SHALL be in support of a Subscription with the relevant Operator and allow connectivity to a mobile network. Applications MAY be included to provide non-telecommunication services. | Operator | A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a company providing wireless cellular network services. | Operator Credentials | A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network Access Credentials, OTA Keys for Remote File/Application management, and authentication algorithm parameters. | OTA Keys | The credentials included in the Profile used in conjunction with OTA Platforms. | OTA Platform | A platform used by an Operator for the Remote File/Application management of enabled Profiles on eUICCs. | Policy Enforcement | A function that executes Policy Rules to implement a policy. | Policy Rule | Defines the atomic action of a policy and the conditions under which it is executed. | Primary Device | A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. | Profile | A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC for the purpose of providing services. |Profile Application An Interoperable Application installed within a Profile Descriptionunder |the control of the Profile Owner. Profile Description The description of a Profile in a format specific to the Operator; example formats could be an Excel table, xml format, or plain text. | Profile Management | A combination of local and remote management operations (enable Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, and query Profile Metadata) | Profile Metadata | Information pertaining to a Profile used for the purpose of Local Profile Management. | Profile Owner | The entity that controls the operations that can be performed upon its Profile. With the exception of Test Profile, this is always an Operator. | Profile Package | A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile [5]. |Term Description Profile Policy Enabler | The functional element within the Profile management system that interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules. | Profile Policy Management | A policy control system that allows the Service Provider to implement, manage and enforce its subscription terms and conditions associated with the installed Profile. | Profile Policy Rule | Defines a qualification for or enforcement of an action to be performed on a Profile when a certain condition occurs. | Protected Profile Package | A Profile Package which has been encrypted for storage but not to a specific eUICC. | Provisioning Profile | A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC for the purposes of providing connectivity to a mobile network solely for the purpose of the provisioning of Profiles on the eUICC. | Remote Memory | Volatile or non-volatile memory residing outside of the TRE | Remote SIM Provisioning | The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, and deleting of a Profile on an eUICC. | Replay Attack | An attack based on previously used or outdated data. | Root Certificate | A Certificate used to authenticate other entities within the Remote SIM Provisioning framework. | Root SM-DS | A globally identified central access point for finding Events from one or more SM-DP+(s). | Service Provider | The Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement with an Operator. The Service Provider could also be the Operator. | Simple Confirmation | A secure and non-interceptable mechanism by which the End User confirms their action, e.g. by selecting Yes/No, OK/Cancel. | SM-DP+ Certificate | A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DP+. | SM-DS Certificate | A Certificate used by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DS. | SMDPid | Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as part of the SM-DP+ Certificate. | NOTE: This is referred to as the smdpOid in SGP.22 [24]. | Strong Confirmation | A secure and non-interceptable mechanism to guarantee a higher level of User Intent than Simple Confirmation by which the End User confirms their action, e.g., by inputting PIN or fingerprint, repeating Simple Confirmation, entering Confirmation Code, etc. | Subscriber | An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a Subscription with an Operator. The Subscriber is allowed to subscribe and unsubscribe to services, as well as register an End User or a list of End Users authorised to use these services. | Subscriber Data | Information that pertains to the identity of a Subscriber such as contract details, authentication credentials, cryptographic keys etc. | NOTE: In many instances, the Subscriber is also the End User and therefore Subscriber Data is likely to include End User Data. |Term Description Subscription | A Subscription describes the commercial relationship between the Subscriber and the Service Provider. | Subscription Manager Data Preparation+ (SM-DP+) | This role prepares Profile Packages, secures each with a Profile Preparation+ (SM-DP+) protection key, stores Profile protection keys in a secure manner as well as the Protected Profile Packages in a Profile Package repository, and links the Protected Profile Packages to specified EIDs. | The SM-DP+ binds Protected Profile Packages to the respective EID and securely downloads these Bound Profile Packages to the LPA of the respective eUICC. | Subscription Manager Discovery Server (SM-DS) | This is responsible for providing addresses of one or more SM-DP+(s)SM- Discovery Server (SM-DS) DP+(s) to a LDS. | Tamper Resistant Element | A security module consisting of hardware and low-level software providing resistance against software and hardware attacks, capable of securely hosting operating systems together with applications and their confidential and cryptographic data. |Test Certificate Issuer A Certificate Authority that issues test PKI certificates as described in SGP.26 [41]. Test ProfileeUICC |An eUICC, Certified or not, configured following the RSP Test Specification (SGP.23 [36]) and using test PKI certificates and test EID as defined in SGP.26 [41]. Test Profile A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC to provide connectivity to test equipment for the purpose of testing the Device and the eUICC. A test Profile is not intended to store any Operator Credentials. | Trusted Link | According to NIST SP 800-53r4 [18], a mechanism by which an End User (through an input Device) can communicate directly with the security functions of the infor … policy. This mechanism can only be activated by the End User or the security functions of the information system and cannot be imitated by untrusted software. … | User Intent | Describes the direct, real time acquisition of the manual End User input on the LUI to trigger locally a Profile download or Profile Management operation. |

1.5 Abbreviationsmodified

Abbreviation Description AC Activation Code ARA-M Access Rule Application - Master ARF Access Rule File AuC Authentication Centre BSS Business Support Services CI Certificate Issuer Abbreviation Description DNSCurve Domain Name System Curve DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions ECASD eUICC Controlling Authority Security Domain EID eUICC Identifier eSVN eUIC … Authentication MNO Mobile Network Operator MNO-SD Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain MSISDN Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number … MSL Minimum Security Level NAA Network Access Application OS Operating System OTA Over The Air PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy RAM Remote Application Management RAT Rules Authorisation Table RFM Remote File Management RMPF Remote Memory Protection Function Abbreviation Description SAS Security Accreditation Scheme SD Security Domain SIM Subscriber Identity Module SM-DP+ Subscription Manager - Data Preparation + SM-DS Subscription Manager - Discovery Server SSD Supplementary Secure Domain Test CI Test Certificate Issuer TL Trust Link TRE Tamper Resistant Element USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module

1.6 Referencesmodified

| Ref | Document Number | Title | [1] | RFC 5280 | X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile | [2] | ETSI TS 102 221 | UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics | [3] | 3GPP TS 23.003 | Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); | Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); | Numbering, addressing and identification | [4] | ITU E.212 | The international identification plan for public networks and Subscriptions | [5] | TCAAPP | Trusted Connectivity Alliance (former SIMalliance): eUICC Profile Package - Interoperable Format Technical Specification | http://simalliance.org/euicc/euicc-technical-releases/ | [6] | RFC 2119 | “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, S. Bradner | http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt | [7] | 3GPP TS 21.133 | 3G security; Security threats and requirements | [8] | SGP.02 | GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC Technical specification | [9] | GPC_SPE_034 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification with its Amendments | [10] | 3GPP TS 35.231 | Specification of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1: Algorithm Specification | [11] | 3GPP TS 35.205 | Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document 1: General | [12] | 3GPP TS 35.206 | Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document 2: Algorithm Specification | [13] | EUM SAS | FS.04 - Security Accreditation Scheme for UICC Production – Standard | [14] | ITU-T E.118 | The International Telecommunication Charge Card | [15] | GPD_SPE_013 | GlobalPlatform Device Technology Secure Element Access Control - Version 1.1 | [16] | 3GPP TS 22.022 | Personalisation of Mobile Equipment - Mobile functionality specification | [17] | TS.26 | GSMA NFC Handset Requirements | [18] | NIST SP 800-53r4 | Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organisations – Revision 4 | [19] | OMAPI | Trusted Connectivity Alliance (former SIMalliance) Open Mobile API Specification | [20] | SGP.03 | NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1 | [21] | SGP.05 | Embedded UICC Protection Profile | [22] | FS.08 | FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3.1 or higher | [23] | SGP.21 | SGP.21 Architecture Specification - Version 1.0 | [24] | SGP.22 | SGP.22 Technical Specification | [25] | SGP.25 | SGP.25 RSP eUICC for Consumer Device Protection Profile or SGP.25 eUICC for Consumer and IoT Device Protection Profile | [26] | SGP.14 | SGP.14 GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy v1.1 | [27] | EMVCo_Sec | EMVCo Security Evaluation Process 5.1 – June 2016 | [28] | FS.09 | FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v8.0 or higher | [29] | [Void] | [30] | [Void] | [31] | [Void] | [32] | [Void] | [33] | JIL-Application-of-Attack-Potential-to-Smartcards-v3-1 | Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar Devices | Version 3.1, Jun 2020 | [34] | [Void] | [35] | [Void] | [36] | SGP.23 | RSP Test Specification | [37] | RFC 8174 | Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words | https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174 | [38] | SGP.24 | RSP Compliance Process | [39] | SGP.08 | Security Evaluation of Integrated eUICC | based on PP-0084 | [40] | SGP.18 | Security Evaluation of Integrated eUICC based on PP-0117 |

1.6.1 Normative referencesadded

Ref Document Number Title X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate [1] RFC 5280 Revocation List (CRL) Profile UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical [2] ETSI TS 102 221 characteristics Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); [3] 3GPP TS 23.003 Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Numbering, addressing and identification The international identification plan for public networks and [4] ITU E.212 Subscriptions Trusted Connectivity Alliance (former SIMalliance): eUICC Profile Package - Interoperable Format Technical [5] TCAAPP Specification http://simalliance.org/euicc/euicc-technical-releases/ “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [6] RFC 2119 Levels”, S. Bradner http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt [7] 3GPP TS 21.133 3G security; Security threats and requirements GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC [8] SGP.02 Technical specification [9] GPC_SPE_034 GlobalPlatform Card Specification with its Amendments Specification of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1: [10] 3GPP TS 35.231 Algorithm Specification Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; [11] 3GPP TS 35.205 Document 1: General Ref Document Number Title Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; [12] 3GPP TS 35.206 Document 2: Algorithm Specification FS.04 - Security Accreditation Scheme for UICC [13] EUM SAS Production – Standard [14] ITU-T E.118 The International Telecommunication Charge Card GlobalPlatform Device Technology Secure Element [15] GPD_SPE_013 Access Control - Version 1.1 Personalisation of Mobile Equipment - Mobile functionality [16] 3GPP TS 22.022 specification [17] TS.26 GSMA NFC Handset Requirements Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information [18] NIST SP 800-53r4 Systems and Organisations – Revision 4 Trusted Connectivity Alliance (former SIMalliance) Open [19] OMAPI Mobile API Specification [20] SGP.03 NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1 [21] SGP.05 Embedded UICC Protection Profile [22] FS.08 FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3.1 or higher [23] SGP.21 SGP.21 Architecture Specification - Version 1.0 [24] SGP.22 SGP.22 Technical Specification SGP.25 RSP eUICC for Consumer Device Protection [25] SGP.25 Profile or SGP.25 eUICC for Consumer and IoT Device Protection Profile [26] SGP.14 SGP.14 GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy v1.1 [27] EMVCo_Sec EMVCo Security Evaluation Process 5.1 – June 2016 [28] FS.09 FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v8.0 or higher [29] [Void] [30] [Void] [31] [Void] [32] [Void] JIL-Application-of- Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar [33] Attack-Potential-to- Devices Smartcards-v3-1 Version 3.1, June 2020 [34] [Void] [35] [Void] [36] SGP.23 RSP Test Specification Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key [37] RFC 8174 Words https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174 [38] SGP.24 RSP Compliance Process Ref Document Number Title Security Evaluation of Integrated eUICC based on PP- [39] SGP.08 0084 Security Evaluation of Integrated eUICC based on PP- [40] SGP.18 0117 [41] SGP.26 eSIM Test Certificates [42] ETSI TS 102 226 Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications

1.6.2 Informative referencesadded

Ref Document Number Title Stepping Stones for Java Card Applet Developers - Version 1.0 – Trusted Connectivity Allliance TCA STEPPING [i.01] https://trustedconnectivityalliance.org/wp- STONES content/uploads/2024/04/Java-Card-Stepping- Stones_FINAL.pdf

2.1 Basic Principlesmodified

| Principle no. | Description | BAS1 | Existing standards and specifications SHALL be used where possible for the specification of the eUICC and related provisioning systems. | BAS2 | GlobalPlatform specifications SHALL be used as a framework of choice for the implementation of the eUICC. | BAS3 | The overall security of the eUICC in combination with the related management processes SHALL at all times and under all circumstances be at least equivalent to the current removable UICC and its provisioning processes. | BAS4 | The architecture of the eUICC and its Remote SIM Provisioning system SHALL comply with the requirements of 3GPP TS 21.133 [7]. |Principle BAS5no. |Description BAS5 The architecture SHALL support a level of security with respect to the protection of Operator Credentials which is at least equivalent to the present levels of security. This applies in particular to: | - the confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters; | - the integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI). | BAS6 | The architecture SHALL support a level of security for all Profile content which is at least equivalent to the current state of the art level of security of the UICC. | BAS7 | The architecture SHALL NOT compromise the security and privacy of Subscriber Data, nor the security and privacy of End User Data. Examples depending on territory include identities that can be used for tracking such as ICCID, MSISDN, EID, IMSI Ki etc. | BAS8 | Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of this document. However, any data which could be used to identify an individual SHALL be treated as personal data and subject to local regulations e.g. the EID, ICCID, etc. |Table 1. :2.1.1: Basic Principles

2.2 Profile Principlesmodified

…unctions. PRO7 Profile Management SHALL be governed by policy. PRO8 A Profile SHALL be either an Operational Profile, a Provisioning Profile or a Test Profile. … 2.PRO9 :Any Java Application contained in a Profile SHALL have passed bytecode verification. Table 2.2.1: Profile Principles

3.1 eUICC Manufacturermodified

| Role no. | Description | EUM1 | The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the initial cryptographic configuration and security architecture of the eUICC. | EUM2 | The eUICCs are delivered by the eUICC Manufacturer (EUM). | EUM3 | Relevant parts of the eUICC Manufacturer’s products and processes are certified by a GSMA-approved certification process. | EUM4 | The EUM issues the eUICC Certificate to allow: | - eUICC authentication and proof of certification to other entities; | - authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-DP+ and an eUICC. | EUM5 | The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any LPA elements that reside in the eUICC and the compliance of the LPA with the requirements in Section 4.11.3. | EUM6 | Field-Test eUICCs SHALL be tracked by the EUM. |EUM7 3.Test :eUICCs SHALL be tracked by the EUM. EUM8 Any Java Application installed by the EUM in the eUICC SHALL be bytecode verified. Table 3.1.1: eUICC Manufacturer Role

3.2 Device Manufacturermodified

Role no. Description DM1 The Device Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any LPA DM1 elements that reside on the Device and the compliance of the LPA with the requirements in Section 4.11. DM2 The Device Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any application DM2 that resides on the Primary Device allowing Local User Interface access to the Companion Device. 4.Table :3.2.1: Device Manufacturer Role

3.3 Operator and Service Providermodified

…ES2+ interface. OPE2 In the event that a Subscriber has selected a Service Provider, that Service Provider will initiate the provisioning of a Profile Package. … Role no. Description OPE3 The Operator, potentially on behalf of the Service Provider, specifies the Profile characteristics and any features and applications analogous to removable UICCs. OPE4 The Operator is able to use an OTA Platform to manage the content of its Enabled Profile in the eUICC (RAM, RFM). 5.OPE5 :The Operator is responsible to ensure that any Java Application it installs on the eUICC (via SM-DP+, via OTA platform or pre-loading) has passed bytecode verification. Table 3.3.1: Operator Role

3.4 Subscriber and End Usermodified

| Role no. | Description | SEU1 | The Subscriber is the contract partner of the Service Provider for the Subscription. | NOTE: The Subscriber MAY not be the End User. | SEU2 | The End User is a human and uses the Device and/or the services related to the Enabled Profile. |Table 6. :3.4.1: Subscriber and End User Role

3.5 Certificate Issuermodified

…The Certificate Issuer communicates with the SM-DP+, SM-DS and the EUM through interfaces that are out of scope of this specification according to SGP.14 [26]. … 7.Table :3.5.1: Certificate Issuer Role

3.6 Application Developeradded

Role no. Description AD01 The Application Developer develops and provides Interoperable Applications with the intent to be included in a Profile or outside of a Profile within an eUICC. Table 3.6.1: Application Developer Role

4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecturemodified

This section contains the functional description of the Remote SIM Provisioning system architecture for the eUICC. [DiagramFigure Description automatically generated] 1. :4.1: Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture

4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overviewmodified

…t used in the GSMA Remote SIM specification [8]. Profiles are provisioned based on the security framework defined in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9]. … [GraphicalFigure user interface Description automatically generated with low confidence] 2. :4.1.1.1: Schematic Representation of the eUICC

4.1.1.1 ECASDmodified

…talled and personalised by the EUM during the eUICC manufacturing as described in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9]. The ECASD SHALL contain the following: … - eUICC private keys for creating signatures. - Associated Certificates for eUICC authentication. - The Certificate Issuers’ (CI) root public keys for verifying SM-DP+ and SM-DS Certificates. - eUICC Manufacturers’ (EUMs) keyset for key/Certificate renewal. Additionally, the ECASD SHALL provide security functions used during key establishment and eUICC authentication.

4.1.1.8 LPA Servicesmodified

The LPA services provide necessary access to the services and data required by the LPA functions for the following: 1. The Root SM-DS address. - The optionally stored default SM-DP+ address. 2. Facilitates the reception of the Bound Profile Package in transfer from the LPA. - Provide information regarding the installed Profiles and their Profile Metadata. 3. Provides Local Profile Management. - Provides functions for the LPA to authenticate and interact with the SM-DS. 4. Ensures access to the EID is restricted to only the LPA.

4.2 Interfacesmodified

[DiagramFigure Description automatically generated] 3. :4.2.1: Interfaces on the eUICC Architecture with the LPA in the Device Configuration

4.2.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)modified

…L support the triggering and confirmation of the Profile download and installation operation and Local Profile Management Operations requested by the End User. … 8.Table :4.2.3.1: End User to LUI (ESeu) Interface Requirements

4.2.14 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)modified

This connection will be provided either by: - An internet connectivity available or provided on the same Device where the LPA resides or - An internet connection shared from another Device via a local go-between connection [DiagramFigure Description automatically generated] 4. :4.2.14.1: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to the SM-DP+

4.2.15 General Interface Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description INT1 All interfaces from the eUICC SHALL indicate the eSVN. INT2 The behaviour of all interfaces SHALL support the indicated eSVN. Req no. Description INT3 During the indication of the supported eSVN from the eUICC to the SM-DP+, the eUICC version SHALL be used or the procedure SHALL fail. See table below. INT4 All communicating entities involved in Remote SIM Provisioning SHALL be mutually authenticated. The Device and the eUICC are considered as one entity in this context. 9.Table :4.2.15.1: General Interface Requirements Platform Version 1 (V1) Version 2 (V2) Version 3 (V3) eUICC V1 Platform uses V1 Platform uses V1 or fails. Platform uses V1 or fails. eUICC V2 ✗ Platform uses V2 Platform uses V2 or fails. eUICC V3 ✗ ✗ Platform uses V3 10.Table :4.2.15.2: eUICC Version vs. Platform

4.3 eUICC Requirementsmodified

| Req no. | Description | EUICC1 | The eUICC SHALL be a discrete or integrated tamper resistant component consisting of hardware and software, capable of securely hosting applications as well as confidential and cryptographic data. | NOTE: Wherever a distinction is required, the former is referred to as Discrete eUICC, and the latter as Integrated eUICC. | EUICC2 | A removable eUICC is packaged in a standardised ETSI Form Factor [2]. | EUICC3 | The Discrete eUICC SHALL be either removable or non-removable. | EUICC4 | The behaviour of the eUICC with an Enabled Profile SHALL be equivalent to the UICC. | EUICC5 | The eUICC SHALL be able to contain zero or more Profiles. | EUICC6 | At a maximum, only one Profile SHALL be enabled at any point in time. | EUICC7 | The behaviour of a NAA USIM or ISIM within a Profile on an eUICC SHALL be identical to a removable UICC NAAs USIM or ISIM. | NOTE: No changes to existing 3GPP/3GPP2 USIM, CSIM and ISIM specifications are expected. | EUICC8 | The eUICC SHALL support Milenage [11][12] and TUAK [10] algorithm sets. | EUICC9 | The ownership of the eUICC MAY change throughout its lifetime as can the Device. | NOTE: According to CERTEU11, the EUM keyset belongs to the EUM for the lifetime of the eUICC. | EUICC10 | If any Profile Management operation does not complete successfully, the eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request. | EUICC11 | The eUICC SHALL contain an ECASD and ISD-R security domains installed and personalised during manufacture. | EUICC12 | It SHALL not be possible to delete or disable the ECASD after eUICC manufacture. |Req EUICC13no. |Description EUICC13 The ISD-R SHALL be responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps. | EUICC14 | The ISD-R SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing as described in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9]. | EUICC15 | The eUICC SHALL support an eUICC Memory Reset. This can only be requested by the End User. | EUICC16 | If the eUICC supports Test Profiles, the eUICC SHALL support eUICC Test Memory Reset. | EUICC17 | The eUICC SHALL support the eUICC Profile Package Interoperable format as defined by Trusted Connectivity Alliance [5]. | EUICC18 | An ISD-R SHALL: | - be created within an eUICC at the time of manufacture; | - NOT be deleted or disabled; | - NOT be able to perform any operations inside an ISD-P. | EUICC19 | An eUICC MAY provide LPA functions. | EUICC20 | An ISD-P SHALL be created by the ISD-R at the request of the SM-DP+. | EUICC21 | Communication between the eUICC and the SM-DP+ SHALL be protected in authenticity, integrity and confidentiality. | EUICC22 | The eUICC SHALL NOT export Profiles installed on the eUICC. | EUICC23 | The eUICC SHALL enforce an isolation of Profiles and prevent Profiles from operating outside of their execution environment i.e. Profile SHALL run in a sandbox. | EUICC24 | The integrity of the Bound Profile Package SHALL be ensured during its installation on the eUICC. | EUICC26 | Profile keys and algorithm parameters SHALL NOT be extractable from the eUICC. | EUICC27 | All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a robust tamper-resistant way and be resistant to side-channel attacks. | EUICC28 | The Operator SHALL be able to update the OTA Keys in its Profile on the eUICC in a secure and confidential way, reusing existing OTA Platform mechanisms. | EUICC29 | A downloaded Profile Package SHALL be installed on the eUICC in a disabled state. | EUICC30 | The eUICC SHALL always report its eSVN in the first communication during the commencement of each session with the SM-DP+ or SM-DS. | EUICC31 | The EUM SHALL install an eUICC Certificate in the eUICC used to authenticate the eUICC and verify the eUICC certification. | EUICC32 | The EUM SHALL install an EUM Certificate in the eUICC used to verify the eUICC Certificate. | EUICC33 | The eUICC SHALL have a means to authenticate itself to the SM-DS. | EUICC34 | The eUICC SHALL protect itself against unauthorised access. | EUICC35 | Upon Profile deletion, the eUICC SHALL ensure a complete deletion of all data related to the Profile. |Req EUICC36no. |Description EUICC36 The eUICC SHALL only accept Profile Management operations sent from the LPA in either the eUICC, or the Device. | EUICC37 | The eUICC SHALL reject any Profile Management operations that are in conflict with the Profile Policy Rules of the respective Profile. | EUICC38 | If any Bound Profile Package download or installation does not complete successfully, the eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request. | EUICC39 | The eUICC SHALL support GlobalPlatform Secure Element Access Control [15]. | EUICC40 | There SHALL be a means to pre-set a default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC. | EUICC41 | The eUICC SHALL store the Root SM-DS address. | EUICC42 | The eUICC SHALL be able to send a delete Notification to the LPA to notify the Notification Receivers that the Profile has been deleted. | EUICC43 | In EUICC41,EUICC42, if connectivity is not available to send the Notification of deletion to the Notification Receivers, each Notification SHALL be retained and sent as soon as connectivity becomes available again. | EUICC44 | The delete Notification process SHALL also be executed for each deleted Profile in case of eUICC Memory reset. | EUICC45 | The eUICC SHALL support a set of standard functions and services including, but not limited to Java Applications, USIM Toolkit functions and GlobalPlatform feat … cification (SGP.22 [24]). A different set of functions and services MAY be defined/supported according to the different eUICC categories as defined in Annex D. … | EUICC46 | The eUICC SHALL support at least the following USIM Toolkit commands: | - PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION including the following fields: local info, IMEI, network measure results, date & time, access technology | - TERMINAL PROFILE | - ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD) | - SEND SHORT MESSAGE | - DISPLAY TEXT | - GET INPUT | - RING TONE | EUICC47 | An eUICC SHALL support at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters preloaded by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing, defined in GSMA SGP.22 [24]. | EUICC48 | Each Notification SHALL be uniquely identifiable and SHALL be signed by the eUICC. | EUICC49 | Each Notification SHALL be protected against re-play attacks and signed by the eUICC. | EUICC50 | [Void] | EUICC51 | [Void] | EUICC52 | The Profile SHALL be able to contain a list of zero or more Notification Receivers for each type of Notification. |Req EUICC53no. |Description EUICC53 The eUICC SHALL support SHA-1. Usage of SHA-1 SHALL be strictly limited to applications inside the Profile where the use of SHA-1 is required. | EUICC54 | The EID SHALL not be modifiable. The EID SHALL not be affected by any of the procedures, including the change of the eUICC Private keys. | EUICC55 | An Integrated eUICC SHALL be certified according to SGP.08 [39] or SGP.18 [40] as described in SGP.24 [38]. | EUICC56 | The Integrated eUICC SHALL be based on an Integrated TRE. | EUICC57 | An Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to execute the test cases defined in SGP.23 [36]. | EUICC58 | For the purpose of integration and/or end-to-end testing, a Field-Test eUICC MAY contain certificates that chain up to the GSMA CI. | EUICC59 | The Integrated eUICC SHALL allow the SM-DP+ to identify the type of the Integrated TRE including its component configuration (e.g. use of internal or Remote Memory, use of other optional components), its manufacturer, in addition to the RSP OS provider. | EUICC60 | The Integrated TRE SHOULD have priority access to Remote Memory in cases of shared resource contention. | EUICC61 | The Integrated eUICC Test Interface SHALL be compatible with commonly used interfaces for smartcard testing. | EUICC62 | The eUICC SHALL NOT be impacted by the Activation Code Retrieval. |EUICC63 11.The :eUICC MAY have a mechanism that enforces a Minimum Security Level (as defined in ETSI TS 102 226 [42]) to any Application with RAM/RFM configuration included in the Profile Package. EUICC64 With respect to EUICC63, if during Profile installation, any Application with RAM/RFM configuration in the Profile Package presents an MSL lower than the one set by the eUICC, then the Profile installation SHALL fail. EUICC65 Where EUICC63 is supported, there SHALL be a single value for the Minimum Security Level. EUICC66 The eUICC MAY have a mechanism that permits the installation of Test Profiles with RAM capabilities and/or Profile Applications only from SM-DP+ Servers specified in an allow-list, which is stored in and enforced within the eUICC. EUICC67 With respect to EUICC66, if supported by the eUICC, the allow-list SHALL be updatable by an EUM-specific mechanism. EUICC68 An eUICC MAY have a mechanism that rejects any Java Application installation into an already installed Test Profile. NOTE: This requirement is not related to Java Applications included in the Test Profile Package. EUICC69 The eUICC SHALL implement a runtime environment where Interoperable Applications are isolated from other applications and Profiles, subject to the provisions of EUICC70. EUICC70 With respect to EUICC69, inter-application communication within a Profile or with the eUICC platform SHALL be allowed only where the target application explicitly provides an interface to share services or data. Table 4.3.1: eUICC Requirements

4.4.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirementsadded

Req no. Description ELG1 The eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version it is supporting. This parameter SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility check. ELG2 The eUICC SHALL include the available memory in the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. ELG3 The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it is unable to accept an additional Profile. ELG4 The eUICC SHALL provide a valid current Certificate to the SM-DP+ signed by the EUM with the Eligibility Check Information. ELG5 The eUICC SHALL provide an identification of the EUM with the Eligibility Check Information. ELG6 The eUICC SHALL provide in the Eligibility Check Information, the current OS version. ELG7 The eUICC SHALL provide in the Eligibility Check Information Device enabler information relating to services that MAY need Profile support (e.g. NFC enablers). ELG8 Eligibility Check Information SHALL be integrity and authenticity protected by the eUICC for its sending to the SM-DP+. ELG9 The eUICC SHALL indicate the application runtime environment name, version and libraries versions supported in eUICC Eligibility Check Information. ELG10 The eUICC SHALL indicate cryptographic algorithms and their respective key lengths supported in the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. ELG11 The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information the list of supported CIs. ELG12 The eUICC SHALL indicate its current certification status in the Eligibility Check Information. ELG13 If the eUICC is NFC capable (e.g. CAT3) the Device SHALL indicate its support for the relevant NFC services including its current certification status during the eUICC Eligibility Check. ELG14 The eUICC SHALL indicate its category (see Annex D). This parameter SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check. ELG15 An eUICC SHALL provide information indicating if it is a Discrete eUICC or an Integrated eUICC. ELG16 An eUICC SHALL indicate in the Eligibility Check Information if it is Field-Test eUICC. ELG17 Void (placeholder to align with SGP.21 Version 3 requirement structure). ELG18 The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it supports eUICC OS Update. ELG19 As per EUICC63, the eUICC SHALL indicate the Minimum Security Level (as defined in ETSI TS 102 226 [42]) expected for any Application with RAM/RFM configuration. Table 4.4.1.1: eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements NOTE: It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and could be used for the eligibility check procedure.

4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirementsremoved

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Req no. Description ------------ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ELG1 The eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version it is supporting. This parameter SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility check. ELG2 The eUICC SHALL include the available memory in the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. ELG3 The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it is unable to accept an additional Profile. ELG4 The eUICC SHALL provide a valid current Certificate to the SM-DP+ signed by the EUM with the Eligibility Check Information. ELG5 The eUICC SHALL provide an identification of the EUM with the Eligibility Check Information. ELG6 The eUICC SHALL provide in the Eligibility Check Information, the current OS version. ELG7 The eUICC SHALL provide in the Eligibility Check Information Device enabler information relating to services that MAY need Profile support (e.g. NFC enablers). ELG8 Eligibility Check Information SHALL be integrity and authenticity protected by the eUICC for its sending to the SM-DP+. ELG9 The eUICC SHALL indicate the application runtime environment version and libraries versions supported in eUICC Eligibility Check Information. ELG10 The eUICC SHALL indicate cryptographic algorithms and their respective key lengths supported in the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. ELG11 The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information the list of supported CIs. ELG12 The eUICC SHALL indicate its current certification status in the Eligibility Check Information. ELG13 If the eUICC is NFC capable (e.g. CAT3) the Device SHALL indicate its support for the relevant NFC services including its current certification status during the eUICC Eligibility Check. ELG14 The eUICC SHALL indicate its category (see Annex D). This parameter SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check. ELG15 An eUICC SHALL provide information indicating if it is a Discrete eUICC or an Integrated eUICC. ELG16 An eUICC SHALL indicate in the Eligibility Check Information if it is Field-Test eUICC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12. : eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements NOTE: It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and could be used for the eligibility check procedure.

4.5 Device Requirementsmodified

| Req no. | Description | DEV1 | The Device SHALL conform to the terminal requirements within ETSI TS 102 221 [2] with the exceptions as defined in this specification. | DEV2 | There SHALL be a means for the End User to obtain the EID through the Device software. This SHALL only be possible through the LUI. | DEV3 | If an eUICC is within the Device packaging, then the EID SHALL be printed in machine readable form on the Device packaging. | DEV4 | Bearer connection of the Companion Device to the SM-DP+ SHALL only be determined by the bearer availability. | NOTE: The Companion Device MAY use any connectivity method available to connect to the SM-DP+. | DEV5 | Devices compliant with the GSMA NFC Handset Requirements [17] SHALL support the Open Mobile API [19] used by the Device applications to exchange data with their counterpart applications running in the Enabled Profile on the eUICC. | DEV6 | The implementation of the Remote SIM Provisioning specification in the Device SHALL not impact the potential use of the SIM Lock mechanism defined in 3GPP TS 22.022 [16]. | DEV7 | In the case where the Device supports both the LPA in the Device, and the LPA in the eUICC, the Device SHALL have a mechanism (setting or configuration parameter) that sets which LPA SHALL be used. | DEV8 | The End User SHALL be able to modify the parameter defined in DEV7. | DEV9 | A Device that supports an eUICC without an LPA in the eUICC, SHALL provide LPA functions. | DEV10 | A Device that supports only an eUICC with an LPA in the eUICC, MAY provide LPA functions. |Req DEV11no. |Description DEV11 If the Device supports Device Test Modes, the Device SHALL support eUICC Test Memory Reset. eUICC Test Memory Reset can only be requested by the End User when the Device is in Device Test Mode. | DEV12 | Where technically feasible, the Device SHALL implement a mechanism allowing the End User to protect the access to the Device and its Profile Management Operations with personal data. Implementation is OEM specific. | NOTE: This can be achieved by the implementation of a Device PIN lock, fingerprint, password, facial recognition (etc.) | DEV13 | The End User SHOULD be able to enable/disable the mechanism described in DEV12. Implementation is OEM specific. | NOTE: The mechanism described in DEV12 should be enabled by default. | DEV14 | With respect to LPA41, a Device containing any additional feature that affects the status of Operational Profiles SHOULD enforce the Confirmation Level of the e … m and process of the Confirmation Level is implementation specific. The End User SHOULD be able to revoke/unset a cached Confirmation previously given, if any. … | NOTE: In case the LPA or a Device application performs automatic Profile management, the Device or the application must ensure that the End User has been made fully aware of the conditions under which the service operates. | NOTE: The Device protects against abuse or malevolence of management of profiles as compared to the specified LPA functionalities. |Table 13. :4.5.1: Device Requirements

4.5.1 Device Capability Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description DEVCAP1 There SHALL be a mechanism that is able to provide the Device capabilities to the SM-DP+. 14.Table :4.5.1.1: Device Capability Requirements

4.5.2 Device with Integrated eUICCmodified

…mponents. DIE2 All Integrated TRE software and data stored in Remote Memory outside the SoC SHALL be protected against access by non Integrated TRE components. … 15.Table :4.5.2.1: Device with Integrated eUICC Requirements

4.6.1 Device Reset Requirementsmodified

… secured procedure, trigger/request the eUICC Memory Reset. FAC3 The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the eUICC Test Memory Reset. … 16.Table :4.6.1.1: Device Reset Requirements

4.6.2 eUICC Memory Reset Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description MEM1 eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC apart from pre-installedpre- installed Profiles that are flagged as permanent. MEM2 eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC regardless of their Profile Policy Rules but not the Prov … Memory Reset function. The same level of security as is offered by the LUI based reset function SHALL apply. User Intent and Confirmation Request SHALL apply. … 17.Table :4.6.2.1: eUICC Memory Reset Requirements

4.6.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirementsmodified

…firmation SHALL be verified in order to enable eUICC Test Memory Reset. MEMT3 If Test Profiles are not supported, then eUICC Test Memory Reset is not required. … 18.Table :4.6.3.1: eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements

4.7.1 Test Profile Requirementsmodified

…led on the eUICC. TPRO5 Test Profiles SHALL only be visible and usable when the Device is in Device Test Mode. TPRO6 It SHALL be possible to download, install, … enable,enable disable or deletedisable Test Profiles in the eUICC only in Device Test Mode with the exception of the eUICC Memory Reset operation. TPRO7 Test Profiles, as with any other Profile, SHALL be managed through a certified SM-DP+.SM- DP+. TPRO8 The enabling of a Test Profile SHALL override the ‘Disabling of this Profile is not allowed’ (POL RULE1) Profile Policy Rule. TPRO9 When the Device Test M … ated from the End User. TPRO12 When exiting Device Test Mode, an End User notice SHALL be presented to prompt the tester to perform an eUICC Test Memory Reset. … 19.TPRO13 :The LPA MAY delete any Test Profile without user consent when in or out of the Device Test Mode. TPRO14 It MAY be possible to download Java Applications to a Test Profile installed on a Test eUICC. TPRO15 Test Profiles MAY contain Profile Applications. TPRO16 When an eUICC contains an eUICC certificate chaining to the GSMA CI, the Test Profile MAY have RFM and RAM capabilities. TPRO17 Where an eUICC contains an eUICC certificate chaining to the GSMA CI and TPRO16 applies, Test Profiles SHALL only have confidentially managed keys, used for application and file management, that are unique per Profile. Table 4.7.1.1: Test Profiles Requirements The Device MAY implement a mechanism for connecting an external SIM card for the purpose of testing in the context of Device repair,… …

4.7.2 Provisioning Profile Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description PPRO1 Provisioning Profiles SHALL be based on the same format structure as described for the Profile (Figure 2).4.1.1.1). PPRO2 A Provisioning Profile MAY be enabled by the LPA upon End User request for operations defined in PPRO6 if establishment of the connectivity using the cur … Profile maintenance functions. The Provisioning Profile SHALL not be used as an Operational Profile. PPRO7 PPRO6 SHALL be enforceable in the RSP architecture. … 20.Table :4.7.2.1: Provisioning Profile Requirements

4.8 Profile Metadata Requirementsmodified

| Req no. | Description | META1 | All Profiles SHALL have associated Profile Metadata. | META2 | The Profile Metadata SHALL be stored in the eUICC. | META3 | The Profile Metadata SHALL be accessible irrespective of the state of the Profile. | META4 | The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the Service Provider name. | NOTE: EFSPN is already used in a different context outside of this specification and could be blank. | META5 | The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile. | META6 | The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of the Profile. | META7 | The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description of the Profile defined by the Operator/Service Provider. | META8 | The eUICC SHALL support the ‘set/edit nickname’ function. | META9 | The Profile Metadata SHALL always be available to the LUI. | META10 | The Profile Metadata SHALL include an OPTIONAL field to allow the display of an icon defined by the Operator/Service Provider for the respective Profile. | META11 | The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include a copy of the Profile Policy Rules associated to the Profile. | META12 | All Profiles SHALL be uniquely identified in the Profile Metadata as Operational, Provisioning or Test Profile. | META13 | An Operator SHALL be able to access and update the following Profile Metadata of its Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is Enabled: | - Service Provider name | - Short description of the Profile | - Icon of the Profile | META14 | The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include additional proprietary information. The additional proprietary information SHALL include a field for uniquely identifying the issuer of the additional proprietary information. |Req META15no. |Description META15 With regard to META14, the eUICC SHALL ignore fields it does not support. | META16 | With regard to META14, the LPA SHALL ignore fields it does not support. | META17 | The information defined in META14 SHALL NOT impact the functionalities and Profile Management Operations defined in this specification that are not Vendor specific. | META18 | The information defined in META14 SHALL NOT impact the interoperability of the solution defined in this specification (incl. Devices, Profiles and SM-DP+). | META19 | With regard to META14, the eUICC SHALL store the additional proprietary information in its memory if indicated by the Profile Owner. |Table 21. :4.8.1: Profile Metadata Requirements

4.9 NFC Requirementsmodified

…ted. NFC5 All NFC applications and NFC enabling applications (e.g. ARA-M, PPSE, CRS, CREL, etc.) attached to an Operational Profile SHALL be included under the … ISD-PISD- P created for the Profile, either under the MNO-SD or in an SD hierarchy with a self-extradited SSD with authorised management privilege. NFC6 The NFC eUICC solut … evice SHALL at least have an embedded eUICC or have the capability to support a removable eUICC that is compliant with CAT3 and SGP.03 [20] in either instance. … 22.Table :4.9.1: NFC Requirements

4.10.1 SM-DP+ Overviewmodified

…addition, the SM-DP+ is responsible for requesting the creation of the ISD-P in the eUICC into which the Profile will be installed. The SM-DP+ will also be the … off-cardoff- card entity that will be responsible for the lifecycle management of the ISD-P that was created at its request. This is performed via the distinct functions listed below. [GraphicalFigure user4.10.1.1: interface Description automatically generated with low confidence] 5. : SM-DP+ Functions Function name Description Profile Package Generation Creates Profile Packages [i.e. Personalised Profiles, including (IMSI, Ki, ICCID…)] from P … s and installs the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC through the LPA. SM-DS Event Registration Notifies the SM-DS of a pending operation for a specific eUICC. … 23.Table :4.10.1.1: SM-DP+ Function Descriptions

4.10.2 SM-DP+ Requirementsmodified

| Req no. | Description | SMDP1 | The SM-DP+ SHALL act on behalf of an Operator. | SMDP2 | The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to initiate the request for ISD-P creation as part of the Bound Profile Package delivery. | SMDP3 | The SM-DP+ SHALL establish an end-to-end secure channel to the eUICC to download and install Bound Profile Packages on the eUICC. | SMDP4 | The SM-DP+ SHALL link a Protected Profile Package for binding to a specific eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator. | SMDP5 | The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the linked Protected Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC. | SMDP6 | The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any Certified eUICC. | SMDP7 | Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound Profile Package delivered by the SM-DP+. | SMDP8 | Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP+ after completing all production steps, Profile Package Protection, and binding. | SMDP9 | Communication session between the SM-DP+ and the LPA SHALL be terminated by the SM-DP+ after execution of intended Operation(s). | SMDP10 | End-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC involved in the Profile download and installation SHALL be protected in terms of integrity, authenticity and confidentiality. | SMDP11 | Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected through encryption. | SMDP12 | On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile creation and storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure deletion procedures (logically and physically). | SMDP13 | SM-DP+/eUICC communication SHALL incorporate Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). | SMDP14 | The transport used for the Bound Profile Package SHALL implement anti-replay mechanisms between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC. | SMDP15 | Connectivity to the SM-DP+ SHALL be aborted and an explicit error message SHALL be triggered by the SM-DP+ upon failure to verify authenticity of the connecting party. (No message SHALL be sent to the connecting party) | SMDP16 | After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound Profile Package to the LPA, the transport encryption procedure SHALL be renewed. | If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more than a configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction SHALL be terminated and the Operator SHALL be notified. | SMDP17 | The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols whenever available (e.g. DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.). | SMDP18 | The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC Profile Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by Trusted Connectivity Alliance [5]. |Req SMDP19no. |Description SMDP19 The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on demand. | SMDP20 | It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk. | SMDP21 | The SM-DP+ SHALL send a confirmation of the successfully completed download and installation of a Profile to the Operator. | SMDP22 | There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between any SM-DP+ and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the Profile. Such a mechanism SH … ormed by the Operator itself. If such deletion mechanism is used, there will be no off-card entity responsible for managing the ISD-P of the installed Profile. … | SMDP23 | The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid. | SMDP24 | The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid. | SMDP25 | The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Notification to the Operator informing them that a specific Bound Profile Package download is about to start. | SMDP26 | The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an eUICC Eligibility Check Information report and other relevant information (e.g. Activation Code, ICCID, etc.) to the Operator ahead of/prior to the eUICC Bound Profile Package download. | SMDP27 | The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to perform Event Registrations to the SM-DS. | SMDP28 | The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to request from an Alternative SM-DS not to propagate the Event Registration to the Root SM-DS. | SMDP29 | The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Profile delete Notification to the Operator owning a Profile when a related delete Notification is received from the eUICC. | SMDP30 | The SM-DP+ SHALL support the following states for a Profile Package, triggered by the Profile Owner: | - A Profile Package is not released for Profile Package download. | - A Profile Package is released for Profile Package download. | SMDP31 | The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to select the elliptic curve parameter in the Profile download procedure. | SMDP32 (FFS) | It SHALL be possible for a SM-DP+ to conduct an Event Record Query to a SM-DSSM- (FFS) DS (Root or Alternative) for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations it owns. | SMDP33 (FFS) | The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event Record on the (FFS) Root SM-DS or the Alternative SM-DS, identified by the EID or the Event-ID over the ES12 interface. | SMDP34 (FFS) | Response to a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only occur where the Root (FFS) SM-DS or Alternative SM-DS validates the Event Record ownership. | SMDP35 (FFS) | Ownership validation of a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only use the (FFS) requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components of the Event Record held. | SMDP36 | A SM-DP+ SHALL support all sets of elliptic curve parameters as defined in GSMA SGP.22 [24]. | SMDP37 | If a Profile Package is not yet released for download then the LPA SHALL be informed by means of a specific error code. |Req SMDP38no. |Description SMDP38 An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to distinguish a Field-Test eUICC from a Certified eUICC through eUICC Eligibility Check Information. | SMDP39 | The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to be instructed by the Profile Owner to reject Profile download to Field-Test eUICCs. | NOTE: The mechanism is out of scope of this document and it is left to the implementation. | SMDP40 | The SM-DP+ SHALL NOT perform a Profile download to a Field-Test eUICC if it has been instructed so by the Profile Owner as per SMDP39. | SMDP41 | It is OPTIONAL for the SM-DP+ to support Activation Code Retrieval. If supported, SMDP42, SMDP43, SMDP44 and SMDP45 SHALL apply. | SMDP42 | With regards to LPA70, the SM-DP+ SHALL only provide the Activation Code associated with the requested Profile after successful common mutual authentication with the eUICC where the target Profile is currently installed and if allowed by the Profile Owner. | SMDP43 | If requested by the Profile Owner, the SM-DP+ SHALL notify the Profile Owner of any Activation Code Retrieval operation over ES2+ (including the ICCID and the EID). | SMDP44 | The SM-DP+ SHALL release the Profile Package associated with the Activation Code as per SMDP42 only after successful reception of the Delete Notification of the target Profile from the eUICC. | SMDP45 | The Profile Owner SHALL be able to accept or reject over ES2+, the Activation Code Retrieval request received by the SM-DP+. | SMDP46 | With regard to LPA71, the SM-DP+ supporting Activation Code Retrieval SHALL be able to provide an indication to the LPA whether Activation Code Retrieval is available or not for the requested Profile. |Table 24. :4.10.2.1: SM-DP+ Requirements

4.10.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirementsmodified

…in the eUICC is blank, then the use of the SM-DS discovery procedure or an SM-DP+ address in an AC SHALL be required to establish the target SM-DP+. DF5 [Void] … 25.Table :4.10.3.1: Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements

4.11 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)modified

[]Primary 6.Device :User End User Interface ESeu User Interface ESeu LPA LUI ES10c eUICC Companion Device Figure 4.11.1: End User Interaction and Interfaces between a Primary and Companion Device, where the Companion Device MAY have a UI

4.11.1 LPA Overviewmodified

…tion will depend upon the capability within the Device. The way this variability is implemented across different Devices and Device types is for further study. … [TextFigure Description4.11.1.1: automatically generated] 7. : LPA Functions | Function name | Description | Local Discovery Service | Where required, the LDS is responsible for retrieving pending (LDS) Event Records from the SM-DS. | (LDS) | Local Profile Download | This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound (LPD) Profile Package in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile Package from the SM-DP+ to the LPD in a single transaction, and (ii) the onward transfer of the Bound Profile Package into the eUICC in segments. | (LPD) | This function will depend on network, Device, and eUICC capabilities. | Local User Interface | This function allows the End User to perform Local Profile (LUI) Management on the Device. User Intent SHALL be enforced. |Table (LUI) | 26. :4.11.1.1: LPA Function Descriptions

4.11.2 Operational LPA Modesmodified

When there is an LPA in the Device and in the eUICC, then the LPA to be used is specified by the Device settings (DEV7): - LPA in the Device LPA in the eUICC

4.11.2.1 LPA in the eUICCmodified

LPA in the eUICC LPA functions are provided by the eUICC. [GraphicalFigure user interface, diagram Description automatically generated] 8. :4.11.2.1.1: LPA in the eUICC

4.11.2.2 LPA in the Devicemodified

LPA functions are provided by the Device. [DiagramFigure Description automatically generated] 9. :4.11.2.2.1: LPA in the Device

4.11.3 LPA Requirementsmodified

| Req no. | Description | LPA1 | The LPA SHALL be responsible for instructing the eUICC to perform Local Profile LPA1 Management Operations as per End User request. | LPA2 | A mechanism SHALL be implemented between any LPA elements outside the LPA2 eUICC, and the eUICC to ensure that the communication is not compromised wherever the LPA is located. | LPA3 | A secure mechanism SHALL be implemented between the LUI and the associated LPA3 display or input applications on the Device. | LPA4 | Access to the LUI SHALL be protected according to current best practices. This LPA4 SHALL be enforced by the Device OS. | LPA5 | All Local Profile Management Operations SHALL require User Intent. | LPA6 | LUI access SHALL require User Intent. | LPA7 | The End User SHALL be able to easily access the list of installed Profiles. | LPA8 | The LPA SHALL protect Profile Metadata from unauthorised access. | LPA9 | The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘enable’ SHALL be supported. This LPA9 operation SHALL allow the End User to select the Profile to be enabled. | LPA10 | The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘disable’ SHALL be supported. | LPA11 | The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘delete’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the eUICC. LPA11 The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for the deletion of the Profile. Strong Confirmation SHALL be enforced. | LPA12 | The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This LPA12 operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Operational Profiles on the eUICC and relevant associated information through their Profile Metadata. | LPA13 | The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’ SHOULD be supported. When supported, this operation SHALL allow the End User to edit LPA13 the default SM-DP+ address. Simple confirmation SHALL be enforced. If the LPA does not support ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’, alternative Device-specific method(s) to edit the default SM-DP+ address SHALL be provided to the End User. | LPA14 | The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as described LPA14 in Section 4.6.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. Strong Confirmation SHALL be enforced. | LPA15 | The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Test Memory Reset’ SHALL LPA15 execute the eUICC Test Memory Reset as described in Section 4.6.3. Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced. | LPA16 | The Local Profile Management Operation ‘set/edit nickname’ SHOULD be supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to add or modify a nickname LPA16 for the selected Profile. The operation SHALL NOT modify the Service Provider name. If the LPA does not support ‘set/edit nickname’, alternative vendor-specific methods to distinguish Profiles on the LUI SHOULD be provided by the LPA. | LPA17 | The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile’ SHALL be supported. This LPA17 operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to the eUICC. |Req no. Description At least three mechanisms SHALL be supported by the LPA depending on the type of Device where technically capable: | - Profile download from default SM-DP+ | - Profile download via SM-DS service discovery | - Profile download with Activation Code | Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced. | LPA18 | [Void] | LPA19 | [Void] | LPA20 | The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Simple LPA20 Confirmation located on the Device as described in this document. | LPA21 | [Void] | LPA22 | [Void] | LPA23 | [Void] | LPA24 | [Void] | LPA25 | [Void] | LPA26 | [Void] | LPA27 | When enforced, any Confirmation Request SHALL allow the End User to cancel the LPA27 Local Profile Management Operation. | LPA28 | It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI of a Companion Device allowing input from LPA28 an End User interface on the Primary Device. | LPA29 | When a Companion Device LUI allows input from a Primary Device, the Companion Device LUI SHALL be able to restrict the actions that can be applied. For example: | - not offer the eUICC Memory Reset; |LPA29 - only ‘enable’ and ‘disable’ operation are exposed. | - Profile enabling is exposed only if no Profile is already enabled on the Companion Device. | LPA30 | The LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be able to request an End User initiated LPA30 action on the Companion Device before the establishment of any proximity secure link (used for inputs into the LUI from another Device). | LPA31 | A point-to-point proximity secure link initiated by the End User and offering LPA31 confidentiality and integrity SHALL be established between the Companion and Primary Device for any input executed from the Primary Device. | LPA32 | When operating a Companion Device LUI from a Primary Device, any required User Intent or Confirmation Request SHALL only be executed by the LPA on the LPA32 Companion Device. The physical End User input MAY be done in either the Primary or the Companion Device. | LPA33 | The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure LPA33 measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI. | LPA34 | [Void] | LPA35 | The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the LPA35 internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over such connection, ES8+ and ES9+ interfaces can be established. |Req LPA36no. |Description The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally shared LPA36 Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over such connection, ES8+, and ES9+ interfaces can be established. | LPA37 | The LPA SHALL be able to determine if connectivity to the SM-DP+ is available by LPA37 any means. | LPA38 | The LPA SHALL be able to notify the End User that there is no connection to the LPA38 internet and or no connection to the SM-DP+ in order to allow the End User to enable or troubleshoot required connectivity. | LPA39 | The LPA SHALL only be able to access the eUICC if it has assigned privileges. | LPA40 | There SHALL only be one LPA on the Device. | LPA41 | The LPA MAY be extended to support additional features which are not described in this specification. |LPA41 NOTE: These additional features could be (but not limited to) interaction with entities external to LPA, automation or batch processing of Local Profile Management Operations, etc. | LPA41a | The LPA including additional features SHALL maintain the interoperability of the LPA41a solution defined in this specification. | LPA42 | [Void] | LPA43 | When multiple Operational Profiles are installed, the Local Profile Management Operation ‘enable’ SHALL first initiate the ‘disable’ operation for any Enabled Profile prior to initiating the ‘enable’ operation for the selected Profile. | LPA44 | The LPA SHALL be able to read the Profile Policy Rules. | LPA45 | When a Profile with Profile Policy Rules is installed, in the case where End User consent is requested, the LPA SHOULD display the consequences of the Profile P … o install cannot be deleted under the terms you have agreed with your service provider. Approve installation YES/NO?”). Strong Confirmation SHOULD be enforced. … | LPA46 | Prior to downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHALL check the condition for whether the Enabled Profile, if any, has enabled POL RULE1. If this is the case, a dedicated message SHALL be displayed identifying the consequences to the End User. Examples of information that may be displayed would be: | - Enabling of the new Profile will not be possible because the currently Enabled Profile cannot be disabled. | - The Profile name of the Enabled Profile. | - For more information, the End User should contact the Profile Owner of this Profile. | With displaying this message, the End User SHALL be able to decide on whether to continue the download or to cancel the operation. | This dialogue MAY be combined with the regular End User Intent for confirming a Profile download. |Req LPA47no. |Description LPA47 The communication between the End User interface of the Primary Device and the LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be protected (confidentiality, integrity and authentication). | LPA48 | [Void] | LPA49 | Confirmation Requests for consecutive Local Profile Management Operations MAY be achieved in one step as long as the different actions are clearly explained to … nto one single step with a single confirmation only (e.g. “Do you want to install profile ‘ProfileName’ on your Device and enable it? Yes / No / Install only”) … | LPA50 | When consecutive operations are achieved in one single step (LPA49), the highest level of confirmation SHALL be applied - i.e. in the case of two operations having respectively Strong and Simple Confirmation Requests, the single step SHALL use the Strong Confirmation Request. | LPA51 | The Local Profile Management Operations ‘enable’ (LPA9), ‘disable’ (LPA10), and ‘delete’ (LPA11) SHALL be able to trigger a Notification to the Notification Receivers of the respective Profile being managed to indicate that this operation was actioned. These Notifications are sent on a best effort basis and SHALL not impact otherwise the operation. | LPA52 | The LPA SHALL provide a Trusted Link from the End User to the eUICC through the LUI. | LPA53 | The End User SHALL be able to configure the LPA such that the automatic Event LPA53 Record retrieval from the SM-DS is disabled. | LPA54 | The LPA SHALL be able to read any SM-DS and SM-DP+ addresses configured in the eUICC. | LPA55 | It SHALL be possible to check the LPA Integrity. If the integrity check fails, LPA55 communication between the eUICC and the LPA SHALL not occur. | LPA56 | LPA Integrity SHALL be ensured using the best practice methods on the targeted LPA56 platform. See 0. | LPA57 | The polling mechanism in the LPA SHALL have two types of triggers; those that are LPA57 event based, and those that are End User initiated. | LPA58 | Event based triggers for polling SHOULD include Device power-up when no LPA58 Operational Profile is installed; in addition other triggers MAY be provided. Event based triggers MAY be disabled by the End User. | LPA59 | End User initiated triggers for polling SHALL include: | - The ‘Add Profile’ operation to trigger the default SM-DP+ if configured, and the LPA59 Root SM-DS. | - In addition, other manual triggers MAY be provided. | LPA60 | [Void] | LPA61 | Error/retry handling of the LPA polling mechanism SHALL be implemented e.g. LPA61 advise the End User to retry or automatically retry as appropriate. The corresponding confirmation needs to be enforced in the retry cases. | LPA62 | As part of the initial Device setup, if no Operational Profile is already installed, LPA62 means SHALL be provided to the End User to retrieve pending Profiles waiting on Req no. Description the Default SM-DP+ if configured, via the Root SM-DS, and via the Activation Code procedure. | Simple Confirmation is required. | NOTE: Implementation is left to the OEM and retrieval does not need to happen exactly during the initial Device setup if the End User, as an example, is informed on how to retrieve these profiles after the setup. | LPA63 | The End User SHALL always be able to manually request the retrieval of any waiting Event Record via the LPA if there is no default SM-DP+ address. |LPA63 NOTE: This may be achieved through the combination with existing operations – e.g. pressing “Add Profile” would contact the server to retrieve an Event. | LPA64 | The Operator/Service Provider name SHALL be given in the signalling information from the SM-DP+ to the LPA when initiating the download of a Profile and shown LPA64 to the End User before the Profile is downloaded. | Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced. | LPA65 | The LPA SHOULD present the EID to the End User as both text and in a defined LPA65 scannable format (e.g. QR Code). | LPA66 | [Void] | LPA67 | If the SM-DP+ stops the Profile download procedure, the LPA SHALL notify the End LPA67 User. | LPA68 | [Void] | LPA69 | It is OPTIONAL for the LPA to support the Activation Code Retrieval operation. | LPA70 | The LPA supporting Activation Code Retrieval SHALL support the Local Profile Management Operation 'retrieve Activation Code'. This Operation SHALL allow LPA70 the LPA to request the Activation Code associated with a specific Profile currently installed on the eUICC. | LPA71 | The LPA supporting Activation Code Retrieval MAY check the eligibility of the LPA71 Activation Code Retrieval from the SM-DP+ for a specific Profile installed on the eUICC. |Table 27. :4.11.3.1: LPA Requirements

4.11.4 LDS Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description LDS1 The LDS SHALL be able to read out the address described in EUICC41 and only LDS1 use the address to connect to the SM-DS 28.Table :4.11.4.1: LDS Requirement

4.12.1 SM-DS Overviewmodified

…ot SM-DS and will receive the Alternative SM-DS address. It will then request the Event from the Alternative SM-DS, which will respond with the SM-DP+ address. … [C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.214.12.1.1: UML diagrams - PHASE 1\basic operation of the SM-DS 1.png] 10. : Alternative Device to Root SM-DS Event Registration [C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.214.12.1.2: UML diagrams - PHASE 1\basic operation of the SM-DS 2.png] 11. : Root SM-DS Event Registration [C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.21 UML diagrams - PHASE 1\basic operation of the SM-DS 3.png] 12. :4.12.1.3: Alternative SM-DS Discovery

4.12.2 SM-DS Implementationmodified

Two configurations of the SM-DS MAY exist: - A Root SM-DS - An Alternative SM-DS [DiagramFigure Description4.12.2.1: automatically generated] 13. : SM-DS Implementation Figure 134.12.2.1 shows both configurations. The Root SM-DS is configured at the time of Device manufacture and is invariant.

4.12.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelinesmodified

The following statements SHOULD be considered when defining a technical implementation: - A competitive environment on the supply of SM-DS services SHOULD be favoured by the approach. - There SHOULD be no single-points-of-failure. - Implementation SHOULD inherently provide both vertical and horizontal performance/scalability. - There SHOULD be no need for pre-registration of Devices or eUICCs at a certain SM-DSSM- DS as required in SGP.02 [8] (GSMA Embedded SIM for the SM-SR).

4.12.4 SM-DS functionsmodified

The SM-DS has three distinct functions: [TextFigure Description4.12.4.1: automatically generated] 14. : SM-DS Functions Function name Description Event Registration Process by which an Event Record received from a SM-DP+ is stored. Event Deletion Process by which an SM-DP+ can delete its own Event Record. Event Retrieval Provides all registered Event Records, upon Discovery Request from any enquiring LDS. 29.Table :4.12.4.1: SM-DS Function Descriptions

4.12.5 SM-DS Requirementsmodified

| Req no. | Description | SMDS1 | The SM-DS SHALL enable a LDS to discover its own Event Records registered by SM-DP+(s) or by Alternative SM-DS(s). | SMDS2 | The SM-DS SHALL not be able to identify the nature of an Event. | NOTE: The nature of the Event may be ‘Profile Package available for download’. | SMDS3 | All valid Discovery Requests and Event Registrations SHALL be processed in a non-discriminatory manner. | SMDS4 | The SM-DS SHALL only accept Event Registrations from | - any authorised and authenticated SM-DP+(s) having a valid Certificate. | - any authorised and authenticated SM-DS(s) having a valid Certificate. | SMDS5 | The SM-DS SHALL only accept Discovery Requests authenticated by an eUICC via the corresponding LDS. | SMDS6 | The SM-DS and the SM-DP+ as well as connected SM-DSs SHALL be mutually authenticated. | SMDS7 | The SM-DS SHALL NOT have visibility of any data that may be used to compromise the End User´s privacy. | SMDS8 | The SM-DS SHALL support multiple concurrent Event Registrations per eUICC and SHALL present to the LDS all currently valid Event Records in the same order as they were received by the SM-DS (first in, first out). | SMDS9 | The SM-DS SHALL only store Event Records destined for specific EIDs. |Req SMDS10no. |Description SMDS10 Subscriber Specific data and Profile related contents SHALL NOT be stored within the SM-DS. | SMDS11 | The SM-DS SHALL NOT allow the harvesting of any information such as Operator, EIDs, Device Manufacturers, Devices, etc. | SMDS12 | The SM-DS SHALL only return to the LDS, the Event Records related to the served eUICC. | SMDS13 | The SM-DS SHALL NOT have any contact with the Profile Packages e.g. SHALL NOT store or process any Profile Package. | SMDS14 | The SM-DS SHALL provide the same data regardless of the status of the Device that queries it (i.e. consistent in time and in geographic location). | SMDS15 | The SM-DS SHOULD NOT significantly impact the end-to-end provisioning time. | SMDS16 | The SM-DS SHALL provide defence against DoS attacks. | SMDS17 | All communications to, from and between entities of the SM-DS SHALL be encrypted. | SMDS18 | The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event Records registered on the SM-DS. | SMDS19 | An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event Records registered on the Root SM-DS (In response to an SM-DP+ delete operation defined in SMDS18). | SMDS20 | An Alternative SM-DS SHALL propagate the Event Record to the Root SM-DS if requested by the SM-DP+. | SMDS21 | If there are multiple Event Records registered on the SM-DS for one eUICC, these SHALL all be sent as a single response. | SMDS22 | An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an Event Record to an LDS either by the Root SM-DS or via any Alternative SM-DS selected by the SM-DP+. If an Alternative SM-DS is selected, the Event Record to the LDS SHALL come from this Alternative SM-DS. | SMDS23 | There SHALL be a unique Root SM-DS. | NOTE: This requirement does not forbid the potential load-balancing of this Root SM-DS. | SMDS24 | The Root SM-DS SHALL be managed by the GSMA. | SMDS25 (FFS) | It SHALL be possible for the Alternative SM-DS to conduct an Event Record Query (FFS) to the Root SM-DS for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations it owns. | SMDS26 (FFS) | A SM-DS response to an Event Record Query SHALL only confirm Event Record (FFS) existence and SHALL NOT include additional information. | SMDS27 (FFS) | An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event Record (FFS) on the Root SM-DS, identified by the EID or the Event-ID over the ES15 interface. | SMDS28 (FFS) | Response to a SM-DS Event Record query SHALL only occur where the responder (FFS) validates the Event Record ownership. | SMDS29 (FFS) | Ownership validation of a SM-DS Event Record Query SHALL only use the (FFS) requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components of the Event Record held. |Req SMDS30no. (FFS)Description |SMDS30 The SM-DS (Root or Alternative) MAY inform the SM-DP+ directly or via another (FFS) SM-DS, that a Discovery Request from an authorised LDS has been answered by issuing an Event Record. | SMDS31 (FFS) | The SM-DS SHALL only inform the Event Record’s owning SM-DP+ or SM-DS that (FFS) it has replied to a Discovery Request. |Table 30.4.12.5.1: SM-DS Requirements

4.12.6 Event Registration/Deletion Proceduremodified

The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with the Root SM-DS and an Alternative SM-DS (cascade mode). [C:\Users\ckwok\MASTERFigure SGP.21 UML diagrams\Event Registration or Deletion Procedure.png] 15. :4.12.6.1: Event Registration/Deletion Procedure

4.12.7 Discovery Request Proceduremodified

The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with an Alternative SM-DS and the Root SM-DS (cascade mode). # [C:\Users\CKwok\MASTERFigure SGP.21 UML diagrams\Discovery Request - Phase 2.png] 16. :4.12.7.1: Discovery Request Procedure Procedure: 1. to 3. In order to generate a Discovery Request, the LDS requests the eUICC to generate an eUICC Authorisation which c… …

4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirementsmodified

| Policy no. | Description | POL1 | A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only be configured within a Profile. | POL2 | Each Profile MAY have Profile Policy Rules associated to itself. | POL3 | A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only apply to the Profile that contains it. | POL4 | Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be consistent across implementations. | POL5 | Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be able to resolve any Profile Policy Rule conflict. | POL6 | The updating of a Profile’s Policy Rules SHALL be restricted to the Profile Owner. | POL7 | The mechanism used for the update of a Profile Policy Rule SHALL be atomic. | POL8 | The set of Profile Policy Rules SHALL be extensible for future releases. | POL9 | There SHALL be a Profile Policy Rule scheme to allow extensibility of the Policy Rules, e.g. described like ‘operational command, scope of application, qualification’ | POL10 | A Profile Policy Rule SHALL be enforced whenever a Profile state change is attempted. | POL11 | Downloading and installing a Profile with the Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of this Profile is not allowed’ (POL RULE1) SHALL only be possible if no other Operational Profile is currently installed. | POL12 | The LPA and the eUICC SHALL prevent the downloading and installation of a Profile containing Profile Policy Rules that conflict with the Profile Policy Rules of the already installed Profiles. | NOTE: The technical specification SHALL describe exhaustively each conflict that MAY occur. | POL12a | The LPA MAY cancel the Profile download procedure if it does not support the downloading of Profiles containing Profile Policy Rules to a removable eUICC regardless of its RAT. |Policy POL13no. |Description POL13 An Operator SHALL be able to deactivate the Profile Policy Rules of its Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is enabled. | NOTE: The activation of Profile Policy Rules on the ES6 interface is a potential feature for a future release. | POL14 | Before a Profile is installed with Profile Policy Rules, the End User SHALL be able to be notified about the Profile Policy Rules and if notified, the installation SHALL thereafter be conditional on End User Strong Confirmation. | This prompting may not be needed if the installation is directly allowed by the RAT. | POL15 | The request for End User consent for the installation of Profile Policy Rules and Profile download MAY be combined into a single prompt therefore requiring a single confirmation by the End User. | POL16 | Profile Policy Rules SHALL be enforced by the Profile Policy Enabler in the eUICC. | POL17 | The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL only support the Profile Policy Rules defined in this specification. | POL18 | The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL be capable of supporting all the Profile Policy Rules as defined in this specification. | POL19 | POL RULE3 SHALL be enforceable in all cases with the exception of the enabling of a Provisioning Profile. | NOTE: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification. | POL20 | Allowing the installation of a Profile with Profile Policy Rules SHALL be subject to compliance with local regulatory requirements. | POL21 | Profile Policy Rules MAY be configured for Profiles only if the Profile Owner can be identified in the Metadata. | NOTE: POLPPE requirements depend on the identification of the Profile Owner. |Table 31. :4.13.2.1: Profile Policy Management Requirements

4.13.3 Policy Rulesmodified

| Policy no. | Description | POL RULE1 | The Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be supported. | POL RULE2 | The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be supported. | POL RULE3 | The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is required upon its successful disabling’ SHALL be supported. | NOTE: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification. |Table 32. :4.13.3.1: Policy Rules Requirements

4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirementsmodified

| Policy no. | Description | POLPPE1 | The Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) SHALL be stored in the Profile Policy Enabler in the eUICC. | POLPPE2 | The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL enforce the contents of the installed RAT, if any, only at Profile installation time. | POLPPE3 | The RAT SHALL allow multiple Profile Owners to have Profile Policy Rules enabled in their Profiles. | POLPPE4 | The RAT SHALL be able to support specific configurations which allow a set of or all Profile Policy Rules for any Profile Owner. | POLPPE5 | The RAT SHALL only be installed at pre-issuance or during the initial Device setup provided there are no Operational Profiles installed. | POLPPE6 | The RAT SHALL not be affected by the eUICC Memory Reset function. | POLPPE7 | To support identifiable regulatory requirement, a RAT SHALL be able to support a specific configuration which MAY forbid any Profile Owner to set a specific Profile Policy Rule. | POLPPE8 | If POLPPE7 is set, this information SHALL be part of the eligibility check information shared between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC. | POLPPE9 | Where the RAT allows the Profile Policy Rules for the Profile being installed, installation SHALL proceed as stated in POL14. | POLPPE10 | The RAT SHALL be able to support a setting to display the consequences of the Profile Policy Rules to the End User before installation of the Profile. | POLPPE11 | The OEM or EUM SHALL be responsible for providing the RAT. | POLPPE12 | A fixed RAT SHALL be implemented in the eUICC. | NOTE: RAT configuration examples are described in 0. |Table 33. :4.13.4.1: Profile Policy Enabler Requirements

4.14.1 eUICC Certification Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description CERTEU1 The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS UP certifiedaccredited [13]. CERTEU2 The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance with GSMA SGP.22 [24]. CERTEU3 The eUICC SHALL be certified according to the Protection Profile defined by the GSMA [25]. CERTEU4 The eUICC Protection Profile SHALL at least include the following elements: ISD-R,ISD- R, Profile storage, isolation of Profiles, and Telecom Framework. CERTEU5 The eUICC protection Profile SHALL be equivalent to the eUICC Protection Profile defined in SGP.05 [21]. CERTEU6 The Evaluation Assurance Level of the eUICC Protection Profile SHALL be (at least) EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 (EAL 4+) [33]. Req no. Description CERTEU7 The eUICC public key Certificate used for authentication SHALL contain the EID. CERTEU8 It SHALL be possible to obtain the technical reference of the pr … e corresponding Certificate. CERTEU12 If the eUICC private key(s) are modifiable, it SHALL use the mechanism defined in the GlobalPlatform specification with a … minimumMinimum securitySecurity levelLevel corresponding to the AES algorithm using a key length of 128 bits. CERTEU13 If the eUICC's EUM Certificate is updatable, then the eUICC SHALL support a secure … CC SHOULD be certified according to EMVCo Security Evaluation process [27]. CERTEU17 Field-Test eUICCs SHALL use a certified hardware according to SGP.24 [38]. … 34.Table :4.14.1.1: eUICC Certification Requirements

4.14.2 Device Compliance Requirementmodified

…grated TRE implementations SHALL ensure that any interfaces between the Integrated TRE and the SoC are protected against confidentiality and integrity attacks. … 35.Table :4.14.2.1: Device Compliance Requirement

4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification Requirementsmodified

| Req no. | Description | CERTDP1 | The SM-DP+ provider SHALL be required to declare product (SM-DP+) compliance with GSMA SGP.22 [24]. | CERTDP2 | The SM-DP+ SHALL be certifiedaccredited according to FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3 [22] and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology [28]. | CERTDP3 | SM-DP+ elements SHALL use Hardware Security Modules (HSM) for cryptographic related operations (key storage, derivation, cryptographic operations). | NOTE: This is to be covered by the SAS documents “HSM certified according to FIPS 140-2 level 3 or higher” | CERTDP4 | The SM-DP+ SHALL implement privileges isolation (Log, Audit, Operation, and Administration). | CERTDP5 | The SM-DP+ SHALL implement operating system hardening mechanisms. | CERTDP6 | The SM-DP+ SHALL implement separation of control, user and administrative planes. | CERTDP7 | [Void] | CERTDP8 | [Void] | CERTDP9 | The private keys of SM-DP+ Certificates used for Profile Binding with eUICC SHALL be protected and stored in HSM according to CERTDP3. | CERTDP10 | The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to mitigate against DoS attacks. | CERTDP11 | [Void] | CERTDP12 | The SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI. |CERTDP13 36.The :SM-DP+ processes SHALL ensure that any Java Application to be included in Profile Package(s) is bytecode verified. NOTE 1: As per CERTDP2, the SM-DP+ processes are verified in the scope of SAS-SM. NOTE 2: It is sufficient to enforce this requirement once for a given Java Application contained within an unpersonalised Profile. Table 4.14.3.1: SM-DP+ Certification Requirements

4.14.4 SM-DS Certification Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description CERTDS1 The SM-DS provider SHALL be required to declare product compliance with GSMA SGP.22 [24]. CERTDS2 The SM-DS SHALL be certifiedaccredited according to FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3 [22] and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v3 [28]. CERTDS3 The SM-DS SHALL implement isolation of privileges (Log, Audit, Operation, and Administration). CERTDS4 The SM-DS SHALL implement operating system hardening mechanisms. Req no. Description CERTDS5 The SM-DS SHALL implement separation of control, user and administrative planes. CERTDS6 [Void] CERTDS7 [Void] CERTDS8 The SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI. 37.Table :4.14.4.1: SM-DS Certification Requirements

4.14.5 LPA Certification Requirementsmodified

…ticate the SM-DS during the TLS session. CERTLPA6 The LPA SHALL only accept valid TLS Certificates as defined in CERTPK10a for SM-DP+ and SM-DS authentication. … 38.Table :4.14.5.1: LPA Certification Requirements

4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management Requirementsmodified

| Req no. | Description | CERTPK1 | The eUICC SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+. | CERTPK2 | The LPD SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+. | CERTPK3 | The LDS SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS. | CERTPK4 | The LDS authentication of an SM-DS using an invalid Public Key Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop. | CERTPK5 | The LPD authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop. | CERTPK6 | The SM-DP+ authentication of an eUICC using an invalid Public Key Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop. | CERTPK7 | The eUICC authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop. | CERTPK8 | The GSMA CI SHALL revoke the Public Key Certificate of any entities (SM-DP+, SM-DS, EUM) if it is compromised (e.g. private key theft). | CERTPK9 | The eUICC SHALL be able to support a set of GSMA CIs. |CERTPK9a CERTPK10The |EUM SHALL ensure that the support of GSMA CI and Test CI are mutually exclusive on any given eUICC. CERTPK10 A Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if: |Req -no. Description it has a valid signature | - it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a trusted chain of Certificates up to a GSMA CI. Certificate Path validation SHALL follow the process defined in RFC 5280 [1]. | - it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in the trust chain has been revoked | - it has not expired | If any of these applicable verifications fail, the Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as invalid. | CERTPK10a | A TLS Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if: | - it has a valid signature | - it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a public trusted CA, or a trusted chain of Certificates up to a GSMA CI or a public trusted CA. Certificate Path validation SHALL follow the process defined in RFC 5280 [1]. | - it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in its trust chain has been revoked | - it has not expired | If any of these applicable verifications fail, the TLS Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as invalid. | CERTPK11 | The eUICC, LPA, SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL have knowledge of revoked Public Key Certificates. | NOTE: This requirement also applies to TLS Certificates that chain to either the GSMA CI or a public trusted CA. |Table 39. :4.14.6.1: Public Key Certificates Management Requirements

4.15 eUICC OS Updateadded

Req no. Description OSUpd1 An eUICC SHOULD support a secure mechanism to allow an eUICC OS Update. While its implementation detail is out of scope of specification, the use of eUICC OS Update PP-Module as described in SGP.25 [21] is mandatory. OSUpd2 If such a mechanism is used, the eSIM Products for which the compliance is affected by the eUICC OS update SHALL maintain compliance as specified in SGP.24 [27]. Table 4.15.1: eUICC OS Update Requirements

4.16 Requirements for Interoperable Applicationsadded

Req no. Description APP01 Application Developers SHALL develop Interoperable Applications according to current best practices. NOTE: The “Stepping Stones for Java Card Applet Developers” [i.01] can be used for guidance on the development of Java Card Applets. Table 4.16.1: Requirements for Interoperable Applications

5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirementsmodified

…Root SM-DS and a default SM-DP+ address are populated, the LPA SHALL first contact the SM-DP+ and then SM-DS to initiate a Remote SIM Provisioning transaction. … 40.Table :5.1.1.1: LPA Initiated Download Requirements

5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Proceduremodified

This following procedure describes the Events that are part of the Profile Package download and installation procedure initiated by the LPA. [C:\Users\ckwok\MASTERFigure SGP.21 UML diagrams\Profile download procedure.png] 17. :5.1.2.1: Profile Download Procedure Start conditions: a. The Subscriber has completed the Subscription process to the selected Operator/Service Provider offer. b. The P… …

5.2.1 Activation Code Requirementsmodified

| Req no. | Description | AC1 | Where used, the Activation Code SHALL trigger the download of a Bound Profile Package from a specific SM-DP+. | AC2 | The Activation Code SHALL comprise of the following parameters: | - SM-DP+ address | - Activation Code Token (Includes OPTIONAL Confirmation Code Required Flag) | - SMDPid (OPTIONAL) | AC3 | The Activation Code Token SHALL be able to include a parameter indicating whether a Confirmation Code is required or not. | If such a Confirmation Code is required, the LPA SHALL ask the End User to input a Confirmation Code. The SM-DP+ SHALL verify the Confirmation Code before delivering the Bound Profile Package. | NOTE: How the Confirmation Code is created and provided to the End User is out of scope of this specification. | AC4 | The Activation Code SHALL be verified by the SM-DP+ before delivering the Bound Profile Package. | AC5 | The Activation Code input in the LPA by the End User SHALL support at least manual typing and QR code scanning. | AC6 | All Activation Code procedures SHALL be implemented natively as part of the LPA. | AC7 | [Void] | AC8 | Following the Activation Code procedure, the Profile Package download procedure SHALL be used. | AC9 | The Activation Code procedure SHALL preserve eco-system security, privacy and validation of User Intent. | AC10 | The Activation Code procedure SHALL be used for the sole purpose of downloading a Profile package to the targeted eUICC. The Activation Code procedure SHALL prevent sending IMEI and EID information to a non-authenticatednon- authenticated SM-DP+. | AC11 | The Activation Code SHALL uniquely identify the Operator/Service Provider. | AC12 | The Activation Code request to the SM-DP+ SHALL be extended by the LPA with the EID after the specific SM-DP+ has been authenticated. |Table 41. :5.2.1.1: Activation Code Requirements

5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Proceduremodified

…criber or the End User on behalf of the Subscriber to “activate” a Device by means of requesting the download of an Operational Profile from the Device itself. … [C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.215.2.2.1: UML diagrams - PHASE 1\PRO DL PRO NEW.png] 18. : Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure Start Conditions: a. A Subscription has been established by the Subscriber. b. Activation Code material and opti … The SM-DP+ checks the EUM Certificate with the CI Public Key. The SM-DP+ checks the signature of the nonceSMDP; the eUICC is at this stage authenticated by the … SM-DP+.SM- DP+. 17. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the eligibility check based on the transmitted information (EID, Device information, eUICC information, eSVN). 18. The SM-DP+ chec… …

5.3.1.1 Enable Profilemodified

This procedure performs the enabling of a target Profile. The request is given by the End User to the LPA. [C:\Users\CKwok\MASTERFigure SGP.215.3.1.1.1: UML diagrams\Enable profile procedure.png] 19. : Enable Profile Procedure Start conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is … he LPA. 6. The target Profile is enabled. 7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the enabling of the Profile. 8. The End User is informed via the LPA. End conditions: … a.b. The target Profile is enabled.

5.3.1.2 Disable Profilemodified

Profile disabling can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA. [C:\Users\CKwok\MASTERFigure SGP.21 UML diagrams\Disable profile procedure.png] 20. :5.3.1.2.1: Disable Profile Procedure Start conditions: a. The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is… …

5.3.1.3 Delete Profilemodified

Profile deletion can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA. [C:\Users\CKwok\MASTERFigure SGP.21 UML diagrams\Delete profile procedure.png] 21. :5.3.1.3.1: Delete Profile Procedure Start conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User c. The LPA is authenticated… …

5.3.1.4 Add/Update Profile Nicknamemodified

…te a nickname to a Profile for ease of use. Note that adding or changing a nickname SHALL NOT affect any other data or other Profile Metadata for that Profile. … [C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.215.3.1.4.1: UML diagrams\Update profile nickname procedure.png] 22. : Add/Update Profile Nickname Procedure Start conditions: a. User Intent has been verified. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is a … of the nickname on the LPA. 2. The LPA updates the Profile Metadata of the target Profile with the End User’s choice of nickname in the eUICC. End conditions: … a.c. Profile Metadata of the target Profile has been updated with the End User’s choice of nickname.

5.3.1.5 Query Profile Metadatamodified

…the Profile Metadata for the selected Profile on the eUICC at the time of querying. No changes are made to any data on the eUICC as a result of this procedure. … [DiagramFigure Description automatically generated] 23. :5.3.1.5.1: Query Profile Metadata Procedure Start conditions: a. The LPA is authenticated to eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. b. The list of P… …

5.3.1.6 eUICC Memory Resetmodified

…ed Profile Metadata. The request is given by the End User to the LPA. NOTE: A similar procedure will apply to perform the eUICC Test Memory Reset of the eUICC. … [C:\Users\CKwok\MASTERFigure SGP.21 UML diagrams\eUICC Memory Reset procedure.png] 24. :5.3.1.6.1: eUICC Memory Reset Procedure Start conditions: a. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. b. The eUICC Mem… …

5.3.1.7 Add Profile with Activation Codemodified

…able the downloaded Profile, nor disable an Enabled Profile. Network connectivity is assumed. The download can be initiated by the input of an Activation Code. … [C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.21 UML diagrams - PHASE 1\Add profile procedure.png] 25. :5.3.1.7.1: Add Profile with Activation Code Procedure Start conditions: a. User Intent has been verified. b. The download of a new Profile is allowed on the eUICC. c. The… …

5.3.1.8 Edit SM-DP+ Addressmodified

This procedure will allow the End User to edit a default SM-DP+ address on to the eUICC. [C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.215.3.1.8.1: UML diagrams - PHASE 1\Edit SM-DP+ Address.png] 26. : Edit SM-DP+ Address Start conditions: a. There is a default SM-DP+ address in the LPA. b. The End User is willing to edit the default SM-DP+ address Procedure: … e in the LPA Service. 4. The LPA Service informs the LPA of the storage of the default SM-DP+ address. 5. The End User is informed via the LPA. End conditions: … a.d. The target default SM-DP+ Address is edited in the LPA Services.

5.3.1.9 Retrieve Activation Codemodified

…fic Profile currently installed on the eUICC. The End User can request for the download and installation of the Profile by using the retrieved Activation Code. … [AFigure diagram of a program Description automatically generated] 27. :5.3.1.9.1: Retrieve Activation Code Start conditions: a. The target Profile is installed on the eUICC b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is… …

A.1 New Profile on New Primary Device (Off Device Activation)modified

Risk no. Risk description INI1 Incomplete or corrupted Profile being pushed to the Subscriber. INI2 Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles to Devices. 42.Table :A.1.1: New Profile on New Primary Device Risks

A.2 Profile Deletionmodified

…User. IND5 Non-tech-savvy or malicious Subscriber repeatedly deleting Profiles and asking for them to be reloaded leading to surcharge of provisioning servers. … 43.Table :ProfileA.2.1: Profile Deletion Risks

A.3 Profile Switchmodified

…ofiles leading to a loss of connectivity. INP4 Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to major fraud scenarios. … 44.Table :A.3.1: Profile Switching Risks

A.4 Profile Swapmodified

Risk no. Risk description INS1 Race condition leading to the deactivation of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity. 45.Table :A.4.1: Profile Swapping Risks

A.5 Cryptographic Related Risksmodified

…eric” key material during the Profile creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single point of failure and attack being created. … 46.Table :A.5.1: Cryptographic Related Risks

A.6 Quality of Servicemodified

…er expected service level. QoS3 Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a temporary or permanent inability to deliver a Profile. … 47.Table :A.6.1: Quality of Service Risks

A.7 Non-human or Unpredictablemodified

…a datacentre. EXC3 Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, SIM vendor…). … 48.Table :A.7.1: Non-human or Unpredictable Risks

A.8 New Profile during Subscriber Journeymodified

…y or Companion Device. EXN2 Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the loss of confidentiality during the provisioning of Profile operations. … EXN3Risk no. Risk description Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the tampering of registration EXN3 information during provisioning of Profile operations. EXN4 Social engineering leading to the communication of OTP materials to attackers. EXN5 Man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping during Profile provisioning leading to the loss EXN5 of confidentiality. EXN6 “Implicit authentication” (e.g. HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of EXN6 authentication or Profile material. 49.Table :A.8.1: New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks

A.9 Device Swapmodified

… scenarios leading to Profiles being activated on both Devices. EXS2 Malicious entity using weak swap procedures in order to compromise authentication vectors. … 50.Table :A.9.1: Device Swapping Risks

A.10 Loss of Privacymodified

…n of unexpected and unpredicted « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties to spy or compromise Devices or the Subscriber themselves. … 51.Table :A.10.1: Loss of Privacy Risks

A.11 Othersmodified

…Profile Management actors leading to the critical loss of private keys. EXO2 Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios. … 52.Table :A.11.1: Other Risks

A.12 Creation Processmodified

…purged of authentication vectors. CRE2 Communication between systems participating in the Profile creation SHALL be protected in integrity and confidentiality. … 53.Table :A.12.1: Creation Process Requirements

B.1 Profile Production Proceduremodified

…is performed upon their request and permission (if not produced by the Operators themselves). The same Operator procedures as in the current UICCs SHALL apply. … [C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.21B.1.1: UML diagrams - PHASE 1\Profile production procedure.png] 28. : Profile Production Procedure Profile Production consists of three steps: - Profile Description definition: The SM-DP+ creates and registers a Profile Description based on the Operational Profile Description. - Operator Credentials generation: The Operator asks the SM-DP+ to generate Operator Credentials that will be used in the next step. This procedure is OPTIONAL and will not be used if the Operator wants to generate the Operator Credentials during Protected Profile Package generation. - Protected Profile Package generation: The Profile Packages will be created, protected and stored. This step (batch type of operation or real time process) is only performed after an order with the respective Operator. - Contract conclusion and Link Profile: At the end of the contract conclusion, an Activation Code is delivered to the End User and the Profile MAY be allocated f… …

B.1.1 Profile Description Definitionmodified

The Profile description definition MAY comprise of the following sequence: [DiagramFigure DescriptionB.1.1.1: automatically generated] 29. : Profile Description Procedure Start Condition: a. Contractual relationship between the Operator and the SM-DP+. Procedure: 1. The Operator defines its different … definition e.g. by sending the corresponding Profile Description ID. NOTE: An Operator can define multiple Profile Descriptions with the SM-DP+ End Condition: … a.e. The Operator is able to order Protected Profile Packages based on Profile Description IDs.

B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generationmodified

… Credentials on the SM-DP+ without associating them to a specific ProfileDescriptionID. Operator Credentials generation MAY comprise of the following sequence: … [C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.21B.1.2.1: UML diagrams - PHASE 1\Operator Credentials Generation.png] 30. : Operator Credentials Generation Start Condition: a. IMSI, ICCID and other resources have been allocated by the Operator. Procedure: 1. The Operator provides the IMSI, ICCID, type of credential to be created (e.g. Milenage [11][12], TUAK [10] etc.) and other resources that MAY already be allocated to the SM-DP+. It asks the SM-DP+ to securely generate and store a set of Operator Credentials. 2. The SM-DP+ securely generates and stores a set of Operator Credentials based on the Operator’s input with the corresponding IMSI, ICCID and other resources provided. 3. The SM-DP+ confirms the generation of Operator Credentials and provides them to the Operator.

B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generationmodified

…ption definition, and the Contract conclusion and Link Profile, depending on whether the Protected Profile Package is created on demand or prepared in advance. … [C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.21B.1.3.1: UML diagrams\Protected Profile Package generation.png] 31. : Protected Profile Package Generation Procedure Start Conditions: a. Profile Description definition Procedure: 1. The Operator orders the Protected Profile Package generation by providing the SM-DP+SM- DP+ with the Profile Description ID and some corresponding Operator input data (credentials e.g. ICCID, IMSI).The Operator input data required for Protected Profil… …

B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profilemodified

…lusion and Link Profile procedure describes different scenarios to link a contract with the Activation Code process. The following options are described below: … - Activation Code with known EID: The EID is given by the Subscriber to the Operator during the conclusion of the contract. - Activation Code with unknown EID: The EID is not given by the Subscriber to the Operator during the conclusion of the contract. The EID is only provided to the SM-DP+ during the Profile download procedure and is given back from the SM-DP+SM- DP+ to the Operator. - Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator: The EID is not immediately given by the Subscriber during the contract conclusion, but provided in step two … …

B.1.4.1 Activation Code with Known EIDmodified

[C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.21B.1.4.1.1: UML diagrams\Activation code with known EID.png] 32. : Activation Code with Known EID Procedure Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure 32:B.1.4.1.1: Contract conclusion with known EID 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator and provides the EID during this process. 2. to 5. Alternatively ‘I… …

B.1.4.2 Activation Code with Unknown EIDmodified

[C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.21B.1.4.2.1: UML diagrams\Activation Code with Unknown EID.png] 33. : Activation Code with Unknown EID Procedure Procedure: Steps 1-6 ininFigure Figure 33:B.1.4.2.1: Contract conclusion without EID 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of the target eUICC (EID). 2. Alternatively ‘ICCID a… …

B.1.4.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operatormodified

[C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.21B.1.4.3.1: UML diagrams\Activation code with EID provided to the Operator in 2nd step.png] 34. : Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure 34:B.1.4.3.1: Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of the target eUICC (EID). 2. Alte… …

C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)modified

This annex provides an example diagram for the implementation of Local Profile Management Operations and describes how the different Confirmation Levels MAY be applied. []Example 35.flow :for Device & LPA Strong Confirmation access PIN setup / settings Unpack Device Power on & start setup (new from factory) Manual setup Set / enable No (skip) device access code / ID? First Access to LPA (no installed profiles) Yes Enter & confirm PIN / ID Manual user Device access Device access setup open restricted Set No Yes device Enable & Set LPA lock? No access (SC) for eUICC (skip) management? Yes No Device Lock separately lock set? No from device (flag) Yes lock? Enter device PIN / Yes (flag) code to confirm Enter & confirm SC PIN / ID Code correct? No LPA lock restricted / SC set Yes LPA / SC set device LPA access open lock restricted (no SC set) SC required Yes SC as required on on each SC (flag) each LUI operation event? No (flag) SC inherited from prior SC input Notes: SC: Strong Confirmation Stop Device access code (PIN / ID) refers to device unlock mechanism Figure C.1: Example Flow for Device & LPA Strong Confirmation Access PIN Setup / Settings

D eUICC Categories (Normative)modified

The following table provides eUICCs categories defined for Remote SIM Provisioning products. | Role no. | Description | CAT1 | Basic eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features: | - Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 64kB | - ISO interface PPS 96 | - BIP over HTTPS features | CAT2 | Medium eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features: | - Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 384kB | - ISO interface PPS 97 | - BIP over HTTPS features | - Processor >= 25MHz | - Crypto processor >= 100MHz | - Memory Protection Unit | CAT3 | Contactless eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features: | - Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 1024kB | - ISO interface PPS 97 | - BIP over HTTPS features | - Processor >= 25MHz | - Crypto processor >= 100MHz | - Memory Protection Unit |Table 54. :D.1: eUICC Categories

E LPA Settings (Informative)modified

[C:\Users\CKwok\Desktop\MASTERFigure SGP.21 UML diagrams - PHASE 1\LPA settings.png] 36. :E.1: LPA Settings

F Certifications Chain and Security Model (Normative)modified

[]: 37.Manufacturing process : Business process CI : Remote Profile Management : Local Profile Management CI Cert Cert : Public key Certificate CI Cert EUM SM-DP+ ES9+: eUICC Cert, EUM Cert ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert, eUICC Cert eUICC ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert LPA PK eUICC Cert, EUM Cert ES10b: Figure F.1: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the Device []: 38.Manufacturing process : Business process : Remote Profile Management CI : Local Profile Management Cert : Public key Certificate CI Cert, CI Cert, CI Cert, SM-DS Cert EUM Cert SM-DP+ Cert SM-DS EUM SM-DP+ ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert, ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert ES9+: eUICC Cert, ES11: eUICC Cert, ES11: SM-DS Cert eUICC Cert EUM Cert EUM Cert ES10a: eUICC Cert, ES10b: eUICC Cert, EUM Cert EUM Cert LPA eUICC LPA ES10a: SM-DS Cert ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert Figure F.2: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the eUICC

F.1 Security Modelmodified

…, all trust links will be broken as a result. If trust link 2 is broken, trust link 1 remains intact however all other Trusted Links are compromised or broken. … [AFigure pictureF.1.1: containing text, parking, meter, screenshot Description automatically generated] 39. : Trusted Link with LPA in the Device [DiagramFigure DescriptionF.1.2: automatically generated] 40. : Trusted Link with LPA in the eUICC | Trust link | Description | Interfaces involved | Possible compromises | Impact of loss of link involved compromises trust link | TL1 | Trust introduced onto theOut eUICCof byThe theCI issuingpublic EUMkey, toThe enabletrust futureof remotethe managemententire andthe authorisationeUICC by the SM-DP+scope and possibly the EUM:EUM’s eUICCsecurity keysmodel (EUMis &issuing CIEUM keysetto eUICCenable Certificates).Certificate, |breached Outand ofall scopefuture |remote Thethe CIEUM’s publickeyset, key,eUICCs theissued EUM’sunder Certificate,management |and Thethe trusteUICC ofkeys, the entirethe security model iscannot breachedbe andauthorisation allby eUICCsthe issuedOS, underand the modelSecurity cannot be trusted. |SM-DP+ theand EUM’spossibly keyset,Domains. | the EUM: eUICC keys,keys theTrust OS,Description andInterfaces thePossible SecurityImpact Domains.of |loss TL2of |link Trustinvolved placedcompromises intrust thelink CI’s(EUM verification& ofCI thekeyset EUM,eUICC SM-DP+,Certificates). andTL2 theTrust resultingplaced Certificatein issuance.the |CI’s Out of scope | The EUM and SM-DP+SM- Certificates. | Loss of Operator verification of the scope DP+ Certificates. trust on the EUM and EUM, SM-DP+, and SM-DP+ |the TL3resulting |Certificate issuance. TL3 Trust placed in the activitiesES2+ forThe eUICC eligibilityLoss andof remoteOperator attestationactivities fromfor theeUICC ISD-RES8+ onCertificate theor targettrust eUICCon to the OperatoreUICC viaeligibility theand SM-DP+.remote |eligibility ES2+check |and/or TheSM-DP+. eUICCattestation Certificatefrom orthe eligibility check failure. |ISD-R Losson ofthe Operatortarget trusteUICC onto the eUICCOperator and/orvia the SM-DP+. | Provides eUICC Certificate, EID, reference to its certification and EUM to the Operator and SM-DP+. | ES8+ | TL4 | Trust placed in the ES2+ SM-DP+ Certificate Loss of Operator activities for Profile dataES8+ transfereUICC fromCertificate theor Operatortrust viaon the SM-DP+ todata thetransfer ISD-Rfrom on the targeteligibility eUICC.check |and/or ES2+eUICC. |Operator SM-DP+via Certificatethe |SM- Lossfailure. ofDP+ Operatorto trustthe ISD-R on the SM-DP+target and/or eUICC. | Protects the Profile and associated credentials and keys (NAAs, OTA keys, ISD-R access, ISD-P SD creation …) with only the Operator, SM-DP+SM- DP+ and the eUICC. |TL5 ES8+Trust |placed eUICCin Certificatethe orES2+ eligibilitySM-DP+ checkCertificate failure.Operator |loss TL5of |trust Trust placed in the information exchange on SM-DP+. between the Operator and the SM-DP+ for Link Profile requests. |TL6 ES2+Trust |placed SM-DP+in Certificatethe |ESeu OperatorLPA security eUICC loss of trust on SM-DP+. | TL6 | Trust placed in the mechanisms provided on LPA. by the LPA: Local Profile Management, Local Profile ManagementTrust OperationsDescription |Interfaces ESeuPossible |Impact LPAof securityloss |of eUICClink lossinvolved ofcompromises trust onlink LPA.Management |Operations TL7 | Trust placed in the TLS session | ES9+ | LPA security or SM-DP+SM- security. | SM-DP+ loss of trust TLS session DP+ security. on LPA (in the Device or the eUICC) or LPA loss of trust on the SM-DP+. | TL8 | Trust in the discovery process | ES11 | LDS security or SM-DSSM- security. | LDS loss of trust on process DS security. the SM-DS and vice versa. | TL9 | Trust in the discovery process | ES11 | eUICC security or SM-DS security. | SM-DS loss of trust process SM-DS security. on the eUICC and vice versa. | TL10 | Trust in the UI | ESeu | Device security | Loss of trust on the Device |Table 55.F.1.1: : Trusted Link Descriptions | Compromised element | Impacted Links | Description | Impact of loss of trustCountermeasures |element CountermeasuresLinks |trust eUICC | TL1, TL3, TL4,The TL9eUICC | The eUICC keyscan andno EUM’sRevoke Keyset.the |Certificate TheTL4, eUICCTL9 cankeys noand longer be trusted. | Revoke the Certificate of the eUICC. |EUM’s Keyset. MNO and SM-DP+ loss of trust on eUICC. | CI | TL2 | The EUM, SM-DS,SM- and SM-DP+ Certificates. | Loss of Operator trust inRepair/Replace theCI. EUM,DS, SM-DS and SM-DP+.SM- |in Repair/Replacethe CI.EUM, SM-DS Generate new CI DP+ and SM-DP+. Certificate and new Certificates. Certificate for the EUM, SM-DS and SM-DP+SM- DP+ following the SAS process. | Remote repair of already issued eUICCs: new CI public key. | EUM | TL1, TL2 | Loss of SAS certification. | Loss of trust from the OperatorNew andSAS SM-DP+for on the EUMaccreditation. Operator and itsSM-DP+ eUICCs.EUM. |Remote Newrepair SASon for the EUM.EUM Remoteand repairits of already issued eUICCs. eUICCs: new EUM Certificate, new eUICC Certificate. |Compromised SM-DP+Impacted |Description TL3,Impact TL4,of TL5,loss TL7,of TL8Countermeasures |element Links trust SM-DP+ TL3, TL4, Loss of SAS certification. | Loss of trust from the Operator,New LPA,SAS SM-DSfor andthe eUICCSM- onTL5, theTL7, SM-DP+.accreditation. |Operator, LPA, SM-DS DP+. New SASSM-DP+ forTL8 theand SM-DP+.eUICC Newon SM-DP+the SM- Certificate. |DP+. SM-DS | TL8 | Loss of SAS certification. | Loss of trust from the Operator,New LPA,SAS SM-DP+for andthe eUICCSM- onaccreditation. theOperator, SM-DS.LPA, |SM- DS. New SASSM-DS forDP+ theand SM-DS.eUICC Newon SM-DSthe Certificate. |SM-DS. LPA | TL6, TL7, TL8 | LPA security failure. | Loss of trust from the SM-DP+,LPA SM-DSrepair andby eUICC on the LPA.TL8 |failure. LPASM-DP+, repairSM-DS byand the Device Manufacturer. |eUICC Deviceon |the TL10LPA. | Device securityTL10 failureDevice | Loss of trust in the Device UI | LUI in the eUICC self-protectedself- security failure Device UI protected with User Intent capture mechanisms (i.e. Captcha Code) |Table 56.F.1.2: : Impact of Compromising Trusted Links and Countermeasures The signer is responsible for the revocation of the Certificates it has signed. This section describes how the new Certificates are pushed to concerned entities according to the security model. - SM-DP+ trusts the CI - EUM trusts the CI - eUICC trusts the EUM and the CI | Req no. | Description | CERT1 | The new SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-DP+ by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair. | CERT2 | The new SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-DS by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair. | CERT3 | The new EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the EUM by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair. | CERT4 | The EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the EUM | NOTE: See details in Section 4.1.1.1. | CERT5 | The CI Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the EUM | NOTE: See details in Section 4.1.1.1. | CERT6 | Certificates SHALL be revocable. | CERT7 | Neither the End User nor any other party SHALL be able to prevent Certificate revocation. | CERT8 | The End User SHALL not be allowed to use Remote SIM Provisioning functions with revoked Certificates. |Req CERT9no. |Description CERT9 The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+ SHALL be revoked if required (e.g. loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification requirements). | CERT10 | The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS SHALL be revoked if required (e.g. loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification requirements). | CERT11 | The Public Key Certificate of the EUM SHALL be revoked if required (e.g. loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification requirements). |Table 57. :F.1.3: Certificate Requirements

G LPA Integrity (Normative)modified

…dures. For cases where the LPA is in the Device, the LPA integrity SHALL be guided by the following Device classes: Device class Description Example of Devices … Advanced Devices with an open operating Smartphones, Tablets, Laptops, system where mechanisms such as Advanced Wearables Advanced secure boot and platform signing of applications are available and used to protect the LPA. Smartphones, Tablets, Laptops, Advanced Wearables Basic Devices without possibility to install Connected sensors, Simple applications. The attack surface of Wearables, Single use case devices the LPA is minimal due to the locked Basic down nature of these Devices. Simple mechanisms to ensure that the LPA is not compromised SHALL be taken. ConnectedTable sensors, Simple Wearables, Single use case devices 58. :G.1: Device Classes

H Rules Authorisation Table (Informative)modified

Annex H reflects the RAT table configuration(s) that MAY be configured in an eUICC. The RAT entries shown in Table 58H.1 MAY be provisioned: PR Operators User consent POL RULE1 * YES POL RULE2 * YES 59.Table :H.1: RAT configuration Additional lines can be added to the RAT table to reflect agreement between some Operators and OEMs as needed. The OEM can also decide to add… …

I LPA Invocation of the Provisioning Profile Example Flow (Informative)modified

[cid:1684509E-2DBD-4F8E-B6B7-06CDC8A2E35E]Figure I.1: LPA Invocation of the Provisioning Profile Example Flow

K.1 Document Historymodified

Version Date Brief Description of Change Approval Authority Editor / Authority Company V1.0 23/12/15 First Release with amendments Carmen Kwok, V1.0 23/12/15 PSMC from Security review. PSMCGSMA Carmen Kwok, GSMA V2.0 25/08/16 Includes Phase 2 content PSMC GSMA Technology Carmen Kwok, GSMA V2.1 29/02/17 Phase 2 maintenance release Technology Group GSMA Carmen Kwok, GSMA V2.2 31/08/17 Phase 2 maintenance release RSPLEN GSMA Carmen Kwok, GSMA V2.3 24/03/21 Phase 2 maintenance release ISAG GSMA Carmen Kwok, GSMA V2.4 03/08/21 Phase 2 maintenance release ISAG GSMA Carmen Kwok, GSMA V2.5 18/11/22 Phase 2 maintenance release ISAG CarmenGSMA Kwok,Introduction GSMAof Activation Code Stéphane Bandin, V2.6 20/09/2024 Retrieval (ACR) and Phase 2 ISAG Orange maintenance release Resolution of CVD-2025-0103 Stéphane Bandin, V2.7 24/04/2026 ISAG eSIM Java Card vulnerability Orange

K.2 Detailed Document History for V2.7modified was Detailed Document History

Version Date Additions V2.7 14/05/2025 Initial draft from SGP.21 V2.6 20/09/2024Draft CR2601R0200 PPRV2.7 on14/05/2025 non-IMSICR27001R01 profilesAllow CR2604R00Test EditorialProfile correctionsDeletion CR2606R01by Correctionthe toLPA SGP.25Draft Reference01 CR2607R03CR27004R01 ActivationDefinition Codeof RetrievalTest useeUICC caseCR27005R01 CR2609R01Clarify eUICCthe isdownload notof EmbeddedJava UICCApplications CR2602R06within AddTest ACProfile retrievalV2.7 operation27/06/2025 CR2605R03CR27007R02 ACRProhibit Test CI coexisting with GSMA CI Draft 02 CR27008R01 Mandate eUICC OS update support CR27013R01 Adding Test CI abbreviation - addingRenumbering eligibiltyof tables and figures V2.7 17/07/2025 CR27002R11 Requirements on Applets in Test Profiles Draft 03 V2.7 17/09/2025 CR27010R03 Adding MSL check of Profile against eUICC Draft 04 configuration CR27016R01 Adding MSL definition and abbreviation CR27017R01 Adding requirement CR2610R00on ACRcommon -MSL addressingvalue ENfor RSP ecosystem V2.7 08/12/2025 CR27009R07 Adding eUICC-based RSP Server allowlist Draft 05 mechanism for test profiles CR27018R02 Comment on euiccapplication impactruntime CR2611R00environment ACRfor -ELG9 addressingCR27019R01 ENMake aboutMSL movingsupport themandatory requirement(AP #107-03) CR27020R12 Make Java Application bytecode verification check mandatory to anotherSM-DP+ sectionprocesses CR2612R00CR27021R04 FixingAddition typoof inApplet Devicebytecode Complianceverification RequirementCR27022R06 Safeguard allowing an eUICC to reject Applet installation into a Test Profile CR27026R04 Introduce requirements on application isolation CR27027R01 Editorial modifications of some requirements related to SAS CR27028R02 Introduce Application Developer Role CR27029R04 Introduce Requirements to Application Developers V2.7 20/01/2026 DQRT Capitalize minimum security level as a definition Draft 06 has been added with CR27016R01

Contents
  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 1.1 Overview
  3. 1.2 Scope
  4. 1.3 Intended Audience
  5. 1.4 Definition of Terms
  6. 1.5 Abbreviations
  7. 1.6 References
  8. 1.6.1 Normative references
  9. 1.6.2 Informative references
  10. 1.7 Conventions
  11. 2 Principles
  12. 2.1 Basic Principles
  13. 2.2 Profile Principles
  14. 3 Roles
  15. 3.1 eUICC Manufacturer
  16. 3.2 Device Manufacturer
  17. 3.3 Operator and Service Provider
  18. 3.4 Subscriber and End User
  19. 3.5 Certificate Issuer
  20. 3.6 Application Developer
  21. 4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture
  22. 4.1 eUICC Architecture
  23. 4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
  24. 4.2 Interfaces
  25. 4.2.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
  26. 4.2.2 Operator – End User (ESop)
  27. 4.2.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)
  28. 4.2.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
  29. 4.2.5 SM-DP+ – LPD (ES9+)
  30. 4.2.6 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
  31. 4.2.7 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)
  32. 4.2.8 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)
  33. 4.2.9 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)
  34. 4.2.10 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)
  35. 4.2.11 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)
  36. 4.2.12 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)
  37. 4.2.13 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)
  38. 4.2.14 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)
  39. 4.2.15 General Interface Requirements
  40. 4.3 eUICC Requirements
  41. 4.4 eUICC Eligibility Check
  42. 4.4.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements
  43. 4.5 Device Requirements
  44. 4.5.1 Device Capability Requirements
  45. 4.5.2 Device with Integrated eUICC
  46. 4.6 Device Initialisation
  47. 4.6.1 Device Reset Requirements
  48. 4.6.2 eUICC Memory Reset Requirements
  49. 4.6.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements
  50. 4.7 Profile Requirements
  51. 4.7.1 Test Profile Requirements
  52. 4.7.2 Provisioning Profile Requirements
  53. 4.8 Profile Metadata Requirements
  54. 4.9 NFC Requirements
  55. 4.10 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+)
  56. 4.10.1 SM-DP+ Overview
  57. 4.10.2 SM-DP+ Requirements
  58. 4.10.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements
  59. 4.11 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)
  60. 4.11.1 LPA Overview
  61. 4.11.2 Operational LPA Modes
  62. 4.11.3 LPA Requirements
  63. 4.11.4 LDS Requirements
  64. 4.12 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)
  65. 4.12.1 SM-DS Overview
  66. 4.12.2 SM-DS Implementation
  67. 4.12.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelines
  68. 4.12.4 SM-DS functions
  69. 4.12.5 SM-DS Requirements
  70. 4.12.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedure
  71. 4.12.7 Discovery Request Procedure
  72. 4.13 Profile Policy Management
  73. 4.13.1 Introduction
  74. 4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirements
  75. 4.13.3 Policy Rules
  76. 4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirements
  77. 4.14 Certification
  78. 4.14.1 eUICC Certification Requirements
  79. 4.14.2 Device Compliance Requirement
  80. 4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification Requirements
  81. 4.14.4 SM-DS Certification Requirements
  82. 4.14.5 LPA Certification Requirements
  83. 4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management Requirements
  84. 4.15 eUICC OS Update
  85. 4.16 Requirements for Interoperable Applications
  86. 5 Operational Procedures
  87. 5.1 LPA Initiated Download
  88. 5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirements
  89. 5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedure
  90. 5.2 Profile Download with Activation Code
  91. 5.2.1 Activation Code Requirements
  92. 5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure
  93. 5.3 Local Profile Management
  94. 5.3.1 Local Profile Management Procedures
  95. A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)
  96. A.1 New Profile on New Primary Device (Off Device Activation)
  97. A.2 Profile Deletion
  98. A.3 Profile Switch
  99. A.4 Profile Swap
  100. A.5 Cryptographic Related Risks
  101. A.6 Quality of Service
  102. A.7 Non-human or Unpredictable
  103. A.8 New Profile during Subscriber Journey
  104. A.9 Device Swap
  105. A.10 Loss of Privacy
  106. A.11 Others
  107. A.12 Creation Process
  108. B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)
  109. B.1 Profile Production Procedure
  110. B.1.1 Profile Description Definition
  111. B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generation
  112. B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generation
  113. B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile
  114. C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)
  115. D eUICC Categories (Normative)
  116. E LPA Settings (Informative)
  117. F Certifications Chain and Security Model (Normative)
  118. F.1 Security Model
  119. G LPA Integrity (Normative)
  120. H Rules Authorisation Table (Informative)
  121. I LPA Invocation of the Provisioning Profile Example Flow (Informative)
  122. J [Void]
  123. K Document Management
  124. K.1 Document History
  125. K.2 Detailed Document History for V2.7
SGP.21 RSP Architecture
                                  Version 2.7
                          24th April 2026

Security Classification: Non-confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other than those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association.

Copyright Notice Copyright © 2026 GSM Association

Disclaimer The GSMA makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document. The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.

Compliance Notice The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy.

This Permanent Reference Document is classified by GSMA as an Industry Specification, as such it has been developed and is maintained by GSMA in accordance with the provisions set out in GSMA AA.35 - Procedures for Industry Specifications.

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This document provides an architecture approach as a proposed solution for the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices across all markets.

The main goal of the Architecture is to define a mechanism for the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices with the necessary credentials to gain mobile network access.

This version focuses on Devices for the consumer market.

Please note that SGP.21 V1.0 [23] has not been superceded.

1.2 Scope

The aim of this document is to define a common architecture framework to enable the Remote SIM Provisioning and management of the eUICC in Devices. The adoption of this architecture framework will aim to provide the basis for ensuring global interoperability for Remote SIM Provisioning between Operators in different deployment scenarios.

1.3 Intended Audience

Technical experts working within Operators, SIM solution providers, Device vendors, standards organisations, network infrastructure vendors, Service Providers and other industry bodies.

1.4 Definition of Terms

Term                          Description
Activation Code               Information issued by an Operator/Service Provider to an End User.
                              It is used by the End User to request for the download and installation
                              of a Profile.
Activation Code Retrieval     The process for the LPA to retrieve from the SM-DP+ the Activation
                              Code that is associated with a specific Profile currently installed on
                              the eUICC. This process is associated with the Local Profile
                              Management Operation, 'retrieve Activation Code'.
Activation Code Token         A part of the Activation Code information provided by the
                              Operator/Service Provider to refer to a Subscription.
Alternative SM-DS             SM-DS used in cascade mode with a Root SM-DS to redirect Event
                              Registration from a SM-DP+ to the Root SM-DS or direct Event
                              Registration from a SM-DP+ for an installed Profile.
Application Developer         An entity that develops Interoperable Applications.
Bound Profile Package         A Protected Profile Package which has been cryptographically linked
                              to a particular eUICC.
Certificate or Public Key     A certificate as defined in RFC.5280 [1][1][1] and GlobalPlatform
Certificate                   specifications GPC_SPE_034 [9].
Term                          Description
Certified eUICC               An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM
                              Provisioning and certified according to the GSMA compliance
                              programme defined in SGP.24 [38].
                              NOTE: Unless stated otherwise, the word eUICC in this specification
                              refers to a Certified eUICC.
Companion Device              A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for the
                              purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.
Confirmation Code             A code entered by an End User required by the SM-DP+ for the
                              download of a Profile.
Confirmation Code Required    A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is required
Flag                          or not.
Confirmation Level            Refers to the hierarchy of User Intent and Confirmation Request,
                              where:
                                • User Intent is the first and lowest level
                                • Simple Confirmation is the second level
                                • Strong Confirmation is the third and highest level
                              NOTE: For examples of implementation, please refer to 0.
Confirmation Request          Describes a request for Strong Confirmation or a Simple
                              Confirmation as defined in this specification.
Device                        User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a
                              mobile network. E.g. a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset.
Device Manufacturer           An entity responsible for manufacturing Devices. The Device
                              Manufacturer MAY be responsible for the selection and insertion of
                              eUICCs in Devices.
Device Test Mode              A mode hidden from the End User that allows access to and use of
                              Test Profiles.
Disabled Profile              The state of a Profile where all files and applications (e.g. NAA)
                              present in the Profile are not selectable.
Discovery Request             An interrogation of the Discovery Service by a Device for Event
                              Records that are registered for its eUICC.
Discrete eUICC                An eUICC implemented on discrete standalone hardware, including
                              its own dedicated volatile and non-volatile memory.
                              A Discrete eUICC can be removable or non-removable.
eUICC                         A UICC which enables the local management of Profiles in a secure
                              way.
                              NOTE: The term originates from “embedded UICC”.
eUICC OS Update               A mechanism to correct existing features on the eUICC by the
                              original OS manufacturer.
Enabled Profile               The state of a Profile when its files and/or applications (e.g. NAA)
                              are selectable.
End User                      The person using the Device.
Term                          Description
End User Data                 Information that pertains to the identity of an End User e.g. personal
                              details,     name,       address,        biometric     characteristics,
                              assigned identification numbers, etc.
eUICC Authorisation           Used by the SM-DS to authenticate the eUICC.
eUICC Certificate             A Certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC.
                              This Certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate.
eUICC Eligibility Check       The information set sent from the eUICC to the SM-DP+ to allow
Information                   eligibility checks.
eUICC Manufacturer (EUM)      The eUICC Manufacturer provides eUICC products.
eUICC Memory Reset            An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a factory
                              state.
eUICC Test Memory Reset       An action that deletes all post-issuance Test Profiles on an eUICC.
EUM Certificate               A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited EUM which
                              can be used to verify eUICC Certificates.
Event                         A Profile download which is set by an SM-DP+ on behalf of an
                              Operator, to be processed by a specific eUICC.
Event-ID                      Unique identifier of an Event for a specific EID generated by the SM-
                              DP+/SM-DS.
Event Record                  The set of information stored on the SM-DS for a specific Event, via
                              the Event Registration procedure. This information consists of either:
                                • the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DP+ address or
                                • the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DS address
Event Record Query            A query to the SM-DS (Root or Alternative) executed to verify Event
                              Registration success or determine that an Event Record still exists.
Event Registration            A process notifying the SM-DS on the availability of information on
                              either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC.
Field-Test eUICC              A pre-production eUICC whose functional or security certifications
                              are not yet completed by the EUM.
Form Factor                   Physical manifestation of the UICC.
GSMA Certificate Issuer       A Certificate Authority accredited by GSMA.
ICCID                         Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU-T
                              E.118 [14].
Integrated eUICC              An eUICC implemented on an Integrated TRE.
Integrated eUICC Test
                              An external interface for the purpose of testing eUICC functionality.
Interface
Integrated TRE                A TRE implemented inside a larger System-on-Chip (SoC),
                              optionally making use of remote volatile and/or non-volatile memory.
International Mobile          Unique identifier owned and issued by Operators as defined in
Subscriber Identity           3GPP TS 23.003 [3] Section 2.2.
Term                            Description
Interoperable Application       An application that can be downloaded, installed, executed and
                                removed on any eUICC compliant with technical requirements of a
                                runtime environment (resources, APIs, version, ...), regardless of its
                                Form Factor, its Manufacturer, Device type, Device Manufacturer,
                                Operator, and Mobile Service Provider.
Link Profile                    The process that associates a Protected Profile Package with a
                                specific eUICC so that a Profile Download including Bound Profile
                                Package generation can be triggered.
                                NOTE: This is normally an offline process, binding is an online
                                process happening during the communication between the SM-DP+
                                and the eUICC.
Local Profile Assistant (LPA)   A functional element in the Device or in the eUICC that provides the
                                LPD, LDS and LUI features.
Local Profile Management        Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated on
                                the ESeu interface.
Local Profile Management        Local Profile Management Operations are enable Profile, disable
Operation                       Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory Reset,
                                eUICC Test Memory Reset, set/edit nickname, add Profile, edit
                                default SM-DP+ address, and retrieve Activation Code.
LPA Integrity                   Assurance that the LPA has not been compromised or affected. The
                                assurance SHALL be provided to the various Remote SIM
                                Provisioning entities to ensure that the LPA can be trusted to execute
                                the actions requested
                                NOTE: This could be linked with a certification process.
LPA Mode                        Defines the Operation LPA Mode which is either LPA in the eUICC
                                or in the Device.
LPA Procedures                  Refers to processes that trigger Local Profile Management
                                Operations.
Minimum Security Level          As defined in ETSI TS 102 226 [42]
Mobile Network Operator         An entity providing access capability and communication services to
                                its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure.
Mobile Virtual Network          An entity providing access capability and communication services to
Operator                        its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure but does not
                                have an allocation of spectrum.
Multi-Factor Authentication     A method of authentication in which an End User is only granted
(MFA)                           access after successfully presenting several separate pieces of
                                evidence to an authentication mechanism – typically at least two of
                                the following categories: knowledge (something they know),
                                possession (something they have), and inherence (something they
                                are).
Network Access Application      Application residing in a Profile providing authorisation to access a
                                network.
Network Access Credentials      Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [4] network. This MAY
                                include data such as Ki/K and IMSI stored within a NAA.
Term                          Description
NFC Device                    Device with NFC capability.
NFC eUICC                     eUICC with NFC capability.
Nonce                         An arbitrary random number generated for one time use, employed
                              for cryptographic communication.
Notification                  A report about a Profile download or Local Profile Management
                              Operation processed by the eUICC.
Notification Receivers        A list of SM-DP+ defined in the Profile containing SM-DP+s that are
                              to receive Notifications concerning the Profile.
Operational Profile           A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned
                              on an eUICC for the purpose of providing services by the Operator.
                              The Profile SHALL be in support of a Subscription with the relevant
                              Operator and allow connectivity to a mobile network. Applications
                              MAY be included to provide non-telecommunication services.
Operator                      A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a
                              company providing wireless cellular network services.
Operator Credentials          A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network
                              Access Credentials, OTA Keys for Remote File/Application
                              management, and authentication algorithm parameters.
OTA Keys                      The credentials included in the Profile used in conjunction with OTA
                              Platforms.
OTA Platform                  A platform used by an Operator for the Remote File/Application
                              management of enabled Profiles on eUICCs.
Policy Enforcement            A function that executes Policy Rules to implement a policy.
Policy Rule                   Defines the atomic action of a policy and the conditions under which
                              it is executed.
Primary Device                A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a
                              Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.
Profile                       A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an
                              eUICC for the purpose of providing services.
Profile Application           An Interoperable Application installed within a Profile under the
                              control of the Profile Owner.
Profile Description           The description of a Profile in a format specific to the Operator;
                              example formats could be an Excel table, xml format, or plain text.
Profile Management            A combination of local and remote management operations (enable
                              Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, and query Profile Metadata)
Profile Metadata              Information pertaining to a Profile used for the purpose of Local
                              Profile Management.
Profile Owner                 The entity that controls the operations that can be performed upon
                              its Profile. With the exception of Test Profile, this is always an
                              Operator.
Profile Package               A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format that
                              is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile [5].
Term                          Description
Profile Policy Enabler        The functional element within the Profile management system that
                              interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules.
Profile Policy Management     A policy control system that allows the Service Provider to
                              implement, manage and enforce its subscription terms and
                              conditions associated with the installed Profile.
Profile Policy Rule           Defines a qualification for or enforcement of an action to be
                              performed on a Profile when a certain condition occurs.
Protected Profile Package     A Profile Package which has been encrypted for storage but not to a
                              specific eUICC.
Provisioning Profile          A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned
                              on an eUICC for the purposes of providing connectivity to a mobile
                              network solely for the purpose of the provisioning of Profiles on the
                              eUICC.
Remote Memory                 Volatile or non-volatile memory residing outside of the TRE
Remote SIM Provisioning       The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, and deleting of a
                              Profile on an eUICC.
Replay Attack                 An attack based on previously used or outdated data.
Root Certificate              A Certificate used to authenticate other entities within the Remote
                              SIM Provisioning framework.
Root SM-DS                    A globally identified central access point for finding Events from one
                              or more SM-DP+(s).
Service Provider              The Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either
                              as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement with
                              an Operator. The Service Provider could also be the Operator.
Simple Confirmation           A secure and non-interceptable mechanism by which the End User
                              confirms their action, e.g. by selecting Yes/No, OK/Cancel.
SM-DP+ Certificate            A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DP+.
SM-DS Certificate             A Certificate used by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DS.
SMDPid                        Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as
                              part of the SM-DP+ Certificate.
                              NOTE: This is referred to as the smdpOid in SGP.22 [24].
Strong Confirmation           A secure and non-interceptable mechanism to guarantee a higher
                              level of User Intent than Simple Confirmation by which the End User
                              confirms their action, e.g., by inputting PIN or fingerprint, repeating
                              Simple Confirmation, entering Confirmation Code, etc.
Subscriber                    An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a
                              Subscription with an Operator. The Subscriber is allowed to
                              subscribe and unsubscribe to services, as well as register an End
                              User or a list of End Users authorised to use these services.
Subscriber Data               Information that pertains to the identity of a Subscriber such as
                              contract details, authentication credentials, cryptographic keys etc.
                              NOTE: In many instances, the Subscriber is also the End User and
                              therefore Subscriber Data is likely to include End User Data.
Term                          Description
Subscription                  A Subscription describes the commercial relationship between the
                              Subscriber and the Service Provider.
Subscription Manager Data     This role prepares Profile Packages, secures each with a Profile
Preparation+ (SM-DP+)         protection key, stores Profile protection keys in a secure manner as
                              well as the Protected Profile Packages in a Profile Package
                              repository, and links the Protected Profile Packages to specified
                              EIDs.
                              The SM-DP+ binds Protected Profile Packages to the respective EID
                              and securely downloads these Bound Profile Packages to the LPA
                              of the respective eUICC.
Subscription Manager          This is responsible for providing addresses of one or more SM-
Discovery Server (SM-DS)      DP+(s) to a LDS.
Tamper Resistant Element      A security module consisting of hardware and low-level software
                              providing resistance against software and hardware attacks, capable
                              of securely hosting operating systems together with applications and
                              their confidential and cryptographic data.
Test Certificate Issuer       A Certificate Authority that issues test PKI certificates as described
                              in SGP.26 [41].
Test eUICC                    An eUICC, Certified or not, configured following the RSP Test
                              Specification (SGP.23 [36]) and using test PKI certificates and test
                              EID as defined in SGP.26 [41].
Test Profile                  A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an
                              eUICC to provide connectivity to test equipment for the purpose of
                              testing the Device and the eUICC. A test Profile is not intended to
                              store any Operator Credentials.
Trusted Link                  According to NIST SP 800-53r4 [18], a mechanism by which an End
                              User (through an input Device) can communicate directly with the
                              security functions of the information system with the necessary
                              confidence to support the system security policy. This mechanism
                              can only be activated by the End User or the security functions of the
                              information system and cannot be imitated by untrusted software.
User Intent                   Describes the direct, real time acquisition of the manual End User
                              input on the LUI to trigger locally a Profile download or Profile
                              Management operation.

1.5 Abbreviations

Abbreviation                  Description
AC                            Activation Code
ARA-M                         Access Rule Application - Master
ARF                           Access Rule File
AuC                           Authentication Centre
BSS                           Business Support Services
CI                            Certificate Issuer
Abbreviation                  Description
DNSCurve                      Domain Name System Curve
DNSSEC                        Domain Name System Security Extensions
ECASD                         eUICC Controlling Authority Security Domain
EID                           eUICC Identifier
eSVN                          eUICC Specification Version Number
ETSI                          European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EUM                           eUICC Manufacturer
FASG                          Fraud and Security Group
FFS                           For Further Study
GSMA                          GSM Association
GSMA CI                       GSMA Certificate Issuer
HLR                           Home Location Register
HTTP                          Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ICCID                         Integrated Circuit Card Identifier
IMSI                          International Mobile Subscriber Identity
ISD-P                         Issuer Security Domain - Profile
ISD-R                         Issuer Security Domain - Root
ISIM                          IP Multimedia Services Identity Module
ITU                           International Telecoms Union
LDS                           Local Discovery Service
LPA                           Local Profile Assistant
LPD                           Local Profile Download
LUI                           Local User Interface
M4M                           Mifare4Mobile
MFA                           Multi-Factor Authentication
MNO                           Mobile Network Operator
MNO-SD                        Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain
MSISDN                        Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number
MSL                           Minimum Security Level
NAA                           Network Access Application
OS                            Operating System
OTA                           Over The Air
PFS                           Perfect Forward Secrecy
RAM                           Remote Application Management
RAT                           Rules Authorisation Table
RFM                           Remote File Management
RMPF                          Remote Memory Protection Function
Abbreviation                  Description
SAS                           Security Accreditation Scheme
SD                            Security Domain
SIM                           Subscriber Identity Module
SM-DP+                        Subscription Manager - Data Preparation +
SM-DS                         Subscription Manager - Discovery Server
SSD                           Supplementary Secure Domain
Test CI                       Test Certificate Issuer
TL                            Trust Link
TRE                           Tamper Resistant Element
USIM                          Universal Subscriber Identity Module

1.6 References

1.6.1 Normative references

Ref           Document Number         Title
                                       X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
       [1]     RFC 5280
                                       Revocation List (CRL) Profile
                                       UICC-Terminal       interface;    Physical     and       logical
       [2]     ETSI TS 102 221
                                       characteristics
                                       Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+);
       [3]     3GPP TS 23.003          Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS);
                                       Numbering, addressing and identification
                                       The international identification plan for public networks and
       [4]     ITU E.212
                                       Subscriptions
                                       Trusted Connectivity Alliance (former SIMalliance): eUICC
                                       Profile Package - Interoperable Format Technical
       [5]     TCAAPP
                                       Specification
                                       http://simalliance.org/euicc/euicc-technical-releases/
                                       “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
       [6]     RFC 2119                Levels”, S. Bradner
                                       http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
       [7]     3GPP TS 21.133          3G security; Security threats and requirements
                                       GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC
       [8]     SGP.02
                                       Technical specification
       [9]     GPC_SPE_034             GlobalPlatform Card Specification with its Amendments
                                       Specification of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1:
      [10]     3GPP TS 35.231
                                       Algorithm Specification
                                       Specification of the         MILENAGE        Algorithm     Set;
      [11]     3GPP TS 35.205
                                       Document 1: General
Ref           Document Number         Title
                                       Specification of the MILENAGE             Algorithm       Set;
      [12]     3GPP TS 35.206
                                       Document 2: Algorithm Specification
                                       FS.04 - Security Accreditation        Scheme       for   UICC
      [13]     EUM SAS
                                       Production – Standard
      [14]     ITU-T E.118             The International Telecommunication Charge Card
                                       GlobalPlatform Device Technology          Secure     Element
      [15]     GPD_SPE_013
                                       Access Control - Version 1.1
                                       Personalisation of Mobile Equipment - Mobile functionality
      [16]     3GPP TS 22.022
                                       specification
      [17]     TS.26                   GSMA NFC Handset Requirements
                                       Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information
      [18]     NIST SP 800-53r4
                                       Systems and Organisations – Revision 4
                                       Trusted Connectivity Alliance (former SIMalliance) Open
      [19]     OMAPI
                                       Mobile API Specification
      [20]     SGP.03                  NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1
      [21]     SGP.05                  Embedded UICC Protection Profile
      [22]     FS.08                   FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3.1 or higher
      [23]     SGP.21                  SGP.21 Architecture Specification - Version 1.0
      [24]     SGP.22                  SGP.22 Technical Specification
                                       SGP.25 RSP eUICC for Consumer Device Protection
      [25]     SGP.25                  Profile or SGP.25 eUICC for Consumer and IoT Device
                                       Protection Profile
      [26]     SGP.14                  SGP.14 GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy v1.1
      [27]     EMVCo_Sec               EMVCo Security Evaluation Process 5.1 – June 2016
      [28]     FS.09                   FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v8.0 or higher
      [29]     [Void]
      [30]     [Void]
      [31]     [Void]
      [32]     [Void]
               JIL-Application-of-     Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar
      [33]     Attack-Potential-to-    Devices
               Smartcards-v3-1         Version 3.1, June 2020
      [34]     [Void]
      [35]     [Void]
      [36]     SGP.23                  RSP Test Specification
                                       Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key
      [37]     RFC 8174                Words
                                       https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174
      [38]     SGP.24                  RSP Compliance Process
Ref            Document Number        Title
                                        Security Evaluation of Integrated eUICC based on PP-
      [39]      SGP.08
                                        0084
                                        Security Evaluation of Integrated eUICC based on PP-
      [40]      SGP.18
                                        0117
      [41]      SGP.26                  eSIM Test Certificates
      [42]      ETSI TS 102 226         Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications

1.6.2 Informative references

Ref            Document Number        Title
                                        Stepping Stones for Java Card Applet Developers -
                                        Version 1.0 – Trusted Connectivity Allliance
                TCA STEPPING
      [i.01]                            https://trustedconnectivityalliance.org/wp-
                STONES
                                        content/uploads/2024/04/Java-Card-Stepping-
                                        Stones_FINAL.pdf

1.7 Conventions

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [6] and clarified by RFC8174 [37], when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

“FFS” or “For Further Study” means that it will be covered in the next version of SGP.21.

2 Principles

This section contains the principles related to the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning system for the eUICC.

The solution based on the requirements described within this document has to be provided in a non-discriminatory manner.

2.1 Basic Principles

Principle no.    Description
BAS1             Existing standards and specifications SHALL be used where possible for the
                 specification of the eUICC and related provisioning systems.
BAS2             GlobalPlatform specifications SHALL be used as a framework of choice for the
                 implementation of the eUICC.
BAS3             The overall security of the eUICC in combination with the related management
                 processes SHALL at all times and under all circumstances be at least equivalent
                 to the current removable UICC and its provisioning processes.
BAS4             The architecture of the eUICC and its Remote SIM Provisioning system SHALL
                 comply with the requirements of 3GPP TS 21.133 [7].
Principle no.   Description
BAS5            The architecture SHALL support a level of security with respect to the protection
                of Operator Credentials which is at least equivalent to the present levels of
                security. This applies in particular to:
                   • the confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters;
                   • the integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI).
BAS6            The architecture SHALL support a level of security for all Profile content which is
                at least equivalent to the current state of the art level of security of the UICC.
BAS7            The architecture SHALL NOT compromise the security and privacy of Subscriber
                Data, nor the security and privacy of End User Data. Examples depending on
                territory include identities that can be used for tracking such as ICCID, MSISDN,
                EID, IMSI Ki etc.
BAS8            Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of this document. However,
                any data which could be used to identify an individual SHALL be treated as
                personal data and subject to local regulations e.g. the EID, ICCID, etc.

Table 2.1.1: Basic Principles

2.2 Profile Principles

Principle no.    Description
PRO1             Profiles are the property of and SHALL be under the control of the issuing
                 Operator.
PRO2             A Profile does not exist outside of an eUICC. I.e. a Profile is always located on a
                 particular eUICC.
PRO3             A Profile SHALL be uniquely identified by its ICCID.
PRO4             An Enabled Profile in combination with an eUICC SHALL be able to carry all
                 logical characteristics of a UICC.
PRO5             Once the Profile is enabled, all relevant UICC characteristics or features as
                 described in ETSI 102 221 [2] specifications SHALL apply, with the exceptions as
                 defined within this specification.
PRO6             It SHALL be possible to delete Profiles only when in a disabled state, with the
                 exception of eUICC Memory Reset, and eUICC Test Memory Reset functions.
PRO7             Profile Management SHALL be governed by policy.
PRO8             A Profile SHALL be either an Operational Profile, a Provisioning Profile or a Test
                 Profile.
PRO9             Any Java Application contained in a Profile SHALL have passed bytecode
                 verification.

Table 2.2.1: Profile Principles

3 Roles

3.1 eUICC Manufacturer

Role no.        Description
EUM1            The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the initial cryptographic configuration
                and security architecture of the eUICC.
EUM2            The eUICCs are delivered by the eUICC Manufacturer (EUM).
EUM3            Relevant parts of the eUICC Manufacturer’s products and processes are certified
                by a GSMA-approved certification process.
EUM4            The EUM issues the eUICC Certificate to allow:
                   • eUICC authentication and proof of certification to other entities;
                   • authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-DP+ and an eUICC.
EUM5            The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any LPA
                elements that reside in the eUICC and the compliance of the LPA with the
                requirements in Section 4.11.3.
EUM6            Field-Test eUICCs SHALL be tracked by the EUM.
EUM7            Test eUICCs SHALL be tracked by the EUM.
EUM8            Any Java Application installed by the EUM in the eUICC SHALL be bytecode
                verified.

Table 3.1.1: eUICC Manufacturer Role

3.2 Device Manufacturer

Role no.        Description
                The Device Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any LPA
DM1             elements that reside on the Device and the compliance of the LPA with the
                requirements in Section 4.11.
                The Device Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any application
DM2             that resides on the Primary Device allowing Local User Interface access to the
                Companion Device.

Table 3.2.1: Device Manufacturer Role

3.3 Operator and Service Provider

This section describes the characteristics of the Operator and Service Provider roles relevant to this architecture and its operation. Other characteristics exist but are considered out of scope.

Role no.            Description
OPE1                The Operator has access to a SM-DP+ via the ES2+ interface.
OPE2                In the event that a Subscriber has selected a Service Provider, that Service
                    Provider will initiate the provisioning of a Profile Package.
Role no.            Description
OPE3                The Operator, potentially on behalf of the Service Provider, specifies the Profile
                    characteristics and any features and applications analogous to removable
                    UICCs.
OPE4                The Operator is able to use an OTA Platform to manage the content of its
                    Enabled Profile in the eUICC (RAM, RFM).
OPE5                The Operator is responsible to ensure that any Java Application it installs on the
                    eUICC (via SM-DP+, via OTA platform or pre-loading) has passed bytecode
                    verification.

Table 3.3.1: Operator Role

3.4 Subscriber and End User

Role no.            Description
SEU1                The Subscriber is the contract partner of the Service Provider for the
                    Subscription.
                    NOTE: The Subscriber MAY not be the End User.
SEU2                The End User is a human and uses the Device and/or the services related to
                    the Enabled Profile.

Table 3.4.1: Subscriber and End User Role

3.5 Certificate Issuer

Role no.            Description
CIS1                The Certificate Issuer issues Certificates for GSMA accredited Remote SIM
                    Provisioning entities and acts as a trusted third party for the purpose of
                    authenticating the entities of the system.
CIS2                The Certificate Issuer communicates with the SM-DP+, SM-DS and the EUM
                    through interfaces that are out of scope of this specification according to
                    SGP.14 [26].

Table 3.5.1: Certificate Issuer Role

3.6 Application Developer

Role no.            Description
AD01                The Application Developer develops and provides Interoperable Applications
                    with the intent to be included in a Profile or outside of a Profile within an eUICC.

Table 3.6.1: Application Developer Role

4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture

This section contains the functional description of the Remote SIM Provisioning system architecture for the eUICC.

Figure 4.1: Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture

4.1 eUICC Architecture

4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview

This section describes the internal high-level architecture of the eUICC. The eUICC architecture is similar to that used in the GSMA Remote SIM specification [8]. Profiles are provisioned based on the security framework defined in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].

Figure 4.1.1.1: Schematic Representation of the eUICC

4.1.1.1 ECASD

The eUICC Controlling Authority Security Domain (ECASD) is responsible for the secure storage of credentials needed to support the required security domains on the eUICC.

There SHALL only be one ECASD on an eUICC. The ECASD SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during the eUICC manufacturing as described in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].

The ECASD SHALL contain the following:
   •      eUICC private keys for creating signatures.
   •      Associated Certificates for eUICC authentication.
   •      The Certificate Issuers’ (CI) root public keys for verifying SM-DP+ and SM-DS
          Certificates.
   •      eUICC Manufacturers’ (EUMs) keyset for key/Certificate renewal.

Additionally, the ECASD SHALL provide security functions used during key establishment and eUICC authentication.

4.1.1.2 ISD-R

The ISD-R is responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.

4.1.1.3 ISD-P

The ISD-P is a secure container (security domain) for the hosting of a Profile. The ISD-P is used for Profile download and installation in collaboration with the Profile Package interpreter for the decoding/interpretation of the received Bound Profile Package.

The ISD-P is the on-card representative of the SM-DP+.

4.1.1.4 MNO-SD

The MNO-SD is the on-card representative of the Operator. It contains the Operator’s Over- The-Air (OTA) Keys and provides a secure OTA channel.

4.1.1.5 Profile Policy Enabler

The eUICC Operating System (OS) service which offers Profile Policy Rules validation and enforcement.

4.1.1.6 Telecom Framework

The telecom framework is an operating system service that provides standardised network authentication algorithms to the NAAs hosted in the ISD-Ps. Furthermore, it offers the capability to configure the algorithms with the necessary parameters.

4.1.1.7 Profile Package Interpreter

The Profile Package interpreter is an eUICC operating system service that translates the Profile Package data into an installed Profile using the specific internal format of the target eUICC.

4.1.1.8 LPA Services

The LPA services provide necessary access to the services and data required by the LPA functions for the following:

1. The Root SM-DS address. • The optionally stored default SM-DP+ address. 2. Facilitates the reception of the Bound Profile Package in transfer from the LPA. • Provide information regarding the installed Profiles and their Profile Metadata. 3. Provides Local Profile Management. • Provides functions for the LPA to authenticate and interact with the SM-DS. 4. Ensures access to the EID is restricted to only the LPA.

4.2 Interfaces

Figure 4.2.1: Interfaces on the eUICC Architecture with the LPA in the Device

Configuration

4.2.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)

The ES2+ interface is used by the Operator to order Profiles for specific eUICCs as well as other administrative functions.

4.2.2 Operator – End User (ESop)

ESop is the interface between the Operator and the End User.

This interface is out of scope of this specification.

4.2.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)

ESeu is the interface between the End User and the LUI.

In a Primary/Companion Device scenario the LUI used SHALL only reside within the Companion Device or its eUICC.

The ESeu interface is used to support the following requirements:

Req no.              Description
ESeu1                [Void]
ESeu2                Each Local Profile Management Operation SHALL be explicitly initiated by
                     the End User, and verified by User Intent.
ESeu3                The ESeu interface SHALL support the triggering and confirmation of the
                     Profile download and installation operation and Local Profile Management
                     Operations requested by the End User.

Table 4.2.3.1: End User to LUI (ESeu) Interface Requirements

4.2.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)

The ES6 interface is used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services.

4.2.5 SM-DP+ – LPD (ES9+)

The ES9+ interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the LPD.

4.2.6 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)

The ES8+ interface provides a secure end-to-end channel between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC for the administration of the ISD-P and the associated Profile during download and installation.

4.2.7 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)

The ES12 interface allows any SM-DP+ to issue or remove Event Registrations on the SM- DS.

4.2.8 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)

The ES11 interface allows the LDS to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC.

4.2.9 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)

ESeum is the interface between the EUM and the eUICC. This interface is out of scope of this specification.

4.2.10 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)

The ES10a interface is used by the LPA in the Device to get the configured addresses from the eUICC for Root SM-DS, and optionally the default SM-DP+.

4.2.11 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)

The ES10b interface is used by the LPD in the Device and the LPA services to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.

4.2.12 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)

The ES10c interface is used between the LUI in the Device and the LPA services for Local Profile Management by the End User.

4.2.13 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)

In the case of deployments with cascaded SM-DSs, the ES15 interface is used to connect the SM-DSs.

4.2.14 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)

This connection will be provided either by:

•     An internet connectivity available or provided on the same Device where the LPA
      resides
      or
•     An internet connection shared from another Device via a local go-between connection

Figure 4.2.14.1: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to

the SM-DP+

4.2.15 General Interface Requirements

Req no.         Description
INT1            All interfaces from the eUICC SHALL indicate the eSVN.
INT2            The behaviour of all interfaces SHALL support the indicated eSVN.
Req no.         Description
INT3            During the indication of the supported eSVN from the eUICC to the SM-DP+, the
                eUICC version SHALL be used or the procedure SHALL fail. See table below.
INT4            All communicating entities involved in Remote SIM Provisioning SHALL be mutually
                authenticated. The Device and the eUICC are considered as one entity in this
                context.

Table 4.2.15.1: General Interface Requirements

Platform      Version 1 (V1)           Version 2 (V2)               Version 3 (V3)
eUICC V1       Platform uses V1     Platform uses V1 or fails.   Platform uses V1 or fails.
eUICC V2              ✗                 Platform uses V2         Platform uses V2 or fails.
eUICC V3              ✗                         ✗                    Platform uses V3

Table 4.2.15.2: eUICC Version vs. Platform

4.3 eUICC Requirements

Req no.          Description
EUICC1           The eUICC SHALL be a discrete or integrated tamper resistant component
                 consisting of hardware and software, capable of securely hosting applications as
                 well as confidential and cryptographic data.
                 NOTE: Wherever a distinction is required, the former is referred to as Discrete
                 eUICC, and the latter as Integrated eUICC.
EUICC2           A removable eUICC is packaged in a standardised ETSI Form Factor [2].
EUICC3           The Discrete eUICC SHALL be either removable or non-removable.
EUICC4           The behaviour of the eUICC with an Enabled Profile SHALL be equivalent to the
                 UICC.
EUICC5           The eUICC SHALL be able to contain zero or more Profiles.
EUICC6           At a maximum, only one Profile SHALL be enabled at any point in time.
EUICC7           The behaviour of a NAA USIM or ISIM within a Profile on an eUICC SHALL be
                 identical to a removable UICC NAAs USIM or ISIM.
                 NOTE: No changes to existing 3GPP/3GPP2 USIM, CSIM and ISIM specifications
                 are expected.
EUICC8           The eUICC SHALL support Milenage [11][12] and TUAK [10] algorithm sets.
EUICC9           The ownership of the eUICC MAY change throughout its lifetime as can the Device.
                 NOTE: According to CERTEU11, the EUM keyset belongs to the EUM for the
                 lifetime of the eUICC.
EUICC10          If any Profile Management operation does not complete successfully, the eUICC
                 SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request.
EUICC11          The eUICC SHALL contain an ECASD and ISD-R security domains installed and
                 personalised during manufacture.
EUICC12          It SHALL not be possible to delete or disable the ECASD after eUICC manufacture.
Req no.         Description
EUICC13         The ISD-R SHALL be responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the lifecycle
                management of all ISD-Ps.
EUICC14         The ISD-R SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during eUICC
                manufacturing as described in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].
EUICC15         The eUICC SHALL support an eUICC Memory Reset. This can only be requested
                by the End User.
EUICC16         If the eUICC supports Test Profiles, the eUICC SHALL support eUICC Test Memory
                Reset.
EUICC17         The eUICC SHALL support the eUICC Profile Package Interoperable format as
                defined by Trusted Connectivity Alliance [5].
EUICC18         An ISD-R SHALL:
                   • be created within an eUICC at the time of manufacture;
                   • NOT be deleted or disabled;
                   • NOT be able to perform any operations inside an ISD-P.
EUICC19         An eUICC MAY provide LPA functions.
EUICC20         An ISD-P SHALL be created by the ISD-R at the request of the SM-DP+.
EUICC21         Communication between the eUICC and the SM-DP+ SHALL be protected in
                authenticity, integrity and confidentiality.
EUICC22         The eUICC SHALL NOT export Profiles installed on the eUICC.
EUICC23         The eUICC SHALL enforce an isolation of Profiles and prevent Profiles from
                operating outside of their execution environment i.e. Profile SHALL run in a
                sandbox.
EUICC24         The integrity of the Bound Profile Package SHALL be ensured during its installation
                on the eUICC.
EUICC26         Profile keys and algorithm parameters SHALL NOT be extractable from the eUICC.
EUICC27         All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a robust tamper-resistant way
                and be resistant to side-channel attacks.
EUICC28         The Operator SHALL be able to update the OTA Keys in its Profile on the eUICC
                in a secure and confidential way, reusing existing OTA Platform mechanisms.
EUICC29         A downloaded Profile Package SHALL be installed on the eUICC in a disabled
                state.
EUICC30         The eUICC SHALL always report its eSVN in the first communication during the
                commencement of each session with the SM-DP+ or SM-DS.
EUICC31         The EUM SHALL install an eUICC Certificate in the eUICC used to authenticate the
                eUICC and verify the eUICC certification.
EUICC32         The EUM SHALL install an EUM Certificate in the eUICC used to verify the eUICC
                Certificate.
EUICC33         The eUICC SHALL have a means to authenticate itself to the SM-DS.
EUICC34         The eUICC SHALL protect itself against unauthorised access.
EUICC35         Upon Profile deletion, the eUICC SHALL ensure a complete deletion of all data
                related to the Profile.
Req no.         Description
EUICC36         The eUICC SHALL only accept Profile Management operations sent from the LPA
                in either the eUICC, or the Device.
EUICC37         The eUICC SHALL reject any Profile Management operations that are in conflict
                with the Profile Policy Rules of the respective Profile.
EUICC38         If any Bound Profile Package download or installation does not complete
                successfully, the eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the
                request.
EUICC39         The eUICC SHALL support GlobalPlatform Secure Element Access Control [15].
EUICC40         There SHALL be a means to pre-set a default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC.
EUICC41         The eUICC SHALL store the Root SM-DS address.
EUICC42         The eUICC SHALL be able to send a delete Notification to the LPA to notify the
                Notification Receivers that the Profile has been deleted.
EUICC43         In EUICC42, if connectivity is not available to send the Notification of deletion to the
                Notification Receivers, each Notification SHALL be retained and sent as soon as
                connectivity becomes available again.
EUICC44         The delete Notification process SHALL also be executed for each deleted Profile in
                case of eUICC Memory reset.
EUICC45         The eUICC SHALL support a set of standard functions and services including, but
                not limited to Java Applications, USIM Toolkit functions and GlobalPlatform
                features. The list of supported functions and services (e.g. API package names and
                versions) SHALL be explicitly referenced within the technical specification (SGP.22
                [24]). A different set of functions and services MAY be defined/supported according
                to the different eUICC categories as defined in Annex D.
EUICC46         The eUICC SHALL support at least the following USIM Toolkit commands:
                  • PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION including the following fields: local info,
                     IMEI, network measure results, date & time, access technology
                   • TERMINAL PROFILE
                   • ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD)
                   • SEND SHORT MESSAGE
                   • DISPLAY TEXT
                   • GET INPUT
                   • RING TONE
EUICC47         An eUICC SHALL support at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters preloaded
                by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing, defined in GSMA SGP.22 [24].
EUICC48         Each Notification SHALL be uniquely identifiable and SHALL be signed by the
                eUICC.
EUICC49         Each Notification SHALL be protected against re-play attacks and signed by the
                eUICC.
EUICC50         [Void]
EUICC51         [Void]
EUICC52         The Profile SHALL be able to contain a list of zero or more Notification Receivers
                for each type of Notification.
Req no.         Description
EUICC53         The eUICC SHALL support SHA-1. Usage of SHA-1 SHALL be strictly limited to
                applications inside the Profile where the use of SHA-1 is required.
EUICC54         The EID SHALL not be modifiable. The EID SHALL not be affected by any of the
                procedures, including the change of the eUICC Private keys.
EUICC55         An Integrated eUICC SHALL be certified according to SGP.08 [39] or SGP.18 [40]
                as described in SGP.24 [38].
EUICC56         The Integrated eUICC SHALL be based on an Integrated TRE.
EUICC57         An Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to execute the test cases defined in SGP.23
                [36].
EUICC58         For the purpose of integration and/or end-to-end testing, a Field-Test eUICC MAY
                contain certificates that chain up to the GSMA CI.
EUICC59         The Integrated eUICC SHALL allow the SM-DP+ to identify the type of the
                Integrated TRE including its component configuration (e.g. use of internal or
                Remote Memory, use of other optional components), its manufacturer, in addition
                to the RSP OS provider.
EUICC60         The Integrated TRE SHOULD have priority access to Remote Memory in cases of
                shared resource contention.
EUICC61         The Integrated eUICC Test Interface SHALL be compatible with commonly used
                interfaces for smartcard testing.
EUICC62         The eUICC SHALL NOT be impacted by the Activation Code Retrieval.
EUICC63         The eUICC MAY have a mechanism that enforces a Minimum Security Level (as
                defined in ETSI TS 102 226 [42]) to any Application with RAM/RFM configuration
                included in the Profile Package.
EUICC64         With respect to EUICC63, if during Profile installation, any Application with
                RAM/RFM configuration in the Profile Package presents an MSL lower than the one
                set by the eUICC, then the Profile installation SHALL fail.
EUICC65         Where EUICC63 is supported, there SHALL be a single value for the Minimum
                Security Level.
EUICC66         The eUICC MAY have a mechanism that permits the installation of Test Profiles
                with RAM capabilities and/or Profile Applications only from SM-DP+ Servers
                specified in an allow-list, which is stored in and enforced within the eUICC.
EUICC67         With respect to EUICC66, if supported by the eUICC, the allow-list SHALL be
                updatable by an EUM-specific mechanism.
EUICC68         An eUICC MAY have a mechanism that rejects any Java Application installation
                into an already installed Test Profile.
                NOTE: This requirement is not related to Java Applications included in the
                Test Profile Package.
EUICC69         The eUICC SHALL implement a runtime environment where Interoperable
                Applications are isolated from other applications and Profiles, subject to the
                provisions of EUICC70.
EUICC70         With respect to EUICC69, inter-application communication within a Profile or with
                the eUICC platform SHALL be allowed only where the target application explicitly
                provides an interface to share services or data.

Table 4.3.1: eUICC Requirements

4.4 eUICC Eligibility Check

The eUICC eligibility check enables a SM-DP+ to validate the eligibility of an eUICC for the installation of a Profile using information sent by the eUICC. The set of information sent by the eUICC to the SM-DP+ for eligibility checking purposes is referenced herein as the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. Some eUICC eligibility check parameters MAY be required due to Device capabilities which must be supported by the Profile/eUICC and delivered as part of the eUICC Eligibility Check Information set.

NOTE:Device capability refers to a Device feature or service-enabling function provided by the Device that MAY have a direct effect on the content of the Profile or the procedure used to download the Profile, and consequently requires support from the eUICC.

4.4.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements

Req no.         Description
ELG1            The eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version it is supporting. This
                parameter SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility check.
ELG2            The eUICC SHALL include the available memory in the eUICC Eligibility Check
                Information.
ELG3            The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it is unable to
                accept an additional Profile.
ELG4            The eUICC SHALL provide a valid current Certificate to the SM-DP+ signed by the
                EUM with the Eligibility Check Information.
ELG5            The eUICC SHALL provide an identification of the EUM with the Eligibility Check
                Information.
ELG6            The eUICC SHALL provide in the Eligibility Check Information, the current OS
                version.
ELG7            The eUICC SHALL provide in the Eligibility Check Information Device enabler
                information relating to services that MAY need Profile support (e.g. NFC enablers).
ELG8            Eligibility Check Information SHALL be integrity and authenticity protected by the
                eUICC for its sending to the SM-DP+.
ELG9            The eUICC SHALL indicate the application runtime environment name, version and
                libraries versions supported in eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
ELG10           The eUICC SHALL indicate cryptographic algorithms and their respective key
                lengths supported in the eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
ELG11           The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information the list of supported
                CIs.
ELG12           The eUICC SHALL indicate its current certification status in the Eligibility Check
                Information.
ELG13           If the eUICC is NFC capable (e.g. CAT3) the Device SHALL indicate its support for
                the relevant NFC services including its current certification status during the eUICC
                Eligibility Check.
ELG14           The eUICC SHALL indicate its category (see Annex D). This parameter SHALL be
                transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check.
ELG15           An eUICC SHALL provide information indicating if it is a Discrete eUICC or an
                Integrated eUICC.
ELG16           An eUICC SHALL indicate in the Eligibility Check Information if it is Field-Test
                eUICC.
ELG17           Void (placeholder to align with SGP.21 Version 3 requirement structure).
ELG18           The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it supports eUICC
                OS Update.
ELG19           As per EUICC63, the eUICC SHALL indicate the Minimum Security Level (as
                defined in ETSI TS 102 226 [42]) expected for any Application with RAM/RFM
                configuration.

Table 4.4.1.1: eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements

NOTE:It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and could be used for the eligibility check procedure.

4.5 Device Requirements

Req no.         Description
DEV1            The Device SHALL conform to the terminal requirements within ETSI TS 102 221
                [2] with the exceptions as defined in this specification.
DEV2            There SHALL be a means for the End User to obtain the EID through the Device
                software. This SHALL only be possible through the LUI.
DEV3            If an eUICC is within the Device packaging, then the EID SHALL be printed in
                machine readable form on the Device packaging.
DEV4            Bearer connection of the Companion Device to the SM-DP+ SHALL only be
                determined by the bearer availability.
                NOTE: The Companion Device MAY use any connectivity method available to
                connect to the SM-DP+.
DEV5            Devices compliant with the GSMA NFC Handset Requirements [17] SHALL support
                the Open Mobile API [19] used by the Device applications to exchange data with
                their counterpart applications running in the Enabled Profile on the eUICC.
DEV6            The implementation of the Remote SIM Provisioning specification in the Device
                SHALL not impact the potential use of the SIM Lock mechanism defined in 3GPP
                TS 22.022 [16].
DEV7            In the case where the Device supports both the LPA in the Device, and the LPA in
                the eUICC, the Device SHALL have a mechanism (setting or configuration
                parameter) that sets which LPA SHALL be used.
DEV8            The End User SHALL be able to modify the parameter defined in DEV7.
DEV9            A Device that supports an eUICC without an LPA in the eUICC, SHALL provide
                LPA functions.
DEV10           A Device that supports only an eUICC with an LPA in the eUICC, MAY provide LPA
                functions.
Req no.         Description
DEV11           If the Device supports Device Test Modes, the Device SHALL support eUICC Test
                Memory Reset. eUICC Test Memory Reset can only be requested by the End User
                when the Device is in Device Test Mode.
DEV12           Where technically feasible, the Device SHALL implement a mechanism allowing
                the End User to protect the access to the Device and its Profile Management
                Operations with personal data. Implementation is OEM specific.
                NOTE: This can be achieved by the implementation of a Device PIN lock,
                fingerprint, password, facial recognition (etc.)
DEV13           The End User SHOULD be able to enable/disable the mechanism described in
                DEV12. Implementation is OEM specific.
                NOTE: The mechanism described in DEV12 should be enabled by default.
DEV14           With respect to LPA41, a Device containing any additional feature that affects the
                status of Operational Profiles SHOULD enforce the Confirmation Level of the
                equivalent Local Profile Management Operations defined in this specification. The
                mechanism and process of the Confirmation Level is implementation specific. The
                End User SHOULD be able to revoke/unset a cached Confirmation previously
                given, if any.

NOTE:In case the LPA or a Device application performs automatic Profile management, the Device or the application must ensure that the End User has been made fully aware of the conditions under which the service operates.

NOTE:The Device protects against abuse or malevolence of management of profiles as compared to the specified LPA functionalities.

Table 4.5.1: Device Requirements

4.5.1 Device Capability Requirements

Req no.         Description
DEVCAP1         There SHALL be a mechanism that is able to provide the Device capabilities to the
                SM-DP+.

Table 4.5.1.1: Device Capability Requirements

4.5.2 Device with Integrated eUICC

Req no.         Description
DIE1            Access to any Remote Memory used by the TRE to store software and data SHALL
                be protected against attacks on availability (e.g. Denial of Service, memory
                corruption, tampering) by other Device components.
DIE2            All Integrated TRE software and data stored in Remote Memory outside the SoC
                SHALL be protected against access by non Integrated TRE components.

Table 4.5.2.1: Device with Integrated eUICC Requirements

4.6 Device Initialisation

4.6.1 Device Reset Requirements

Req no.          Description
FAC1             It SHALL be possible for the End User to perform any type of Device reset without
                 affecting the status of the eUICC.
FAC2             The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the eUICC
                 Memory Reset.
FAC3             The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the eUICC
                 Test Memory Reset.

Table 4.6.1.1: Device Reset Requirements

4.6.2 eUICC Memory Reset Requirements

Req no.          Description
MEM1             eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC apart from pre-
                 installed Profiles that are flagged as permanent.
MEM2             eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC regardless of their
                 Profile Policy Rules but not the Provisioning Profile or preinstalled Test Profiles.
MEM3             Strong Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to initiate eUICC Memory Reset.
MEM4             In addition to MEM3, other secure means MAY be provided to perform the eUICC
                 Memory Reset function. The same level of security as is offered by the LUI based
                 reset function SHALL apply. User Intent and Confirmation Request SHALL apply.

Table 4.6.2.1: eUICC Memory Reset Requirements

4.6.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements

Req no.          Description
MEMT1            eUICC Test Memory Reset SHALL delete all post-issuance installed Test Profiles
                 on the eUICC including the Enabled Test Profile if any.
MEMT2            Simple Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to enable eUICC Test Memory
                 Reset.
MEMT3            If Test Profiles are not supported, then eUICC Test Memory Reset is not required.

Table 4.6.3.1: eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements

4.7 Profile Requirements

4.7.1 Test Profile Requirements

Req no.          Description
TPRO1            It is OPTIONAL for the removable eUICC to support the requirements of Test
                 Profiles described in this section. If Test Profiles are not supported, it SHALL not
                 be possible to download Test Profiles into the eUICC.
TPRO2            Test Profiles SHALL NOT be able to authenticate to an Operator’s mobile network
                 using Operator Credentials. The eUICC SHALL ensure that such Profiles cannot
                be used to connect to any Operator’s mobile network even if authentication
                information is contained in the Test Profile.
TPRO3           A Test Profile SHALL be installed in its own individual ISD-P.
TPRO4           Test Profiles MAY be pre-installed on the eUICC.
TPRO5           Test Profiles SHALL only be visible and usable when the Device is in Device Test
                Mode.
TPRO6           It SHALL be possible to download, install, enable or disable Test Profiles in the
                eUICC only in Device Test Mode with the exception of the eUICC Memory Reset
                operation.
TPRO7           Test Profiles, as with any other Profile, SHALL be managed through a certified SM-
                DP+.
TPRO8           The enabling of a Test Profile SHALL override the ‘Disabling of this Profile is not
                allowed’ (POL RULE1) Profile Policy Rule.
TPRO9           When the Device Test Mode is deactivated, the LPA SHALL disable any enabled
                Test Profile.
TPRO10          When the Test Profile is disabled, the eUICC SHALL enable the Operational Profile
                that was previously enabled, if any.
TPRO11          The Device Test Mode activation SHALL be obfuscated from the End User.
TPRO12          When exiting Device Test Mode, an End User notice SHALL be presented to
                prompt the tester to perform an eUICC Test Memory Reset.
TPRO13          The LPA MAY delete any Test Profile without user consent when in or out of the
                Device Test Mode.
TPRO14          It MAY be possible to download Java Applications to a Test Profile installed on a
                Test eUICC.
TPRO15          Test Profiles MAY contain Profile Applications.
TPRO16          When an eUICC contains an eUICC certificate chaining to the GSMA CI, the Test
                Profile MAY have RFM and RAM capabilities.
TPRO17          Where an eUICC contains an eUICC certificate chaining to the GSMA CI and
                TPRO16 applies, Test Profiles SHALL only have confidentially managed keys,
                used for application and file management, that are unique per Profile.

Table 4.7.1.1: Test Profiles Requirements

The Device MAY implement a mechanism for connecting an external SIM card for the purpose of testing in the context of Device repair, without affecting the state of the eUICC.

4.7.2 Provisioning Profile Requirements

Req no.         Description
PPRO1           Provisioning Profiles SHALL be based on the same format structure as described
                for the Profile (Figure 4.1.1.1).
PPRO2           A Provisioning Profile MAY be enabled by the LPA upon End User request for
                operations defined in PPRO6 if establishment of the connectivity using the currently
                Enabled Profile is unsuccessful. If this results in an Operational Profile being
                disabled, the End User SHALL first give consent to the loss of communication
                provided by the Enabled Profile.
PPRO3           Provisioning Profiles and their associated Profile Metadata SHALL not be visible to
                the End User on the LUI.
PPRO4           Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be selectable by the End User.
PPRO5           Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be deleted through any action by the End User
                including the use of eUICC Memory Reset.
PPRO6           Provisioning Profile SHALL only be used for the intended purposes of Profile
                downloading and related Profile maintenance functions. The Provisioning Profile
                SHALL not be used as an Operational Profile.
PPRO7           PPRO6 SHALL be enforceable in the RSP architecture.

Table 4.7.2.1: Provisioning Profile Requirements

4.8 Profile Metadata Requirements

Req no.         Description
META1           All Profiles SHALL have associated Profile Metadata.
META2           The Profile Metadata SHALL be stored in the eUICC.
META3           The Profile Metadata SHALL be accessible irrespective of the state of the Profile.
META4           The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the Service Provider name.
                NOTE: EFSPN is already used in a different context outside of this specification
                and could be blank.
META5           The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile.
META6           The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of the
                Profile.
META7           The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description of the
                Profile defined by the Operator/Service Provider.
META8           The eUICC SHALL support the ‘set/edit nickname’ function.
META9           The Profile Metadata SHALL always be available to the LUI.
META10          The Profile Metadata SHALL include an OPTIONAL field to allow the display of an
                icon defined by the Operator/Service Provider for the respective Profile.
META11          The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include a copy of the Profile Policy Rules
                associated to the Profile.
META12          All Profiles SHALL be uniquely identified in the Profile Metadata as Operational,
                Provisioning or Test Profile.
META13          An Operator SHALL be able to access and update the following Profile Metadata
                of its Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is Enabled:
                   • Service Provider name
                   • Short description of the Profile
                   • Icon of the Profile
META14          The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include additional proprietary information.
                The additional proprietary information SHALL include a field for uniquely identifying
                the issuer of the additional proprietary information.
Req no.         Description
META15          With regard to META14, the eUICC SHALL ignore fields it does not support.
META16          With regard to META14, the LPA SHALL ignore fields it does not support.
META17          The information defined in META14 SHALL NOT impact the functionalities and
                Profile Management Operations defined in this specification that are not Vendor
                specific.
META18          The information defined in META14 SHALL NOT impact the interoperability of the
                solution defined in this specification (incl. Devices, Profiles and SM-DP+).
META19          With regard to META14, the eUICC SHALL store the additional proprietary
                information in its memory if indicated by the Profile Owner.
                       Table 4.8.1: Profile Metadata Requirements

4.9 NFC Requirements

An NFC Device and an NFC eUICC SHALL be compliant with the following list of requirements:

Req no.         Description
NFC1            An NFC Device SHALL be compliant with GSMA TS 26 [17] .
NFC2            After installation of an Operational Profile, the NFC eUICC SHALL support all
                requirements as specified in the SGP.03 GSMA NFC UICC Requirements
                Specification [20].
NFC3            The NFC Device SHALL retrieve and enforce access control rules as specified in
                the GlobalPlatform SEAC specification [15].
NFC4            The eUICC SHALL be able to generate proof that the Operational Profile has been
                deleted.
NFC5            All NFC applications and NFC enabling applications (e.g. ARA-M, PPSE, CRS,
                CREL, etc.) attached to an Operational Profile SHALL be included under the ISD-
                P created for the Profile, either under the MNO-SD or in an SD hierarchy with a
                self-extradited SSD with authorised management privilege.
NFC6            The NFC eUICC solution SHALL be able to provide assurance to NFC application
                Service Providers that the combination of an eUICC and Operational Profile is
                trusted. This solution SHALL be based on the CASD that is part of the Operational
                Profile and scenario Push 2B and scenario 3 as specified by SGP.03 [20].
NFC7            If the NFC eUICC is compliant with M4M, the eUICC SHALL reset all the M4M
                virtual cards associated to that Profile when a Profile containing M4M applications
                is disabled.
NFC8            The appropriate NFC related certification information SHALL be part of the
                information shared with the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check.
NFC9            A NFC Device SHALL at least have an embedded eUICC or have the capability to
                support a removable eUICC that is compliant with CAT3 and SGP.03 [20] in either
                instance.

Table 4.9.1: NFC Requirements

4.10 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+)

4.10.1 SM-DP+ Overview

The SM-DP+ is responsible for the creation, generation, management and the protection of resulting Profiles upon the input/request of the Operator. It is also responsible for the delivery of a Profile within a Bound Profile Package, making the Bound Profile Package available for the secure delivery. In addition, the SM-DP+ is responsible for requesting the creation of the ISD-P in the eUICC into which the Profile will be installed. The SM-DP+ will also be the off- card entity that will be responsible for the lifecycle management of the ISD-P that was created at its request. This is performed via the distinct functions listed below.

Figure 4.10.1.1: SM-DP+ Functions

Function name                     Description
Profile Package Generation        Creates Profile Packages [i.e. Personalised Profiles, including
                                  (IMSI, Ki, ICCID…)] from Profile Descriptions agreed with
                                  Operators. This can be an off-line batch or real time process.
Profile Package Protection        Secures each Profile Package according to the security process
                                  creating the Protected Profile Package.
Profile Package Binding           Binds the Protected Profile Package to a target eUICC using the
                                  security process thus creating the Bound Profile Package.
Profile Package Storage           Temporarily stores Protected Profile Packages or Bound Profile
                                  Packages for subsequent delivery to the eUICC.
Profile Package Delivery          Securely transmits and installs the Bound Profile Package to the
                                  eUICC through the LPA.
SM-DS Event Registration          Notifies the SM-DS of a pending operation for a specific eUICC.

Table 4.10.1.1: SM-DP+ Function Descriptions

4.10.2 SM-DP+ Requirements

Req no.         Description
SMDP1           The SM-DP+ SHALL act on behalf of an Operator.
SMDP2           The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to initiate the request for ISD-P creation as part of the
                Bound Profile Package delivery.
SMDP3           The SM-DP+ SHALL establish an end-to-end secure channel to the eUICC to
                download and install Bound Profile Packages on the eUICC.
SMDP4           The SM-DP+ SHALL link a Protected Profile Package for binding to a specific
                eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator.
SMDP5           The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the linked Protected
                Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC.
SMDP6           The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any Certified
                eUICC.
SMDP7           Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound Profile
                Package delivered by the SM-DP+.
SMDP8           Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP+ after completing all production
                steps, Profile Package Protection, and binding.
SMDP9           Communication session between the SM-DP+ and the LPA SHALL be terminated
                by the SM-DP+ after execution of intended Operation(s).
SMDP10          End-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC involved in the
                Profile download and installation SHALL be protected in terms of integrity,
                authenticity and confidentiality.
SMDP11          Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected through
                encryption.
SMDP12          On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile creation and
                storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure deletion procedures
                (logically and physically).
SMDP13          SM-DP+/eUICC communication SHALL incorporate Perfect Forward Secrecy
                (PFS).
SMDP14          The transport used for the Bound Profile Package SHALL implement anti-replay
                mechanisms between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
SMDP15          Connectivity to the SM-DP+ SHALL be aborted and an explicit error message
                SHALL be triggered by the SM-DP+ upon failure to verify authenticity of the
                connecting party. (No message SHALL be sent to the connecting party)
SMDP16          After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound Profile
                Package to the LPA, the transport encryption procedure SHALL be renewed.
                If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more than a
                configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction SHALL be terminated
                and the Operator SHALL be notified.
SMDP17          The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols whenever available
                (e.g. DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.).
SMDP18          The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC Profile
                Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by Trusted Connectivity
                Alliance [5].
Req no.         Description
SMDP19          The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on demand.
SMDP20          It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk.
SMDP21          The SM-DP+ SHALL send a confirmation of the successfully completed download
                and installation of a Profile to the Operator.
SMDP22          There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between any SM-DP+
                and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the Profile. Such a mechanism
                SHALL either be ordered by the Operator or be performed by the Operator itself. If
                such deletion mechanism is used, there will be no off-card entity responsible for
                managing the ISD-P of the installed Profile.
SMDP23          The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid.
SMDP24          The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid.
SMDP25          The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Notification to the Operator informing them
                that a specific Bound Profile Package download is about to start.
SMDP26          The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an eUICC Eligibility Check Information report
                and other relevant information (e.g. Activation Code, ICCID, etc.) to the Operator
                ahead of/prior to the eUICC Bound Profile Package download.
SMDP27          The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to perform Event Registrations to the SM-DS.
SMDP28          The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to request from an Alternative SM-DS not to
                propagate the Event Registration to the Root SM-DS.
SMDP29          The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Profile delete Notification to the Operator
                owning a Profile when a related delete Notification is received from the eUICC.
SMDP30          The SM-DP+ SHALL support the following states for a Profile Package, triggered
                by the Profile Owner:
                   • A Profile Package is not released for Profile Package download.
                   • A Profile Package is released for Profile Package download.
SMDP31          The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to select the elliptic curve parameter in the Profile
                download procedure.
SMDP32          It SHALL be possible for a SM-DP+ to conduct an Event Record Query to a SM-
(FFS)           DS (Root or Alternative) for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations it owns.
SMDP33          The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event Record on the
(FFS)           Root SM-DS or the Alternative SM-DS, identified by the EID or the Event-ID over
                the ES12 interface.
SMDP34          Response to a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only occur where the Root
(FFS)           SM-DS or Alternative SM-DS validates the Event Record ownership.
SMDP35          Ownership validation of a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only use the
(FFS)           requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components of the Event
                Record held.
SMDP36          A SM-DP+ SHALL support all sets of elliptic curve parameters as defined in GSMA
                SGP.22 [24].
SMDP37          If a Profile Package is not yet released for download then the LPA SHALL be
                informed by means of a specific error code.
Req no.         Description
SMDP38          An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to distinguish a Field-Test eUICC from a Certified
                eUICC through eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
SMDP39          The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to be instructed by the Profile Owner to reject Profile
                download to Field-Test eUICCs.
                NOTE: The mechanism is out of scope of this document and it is left to the
                implementation.
SMDP40          The SM-DP+ SHALL NOT perform a Profile download to a Field-Test eUICC if it
                has been instructed so by the Profile Owner as per SMDP39.
SMDP41          It is OPTIONAL for the SM-DP+ to support Activation Code Retrieval. If
                supported, SMDP42, SMDP43, SMDP44 and SMDP45 SHALL apply.
SMDP42          With regards to LPA70, the SM-DP+ SHALL only provide the Activation Code
                associated with the requested Profile after successful common mutual
                authentication with the eUICC where the target Profile is currently installed and if
                allowed by the Profile Owner.
SMDP43          If requested by the Profile Owner, the SM-DP+ SHALL notify the Profile Owner of
                any Activation Code Retrieval operation over ES2+ (including the ICCID and the
                EID).
SMDP44          The SM-DP+ SHALL release the Profile Package associated with the Activation
                Code as per SMDP42 only after successful reception of the Delete Notification of
                the target Profile from the eUICC.
SMDP45          The Profile Owner SHALL be able to accept or reject over ES2+, the Activation
                Code Retrieval request received by the SM-DP+.
SMDP46          With regard to LPA71, the SM-DP+ supporting Activation Code Retrieval SHALL
                be able to provide an indication to the LPA whether Activation Code Retrieval is
                available or not for the requested Profile.

Table 4.10.2.1: SM-DP+ Requirements

4.10.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements

Req no.         Description
DF1             The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be ignored if an SM-DP+
                address is present in an AC being presented to the LUI.
DF2             The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be accessible by the LPA to
                establish a connection to this SM-DP+.
DF3             The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC MAY be left blank.
DF4             If the default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC is blank, then the use of the SM-DS
                discovery procedure or an SM-DP+ address in an AC SHALL be required to
                establish the target SM-DP+.
DF5             [Void]

Table 4.10.3.1: Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements

4.11 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)

Primary Device

  User
                                    End User
Interface             ESeu
  User
Interface           ESeu
        LPA
LUI

ES10c

eUICC
                          Companion
                            Device

Figure 4.11.1: End User Interaction and Interfaces between a Primary and Companion

Device, where the Companion Device MAY have a UI

4.11.1 LPA Overview

This role exists both within the Device in conjunction with LPA Services provided by the eUICC, and within the eUICC with the LPA function provided by the eUICC. It provides three distinct functions, the Local User Interface (LUI), the Local Profile Download (LPD) and the Local Discovery Service (LDS) as described below. Whilst the eUICC alone cannot provide any of these functions without Device interaction, the specific level of interaction will depend upon the capability within the Device. The way this variability is implemented across different Devices and Device types is for further study.

Figure 4.11.1.1: LPA Functions

Function name                    Description
Local Discovery Service          Where required, the LDS is responsible for retrieving pending
(LDS)                            Event Records from the SM-DS.
Local Profile Download           This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound
(LPD)                            Profile Package in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile
                                 Package from the SM-DP+ to the LPD in a single transaction, and
                                 (ii) the onward transfer of the Bound Profile Package into the
                                 eUICC in segments.
                                 This function will depend on network, Device, and eUICC
                                 capabilities.
Local User Interface             This function allows the End User to perform Local Profile
(LUI)                            Management on the Device. User Intent SHALL be enforced.

Table 4.11.1.1: LPA Function Descriptions

4.11.2 Operational LPA Modes

When there is an LPA in the Device and in the eUICC, then the LPA to be used is specified by the Device settings (DEV7):

•     LPA in the Device
•     LPA in the eUICC

4.11.2.1 LPA in the eUICC

LPA functions are provided by the eUICC.

Figure 4.11.2.1.1: LPA in the eUICC

4.11.2.2 LPA in the Device

LPA functions are provided by the Device.

Figure 4.11.2.2.1: LPA in the Device

4.11.3 LPA Requirements

Req no.          Description
                 The LPA SHALL be responsible for instructing the eUICC to perform Local Profile
LPA1
                 Management Operations as per End User request.
                 A mechanism SHALL be implemented between any LPA elements outside the
LPA2             eUICC, and the eUICC to ensure that the communication is not compromised
                 wherever the LPA is located.
                 A secure mechanism SHALL be implemented between the LUI and the associated
LPA3
                 display or input applications on the Device.
                 Access to the LUI SHALL be protected according to current best practices. This
LPA4
                 SHALL be enforced by the Device OS.
LPA5             All Local Profile Management Operations SHALL require User Intent.
LPA6             LUI access SHALL require User Intent.
LPA7             The End User SHALL be able to easily access the list of installed Profiles.
LPA8             The LPA SHALL protect Profile Metadata from unauthorised access.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘enable’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA9
                 operation SHALL allow the End User to select the Profile to be enabled.
LPA10            The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘disable’ SHALL be supported.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘delete’ SHALL be supported. This
                 operation SHALL allow the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the eUICC.
LPA11
                 The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for the deletion
                 of the Profile. Strong Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA12            operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Operational Profiles
                 on the eUICC and relevant associated information through their Profile Metadata.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’ SHOULD
                 be supported. When supported, this operation SHALL allow the End User to edit
LPA13            the default SM-DP+ address. Simple confirmation SHALL be enforced. If the LPA
                 does not support ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’, alternative Device-specific
                 method(s) to edit the default SM-DP+ address SHALL be provided to the End User.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be
                 supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as described
LPA14
                 in Section 4.6.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences
                 of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. Strong Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Test Memory Reset’ SHALL
LPA15            execute the eUICC Test Memory Reset as described in Section 4.6.3. Simple
                 Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation ‘set/edit nickname’ SHOULD be
                 supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to add or modify a nickname
LPA16            for the selected Profile. The operation SHALL NOT modify the Service Provider
                 name. If the LPA does not support ‘set/edit nickname’, alternative vendor-specific
                 methods to distinguish Profiles on the LUI SHOULD be provided by the LPA.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA17
                 operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to the eUICC.
Req no.          Description
                 At least three mechanisms SHALL be supported by the LPA depending on the type
                 of Device where technically capable:
                   • Profile download from default SM-DP+
                   • Profile download via SM-DS service discovery
                   • Profile download with Activation Code
                 Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
LPA18            [Void]
LPA19            [Void]
                 The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Simple
LPA20
                 Confirmation located on the Device as described in this document.
LPA21            [Void]
LPA22            [Void]
LPA23            [Void]
LPA24            [Void]
LPA25            [Void]
LPA26            [Void]
                 When enforced, any Confirmation Request SHALL allow the End User to cancel the
LPA27
                 Local Profile Management Operation.
                 It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI of a Companion Device allowing input from
LPA28
                 an End User interface on the Primary Device.
                 When a Companion Device LUI allows input from a Primary Device, the Companion
                 Device LUI SHALL be able to restrict the actions that can be applied. For example:
                   • not offer the eUICC Memory Reset;
LPA29
                   • only ‘enable’ and ‘disable’ operation are exposed.
                   • Profile enabling is exposed only if no Profile is already enabled on the
                     Companion Device.
                 The LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be able to request an End User initiated
LPA30            action on the Companion Device before the establishment of any proximity secure
                 link (used for inputs into the LUI from another Device).
                 A point-to-point proximity secure link initiated by the End User and offering
LPA31            confidentiality and integrity SHALL be established between the Companion and
                 Primary Device for any input executed from the Primary Device.
                 When operating a Companion Device LUI from a Primary Device, any required User
                 Intent or Confirmation Request SHALL only be executed by the LPA on the
LPA32
                 Companion Device. The physical End User input MAY be done in either the Primary
                 or the Companion Device.
                 The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure
LPA33
                 measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI.
LPA34            [Void]
                 The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the
LPA35            internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over
                 such connection, ES8+ and ES9+ interfaces can be established.
Req no.          Description
                 The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another
                 Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally shared
LPA36
                 Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over such
                 connection, ES8+, and ES9+ interfaces can be established.
                 The LPA SHALL be able to determine if connectivity to the SM-DP+ is available by
LPA37
                 any means.
                 The LPA SHALL be able to notify the End User that there is no connection to the
LPA38            internet and or no connection to the SM-DP+ in order to allow the End User to
                 enable or troubleshoot required connectivity.
LPA39            The LPA SHALL only be able to access the eUICC if it has assigned privileges.
LPA40            There SHALL only be one LPA on the Device.
                 The LPA MAY be extended to support additional features which are not described
                 in this specification.
LPA41            NOTE: These additional features could be (but not limited to) interaction with
                 entities external to LPA, automation or batch processing of Local Profile
                 Management Operations, etc.
                 The LPA including additional features SHALL maintain the interoperability of the
LPA41a
                 solution defined in this specification.
LPA42            [Void]
LPA43            When multiple Operational Profiles are installed, the Local Profile Management
                 Operation ‘enable’ SHALL first initiate the ‘disable’ operation for any Enabled Profile
                 prior to initiating the ‘enable’ operation for the selected Profile.
LPA44            The LPA SHALL be able to read the Profile Policy Rules.
LPA45            When a Profile with Profile Policy Rules is installed, in the case where End User
                 consent is requested, the LPA SHOULD display the consequences of the Profile
                 Policy Rule to the End User. This message SHALL be formulated in a descriptive
                 and non-discriminatory manner (e.g. for “Non-Delete” Profile Policy Rule: “The
                 profile that you are about to install cannot be deleted under the terms you have
                 agreed with your service provider. Approve installation YES/NO?”). Strong
                 Confirmation SHOULD be enforced.
LPA46            Prior to downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHALL check the condition for whether
                 the Enabled Profile, if any, has enabled POL RULE1. If this is the case, a dedicated
                 message SHALL be displayed identifying the consequences to the End User.
                 Examples of information that may be displayed would be:
                   • Enabling of the new Profile will not be possible because the currently Enabled
                     Profile cannot be disabled.
                   • The Profile name of the Enabled Profile.
                   • For more information, the End User should contact the Profile Owner of this
                     Profile.
                 With displaying this message, the End User SHALL be able to decide on whether
                 to continue the download or to cancel the operation.
                 This dialogue MAY be combined with the regular End User Intent for confirming a
                 Profile download.
Req no.          Description
LPA47            The communication between the End User interface of the Primary Device and the
                 LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be protected (confidentiality, integrity and
                 authentication).
LPA48            [Void]
LPA49            Confirmation Requests for consecutive Local Profile Management Operations MAY
                 be achieved in one step as long as the different actions are clearly explained to the
                 End User. For instance, upon installation of a new Profile, the LPA MAY propose
                 ‘add Profile’ and ‘enable’ into one single step with a single confirmation only (e.g.
                 “Do you want to install profile ‘ProfileName’ on your Device and enable it? Yes / No
                 / Install only”)
LPA50            When consecutive operations are achieved in one single step (LPA49), the highest
                 level of confirmation SHALL be applied - i.e. in the case of two operations having
                 respectively Strong and Simple Confirmation Requests, the single step SHALL use
                 the Strong Confirmation Request.
LPA51            The Local Profile Management Operations ‘enable’ (LPA9), ‘disable’ (LPA10), and
                 ‘delete’ (LPA11) SHALL be able to trigger a Notification to the Notification Receivers
                 of the respective Profile being managed to indicate that this operation was actioned.
                 These Notifications are sent on a best effort basis and SHALL not impact otherwise
                 the operation.
LPA52            The LPA SHALL provide a Trusted Link from the End User to the eUICC through
                 the LUI.
                 The End User SHALL be able to configure the LPA such that the automatic Event
LPA53
                 Record retrieval from the SM-DS is disabled.
LPA54            The LPA SHALL be able to read any SM-DS and SM-DP+ addresses configured in
                 the eUICC.
                 It SHALL be possible to check the LPA Integrity. If the integrity check fails,
LPA55
                 communication between the eUICC and the LPA SHALL not occur.
                 LPA Integrity SHALL be ensured using the best practice methods on the targeted
LPA56
                 platform. See 0.
                 The polling mechanism in the LPA SHALL have two types of triggers; those that are
LPA57
                 event based, and those that are End User initiated.
                 Event based triggers for polling SHOULD include Device power-up when no
LPA58            Operational Profile is installed; in addition other triggers MAY be provided. Event
                 based triggers MAY be disabled by the End User.
                 End User initiated triggers for polling SHALL include:
                   • The ‘Add Profile’ operation to trigger the default SM-DP+ if configured, and the
LPA59
                     Root SM-DS.
                   • In addition, other manual triggers MAY be provided.
LPA60            [Void]
                 Error/retry handling of the LPA polling mechanism SHALL be implemented e.g.
LPA61            advise the End User to retry or automatically retry as appropriate. The
                 corresponding confirmation needs to be enforced in the retry cases.
                 As part of the initial Device setup, if no Operational Profile is already installed,
LPA62
                 means SHALL be provided to the End User to retrieve pending Profiles waiting on
Req no.          Description
                 the Default SM-DP+ if configured, via the Root SM-DS, and via the Activation Code
                 procedure.
                 Simple Confirmation is required.
                 NOTE: Implementation is left to the OEM and retrieval does not need to happen
                 exactly during the initial Device setup if the End User, as an example, is informed
                 on how to retrieve these profiles after the setup.
                 The End User SHALL always be able to manually request the retrieval of any
                 waiting Event Record via the LPA if there is no default SM-DP+ address.
LPA63
                 NOTE: This may be achieved through the combination with existing operations –
                 e.g. pressing “Add Profile” would contact the server to retrieve an Event.
                 The Operator/Service Provider name SHALL be given in the signalling information
                 from the SM-DP+ to the LPA when initiating the download of a Profile and shown
LPA64
                 to the End User before the Profile is downloaded.
                 Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                 The LPA SHOULD present the EID to the End User as both text and in a defined
LPA65
                 scannable format (e.g. QR Code).
LPA66            [Void]
                 If the SM-DP+ stops the Profile download procedure, the LPA SHALL notify the End
LPA67
                 User.
LPA68            [Void]
LPA69            It is OPTIONAL for the LPA to support the Activation Code Retrieval operation.
                 The LPA supporting Activation Code Retrieval SHALL support the Local Profile
                 Management Operation 'retrieve Activation Code'. This Operation SHALL allow
LPA70
                 the LPA to request the Activation Code associated with a specific Profile currently
                 installed on the eUICC.
                 The LPA supporting Activation Code Retrieval MAY check the eligibility of the
LPA71            Activation Code Retrieval from the SM-DP+ for a specific Profile installed on the
                 eUICC.
                             Table 4.11.3.1: LPA Requirements

4.11.4 LDS Requirements

Req no.         Description
                The LDS SHALL be able to read out the address described in EUICC41 and only
LDS1
                use the address to connect to the SM-DS

Table 4.11.4.1: LDS Requirement

4.12 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)

4.12.1 SM-DS Overview

The role of the SM-DS is to provide mechanisms that allow an SM-DP+ to inform the LDS within any Device that an SM-DP+ wishes to communicate with it. The purpose of the SM-DS to LDS communication SHALL be informing the LDS of a pending Event.

The principle of operation remains the same for all use cases. The SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration message for a target Device to a SM-DS.

In a simple deployment, only the Root SM-DS is configured on the eUICC. The Root SM-DS address is unique and filled in the eUICC. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM-DS using the same logical location. When the Root SM-DS has an Event-ID for the target Device it will respond with the SM-DP+ address, or if there is no Event-ID the response will be a null response.

In a deployment with cascaded SM-DSs, the SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration to an Alternative SM-DS, which may not be configured as the Root SM-DS on the eUICC. This Alternative SM-DS will cascade the Event Registration to the Root SM-DS. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM-DS and will receive the Alternative SM-DS address. It will then request the Event from the Alternative SM-DS, which will respond with the SM-DP+ address.

Figure 4.12.1.1: Alternative Device to Root SM-DS Event Registration

Figure 4.12.1.2: Root SM-DS Event Registration

Figure 4.12.1.3: Alternative SM-DS Discovery

4.12.2 SM-DS Implementation

Two configurations of the SM-DS MAY exist: • A Root SM-DS • An Alternative SM-DS

Figure 4.12.2.1: SM-DS Implementation

Figure 4.12.2.1 shows both configurations. The Root SM-DS is configured at the time of Device manufacture and is invariant.

4.12.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelines

The following statements SHOULD be considered when defining a technical implementation:
   • A competitive environment on the supply of SM-DS services SHOULD be favoured by
       the approach.
   • There SHOULD be no single-points-of-failure.
   • Implementation SHOULD inherently provide both vertical and horizontal
       performance/scalability.

•There SHOULD be no need for pre-registration of Devices or eUICCs at a certain SM- DS as required in SGP.02 [8] (GSMA Embedded SIM for the SM-SR).

4.12.4 SM-DS functions

The SM-DS has three distinct functions:

Figure 4.12.4.1: SM-DS Functions

Function name              Description
Event Registration         Process by which an Event Record received from a SM-DP+ is stored.
Event Deletion             Process by which an SM-DP+ can delete its own Event Record.
Event Retrieval            Provides all registered Event Records, upon Discovery Request from any
                           enquiring LDS.

Table 4.12.4.1: SM-DS Function Descriptions

4.12.5 SM-DS Requirements

Req no.           Description
SMDS1             The SM-DS SHALL enable a LDS to discover its own Event Records registered by
                  SM-DP+(s) or by Alternative SM-DS(s).
SMDS2             The SM-DS SHALL not be able to identify the nature of an Event.
                  NOTE: The nature of the Event may be ‘Profile Package available for download’.
SMDS3             All valid Discovery Requests and Event Registrations SHALL be processed in a
                  non-discriminatory manner.
SMDS4             The SM-DS SHALL only accept Event Registrations from
                     • any authorised and authenticated SM-DP+(s) having a valid Certificate.
                     • any authorised and authenticated SM-DS(s) having a valid Certificate.
SMDS5             The SM-DS SHALL only accept Discovery Requests authenticated by an eUICC
                  via the corresponding LDS.
SMDS6             The SM-DS and the SM-DP+ as well as connected SM-DSs SHALL be mutually
                  authenticated.
SMDS7             The SM-DS SHALL NOT have visibility of any data that may be used to
                  compromise the End User´s privacy.
SMDS8             The SM-DS SHALL support multiple concurrent Event Registrations per eUICC and
                  SHALL present to the LDS all currently valid Event Records in the same order as
                  they were received by the SM-DS (first in, first out).
SMDS9             The SM-DS SHALL only store Event Records destined for specific EIDs.
Req no.         Description
SMDS10          Subscriber Specific data and Profile related contents SHALL NOT be stored within
                the SM-DS.
SMDS11          The SM-DS SHALL NOT allow the harvesting of any information such as Operator,
                EIDs, Device Manufacturers, Devices, etc.
SMDS12          The SM-DS SHALL only return to the LDS, the Event Records related to the served
                eUICC.
SMDS13          The SM-DS SHALL NOT have any contact with the Profile Packages e.g. SHALL
                NOT store or process any Profile Package.
SMDS14          The SM-DS SHALL provide the same data regardless of the status of the Device
                that queries it (i.e. consistent in time and in geographic location).
SMDS15          The SM-DS SHOULD NOT significantly impact the end-to-end provisioning time.
SMDS16          The SM-DS SHALL provide defence against DoS attacks.
SMDS17          All communications to, from and between entities of the SM-DS SHALL be
                encrypted.
SMDS18          The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event Records registered on
                the SM-DS.
SMDS19          An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event Records
                registered on the Root SM-DS (In response to an SM-DP+ delete operation defined
                in SMDS18).
SMDS20          An Alternative SM-DS SHALL propagate the Event Record to the Root SM-DS if
                requested by the SM-DP+.
SMDS21          If there are multiple Event Records registered on the SM-DS for one eUICC, these
                SHALL all be sent as a single response.
SMDS22          An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an Event Record to an LDS either by the Root
                SM-DS or via any Alternative SM-DS selected by the SM-DP+. If an Alternative
                SM-DS is selected, the Event Record to the LDS SHALL come from this Alternative
                SM-DS.
SMDS23          There SHALL be a unique Root SM-DS.
                NOTE: This requirement does not forbid the potential load-balancing of this Root
                SM-DS.
SMDS24          The Root SM-DS SHALL be managed by the GSMA.
SMDS25          It SHALL be possible for the Alternative SM-DS to conduct an Event Record Query
(FFS)           to the Root SM-DS for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations it owns.
SMDS26          A SM-DS response to an Event Record Query SHALL only confirm Event Record
(FFS)           existence and SHALL NOT include additional information.
SMDS27          An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event Record
(FFS)           on the Root SM-DS, identified by the EID or the Event-ID over the ES15 interface.
SMDS28          Response to a SM-DS Event Record query SHALL only occur where the responder
(FFS)           validates the Event Record ownership.
SMDS29          Ownership validation of a SM-DS Event Record Query SHALL only use the
(FFS)           requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components of the Event
                Record held.
Req no.         Description
SMDS30          The SM-DS (Root or Alternative) MAY inform the SM-DP+ directly or via another
(FFS)           SM-DS, that a Discovery Request from an authorised LDS has been answered by
                issuing an Event Record.
SMDS31          The SM-DS SHALL only inform the Event Record’s owning SM-DP+ or SM-DS that
(FFS)           it has replied to a Discovery Request.

Table 4.12.5.1: SM-DS Requirements

4.12.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedure

The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with the Root SM-DS and an Alternative SM-DS (cascade mode).

Figure 4.12.6.1: Event Registration/Deletion Procedure

4.12.6.1 Event Registration Procedure

Starting Condition:

a.       The SM-DP+ has an Event Registration action waiting for a target eUICC identified by
         the EID.
Procedure:
1.       The SM-DP+ establishes a secure connection to an Alternative SM-DS of the Profile
         Owner´s choice.
2.       The SM-DP+ notifies the Alternative SM-DS about an Event Registration action.
3. to 4. The Alternative SM-DS registers and confirms the Event Registration.
5.       The Alternative SM-DS establishes a secure connection to the Root SM-DS.
6.         The Alternative SM-DS informs the Root SM-DS that for the given EID, an Event
           Record is waiting at the Alternative SM-DS.
7.         The Root SM-DS registers the Event Registration.
8.         The Root SM-DS confirms the receipt of the information.

4.12.6.2 Event Deletion Procedure

Starting Condition:

a.       The SM-DP+ has an Event Deletion action waiting for a target eUICC identified by the
         EID
Procedure:
1.       The SM-DP+ establishes a secure connection to an Alternative SM-DS of the Profile
         Owner´s choice.
2.       The SM-DP+ notifies the Alternative SM-DS about an Event Deletion action.
3. to 4. The Alternative SM-DS deletes the Event Record and confirms the Event Deletion.
5.       The Alternative SM-DS establishes a secure connection to the Root SM-DS.
6.       The Alternative SM-DS informs the Root SM-DS that for the given EID, an Event
         Record has to be deleted.
7.       The Root SM-DS deletes the Event Record.
8.       The Root SM-DS confirms the deletion of the Event Record.

4.12.7 Discovery Request Procedure

The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with an Alternative SM-DS and the
Root SM-DS (cascade mode).     #

Figure 4.12.7.1: Discovery Request Procedure

Procedure:
1. to 3. In order to generate a Discovery Request, the LDS requests the eUICC to generate
         an eUICC Authorisation which contains (at least) the eUICC-Certificate and is
         signed by the eUICC.
4. to 5. The LDS establishes a secure communication to the Root SM-DS.
6.       The Root SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by checking the eUICC
         Authorisation.
7.       In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record is waiting, it delivers back:
            a. The address of the SM-DP+, where an action is waiting.
               or
            b. The rest of the following actions:
                     i. The address of the Alternative SM-DS, where an Event Record can be
                        retrieved.
                    ii. The LDS establishes a secure connection to the Alternative SM-DS.
                   iii. The Alternative SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by
                        checking the eUICC Authorisation.
                   iv. In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record has been
                        received, it delivers back the address of the SM-DP+, where an action
                        is waiting.
8.      The LPA establishes a connection to the SM-DP+ and the waiting action can be
        performed.

4.13 Profile Policy Management

4.13.1 Introduction

The Profile Policy Management function provides mechanisms by which Service Providers are able to reinforce the conditions or policies (operational and business) under which services are provided to the Subscriber. In some instances this MAY also include the enforcement of the policies set by the Subscriber.

Profile Policy Management MAY also be applied with other already existing policy enforcement technologies which are also subject to agreement by the Subscriber.

The realisation of the Profile Policy Management function is based on two key elements. The first element is the Profile Policy Enabler which is contained within the eUICC. The second element is a set of defined Profile Policy Rules which are required for the actual enforcement of specific policies.

4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirements

Policy no.       Description
POL1             A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only be configured within a Profile.
POL2             Each Profile MAY have Profile Policy Rules associated to itself.
POL3             A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only apply to the Profile that contains it.
POL4             Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be consistent across implementations.
POL5             Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be able to resolve any Profile Policy Rule
                 conflict.
POL6             The updating of a Profile’s Policy Rules SHALL be restricted to the Profile Owner.
POL7             The mechanism used for the update of a Profile Policy Rule SHALL be atomic.
POL8             The set of Profile Policy Rules SHALL be extensible for future releases.
POL9             There SHALL be a Profile Policy Rule scheme to allow extensibility of the Policy
                 Rules, e.g. described like ‘operational command, scope of application,
                 qualification’
POL10            A Profile Policy Rule SHALL be enforced whenever a Profile state change is
                 attempted.
POL11            Downloading and installing a Profile with the Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of this
                 Profile is not allowed’ (POL RULE1) SHALL only be possible if no other
                 Operational Profile is currently installed.
POL12            The LPA and the eUICC SHALL prevent the downloading and installation of a
                 Profile containing Profile Policy Rules that conflict with the Profile Policy Rules of
                 the already installed Profiles.
                 NOTE: The technical specification SHALL describe exhaustively each conflict that
                 MAY occur.
POL12a           The LPA MAY cancel the Profile download procedure if it does not support the
                 downloading of Profiles containing Profile Policy Rules to a removable eUICC
                 regardless of its RAT.
Policy no.       Description
POL13            An Operator SHALL be able to deactivate the Profile Policy Rules of its Profile
                 using the ES6 interface if the Profile is enabled.
                 NOTE: The activation of Profile Policy Rules on the ES6 interface is a potential
                 feature for a future release.
POL14            Before a Profile is installed with Profile Policy Rules, the End User SHALL be able
                 to be notified about the Profile Policy Rules and if notified, the installation SHALL
                 thereafter be conditional on End User Strong Confirmation.
                 This prompting may not be needed if the installation is directly allowed by the
                 RAT.
POL15            The request for End User consent for the installation of Profile Policy Rules and
                 Profile download MAY be combined into a single prompt therefore requiring a
                 single confirmation by the End User.
POL16            Profile Policy Rules SHALL be enforced by the Profile Policy Enabler in the
                 eUICC.
POL17            The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL only support the Profile Policy Rules defined in
                 this specification.
POL18            The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL be capable of supporting all the Profile Policy
                 Rules as defined in this specification.
POL19            POL RULE3 SHALL be enforceable in all cases with the exception of the enabling
                 of a Provisioning Profile.
                 NOTE: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been
                 fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.
POL20            Allowing the installation of a Profile with Profile Policy Rules SHALL be subject to
                 compliance with local regulatory requirements.
POL21            Profile Policy Rules MAY be configured for Profiles only if the Profile Owner can
                 be identified in the Metadata.
                 NOTE: POLPPE requirements depend on the identification of the Profile Owner.

Table 4.13.2.1: Profile Policy Management Requirements

4.13.3 Policy Rules

Policy no.        Description
POL RULE1         The Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be
                  supported.
POL RULE2         The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be
                  supported.
POL RULE3         The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is required upon its successful
                  disabling’ SHALL be supported.
                  NOTE: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been
                  fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.

Table 4.13.3.1: Policy Rules Requirements

4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirements

Policy no.       Description
POLPPE1          The Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) SHALL be stored in the Profile Policy
                 Enabler in the eUICC.
POLPPE2          The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL enforce the contents of the installed RAT, if
                 any, only at Profile installation time.
POLPPE3          The RAT SHALL allow multiple Profile Owners to have Profile Policy Rules
                 enabled in their Profiles.
POLPPE4          The RAT SHALL be able to support specific configurations which allow a set of or
                 all Profile Policy Rules for any Profile Owner.
POLPPE5          The RAT SHALL only be installed at pre-issuance or during the initial Device setup
                 provided there are no Operational Profiles installed.
POLPPE6          The RAT SHALL not be affected by the eUICC Memory Reset function.
POLPPE7          To support identifiable regulatory requirement, a RAT SHALL be able to support
                 a specific configuration which MAY forbid any Profile Owner to set a specific
                 Profile Policy Rule.
POLPPE8          If POLPPE7 is set, this information SHALL be part of the eligibility check
                 information shared between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
POLPPE9          Where the RAT allows the Profile Policy Rules for the Profile being installed,
                 installation SHALL proceed as stated in POL14.
POLPPE10         The RAT SHALL be able to support a setting to display the consequences of the
                 Profile Policy Rules to the End User before installation of the Profile.
POLPPE11         The OEM or EUM SHALL be responsible for providing the RAT.
POLPPE12         A fixed RAT SHALL be implemented in the eUICC.
                 NOTE: RAT configuration examples are described in 0.

Table 4.13.4.1: Profile Policy Enabler Requirements

4.14 Certification

4.14.1 eUICC Certification Requirements

Req no.          Description
CERTEU1          The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS UP accredited [13].
CERTEU2          The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance with GSMA
                 SGP.22 [24].
CERTEU3          The eUICC SHALL be certified according to the Protection Profile defined by the
                 GSMA [25].
CERTEU4          The eUICC Protection Profile SHALL at least include the following elements: ISD-
                 R, Profile storage, isolation of Profiles, and Telecom Framework.
CERTEU5          The eUICC protection Profile SHALL be equivalent to the eUICC Protection
                 Profile defined in SGP.05 [21].
CERTEU6          The Evaluation Assurance Level of the eUICC Protection Profile SHALL be (at
                 least) EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 (EAL 4+) [33].
Req no.          Description
CERTEU7          The eUICC public key Certificate used for authentication SHALL contain the EID.
CERTEU8          It SHALL be possible to obtain the technical reference of the product, for example
                 the Common Criteria certification report number and if applicable, the EMVco
                 PCN (Platform Certification Number) associated with a specific eUICC.
CERTEU9          The EUM Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.
CERTEU10         The eUICC Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by the EUM using its EUM private key
                 corresponding to its Certificate (CERTEU9).
CERTEU11         The eUICC private key(s) SHOULD not be modifiable. If they are, they should be
                 modifiable only by the EUM that issued the corresponding Certificate.
CERTEU12         If the eUICC private key(s) are modifiable, it SHALL use the mechanism defined
                 in the GlobalPlatform specification with a Minimum Security Level corresponding
                 to the AES algorithm using a key length of 128 bits.
CERTEU13         If the eUICC's EUM Certificate is updatable, then the eUICC SHALL support a
                 secure mechanism to update its EUM Certificate.
CERTEU14         If the eUICC's CI public keys are updatable, then the eUICC SHALL support a
                 secure mechanism to update its CI public keys.
CERTEU15         If the eUICC's Certificate is updatable, then the eUICC SHALL support a secure
                 mechanism to update its eUICC Certificate.
CERTEU16         Where appropriate, the eUICC SHOULD be certified according to EMVCo
                 Security Evaluation process [27].
CERTEU17         Field-Test eUICCs SHALL use a certified hardware according to SGP.24 [38].

Table 4.14.1.1: eUICC Certification Requirements

4.14.2 Device Compliance Requirement

Req no.          Description
CERTDEV1         There SHALL be a compliance process for all parts of Local Profile
                 Management implementations in accordance with the GSMA.
CERTDEV2         The certification process for Integrated TRE using Remote Memory residing
                 outside the SoC as per DIE1 SHALL cover the Integrated TRE, internal and
                 external SoC interfaces used for Integrated eUICC implementation, and Remote
                 Memory residing outside the SoC.
CERTDEV3         The certification process for Integrated TRE implementations SHALL ensure that
                 software and data stored in Remote Memory residing outside the SoC as per
                 DIE1 are protected against confidentiality, integrity, and availability attacks.
CERTDEV4         The certification process for Integrated TRE implementations SHALL ensure that
                 any interfaces between the Integrated TRE and the SoC are protected against
                 confidentiality and integrity attacks.

Table 4.14.2.1: Device Compliance Requirement

4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification Requirements

Req no.          Description
CERTDP1          The SM-DP+ provider SHALL be required to declare product (SM-DP+)
                 compliance with GSMA SGP.22 [24].
CERTDP2          The SM-DP+ SHALL be accredited according to FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3 [22]
                 and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology [28].
CERTDP3          SM-DP+ elements SHALL use Hardware Security Modules (HSM) for
                 cryptographic related operations (key storage, derivation, cryptographic
                 operations).
                 NOTE: This is to be covered by the SAS documents “HSM certified according to
                 FIPS 140-2 level 3 or higher”
CERTDP4          The SM-DP+ SHALL implement privileges isolation (Log, Audit, Operation, and
                 Administration).
CERTDP5          The SM-DP+ SHALL implement operating system hardening mechanisms.
CERTDP6          The SM-DP+ SHALL implement separation of control, user and administrative
                 planes.
CERTDP7          [Void]
CERTDP8          [Void]
CERTDP9          The private keys of SM-DP+ Certificates used for Profile Binding with eUICC
                 SHALL be protected and stored in HSM according to CERTDP3.
CERTDP10         The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to mitigate against DoS
                 attacks.
CERTDP11         [Void]
CERTDP12         The SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.
CERTDP13         The SM-DP+ processes SHALL ensure that any Java Application to be included
                 in Profile Package(s) is bytecode verified.
                 NOTE 1: As per CERTDP2, the SM-DP+ processes are verified in the scope of
                 SAS-SM.
                 NOTE 2: It is sufficient to enforce this requirement once for a given Java
                 Application contained within an unpersonalised Profile.

Table 4.14.3.1: SM-DP+ Certification Requirements

4.14.4 SM-DS Certification Requirements

Req no.           Description
CERTDS1           The SM-DS provider SHALL be required to declare product compliance with
                  GSMA SGP.22 [24].
CERTDS2           The SM-DS SHALL be accredited according to FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3 [22]
                  and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v3 [28].
CERTDS3           The SM-DS SHALL implement isolation of privileges (Log, Audit, Operation, and
                  Administration).
CERTDS4           The SM-DS SHALL implement operating system hardening mechanisms.
Req no.           Description
CERTDS5           The SM-DS SHALL implement separation of control, user and administrative
                  planes.
CERTDS6           [Void]
CERTDS7           [Void]
CERTDS8           The SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.

Table 4.14.4.1: SM-DS Certification Requirements

4.14.5 LPA Certification Requirements

Req no.           Description
CERTLPA1          There SHALL be a certification process for all the LPA elements communicating
                  with Remote SIM Provisioning entities.
CERTLPA2          The certification process SHALL ensure that Local Profile Management
                  Operations are sent by authorised LPA elements only.
CERTLPA3          The certification process SHALL ensure a mechanism exists to block
                  compromised LPAs.
CERTLPA4          The LPD SHALL authenticate the SM-DP+ during the TLS session.
CERTLPA5          The LDS SHALL authenticate the SM-DS during the TLS session.
CERTLPA6          The LPA SHALL only accept valid TLS Certificates as defined in CERTPK10a for
                  SM-DP+ and SM-DS authentication.

Table 4.14.5.1: LPA Certification Requirements

4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management Requirements

Req no.           Description
CERTPK1           The eUICC SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+.
CERTPK2           The LPD SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+.
CERTPK3           The LDS SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS.
CERTPK4           The LDS authentication of an SM-DS using an invalid Public Key Certificate
                  SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop.
CERTPK5           The LPD authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key Certificate
                  SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop.
CERTPK6           The SM-DP+ authentication of an eUICC using an invalid Public Key Certificate
                  SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop.
CERTPK7           The eUICC authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key Certificate
                  SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop.
CERTPK8           The GSMA CI SHALL revoke the Public Key Certificate of any entities (SM-DP+,
                  SM-DS, EUM) if it is compromised (e.g. private key theft).
CERTPK9           The eUICC SHALL be able to support a set of GSMA CIs.
CERTPK9a          The EUM SHALL ensure that the support of GSMA CI and Test CI are mutually
                  exclusive on any given eUICC.
CERTPK10          A Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:
Req no.           Description
                    • it has a valid signature
                    • it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a trusted chain of Certificates up to a GSMA
                      CI. Certificate Path validation SHALL follow the process defined in RFC
                      5280 [1].
                    • it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in the trust chain has been
                      revoked
                    • it has not expired
                  If any of these applicable verifications fail, the Public Key Certificate SHALL be
                  considered as invalid.
CERTPK10a         A TLS Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:
                    • it has a valid signature
                    • it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a public trusted CA, or a trusted chain of
                      Certificates up to a GSMA CI or a public trusted CA. Certificate Path
                      validation SHALL follow the process defined in RFC 5280 [1].
                    • it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in its trust chain has been
                      revoked
                    • it has not expired
                  If any of these applicable verifications fail, the TLS Public Key Certificate SHALL
                  be considered as invalid.
CERTPK11          The eUICC, LPA, SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL have knowledge of revoked Public
                  Key Certificates.
                  NOTE: This requirement also applies to TLS Certificates that chain to either the
                  GSMA CI or a public trusted CA.

Table 4.14.6.1: Public Key Certificates Management Requirements

4.15 eUICC OS Update

Req no.           Description
OSUpd1            An eUICC SHOULD support a secure mechanism to allow an eUICC OS Update.
                  While its implementation detail is out of scope of specification, the use of
                  eUICC OS Update PP-Module as described in SGP.25 [21] is mandatory.
OSUpd2            If such a mechanism is used, the eSIM Products for which the compliance is
                  affected by the eUICC OS update SHALL maintain compliance as specified in
                  SGP.24 [27].

Table 4.15.1: eUICC OS Update Requirements

4.16 Requirements for Interoperable Applications

Req no.           Description
APP01             Application Developers SHALL develop Interoperable Applications according to
                  current best practices.
                  NOTE: The “Stepping Stones for Java Card Applet Developers” [i.01] can be used
                  for guidance on the development of Java Card Applets.

Table 4.16.1: Requirements for Interoperable Applications

5 Operational Procedures

5.1 LPA Initiated Download

5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirements

Req no.           Description
LID1              The LPA SHALL use any Root SM-DS or default SM-DP+ address populated on
                  the eUICC if it has not been provided already by the Activation Code.
LID2              In the context of LID1, if both a Root SM-DS and a default SM-DP+ address are
                  populated, the LPA SHALL first contact the SM-DP+ and then SM-DS to initiate
                  a Remote SIM Provisioning transaction.

Table 5.1.1.1: LPA Initiated Download Requirements

5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedure

This following procedure describes the Events that are part of the Profile Package download and installation procedure initiated by the LPA.

Figure 5.1.2.1: Profile Download Procedure

Start conditions:

       a.        The Subscriber has completed the Subscription process to the selected
                 Operator/Service Provider offer.
       b.        The Profile ordering process related to this Subscription has been completed
                 (i.e. an assigned Protected Profile Package is stored on the SM-DP+).
Procedure:
       1.         The LPA initiates Profile Package download and identifies the address of the
                  SM-DP+ where the Profile is stored and available for download (via e.g. URL,
                  QR code, manual input, etc.) as well as other information provided (e.g. Token,
                  SMDPId, Confirmation Code).
       2.         The LPA authenticates the SM-DP+ through establishing a TLS connection with
                  the SM-DP+, and verifying the SMDPid if such information has been provided.
       3. to 4. The LPA gets an eUICC challenge
       5. to 6. The LPA sends the eUICC challenge and any other relevant information to the
                  SM-DP+.
       7. to 9. The SM-DP+ signs the eUICC challenge, and generates a DP_Challenge to be
                  sent back to the eUICC.
       10.        The LPA sends the material received by the SM-DP+ and the AC Token to the
                  eUICC; the eUICC checks the SMDPid and authenticates the SM-DP+.
       11.        The eUICC sends back a signed set of information including the DP_Challenge,
                  the AC Token, the EID and its Certificate to the LPA.
       12.        The End User confirms the download of the Profile, optionally with the display
                  of the Profile name of the Operator.
       13.        The LPA sends the set of information received in Step 11 from the eUICC to
                  the SM-DP+.
       14.        The SM-DP+ verifies the signature; the eUICC is authenticated.
       15. to 16. OPTIONAL: The eUICC Eligibility Check and Profile binding functions are
                  performed by the SM-DP+.
       17. to 22. OPTIONAL
       17.        The Operator is notified about the Profile Package that is about to be
                  downloaded.
       18.        If the Operator has been notified, it MAY request to stop the download process
                  by indicating an error code to the SM-DP+.
       19.        If the Operator sends an error code to the SM-DP+, the SM-DP+ stops the
                  download process and indicates the error code to the LPA.
       20.        The LPA notifies the End User with an appropriate message.
       21. to 22. The SM-DP+ MAY receive information from the Operator to prepare the
                  appropriate Profile Package.
       23. to 25. The Bound Profile Package is sent to the eUICC and installed on the eUICC.
       26.        The Profile Package download report is sent from the SM-DP+ to the Operator.
End Condition:
a.       The Profile is installed in the eUICC in a Disabled state

5.2 Profile Download with Activation Code

5.2.1 Activation Code Requirements

Req no.         Description
AC1             Where used, the Activation Code SHALL trigger the download of a Bound Profile
                Package from a specific SM-DP+.
AC2              The Activation Code SHALL comprise of the following parameters:
                   • SM-DP+ address
                   • Activation Code Token (Includes OPTIONAL Confirmation Code Required
                     Flag)
                   • SMDPid (OPTIONAL)
AC3             The Activation Code Token SHALL be able to include a parameter indicating
                whether a Confirmation Code is required or not.
                If such a Confirmation Code is required, the LPA SHALL ask the End User to input
                a Confirmation Code. The SM-DP+ SHALL verify the Confirmation Code before
                delivering the Bound Profile Package.
                NOTE: How the Confirmation Code is created and provided to the End User is out
                of scope of this specification.
AC4             The Activation Code SHALL be verified by the SM-DP+ before delivering the Bound
                Profile Package.
AC5             The Activation Code input in the LPA by the End User SHALL support at least
                manual typing and QR code scanning.
AC6             All Activation Code procedures SHALL be implemented natively as part of the LPA.
AC7             [Void]
AC8             Following the Activation Code procedure, the Profile Package download procedure
                SHALL be used.
AC9             The Activation Code procedure SHALL preserve eco-system security, privacy and
                validation of User Intent.
AC10            The Activation Code procedure SHALL be used for the sole purpose of
                downloading a Profile package to the targeted eUICC. The Activation Code
                procedure SHALL prevent sending IMEI and EID information to a non-
                authenticated SM-DP+.
AC11            The Activation Code SHALL uniquely identify the Operator/Service Provider.
AC12            The Activation Code request to the SM-DP+ SHALL be extended by the LPA with
                the EID after the specific SM-DP+ has been authenticated.

Table 5.2.1.1: Activation Code Requirements

5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure

The Activation Code procedure defines a common functionality which allows the Subscriber or the End User on behalf of the Subscriber to “activate” a Device by means of requesting the download of an Operational Profile from the Device itself.

Figure 5.2.2.1: Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure

Start Conditions:
       a.   A Subscription has been established by the Subscriber.
       b.   Activation Code material and optionally a Confirmation Code has been provided
            to the SM-DP+ (Step 1), and an Activation Code has been provided to the End
            User and optionally a Confirmation Code (side channel) (Step 2).

Procedure: 3. The End User inputs the Activation Code to the LPA through the LUI.

4. The LPA parses the Activation Code parameters to recognise the SM-DP+ address,
   the Activation Code Token, the LPA Mode and optionally the SMDPid. In addition, the
   LPA MAY parse in the Activation Token the information that a Confirmation Code is
   required.
5. If the Confirmation Code parameter in the Activation Code Token is set to “require
   Confirmation Code”, the End User is prompted to input a Confirmation Code provided
   to them by the issuing Operator/Service Provider.
6. The Activation Code download procedure is initiated by the LPA. The LPA requests a
   nonceeUICC from the eUICC.
7. The eUICC creates a nonceeUICC associated with the supported eUICC Specification
   Version Number (eSVN).
8. The eUICC transmits the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to the
   LPA.
9. The LPA sends the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to the SM-DP+.

NOTE:Prior to this step a HTTPs session SHALL be established between the LPA and the SM-DP+ based on a public key of the Root Certificate stored in the Device which includes authentication using the TLS Certificate and checking for the presence of the SMDPid in the TLS Certificate used for the TLS session.

10. Upon receiving the nonceeUICC and the associated eSVN, the SM-DP+ creates
    nonceSMDP and signs both the nonceSMDP and the nonceeUICC.
11. The SM-DP+ sends the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the LPA.
12. The LPA collects the Activation Code parameters as well as the Device information
    needed for the eligibility procedure and optionally the Confirmation Code and transmits
    them with the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the eUICC.
13. The eUICC checks the signature attached to the nonceeUICC. If the SMDPid is
    configured in the AC, the eUICC checks that the SMDPid provided by the LPA and the
    SMDPid in the SM-DP+ Certificate correspond. The SM-DP+ is at this stage
    authenticated by the eUICC. The eUICC generates key material that will be used for
    the session key establishment. The eUICC signs a set of information with the eUICC
    private key which includes:
     a. The nonceSMDP
     b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the preparation of
        the Bound Profile Package
     c. Activation Code parameters
     d. The Device and eUICC information
     e. Optionally the Confirmation Code
14. The eUICC sends the signed set of information to the LPA in addition to:
    a. The nonceSMDP
    b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the preparation of
        the Bound Profile Package
    c. Activation Code parameters
    d. The Device and eUICC information
    e. The eUICC Certificate which includes the EID
    f. The EUM Certificate
    g. Optionally the Confirmation Code
15. The LPA sends the whole set of information received from the eUICC to the SM-DP+.
16. The SM-DP+ checks the EUM Certificate with the CI Public Key. The SM-DP+ checks
    the signature of the nonceSMDP; the eUICC is at this stage authenticated by the SM-
    DP+.
17. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the eligibility check based on the transmitted information
    (EID, Device information, eUICC information, eSVN).
18. The SM-DP+ checks the Activation Code parameters and optionally the Confirmation
    Code to retrieve the referenced Profile Package.
19. The Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC:
    a. The SM-DP+ establishes session keys with the eUICC.
    b. A Bound Profile Package is prepared on the basis of the eUICC session key
        material and is downloaded and installed on the eUICC.
    c. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and the
        Operator is notified by the SM-DP+.
    d. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged by the eUICC
        to the LPA which notifies the End User of the status.
End Conditions:
        a.     A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a
               Disabled state.
        b.     The LPA MAY offer the Profile for enablement by the End User.

5.3 Local Profile Management

5.3.1 Local Profile Management Procedures

5.3.1.1 Enable Profile

This procedure performs the enabling of a target Profile. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.

Figure 5.3.1.1.1: Enable Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC.
       b.   The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
       c.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
Procedure:
       1.   The End User makes a Profile enable request on the LPA.
       2.   User Intent is verified.
       3.   The LPA sends a Profile enable operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the
            eUICC.
       4.   The ISD-R checks if applied Profile Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the
            Profile to be enabled
       5.   If there is a conflict with Profile Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and
            informs the End User via the LPA.
       6.   The target Profile is enabled.
       7.   The ISD-R informs the LPA of the enabling of the Profile.
       8.   The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions:
       b.   The target Profile is enabled.

5.3.1.2 Disable Profile

Profile disabling can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.

Figure 5.3.1.2.1: Disable Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC.
       b.   The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
       c.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
Procedure:
       1.   The End User makes a Profile disable request on the LPA.
       2.   User Intent is verified.
       3.   The LPA sends a Profile disable operation to the ISD-R on the eUICC.
       4.   The ISD-R checks if applied Profile Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the
            Profile to be disabled.
       5.   If there is a conflict with Profile Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and
            informs the End User via the LPA.
       6.   The ISD-R disables the target Profile.
       7.   The ISD-R informs the LPA of the disabling of the Profile.
       8.   The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions:
       a.   The target Profile is disabled.

5.3.1.3 Delete Profile

Profile deletion can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.

Figure 5.3.1.3.1: Delete Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   The target Profile is disabled.
       b.   The target Profile has been chosen by the End User
       c.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
Procedure:
       1.   The End User makes a Profile deletion request on the LPA.
       2.   User Intent is verified.
       3.   The LPA sends a Profile deletion operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the
            eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
       4.   The ISD-R checks if applied Profile Policy Rules permits the Profile to be deleted.
       5.   If there is a conflict with Profile Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and
            informs the End User via the LPA.
 6.      The ISD-R erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P.
 7.      The ISD-R informs the LPA of the Profile deletion.
 8.      The Profile Metadata for the target Profile is erased.
 9.      The End User is informed via the LPA.
10.      The LPA sends delete Notifications to the Notification Receivers for Profile deletion
         in the Profile.
End conditions:
       a.   The target Profile is deleted.

5.3.1.4 Add/Update Profile Nickname

Add/update nickname will allow the Subscriber or End User to attribute a nickname to a Profile for ease of use. Note that adding or changing a nickname SHALL NOT affect any other data or other Profile Metadata for that Profile.

Figure 5.3.1.4.1: Add/Update Profile Nickname Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   User Intent has been verified.
       b.   The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
       c.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
Procedure:
       1.   The End User requests the update of the nickname on the LPA.
       2.   The LPA updates the Profile Metadata of the target Profile with the End User’s choice
            of nickname in the eUICC.
End conditions:
       c.   Profile Metadata of the target Profile has been updated with the End User’s choice
            of nickname.

5.3.1.5 Query Profile Metadata

This procedure will allow the End User to query the Profile Metadata of the Profiles accessible to the End User. The result SHALL display all (or parts of) the Profile Metadata for the selected Profile on the eUICC at the time of querying. No changes are made to any data on the eUICC as a result of this procedure.

Figure 5.3.1.5.1: Query Profile Metadata Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   The LPA is authenticated to eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
       b.   The list of Profiles accessible to the End User is displayed by the LPA (LUI).
Procedure:
       1.   The End User selects a Profile to query.
       2.   The LPA receives a query request from the End User.
       3.   The LPA requests Profile Metadata from the eUICC.
       4.   The LPA displays the Profile Metadata to the End User on the LUI.
End conditions:
       a.   No change to Profile Metadata.

5.3.1.6 eUICC Memory Reset

This procedure performs the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC including its associated Profile Metadata. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.

NOTE:A similar procedure will apply to perform the eUICC Test Memory Reset of the eUICC.

Figure 5.3.1.6.1: eUICC Memory Reset Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
       b.   The eUICC Memory Reset option is displayed by the LPA (LUI).
Procedure:
       1.   The End User makes an eUICC Memory Reset request on the LPA (LUI).
       2.   User Intent is verified.
       3.   The LPA (LUI) displays a message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ to
            the End User.
       4.   The End User confirms the conformity with the consequences to the LPA.
       5.   The LPA sends an eUICC Memory Reset operation to the eUICC.
       6.   The eUICC deletes the Profile on the eUICC even if it is an Enabled Profile including
            the Profile Metadata associated with it.
       7.   The eUICC informs the LPA of the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC.
       8.   The End User is informed via the LPA (LUI).
       9.   The LPA sends delete Notifications to all Notification Receivers for Profile deletion
            in the Profile.
End conditions:
       a.   The Profile is deleted from the eUICC.

5.3.1.7 Add Profile with Activation Code

This procedure will allow the Subscriber to add a single Profile. This procedure will not enable the downloaded Profile, nor disable an Enabled Profile. Network connectivity is assumed. The download can be initiated by the input of an Activation Code.

Figure 5.3.1.7.1: Add Profile with Activation Code Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   User Intent has been verified.
       b.   The download of a new Profile is allowed on the eUICC.
       c.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Profile
            download.
Procedure:
       1.   The End User obtains an Activation Code to add a Profile to their Device.
       2.   The LPA requests the End User to enter the Activation Code.
       3.   Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure as described in Section 5.2.2
            starts.
End conditions:
       a.   The Profile has been installed on the End User’s Device.
       b.   Profile Metadata has been updated from the Profile.

5.3.1.8 Edit SM-DP+ Address

This procedure will allow the End User to edit a default SM-DP+ address on to the eUICC.

Figure 5.3.1.8.1: Edit SM-DP+ Address

Start conditions:
       a.   There is a default SM-DP+ address in the LPA.
       b.   The End User is willing to edit the default SM-DP+ address
Procedure:
       1.   The End User edits the SM-DP+ Address via the LPA.
       2.   Simple Confirmation from the End User is required.
       3.   The LPA sends the default SM-DP+ address for storage in the LPA Service.
       4.   The LPA Service informs the LPA of the storage of the default SM-DP+ address.
       5.   The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions:
       d.   The target default SM-DP+ Address is edited in the LPA Services.

5.3.1.9 Retrieve Activation Code

This procedure will allow the LPA to retrieve from the SM-DP+ the Activation Code that is associated with a specific Profile currently installed on the eUICC. The End User can request for the download and installation of the Profile by using the retrieved Activation Code.

Figure 5.3.1.9.1: Retrieve Activation Code

Start conditions:
       a.   The target Profile is installed on the eUICC
       b.   The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
       c.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
Procedure:
       1.   The End User makes a 'Retrieve Activation Code' request on the LPA.
       2.   The LPA, eUICC and the SM-DP+ perform the Activation Code Retrieval of the
            selected Profile that is installed on the eUICC. This step can also involve the
            Operator.
       3.   If all the conditions are met, the SM-DP+ provides the Activation Code which can
            be used for the download and installation of the selected Profile.

End conditions: a. The LPA has stored the Activation Code provided by the SM-DP+ in its memory.

A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)

A.1 New Profile on New Primary Device (Off Device Activation)

Risk no.       Risk description
INI1           Incomplete or corrupted Profile being pushed to the Subscriber.
INI2           Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles
               to Devices.

Table A.1.1: New Profile on New Primary Device Risks

A.2 Profile Deletion

Risk no.       Risk description
IND1           Long term gathering of key materials due to a long term storage of delivered Profiles
               after their disabling.
IND2           Loss of sensitive data from discarded media supports (hard drives…)
IND3           Malware launching coordinated or isolated deletion of one or several Profiles
               leading to a loss of connectivity to an End User.
IND4           Accidental Profile deletion (e.g. unattended children…) leading to a loss of
               connectivity to an End User.
IND5           Non-tech-savvy or malicious Subscriber repeatedly deleting Profiles and asking for
               them to be reloaded leading to surcharge of provisioning servers.

Table A.2.1: Profile Deletion Risks

A.3 Profile Switch

Risk no.       Risk description
INP1           Malicious Profile switching originating from an internal party.
INP2           Human error leading to the switching of alternate Profiles leading to a loss of
               connectivity.
INP3           Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles
               leading to a loss of connectivity.
INP4           Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles
               leading to major fraud scenarios.

Table A.3.1: Profile Switching Risks

A.4 Profile Swap

Risk no.       Risk description
INS1           Race condition leading to the deactivation of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity.

Table A.4.1: Profile Swapping Risks

A.5 Cryptographic Related Risks

Risk no.       Risk description
INO1           Loss or theft of private keys in one or several Profile Management components
               leading to the loss of confidentiality on the whole chain.
INO2           Inability to revoke compromised Certificates leading to the loss of trust on the whole
               Certificate chain.
INO3           Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful disclosure of key materials.
INO4           Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful compromise of key
               components.
INO5           Malicious or accidental revocation of Certificates leading to the denial of service on
               the whole provisioning Certificate chain.
INO6           Use of temporary symmetric cryptographic or “generic” key material during the
               Profile creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single
               point of failure and attack being created.

Table A.5.1: Cryptographic Related Risks

A.6 Quality of Service

Risk no.       Risk description
QoS1           Profile creation burst leading to the inability for the eUICC platforms to deliver
               expected service level.
QoS2           Denial of service on delivery platforms leading to the inability to deliver expected
               service level.
QoS3           Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a
               temporary or permanent inability to deliver a Profile.

Table A.6.1: Quality of Service Risks

A.7 Non-human or Unpredictable

Risk no.       Risk description
EXC1           Catastrophic event such as floods, earthquakes, etc. leading to the destruction of a
               datacentre.
EXC2           Geopolitical/Human events leading to the destruction of a datacentre.
EXC3           Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the
               provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, SIM vendor…).

Table A.7.1: Non-human or Unpredictable Risks

A.8 New Profile during Subscriber Journey

Risk no.       Risk description
EXN1           Malicious pairing of new Device using unattended Primary or Companion Device.
EXN2           Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the loss of confidentiality
               during the provisioning of Profile operations.
Risk no.       Risk description
               Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the tampering of registration
EXN3
               information during provisioning of Profile operations.
EXN4           Social engineering leading to the communication of OTP materials to attackers.
               Man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping during Profile provisioning leading to the loss
EXN5
               of confidentiality.
               “Implicit authentication” (e.g. HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of
EXN6
               authentication or Profile material.

Table A.8.1: New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks

A.9 Device Swap

Risk no.       Risk description
EXS1           Malicious Subscriber using race condition scenarios leading to Profiles being
               activated on both Devices.
EXS2           Malicious entity using weak swap procedures in order to compromise authentication
               vectors.

Table A.9.1: Device Swapping Risks

A.10 Loss of Privacy

Risk no.       Risk description
PRI1           Improper handling, transport or disclosure of the EID or any user related data
               information leading to the use of the latter as a “super” user tracking identifier.
PRI2           eUICC management commands leading to the creation of unexpected and
               unpredicted « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties
               to spy or compromise Devices or the Subscriber themselves.

Table A.10.1: Loss of Privacy Risks

A.11 Others

Risk no.       Risk description
EXO1           Compromising of exchanges between Profile Management actors leading to the
               critical loss of private keys.
EXO2           Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios.

Table A.11.1: Other Risks

A.12 Creation Process

Req no.        Requirement description
CRE1           Profiles failing to be created SHALL be securely deleted or at least purged of
               authentication vectors.
CRE2           Communication between systems participating in the Profile creation SHALL be
               protected in integrity and confidentiality.

Table A.12.1: Creation Process Requirements

B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)

B.1 Profile Production Procedure

This section describes a generic implementation. It should be regarded as an example only; specific implementation MAY be required to address specific security concerns.

Within the eUICC, the current functionality of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Just as with current UICCs, Profiles are the responsibility of the Operator and Profile production is performed upon their request and permission (if not produced by the Operators themselves).

The same Operator procedures as in the current UICCs SHALL apply.

Figure B.1.1: Profile Production Procedure

Profile Production consists of three steps:

•   Profile Description definition: The SM-DP+ creates and registers a Profile
    Description based on the Operational Profile Description.
•   Operator Credentials generation: The Operator asks the SM-DP+ to generate
    Operator Credentials that will be used in the next step. This procedure is OPTIONAL
    and will not be used if the Operator wants to generate the Operator Credentials during
    Protected Profile Package generation.
•        Protected Profile Package generation: The Profile Packages will be created,
         protected and stored. This step (batch type of operation or real time process) is only
         performed after an order with the respective Operator.
•        Contract conclusion and Link Profile: At the end of the contract conclusion, an
         Activation Code is delivered to the End User and the Profile MAY be allocated for this
         contract.

NOTE:The generation of the Bound Profile Package is part of the Profile download with Activation Code procedure in Section 5.2.2.

B.1.1 Profile Description Definition

The Profile description definition MAY comprise of the following sequence:

Figure B.1.1.1: Profile Description Procedure

Start Condition:
       a.      Contractual relationship between the Operator and the SM-DP+.
Procedure:
       1.      The Operator defines its different Profile types (identified by a [non-standardised]
               Profile Description ID) which contains the Network Access Application like USIM,
               file structure, data and applications, etc.
       2.      The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Descriptions based on the Operators input with the
               corresponding Profile Description ID.
       3.      The SM-DP+ confirms the Profile Description definition e.g. by sending the
               corresponding Profile Description ID.

NOTE:An Operator can define multiple Profile Descriptions with the SM-DP+

End Condition:
       e.      The Operator is able to order Protected Profile Packages based on Profile
               Description IDs.

B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generation

This procedure allows the Operator to allocate a set of Operator Credentials on the SM-DP+ without associating them to a specific ProfileDescriptionID. Operator Credentials generation MAY comprise of the following sequence:

Figure B.1.2.1: Operator Credentials Generation

Start Condition:

a.   IMSI, ICCID and other resources have been allocated by the Operator.

Procedure:

1.   The Operator provides the IMSI, ICCID, type of credential to be created (e.g.
     Milenage [11][12], TUAK [10] etc.) and other resources that MAY already be
     allocated to the SM-DP+. It asks the SM-DP+ to securely generate and store a set
     of Operator Credentials.
2.   The SM-DP+ securely generates and stores a set of Operator Credentials based on
     the Operator’s input with the corresponding IMSI, ICCID and other resources
     provided.
3.   The SM-DP+ confirms the generation of Operator Credentials and provides them to
     the Operator.

B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generation

The Protected Profile Package Generation MAY comprise of the following sequence:

This procedure MAY apply between the Profile Description definition, and the Contract conclusion and Link Profile, depending on whether the Protected Profile Package is created on demand or prepared in advance.

Figure B.1.3.1: Protected Profile Package Generation Procedure

Start Conditions:
       a.   Profile Description definition
Procedure:
       1.   The Operator orders the Protected Profile Package generation by providing the SM-
            DP+ with the Profile Description ID and some corresponding Operator input data
            (credentials e.g. ICCID, IMSI).The Operator input data required for Protected Profile
            Package generation (IMSI, ICCID, K/Ki, OTA Keys, PIN, PUK, etc.) is either created
            by the Operator (and provided to the SM-DP+) or by the SM-DP+ (and provided to
            the Operator).
       2.   The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Packages.
       3.   The SM-DP+ creates the Protected Profile Packages.
       4.   The SM-DP+ stores the Protected Profile Packages (securely).
       5.   The SM-DP+ confirms the Protected Profile Package generation, and eventually
            sends the additional Operator input data created by the SM-DP+.
       6.   The Operator registers the Operator data in the Operator systems like HLR/AuC
            and BSS.
End Condition:
       a.       The ordered Protected Profile Packages are available at the SM-DP+. The Operator
                is able to activate these Subscriptions and a Profile download can be triggered upon
                binding to an EID.

B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile

The Activation Code has to be provided to the End User in order to achieve the Profile download procedure. The contract conclusion and Link Profile procedure describes different scenarios to link a contract with the Activation Code process. The following options are described below:

•Activation Code with known EID: The EID is given by the Subscriber to the Operator during the conclusion of the contract.

•Activation Code with unknown EID: The EID is not given by the Subscriber to the Operator during the conclusion of the contract. The EID is only provided to the SM-DP+ during the Profile download procedure and is given back from the SM- DP+ to the Operator.

•Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator: The EID is not immediately given by the Subscriber during the contract conclusion, but provided in step two to the Operator.

The contract reference MAY be, but not necessarily, any Activation Code parameter (e.g. token), ICCID or the IMSI.

In any case, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to allocate and link a Profile to the corresponding eUICC during the Profile download procedure.

B.1.4.1 Activation Code with Known EID

Figure B.1.4.1.1: Activation Code with Known EID Procedure

Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure B.1.4.1.1: Contract conclusion with known EID

1.       The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator and provides the EID
         during this process.
2. to 5.    Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator prior to Profile download
         procedure’: The Operator allocates the Profile and sends the EID, IMSI and
         ICCID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the different parameters and confirms
         this to the Operator.
6. to 10. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+ prior to Profile download
         procedure’: The Operator sends the EID, the IMSI and the Profile Description
         ID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates an ICCID to a corresponding Profile,
         links the different parameters and confirms the allocated ICCID and the link to
         the Operator.
11.       The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
          corresponding information (contract reference).
End Condition:
        a.       The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
                 Operator.
        b.       The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

B.1.4.2 Activation Code with Unknown EID

Figure B.1.4.2.1: Activation Code with Unknown EID Procedure

Procedure: Steps 1-6 inFigure B.1.4.2.1: Contract conclusion without EID

1.       The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of the
         target eUICC (EID).
2.       Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
         Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
         template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
         (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator.
6.       The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
         corresponding information (contract reference).
End Condition:
       a.     The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
              Operator.
       b.     The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

B.1.4.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator

Figure B.1.4.3.1: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator

Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure B.1.4.3.1: Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator

1.      The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of
        the target eUICC (EID).
    2.     Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
           Profile (ICCID)
 3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
           template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
           (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator.
 6.        The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
           corresponding information (contract reference).
 7.        After the Subscriber has chosen the Device/eUICC, the EID is provided
           together with the contract reference to the Operator.
 8. to 10. The Operator requests the linking of the eUICC (EID) and Profile (ICCID) by
           the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the EID and the ICCID and confirms this to the
           Operator.
11.        The Operator confirms the linking of the EID to the corresponding contract to
           the Subscriber.
End Condition:
       a.      The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
               Operator.
       b.      The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)

This annex provides an example diagram for the implementation of Local Profile Management Operations and describes how the different Confirmation Levels MAY be applied.

                     Example flow for Device & LPA Strong Confirmation
                                access PIN setup / settings
 Unpack Device
                                  Power on & start setup
(new from factory)

Manual setup

              Set / enable
  No
(skip)
             device access
               code / ID?                  First Access to LPA
                                           (no installed profiles)
                      Yes
                                   Enter & confirm
                                       PIN / ID
                                                                                        Manual user
Device access                       Device access                                         setup
    open                             restricted
                                                                             Set
                                                               No                          Yes
                                                                           device
                    Enable & Set LPA                                        lock?
  No
                  access (SC) for eUICC
(skip)
                     management?
                         Yes                                              No
                                                                   Device
                     Lock separately                              lock set?
                                             No
                       from device         (flag)                         Yes
                          lock?
                                                            Enter device PIN /
                         Yes (flag)                          code to confirm
                     Enter & confirm
                       SC PIN / ID
                                                                     Code
                                                                    correct?         No
                         LPA lock
                    restricted / SC set                             Yes
                                                                          LPA / SC set device
LPA access open                                                             lock restricted
  (no SC set)
                                     SC required
                                                          Yes           SC as required on
                                     on each SC
                                                         (flag)         each LUI operation
                                       event?
                                       No    (flag)
SC inherited from
  prior SC input
                                     Notes:
                                     SC: Strong Confirmation
Stop                                 Device access code (PIN / ID) refers
                                     to device unlock mechanism

Figure C.1: Example Flow for Device & LPA Strong Confirmation Access PIN Setup /

Settings

D eUICC Categories (Normative)

The following table provides eUICCs categories defined for Remote SIM Provisioning products.

Role no.       Description
CAT1           Basic eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
                 • Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 64kB
                 • ISO interface PPS 96
                 • BIP over HTTPS features
CAT2           Medium eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
                 • Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 384kB
                 • ISO interface PPS 97
                 • BIP over HTTPS features
                 • Processor >= 25MHz
                 • Crypto processor >= 100MHz
                 • Memory Protection Unit
CAT3           Contactless eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
                 • Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 1024kB
                 • ISO interface PPS 97
                 • BIP over HTTPS features
                 • Processor >= 25MHz
                 • Crypto processor >= 100MHz
                 • Memory Protection Unit

Table D.1: eUICC Categories

E LPA Settings (Informative)

Figure E.1: LPA Settings

F Certifications Chain and Security Model (Normative)

                                                                                : Manufacturing process
                                                                                : Business process
                      CI                                                        : Remote Profile Management
                                                                                : Local Profile Management
CI Cert                                                                    Cert : Public key Certificate
                                      CI Cert
EUM
                                                                                                                        SM-DP+

ES9+: eUICC Cert, EUM Cert

                                                                                                                                                          ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert
ESeum: CI cert, EUM
Cert, eUICC Cert
eUICC                                                      ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert                                                  LPA
                                                           PK eUICC Cert, EUM Cert
                                                         ES10b:

Figure F.1: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the Device

                                                 : Manufacturing process
                                                 : Business process
                                                 : Remote Profile Management
CI                                               : Local Profile Management
                                            Cert : Public key Certificate
 CI Cert,                                        CI Cert,                                             CI Cert,
SM-DS Cert                                      EUM Cert                                            SM-DP+ Cert
SM-DS                                                                                 EUM                                                                                     SM-DP+
                                                                                           ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert,
                                                                                                                                                                                                      ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert
                                                                                                                                                                                ES9+: eUICC Cert,
ES11: eUICC Cert,

ES11: SM-DS Cert

                                                                                             eUICC Cert
                                                                                                                                                                                EUM Cert
EUM Cert
                              ES10a: eUICC Cert,                                                                           ES10b: eUICC Cert,
                                  EUM Cert                                                                                     EUM Cert
LPA                                                                            eUICC                                                                                            LPA
                              ES10a: SM-DS Cert                                                                          ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert

Figure F.2: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the eUICC

F.1 Security Model

The Security Model defines the trust relationships between all the active components of the eUICC ecosystem with an LPA in the Device. The figure below shows only the end-to-end logical links where cryptographic keys and sensitive data are sent. The different links define the end-to-end trust relationship between entities. We distinguish a hierarchy of seven trust links with link 1 being the most significant and link 7 being the least significant. If trust link 1 is broken, all trust links will be broken as a result. If trust link 2 is broken, trust link 1 remains intact however all other Trusted Links are compromised or broken.

Figure F.1.1: Trusted Link with LPA in the Device

Figure F.1.2: Trusted Link with LPA in the eUICC

Trust       Description             Interfaces    Possible               Impact of loss of
link                                involved      compromises            trust link
TL1         Trust introduced onto   Out of        The CI public key,     The trust of the entire
            the eUICC by the        scope         the EUM’s              security model is
            issuing EUM to enable                 Certificate,           breached and all
            future remote                         the EUM’s keyset,      eUICCs issued under
            management and                        the eUICC keys, the    the model cannot be
            authorisation by the                  OS, and the Security   trusted.
            SM-DP+ and possibly                   Domains.
            the EUM: eUICC keys
Trust       Description                 Interfaces   Possible               Impact of loss of
link                                    involved     compromises            trust link
            (EUM & CI keyset
            eUICC Certificates).
TL2         Trust placed in the CI’s    Out of       The EUM and SM-        Loss of Operator
            verification of the         scope        DP+ Certificates.      trust on the EUM and
            EUM, SM-DP+, and                                                SM-DP+
            the resulting Certificate
            issuance.
TL3         Trust placed in the         ES2+         The eUICC              Loss of Operator
            activities for eUICC        ES8+         Certificate or         trust on the eUICC
            eligibility and remote                   eligibility check      and/or SM-DP+.
            attestation from the                     failure.
            ISD-R on the target
            eUICC to the Operator
            via the SM-DP+.
            Provides eUICC
            Certificate, EID,
            reference to its
            certification and EUM
            to the Operator and
            SM-DP+.
TL4         Trust placed in the         ES2+         SM-DP+ Certificate     Loss of Operator
            activities for Profile      ES8+         eUICC Certificate or   trust on the SM-DP+
            data transfer from the                   eligibility check      and/or eUICC.
            Operator via the SM-                     failure.
            DP+ to the ISD-R on
            the target eUICC.
            Protects the Profile
            and associated
            credentials and keys
            (NAAs, OTA keys,
            ISD-R access, ISD-P
            SD creation …) with
            only the Operator, SM-
            DP+ and the eUICC.
TL5         Trust placed in the         ES2+         SM-DP+ Certificate     Operator loss of trust
            information exchange                                            on SM-DP+.
            between the Operator
            and the SM-DP+ for
            Link Profile requests.
TL6         Trust placed in the         ESeu         LPA security           eUICC loss of trust
            mechanisms provided                                             on LPA.
            by the LPA: Local
            Profile Management,
            Local Profile
Trust       Description                 Interfaces    Possible                 Impact of loss of
link                                    involved      compromises              trust link
            Management
            Operations
TL7         Trust placed in the         ES9+          LPA security or SM-      SM-DP+ loss of trust
            TLS session                               DP+ security.            on LPA (in the
                                                                               Device or the eUICC)
                                                                               or LPA loss of trust
                                                                               on the SM-DP+.
TL8         Trust in the discovery      ES11          LDS security or SM-      LDS loss of trust on
            process                                   DS security.             the SM-DS and vice
                                                                               versa.
TL9         Trust in the discovery      ES11          eUICC security or        SM-DS loss of trust
            process                                   SM-DS security.          on the eUICC and
                                                                               vice versa.
TL10        Trust in the UI             ESeu          Device security          Loss of trust on the
                                                                               Device

Table F.1.1: Trusted Link Descriptions

Compromised Impacted               Description       Impact of loss of         Countermeasures
element     Links                                    trust
eUICC             TL1, TL3,        The eUICC         The eUICC can no          Revoke the Certificate
                  TL4, TL9         keys and          longer be trusted.        of the eUICC.
                                   EUM’s Keyset.     MNO and SM-DP+
                                                     loss of trust on eUICC.
CI                TL2              The EUM, SM-      Loss of Operator trust    Repair/Replace CI.
                                   DS, and SM-       in the EUM, SM-DS         Generate new CI
                                   DP+               and SM-DP+.               Certificate and new
                                   Certificates.                               Certificate for the
                                                                               EUM, SM-DS and SM-
                                                                               DP+ following the SAS
                                                                               process.
                                                                               Remote repair of
                                                                               already issued
                                                                               eUICCs: new CI public
                                                                               key.
EUM               TL1, TL2         Loss of SAS       Loss of trust from the    New SAS for the
                                   accreditation.    Operator and SM-DP+       EUM. Remote repair
                                                     on the EUM and its        of already issued
                                                     eUICCs.                   eUICCs: new EUM
                                                                               Certificate, new
                                                                               eUICC Certificate.
Compromised Impacted            Description        Impact of loss of        Countermeasures
element     Links                                  trust
SM-DP+            TL3, TL4,     Loss of SAS        Loss of trust from the   New SAS for the SM-
                  TL5, TL7,     accreditation.     Operator, LPA, SM-DS     DP+. New SM-DP+
                  TL8                              and eUICC on the SM-     Certificate.
                                                   DP+.
SM-DS             TL8           Loss of SAS        Loss of trust from the   New SAS for the SM-
                                accreditation.     Operator, LPA, SM-       DS. New SM-DS
                                                   DP+ and eUICC on the     Certificate.
                                                   SM-DS.
LPA               TL6, TL7,     LPA security       Loss of trust from the   LPA repair by the
                  TL8           failure.           SM-DP+, SM-DS and        Device Manufacturer.
                                                   eUICC on the LPA.
Device            TL10          Device             Loss of trust in the     LUI in the eUICC self-
                                security failure   Device UI                protected with User
                                                                            Intent capture
                                                                            mechanisms (i.e.
                                                                            Captcha Code)

Table F.1.2: Impact of Compromising Trusted Links and Countermeasures

The signer is responsible for the revocation of the Certificates it has signed. This section describes how the new Certificates are pushed to concerned entities according to the security model.

•   SM-DP+ trusts the CI
•   EUM trusts the CI
•   eUICC trusts the EUM and the CI
Req no.          Description
CERT1            The new SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-DP+ by
                 a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
CERT2            The new SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-DS by a
                 GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
CERT3            The new EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the EUM by a GSMA CI upon
                 achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
CERT4            The EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the EUM
                 NOTE: See details in Section 4.1.1.1.
CERT5            The CI Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the EUM
                 NOTE: See details in Section 4.1.1.1.
CERT6            Certificates SHALL be revocable.
CERT7            Neither the End User nor any other party SHALL be able to prevent Certificate
                 revocation.
CERT8            The End User SHALL not be allowed to use Remote SIM Provisioning functions
                 with revoked Certificates.
Req no.          Description
CERT9            The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+ SHALL be revoked if required (e.g.
                 loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning
                 certification requirements).
CERT10           The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS SHALL be revoked if required (e.g. loses
                 or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification
                 requirements).
CERT11           The Public Key Certificate of the EUM SHALL be revoked if required (e.g. loses
                 or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification
                 requirements).

Table F.1.3: Certificate Requirements

G LPA Integrity (Normative)

The LPA SHALL be protected against misuse or being compromised by means of implementing standard procedures.

For cases where the LPA is in the Device, the LPA integrity SHALL be guided by the following Device classes:

Device class         Description                              Example of Devices
                     Devices with an open operating           Smartphones, Tablets, Laptops,
                     system where mechanisms such as          Advanced Wearables
Advanced             secure boot and platform signing of
                     applications are available and used
                     to protect the LPA.
                     Devices without possibility to install   Connected sensors, Simple
                     applications. The attack surface of      Wearables, Single use case devices
                     the LPA is minimal due to the locked
Basic                down nature of these Devices.
                     Simple mechanisms to ensure that
                     the LPA is not compromised SHALL
                     be taken.

Table G.1: Device Classes

H Rules Authorisation Table (Informative)

Annex H reflects the RAT table configuration(s) that MAY be configured in an eUICC.

The RAT entries shown in Table H.1 MAY be provisioned:

PR              Operators     User consent
POL RULE1                 *              YES
POL RULE2                 *              YES

Table H.1: RAT configuration

Additional lines can be added to the RAT table to reflect agreement between some Operators and OEMs as needed. The OEM can also decide to add lines to the RAT table.

NOTE:POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.

I LPA Invocation of the Provisioning Profile Example Flow (Informative)

Figure I.1: LPA Invocation of the Provisioning Profile Example Flow

J [Void]

K Document Management

K.1 Document History

Version    Date          Brief Description of Change         Approval          Editor /
                                                             Authority         Company
                         First Release with amendments                         Carmen Kwok,
V1.0       23/12/15                                          PSMC
                         from Security review.                                 GSMA
                                                                               Carmen Kwok,
V2.0       25/08/16      Includes Phase 2 content            PSMC
                                                                               GSMA
                                                             Technology        Carmen Kwok,
V2.1       29/02/17      Phase 2 maintenance release
                                                             Group             GSMA
                                                                               Carmen Kwok,
V2.2       31/08/17      Phase 2 maintenance release         RSPLEN
                                                                               GSMA
                                                                               Carmen Kwok,
V2.3       24/03/21      Phase 2 maintenance release         ISAG
                                                                               GSMA
                                                                               Carmen Kwok,
V2.4       03/08/21      Phase 2 maintenance release         ISAG
                                                                               GSMA
                                                                               Carmen Kwok,
V2.5       18/11/22      Phase 2 maintenance release         ISAG
                                                                               GSMA
                         Introduction of Activation Code
                                                                               Stéphane Bandin,
V2.6       20/09/2024    Retrieval (ACR) and Phase 2         ISAG
                                                                               Orange
                         maintenance release
                         Resolution of CVD-2025-0103                           Stéphane Bandin,
V2.7       24/04/2026                                        ISAG
                         eSIM Java Card vulnerability                          Orange

K.2 Detailed Document History for V2.7

Version    Date                Additions
V2.7       14/05/2025                               Initial draft from SGP.21 V2.6
Draft 00
V2.7       14/05/2025          CR27001R01           Allow Test Profile Deletion by the LPA
Draft 01                       CR27004R01           Definition of Test eUICC
                               CR27005R01           Clarify the download of Java Applications
                                                    within Test Profile
V2.7       27/06/2025          CR27007R02           Prohibit Test CI coexisting with GSMA CI
Draft 02                       CR27008R01           Mandate eUICC OS update support
                               CR27013R01           Adding Test CI abbreviation
                               -                    Renumbering of tables and figures
V2.7       17/07/2025          CR27002R11           Requirements on Applets in Test Profiles
Draft 03
V2.7        17/09/2025         CR27010R03          Adding MSL check of Profile against eUICC
Draft 04                                           configuration
                               CR27016R01          Adding MSL definition and abbreviation
                               CR27017R01          Adding requirement on common MSL value for
                                                   RSP ecosystem
V2.7        08/12/2025         CR27009R07          Adding eUICC-based RSP Server allowlist
Draft 05                                           mechanism for test profiles
                               CR27018R02          Comment on application runtime environment
                                                   for ELG9
                               CR27019R01          Make MSL support mandatory (AP #107-03)
                               CR27020R12          Make Java Application bytecode verification
                                                   check mandatory to SM-DP+ processes
                               CR27021R04          Addition of Applet bytecode verification
                               CR27022R06          Safeguard allowing an eUICC to reject Applet
                                                   installation into a Test Profile
                               CR27026R04          Introduce requirements on application isolation
                               CR27027R01          Editorial modifications of some requirements
                                                   related to SAS
                               CR27028R02          Introduce Application Developer Role
                               CR27029R04          Introduce Requirements to Application
                                                   Developers
V2.7        20/01/2026         DQRT                Capitalize minimum security level as a definition
Draft 06                                           has been added with CR27016R01
Other Information
 Type                              Description
 Document Owner                    eSIMG
 Editor / Company                  Stéphane Bandin, Orange

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