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GSMA · Specification

SGP.21v2.3

RSP Architecture

Defines a common architecture for remotely provisioning and managing device eUICCs with credentials for mobile network access, for consumer-market devices and industry stakeholders.

Version
v2.3
  1. v3.12023-12-01
  2. v3.02022-03-28
  3. v2.72026-04-24
  4. v2.62024-09-20
  5. v2.52022-11-18
  6. v2.42021-08-03
  7. v2.32021-06-30
  8. v2.22017-09-01
  9. v2.12017-02-27
  10. v2.02016-08-23
  11. v1.02015-12-23
Issued
2021-06-30
Source
Original PDF

A formatted version of this document is not available yet; the text below is extracted clause by clause, so tables and figures may be incomplete.

Overview

This document defines a common architecture framework for remote SIM provisioning and management of embedded UICCs in consumer-market devices, with the aim of supporting global interoperability across operators and deployment scenarios. It sets out the system’s roles, components, interfaces, eUICC and device requirements, profile and metadata requirements, and security and certification topics. It also describes operational procedures for downloading and managing profiles, including download using an activation code. The framework provides a shared basis for operators, device and SIM solution providers, and other technical stakeholders to implement remote provisioning.

  • eUICC
  • LPA
  • SM-DP+
  • SM-DS
  • NFC
  • Remote SIM Provisioning

Overview generated automatically from the document's scope and outline. The document text is authoritative.

Changes since v2.2

48 clauses modified, 10 clauses added, 2 clauses removed, 1 clause renumbered

Compared automatically clause by clause from the extracted text of both versions; differences only in layout, spacing or table cells are ignored. The documents are authoritative.

1.4 Definition of Termsmodified

…t SM-DS to redirect Event Alternative SM-DS Registration from a SM-DP+ to the Root SM-DS or direct Event Registration from a SM-DP+ for an installed Profile. A … mechanism by which the End User confirms their action through Authenticated Confirmation a method involving the input of personalised information (e.g. PIN, fingerprint). A Protected Profile Package which has been cryptographically Bound Profile Package linked to a particular eUICC. Certificate or Public Key A certificate as define … 5][9]. An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM Certified eUICC Provisioning and certified according to SGP.25 GSMA eUICC Protection Profile [25]. … Term Description A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for the Companion Device purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. A code entered by an End User required by the SM-DP+ for the Confirmation Code download of a Profile. Term Description Confirmation Code Required A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is required Flag or not. Refers to the hierarchy of User Intent and Confirmation Request, where:  User Intent is the first and lowest level Confirmation Level  Simple Confirmation is the second level  AuthenticatedStrong Confirmation is the third and highest level Note: For examples of implementation, please refer to ‎AnnexAnnex C. Describes a request for AuthenticatedStrong Confirmation or a Simple Confirmation Request Confirmation as defined in this specification. User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a D … in the Profile are not selectable. An interrogation of the Discovery Service by a Device for Event Discovery Request Records that are registered for its eUICC. … An eUICC implemented on discrete standalone hardware, including Discrete eUICC its own dedicated volatile and non-volatile memory. A Discrete eUICC can be removable or non-removablenon-removable. A UICC which enables the local eUICC management of Profiles in a eUICC secure way. Note: The term originates from “embedded UICC”. The state of a Profile when its files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) Enabled Profile are selectable. End User The person using the Device. Information that pertains … + or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC. Form Factor Physical manifestation of the UICC. GSMA Certificate Issuer A Certificate Authority accredited by GSMA. … IC Dedicated Software As defined in BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29]. Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU- ICCID T E.118 [14][14]. Integrated eUICC An eUICC implemented on an Integrated TRE. Integrated eUICC Test An external interface for the purpose of testing eUICC functionality. Interface A TRE implemented inside a larger System-on-Chip (SoC), Integrated TRE optionally making use of remote volatile and/or non-volatile memory. International Mobile Unique identifier owned and issued by Operators as defined in Subscriber Identity 3GPP TS 23.003 [3] Section 2.2. The process that associat … delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory Operation Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, set/edit nickname, add Profile, and edit default SM-DP+ address. … Term Description Assurance that the LPA has not been compromised or affected. The assurance SHALL be provided to the various Remote SIM LPA Integrity Provisioning entities to en … ation LPA Mode which is either LPA in the eUICC LPA Mode or in the Device. Refers to processes that trigger Local Profile Management LPA Procedures Operations. … Term Description An entity providing access capability and communication services Mobile Network Operator to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure. An entity p … File/Application management, and authentication algorithm parameters. The credentials included in the Profile used in conjunction with OTA OTA Keys Platforms. … Term Description A platform used by an Operator for the Remote File/Application OTA Platform management of enabled Profiles on eUICCs. Policy Enforcement A function that execute … for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an Profile eUICC for the purpose of providing services. … Term Description The description of a Profile in a format specific to the Operator; Profile Description example formats could be an Excel table, xml format, or plain text. A com … eUICC for the purposes of providing connectivity to a mobile Provisioning Profile network solely for the purpose of the provisioning of Profiles on the eUICC. … Remote Memory Volatile or non-volatile memory residing outside of the TRE The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, and deleting of a Remote SIM Provisioning Profile on an eUICC. Replay Attack An attack based on previously used or outdated data. A Certificate used to authenticate other entities within the Remote Root Certificate SIM Provisioning framework. A globally identified central access point for … bers either Service Provider as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement with an Operator. The Service Provider could also be the Operator. … Term Description A secure and non-interceptable mechanism by which the End User Simple Confirmation confirms their action, e.g. by selecting Yes/No, OK/Cancel. SM-DP+ Certificat … tifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as SMDPid part of the SM-DP+ Certificate. Note: This is referred to as the smdpOid in SGP.22 [24]. … A secure and non-interceptable mechanism to guarantee a higher level of User Intent than Simple Confirmation by which the End Strong Confirmation User confirms their action, e.g., by inputting PIN or fingerprint, repeating Simple Confirmation, entering Confirmation Code, etc. An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a Subscription with an Operator. The Subscriber is allowed to Subscriber subscribe and unsubscribe to services, as well as register an End User or a list of End Users authorised to use these services. Term Description Information that pertains to the identity of a Subscriber such as contract details, authentication credentials, cryptographic keys etc. Subscriber Data Note: In … he LPA of the respective eUICC. Subscription Manager This is responsible for providing addresses of one or more SM- Discovery Server (SM-DS) DP+(s) to a LDS. A … security module consisting of hardware and low-level software providing resistance against software and hardware attacks, Tamper Resistant Element capable of securely hosting operating systems together with applications and their confidential and cryptographic data. A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC to provide connectivity to test equipment for the purpose of Test Profile testing the Device … y policy. This mechanism can only be activated by the End User or the security functions of the information system and cannot be imitated by untrusted software. … Term Description Describes the direct, real time acquisition of the manual End User User Intent input on the LUI to trigger locally a Profile download or Profile Management operation.

1.5 Abbreviationsmodified

… Name System Security Extensions ECASD eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain EID Embedded UICC Identifier eSVN embedded UICC Specification Version Number … Abbreviation Description ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute eUICC Embedded UICC EUM eUICC Manufacturer FASG Fraud and Security Group FFS For Further Study GSMA GSM Ass … n LDS Local Discovery Service LPA Local Profile Assistant LPD Local Profile Download LUI Local User Interface M4M Mifare4Mobile MFA Multi-Factor Authentication … Abbreviation Description MNO Mobile Network Operator MNO-SD Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain MSISDN Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number NAA Network Access Application OS Operating System OTA Over The Air PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy RAM Remote Application Management RAT Rules Authorisation Table RFM Remote File Management RMPF Remote Memory Protection Function SAS Security Accreditation Scheme SD Security Domain SIM Subscriber Identity Module SM-DP+ Subscription Manager - Data Preparation + SM-DS Subscription Manager - Discovery Server SSD Supplementary Secure Domain TL Trust Link AbbreviationTRE DescriptionTamper Resistant Element USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module

1.6 Referencesmodified

…ommunications System (UMTS); Numbering, addressing and identification The international identification plan for public networks [4] ITU E.212 and Subscriptions … SIMalliance:Trusted Connectivity Alliance (former SIMalliance): eUICC Profile Package - Interoperable [5] SIMAPP Format Technical [5] TCAAPP Specification http://simalliance.org/euicc/euicc-technical-releases/ “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [6] RFC 2119 Levels”, S. Bradner http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt [7] 3GPP TS 21.133 3G security; Security threats and requirements Ref Document Number Title GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC [8] SGP.02 Technical specification [9] GPC_SPE_034 GlobalPlatform Card Specification with its Amendments Specifica … ion [17] TS.26 GSMA NFC Handset Requirements Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information [18] NIST SP 800-53r4 Systems and Organisations – Revision 4 … [19]Trusted OMAPIConnectivity SIMallianceAlliance (former SIMalliance) Open [19] OMAPI Mobile API Specification [20] SGP.03 NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1 [21] SGP.05 Embedded UICC Protection Profile Ref Document Number Title [22] FS.08 FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3 [23] SGP.21 SGP.21 Architecture Specification - Version 1.0 [24] SGP.22 SGP.22 Technical Specification - Version 2.2 SGP.25 … 26] SGP.14 SGP.14 GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy v1.1 [27] EMVCo_Sec EMVCo Security Evaluation Process 5.1 – June 2016 [28] FS.09 FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v3 … Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation [29] BSI-CC-PP-0084 Packages Recommendation for Key Derivation Using [30] NIST SP 800-108 Pseudorandom Functions Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key [31] BSI TR-02102-1 Lengths [32] ANSSI RGS v2 B1 Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 Annexe B1 Ref Document Number Title JIL-Application-of- Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar [33] Attack-Potential-to- Devices Smartcards-v2-9 Version 2.9, Jan 2013 Guideline for Using Cryptographic Standards in the [34] NIST SP 800-175B Federal Government: Cryptographic Mechanisms SOG-IS Smartcards and similar devices CC supporting [35] SOG-IS documents at this link: https://www.sogis.eu/uk/supporting_doc_en.html [36] SGP.23 RSP Test Specification Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key [37] RFC 8174 Words https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174

1.7 Conventionsmodified

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [6][6][6][6].[6] and clarified by RFC8174 [37][37], when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here[6][6][6]. “FFS” or “For Further Study” means that it will be covered in the next version of SGP.21.

2.1 Basic Principlesmodified

…This applies in particular to:  the confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters;  the integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI). … BAS6Principle no. Description The architecture SHALL support a level of security for all Profile content which is Principle no. DescriptionBAS6 at least equivalent to the current state of the art level of security of the UICC. The architecture SHALL NOT compromise the security and privacy of Subscriber… …

3.1 eUICC Manufacturermodified

…ificate to allow: EUM4  eUICC authentication and proof of certification to other entities;  authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-DP+ and an eUICC. … Role no. Description The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any LPA EUM5 elements that reside in the eUICC and the compliance of the LPA with the Role no. Description requirements in Section ‎4.11.3.4.11.3. Table 3: eUICC Manufacturer Role

3.2 Device Manufacturermodified

Role no. Description The Device Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any LPA DM1 elements that reside on the Device and the compliance of the LPA with the requirements in Section ‎4.11.4.11. The Device Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of DM2 any application that resides on the Primary Device allowing Local User Interface access to… …

3.5 Certificate Issuermodified

…cates for GSMA accredited Remote SIM CIS1 Provisioning entities and acts as a trusted third party for the purpose of authenticating the entities of the system. … Role no. Description The Certificate Issuer communicates with the SM-DP+, SM-DS and the EUM CIS2 through interfaces that are out of scope of this specification according to SGP.14 [26]. Table 7: Certificate Issuer Role

4.3 eUICC Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description The eUICC SHALL be a discrete or integrated tamper resistant component consisting of EUICC1 hardware and software, capable of securely hosting EUICC1 applications as well as confidential and cryptographic data. Note: Wherever a distinction is required, the former is referred to as Discrete eUICC, and the latter as Integrated eUICC. EUICC2 A removable eUICC is packaged in a standardised ETSI Form Factor [2]. EUICC3 The Discrete eUICC SHALL be either removable or non-removable. The behaviour of the eUICC with an Enabled Profile SHALL be equivalent EUICC4 to the UICC. EUICC5 The eUICC SH … UICC MAY change throughout its lifetime as can the Device. EUICC9 Note: According to CERTEU11, the EUM keyset belongs to the EUM for the lifetime of the eUICC. … Req no. Description If any Profile Management operation does not complete successfully, the EUICC10 eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request. Req no. Description The eUICC SHALL contain an ECASD and ISD-R security domains installed EUICC11 and personalised during manufacture. It SHALL not be possible to delete or disable … Profiles, the eUICC SHALL support eUICC Test EUICC16 Memory Reset. The eUICC SHALL support the eUICC Profile Package Interoperable format EUICC17 as defined by … SIMallianceTrusted Connectivity Alliance [5]. An ISD-R SHALL:  be created within an eUICC at the time of manufacture; EUICC18  NOT be deleted or disabled;  NOT be able to perform any operations insi … on with the SM-DP+ or SM-DS. The EUM SHALL install an eUICC Certificate in the eUICC used to EUICC31 authenticate the eUICC and verify the eUICC certification. … Req no. Description The EUM SHALL install an EUM Certificate in the eUICC used to verify the EUICC32 eUICC Certificate. Req no. Description EUICC33 The eUICC SHALL have a means to authenticate itself to the SM-DS. EUICC34 The eUICC SHALL protect itself against unauthorised access. Upon Profile delet … ecification (SGP.22 [24]). A different set of functions and services MAY be defined/supported according to the different Embedded UICC categories as defined in … ‎AnnexAnnex D. The eUICC SHALL support at least the following USIM Toolkit commands:  PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION including the following fields: local info, IMEI, network … ONE An eUICC SHALL support at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters EUICC47 preloaded by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing, defined in GSMA SGP.22 [24]. … Req no. Description Each Notification SHALL be uniquely identifiable and SHALL be signed by EUICC48 the eUICC. Req no. Description Each Notification SHALL be protected against re-play attacks and signed by EUICC49 the eUICC. EUICC50 [Void] EUICC51 [Void] The Profile SHALL be able to contain … -1 is required. The EID SHALL not be modifiable. The EID SHALL not be affected by any EUICC54 of the procedures, including the change of the eUICC Private keys. … An Integrated eUICC SHALL conform to the additional requirements defined EUICC55 in Annex J. EUICC56 The Integrated eUICC SHALL be based on an Integrated TRE. An Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to execute the test cases defined in EUICC57 SGP.23 [36]. Table 11: eUICC Requirements

4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirementsmodified

…UICC SHALL provide in the Eligibility Check Information Device ELG7 enabler information relating to services that MAY need Profile support (e.g. NFC enablers). … ELG8 Eligibility Check Information SHALL be integrity and authenticity protected ELG8 by the eUICC for its sending to the SM-DP+. The eUICC SHALL indicate the application runtime environment version ELG9 and libraries versions supported in eUICC … support for the relevant NFC services including its current certification status during the eUICC Eligibility Check. The eUICC SHALL indicate its category (see … ‎AnnexAnnex D). This parameter ELG14 SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check. An eUICC SHALL provide information indicating if it is a Discrete eUICC or ELG15 an Integrated eUICC. Table 12: eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements Note: It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and could be used for the eligibility check procedure.

4.5 Device Requirementsmodified

…the Open Mobile API [19] used by the Device applications to DEV5 exchange data with their counterpart applications running in the Enabled Profile on the eUICC. … Req no. Description The implementation of the Remote SIM Provisioning specification in the DEV6 Device SHALL not impact the potential use of the SIM Lock mechanism defined in 3GPP … r SHALL be able to modify the parameter defined in DEV7. A Device that supports an embedded UICC without an LPA in the eUICC, DEV9 SHALL provide LPA functions. … DEV10 A Device that supports only an embedded UICC with an LPA in the eUICC, ReqDEV10 no. Description MAY provide LPA functions. If the Device supports Device Test Modes, the Device SHALL support DEV11 eUICC Test Memory Reset. eUICC Test Memory Reset can only be requested by the End User when the Device is in Device Test Mode. Where technically feasible, the Device SHALL implement a mechanism allowing the End User to protect the access to the Device and its Profile Management Operations with personal data. Implementation is OEM DEV12 specific. Note: This can be achieved by the implementation of a Device PIN lock, fingerprint, password, facial recognition (etc.) The End User SHOULD be able to enable/disable the mechanism DEV13 described in DEV12. Implementation is OEM specific. Note: The mechanism described in DEV12 should be enabled by default. With respect to LPA41, a Device containing any additional feature that affects the status of Operational Profiles SHOULD enforce the Confirmation Level of the equivalent Local Profile Management Operations defined in this specification. The mechanism and process of the Confirmation Level is implementation specific. The End User SHOULD be able to revoke/unset a cached Confirmation previously given, if any. DEV14 NOTE: In case the LPA or a Device application performs automatic Profile management, the Device or the application must ensure that the End User has been made fully aware of the conditions under which the service operates. NOTE: The Device protects against abuse or malevolence of management of profiles as compared to the specified LPA functionalities. Table 13: Device Requirements

4.5.2 Device with Integrated eUICCadded

Req no. Description Access to any Remote Memory used by the TRE to store software and data as defined in GS01 SHALL be protected against attacks on availability (e.g. DIE1 Denial of Service, memory corruption, tampering) by other Device components. All Integrated TRE software and data stored in Remote Memory outside the DIE2 SoC, per GS01 SHALL be protected against access by non Integrated TRE components. Table 15: Device with Integrated eUICC Requirements

4.6.1 Device Reset Requirementsmodified

…ocedure, trigger/request the FAC2 eUICC Memory Reset. The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the FAC3 eUICC Test Memory Reset. Table … 15:16: Device Reset Requirements

4.6.2 eUICC Memory Reset Requirementsmodified

…mory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC regardless of MEM2 their Profile Policy Rules but not the Provisioning Profile or preinstalled Test Profiles. … AuthenticatedStrong Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to initiate eUICC MEM3 Memory MEM3 Reset. In addition to MEM3, other secure means MAY be provided to perform the eUICC Memory Reset function. The same level of security as is offered by MEM4 the LUI based reset function SHALL apply. User Intent and Confirmation Request SHALL apply. Table 16:17: eUICC Memory Reset Requirements

4.6.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description MEMT1 eUICC Test Memory Reset SHALL delete all post-issuance installed Test MEMT1 Profiles on the eUICC including the Enabled Test Profile if any. Simple Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to enable eUICC Test MEMT2 Memory Reset. If Test Profiles are not supported, then eUICC Test Memory Reset is not MEMT3 required. Table 17:18: eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements

4.7.1 Test Profile Requirementsmodified

…rom the End User. When exiting Device Test Mode, an End User notice SHALL be presented TPRO12 to prompt the tester to perform an eUICC Test Memory Reset. Table … 18:19: Test Profiles Requirements The Device MAY implement a mechanism for connecting an external SIM card for the purpose of testing in the context of Device repair,… …

4.7.2 Provisioning Profile Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description PPRO1 Provisioning Profiles SHALL be based on the same format structure as PPRO1 described for the Profile (‎Figure(Figure 2). A Provisioning Profile MAY be enabled by the LPA upon End User request PPRO2 for operations defined in PPRO6 if establishment of the connectivity using PPRO2 the currently Enabled Profile is unsuccessful. If this results in an Operational Profile being disabled, the End User SHALL first give consent to the loss of co … le maintenance functions. The Provisioning Profile SHALL not be used as an Operational Profile. PPRO7 PPRO6 SHALL be enforceable in the RSP architecture. Table … 19:20: Provisioning Profile Requirements

4.8 Profile Metadata Requirementsmodified

…of its Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is Enabled: META13  Service Provider name  Short description of the Profile  Icon of the Profile Table … 20:21: Profile Metadata Requirements

4.9 NFC Requirementsmodified

… at least have an embedded eUICC or have the NFC9 capability to support a removable eUICC that is compliant with CAT3 and SGP.03 [20] in either instance. Table … 21:22: NFC Requirements

4.10.1 SM-DP+ Overviewmodified

…the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC Delivery through the LPA. SM-DS Event Notifies the SM-DS of a pending operation for a specific eUICC. Registration Table … 22:23: SM-DP+ Function Descriptions

4.10.2 SM-DP+ Requirementsmodified

… DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.). The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC Profile SMDP18 Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by … SIMallianceTrusted Connectivity Alliance [5]. SMDP19 The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on demand. SMDP20 It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk. … n SMDP36 GSMA SGP.22 [24]. If a Profile Package is not yet released for download then the LPA SHALL SMDP37 be informed by means of a specific error code. Table … 23:24: SM-DP+ Requirements

4.10.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirementsmodified

…CC is blank, then the use of the DF4 SM-DS discovery procedure or an SM-DP+ address in an AC SHALL be required to establish the target SM-DP+. DF5 [Void] Table … 24:25: Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements

4.11.1 LPA Overviewmodified

…abilities. Local User Interface This function allows the End User to perform Local Profile Management (LUI) on the Device. User Intent SHALL be enforced. Table … 25:26: LPA Function Descriptions

4.11.3 LPA Requirementsmodified

…low the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the eUICC. LPA11 The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for the deletion of the Profile. … AuthenticatedStrong Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Operational LPA12 Profiles on the eUICC and relevant associated information through their Profile Metadata. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’ SHALLSHOULD LPA13 be supported. ThisWhen supported, this operation SHALL allow the End User to edit the default SM-SM-DP+ DP+ address. Simple confirmation SHALL be LPA13 enforced. If the LPA does not support ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’, alternative Device-specific method(s) to edit the default SM-DP+ address SHALL be provided to the End User. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as described LPA14 in Section ‎4.6.2.4.6.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. AuthenticatedStrong Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Test Memory Reset’ SHALL be LPA15 supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Test Memory Reset as described in Section ‎4.6.3.4.6.3. Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘set/edit nickname’ SHOULD be supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User … e LPA. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to the … LPA17 eUICC. At least three mechanisms SHALL be supported by the LPA depending on the LPA17 type of Device where technically capable:  Profile download from default SM-DP+  Profile download via SM-DS service discovery  Profile download with Activation Code AuthenticatedSimple Confirmation SHALL be enforcedenforced. except in the case of initial Device setup (LPA62). The LPA SHALL NOT be accessible by any applications other than those LPA18 provided by the provider of the LPA for the sole purpose of enabling the services and functions of the LPA. The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Authenticated LPA19 Confirmation[Void] as described in this document. The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Simple LPA20 Confirmation located on the Device as described in this document. LPA21 Access[Void] to the LUI SHALL be protected by an Authenticated Confirmation. LPA22 The[Void] mechanism in LPA21 SHALL be selectable/unselectable by the End User. The mechanisms in LPA21 SHALL be prompted to be enabled by default but this LPA23 MAY[Void] be skipped by the End User. The LPA and its host (i.e. the Device, if the LPA is in the Device; the eUICC, if the LPA is in the eUICC) SHALL implement a mechanism to protect the LPA access LPA24 through[Void] an Authenticated Confirmation. This Authenticated Confirmation MAY be implemented by using the mechanisms implemented in the Device such as phone lock code, fingerprint input, etc. The End User SHALL be able to define dedicated personalised user credential to LPA25 access[Void] the LPA. If the End User selects the protection of access to the LUI (LPA23), then the LPA26 subsequent[Void] Authenticated Confirmation at operation level MAY be replaced with a Simple Confirmation. When enforced, any Confirmation Request SHALL allow the End User to cancel LPA27 the Local Profile Management Operation. It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI … ween the Companion and Primary Device for any input executed from the Primary Device. When operating a Companion Device LUI from a Primary Device, any required … LPA32 User Intent or Confirmation Request SHALL only be executed by the LPA on the LPA32 Companion Device. The physical End User input MAY be done in either the Primary or the Companion Device. The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure LPA33 measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI. The End User Data used for the User Intent protection (e.g. PIN code, fingerprint) LPA34 SHALL[Void] be stored in a secure environment. The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the LPA35 internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+ … oot required connectivity. LPA39 The LPA SHALL only be able to access the eUICC if it has assigned privileges. LPA40 There SHALL only be one LPA on the Device. … LPA41 The LPA SHALLMAY onlybe performextended operationsto thatsupport additional features which are not described in this specification. LPA42LPA41 LPANOTE: ProceduresThese SHALLadditional notfeatures could be called(but bynot anylimited to) interaction with entities external (non-LPA)to processes.LPA, automation or batch processing of Local Profile Management Operations, etc. The LPA including additional features SHALL maintain the interoperability of the LPA41a solution defined in this specification. LPA42 [Void] LPA43 When multiple Operational Profiles are installed, the Local Profile Management Operation ‘enable’ SHALL first initiate the ‘disable’ operation for any Ena … be able to read the Profile Policy Rules. LPA45 When a Profile with Profile Policy Rules is installed, in the case where End User consent is requested, the LPA … SHALLSHOULD display the consequences of the Profile Policy Rule to the End User. This message SHALL be formulated in a descriptive and non-discriminatory manner (e.g. for “Non-Delete” Profile Policy Rule: “The profile that you are about to install cannot be deleted under the terms you have agreed with your service provider. Approve installation YES/NO?”). AuthenticatedStrong Confirmation SHALLSHOULD be enforcedenforced. with the exception listed in LPA17. LPA46 Prior to downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHALL check the condition for whether the Enabled Profile, if any, has enabled POL RULE1. If this is the case, … ween the End User interface of the Primary Device and the LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be protected (confidentiality, integrity and authentication). LPA48 … There[Void] SHALL be a mechanism to limit the validity of LPA26 if the End User quits the LPA menu or does not perform the operation within a period of time to avoid the abuse of bypassing the Authenticated Confirmation LPA49 Confirmation Requests for consecutive Local Profile Management Operations MAY be achieved in one step as long as the different actions are clearly explain … operations are achieved in one single step (LPA49), the highest level of confirmation SHALL be applied - i.e. in the case of two operations having respectively … AuthenticatedStrong and Simple Confirmation Requests, the single step SHALL use the AuthenticatedStrong Confirmation Request. LPA51 The Local Profile Management Operations ‘enable’ (LPA9), ‘disable’ (LPA10), and ‘delete’ (LPA11) SHALL be able to trigger a Notific … communication between the eUICC and the LPA SHALL not occur. LPA Integrity SHALL be ensured using the best practice methods on the targeted LPA56 platform. See … ‎AnnexAnnex G. The polling mechanism in the LPA SHALL have two types of triggers; those that LPA57 are LPA57 event based, and those that are End User initiated. Event based triggers for polling SHOULD include Device power-up when no LPA58 Operational Profile is install … lemented e.g. LPA61 advise the End User to retry or automatically retry as appropriate. The corresponding confirmation needs to be enforced in the retry cases. … LPA62 As part of the initial Device setup, if no Operational Profile is already installed, means SHALL be provided to the End User to retrieve pending Profiles waiting on LPA62 the Default SM-DP+ if configured, via the Root SM-DS, and via the Activation Code procedure. NoSimple Authenticated Confirmation is required. Note: Implementation is left to the OEM and retrieval does not need to happen exactly during the initial Device setup if the End User, … d in a defined LPA65 scannable format (e.g. QR Code). LPA66 [Void] If the SM-DP+ stops the Profile download procedure, the LPA SHALL notify the LPA67 End User. … No automation of Local Profile Management Operations SHALL be accessible LPA68 except[Void] in the case described in LPA43. Table 26:27: LPA Requirements

4.11.4 LDS Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description The LDS SHALL be able to read out the address described in EUICC Error! LDS1 Reference source not found. and only use the address to connect to the SM-DS Table 27:28: LDS Requirement

4.12.2 SM-DS Implementationmodified

Two configurations of the SM-DS MAY exist:  A Root SM-DS  An Alternative SM-DS Figure 13: SM-DS Implementation ‎Figure igure 13 shows both configurations. The Root SM-DS is configured at the time of Device F manufacture and is invariant.

4.12.4 SM-DS functionsmodified

…by which an SM-DP+ can delete its own Event Record. Provides all registered Event Records, upon Discovery Request from Event Retrieval any enquiring LDS. Table … 28:29: SM-DS Function Descriptions

4.12.5 SM-DS Requirementsmodified

…e SM-DS SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event SMDS19 Records registered on the Root SM-DS (In response to an SM-DP+ delete operation defined in SMDS18). … SMDS20Req no. Description An Alternative SM-DS SHALL propagate the Event Record to the Root SM- ReqSMDS20 no. Description DS if requested by the SM-DP+. If there are multiple Event Records registered on the SM-DS for one SMDS21 eUICC, these SHALL all be sent as a single response. A … issuing an Event Record. The SM-DS SHALL only inform the Event Record’s owning SM-DP+ or SM- SMDS31 (FFS) DS that it has replied to a Discovery Request. Table … 2930 SM-DS Requirements

4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirementsmodified

…h the Profile Policy POL12 Rules of the already installed Profiles. Note: The technical specification SHALL describe exhaustively each conflict that MAY occur. … The LPA MAY cancel the Profile download procedure if it does not support POL12a the downloading of Profiles containing Profile Policy Rules to a removable eUICC regardless of its RAT. An Operator SHALL be able to deactivate the Profile Policy Rules of its Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is enabled. POL13 Note: The activation of … y Rules, the End User SHALL be able to be notified about the Profile Policy Rules and if notified, the installation SHALL thereafter be conditional on End User … AuthenticatedStrong POL14 Confirmation. This prompting may not be needed if the installation is directly allowed by the RAT. The request for End User consent for the installation … OL19 Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification. … Policy no. Description Allowing the installation of a Profile with Profile Policy Rules SHALL be POL20 subject to compliance with local regulatory requirements. Table 30:31: Profile Policy Management Requirements

4.13.3 Policy Rulesmodified

…ote: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification. Table … 31:32: Policy Rules Requirements

4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirementsmodified

… installation of the Profile. POLPPE11 The OEM or EUM SHALL be responsible for providing the RAT. A fixed RAT SHALL be implemented in the eUICC. POLPPE12 Note: … The allowed RAT configuration(s)configuration examples are detaileddescribed in ‎AnnexAnnex H. Table 32:33: Profile Policy Enabler Requirements

4.14.1 eUICC Certification Requirementsmodified

…mechanism to update its eUICC Certificate. Where appropriate, the eUICC SHOULD be certified according to EMVCo CERTEU16 Security Evaluation process [27]. Table … 33:34: eUICC Certification Requirements

4.14.2 Device Compliance Requirementmodified

Req no. Description There SHALL be a compliance process for all parts of Local Profile CERTDEV1 Management implementations in accordance with the GSMA. The certification process for Integrated TRE using Remote Memory residing outside the SoC as per DIE1 SHALL cover the Integrated TRE, internal and CERTDEV2 external SoC interfaces used for Integrated eUICC implementation, and Remote Memory residing outside the SoC. The certification process for Integrated TRE implementions SHALL ensure that software and data stored in Remote Memory residing outside the SoC CERTDEV3 as per DIE1 are protected against confidentiality, integrity, and availability attacks. The certification process for Integrated TRE implementions SHALL ensure CERTDEV4 that any interfaces between the Integrated TRE and the SoC are protected against confidentiality and integrity attacks. Table 34:35: Device Compliance Requirement

4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description The SM-DP+ provider SHALL be required to declare product (SM-DP+) CERTDP1 compliance with GSMA SGP.22 V2.2 [24]. The SM-DP+ SHALL be certified according to FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3 CERTDP2 v3 [22] and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v3 [28]. SM-DP+ elements SHALL use Hardware Security Modules (HSM) for cryptographic related operations (key storage, derivati … is is to be covered by the SAS documents “HSM certified according to FIPS 140-2 level 3 or higher” The SM-DP+ SHALL implement privileges isolation (Log, Audit, … Operation, CERTDP4 Operation, and Administration). CERTDP5 The SM-DP+ SHALL implement operating system hardening CERTDP5 mechanisms. The SM-DP+ SHALL implement separation of control, user and CERTDP6 administrative planes. The SM-DP+ SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration CERTDP7 operation. SM-DP+ hard drives and backup mediums used for storing Profiles SHALL CERTDP8 SHALL be ciphered. The private keys of SM-DP+ Certificates used for mutual authentication CERTDP9 and Profile Binding with eUICC SHALL be protected and stored in HSM … tacks. CERTDP11 The SM-DP+ SHALL log all Certificate authentication failures. CERTDP12 The SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI. Table … 35:36: SM-DP+ Certification Requirements

4.14.4 SM-DS Certification Requirementsmodified

…rd v3 CERTDS2 [22] and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v3 [28]. The SM-DS SHALL implement isolation of privileges (Log, Audit, Operation, CERTDS3 and Administration). … Req no. Description CERTDS4 The SM-DS SHALL implement operating system hardening mechanisms. The SM-DS SHALL implement separation of control, user and CERTDS5 administrative planes … TDS6 operation. CERTDS7 SM-DS hard drives and backup mediums SHALL be ciphered. CERTDS8 The SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI. Table … 36:37: SM-DS Certification Requirements

4.14.5 LPA Certification Requirementsmodified

…4 The LPD SHALL authenticate the SM-DP+ during the TLS session. CERTLPA5 The LDS SHALL authenticate the SM-DS during the TLS session. The LPA SHALL only accept … valid TLS Certificates signedas bydefined ain GSMACERTLPA6 CICERTPK10a for SM-DP+ CERTLPA6 and SM-DS authentication. Table 37:38: LPA Certification Requirements

4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management Requirementsmodified

…the SM-DS. The LDS authentication of an SM-DS using an invalid Public Key Certificate CERTPK4 SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop. … Req no. Description The LPD authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key CERTPK5 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11CERTPK1), and on-going communication SHALL stop. The … cate of any entities (SM- CERTPK8 DP+, SM-DS, EUM) if it is compromised (e.g. private key theft). CERTPK9 The eUICC SHALL be able to support a set of GSMA CIs. … Req no. Description A Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:  it has a valid signature  it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a trusted chain of Certificates up to a GSMA CI. Certificate Path validation SHALL follow the process defined in RFC 5280 ‎0Error!0Error! Reference source not found.. CERTPK10  it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in the trust chain has been revoked  it has not expired If any of these applicable verifications fail, the Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as invalid. A TLS Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:  it has a valid signature  it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a public trusted CA, or a trusted chain of Certificates up to a GSMA CI or a public trusted CA. Certificate Path validation SHALL follow the process defined in RFC 5280 0Error! CERTPK10a Reference source not found..  it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in its trust chain has been revoked  it has not expired If any of these applicable verifications fail, the TLS Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as invalid. The eUICC, LPA, SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL have knowledge of revoked CERTPK11 Public Key Certificates. CERTPK11 Note: This requirement also applies to TLS Certificates that chain to either the GSMA CI or a public trusted CA. Table 38:39: Public Key Certificates Management Requirements

5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirementsmodified

…and a default SM-DP+ address LID2 are populated, the LPA SHALL first contact the SM-DP+ and then SM-DS to initiate a Remote SIM Provisioning transaction. Table … 39:40: LPA Initiated Download Requirements

5.2.1 Activation Code Requirementsmodified

…vice Provider. The Activation Code request to the SM-DP+ SHALL be extended by the LPA AC12 with the EID after the specific SM-DP+ has been authenticated. Table … 40:41: Activation Code Requirements

5.3.1.7 Add Profile with Activation Codemodified

…file to their Device. 2. The LPA requests the End User to enter the Activation Code. 3. Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure as described in Section … ‎5.2.25.2.2 starts. End conditions: a. The Profile has been installed on the End User’s Device. b. Profile Metadata has been updated from the Profile.

A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)modified

… corrupted Profile being pushed to the Subscriber. Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles to INI2 Devices. Table … 41:42: New Profile on New Primary Device Risks Profile Deletion Risk Risk description no. Long term gathering of key materials due to a long term storage of delivered … Non-tech-savvy or malicious Subscriber repeatedly deleting Profiles and asking for them IND5 to be reloaded leading to surcharge of provisioning servers. Table … 42:Profile43:Profile Deletion Risks Profile Switch Risk Risk description no. INP1 Malicious Profile switching originating from an internal party. Human error leading to the switchi … ing to INP3 a loss of connectivity. Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to INP4 major fraud scenarios. Table … 43:44: Profile Switching Risks Profile Swap Risk Risk description no. INS1 Race condition leading to the deactivation of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity. Table 44:45: Profile Swapping Risks Cryptographic Related Risks Risk Risk description no. Loss or theft of private keys in one or several Profile Management components lead … aterial during the Profile INO6 creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single point of failure and attack being created. Table … 45:46: Cryptographic Related Risks Quality of Service Risk Risk description no. Profile creation burst leading to the inability for the eUICC platforms to deliver exp … QoS2 service level. Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a temporary or QoS3 permanent inability to deliver a Profile. Table … 46:47: Quality of Service Risks Non-human or Unpredictable Risk Risk description no. Catastrophic event such as floods, earthquakes, etc. leading to the destruction o … centre. Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the EXC3 provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, SIM vendor…). Table … 47:48: Non-human or Unpredictable Risks New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risk Risk description no. EXN1 Malicious pairing of new Device using unattended Primary … the loss of EXN5 confidentiality. “Implicit authentication” (e.g. HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of EXN6 authentication or Profile material. Table … 48:49: New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks Device Swap Risk Risk description no. Malicious Subscriber using race condition scenarios leading to Profiles being activated EXS1 on both Devices. Malicious entity using weak swap procedures in order to compromise authentication EXS2 vectors. Table 49:50: Device Swapping Risks Loss of Privacy Risk Risk description no. Improper handling, transport or disclosure of the EID or any user related data PRI1 information … cted and unpredicted PRI2 « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties to spy or compromise Devices or the Subscriber themselves. Table … 50:51: Loss of Privacy Risks Others Risk Risk description no. Compromising of exchanges between Profile Management actors leading to the critical EXO1 loss of private keys. EXO2 Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios. Table 51:52: Other Risks Creation Process Req Requirement description no. Profiles failing to be created SHALL be securely deleted or at least purged of CRE1 authentication vectors. CRE2Req Requirement description no. Communication between systems participating in the Profile creation SHALL be ReqCRE2 Requirement description no. protected in integrity and confidentiality. Table 52:53: Creation Process Requirements

B.1 Profile Production Proceduremodified

…MAY be allocated for this contract. Note: The generation of the Bound Profile Package is part of the Profile download with Activation Code procedure in Section … ‎5.2.2.5.2.2.

B.1.4.1 Activation Code with Known EIDmodified

Figure 31: Activation Code with Known EID Procedure Procedure: Steps 1-11 in ‎FigureFigure 31: Contract conclusion with known EID 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator and provides the EID during this process. 2. to 5. Alternativel… …

B.1.4.2 Activation Code with Unknown EIDmodified

Figure 32: Activation Code with Unknown EID Procedure Procedure: Steps 1-6 in ‎FigureFigure 32: Contract conclusion without EID 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of the target eUICC (EID). 2. Alternatively ‘ICC… …

B.1.4.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operatormodified

Figure 33: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator Procedure: Steps 1-11 in ‎FigureFigure 33Error! Reference source not found.: Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowle… …

C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)modified

This annex provides an example diagram for the implementation of Local Profile Management Operations and describes how the different Confirmation Levels MAY be applied. Example flow for Device & LPA Strong Confirmation access PIN setup / settings Unpack Device Power on & start setup (new from factory) Manual setup Set / enable No (skip) device access code / ID? First Access to LPA (no installed profiles) Yes Enter & confirm PIN / ID Manual user Device access Device access setup open restricted Set No Yes device Enable & Set LPA lock? No access (SC) for eUICC (skip) management? Yes No Device Lock separately lock set? No from device (flag) Yes lock? Enter device PIN / Yes (flag) code to confirm Enter & confirm SC PIN / ID Code correct? No LPA lock restricted / SC set Yes LPA / SC set device LPA access open lock restricted (no SC set) SC required Yes SC as required on on each SC (flag) each LUI operation event? No (flag) SC inherited from prior SC input Notes: SC: Strong Confirmation Stop Device access code (PIN / ID) refers to device unlock mechanism Figure 34: Example Flow for Device & LPA AuthenticatedStrong Confirmation Access PIN Setup / Settings

D eUICC Categories (Normative)modified

…talled (EEPROM) : 1024kB  ISO interface PPS 97 CAT3  BIP over HTTPS features  Processor >= 25MHz  Crypto processor >= 100MHz  Memory Protection Unit Table … 53:54: eUICC Categories

F.1 Security Modelmodified

…nder management and the eUICC keys, the the model cannot be authorisation by the OS, and the Security trusted. SM-DP+ and possibly Domains. the EUM: eUICC keys … (EUM & CI keyset Trust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of link involved compromises trust link (EUM & CI keyset eUICC Certificates). TL2 Trust placed in the CI’s Out of The EUM and SM- Loss of Operator verification of the scope DP+ Certificates. trust on the EUM and EUM, … Profile requests. TL6 Trust placed in the ESeu LPA security eUICC loss of trust mechanisms provided on LPA. by the LPA: Local Profile Management, Local Profile … Management Operations Trust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of link involved compromises trust link Management Operations TL7 Trust placed in the ES9+ LPA security or SM- SM-DP+ loss of trust TLS session DP+ security. on LPA (in the Device or the eUICC) or LPA loss of trust on the … ecurity or SM-DS loss of trust process SM-DS security. on the eUICC and vice versa. TL10 Trust in the UI ESeu Device security Loss of trust on the Device Table … 54:55: Trusted Link Descriptions Compromised Impacted Description Impact of loss of Countermeasures element Links trust eUICC TL1, TL3, The eUICC The eUICC can no Rev … for the certification. Operator and SM-DP+ EUM. Remote repair on the EUM and its of already issued eUICCs. eUICCs: new EUM Certificate, new eUICC Certificate. … Compromised Impacted Description Impact of loss of Countermeasures element Links trust SM-DP+ TL3, TL4, Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the SM- TL5, TL7, certification. Operator, LPA, SM-DS DP+. New SM-DP+ TL8 and eUICC on the SM- Certificate. DP+. Compromised Impacted Description Impact of loss of Countermeasures element Links trust SM-DS TL8 Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the SM- certification. Operator, LPA, SM- DS. New SM-DS DP+ and eUICC on the Certificate. SM-DS. LPA TL … vice TL10 Device Loss of trust in the LUI in the eUICC self- security failure Device UI protected with User Intent capture mechanisms (i.e. Captcha Code) Table … 55:56: Impact of Compromising Trusted Links and Countermeasures The signer is responsible for the revocation of the Certificates it has signed. This section describes … CERT3 upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair. The EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the CERT4 EUM Note: See details in Section … ‎4.1.1.1.4.1.1.1. The CI Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the EUM CERT5 Note: See details in Section ‎4.1.1.1.4.1.1.1. CERT6 Certificates SHALL be revocable. Neither the End User nor any other party SHALL be able to prevent CERT7 Certificate revocation. The End User SHALL not be allowed to use Remote SIM Provisioning CERT8 functions with revoked Certificates. Req no. Description The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+ SHALL be revoked if required CERT9 (e.g. loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification requirements). The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS SHALL be revoked if required (e.g. CERT10 loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning Req no. Description certification requirements). The Public Key Certificate of the EUM SHALL be revoked if required (e.g. CERT11 loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification requirements). Table 56:57: Certificate Requirements

G LPA Integrity (Normative)modified

…ices the LPA is minimal due to the locked Basic down nature of these Devices. Simple mechanisms to ensure that the LPA is not compromised SHALL be taken. Table … 57:58: Device Classes

H Rules Authorisation Table (Informative)added

Annex H reflects the RAT table configuration(s) that MAY be configured in embedded UICC. The RAT entries shown in Table 58 MAY be provisioned: PR Operators User consent POL RULE1 * YES POL RULE2 * YES Table 59: RAT configuration Additional lines can be added to the RAT table to reflect agreement between some Operators and OEMs as needed. The OEM can also decide to add lines to the RAT table. Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.

H Rules Authorisation Table (Normative)removed

Annex H reflects the RAT table configuration(s) that SHALL be configured in embedded UICC. Legend: The following colours apply Line colour Mandatory to be included Optional The following RAT SHALL apply to all products PR Operators User consent Mandatory part POL RULE1 * YES of the RAT table POL RULE2 * YES Table 58: RAT configuration Additional lines can be added to the RAT table to reflect agreement between some Operators and OEMs as needed. The OEM can also decide to add lines to the RAT table. PR Operators User consent POL RULE 1 Operator1 NO Mandatory part POL RULE1 * YES of the RAT table POL RULE2 * YES Table 59: RAT configuration Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.

J Integrated eUICC Security Requirements (Normative)added

J.1 General Security Requirementsadded

Requirement Description An Integrated TRE MAY use a Remote Memory within the Device, dedicated GS01 to the Integrated TRE, to store software and data. All Integrated eUICC software and data which are stored outside the Integrated TRE SHALL be protected by the Integrated TRE in order to ensure GS02 their confidentiality, their integrity, and software side channel protection. This includes protection against side-channel attacks such as cache-timing attacks. All Integrated TRE software and data, including context, SHALL only be GS03 stored in protected memory as requested in paragraph 36 in BSI-CC-PP- 0084 [29]. All Integrated TRE software and data stored outside an Integrated TRE GS04 SHALL be protected against replay attacks. The Integrated TRE internal instruction and data buses SHALL be isolated GS05 from the rest of the SoC. The other SoC components SHALL have no access to the Integrated TRE GS06 internal buses. The Integrated TRE SHALL be the only entity to expose TRE data outside the GS07 Integrated TRE. The Integrated TRE SHOULD have priority access to Remote Memory as GS08 defined in GS02 in cases of shared resource contention All the credentials used to protect the data stored in the Remote Memory, GS08a dedicated to the Integrated TRE as per requirements GS02 and GS03, SHALL only be stored and used in the Integrated TRE. The Integrated TRE SHALL be isolated from all other SoC components such GS09 that no other SoC components can have access to assets inside the Integrated TRE. The Integrated TRE SHALL have a hardware and software protection means GS10 that controls the access to every function of the Integrated TRE (e.g. cryptographic unit). The Integrated TRE SHALL process/execute its data/software in a dedicated GS11 secure CPU contained within the Integrated TRE. The Integrated TRE SHALL be resistant against hardware and software side- GS12 channel attacks (e.g. DPA, cache-timing attacks, EMA etc.). All Integrated TRE software and data SHALL be exclusively processed within GS13 the Integrated TRE. The Integrated TRE SHALL include in its security target the following threats for software and data managed by the TRE, but stored outside the TRE: GS14  leakage  probing  manipulation Requirement Description The protection of software and data stored in Remote Memory as defined in GS15 GS02 SHALL be managed by the Integrated TRE using means which are independent of the Remote Memory implementation. All cryptographic processing used by the Integrated TRE SHALL be GS16 contained within the Integrated TRE. All security mechanisms within the Integrated TRE SHALL withstand state of GS17 the art attacks. If Remote Memory outside the SoC is used, the combination of Integrated GS18 TRE and Remote Memory SHALL implement mechanisms protecting access to Remote Memory. Integrated TRE implementations using Remote Memory outside the SoC GS19 SHALL implement mechanisms protecting the integrity of Remote Memory contents as defined in GS02. Table 60: General Security Requirements PP-0084 Security IC +IC Dedicated Software Device SoC Integrated TRE Secure CPU Cryptographic Processing ... ... Instruction and data buses Remote Memory Isolation/Firewall/ Protection Function Access Control Remote Memory (optional) Volatile Non-Volatile +Augmentation for Remote Memory/Isolation Figure 40: Example of Optional Remote Memory Usage Note: IC Dedicated Software including its authentication by the TRE, is covered by BSI-CC- PP-0084 [29] and is not required to be augmented by this annex.

J.2 Security Certificationadded

Requirement Description An Integrated TRE together with the RMPF SHALL be evaluated according to BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29] augmented with the requirements defined in this SC01 annex. Note: The requirements relating to Remote Memory are only applicable when that type of memory is used by the Integrated TRE. Evidence of Isolation (for example GS05, GS06, GS07, GS09) SHALL be SC02 assessed during evaluation. Evidence of proper Life Cycle management of the Integrated TRE SHALL be SC03 assessed during evaluation. Table 61: Security Certification Requirements

J.3 Conformance Claimsadded

Requirement Description The Integrated TRE SHALL claim in its security target, that it comprises of Security IC and IC Dedicated Software regarded as a Security Integrated CC01 Circuit which implements all functional aspects specified by the BSI-CC-PP- 0084 [29] protection profile augmented with the requirements defined in this annex. The Integrated TRE SHALL provide resistance to attackers with “high” attack CC02 potential as defined by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 in [33]. The Integrated TRE SHALL be evaluated against the requirements, methods CC03 of attacks and evaluation documents for smartcards and similar devices published by SOG-IS [35]. Table 62: Conformance Claims

J.4 Security Objectivesadded

BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29] defines security problems related to the Security IC being evaluated and corresponding security objectives. Within BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29], the definitions do not take into account the implementation of the TRE within a SoC and the use of Remote Memory. In particular, Integrated TRE has to include additional security problems and objectives in its security target. The security target shall include the following in its security objectives: Requirement Description The Integrated TRE SHALL define, in its security target, a security objective to protect software and data managed by the TRE and stored outside the TRE against: SO01  leakage  probing  manipulation Table 63: Security Objectives

J.5 Security Functional Requirementsadded

Requirement Description The Integrated TRE SHALL contain a Remote Memory Protection Function IESFR01 (RMPF) to protect software and data to be stored in Remote Memory, outside the TRE. IESFR02 The RMPF SHALL reside in the Integrated TRE. The RMPF SHALL ensure the following security properties: (1) confidentiality (2) integrity and (3) replay-protection. Note: these properties are intended to cover a range of possible attacks, IESFR03 including replay of commands on the Remote Memory, rollback of data stored in the Remote Memory, cloning the content of a Remote Memory from another device, swapping or corrupting data within the Remote Memory, etc. The RMPF SHALL use keys that are either: IESFR04  derived from a secret TRE-unique seed(s), or;  randomly generated within the Integrated TRE TRE-unique seed(s) used by RMPF SHALL be generated using a certified IESFR05 random number generator as required by BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29]. TRE-unique seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be generated inside the IESFR06 TRE. The entropy of the TRE-unique seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be at IESFR07 least 256 bits. IESFR08 Randomly generated keys used by the RMPF shall be at least 256 bits. The key derivation mechanism used by the RMPF SHALL be compliant with NIST SP 800-108 [30][30] and SHALL use:  a block cipher with security strength equivalent to or greater than IESFR09 AES-256, or  a hash function with security strength equivalent to or greater than SHA-256, IESFR10 The keys used by the RMPF SHALL be protected by the TRE. IESFR11 Seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be restricted to the RMPF. Confidentiality Requirements The RMPF SHALL provide confidentiality based on encryption using a cipher with security strength equivalent to, or greater than AES-256 and using a IESFR12 suitable mode of operation approved by NIST in NIST SP 800-175B [34][18] or recommended by BSI in BSI TR-02102-1 [31] or recommended by ANSSI RGS v2 B1 [32]. Integrity and Authenticity The RMPF SHALL use a cryptographic integrity mechanism with security IESFR13 strength equivalent to, or greater than SHA-256. The RMPF SHALL provide authentication using a MAC of at least 128 bits based IESFR14  on a block cipher using a cipher with security strength equivalent to or greater than AES-256, or Requirement Description  on a hash function with security strength equivalent to or greater than SHA-256, and using a mode of operation approved by NIST in NIST SP 800-175B [34] or recommended by BSI in BSI TR-02102-1 [31] or recommended by ANSSI RGS v2 B1 [32]. IESFR12 and IESFR14 MAY also be provided in combination by an IESFR15 authenticated encryption mode fulfilling both requirements. Replay protection IESFR16 The RMPF SHALL detect any replay attack on the Integrated TRE. The Integrated eUICC SHALL be resistant to replay attacks on the data IESFR17 stored in Remote Memory. The Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to verify that the data received from the Remote Memory is not unsolicited. Note: Solicited data received from the Remote Memory is data that the IESFR18 Integrated eUICC did intend to retrieve at runtime from Remote Memory and/or retrieved data that the Integrated eUICC was able to verify according to the requirements set in this Annex. The RMPF SHALL NOT process data if it is unable to detect a replay attack. Note: Such a situation may arise e.g. if the RMPF uses a counter to detect IESFR19 replay attacks and the counter expired or became unreliable for any other reason. Test Interface The Integrated eUICC Test Interface SHALL NOT affect the security IESFR20 requirements defined in this annex. The Integrated eUICC Test Interface SHALL be compatible with commonly IESFR21 used interfaces for smartcard testing. Table 64: Security Functional Requirements

J.6 Identificationadded

Requirement Description The Integrated eUICC SHALL allow the SM-DP+ to identify the type of the Integrated TRE including its component configuration (e.g. use of internal or ID01 Remote Memory, use of other optional components), its manufacturer, in addition to the RSP OS provider. Table 65: Identification Requirement

K Document Managementadded

J Document Managementremoved

K.1 Document Historyrenumbered was J.1

…ontent PSMC GSMA Carmen Kwok, V2.1 29/02/17 Phase 2 maintenance release Technology Group GSMA Carmen Kwok, V2.2 31/08/17 Phase 2 maintenance release RSPLEN GSMA … Carmen Kwok, V2.3 30/06/21 Phase 2 maintenance release ISAG GSMA

Contents
  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 1.1 Overview
  3. 1.2 Scope
  4. 1.3 Intended Audience
  5. 1.4 Definition of Terms
  6. 1.5 Abbreviations
  7. 1.6 References
  8. 1.7 Conventions
  9. 2 Principles
  10. 2.1 Basic Principles
  11. 2.2 Profile Principles
  12. 3 Roles
  13. 3.1 eUICC Manufacturer
  14. 3.2 Device Manufacturer
  15. 3.3 Operator and Service Provider
  16. 3.4 Subscriber and End User
  17. 3.5 Certificate Issuer
  18. 4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture
  19. 4.1 eUICC Architecture
  20. 4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
  21. 4.2 Interfaces
  22. 4.2.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
  23. 4.2.2 Operator – End User (ESop)
  24. 4.2.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)
  25. 4.2.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
  26. 4.2.5 SM-DP+ – LPD (ES9+)
  27. 4.2.6 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
  28. 4.2.7 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)
  29. 4.2.8 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)
  30. 4.2.9 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)
  31. 4.2.10 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)
  32. 4.2.11 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)
  33. 4.2.12 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)
  34. 4.2.13 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)
  35. 4.2.14 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)
  36. 4.2.15 General Interface Requirements
  37. 4.3 eUICC Requirements
  38. 4.4 eUICC Eligibility Check
  39. 4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements
  40. 4.5 Device Requirements
  41. 4.5.1 Device Capability Requirements
  42. 4.5.2 Device with Integrated eUICC
  43. 4.6 Device Initialisation
  44. 4.6.1 Device Reset Requirements
  45. 4.6.2 eUICC Memory Reset Requirements
  46. 4.6.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements
  47. 4.7 Profile Requirements
  48. 4.7.1 Test Profile Requirements
  49. 4.7.2 Provisioning Profile Requirements
  50. 4.8 Profile Metadata Requirements
  51. 4.9 NFC Requirements
  52. 4.10 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+)
  53. 4.10.1 SM-DP+ Overview
  54. 4.10.2 SM-DP+ Requirements
  55. 4.10.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements
  56. 4.11 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)
  57. 4.11.1 LPA Overview
  58. 4.11.2 Operational LPA Modes
  59. 4.11.3 LPA Requirements
  60. 4.11.4 LDS Requirements
  61. 4.12 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)
  62. 4.12.1 SM-DS Overview
  63. 4.12.2 SM-DS Implementation
  64. 4.12.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelines
  65. 4.12.4 SM-DS functions
  66. 4.12.5 SM-DS Requirements
  67. 4.12.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedure
  68. 4.12.7 Discovery Request Procedure
  69. 4.13 Profile Policy Management
  70. 4.13.1 Introduction
  71. 4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirements
  72. 4.13.3 Policy Rules
  73. 4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirements
  74. 4.14 Certification
  75. 4.14.1 eUICC Certification Requirements
  76. 4.14.2 Device Compliance Requirement
  77. 4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification Requirements
  78. 4.14.4 SM-DS Certification Requirements
  79. 4.14.5 LPA Certification Requirements
  80. 4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management Requirements
  81. 5 Operational Procedures
  82. 5.1 LPA Initiated Download
  83. 5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirements
  84. 5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedure
  85. 5.2 Profile Download with Activation Code
  86. 5.2.1 Activation Code Requirements
  87. 5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure
  88. 5.3 Local Profile Management
  89. 5.3.1 Local Profile Management Procedures
  90. A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)
  91. B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)
  92. B.1 Profile Production Procedure
  93. B.1.1 Profile Description Definition
  94. B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generation
  95. B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generation
  96. B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile
  97. C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)
  98. D eUICC Categories (Normative)
  99. E LPA Settings (Informative)
  100. F Certifications Chain and Security Model (Normative)
  101. F.1 Security Model
  102. G LPA Integrity (Normative)
  103. H Rules Authorisation Table (Informative)
  104. I LPA Invocation of the Provisioning Profile Example Flow (Informative)
  105. J Integrated eUICC Security Requirements (Normative)
  106. J.1 General Security Requirements
  107. J.2 Security Certification
  108. J.3 Conformance Claims
  109. J.4 Security Objectives
  110. J.5 Security Functional Requirements
  111. J.6 Identification
  112. K Document Management
  113. K.1 Document History
RSP Architecture
               Version 2.3
          30 June 2021

This Industry Specification is a Non-Binding Permanent Document of the GSMA

Security Classification: Non-confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other than those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association.

Copyright Notice Copyright © 2021 GSM Association

Disclaimer The GSM Association (“Association”) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document. The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.

Antitrust Notice The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy.

This Permanent Reference Document is classified by GSMA as an Industry Specification, as such it has been developed and is maintained by GSMA in accordance with the provisions set out in GSMA AA.35 - Procedures for Industry Specifications.

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This document provides an architecture approach as a proposed solution for the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices across all markets.

The main goal of the Architecture is to define a mechanism for the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices with the necessary credentials to gain mobile network access.

This version focuses on Devices for the consumer market.

Please note that SGP.21 V1.0 [23] has not been superceded.

1.2 Scope

The aim of this document is to define a common architecture framework to enable the Remote SIM Provisioning and management of the Embedded UICC (eUICC) in Devices. The adoption of this architecture framework will aim to provide the basis for ensuring global interoperability for Remote SIM Provisioning between Operators in different deployment scenarios.

1.3 Intended Audience

Technical experts working within Operators, SIM solution providers, Device vendors, standards organisations, network infrastructure vendors, Service Providers and other industry bodies.

1.4 Definition of Terms

Term                         Description
                             Information issued by an Operator/Service Provider to an End
Activation Code              User. It is used by the End User to request for the download and
                             installation of a Profile.
                             A part of the Activation Code information provided by the
Activation Code Token
                             Operator/Service Provider to refer to a Subscription.
                             SM-DS used in cascade mode with a Root SM-DS to redirect Event
Alternative SM-DS            Registration from a SM-DP+ to the Root SM-DS or direct Event
                             Registration from a SM-DP+ for an installed Profile.
                             A Protected Profile Package which has been cryptographically
Bound Profile Package
                             linked to a particular eUICC.
Certificate or Public Key    A certificate as defined in RFC.5280 [1] and GlobalPlatform
Certificate                  specifications GPC_SPE_034 [15][9].
                             An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM
Certified eUICC              Provisioning and certified according to SGP.25 GSMA eUICC
                             Protection Profile [25].
                             A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for the
Companion Device
                             purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.
                             A code entered by an End User required by the SM-DP+ for the
Confirmation Code
                             download of a Profile.
Term                         Description
Confirmation Code Required   A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is required
Flag                         or not.
                             Refers to the hierarchy of User Intent and Confirmation Request,
                             where:
                                 User Intent is the first and lowest level
Confirmation Level
                                 Simple Confirmation is the second level
                                 Strong Confirmation is the third and highest level
                             Note: For examples of implementation, please refer to Annex C.
                             Describes a request for Strong Confirmation or a Simple
Confirmation Request
                             Confirmation as defined in this specification.
                             User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a
Device
                             mobile network. E.g. a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset.
                             An entity responsible for manufacturing Devices. The Device
Device Manufacturer          Manufacturer MAY be responsible for the selection and insertion of
                             eUICCs in Devices.
                             A mode hidden from the End User that allows access to and use of
Device Test Mode
                             Test Profiles.
                             The state of a Profile where all files and applications (e.g. NAA)
Disabled Profile
                             present in the Profile are not selectable.
                             An interrogation of the Discovery Service by a Device for Event
Discovery Request
                             Records that are registered for its eUICC.
                             An eUICC implemented on discrete standalone hardware, including
Discrete eUICC               its own dedicated volatile and non-volatile memory.
                             A Discrete eUICC can be removable or non-removable.
                             A UICC which enables the local management of Profiles in a
eUICC                        secure way.
                             Note: The term originates from “embedded UICC”.
                             The state of a Profile when its files and/or applications (e.g. NAA)
Enabled Profile
                             are selectable.
End User                     The person using the Device.
                             Information that pertains to the identity of an End User e.g.
End User Data                personal details, name, address, biometric characteristics,
                             assigned identification numbers, etc.
eUICC Authorisation          Used by the SM-DS to authenticate the eUICC.
                             A Certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC.
eUICC Certificate
                             This Certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate.
eUICC Eligibility Check      The information set sent from the eUICC to the SM-DP+ to allow
Information                  eligibility checks.
eUICC Manufacturer (EUM)     The eUICC Manufacturer provides eUICC products.
                             An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a factory
eUICC Memory Reset
                             state.
eUICC Test Memory Reset      An action that deletes all post-issuance Test Profiles on an eUICC.
Term                            Description
                                A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited EUM
EUM Certificate
                                which can be used to verify eUICC Certificates.
                                A Profile download which is set by an SM-DP+ on behalf of an
Event
                                Operator, to be processed by a specific eUICC.
                                Unique identifier of an Event for a specific EID generated by the
Event-ID
                                SM-DP+/SM-DS.
                                The set of information stored on the SM-DS for a specific Event, via
                                the Event Registration procedure. This information consists of
Event Record                    either:
                                   the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DP+ address or
                                   the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DS address
                                A query to the SM-DS (Root or Alternative) executed to verify Event
Event Record Query
                                Registration success or determine that an Event Record still exists.
                                A process notifying the SM-DS on the availability of information on
Event Registration
                                either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC.
Form Factor                     Physical manifestation of the UICC.
GSMA Certificate Issuer         A Certificate Authority accredited by GSMA.
IC Dedicated Software           As defined in BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29].
                                Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU-
ICCID
                                T E.118 [14][14].
Integrated eUICC                An eUICC implemented on an Integrated TRE.
Integrated eUICC Test
                                An external interface for the purpose of testing eUICC functionality.
Interface
                                A TRE implemented inside a larger System-on-Chip (SoC),
Integrated TRE                  optionally making use of remote volatile and/or non-volatile
                                memory.
International Mobile            Unique identifier owned and issued by Operators as defined in
Subscriber Identity             3GPP TS 23.003 [3] Section 2.2.
                                The process that associates a Protected Profile Package with a
                                specific eUICC so that a Profile Download including Bound Profile
                                Package generation can be triggered.
Link Profile
                                Note: This is normally an offline process, binding is an online
                                process happening during the communication between the SM-
                                DP+ and the eUICC.
                                A functional element in the Device or in the eUICC that provides
Local Profile Assistant (LPA)
                                the LPD, LDS and LUI features.
                                Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated
Local Profile Management
                                on the ESeu interface.
                                Local Profile Management Operations are enable Profile, disable
Local Profile Management        Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory
Operation                       Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, set/edit nickname, add Profile,
                                and edit default SM-DP+ address.
Term                          Description
                              Assurance that the LPA has not been compromised or affected.
                              The assurance SHALL be provided to the various Remote SIM
LPA Integrity                 Provisioning entities to ensure that the LPA can be trusted to
                              execute the actions requested
                              Note: This could be linked with a certification process.
                              Defines the Operation LPA Mode which is either LPA in the eUICC
LPA Mode
                              or in the Device.
                              Refers to processes that trigger Local Profile Management
LPA Procedures
                              Operations.
                              An entity providing access capability and communication services
Mobile Network Operator
                              to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure.
                              An entity providing access capability and communication services
Mobile Virtual Network
                              to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure but does
Operator
                              not have an allocation of spectrum.
                              A method of authentication in which an End User is only granted
                              access after successfully presenting several separate pieces of
Multi-Factor Authentication   evidence to an authentication mechanism – typically at least two of
(MFA)                         the following categories: knowledge (something they know),
                              possession (something they have), and inherence (something they
                              are).
                              Application residing in a Profile providing authorisation to access a
Network Access Application
                              network.
                              Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [4] network. This
Network Access Credentials
                              MAY include data such as Ki/K and IMSI stored within a NAA.
NFC Device                    Device with NFC capability.
NFC eUICC                     eUICC with NFC capability.
                              An arbitrary random number generated for one time use, employed
Nonce
                              for cryptographic communication.
                              A report about a Profile download or Local Profile Management
Notification
                              Operation processed by the eUICC.
                              A list of SM-DP+ defined in the Profile containing SM-DP+s that are
Notification Receivers
                              to receive Notifications concerning the Profile.
                              A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned
                              on an eUICC for the purpose of providing services by the Operator.
Operational Profile           The Profile SHALL be in support of a Subscription with the relevant
                              Operator and allow connectivity to a mobile network. Applications
                              MAY be included to provide non-telecommunication services.
                              A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a
Operator
                              company providing wireless cellular network services.
                              A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network
Operator Credentials          Access Credentials, OTA Keys for Remote File/Application
                              management, and authentication algorithm parameters.
                              The credentials included in the Profile used in conjunction with OTA
OTA Keys
                              Platforms.
Term                         Description
                             A platform used by an Operator for the Remote File/Application
OTA Platform
                             management of enabled Profiles on eUICCs.
Policy Enforcement           A function that executes Policy Rules to implement a policy.
                             Defines the atomic action of a policy and the conditions under
Policy Rule
                             which it is executed.
                             A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a
Primary Device
                             Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.
                             A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an
Profile
                             eUICC for the purpose of providing services.
                             The description of a Profile in a format specific to the Operator;
Profile Description
                             example formats could be an Excel table, xml format, or plain text.
                             A combination of local and remote management operations (enable
Profile Management
                             Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, and query Profile Metadata)
                             Information pertaining to a Profile used for the purpose of Local
Profile Metadata
                             Profile Management.
                             The entity that controls the operations that can be performed upon
Profile Owner                its Profile. With the exception of Test Profile, this is always an
                             Operator.
                             A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format
Profile Package
                             that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile [5][5].
                             The functional element within the Profile management system that
Profile Policy Enabler
                             interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules.
                             A policy control system that allows the Service Provider to
Profile Policy Management    implement, manage and enforce its subscription terms and
                             conditions associated with the installed Profile.
                             Defines a qualification for or enforcement of an action to be
Profile Policy Rule
                             performed on a Profile when a certain condition occurs.
                             A Profile Package which has been encrypted for storage but not to
Protected Profile Package
                             a specific eUICC.
                             A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned
                             on an eUICC for the purposes of providing connectivity to a mobile
Provisioning Profile
                             network solely for the purpose of the provisioning of Profiles on the
                             eUICC.
Remote Memory                Volatile or non-volatile memory residing outside of the TRE
                             The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, and deleting of a
Remote SIM Provisioning
                             Profile on an eUICC.
Replay Attack                An attack based on previously used or outdated data.
                             A Certificate used to authenticate other entities within the Remote
Root Certificate
                             SIM Provisioning framework.
                             A globally identified central access point for finding Events from
Root SM-DS
                             one or more SM-DP+(s).
                             The Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either
Service Provider             as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement
                             with an Operator. The Service Provider could also be the Operator.
Term                         Description
                             A secure and non-interceptable mechanism by which the End User
Simple Confirmation
                             confirms their action, e.g. by selecting Yes/No, OK/Cancel.
SM-DP+ Certificate           A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DP+.
SM-DS Certificate            A Certificate used by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DS.
                             Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as
SMDPid                       part of the SM-DP+ Certificate.
                             Note: This is referred to as the smdpOid in SGP.22 [24].
                             A secure and non-interceptable mechanism to guarantee a higher
                             level of User Intent than Simple Confirmation by which the End
Strong Confirmation
                             User confirms their action, e.g., by inputting PIN or fingerprint,
                             repeating Simple Confirmation, entering Confirmation Code, etc.
                             An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a
                             Subscription with an Operator. The Subscriber is allowed to
Subscriber
                             subscribe and unsubscribe to services, as well as register an End
                             User or a list of End Users authorised to use these services.
                             Information that pertains to the identity of a Subscriber such as
                             contract details, authentication credentials, cryptographic keys etc.
Subscriber Data
                             Note: In many instances, the Subscriber is also the End User and
                             therefore Subscriber Data is likely to include End User Data.
                             A Subscription describes the commercial relationship between the
Subscription
                             Subscriber and the Service Provider.
                             This role prepares Profile Packages, secures each with a Profile
                             protection key, stores Profile protection keys in a secure manner as
                             well as the Protected Profile Packages in a Profile Package
Subscription Manager Data    repository, and links the Protected Profile Packages to specified
Preparation+ (SM-DP+)        EIDs.
                             The SM-DP+ binds Protected Profile Packages to the respective
                             EID and securely downloads these Bound Profile Packages to the
                             LPA of the respective eUICC.
Subscription Manager         This is responsible for providing addresses of one or more SM-
Discovery Server (SM-DS)     DP+(s) to a LDS.
                             A security module consisting of hardware and low-level software
                             providing resistance against software and hardware attacks,
Tamper Resistant Element
                             capable of securely hosting operating systems together with
                             applications and their confidential and cryptographic data.
                             A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an
                             eUICC to provide connectivity to test equipment for the purpose of
Test Profile
                             testing the Device and the eUICC. A test Profile is not intended to
                             store any Operator Credentials.
                             According to NIST SP 800-53r4 [18][18][18], a mechanism by
                             which an End User (through an input Device) can communicate
                             directly with the security functions of the information system with
Trusted Link                 the necessary confidence to support the system security policy.
                             This mechanism can only be activated by the End User or the
                             security functions of the information system and cannot be imitated
                             by untrusted software.
Term                         Description
                             Describes the direct, real time acquisition of the manual End User
User Intent                  input on the LUI to trigger locally a Profile download or Profile
                             Management operation.

1.5 Abbreviations

Abbreviation                 Description
AC                           Activation Code
ARA-M                        Access Rule Application - Master
ARF                          Access Rule File
AuC                          Authentication Centre
BSS                          Business Support Services
CI                           Certificate Issuer
DNSCurve                     Domain Name System Curve
DNSSEC                       Domain Name System Security Extensions
ECASD                        eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain
EID                          Embedded UICC Identifier
eSVN                         embedded UICC Specification Version Number
ETSI                         European Telecommunications Standards Institute
eUICC                        Embedded UICC
EUM                          eUICC Manufacturer
FASG                         Fraud and Security Group
FFS                          For Further Study
GSMA                         GSM Association
GSMA CI                      GSMA Certificate Issuer
HLR                          Home Location Register
HTTP                         Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ICCID                        Integrated Circuit Card Identifier
IMSI                         International Mobile Subscriber Identity
ISD-P                        Issuer Security Domain - Profile
ISD-R                        Issuer Security Domain - Root
ISIM                         IP Multimedia Services Identity Module
ITU                          International Telecoms Union
LDS                          Local Discovery Service
LPA                          Local Profile Assistant
LPD                          Local Profile Download
LUI                          Local User Interface
M4M                          Mifare4Mobile
MFA                          Multi-Factor Authentication
Abbreviation                 Description
MNO                          Mobile Network Operator
MNO-SD                       Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain
MSISDN                       Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number
NAA                          Network Access Application
OS                           Operating System
OTA                          Over The Air
PFS                          Perfect Forward Secrecy
RAM                          Remote Application Management
RAT                          Rules Authorisation Table
RFM                          Remote File Management
RMPF                         Remote Memory Protection Function
SAS                          Security Accreditation Scheme
SD                           Security Domain
SIM                          Subscriber Identity Module
SM-DP+                       Subscription Manager - Data Preparation +
SM-DS                        Subscription Manager - Discovery Server
SSD                          Supplementary Secure Domain
TL                           Trust Link
TRE                          Tamper Resistant Element
USIM                         Universal Subscriber Identity Module

1.6 References

Ref          Document Number         Title
                                      X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
      [1]      RFC 5280
                                      Revocation List (CRL) Profile
                                      UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical
      [2]      ETSI TS 102 221
                                      characteristics
                                      Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+);
      [3]      3GPP TS 23.003         Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS);
                                      Numbering, addressing and identification
                                      The international identification plan for public networks
      [4]      ITU E.212
                                      and Subscriptions
                                      Trusted Connectivity Alliance (former SIMalliance): eUICC
                                      Profile Package - Interoperable Format Technical
      [5]      TCAAPP
                                      Specification
                                      http://simalliance.org/euicc/euicc-technical-releases/
                                      “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
      [6]      RFC 2119               Levels”, S. Bradner
                                      http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
      [7]      3GPP TS 21.133         3G security; Security threats and requirements
Ref          Document Number         Title
                                      GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC
      [8]      SGP.02
                                      Technical specification
      [9]      GPC_SPE_034            GlobalPlatform Card Specification with its Amendments
                                      Specification of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1:
      [10]     3GPP TS 35.231
                                      Algorithm Specification
                                      Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document
      [11]     3GPP TS 35.205
                                      1: General
                                      Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document
      [12]     3GPP TS 35.206
                                      2: Algorithm Specification
                                      FS.04 - Security Accreditation Scheme for UICC
      [13]     EUM SAS
                                      Production – Standard
      [14]     ITU-T E.118            The International Telecommunication Charge Card
                                      GlobalPlatform Device Technology Secure Element
      [15]     GPD_SPE_013
                                      Access Control - Version 1.1
                                      Personalisation of Mobile Equipment - Mobile functionality
      [16]     3GPP TS 22.022
                                      specification
      [17]     TS.26                  GSMA NFC Handset Requirements
                                      Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information
      [18]     NIST SP 800-53r4
                                      Systems and Organisations – Revision 4
                                      Trusted Connectivity Alliance (former SIMalliance) Open
      [19]     OMAPI
                                      Mobile API Specification
      [20]     SGP.03                 NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1
      [21]     SGP.05                 Embedded UICC Protection Profile
      [22]     FS.08                  FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3
      [23]     SGP.21                 SGP.21 Architecture Specification - Version 1.0
      [24]     SGP.22                 SGP.22 Technical Specification - Version 2.2
                                      SGP.25 RSP eUICC for Consumer Device Protection
                                      Profile
      [25]     SGP.25                 NOTE: This document does not exist at the time of
                                      writing, reference will be valid once the document is
                                      available.
      [26]     SGP.14                 SGP.14 GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy v1.1
      [27]     EMVCo_Sec              EMVCo Security Evaluation Process 5.1 – June 2016
      [28]     FS.09                  FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v3
                                      Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
      [29]     BSI-CC-PP-0084
                                      Packages
                                      Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
      [30]     NIST SP 800-108
                                      Pseudorandom Functions
                                      Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key
      [31]     BSI TR-02102-1
                                      Lengths
      [32]     ANSSI RGS v2 B1        Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 Annexe B1
Ref           Document Number            Title
                JIL-Application-of-       Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar
      [33]      Attack-Potential-to-      Devices
                Smartcards-v2-9           Version 2.9, Jan 2013
                                          Guideline for Using Cryptographic Standards in the
      [34]      NIST SP 800-175B
                                          Federal Government: Cryptographic Mechanisms
                                          SOG-IS Smartcards and similar devices CC supporting
      [35]      SOG-IS                    documents at this link:
                                          https://www.sogis.eu/uk/supporting_doc_en.html
      [36]      SGP.23                    RSP Test Specification
                                          Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key
      [37]      RFC 8174                  Words
                                          https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174

1.7 Conventions

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [6] and clarified by RFC8174 [37][37], when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here[6][6][6].

“FFS” or “For Further Study” means that it will be covered in the next version of SGP.21.

2 Principles

This section contains the principles related to the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning system for the Embedded UICC.

The solution based on the requirements described within this document has to be provided in a non-discriminatory manner.

2.1 Basic Principles

Principle no.    Description
                 Existing standards and specifications SHALL be used where possible for the
BAS1
                 specification of the eUICC and related provisioning systems.
                 GlobalPlatform specifications SHALL be used as a framework of choice for the
BAS2
                 implementation of the eUICC.
                 The overall security of the eUICC in combination with the related management
BAS3             processes SHALL at all times and under all circumstances be at least equivalent
                 to the current removable UICC and its provisioning processes.
                 The architecture of the eUICC and its Remote SIM Provisioning system SHALL
BAS4
                 comply with the requirements of 3GPP TS 21.133 [7].
                 The architecture SHALL support a level of security with respect to the protection
                 of Operator Credentials which is at least equivalent to the present levels of
BAS5             security. This applies in particular to:
                     the confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters;
                     the integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI).
Principle no.   Description
                The architecture SHALL support a level of security for all Profile content which is
BAS6
                at least equivalent to the current state of the art level of security of the UICC.
                The architecture SHALL NOT compromise the security and privacy of Subscriber
                Data, nor the security and privacy of End User Data. Examples depending on
BAS7
                territory include identities that can be used for tracking such as ICCID, MSISDN,
                EID, IMSI Ki etc.
                Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of this document. However,
BAS8            any data which could be used to identify an individual SHALL be treated as
                personal data and subject to local regulations e.g. the EID, ICCID, etc.

Table 1: Basic Principles

2.2 Profile Principles

Principle no.   Description
                Profiles are the property of and SHALL be under the control of the issuing
PRO1
                Operator.
                A Profile does not exist outside of an eUICC. I.e. a Profile is always located on a
PRO2
                particular eUICC.
PRO3            A Profile SHALL be uniquely identified by its ICCID.
                An Enabled Profile in combination with an eUICC SHALL be able to carry all
PRO4
                logical characteristics of a UICC.
                Once the Profile is enabled, all relevant UICC characteristics or features as
PRO5            described in ETSI 102 221 [2] specifications SHALL apply, with the exceptions
                as defined within this specification.
                It SHALL be possible to delete Profiles only when in a disabled state, with the
PRO6
                exception of eUICC Memory Reset, and eUICC Test Memory Reset functions.
PRO7            Profile Management SHALL be governed by policy.
                A Profile SHALL be either an Operational Profile, a Provisioning Profile or a Test
PRO8
                Profile.

Table 2: Profile Principles

3 Roles

3.1 eUICC Manufacturer

Role no.           Description
                   The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the initial cryptographic
EUM1
                   configuration and security architecture of the eUICC.
EUM2               The eUICCs are delivered by the eUICC Manufacturer (EUM).
                   Relevant parts of the eUICC Manufacturer’s products and processes are
EUM3
                   certified by a GSMA-approved certification process.
                   The EUM issues the eUICC Certificate to allow:
EUM4                   eUICC authentication and proof of certification to other entities;
                       authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-DP+ and an eUICC.
Role no.           Description
                   The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any LPA
EUM5               elements that reside in the eUICC and the compliance of the LPA with the
                   requirements in Section 4.11.3.

Table 3: eUICC Manufacturer Role

3.2 Device Manufacturer

Role no.           Description
                   The Device Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any LPA
DM1                elements that reside on the Device and the compliance of the LPA with the
                   requirements in Section 4.11.
                   The Device Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of
DM2                any application that resides on the Primary Device allowing Local User
                   Interface access to the Companion Device.

Table 4: Device Manufacturer Role

3.3 Operator and Service Provider

This section describes the characteristics of the Operator and Service Provider roles relevant to this architecture and its operation. Other characteristics exist but are considered out of scope.

Role no.           Description
OPE1               The Operator has access to a SM-DP+ via the ES2+ interface.
                   In the event that a Subscriber has selected a Service Provider, that Service
OPE2
                   Provider will initiate the provisioning of a Profile Package.
                   The Operator, potentially on behalf of the Service Provider, specifies the
OPE3               Profile characteristics and any features and applications analogous to
                   removable UICCs.
                   The Operator is able to use an OTA Platform to manage the content of its
OPE4
                   Enabled Profile in the eUICC (RAM, RFM).

Table 5: Operator Role

3.4 Subscriber and End User

Role no.           Description
                   The Subscriber is the contract partner of the Service Provider for the
SEU1               Subscription.
                   Note: The Subscriber MAY not be the End User.
                   The End User is a human and uses the Device and/or the services related to
SEU2
                   the Enabled Profile.

Table 6: Subscriber and End User Role

3.5 Certificate Issuer

Role no.           Description
                   The Certificate Issuer issues Certificates for GSMA accredited Remote SIM
CIS1               Provisioning entities and acts as a trusted third party for the purpose of
                   authenticating the entities of the system.
                   The Certificate Issuer communicates with the SM-DP+, SM-DS and the EUM
CIS2               through interfaces that are out of scope of this specification according to
                   SGP.14 [26].

Table 7: Certificate Issuer Role

4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture

This section contains the functional description of the Remote SIM Provisioning system architecture for the Embedded UICC.

Figure 1: Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture

4.1 eUICC Architecture

4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview

This section describes the internal high-level architecture of the eUICC. The eUICC architecture is similar to that used in the GSMA Remote SIM specification [8]. Profiles are provisioned based on the security framework defined in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].

Figure 2: Schematic Representation of the eUICC

4.1.1.1 ECASD

The Embedded UICC Controlling Authority Security Domain (ECASD) is responsible for the secure storage of credentials needed to support the required security domains on the eUICC.

There SHALL only be one ECASD on an eUICC. The ECASD SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during the eUICC manufacturing as described in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].

The ECASD SHALL contain the following:
         eUICC private keys for creating signatures.
         Associated Certificates for eUICC authentication.
         The Certificate Issuers’ (CI) root public keys for verifying SM-DP+ and SM-DS
          Certificates.
         eUICC Manufacturers’ (EUMs) keyset for key/Certificate renewal.

Additionally, the ECASD SHALL provide security functions used during key establishment and eUICC authentication.

4.1.1.2 ISD-R

The ISD-R is responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.

4.1.1.3 ISD-P

The ISD-P is a secure container (security domain) for the hosting of a Profile. The ISD-P is used for Profile download and installation in collaboration with the Profile Package interpreter for the decoding/interpretation of the received Bound Profile Package.

The ISD-P is the on-card representative of the SM-DP+.

4.1.1.4 MNO-SD

The MNO-SD is the on-card representative of the Operator. It contains the Operator’s Over- The-Air (OTA) Keys and provides a secure OTA channel.

4.1.1.5 Profile Policy Enabler

The eUICC Operating System (OS) service which offers Profile Policy Rules validation and enforcement.

4.1.1.6 Telecom Framework

The telecom framework is an operating system service that provides standardised network authentication algorithms to the NAAs hosted in the ISD-Ps. Furthermore, it offers the capability to configure the algorithms with the necessary parameters.

4.1.1.7 Profile Package Interpreter

The Profile Package interpreter is an eUICC operating system service that translates the Profile Package data into an installed Profile using the specific internal format of the target eUICC.

4.1.1.8 LPA Services

The LPA services provide necessary access to the services and data required by the LPA functions for the following:

1. The Root SM-DS address. 2. The optionally stored default SM-DP+ address. 3. Facilitates the reception of the Bound Profile Package in transfer from the LPA. 4. Provide information regarding the installed Profiles and their Profile Metadata. 5. Provides Local Profile Management. 6. Provides functions for the LPA to authenticate and interact with the SM-DS. 7. Ensures access to the EID is restricted to only the LPA.

4.2 Interfaces

Figure 3: Interfaces on the eUICC Architecture with the LPA in the Device

Configuration

4.2.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)

The ES2+ interface is used by the Operator to order Profiles for specific eUICCs as well as other administrative functions.

4.2.2 Operator – End User (ESop)

ESop is the interface between the Operator and the End User.

This interface is out of scope of this specification.

4.2.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)

ESeu is the interface between the End User and the LUI.

In a Primary/Companion Device scenario the LUI used SHALL only reside within the Companion Device or its eUICC.

The ESeu interface is used to support the following requirements:

Req no.             Description
                    The Local Profile Management Operations SHALL be executed only over
ESeu1
                    the ESeu interface.
                    Each Local Profile Management Operation SHALL be explicitly initiated by
ESeu2
                    the End User, and verified by User Intent.
                    The ESeu interface SHALL support the triggering and confirmation of the
ESeu3               Profile download and installation operation and Local Profile Management
                    Operations requested by the End User.

Table 8: End User to LUI (ESeu) Interface Requirements

4.2.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)

The ES6 interface is used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services.

4.2.5 SM-DP+ – LPD (ES9+)

The ES9+ interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the LPD.

4.2.6 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)

The ES8+ interface provides a secure end-to-end channel between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC for the administration of the ISD-P and the associated Profile during download and installation.

4.2.7 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)

The ES12 interface allows any SM-DP+ to issue or remove Event Registrations on the SM- DS.

4.2.8 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)

The ES11 interface allows the LDS to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC.

4.2.9 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)

ESeum is the interface between the EUM and the eUICC. This interface is out of scope of this specification.

4.2.10 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)

The ES10a interface is used by the LPA in the Device to get the configured addresses from the eUICC for Root SM-DS, and optionally the default SM-DP+.

4.2.11 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)

The ES10b interface is used by the LPD in the Device and the LPA services to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.

4.2.12 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)

The ES10c interface is used between the LUI in the Device and the LPA services for Local Profile Management by the End User.

4.2.13 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)

In the case of deployments with cascaded SM-DSs, the ES15 interface is used to connect the SM-DSs.

4.2.14 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)

This connection will be provided either by:

     An internet connectivity available or provided on the same Device where the LPA
      resides
      or
     An internet connection shared from another Device via a local go-between connection

Figure 4: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to the

SM-DP+

4.2.15 General Interface Requirements

Req no.             Description
INT1                All interfaces from the eUICC SHALL indicate the eSVN.
INT2                The behaviour of all interfaces SHALL support the indicated eSVN.
                    During the indication of the supported eSVN from the eUICC to the SM-
INT3                DP+, the eUICC version SHALL be used or the procedure SHALL fail. See
                    table below.
                    All communicating entities involved in Remote SIM Provisioning SHALL be
INT4                mutually authenticated. The Device and the eUICC are considered as one
                    entity in this context.

Table 9: General Interface Requirements

Platform      Version 1 (V1)           Version 2 (V2)               Version 3 (V3)
eUICC V1      Platform uses V1      Platform uses V1 or fails.   Platform uses V1 or fails.
eUICC V2             ✗                  Platform uses V2         Platform uses V2 or fails.
eUICC V3             ✗                          ✗                    Platform uses V3

Table 10: eUICC Version vs. Platform

4.3 eUICC Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     The eUICC SHALL be a discrete or integrated tamper resistant component
                     consisting of hardware and software, capable of securely hosting
EUICC1               applications as well as confidential and cryptographic data.
                     Note: Wherever a distinction is required, the former is referred to as
                     Discrete eUICC, and the latter as Integrated eUICC.
EUICC2               A removable eUICC is packaged in a standardised ETSI Form Factor [2].
EUICC3               The Discrete eUICC SHALL be either removable or non-removable.
                     The behaviour of the eUICC with an Enabled Profile SHALL be equivalent
EUICC4
                     to the UICC.
EUICC5               The eUICC SHALL be able to contain zero or more Profiles.
EUICC6               At a maximum, only one Profile SHALL be enabled at any point in time.
                     The behaviour of a NAA USIM or ISIM within a Profile on an eUICC SHALL
                     be identical to a removable UICC NAAs USIM or ISIM.
EUICC7
                     Note: No changes to existing 3GPP/3GPP2 USIM, CSIM and ISIM
                     specifications are expected.
                     The eUICC SHALL support Milenage [11][12] and TUAK [10] algorithm
EUICC8
                     sets[10][10].
                     The ownership of the eUICC MAY change throughout its lifetime as can the
                     Device.
EUICC9
                     Note: According to CERTEU11, the EUM keyset belongs to the EUM for the
                     lifetime of the eUICC.
Req no.              Description
                     If any Profile Management operation does not complete successfully, the
EUICC10
                     eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request.
                     The eUICC SHALL contain an ECASD and ISD-R security domains installed
EUICC11
                     and personalised during manufacture.
                     It SHALL not be possible to delete or disable the ECASD after eUICC
EUICC12
                     manufacture.
                     The ISD-R SHALL be responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the
EUICC13
                     lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.
                     The ISD-R SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during eUICC
EUICC14
                     manufacturing as described in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].
                     The eUICC SHALL support an eUICC Memory Reset. This can only be
EUICC15
                     requested by the End User.
                     If the eUICC supports Test Profiles, the eUICC SHALL support eUICC Test
EUICC16
                     Memory Reset.
                     The eUICC SHALL support the eUICC Profile Package Interoperable format
EUICC17
                     as defined by Trusted Connectivity Alliance [5].
                     An ISD-R SHALL:
                         be created within an eUICC at the time of manufacture;
EUICC18
                         NOT be deleted or disabled;
                         NOT be able to perform any operations inside an ISD-P.
EUICC19              An eUICC MAY provide LPA functions.
EUICC20              An ISD-P SHALL be created by the ISD-R at the request of the SM-DP+.
                     Communication between the eUICC and the SM-DP+ SHALL be protected
EUICC21
                     in authenticity, integrity and confidentiality.
EUICC22              The eUICC SHALL NOT export Profiles installed on the eUICC.
                     The eUICC SHALL enforce an isolation of Profiles and prevent Profiles from
EUICC23              operating outside of their execution environment i.e. Profile SHALL run in a
                     sandbox.
                     The integrity of the Bound Profile Package SHALL be ensured during its
EUICC24
                     installation on the eUICC.
                     Profile keys and algorithm parameters SHALL NOT be extractable from the
EUICC26
                     eUICC.
                     All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a robust tamper-
EUICC27
                     resistant way and be resistant to side-channel attacks.
                     The Operator SHALL be able to update the OTA Keys in its Profile on the
EUICC28              eUICC in a secure and confidential way, reusing existing OTA Platform
                     mechanisms.
                     A downloaded Profile Package SHALL be installed on the eUICC in a
EUICC29
                     disabled state.
                     The eUICC SHALL always report its eSVN in the first communication during
EUICC30
                     the commencement of each session with the SM-DP+ or SM-DS.
                     The EUM SHALL install an eUICC Certificate in the eUICC used to
EUICC31
                     authenticate the eUICC and verify the eUICC certification.
Req no.              Description
                     The EUM SHALL install an EUM Certificate in the eUICC used to verify the
EUICC32
                     eUICC Certificate.
EUICC33              The eUICC SHALL have a means to authenticate itself to the SM-DS.
EUICC34              The eUICC SHALL protect itself against unauthorised access.
                     Upon Profile deletion, the eUICC SHALL ensure a complete deletion of all
EUICC35
                     data related to the Profile.
                     The eUICC SHALL only accept Profile Management operations sent from
EUICC36
                     the LPA in either the eUICC, or the Device.
                     The eUICC SHALL reject any Profile Management operations that are in
EUICC37
                     conflict with the Profile Policy Rules of the respective Profile.
                     If any Bound Profile Package download or installation does not complete
EUICC38              successfully, the eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it
                     received the request.
                     The eUICC SHALL support GlobalPlatform Secure Element Access Control
EUICC39
                     [15].
                     There SHALL be a means to pre-set a default SM-DP+ address in the
EUICC40
                     eUICC.
EUICC41              The eUICC SHALL store the Root SM-DS address.
                     The eUICC SHALL be able to send a delete Notification to the LPA to notify
EUICC42
                     the Notification Receivers that the Profile has been deleted.
                     In EUICC42, if connectivity is not available to send the Notification of
EUICC43              deletion to the Notification Receivers, each Notification SHALL be retained
                     and sent as soon as connectivity becomes available again.
                     The delete Notification process SHALL also be executed for each deleted
EUICC44
                     Profile in case of eUICC Memory reset.
                     The eUICC SHALL support a set of standard functions and services
                     including, but not limited to Java Applications, USIM Toolkit functions and
                     GlobalPlatform features. The list of supported functions and services (e.g.
EUICC45              API package names and versions) SHALL be explicitly referenced within the
                     technical specification (SGP.22 [24]). A different set of functions and
                     services MAY be defined/supported according to the different Embedded
                     UICC categories as defined in Annex D.
                     The eUICC SHALL support at least the following USIM Toolkit commands:
                        PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION including the following fields: local
                         info, IMEI, network measure results, date & time, access technology
                         TERMINAL PROFILE
EUICC46                  ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD)
                         SEND SHORT MESSAGE
                         DISPLAY TEXT
                         GET INPUT
                         RING TONE
                     An eUICC SHALL support at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters
EUICC47              preloaded by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing, defined in GSMA
                     SGP.22 [24].
Req no.               Description
                      Each Notification SHALL be uniquely identifiable and SHALL be signed by
EUICC48
                      the eUICC.
                      Each Notification SHALL be protected against re-play attacks and signed by
EUICC49
                      the eUICC.
EUICC50               [Void]
EUICC51               [Void]
                      The Profile SHALL be able to contain a list of zero or more Notification
EUICC52
                      Receivers for each type of Notification.
                      The eUICC SHALL support SHA-1. Usage of SHA-1 SHALL be strictly
EUICC53
                      limited to applications inside the Profile where the use of SHA-1 is required.
                      The EID SHALL not be modifiable. The EID SHALL not be affected by any
EUICC54
                      of the procedures, including the change of the eUICC Private keys.
                      An Integrated eUICC SHALL conform to the additional requirements defined
EUICC55
                      in Annex J.
EUICC56               The Integrated eUICC SHALL be based on an Integrated TRE.
                      An Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to execute the test cases defined in
EUICC57
                      SGP.23 [36].

Table 11: eUICC Requirements

4.4 eUICC Eligibility Check

The eUICC eligibility check enables a SM-DP+ to validate the eligibility of an eUICC for the installation of a Profile using information sent by the eUICC. The set of information sent by the eUICC to the SM-DP+ for eligibility checking purposes is referenced herein as the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. Some eUICC eligibility check parameters MAY be required due to Device capabilities which must be supported by the Profile/eUICC and delivered as part of the eUICC Eligibility Check Information set.

Note: Device capability refers to a Device feature or service-enabling function provided by the Device that MAY have a direct effect on the content of the Profile or the procedure used to download the Profile, and consequently requires support from the eUICC.

4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     The eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version it is supporting. This
ELG1                 parameter SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility
                     check.
                     The eUICC SHALL include the available memory in the eUICC Eligibility
ELG2
                     Check Information.
                     The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it is unable
ELG3
                     to accept an additional Profile.
                     The eUICC SHALL provide a valid current Certificate to the SM-DP+ signed
ELG4
                     by the EUM with the Eligibility Check Information.
                     The eUICC SHALL provide an identification of the EUM with the Eligibility
ELG5
                     Check Information.
                     The eUICC SHALL provide in the Eligibility Check Information, the current
ELG6
                     OS version.
                     The eUICC SHALL provide in the Eligibility Check Information Device
ELG7                 enabler information relating to services that MAY need Profile support (e.g.
                     NFC enablers).
                     Eligibility Check Information SHALL be integrity and authenticity protected
ELG8
                     by the eUICC for its sending to the SM-DP+.
                     The eUICC SHALL indicate the application runtime environment version
ELG9
                     and libraries versions supported in eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
                     The eUICC SHALL indicate cryptographic algorithms and their respective
ELG10
                     key lengths supported in the eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
                     The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information the list of
ELG11
                     supported CIs.
                     The eUICC SHALL indicate its current certification status in the Eligibility
ELG12
                     Check Information.
                     If the eUICC is NFC capable (e.g. CAT3) the Device SHALL indicate its
ELG13                support for the relevant NFC services including its current certification
                     status during the eUICC Eligibility Check.
                     The eUICC SHALL indicate its category (see Annex D). This parameter
ELG14
                     SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check.
                     An eUICC SHALL provide information indicating if it is a Discrete eUICC or
ELG15
                     an Integrated eUICC.

Table 12: eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements

Note: It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and could be used for the eligibility check procedure.

4.5 Device Requirements

Req no.               Description
                      The Device SHALL conform to the terminal requirements within ETSI TS
DEV1
                      102 221 [2] with the exceptions as defined in this specification.
                      There SHALL be a means for the End User to obtain the EID through the
DEV2
                      Device software. This SHALL only be possible through the LUI.
                      If an eUICC is within the Device packaging, then the EID SHALL be printed
DEV3
                      in machine readable form on the Device packaging.
                      Bearer connection of the Companion Device to the SM-DP+ SHALL only
                      be determined by the bearer availability.
DEV4
                      Note: The Companion Device MAY use any connectivity method available
                      to connect to the SM-DP+.
                      Devices compliant with the GSMA NFC Handset Requirements [17] SHALL
                      support the Open Mobile API [19] used by the Device applications to
DEV5
                      exchange data with their counterpart applications running in the Enabled
                      Profile on the eUICC.
Req no.               Description
                      The implementation of the Remote SIM Provisioning specification in the
DEV6                  Device SHALL not impact the potential use of the SIM Lock mechanism
                      defined in 3GPP TS 22.022 [16].[16]
                      In the case where the Device supports both the LPA in the Device, and the
DEV7                  LPA in the eUICC, the Device SHALL have a mechanism (setting or
                      configuration parameter) that sets which LPA SHALL be used.
DEV8                  The End User SHALL be able to modify the parameter defined in DEV7.
                      A Device that supports an embedded UICC without an LPA in the eUICC,
DEV9
                      SHALL provide LPA functions.
                      A Device that supports only an embedded UICC with an LPA in the eUICC,
DEV10
                      MAY provide LPA functions.
                      If the Device supports Device Test Modes, the Device SHALL support
DEV11                 eUICC Test Memory Reset. eUICC Test Memory Reset can only be
                      requested by the End User when the Device is in Device Test Mode.
                      Where technically feasible, the Device SHALL implement a mechanism
                      allowing the End User to protect the access to the Device and its Profile
                      Management Operations with personal data. Implementation is OEM
DEV12
                      specific.
                      Note: This can be achieved by the implementation of a Device PIN lock,
                      fingerprint, password, facial recognition (etc.)
                      The End User SHOULD be able to enable/disable the mechanism
DEV13                 described in DEV12. Implementation is OEM specific.
                      Note: The mechanism described in DEV12 should be enabled by default.
                      With respect to LPA41, a Device containing any additional feature that
                      affects the status of Operational Profiles SHOULD enforce the
                      Confirmation Level of the equivalent Local Profile Management Operations
                      defined in this specification. The mechanism and process of the
                      Confirmation Level is implementation specific. The End User SHOULD be
                      able to revoke/unset a cached Confirmation previously given, if any.
DEV14
                      NOTE: In case the LPA or a Device application performs automatic Profile
                      management, the Device or the application must ensure that the End User
                      has been made fully aware of the conditions under which the service
                      operates.

NOTE:The Device protects against abuse or malevolence of management of profiles as compared to the specified LPA functionalities.

Table 13: Device Requirements

4.5.1 Device Capability Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     There SHALL be a mechanism that is able to provide the Device capabilities
DEVCAP1
                     to the SM-DP+.

Table 14: Device Capability Requirements

4.5.2 Device with Integrated eUICC

Req no.              Description
                     Access to any Remote Memory used by the TRE to store software and data
                     as defined in GS01 SHALL be protected against attacks on availability (e.g.
DIE1
                     Denial of Service, memory corruption, tampering) by other Device
                     components.
                     All Integrated TRE software and data stored in Remote Memory outside the
DIE2                 SoC, per GS01 SHALL be protected against access by non Integrated TRE
                     components.

Table 15: Device with Integrated eUICC Requirements

4.6 Device Initialisation

4.6.1 Device Reset Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     It SHALL be possible for the End User to perform any type of Device reset
FAC1
                     without affecting the status of the eUICC.
                     The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the
FAC2
                     eUICC Memory Reset.
                     The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the
FAC3
                     eUICC Test Memory Reset.

Table 16: Device Reset Requirements

4.6.2 eUICC Memory Reset Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC apart from
MEM1
                     pre-installed Profiles that are flagged as permanent.
                     eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC regardless of
MEM2                 their Profile Policy Rules but not the Provisioning Profile or preinstalled Test
                     Profiles.
                     Strong Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to initiate eUICC Memory
MEM3
                     Reset.
                     In addition to MEM3, other secure means MAY be provided to perform the
                     eUICC Memory Reset function. The same level of security as is offered by
MEM4
                     the LUI based reset function SHALL apply. User Intent and Confirmation
                     Request SHALL apply.

Table 17: eUICC Memory Reset Requirements

4.6.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     eUICC Test Memory Reset SHALL delete all post-issuance installed Test
MEMT1
                     Profiles on the eUICC including the Enabled Test Profile if any.
                     Simple Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to enable eUICC Test
MEMT2
                     Memory Reset.
                     If Test Profiles are not supported, then eUICC Test Memory Reset is not
MEMT3
                     required.

Table 18: eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements

4.7 Profile Requirements

4.7.1 Test Profile Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     It is OPTIONAL for the removable eUICC to support the requirements of
TPRO1                Test Profiles described in this section. If Test Profiles are not supported, it
                     SHALL not be possible to download Test Profiles into the eUICC.
                     Test Profiles SHALL NOT be able to authenticate to an Operator’s mobile
                     network using Operator Credentials. The eUICC SHALL ensure that such
TPRO2
                     Profiles cannot be used to connect to any Operator’s mobile network even if
                     authentication information is contained in the Test Profile.
TPRO3                A Test Profile SHALL be installed in its own individual ISD-P.
TPRO4                Test Profiles MAY be pre-installed on the eUICC.
                     Test Profiles SHALL only be visible and usable when the Device is in
TPRO5
                     Device Test Mode.
                     It SHALL be possible to download, install, enable, disable or delete Test
TPRO6                Profiles in the eUICC only in Device Test Mode with the exception of the
                     eUICC Memory Reset operation.
                     Test Profiles, as with any other Profile, SHALL be managed through a
TPRO7
                     certified SM-DP+.
                     The enabling of a Test Profile SHALL override the ‘Disabling of this Profile
TPRO8
                     is not allowed’ (POL RULE1) Profile Policy Rule.
                     When the Device Test Mode is deactivated, the LPA SHALL disable any
TPRO9
                     enabled Test Profile.
                     When the Test Profile is disabled, the eUICC SHALL enable the Operational
TPRO10
                     Profile that was previously enabled, if any.
TPRO11               The Device Test Mode activation SHALL be obfuscated from the End User.
                     When exiting Device Test Mode, an End User notice SHALL be presented
TPRO12
                     to prompt the tester to perform an eUICC Test Memory Reset.

Table 19: Test Profiles Requirements

The Device MAY implement a mechanism for connecting an external SIM card for the purpose of testing in the context of Device repair, without affecting the state of the eUICC.

4.7.2 Provisioning Profile Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     Provisioning Profiles SHALL be based on the same format structure as
PPRO1
                     described for the Profile (Figure 2).
                     A Provisioning Profile MAY be enabled by the LPA upon End User request
PPRO2                for operations defined in PPRO6 if establishment of the connectivity using
                     the currently Enabled Profile is unsuccessful. If this results in an Operational
                     Profile being disabled, the End User SHALL first give consent to the loss of
                     communication provided by the Enabled Profile.
                     Provisioning Profiles and their associated Profile Metadata SHALL not be
PPRO3
                     visible to the End User on the LUI.
PPRO4                Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be selectable by the End User.
                     Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be deleted through any action by the End
PPRO5
                     User including the use of eUICC Memory Reset.
                     Provisioning Profile SHALL only be used for the intended purposes of
PPRO6                Profile downloading and related Profile maintenance functions. The
                     Provisioning Profile SHALL not be used as an Operational Profile.
PPRO7                PPRO6 SHALL be enforceable in the RSP architecture.

Table 20: Provisioning Profile Requirements

4.8 Profile Metadata Requirements

Req no.             Description
META1               All Profiles SHALL have associated Profile Metadata.
META2               The Profile Metadata SHALL be stored in the eUICC.
                    The Profile Metadata SHALL be accessible irrespective of the state of the
META3
                    Profile.
                    The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the Service Provider name.
META4               Note: EFSPN is already used in a different context outside of this
                    specification and could be blank.
META5               The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile.
                    The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of the
META6
                    Profile.
                    The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description
META7
                    of the Profile defined by the Operator/Service Provider.
META8               The eUICC SHALL support the ‘set/edit nickname’ function.
META9               The Profile Metadata SHALL always be available to the LUI.
                    The Profile Metadata SHALL include an OPTIONAL field to allow the display
META10
                    of an icon defined by the Operator/Service Provider for the respective Profile.
                    The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include a copy of the Profile Policy
META11
                    Rules associated to the Profile.
                    All Profiles SHALL be uniquely identified in the Profile Metadata as
META12
                    Operational, Provisioning or Test Profile.
                    An Operator SHALL be able to access and update the following Profile
                    Metadata of its Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is Enabled:
META13                  Service Provider name
                        Short description of the Profile
                        Icon of the Profile
                        Table 21: Profile Metadata Requirements

4.9 NFC Requirements

An NFC Device and an NFC eUICC SHALL be compliant with the following list of requirements:

Req no.               Description
NFC1                  An NFC Device SHALL be compliant with GSMA TS 26 [17][17][17].
                      After installation of an Operational Profile, the NFC eUICC SHALL support
NFC2                  all requirements as specified in the SGP.03 GSMA NFC UICC
                      Requirements Specification [20].
                      The NFC Device SHALL retrieve and enforce access control rules as
NFC3
                      specified in the GlobalPlatform SEAC specification [15].
                      The eUICC SHALL be able to generate proof that the Operational Profile
NFC4
                      has been deleted.
                      All NFC applications and NFC enabling applications (e.g. ARA-M, PPSE,
                      CRS, CREL, etc.) attached to an Operational Profile SHALL be included
NFC5                  under the ISD-P created for the Profile, either under the MNO-SD or in an
                      SD hierarchy with a self-extradited SSD with authorised management
                      privilege.
                      The NFC eUICC solution SHALL be able to provide assurance to NFC
                      application Service Providers that the combination of an eUICC and
NFC6                  Operational Profile is trusted. This solution SHALL be based on the CASD
                      that is part of the Operational Profile and scenario Push 2B and scenario 3
                      as specified by SGP.03 [20].
                      If the NFC eUICC is compliant with M4M, the eUICC SHALL reset all the
NFC7                  M4M virtual cards associated to that Profile when a Profile containing M4M
                      applications is disabled.
                      The appropriate NFC related certification information SHALL be part of the
NFC8
                      information shared with the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check.
                      A NFC Device SHALL at least have an embedded eUICC or have the
NFC9                  capability to support a removable eUICC that is compliant with CAT3 and
                      SGP.03 [20] in either instance.

Table 22: NFC Requirements

4.10 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+)

4.10.1 SM-DP+ Overview

The SM-DP+ is responsible for the creation, generation, management and the protection of resulting Profiles upon the input/request of the Operator. It is also responsible for the delivery of a Profile within a Bound Profile Package, making the Bound Profile Package available for the secure delivery. In addition, the SM-DP+ is responsible for requesting the creation of the ISD-P in the eUICC into which the Profile will be installed. The SM-DP+ will also be the off-card entity that will be responsible for the lifecycle management of the ISD-P that was created at its request. This is performed via the distinct functions listed below.

Figure 5: SM-DP+ Functions

Function name        Description
                     Creates Profile Packages [i.e. Personalised Profiles, including (IMSI, Ki,
Profile Package      ICCID…)] from Profile Descriptions agreed with Operators. This can be an
Generation           off-line batch or real time process.
Profile Package      Secures each Profile Package according to the security process creating
Protection           the Protected Profile Package.
Profile Package      Binds the Protected Profile Package to a target eUICC using the security
Binding              process thus creating the Bound Profile Package.
Profile Package      Temporarily stores Protected Profile Packages or Bound Profile Packages
Storage              for subsequent delivery to the eUICC.
Profile Package      Securely transmits and installs the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC
Delivery             through the LPA.
SM-DS Event
                     Notifies the SM-DS of a pending operation for a specific eUICC.
Registration

Table 23: SM-DP+ Function Descriptions

4.10.2 SM-DP+ Requirements

Req no.              Description
SMDP1                The SM-DP+ SHALL act on behalf of an Operator.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to initiate the request for ISD-P creation as
SMDP2
                     part of the Bound Profile Package delivery.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL establish an end-to-end secure channel to the eUICC
SMDP3
                     to download and install Bound Profile Packages on the eUICC.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL link a Protected Profile Package for binding to a
SMDP4
                     specific eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the linked
SMDP5
                     Protected Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any
SMDP6
                     Certified eUICC.
Req no.              Description
                     Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound
SMDP7
                     Profile Package delivered by the SM-DP+.
                     Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP+ after completing all
SMDP8
                     production steps, Profile Package Protection, and binding.
                     Communication session between the SM-DP+ and the LPA SHALL be
SMDP9
                     terminated by the SM-DP+ after execution of intended Operation(s).
                     End-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC involved
SMDP10               in the Profile download and installation SHALL be protected in terms of
                     integrity, authenticity and confidentiality.
                     Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected
SMDP11
                     through encryption.
                     On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile creation
SMDP12               and storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure deletion
                     procedures (logically and physically).
                     SM-DP+/eUICC communication SHALL incorporate Perfect Forward
SMDP13
                     Secrecy (PFS).
                     The transport used for the Bound Profile Package SHALL implement anti-
SMDP14
                     replay mechanisms between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
                     Connectivity to the SM-DP+ SHALL be aborted and an explicit error
                     message SHALL be triggered by the SM-DP+ upon failure to verify
SMDP15
                     authenticity of the connecting party. (No message SHALL be sent to the
                     connecting party)
                     After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound Profile
                     Package to the LPA, the transport encryption procedure SHALL be
                     renewed.
SMDP16
                     If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more
                     than a configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction SHALL be
                     terminated and the Operator SHALL be notified.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols whenever
SMDP17
                     available (e.g. DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.).
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC Profile
SMDP18               Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by Trusted
                     Connectivity Alliance [5].
SMDP19               The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on demand.
SMDP20               It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL send a confirmation of the successfully completed
SMDP21
                     download and installation of a Profile to the Operator.
                     There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between any
                     SM-DP+ and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the Profile.
                     Such a mechanism SHALL either be ordered by the Operator or be
SMDP22
                     performed by the Operator itself. If such deletion mechanism is used, there
                     will be no off-card entity responsible for managing the ISD-P of the installed
                     Profile.
SMDP23               The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid.
SMDP24               The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid.
Req no.              Description
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Notification to the Operator
SMDP25               informing them that a specific Bound Profile Package download is about to
                     start.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an eUICC Eligibility Check Information
SMDP26               report and other relevant information (e.g. Activation Code, ICCID, etc.) to
                     the Operator ahead of/prior to the eUICC Bound Profile Package download.
SMDP27               The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to perform Event Registrations to the SM-DS.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to request from an Alternative SM-DS not to
SMDP28
                     propagate the Event Registration to the Root SM-DS.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Profile delete Notification to the
SMDP29               Operator owning a Profile when a related delete Notification is received
                     from the eUICC.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL support the following states for a Profile Package,
                     triggered by the Profile Owner:
SMDP30
                         A Profile Package is not released for Profile Package download.
                         A Profile Package is released for Profile Package download.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to select the elliptic curve parameter in the
SMDP31
                     Profile download procedure.
                     It SHALL be possible for a SM-DP+ to conduct an Event Record Query to a
SMDP32 (FFS)         SM-DS (Root or Alternative) for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations
                     it owns.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event Record on
SMDP33 (FFS)         the Root SM-DS or the Alternative SM-DS, identified by the EID or the
                     Event-ID over the ES12 interface.
                     Response to a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only occur where the
SMDP34 (FFS)
                     Root SM-DS or Alternative SM-DS validates the Event Record ownership.
                     Ownership validation of a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only use
SMDP35 (FFS)         the requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components
                     of the Event Record held.
                     A SM-DP+ SHALL support all sets of elliptic curve parameters as defined in
SMDP36
                     GSMA SGP.22 [24].
                     If a Profile Package is not yet released for download then the LPA SHALL
SMDP37
                     be informed by means of a specific error code.

Table 24: SM-DP+ Requirements

4.10.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be ignored if an SM-DP+
DF1
                     address is present in an AC being presented to the LUI.
                     The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be accessible by the
DF2
                     LPA to establish a connection to this SM-DP+.
DF3                  The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC MAY be left blank.
                      If the default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC is blank, then the use of the
DF4                   SM-DS discovery procedure or an SM-DP+ address in an AC SHALL be
                      required to establish the target SM-DP+.
DF5                   [Void]

Table 25: Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements

4.11 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)

Primary Device

  User
                                      End User
Interface          ESeu
  User
Interface          ESeu
        LPA
LUI

ES10c

eUICC
                            Companion
                              Device

Figure 6: End User Interaction and Interfaces between a Primary and Companion

Device, where the Companion Device MAY have a UI

4.11.1 LPA Overview

This role exists both within the Device in conjunction with LPA Services provided by the eUICC, and within the eUICC with the LPA function provided by the eUICC. It provides three distinct functions, the Local User Interface (LUI), the Local Profile Download (LPD) and the Local Discovery Service (LDS) as described below. Whilst the eUICC alone cannot provide any of these functions without Device interaction, the specific level of interaction will depend upon the capability within the Device. The way this variability is implemented across different Devices and Device types is for further study.

Figure 7: LPA Functions

Function name               Description
Local Discovery
                            Where required, the LDS is responsible for retrieving pending Event
Service
                            Records from the SM-DS.
(LDS)
                            This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound Profile
Local Profile               Package in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile Package
Download                    from the SM-DP+ to the LPD in a single transaction, and (ii) the onward
(LPD)                       transfer of the Bound Profile Package into the eUICC in segments.
                            This function will depend on network, Device, and eUICC capabilities.
Local User Interface        This function allows the End User to perform Local Profile Management
(LUI)                       on the Device. User Intent SHALL be enforced.

Table 26: LPA Function Descriptions

4.11.2 Operational LPA Modes

When there is an LPA in the Device and in the eUICC, then the LPA to be used is specified by the Device settings (DEV7):

     LPA in the Device
     LPA in the eUICC

4.11.2.1 LPA in the eUICC

LPA functions are provided by the eUICC.

Figure 8: LPA in the eUICC

4.11.2.2 LPA in the Device

LPA functions are provided by the Device.

Figure 9: LPA in the Device

4.11.3 LPA Requirements

Req no.         Description
                The LPA SHALL be responsible for instructing the eUICC to perform Local Profile
LPA1
                Management Operations as per End User request.
                A mechanism SHALL be implemented between any LPA elements outside the
LPA2            eUICC, and the eUICC to ensure that the communication is not compromised
                wherever the LPA is located.
                A secure mechanism SHALL be implemented between the LUI and the
LPA3
                associated display or input applications on the Device.
                Access to the LUI SHALL be protected according to current best practices. This
LPA4
                SHALL be enforced by the Device OS.
LPA5            All Local Profile Management Operations SHALL require User Intent.
LPA6            LUI access SHALL require User Intent.
LPA7            The End User SHALL be able to easily access the list of installed Profiles.
LPA8            The LPA SHALL protect Profile Metadata from unauthorised access.
                The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘enable’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA9
                operation SHALL allow the End User to select the Profile to be enabled.
LPA10           The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘disable’ SHALL be supported.
                The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘delete’ SHALL be supported. This
                operation SHALL allow the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the eUICC.
LPA11
                The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for the
                deletion of the Profile. Strong Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This
                operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Operational
LPA12
                Profiles on the eUICC and relevant associated information through their Profile
                Metadata.
                The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’
                SHOULD be supported. When supported, this operation SHALL allow the End
                User to edit the default SM-DP+ address. Simple confirmation SHALL be
LPA13
                enforced. If the LPA does not support ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’, alternative
                Device-specific method(s) to edit the default SM-DP+ address SHALL be provided
                to the End User.
                The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be
                supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as described
LPA14           in Section 4.6.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of
                consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. Strong Confirmation SHALL be
                enforced.
                The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Test Memory Reset’ SHALL
LPA15           execute the eUICC Test Memory Reset as described in Section 4.6.3. Simple
                Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                The Local Profile Management Operation ‘set/edit nickname’ SHOULD be
                supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to add or modify a nickname
LPA16           for the selected Profile. The operation SHALL NOT modify the Service Provider
                name. If the LPA does not support ‘set/edit nickname’, alternative vendor-specific
                methods to distinguish Profiles on the LUI SHOULD be provided by the LPA.
                The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile’ SHALL be supported. This
                operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to the
                eUICC.
                At least three mechanisms SHALL be supported by the LPA depending on the
LPA17           type of Device where technically capable:
                    Profile download from default SM-DP+
                    Profile download via SM-DS service discovery
                    Profile download with Activation Code
                Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                The LPA SHALL NOT be accessible by any applications other than those
LPA18           provided by the provider of the LPA for the sole purpose of enabling the services
                and functions of the LPA.
LPA19           [Void]
                The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Simple
LPA20
                Confirmation located on the Device as described in this document.
LPA21           [Void]
LPA22           [Void]
LPA23           [Void]
LPA24           [Void]
LPA25           [Void]
LPA26           [Void]
                When enforced, any Confirmation Request SHALL allow the End User to cancel
LPA27
                the Local Profile Management Operation.
                It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI of a Companion Device allowing input
LPA28
                from an End User interface on the Primary Device.
                When a Companion Device LUI allows input from a Primary Device, the
                Companion Device LUI SHALL be able to restrict the actions that can be applied.
                For example:
LPA29               not offer the eUICC Memory Reset;
                    only ‘enable’ and ‘disable’ operation are exposed.
                    Profile enabling is exposed only if no Profile is already enabled on the
                     Companion Device.
                The LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be able to request an End User initiated
LPA30           action on the Companion Device before the establishment of any proximity secure
                link (used for inputs into the LUI from another Device).
                A point-to-point proximity secure link initiated by the End User and offering
LPA31           confidentiality and integrity SHALL be established between the Companion and
                Primary Device for any input executed from the Primary Device.
                When operating a Companion Device LUI from a Primary Device, any required
                User Intent or Confirmation Request SHALL only be executed by the LPA on the
LPA32
                Companion Device. The physical End User input MAY be done in either the
                Primary or the Companion Device.
                The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure
LPA33
                measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI.
LPA34           [Void]
                The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the
LPA35           internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over
                such connection, ES8+ and ES9+ interfaces can be established.
                The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another
                Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally
LPA36
                shared Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over
                such connection, ES8+, and ES9+ interfaces can be established.
                The LPA SHALL be able to determine if connectivity to the SM-DP+ is available
LPA37
                by any means.
                The LPA SHALL be able to notify the End User that there is no connection to the
LPA38           internet and or no connection to the SM-DP+ in order to allow the End User to
                enable or troubleshoot required connectivity.
LPA39           The LPA SHALL only be able to access the eUICC if it has assigned privileges.
LPA40           There SHALL only be one LPA on the Device.
                The LPA MAY be extended to support additional features which are not described
                in this specification.
LPA41           NOTE: These additional features could be (but not limited to) interaction with
                entities external to LPA, automation or batch processing of Local Profile
                Management Operations, etc.
                The LPA including additional features SHALL maintain the interoperability of the
LPA41a
                solution defined in this specification.
LPA42           [Void]
LPA43           When multiple Operational Profiles are installed, the Local Profile Management
                Operation ‘enable’ SHALL first initiate the ‘disable’ operation for any Enabled
                Profile prior to initiating the ‘enable’ operation for the selected Profile.
LPA44           The LPA SHALL be able to read the Profile Policy Rules.
LPA45           When a Profile with Profile Policy Rules is installed, in the case where End User
                consent is requested, the LPA SHOULD display the consequences of the Profile
                Policy Rule to the End User. This message SHALL be formulated in a descriptive
                and non-discriminatory manner (e.g. for “Non-Delete” Profile Policy Rule: “The
                profile that you are about to install cannot be deleted under the terms you have
                agreed with your service provider. Approve installation YES/NO?”). Strong
                Confirmation SHOULD be enforced.
LPA46           Prior to downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHALL check the condition for
                whether the Enabled Profile, if any, has enabled POL RULE1. If this is the case, a
                dedicated message SHALL be displayed identifying the consequences to the End
                User. Examples of information that may be displayed would be:
                    Enabling of the new Profile will not be possible because the currently
                     Enabled Profile cannot be disabled.
                    The Profile name of the Enabled Profile.
                    For more information, the End User should contact the Profile Owner of this
                     Profile.
                With displaying this message, the End User SHALL be able to decide on whether
                to continue the download or to cancel the operation.
                This dialogue MAY be combined with the regular End User Intent for confirming a
                Profile download.
LPA47           The communication between the End User interface of the Primary Device and
                the LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be protected (confidentiality, integrity
                and authentication).
LPA48           [Void]
LPA49           Confirmation Requests for consecutive Local Profile Management Operations
                MAY be achieved in one step as long as the different actions are clearly explained
                to the End User. For instance, upon installation of a new Profile, the LPA MAY
                propose ‘add Profile’ and ‘enable’ into one single step with a single confirmation
                only (e.g. “Do you want to install profile ‘ProfileName’ on your Device and enable
                it? Yes / No / Install only”)
LPA50           When consecutive operations are achieved in one single step (LPA49), the
                highest level of confirmation SHALL be applied - i.e. in the case of two operations
                having respectively Strong and Simple Confirmation Requests, the single step
                SHALL use the Strong Confirmation Request.
LPA51           The Local Profile Management Operations ‘enable’ (LPA9), ‘disable’ (LPA10), and
                ‘delete’ (LPA11) SHALL be able to trigger a Notification to the Notification
                Receivers of the respective Profile being managed to indicate that this operation
                was actioned. These Notifications are sent on a best effort basis and SHALL not
                impact otherwise the operation.
LPA52           The LPA SHALL provide a Trusted Link from the End User to the eUICC through
                the LUI.
                The End User SHALL be able to configure the LPA such that the automatic Event
LPA53
                Record retrieval from the SM-DS is disabled.
LPA54           The LPA SHALL be able to read any SM-DS and SM-DP+ addresses configured
                in the eUICC.
                It SHALL be possible to check the LPA Integrity. If the integrity check fails,
LPA55
                communication between the eUICC and the LPA SHALL not occur.
                LPA Integrity SHALL be ensured using the best practice methods on the targeted
LPA56
                platform. See Annex G.
                The polling mechanism in the LPA SHALL have two types of triggers; those that are
LPA57
                event based, and those that are End User initiated.
                Event based triggers for polling SHOULD include Device power-up when no
LPA58           Operational Profile is installed; in addition other triggers MAY be provided. Event
                based triggers MAY be disabled by the End User.
                End User initiated triggers for polling SHALL include:
                    The ‘Add Profile’ operation to trigger the default SM-DP+ if configured, and
LPA59
                     the Root SM-DS.
                    In addition, other manual triggers MAY be provided.
LPA60           [Void]
                Error/retry handling of the LPA polling mechanism SHALL be implemented e.g.
LPA61           advise the End User to retry or automatically retry as appropriate. The
                corresponding confirmation needs to be enforced in the retry cases.
                As part of the initial Device setup, if no Operational Profile is already installed,
                means SHALL be provided to the End User to retrieve pending Profiles waiting on
LPA62
                the Default SM-DP+ if configured, via the Root SM-DS, and via the Activation
                Code procedure.
                Simple Confirmation is required.
                Note: Implementation is left to the OEM and retrieval does not need to happen
                exactly during the initial Device setup if the End User, as an example, is informed
                on how to retrieve these profiles after the setup.
                The End User SHALL always be able to manually request the retrieval of any
                waiting Event Record via the LPA if there is no default SM-DP+ address.
LPA63
                Note: This may be achieved through the combination with existing operations –
                e.g. pressing “Add Profile” would contact the server to retrieve an Event.
                The Operator/Service Provider name SHALL be given in the signalling information
                from the SM-DP+ to the LPA when initiating the download of a Profile and shown
LPA64
                to the End User before the Profile is downloaded.
                Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                The LPA SHOULD present the EID to the End User as both text and in a defined
LPA65
                scannable format (e.g. QR Code).
LPA66           [Void]
                If the SM-DP+ stops the Profile download procedure, the LPA SHALL notify the
LPA67
                End User.
LPA68           [Void]
                               Table 27: LPA Requirements

4.11.4 LDS Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     The LDS SHALL be able to read out the address described in EUICC Error!
LDS1                 Reference source not found. and only use the address to connect to the
                     SM-DS

Table 28: LDS Requirement

4.12 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)

4.12.1 SM-DS Overview

The role of the SM-DS is to provide mechanisms that allow an SM-DP+ to inform the LDS within any Device that an SM-DP+ wishes to communicate with it. The purpose of the SM- DS to LDS communication SHALL be informing the LDS of a pending Event.

The principle of operation remains the same for all use cases. The SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration message for a target Device to a SM-DS.

In a simple deployment, only the Root SM-DS is configured on the eUICC. The Root SM-DS address is unique and filled in the eUICC. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM- DS using the same logical location. When the Root SM-DS has an Event-ID for the target Device it will respond with the SM-DP+ address, or if there is no Event-ID the response will be a null response.

In a deployment with cascaded SM-DSs, the SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration to an Alternative SM-DS, which may not be configured as the Root SM-DS on the eUICC. This Alternative SM-DS will cascade the Event Registration to the Root SM-DS. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM-DS and will receive the Alternative SM-DS address. It will

then request the Event from the Alternative SM-DS, which will respond with the SM-DP+ address.

Figure 10: Alternative Device to Root SM-DS Event Registration

Figure 11: Root SM-DS Event Registration

Figure 12: Alternative SM-DS Discovery

4.12.2 SM-DS Implementation

Two configurations of the SM-DS MAY exist:  A Root SM-DS  An Alternative SM-DS

Figure 13: SM-DS Implementation

Figure 13 shows both configurations. The Root SM-DS is configured at the time of Device manufacture and is invariant.

4.12.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelines

The following statements SHOULD be considered when defining a technical implementation:
    A competitive environment on the supply of SM-DS services SHOULD be favoured by
       the approach.
    There SHOULD be no single-points-of-failure.
    Implementation SHOULD inherently provide both vertical and horizontal
       performance/scalability.
    There SHOULD be no need for pre-registration of Devices or eUICCs at a certain
       SM-DS as required in SGP.02 [8] (GSMA Embedded SIM for the SM-SR).

4.12.4 SM-DS functions

The SM-DS has three distinct functions:

Figure 14: SM-DS Functions

Function name            Description
Event Registration       Process by which an Event Record received from a SM-DP+ is stored.
Event Deletion           Process by which an SM-DP+ can delete its own Event Record.
                         Provides all registered Event Records, upon Discovery Request from
Event Retrieval
                         any enquiring LDS.

Table 29: SM-DS Function Descriptions

4.12.5 SM-DS Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     The SM-DS SHALL enable a LDS to discover its own Event Records
SMDS1
                     registered by SM-DP+(s) or by Alternative SM-DS(s).
                     The SM-DS SHALL not be able to identify the nature of an Event.
SMDS2                Note: The nature of the Event may be ‘Profile Package available for
                     download’.
                     All valid Discovery Requests and Event Registrations SHALL be processed
SMDS3
                     in a non-discriminatory manner.
                     The SM-DS SHALL only accept Event Registrations from
                         any authorised and authenticated SM-DP+(s) having a valid
SMDS4
                          Certificate.
                         any authorised and authenticated SM-DS(s) having a valid Certificate.
                     The SM-DS SHALL only accept Discovery Requests authenticated by an
SMDS5
                     eUICC via the corresponding LDS.
                     The SM-DS and the SM-DP+ as well as connected SM-DSs SHALL be
SMDS6
                     mutually authenticated.
                     The SM-DS SHALL NOT have visibility of any data that may be used to
SMDS7
                     compromise the End User´s privacy.
                     The SM-DS SHALL support multiple concurrent Event Registrations per
SMDS8                eUICC and SHALL present to the LDS all currently valid Event Records in
                     the same order as they were received by the SM-DS (first in, first out).
SMDS9                The SM-DS SHALL only store Event Records destined for specific EIDs.
                     Subscriber Specific data and Profile related contents SHALL NOT be stored
SMDS10
                     within the SM-DS.
                     The SM-DS SHALL NOT allow the harvesting of any information such as
SMDS11
                     Operator, EIDs, Device Manufacturers, Devices, etc.
                     The SM-DS SHALL only return to the LDS, the Event Records related to the
SMDS12
                     served eUICC.
                     The SM-DS SHALL NOT have any contact with the Profile Packages e.g.
SMDS13
                     SHALL NOT store or process any Profile Package.
                     The SM-DS SHALL provide the same data regardless of the status of the
SMDS14
                     Device that queries it (i.e. consistent in time and in geographic location).
                     The SM-DS SHOULD NOT significantly impact the end-to-end provisioning
SMDS15
                     time.
SMDS16               The SM-DS SHALL provide defence against DoS attacks.
                     All communications to, from and between entities of the SM-DS SHALL be
SMDS17
                     encrypted.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event Records
SMDS18
                     registered on the SM-DS.
                     An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event
SMDS19               Records registered on the Root SM-DS (In response to an SM-DP+ delete
                     operation defined in SMDS18).
Req no.              Description
                     An Alternative SM-DS SHALL propagate the Event Record to the Root SM-
SMDS20
                     DS if requested by the SM-DP+.
                     If there are multiple Event Records registered on the SM-DS for one
SMDS21
                     eUICC, these SHALL all be sent as a single response.
                     An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an Event Record to an LDS either by
                     the Root SM-DS or via any Alternative SM-DS selected by the SM-DP+. If
SMDS22
                     an Alternative SM-DS is selected, the Event Record to the LDS SHALL
                     come from this Alternative SM-DS.
                     There SHALL be a unique Root SM-DS.
SMDS23               Note: This requirement does not forbid the potential load-balancing of this
                     Root SM-DS.
SMDS24               The Root SM-DS SHALL be managed by the GSMA.
                     It SHALL be possible for the Alternative SM-DS to conduct an Event Record
SMDS25 (FFS)         Query to the Root SM-DS for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations it
                     owns.
                     A SM-DS response to an Event Record Query SHALL only confirm Event
SMDS26 (FFS)
                     Record existence and SHALL NOT include additional information.
                     An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event
SMDS27 (FFS)         Record on the Root SM-DS, identified by the EID or the Event-ID over the
                     ES15 interface.
                     Response to a SM-DS Event Record query SHALL only occur where the
SMDS28 (FFS)
                     responder validates the Event Record ownership.
                     Ownership validation of a SM-DS Event Record Query SHALL only use the
SMDS29 (FFS)         requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components of
                     the Event Record held.
                     The SM-DS (Root or Alternative) MAY inform the SM-DP+ directly or via
SMDS30 (FFS)         another SM-DS, that a Discovery Request from an authorised LDS has
                     been answered by issuing an Event Record.
                     The SM-DS SHALL only inform the Event Record’s owning SM-DP+ or SM-
SMDS31 (FFS)
                     DS that it has replied to a Discovery Request.

Table 30 SM-DS Requirements

4.12.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedure

The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with the Root SM-DS and an Alternative SM-DS (cascade mode).

Figure 15: Event Registration/Deletion Procedure

4.12.6.1 Event Registration Procedure

Starting Condition:

a.       The SM-DP+ has an Event Registration action waiting for a target eUICC identified by
         the EID.
Procedure:
1.       The SM-DP+ establishes a secure connection to an Alternative SM-DS of the
         Profile Owner´s choice.
2.       The SM-DP+ notifies the Alternative SM-DS about an Event Registration action.
3. to 4. The Alternative SM-DS registers and confirms the Event Registration.
5.       The Alternative SM-DS establishes a secure connection to the Root SM-DS.
6.       The Alternative SM-DS informs the Root SM-DS that for the given EID, an Event
         Record is waiting at the Alternative SM-DS.
7.         The Root SM-DS registers the Event Registration.
8.         The Root SM-DS confirms the receipt of the information.

4.12.6.2 Event Deletion Procedure

Starting Condition:

a.       The SM-DP+ has an Event Deletion action waiting for a target eUICC identified by the
         EID
Procedure:
1.       The SM-DP+ establishes a secure connection to an Alternative SM-DS of the Profile
         Owner´s choice.
2.       The SM-DP+ notifies the Alternative SM-DS about an Event Deletion action.
3. to 4. The Alternative SM-DS deletes the Event Record and confirms the Event Deletion.
5.       The Alternative SM-DS establishes a secure connection to the Root SM-DS.
6.       The Alternative SM-DS informs the Root SM-DS that for the given EID, an Event
         Record has to be deleted.
7.       The Root SM-DS deletes the Event Record.
8.       The Root SM-DS confirms the deletion of the Event Record.

4.12.7 Discovery Request Procedure

The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with an Alternative SM-DS and the
Root SM-DS (cascade mode).     #

Figure 16: Discovery Request Procedure

Procedure:
1. to 3. In order to generate a Discovery Request, the LDS requests the eUICC to generate
         an eUICC Authorisation which contains (at least) the eUICC-Certificate and is
         signed by the eUICC.
4. to 5. The LDS establishes a secure communication to the Root SM-DS.
6.       The Root SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by checking the eUICC
         Authorisation.
7.       In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record is waiting, it delivers back:
            a. The address of the SM-DP+, where an action is waiting.
               or
            b. The rest of the following actions:
                     i. The address of the Alternative SM-DS, where an Event Record can be
                        retrieved.
                    ii. The LDS establishes a secure connection to the Alternative SM-DS.
                   iii. The Alternative SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by
                        checking the eUICC Authorisation.
                   iv. In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record has been
                        received, it delivers back the address of the SM-DP+, where an action
                        is waiting.
8.      The LPA establishes a connection to the SM-DP+ and the waiting action can be
        performed.

4.13 Profile Policy Management

4.13.1 Introduction

The Profile Policy Management function provides mechanisms by which Service Providers are able to reinforce the conditions or policies (operational and business) under which services are provided to the Subscriber. In some instances this MAY also include the enforcement of the policies set by the Subscriber.

Profile Policy Management MAY also be applied with other already existing policy enforcement technologies which are also subject to agreement by the Subscriber.

The realisation of the Profile Policy Management function is based on two key elements. The first element is the Profile Policy Enabler which is contained within the eUICC. The second element is a set of defined Profile Policy Rules which are required for the actual enforcement of specific policies.

4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirements

Policy no.          Description
POL1                A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only be configured within a Profile.
POL2                Each Profile MAY have Profile Policy Rules associated to itself.
POL3                A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only apply to the Profile that contains it.
POL4                Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be consistent across implementations.
                    Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be able to resolve any Profile Policy Rule
POL5
                    conflict.
Policy no.          Description
                    The updating of a Profile’s Policy Rules SHALL be restricted to the Profile
POL6
                    Owner.
                    The mechanism used for the update of a Profile Policy Rule SHALL be
POL7
                    atomic.
POL8                The set of Profile Policy Rules SHALL be extensible for future releases.
                    There SHALL be a Profile Policy Rule scheme to allow extensibility of the
POL9                Policy Rules, e.g. described like ‘operational command, scope of
                    application, qualification’
                    A Profile Policy Rule SHALL be enforced whenever a Profile state change is
POL10
                    attempted.
                    Downloading and installing a Profile with the Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of
POL11               this Profile is not allowed’ (POL RULE1) SHALL only be possible if no other
                    Operational Profile is currently installed.
                    The LPA and the eUICC SHALL prevent the downloading and installation of
                    a Profile containing Profile Policy Rules that conflict with the Profile Policy
POL12               Rules of the already installed Profiles.
                    Note: The technical specification SHALL describe exhaustively each conflict
                    that MAY occur.
                    The LPA MAY cancel the Profile download procedure if it does not support
POL12a              the downloading of Profiles containing Profile Policy Rules to a removable
                    eUICC regardless of its RAT.
                    An Operator SHALL be able to deactivate the Profile Policy Rules of its
                    Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is enabled.
POL13
                    Note: The activation of Profile Policy Rules on the ES6 interface is a
                    potential feature for a future release.
                    Before a Profile is installed with Profile Policy Rules, the End User SHALL
                    be able to be notified about the Profile Policy Rules and if notified, the
                    installation SHALL thereafter be conditional on End User Strong
POL14
                    Confirmation.
                    This prompting may not be needed if the installation is directly allowed by
                    the RAT.
                    The request for End User consent for the installation of Profile Policy Rules
POL15               and Profile download MAY be combined into a single prompt therefore
                    requiring a single confirmation by the End User.
                    Profile Policy Rules SHALL be enforced by the Profile Policy Enabler in the
POL16
                    eUICC.
                    The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL only support the Profile Policy Rules
POL17
                    defined in this specification.
                    The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL be capable of supporting all the Profile
POL18
                    Policy Rules as defined in this specification.
                    POL RULE3 SHALL be enforceable in all cases with the exception of the
                    enabling of a Provisioning Profile.
POL19
                    Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet
                    been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.
Policy no.          Description
                    Allowing the installation of a Profile with Profile Policy Rules SHALL be
POL20
                    subject to compliance with local regulatory requirements.

Table 31: Profile Policy Management Requirements

4.13.3 Policy Rules

Policy no.            Description
                      The Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be
POL RULE1
                      supported.
                      The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be
POL RULE2
                      supported.
                      The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is required upon its
                      successful disabling’ SHALL be supported.
POL RULE3
                      Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet
                      been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.

Table 32: Policy Rules Requirements

4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirements

Policy no.          Description
                    The Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) SHALL be stored in the Profile Policy
POLPPE1
                    Enabler in the eUICC.
                    The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL enforce the contents of the installed RAT,
POLPPE2
                    if any, only at Profile installation time.
                    The RAT SHALL allow multiple Profile Owners to have Profile Policy Rules
POLPPE3
                    enabled in their Profiles.
                    The RAT SHALL be able to support specific configurations which allow a set
POLPPE4
                    of or all Profile Policy Rules for any Profile Owner.
                    The RAT SHALL only be installed at pre-issuance or during the initial
POLPPE5
                    Device setup provided there are no Operational Profiles installed.
POLPPE6             The RAT SHALL not be affected by the eUICC Memory Reset function.
                    To support identifiable regulatory requirement, a RAT SHALL be able to
POLPPE7             support a specific configuration which MAY forbid any Profile Owner to set a
                    specific Profile Policy Rule.
                    If POLPPE7 is set, this information SHALL be part of the eligibility check
POLPPE8
                    information shared between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
                    Where the RAT allows the Profile Policy Rules for the Profile being installed,
POLPPE9
                    installation SHALL proceed as stated in POL14.
                    The RAT SHALL be able to support a setting to display the consequences
POLPPE10
                    of the Profile Policy Rules to the End User before installation of the Profile.
POLPPE11            The OEM or EUM SHALL be responsible for providing the RAT.
                    A fixed RAT SHALL be implemented in the eUICC.
POLPPE12
                    Note: RAT configuration examples are described in Annex H.

Table 33: Profile Policy Enabler Requirements

4.14 Certification

4.14.1 eUICC Certification Requirements

Req no.             Description
CERTEU1             The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS UP certified [13][13][13].
                    The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance with
CERTEU2
                    GSMA SGP.22 [24].
                    The eUICC SHALL be certified according to the Protection Profile defined
CERTEU3
                    by the GSMA [25].
                    The eUICC Protection Profile SHALL at least include the following
CERTEU4             elements: ISD-R, Profile storage, isolation of Profiles, and Telecom
                    Framework.
                    The eUICC protection Profile SHALL be equivalent to the eUICC Protection
CERTEU5
                    Profile defined in SGP.05 [21][21][21].
                    The Evaluation Assurance Level of the eUICC Protection Profile SHALL be
CERTEU6             (at least) EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 (EAL 4+).
                    Note: A study needs to be performed in terms of assurance level by FASG.
                    The eUICC public key Certificate used for authentication SHALL contain the
CERTEU7
                    EID.
                    It SHALL be possible to obtain the technical reference of the product, for
                    example the Common Criteria certification report number and if applicable,
CERTEU8
                    the EMVco PCN (Platform Certification Number) associated with a specific
                    eUICC.
CERTEU9             The EUM Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.
                    The eUICC Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by the EUM using its EUM
CERTEU10            private key corresponding to its Certificate (CERTEU9Error! Reference
                    source not found.).
                    The eUICC private key(s) SHOULD not be modifiable. If they are, they
CERTEU11            should be modifiable only by the EUM that issued the corresponding
                    Certificate.
                    If the eUICC private key(s) are modifiable, it SHALL use the mechanism
CERTEU12            defined in the GlobalPlatform specification with a minimum security level
                    corresponding to the AES algorithm using a key length of 128 bits.
                    If the eUICC's EUM Certificate is updatable, then the eUICC SHALL
CERTEU13
                    support a secure mechanism to update its EUM Certificate.
                    If the eUICC's CI public keys are updatable, then the eUICC SHALL support
CERTEU14
                    a secure mechanism to update its CI public keys.
                    If the eUICC's Certificate is updatable, then the eUICC SHALL support a
CERTEU15
                    secure mechanism to update its eUICC Certificate.
                    Where appropriate, the eUICC SHOULD be certified according to EMVCo
CERTEU16
                    Security Evaluation process [27].

Table 34: eUICC Certification Requirements

4.14.2 Device Compliance Requirement

Req no.             Description
                    There SHALL be a compliance process for all parts of Local Profile
CERTDEV1
                    Management implementations in accordance with the GSMA.
                    The certification process for Integrated TRE using Remote Memory residing
                    outside the SoC as per DIE1 SHALL cover the Integrated TRE, internal and
CERTDEV2
                    external SoC interfaces used for Integrated eUICC implementation, and
                    Remote Memory residing outside the SoC.
                    The certification process for Integrated TRE implementions SHALL ensure
                    that software and data stored in Remote Memory residing outside the SoC
CERTDEV3
                    as per DIE1 are protected against confidentiality, integrity, and availability
                    attacks.
                    The certification process for Integrated TRE implementions SHALL ensure
CERTDEV4            that any interfaces between the Integrated TRE and the SoC are protected
                    against confidentiality and integrity attacks.

Table 35: Device Compliance Requirement

4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification Requirements

Req no.                Description
                       The SM-DP+ provider SHALL be required to declare product (SM-DP+)
CERTDP1
                       compliance with GSMA SGP.22 V2.2 [24].
                       The SM-DP+ SHALL be certified according to FS.08 SAS-SM Standard
CERTDP2
                       v3 [22] and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v3 [28].
                       SM-DP+ elements SHALL use Hardware Security Modules (HSM) for
                       cryptographic related operations (key storage, derivation, cryptographic
CERTDP3                operations).
                       Note: This is to be covered by the SAS documents “HSM certified
                       according to FIPS 140-2 level 3 or higher”
                       The SM-DP+ SHALL implement privileges isolation (Log, Audit,
CERTDP4
                       Operation, and Administration).
                       The SM-DP+ SHALL implement operating system hardening
CERTDP5
                       mechanisms.
                       The SM-DP+ SHALL implement separation of control, user and
CERTDP6
                       administrative planes.
                       The SM-DP+ SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration
CERTDP7
                       operation.
                       SM-DP+ hard drives and backup mediums used for storing Profiles
CERTDP8
                       SHALL be ciphered.
                       The private keys of SM-DP+ Certificates used for mutual authentication
CERTDP9                and Profile Binding with eUICC SHALL be protected and stored in HSM
                       according to CERTDP3.
                       The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to mitigate
CERTDP10
                       against DoS attacks.
CERTDP11               The SM-DP+ SHALL log all Certificate authentication failures.
CERTDP12               The SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.

Table 36: SM-DP+ Certification Requirements

4.14.4 SM-DS Certification Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     The SM-DS provider SHALL be required to declare product compliance with
CERTDS1
                     GSMA SGP.22 [24].
                     The SM-DS SHALL be certified according to FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3
CERTDS2
                     [22] and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v3 [28].
                     The SM-DS SHALL implement isolation of privileges (Log, Audit, Operation,
CERTDS3
                     and Administration).
CERTDS4              The SM-DS SHALL implement operating system hardening mechanisms.
                     The SM-DS SHALL implement separation of control, user and
CERTDS5
                     administrative planes.
                     The SM-DS SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration
CERTDS6
                     operation.
CERTDS7              SM-DS hard drives and backup mediums SHALL be ciphered.
CERTDS8              The SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.

Table 37: SM-DS Certification Requirements

4.14.5 LPA Certification Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     There SHALL be a certification process for all the LPA elements
CERTLPA1
                     communicating with Remote SIM Provisioning entities.
                     The certification process SHALL ensure that Local Profile Management
CERTLPA2
                     Operations are sent by authorised LPA elements only.
                     The certification process SHALL ensure a mechanism exists to block
CERTLPA3
                     compromised LPAs.
CERTLPA4             The LPD SHALL authenticate the SM-DP+ during the TLS session.
CERTLPA5             The LDS SHALL authenticate the SM-DS during the TLS session.
                     The LPA SHALL only accept valid TLS Certificates as defined in
CERTLPA6
                     CERTPK10a for SM-DP+ and SM-DS authentication.

Table 38: LPA Certification Requirements

4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management Requirements

Req no.              Description
CERTPK1              The eUICC SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+.
CERTPK2              The LPD SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+.
CERTPK3              The LDS SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS.
                     The LDS authentication of an SM-DS using an invalid Public Key Certificate
CERTPK4
                     SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop.
Req no.              Description
                     The LPD authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK5              Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11CERTPK1), and on-going
                     communication SHALL stop.
                     The SM-DP+ authentication of an eUICC using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK6              Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication
                     SHALL stop.
                     The eUICC authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK7              Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication
                     SHALL stop.
                     The GSMA CI SHALL revoke the Public Key Certificate of any entities (SM-
CERTPK8
                     DP+, SM-DS, EUM) if it is compromised (e.g. private key theft).
CERTPK9              The eUICC SHALL be able to support a set of GSMA CIs.
                     A Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:
                         it has a valid signature
                         it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a trusted chain of Certificates up to a
                          GSMA CI. Certificate Path validation SHALL follow the process
                          defined in RFC 5280 0Error! Reference source not found..
CERTPK10
                         it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in the trust chain has been
                          revoked
                         it has not expired
                     If any of these applicable verifications fail, the Public Key Certificate SHALL
                     be considered as invalid.
                     A TLS Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:
                         it has a valid signature
                         it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a public trusted CA, or a trusted chain of
                          Certificates up to a GSMA CI or a public trusted CA. Certificate Path
                          validation SHALL follow the process defined in RFC 5280 0Error!
CERTPK10a                 Reference source not found..
                         it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in its trust chain has been
                          revoked
                         it has not expired
                     If any of these applicable verifications fail, the TLS Public Key Certificate
                     SHALL be considered as invalid.
                     The eUICC, LPA, SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL have knowledge of revoked
                     Public Key Certificates.
CERTPK11
                     Note: This requirement also applies to TLS Certificates that chain to either
                     the GSMA CI or a public trusted CA.

Table 39: Public Key Certificates Management Requirements

5 Operational Procedures

5.1 LPA Initiated Download

5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     The LPA SHALL use any Root SM-DS or default SM-DP+ address
LID1                 populated on the eUICC if it has not been provided already by the Activation
                     Code.
                     In the context of LID1, if both a Root SM-DS and a default SM-DP+ address
LID2                 are populated, the LPA SHALL first contact the SM-DP+ and then SM-DS to
                     initiate a Remote SIM Provisioning transaction.

Table 40: LPA Initiated Download Requirements

5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedure

This following procedure describes the Events that are part of the Profile Package download and installation procedure initiated by the LPA.

Figure 17: Profile Download Procedure

Start conditions:

       a.        The Subscriber has completed the Subscription process to the selected
                 Operator/Service Provider offer.
       b.        The Profile ordering process related to this Subscription has been completed
                 (i.e. an assigned Protected Profile Package is stored on the SM-DP+).
Procedure:
       1.         The LPA initiates Profile Package download and identifies the address of the
                  SM-DP+ where the Profile is stored and available for download (via e.g. URL,
                  QR code, manual input, etc.) as well as other information provided (e.g.
                  Token, SMDPId, Confirmation Code).
       2.         The LPA authenticates the SM-DP+ through establishing a TLS connection
                  with the SM-DP+, and verifying the SMDPid if such information has been
                  provided.
       3. to 4. The LPA gets an eUICC challenge
       5. to 6. The LPA sends the eUICC challenge and any other relevant information to the
                  SM-DP+.
       7. to 9. The SM-DP+ signs the eUICC challenge, and generates a DP_Challenge to
                  be sent back to the eUICC.
       10.        The LPA sends the material received by the SM-DP+ and the AC Token to
                  the eUICC; the eUICC checks the SMDPid and authenticates the SM-DP+.
       11.        The eUICC sends back a signed set of information including the
                  DP_Challenge, the AC Token, the EID and its Certificate to the LPA.
       12.        The End User confirms the download of the Profile, optionally with the display
                  of the Profile name of the Operator.
       13.        The LPA sends the set of information received in Step 11 from the eUICC to
                  the SM-DP+.
       14.        The SM-DP+ verifies the signature; the eUICC is authenticated.
       15. to 16. OPTIONAL: The eUICC Eligibility Check and Profile binding functions are
                  performed by the SM-DP+.
       17. to 22. OPTIONAL
       17.        The Operator is notified about the Profile Package that is about to be
                  downloaded.
       18.        If the Operator has been notified, it MAY request to stop the download
                  process by indicating an error code to the SM-DP+.
       19.        If the Operator sends an error code to the SM-DP+, the SM-DP+ stops the
                  download process and indicates the error code to the LPA.
       20.        The LPA notifies the End User with an appropriate message.
       21. to 22. The SM-DP+ MAY receive information from the Operator to prepare the
                  appropriate Profile Package.
       23. to 25. The Bound Profile Package is sent to the eUICC and installed on the eUICC.
       26.        The Profile Package download report is sent from the SM-DP+ to the
                  Operator.
End Condition:
a.       The Profile is installed in the eUICC in a Disabled state

5.2 Profile Download with Activation Code

5.2.1 Activation Code Requirements

Req no.            Description
                   Where used, the Activation Code SHALL trigger the download of a Bound
AC1
                   Profile Package from a specific SM-DP+.
                   The Activation Code SHALL comprise of the following parameters:
                      SM-DP+ address
AC2                   Activation Code Token (Includes OPTIONAL Confirmation Code
                       Required Flag)
                      SMDPid (OPTIONAL)
                   The Activation Code Token SHALL be able to include a parameter indicating
                   whether a Confirmation Code is required or not.
                   If such a Confirmation Code is required, the LPA SHALL ask the End User to
AC3                input a Confirmation Code. The SM-DP+ SHALL verify the Confirmation Code
                   before delivering the Bound Profile Package.
                   Note: How the Confirmation Code is created and provided to the End User is
                   out of scope of this specification.
                   The Activation Code SHALL be verified by the SM-DP+ before delivering the
AC4
                   Bound Profile Package.
                   The Activation Code input in the LPA by the End User SHALL support at least
AC5
                   manual typing and QR code scanning.
                   All Activation Code procedures SHALL be implemented natively as part of the
AC6
                   LPA.
AC7                [Void]
                   Following the Activation Code procedure, the Profile Package download
AC8
                   procedure SHALL be used.
                   The Activation Code procedure SHALL preserve eco-system security, privacy
AC9
                   and validation of User Intent.
                   The Activation Code procedure SHALL be used for the sole purpose of
                   downloading a Profile package to the targeted eUICC. The Activation Code
AC10
                   procedure SHALL prevent sending IMEI and EID information to a non-
                   authenticated SM-DP+.
AC11               The Activation Code SHALL uniquely identify the Operator/Service Provider.
                   The Activation Code request to the SM-DP+ SHALL be extended by the LPA
AC12
                   with the EID after the specific SM-DP+ has been authenticated.

Table 41: Activation Code Requirements

5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure

The Activation Code procedure defines a common functionality which allows the Subscriber or the End User on behalf of the Subscriber to “activate” a Device by means of requesting the download of an Operational Profile from the Device itself.

Figure 18: Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure

Start Conditions:
       a.   A Subscription has been established by the Subscriber.
       b.   Activation Code material and optionally a Confirmation Code has been provided
            to the SM-DP+ (Step 1), and an Activation Code has been provided to the End
            User and optionally a Confirmation Code (side channel) (Step 2).

Procedure: 3. The End User inputs the Activation Code to the LPA through the LUI.

4. The LPA parses the Activation Code parameters to recognise the SM-DP+ address,
   the Activation Code Token, the LPA Mode and optionally the SMDPid. In addition,
   the LPA MAY parse in the Activation Token the information that a Confirmation Code
   is required.
5. If the Confirmation Code parameter in the Activation Code Token is set to “require
   Confirmation Code”, the End User is prompted to input a Confirmation Code provided
   to them by the issuing Operator/Service Provider.
6. The Activation Code download procedure is initiated by the LPA. The LPA requests a
   nonceeUICC from the eUICC.
7. The eUICC creates a nonceeUICC associated with the supported eUICC
   Specification Version Number (eSVN).
8. The eUICC transmits the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to the
   LPA.
9. The LPA sends the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to the SM-
   DP+.

Note: Prior to this step a HTTPs session SHALL be established between the LPA and the SM-DP+ based on a public key of the Root Certificate stored in the Device which includes authentication using the TLS Certificate and checking for the presence of the SMDPid in the TLS Certificate used for the TLS session.

10. Upon receiving the nonceeUICC and the associated eSVN, the SM-DP+ creates
    nonceSMDP and signs both the nonceSMDP and the nonceeUICC.
11. The SM-DP+ sends the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the LPA.
12. The LPA collects the Activation Code parameters as well as the Device information
    needed for the eligibility procedure and optionally the Confirmation Code and
    transmits them with the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the eUICC.
13. The eUICC checks the signature attached to the nonceeUICC. If the SMDPid is
    configured in the AC, the eUICC checks that the SMDPid provided by the LPA and
    the SMDPid in the SM-DP+ Certificate correspond. The SM-DP+ is at this stage
    authenticated by the eUICC. The eUICC generates key material that will be used for
    the session key establishment. The eUICC signs a set of information with the eUICC
    private key which includes:
     a. The nonceSMDP
     b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the preparation
        of the Bound Profile Package
     c. Activation Code parameters
     d. The Device and eUICC information
     e. Optionally the Confirmation Code
14. The eUICC sends the signed set of information to the LPA in addition to:
    a. The nonceSMDP
    b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the preparation
        of the Bound Profile Package
    c. Activation Code parameters
    d. The Device and eUICC information
    e. The eUICC Certificate which includes the EID
    f. The EUM Certificate
    g. Optionally the Confirmation Code
15. The LPA sends the whole set of information received from the eUICC to the SM-
    DP+.
16. The SM-DP+ checks the EUM Certificate with the CI Public Key. The SM-DP+
    checks the signature of the nonceSMDP; the eUICC is at this stage authenticated by
    the SM-DP+.
17. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the eligibility check based on the transmitted information
    (EID, Device information, eUICC information, eSVN).
18. The SM-DP+ checks the Activation Code parameters and optionally the Confirmation
    Code to retrieve the referenced Profile Package.
19. The Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC:
    a. The SM-DP+ establishes session keys with the eUICC.
    b. A Bound Profile Package is prepared on the basis of the eUICC session key
        material and is downloaded and installed on the eUICC.
    c. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and the
        Operator is notified by the SM-DP+.
    d. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged by the eUICC
        to the LPA which notifies the End User of the status.
End Conditions:
        a.     A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a
               Disabled state.
        b.     The LPA MAY offer the Profile for enablement by the End User.

5.3 Local Profile Management

5.3.1 Local Profile Management Procedures

5.3.1.1 Enable Profile

This procedure performs the enabling of a target Profile. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.

Figure 19: Enable Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC.
       b.   The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
       c.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
Procedure:
       1.   The End User makes a Profile enable request on the LPA.
       2.   User Intent is verified.
       3.   The LPA sends a Profile enable operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the
            eUICC.
       4.   The ISD-R checks if applied Profile Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the
            Profile to be enabled
       5.   If there is a conflict with Profile Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and
            informs the End User via the LPA.
       6.   The target Profile is enabled.
       7.   The ISD-R informs the LPA of the enabling of the Profile.
       8.   The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions:
       a.   The target Profile is enabled.

5.3.1.2 Disable Profile

Profile disabling can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.

Figure 20: Disable Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC.
       b.   The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
       c.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
Procedure:
       1.   The End User makes a Profile disable request on the LPA.
       2.   User Intent is verified.
       3.   The LPA sends a Profile disable operation to the ISD-R on the eUICC.
       4.   The ISD-R checks if applied Profile Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the
            Profile to be disabled.
       5.   If there is a conflict with Profile Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and
            informs the End User via the LPA.
       6.   The ISD-R disables the target Profile.
       7.   The ISD-R informs the LPA of the disabling of the Profile.
       8.   The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions:
       a.   The target Profile is disabled.

5.3.1.3 Delete Profile

Profile deletion can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.

Figure 21: Delete Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   The target Profile is disabled.
       b.   The target Profile has been chosen by the End User
       c.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
Procedure:
       1.   The End User makes a Profile deletion request on the LPA.
       2.   User Intent is verified.
       3.   The LPA sends a Profile deletion operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on
            the eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
       4.   The ISD-R checks if applied Profile Policy Rules permits the Profile to be deleted.
       5.   If there is a conflict with Profile Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and
            informs the End User via the LPA.
       6.   The ISD-R erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P.
 7.       The ISD-R informs the LPA of the Profile deletion.
 8.       The Profile Metadata for the target Profile is erased.
 9.       The End User is informed via the LPA.
10.       The LPA sends delete Notifications to the Notification Receivers for Profile
          deletion in the Profile.
End conditions:
       a.   The target Profile is deleted.

5.3.1.4 Add/Update Profile Nickname

Add/update nickname will allow the Subscriber or End User to attribute a nickname to a Profile for ease of use. Note that adding or changing a nickname SHALL NOT affect any other data or other Profile Metadata for that Profile.

Figure 22: Add/Update Profile Nickname Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   User Intent has been verified.
       b.   The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
       c.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
Procedure:
       1.   The End User requests the update of the nickname on the LPA.
       2.   The LPA updates the Profile Metadata of the target Profile with the End User’s
            choice of nickname in the eUICC.
End conditions:
       a.   Profile Metadata of the target Profile has been updated with the End User’s choice
            of nickname.

5.3.1.5 Query Profile Metadata

This procedure will allow the End User to query the Profile Metadata of the Profiles accessible to the End User. The result SHALL display all (or parts of) the Profile Metadata for the selected Profile on the eUICC at the time of querying. No changes are made to any data on the eUICC as a result of this procedure.

Figure 23: Query Profile Metadata Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   The LPA is authenticated to eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
       b.   The list of Profiles accessible to the End User is displayed by the LPA (LUI).
Procedure:
       1.   The End User selects a Profile to query.
       2.   The LPA receives a query request from the End User.
       3.   The LPA requests Profile Metadata from the eUICC.
       4.   The LPA displays the Profile Metadata to the End User on the LUI.
End conditions:
       a.   No change to Profile Metadata.

5.3.1.6 eUICC Memory Reset

This procedure performs the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC including its associated Profile Metadata. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.

Note: A similar procedure will apply to perform the eUICC Test Memory Reset of the eUICC.

Figure 24: eUICC Memory Reset Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
            Management.
       b.   The eUICC Memory Reset option is displayed by the LPA (LUI).
Procedure:
       1.   The End User makes an eUICC Memory Reset request on the LPA (LUI).
       2.   User Intent is verified.
       3.   The LPA (LUI) displays a message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ to
            the End User.
       4.   The End User confirms the conformity with the consequences to the LPA.
       5.   The LPA sends an eUICC Memory Reset operation to the eUICC.
       6.   The eUICC deletes the Profile on the eUICC even if it is an Enabled Profile
            including the Profile Metadata associated with it.
       7.   The eUICC informs the LPA of the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC.
       8.   The End User is informed via the LPA (LUI).
       9.   The LPA sends delete Notifications to all Notification Receivers for Profile deletion
            in the Profile.
End conditions:
       a.   The Profile is deleted from the eUICC.

5.3.1.7 Add Profile with Activation Code

This procedure will allow the Subscriber to add a single Profile. This procedure will not enable the downloaded Profile, nor disable an Enabled Profile. Network connectivity is assumed. The download can be initiated by the input of an Activation Code.

Figure 25: Add Profile with Activation Code Procedure

Start conditions:
       a.   User Intent has been verified.
       b.   The download of a new Profile is allowed on the eUICC.
       c.   The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Profile
            download.
Procedure:
       1.   The End User obtains an Activation Code to add a Profile to their Device.
       2.   The LPA requests the End User to enter the Activation Code.
       3.   Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure as described in Section 5.2.2
            starts.
End conditions:
       a.   The Profile has been installed on the End User’s Device.
       b.   Profile Metadata has been updated from the Profile.

5.3.1.8 Edit SM-DP+ Address

This procedure will allow the End User to edit a default SM-DP+ address on to the eUICC.

Figure 26: Edit SM-DP+ Address

Start conditions:
       a.   There is a default SM-DP+ address in the LPA.
       b.   The End User is willing to edit the default SM-DP+ address
Procedure:
       1.   The End User edits the SM-DP+ Address via the LPA.
       2.   Simple Confirmation from the End User is required.
       3.   The LPA sends the default SM-DP+ address for storage in the LPA Service.
       4.   The LPA Service informs the LPA of the storage of the default SM-DP+ address.
       5.   The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions:
       a.   The target default SM-DP+ Address is edited in the LPA Services.

A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)

New Profile on New Primary Device (Off Device Activation)
 Risk     Risk description
 no.
 INI1     Incomplete or corrupted Profile being pushed to the Subscriber.
          Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles to
 INI2
          Devices.

Table 42: New Profile on New Primary Device Risks

Profile Deletion
 Risk     Risk description
 no.
          Long term gathering of key materials due to a long term storage of delivered Profiles
 IND1
          after their disabling.
 IND2     Loss of sensitive data from discarded media supports (hard drives…)
          Malware launching coordinated or isolated deletion of one or several Profiles leading to a
 IND3
          loss of connectivity to an End User.
          Accidental Profile deletion (e.g. unattended children…) leading to a loss of connectivity
 IND4
          to an End User.
          Non-tech-savvy or malicious Subscriber repeatedly deleting Profiles and asking for them
 IND5
          to be reloaded leading to surcharge of provisioning servers.

Table 43:Profile Deletion Risks

Profile Switch
 Risk     Risk description
 no.
 INP1     Malicious Profile switching originating from an internal party.
          Human error leading to the switching of alternate Profiles leading to a loss of
 INP2
          connectivity.
          Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to
 INP3
          a loss of connectivity.
          Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to
 INP4
          major fraud scenarios.

Table 44: Profile Switching Risks

Profile Swap
 Risk     Risk description
 no.
 INS1     Race condition leading to the deactivation of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity.

Table 45: Profile Swapping Risks

Cryptographic Related Risks
 Risk     Risk description
 no.
          Loss or theft of private keys in one or several Profile Management components leading
 INO1
          to the loss of confidentiality on the whole chain.
          Inability to revoke compromised Certificates leading to the loss of trust on the whole
 INO2
          Certificate chain.
 INO3     Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful disclosure of key materials.
 INO4     Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful compromise of key components.
          Malicious or accidental revocation of Certificates leading to the denial of service on the
 INO5
          whole provisioning Certificate chain.
          Use of temporary symmetric cryptographic or “generic” key material during the Profile
 INO6     creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single point of
          failure and attack being created.

Table 46: Cryptographic Related Risks

Quality of Service
 Risk      Risk description
 no.
           Profile creation burst leading to the inability for the eUICC platforms to deliver expected
 QoS1
           service level.
           Denial of service on delivery platforms leading to the inability to deliver expected
 QoS2
           service level.
           Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a temporary or
 QoS3
           permanent inability to deliver a Profile.

Table 47: Quality of Service Risks

Non-human or Unpredictable
 Risk      Risk description
 no.
           Catastrophic event such as floods, earthquakes, etc. leading to the destruction of a
 EXC1
           datacentre.
 EXC2      Geopolitical/Human events leading to the destruction of a datacentre.
           Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the
 EXC3
           provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, SIM vendor…).

Table 48: Non-human or Unpredictable Risks

New Profile during Subscriber Journey
 Risk      Risk description
 no.
 EXN1      Malicious pairing of new Device using unattended Primary or Companion Device.
           Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the loss of confidentiality during
 EXN2
           the provisioning of Profile operations.
Risk      Risk description
no.
          Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the tampering of registration
EXN3
          information during provisioning of Profile operations.
EXN4      Social engineering leading to the communication of OTP materials to attackers.
          Man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping during Profile provisioning leading to the loss of
EXN5
          confidentiality.
          “Implicit authentication” (e.g. HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of
EXN6
          authentication or Profile material.

Table 49: New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks

Device Swap
 Risk      Risk description
 no.
           Malicious Subscriber using race condition scenarios leading to Profiles being activated
 EXS1
           on both Devices.
           Malicious entity using weak swap procedures in order to compromise authentication
 EXS2
           vectors.

Table 50: Device Swapping Risks

Loss of Privacy
 Risk      Risk description
 no.
           Improper handling, transport or disclosure of the EID or any user related data
 PRI1
           information leading to the use of the latter as a “super” user tracking identifier.
           eUICC management commands leading to the creation of unexpected and unpredicted
 PRI2      « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties to spy or
           compromise Devices or the Subscriber themselves.

Table 51: Loss of Privacy Risks

Others
 Risk      Risk description
 no.
           Compromising of exchanges between Profile Management actors leading to the critical
 EXO1
           loss of private keys.
 EXO2      Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios.

Table 52: Other Risks

Creation Process
 Req       Requirement description
 no.
           Profiles failing to be created SHALL be securely deleted or at least purged of
 CRE1
           authentication vectors.
Req       Requirement description
no.
          Communication between systems participating in the Profile creation SHALL be
CRE2
          protected in integrity and confidentiality.

Table 53: Creation Process Requirements

B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)

B.1 Profile Production Procedure

This section describes a generic implementation. It should be regarded as an example only; specific implementation MAY be required to address specific security concerns.

Within the eUICC, the current functionality of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Just as with current UICCs, Profiles are the responsibility of the Operator and Profile production is performed upon their request and permission (if not produced by the Operators themselves).

The same Operator procedures as in the current UICCs SHALL apply.

Figure 27: Profile Production Procedure

Profile Production consists of three steps:

   Profile Description definition: The SM-DP+ creates and registers a Profile
    Description based on the Operational Profile Description.
   Operator Credentials generation: The Operator asks the SM-DP+ to generate
    Operator Credentials that will be used in the next step. This procedure is OPTIONAL
    and will not be used if the Operator wants to generate the Operator Credentials
    during Protected Profile Package generation.
   Protected Profile Package generation: The Profile Packages will be created,
    protected and stored. This step (batch type of operation or real time process) is only
    performed after an order with the respective Operator.
        Contract conclusion and Link Profile: At the end of the contract conclusion, an
         Activation Code is delivered to the End User and the Profile MAY be allocated for this
         contract.

Note: The generation of the Bound Profile Package is part of the Profile download with Activation Code procedure in Section 5.2.2.

B.1.1 Profile Description Definition

The Profile description definition MAY comprise of the following sequence:

Figure 28: Profile Description Procedure

Start Condition:
       a.      Contractual relationship between the Operator and the SM-DP+.
Procedure:
       1.      The Operator defines its different Profile types (identified by a [non-standardised]
               Profile Description ID) which contains the Network Access Application like USIM,
               file structure, data and applications, etc.
       2.      The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Descriptions based on the Operators input with
               the corresponding Profile Description ID.
       3.      The SM-DP+ confirms the Profile Description definition e.g. by sending the
               corresponding Profile Description ID.

Note: An Operator can define multiple Profile Descriptions with the SM-DP+

End Condition:
       a.      The Operator is able to order Protected Profile Packages based on Profile
               Description IDs.

B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generation

This procedure allows the Operator to allocate a set of Operator Credentials on the SM-DP+ without associating them to a specific ProfileDescriptionID. Operator Credentials generation MAY comprise of the following sequence:

Figure 29: Operator Credentials Generation

Start Condition:

a.   IMSI, ICCID and other resources have been allocated by the Operator.

Procedure:

1.   The Operator provides the IMSI, ICCID, type of credential to be created (e.g.
     Milenage [11][12], TUAK [10] etc.) and other resources that MAY already be
     allocated to the SM-DP+. It asks the SM-DP+ to securely generate and store a set
     of Operator Credentials.
2.   The SM-DP+ securely generates and stores a set of Operator Credentials based
     on the Operator’s input with the corresponding IMSI, ICCID and other resources
     provided.
3.   The SM-DP+ confirms the generation of Operator Credentials and provides them
     to the Operator.

B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generation

The Protected Profile Package Generation MAY comprise of the following sequence:

This procedure MAY apply between the Profile Description definition, and the Contract conclusion and Link Profile, depending on whether the Protected Profile Package is created on demand or prepared in advance.

Figure 30: Protected Profile Package Generation Procedure

Start Conditions:
       a.   Profile Description definition
Procedure:
       1.   The Operator orders the Protected Profile Package generation by providing the
            SM-DP+ with the Profile Description ID and some corresponding Operator input
            data (credentials e.g. ICCID, IMSI).The Operator input data required for Protected
            Profile Package generation (IMSI, ICCID, K/Ki, OTA Keys, PIN, PUK, etc.) is
            either created by the Operator (and provided to the SM-DP+) or by the SM-DP+
            (and provided to the Operator).
       2.   The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Packages.
       3.   The SM-DP+ creates the Protected Profile Packages.
       4.   The SM-DP+ stores the Protected Profile Packages (securely).
       5.   The SM-DP+ confirms the Protected Profile Package generation, and eventually
            sends the additional Operator input data created by the SM-DP+.
       6.   The Operator registers the Operator data in the Operator systems like HLR/AuC
            and BSS.
End Condition:
       a.       The ordered Protected Profile Packages are available at the SM-DP+. The
                Operator is able to activate these Subscriptions and a Profile download can be
                triggered upon binding to an EID.

B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile

The Activation Code has to be provided to the End User in order to achieve the Profile download procedure. The contract conclusion and Link Profile procedure describes different scenarios to link a contract with the Activation Code process. The following options are described below:

    Activation Code with known EID: The EID is given by the Subscriber to the
     Operator during the conclusion of the contract.
    Activation Code with unknown EID: The EID is not given by the Subscriber to
     the Operator during the conclusion of the contract. The EID is only provided to
     the SM-DP+ during the Profile download procedure and is given back from the
     SM-DP+ to the Operator.
    Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator: The EID is not
     immediately given by the Subscriber during the contract conclusion, but provided
     in step two to the Operator.

The contract reference MAY be, but not necessarily, any Activation Code parameter (e.g. token), ICCID or the IMSI.

In any case, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to allocate and link a Profile to the corresponding eUICC during the Profile download procedure.

B.1.4.1 Activation Code with Known EID

Figure 31: Activation Code with Known EID Procedure

Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure 31: Contract conclusion with known EID

1.        The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator and provides the EID
          during this process.
2. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator prior to Profile download
          procedure’: The Operator allocates the Profile and sends the EID, IMSI and
          ICCID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the different parameters and
          confirms this to the Operator.
6. to 10. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+ prior to Profile download
          procedure’: The Operator sends the EID, the IMSI and the Profile Description
          ID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates an ICCID to a corresponding
          Profile, links the different parameters and confirms the allocated ICCID and
          the link to the Operator.
11.       The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
          corresponding information (contract reference).
End Condition:
        a.      The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
                Operator.
        b.      The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

B.1.4.2 Activation Code with Unknown EID

Figure 32: Activation Code with Unknown EID Procedure

Procedure: Steps 1-6 in Figure 32: Contract conclusion without EID

1.       The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of
         the target eUICC (EID).
2.       Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
         Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
         template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
         (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator.
6.       The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
         corresponding information (contract reference).
End Condition:
       a.      The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
               Operator.
b.          The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

B.1.4.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator

Figure 33: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator

Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure 33Error! Reference source not found.: Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator

1.           The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of
             the target eUICC (EID).
2.           Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
             Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5.     Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
             template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
             (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator.
    6.     The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
           corresponding information (contract reference).
 7.        After the Subscriber has chosen the Device/eUICC, the EID is provided
           together with the contract reference to the Operator.
 8. to 10. The Operator requests the linking of the eUICC (EID) and Profile (ICCID) by
           the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the EID and the ICCID and confirms this to
           the Operator.
11.        The Operator confirms the linking of the EID to the corresponding contract to
           the Subscriber.
End Condition:
       a.     The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
              Operator.
       b.     The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)

This annex provides an example diagram for the implementation of Local Profile Management Operations and describes how the different Confirmation Levels MAY be applied.

                     Example flow for Device & LPA Strong Confirmation
                                access PIN setup / settings
 Unpack Device
                                  Power on & start setup
(new from factory)

Manual setup

              Set / enable
  No
(skip)
             device access
               code / ID?                  First Access to LPA
                                           (no installed profiles)
                      Yes
                                   Enter & confirm
                                       PIN / ID
                                                                                        Manual user
Device access                       Device access                                         setup
    open                             restricted
                                                                             Set
                                                               No                          Yes
                                                                           device
                    Enable & Set LPA                                        lock?
  No
                  access (SC) for eUICC
(skip)
                     management?
                         Yes                                              No
                                                                   Device
                     Lock separately                              lock set?
                                             No
                       from device         (flag)                         Yes
                          lock?
                                                            Enter device PIN /
                         Yes (flag)                          code to confirm
                     Enter & confirm
                       SC PIN / ID
                                                                     Code
                                                                    correct?         No
                         LPA lock
                    restricted / SC set                             Yes
                                                                          LPA / SC set device
LPA access open                                                             lock restricted
  (no SC set)
                                     SC required
                                                          Yes           SC as required on
                                     on each SC
                                                         (flag)         each LUI operation
                                       event?
                                       No    (flag)
SC inherited from
  prior SC input
                                     Notes:
                                     SC: Strong Confirmation
Stop                                 Device access code (PIN / ID) refers
                                     to device unlock mechanism

Figure 34: Example Flow for Device & LPA Strong Confirmation Access PIN Setup /

Settings

D eUICC Categories (Normative)

The following table provides eUICCs categories defined for Remote SIM Provisioning products.

Role no.         Description
                 Basic eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
                     Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 64kB
CAT1
                     ISO interface PPS 96
                     BIP over HTTPS features
                 Medium eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
                     Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 384kB
                     ISO interface PPS 97
CAT2                 BIP over HTTPS features
                     Processor >= 25MHz
                     Crypto processor >= 100MHz
                     Memory Protection Unit
                 Contactless eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
                     Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 1024kB
                     ISO interface PPS 97
CAT3                 BIP over HTTPS features
                     Processor >= 25MHz
                     Crypto processor >= 100MHz
                     Memory Protection Unit

Table 54: eUICC Categories

E LPA Settings (Informative)

Figure 35: LPA Settings

F Certifications Chain and Security Model (Normative)

                                                                                : Manufacturing process
                                                                                : Business process
                      CI                                                        : Remote Profile Management
                                                                                : Local Profile Management
CI Cert                                                                    Cert : Public key Certificate
                                      CI Cert
EUM
                                                                                                                        SM-DP+

ES9+: eUICC Cert, EUM Cert

                                                                                                                                                           ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert
ESeum: CI cert, EUM
Cert, eUICC Cert
eUICC                                                      ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert                                                  LPA
                                                           PK eUICC Cert, EUM Cert
                                                         ES10b:

Figure 36: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the Device

                                                 : Manufacturing process
                                                 : Business process
                                                 : Remote Profile Management
CI                                               : Local Profile Management
                                            Cert : Public key Certificate
 CI Cert,                                        CI Cert,                                                CI Cert,
SM-DS Cert                                      EUM Cert                                               SM-DP+ Cert
SM-DS                                                                                 EUM                                                                                     SM-DP+
                                                                                           ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert,
                                                                                                                                                                                                      ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert
                                                                                                                                                                                ES9+: eUICC Cert,
ES11: eUICC Cert,

ES11: SM-DS Cert

                                                                                             eUICC Cert
                                                                                                                                                                                EUM Cert
EUM Cert
                              ES10a: eUICC Cert,                                                                           ES10b: eUICC Cert,
                                  EUM Cert                                                                                     EUM Cert
LPA                                                                            eUICC                                                                                            LPA
                              ES10a: SM-DS Cert                                                                          ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert

Figure 37: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the eUICC

F.1 Security Model

The Security Model defines the trust relationships between all the active components of the eUICC ecosystem with an LPA in the Device.

The figure below shows only the end-to-end logical links where cryptographic keys and sensitive data are sent. The different links define the end-to-end trust relationship between entities. We distinguish a hierarchy of seven trust links with link 1 being the most significant and link 7 being the least significant. If trust link 1 is broken, all trust links will be broken as a result. If trust link 2 is broken, trust link 1 remains intact however all other Trusted Links are compromised or broken.

Figure 38: Trusted Link with LPA in the Device

Figure 39: Trusted Link with LPA in the eUICC

Trust       Description             Interfaces   Possible               Impact of loss of
link                                involved     compromises            trust link
TL1         Trust introduced onto   Out of       The CI public key,     The trust of the entire
            the eUICC by the        scope        the EUM’s              security model is
            issuing EUM to enable                Certificate,           breached and all
            future remote                        the EUM’s keyset,      eUICCs issued under
            management and                       the eUICC keys, the    the model cannot be
            authorisation by the                 OS, and the Security   trusted.
            SM-DP+ and possibly                  Domains.
            the EUM: eUICC keys
Trust       Description                 Interfaces   Possible               Impact of loss of
link                                    involved     compromises            trust link
            (EUM & CI keyset
            eUICC Certificates).
TL2         Trust placed in the CI’s    Out of       The EUM and SM-        Loss of Operator
            verification of the         scope        DP+ Certificates.      trust on the EUM and
            EUM, SM-DP+, and                                                SM-DP+
            the resulting Certificate
            issuance.
TL3         Trust placed in the         ES2+         The eUICC              Loss of Operator
            activities for eUICC        ES8+         Certificate or         trust on the eUICC
            eligibility and remote                   eligibility check      and/or SM-DP+.
            attestation from the                     failure.
            ISD-R on the target
            eUICC to the Operator
            via the SM-DP+.
            Provides eUICC
            Certificate, EID,
            reference to its
            certification and EUM
            to the Operator and
            SM-DP+.
TL4         Trust placed in the         ES2+         SM-DP+ Certificate     Loss of Operator
            activities for Profile      ES8+         eUICC Certificate or   trust on the SM-DP+
            data transfer from the                   eligibility check      and/or eUICC.
            Operator via the SM-                     failure.
            DP+ to the ISD-R on
            the target eUICC.
            Protects the Profile
            and associated
            credentials and keys
            (NAAs, OTA keys,
            ISD-R access, ISD-P
            SD creation …) with
            only the Operator, SM-
            DP+ and the eUICC.
TL5         Trust placed in the         ES2+         SM-DP+ Certificate     Operator loss of trust
            information exchange                                            on SM-DP+.
            between the Operator
            and the SM-DP+ for
            Link Profile requests.
TL6         Trust placed in the         ESeu         LPA security           eUICC loss of trust
            mechanisms provided                                             on LPA.
            by the LPA: Local
            Profile Management,
            Local Profile
Trust       Description                Interfaces    Possible                 Impact of loss of
link                                   involved      compromises              trust link
            Management
            Operations
TL7         Trust placed in the        ES9+          LPA security or SM-      SM-DP+ loss of trust
            TLS session                              DP+ security.            on LPA (in the
                                                                              Device or the eUICC)
                                                                              or LPA loss of trust
                                                                              on the SM-DP+.
TL8         Trust in the discovery     ES11          LDS security or SM-      LDS loss of trust on
            process                                  DS security.             the SM-DS and vice
                                                                              versa.
TL9         Trust in the discovery     ES11          eUICC security or        SM-DS loss of trust
            process                                  SM-DS security.          on the eUICC and
                                                                              vice versa.
TL10        Trust in the UI            ESeu          Device security          Loss of trust on the
                                                                              Device

Table 55: Trusted Link Descriptions

Compromised Impacted              Description       Impact of loss of         Countermeasures
element     Links                                   trust
eUICC             TL1, TL3,       The eUICC         The eUICC can no          Revoke the Certificate
                  TL4, TL9        keys and          longer be trusted.        of the eUICC.
                                  EUM’s Keyset.     MNO and SM-DP+
                                                    loss of trust on eUICC.
CI                TL2             The EUM, SM-      Loss of Operator trust    Repair/Replace CI.
                                  DS, and SM-       in the EUM, SM-DS         Generate new CI
                                  DP+               and SM-DP+.               Certificate and new
                                  Certificates.                               Certificate for the
                                                                              EUM, SM-DS and SM-
                                                                              DP+ following the SAS
                                                                              process.
                                                                              Remote repair of
                                                                              already issued
                                                                              eUICCs: new CI public
                                                                              key.
EUM               TL1, TL2        Loss of SAS       Loss of trust from the    New SAS for the
                                  certification.    Operator and SM-DP+       EUM. Remote repair
                                                    on the EUM and its        of already issued
                                                    eUICCs.                   eUICCs: new EUM
                                                                              Certificate, new
                                                                              eUICC Certificate.
Compromised Impacted              Description        Impact of loss of        Countermeasures
element     Links                                    trust
SM-DP+            TL3, TL4,       Loss of SAS        Loss of trust from the   New SAS for the SM-
                  TL5, TL7,       certification.     Operator, LPA, SM-DS     DP+. New SM-DP+
                  TL8                                and eUICC on the SM-     Certificate.
                                                     DP+.
SM-DS             TL8             Loss of SAS        Loss of trust from the   New SAS for the SM-
                                  certification.     Operator, LPA, SM-       DS. New SM-DS
                                                     DP+ and eUICC on the     Certificate.
                                                     SM-DS.
LPA               TL6, TL7,       LPA security       Loss of trust from the   LPA repair by the
                  TL8             failure.           SM-DP+, SM-DS and        Device Manufacturer.
                                                     eUICC on the LPA.
Device            TL10            Device             Loss of trust in the     LUI in the eUICC self-
                                  security failure   Device UI                protected with User
                                                                              Intent capture
                                                                              mechanisms (i.e.
                                                                              Captcha Code)

Table 56: Impact of Compromising Trusted Links and Countermeasures

The signer is responsible for the revocation of the Certificates it has signed. This section describes how the new Certificates are pushed to concerned entities according to the security model.

   SM-DP+ trusts the CI
   EUM trusts the CI
   eUICC trusts the EUM and the CI
Req no.                Description
                       The new SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-
CERT1
                       DP+ by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
                       The new SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-DS
CERT2
                       by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
                       The new EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the EUM by a GSMA CI
CERT3
                       upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
                       The EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the
CERT4                  EUM
                       Note: See details in Section 4.1.1.1.
                       The CI Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the EUM
CERT5
                       Note: See details in Section 4.1.1.1.
CERT6                  Certificates SHALL be revocable.
                       Neither the End User nor any other party SHALL be able to prevent
CERT7
                       Certificate revocation.
                       The End User SHALL not be allowed to use Remote SIM Provisioning
CERT8
                       functions with revoked Certificates.
Req no.             Description
                    The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+ SHALL be revoked if required
CERT9               (e.g. loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM
                    Provisioning certification requirements).
                    The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS SHALL be revoked if required (e.g.
CERT10              loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning
                    certification requirements).
                    The Public Key Certificate of the EUM SHALL be revoked if required (e.g.
CERT11              loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning
                    certification requirements).

Table 57: Certificate Requirements

G LPA Integrity (Normative)

The LPA SHALL be protected against misuse or being compromised by means of implementing standard procedures.

For cases where the LPA is in the Device, the LPA integrity SHALL be guided by the following Device classes:

Device class         Description                              Example of Devices
                     Devices with an open operating           Smartphones, Tablets, Laptops,
                     system where mechanisms such as          Advanced Wearables
Advanced             secure boot and platform signing of
                     applications are available and used
                     to protect the LPA.
                     Devices without possibility to install   Connected sensors, Simple
                     applications. The attack surface of      Wearables, Single use case devices
                     the LPA is minimal due to the locked
Basic                down nature of these Devices.
                     Simple mechanisms to ensure that
                     the LPA is not compromised SHALL
                     be taken.

Table 58: Device Classes

H Rules Authorisation Table (Informative)

Annex H reflects the RAT table configuration(s) that MAY be configured in embedded UICC.

The RAT entries shown in Table 58 MAY be provisioned:

PR                 Operators   User consent
POL RULE1                  *            YES
POL RULE2                  *            YES

Table 59: RAT configuration

Additional lines can be added to the RAT table to reflect agreement between some Operators and OEMs as needed. The OEM can also decide to add lines to the RAT table.

Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.

I LPA Invocation of the Provisioning Profile Example Flow (Informative)

J Integrated eUICC Security Requirements (Normative)

J.1 General Security Requirements

Requirement         Description
                    An Integrated TRE MAY use a Remote Memory within the Device, dedicated
GS01
                    to the Integrated TRE, to store software and data.
                    All Integrated eUICC software and data which are stored outside the
                    Integrated TRE SHALL be protected by the Integrated TRE in order to ensure
GS02                their confidentiality, their integrity, and software side channel protection.
                    This includes protection against side-channel attacks such as cache-timing
                    attacks.
                    All Integrated TRE software and data, including context, SHALL only be
GS03                stored in protected memory as requested in paragraph 36 in BSI-CC-PP-
                    0084 [29].
                    All Integrated TRE software and data stored outside an Integrated TRE
GS04
                    SHALL be protected against replay attacks.
                    The Integrated TRE internal instruction and data buses SHALL be isolated
GS05
                    from the rest of the SoC.
                    The other SoC components SHALL have no access to the Integrated TRE
GS06
                    internal buses.
                    The Integrated TRE SHALL be the only entity to expose TRE data outside the
GS07
                    Integrated TRE.
                    The Integrated TRE SHOULD have priority access to Remote Memory as
GS08
                    defined in GS02 in cases of shared resource contention
                    All the credentials used to protect the data stored in the Remote Memory,
GS08a               dedicated to the Integrated TRE as per requirements GS02 and GS03,
                    SHALL only be stored and used in the Integrated TRE.
                    The Integrated TRE SHALL be isolated from all other SoC components such
GS09                that no other SoC components can have access to assets inside the
                    Integrated TRE.
                    The Integrated TRE SHALL have a hardware and software protection means
GS10                that controls the access to every function of the Integrated TRE (e.g.
                    cryptographic unit).
                    The Integrated TRE SHALL process/execute its data/software in a dedicated
GS11
                    secure CPU contained within the Integrated TRE.
                    The Integrated TRE SHALL be resistant against hardware and software side-
GS12
                    channel attacks (e.g. DPA, cache-timing attacks, EMA etc.).
                    All Integrated TRE software and data SHALL be exclusively processed within
GS13
                    the Integrated TRE.
                    The Integrated TRE SHALL include in its security target the following threats
                    for software and data managed by the TRE, but stored outside the TRE:
GS14                       leakage
                           probing
                           manipulation
Requirement             Description
                        The protection of software and data stored in Remote Memory as defined in
GS15                    GS02 SHALL be managed by the Integrated TRE using means which are
                        independent of the Remote Memory implementation.
                        All cryptographic processing used by the Integrated TRE SHALL be
GS16
                        contained within the Integrated TRE.
                        All security mechanisms within the Integrated TRE SHALL withstand state of
GS17
                        the art attacks.
                        If Remote Memory outside the SoC is used, the combination of Integrated
GS18                    TRE and Remote Memory SHALL implement mechanisms protecting access
                        to Remote Memory.
                        Integrated TRE implementations using Remote Memory outside the SoC
GS19                    SHALL implement mechanisms protecting the integrity of Remote Memory
                        contents as defined in GS02.

Table 60: General Security Requirements

PP-0084 Security IC
+IC Dedicated Software
                                        Device
SoC
                                              Integrated TRE
                         Secure CPU            Cryptographic Processing
...      ...                       Instruction and data buses
 Remote Memory               Isolation/Firewall/
Protection Function            Access Control
Remote Memory (optional)
           Volatile                 Non-Volatile
+Augmentation for
Remote Memory/Isolation

Figure 40: Example of Optional Remote Memory Usage

Note: IC Dedicated Software including its authentication by the TRE, is covered by BSI-CC- PP-0084 [29] and is not required to be augmented by this annex.

J.2 Security Certification

Requirement           Description
                      An Integrated TRE together with the RMPF SHALL be evaluated according to
                      BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29] augmented with the requirements defined in this
SC01                  annex.
                      Note: The requirements relating to Remote Memory are only applicable when
                      that type of memory is used by the Integrated TRE.
                      Evidence of Isolation (for example GS05, GS06, GS07, GS09) SHALL be
SC02
                      assessed during evaluation.
                      Evidence of proper Life Cycle management of the Integrated TRE SHALL be
SC03
                      assessed during evaluation.

Table 61: Security Certification Requirements

J.3 Conformance Claims

Requirement           Description
                      The Integrated TRE SHALL claim in its security target, that it comprises of
                      Security IC and IC Dedicated Software regarded as a Security Integrated
CC01                  Circuit which implements all functional aspects specified by the BSI-CC-PP-
                      0084 [29] protection profile augmented with the requirements defined in this
                      annex.
                      The Integrated TRE SHALL provide resistance to attackers with “high” attack
CC02
                      potential as defined by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 in [33].
                      The Integrated TRE SHALL be evaluated against the requirements, methods
CC03                  of attacks and evaluation documents for smartcards and similar devices
                      published by SOG-IS [35].

Table 62: Conformance Claims

J.4 Security Objectives

BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29] defines security problems related to the Security IC being evaluated and corresponding security objectives. Within BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29], the definitions do not take into account the implementation of the TRE within a SoC and the use of Remote Memory. In particular, Integrated TRE has to include additional security problems and objectives in its security target. The security target shall include the following in its security objectives:

Requirement           Description
                      The Integrated TRE SHALL define, in its security target, a security objective
                      to protect software and data managed by the TRE and stored outside the
                      TRE against:
SO01
                             leakage
                             probing
                             manipulation

Table 63: Security Objectives

J.5 Security Functional Requirements

Requirement          Description
                     The Integrated TRE SHALL contain a Remote Memory Protection Function
IESFR01              (RMPF) to protect software and data to be stored in Remote Memory,
                     outside the TRE.
IESFR02              The RMPF SHALL reside in the Integrated TRE.
                     The RMPF SHALL ensure the following security properties: (1) confidentiality
                     (2) integrity and (3) replay-protection.
                     Note: these properties are intended to cover a range of possible attacks,
IESFR03
                     including replay of commands on the Remote Memory, rollback of data
                     stored in the Remote Memory, cloning the content of a Remote Memory from
                     another device, swapping or corrupting data within the Remote Memory, etc.
                     The RMPF SHALL use keys that are either:
IESFR04                     derived from a secret TRE-unique seed(s), or;
                            randomly generated within the Integrated TRE
                     TRE-unique seed(s) used by RMPF SHALL be generated using a certified
IESFR05
                     random number generator as required by BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29].
                     TRE-unique seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be generated inside the
IESFR06
                     TRE.
                     The entropy of the TRE-unique seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be at
IESFR07
                     least 256 bits.
IESFR08              Randomly generated keys used by the RMPF shall be at least 256 bits.
                     The key derivation mechanism used by the RMPF SHALL be compliant with
                     NIST SP 800-108 [30][30] and SHALL use:
                            a block cipher with security strength equivalent to or greater than
IESFR09
                             AES-256, or
                            a hash function with security strength equivalent to or greater than
                             SHA-256,
IESFR10              The keys used by the RMPF SHALL be protected by the TRE.
IESFR11              Seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be restricted to the RMPF.
                                Confidentiality Requirements
                     The RMPF SHALL provide confidentiality based on encryption using a cipher
                     with security strength equivalent to, or greater than AES-256 and using a
IESFR12              suitable mode of operation approved by NIST in NIST SP 800-175B [34][18]
                     or recommended by BSI in BSI TR-02102-1 [31] or recommended by ANSSI
                     RGS v2 B1 [32].
                                  Integrity and Authenticity
                     The RMPF SHALL use a cryptographic integrity mechanism with security
IESFR13
                     strength equivalent to, or greater than SHA-256.
                     The RMPF SHALL provide authentication using a MAC of at least 128 bits
                     based
IESFR14
                            on a block cipher using a cipher with security strength equivalent to
                             or greater than AES-256, or
Requirement          Description
                               on a hash function with security strength equivalent to or greater
                                than SHA-256,
                     and using a mode of operation approved by NIST in NIST SP 800-175B [34]
                     or recommended by BSI in BSI TR-02102-1 [31] or recommended by ANSSI
                     RGS v2 B1 [32].
                     IESFR12 and IESFR14 MAY also be provided in combination by an
IESFR15
                     authenticated encryption mode fulfilling both requirements.
                                         Replay protection
IESFR16              The RMPF SHALL detect any replay attack on the Integrated TRE.
                     The Integrated eUICC SHALL be resistant to replay attacks on the data
IESFR17
                     stored in Remote Memory.
                     The Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to verify that the data received from
                     the Remote Memory is not unsolicited.
                     Note: Solicited data received from the Remote Memory is data that the
IESFR18
                     Integrated eUICC did intend to retrieve at runtime from Remote Memory
                     and/or retrieved data that the Integrated eUICC was able to verify according
                     to the requirements set in this Annex.
                     The RMPF SHALL NOT process data if it is unable to detect a replay attack.
                     Note: Such a situation may arise e.g. if the RMPF uses a counter to detect
IESFR19
                     replay attacks and the counter expired or became unreliable for any other
                     reason.
                                            Test Interface
                     The Integrated eUICC Test Interface SHALL NOT affect the security
IESFR20
                     requirements defined in this annex.
                     The Integrated eUICC Test Interface SHALL be compatible with commonly
IESFR21
                     used interfaces for smartcard testing.

Table 64: Security Functional Requirements

J.6 Identification

Requirement         Description
                    The Integrated eUICC SHALL allow the SM-DP+ to identify the type of the
                    Integrated TRE including its component configuration (e.g. use of internal or
ID01
                    Remote Memory, use of other optional components), its manufacturer, in
                    addition to the RSP OS provider.

Table 65: Identification Requirement

K Document Management

K.1 Document History

Version    Date          Brief Description of Change        Approval             Editor /
                                                            Authority            Company
                         First Release with amendments                           Carmen Kwok,
V1.0       23/12/15                                         PSMC
                         from Security review.                                   GSMA
                                                                                 Carmen Kwok,
V2.0       25/08/16      Includes Phase 2 content           PSMC
                                                                                 GSMA
                                                                                 Carmen Kwok,
V2.1       29/02/17      Phase 2 maintenance release        Technology Group
                                                                                 GSMA
                                                                                 Carmen Kwok,
V2.2       31/08/17      Phase 2 maintenance release        RSPLEN
                                                                                 GSMA
                                                                                 Carmen Kwok,
V2.3       30/06/21      Phase 2 maintenance release        ISAG
                                                                                 GSMA
Other Information
 Type                              Description
 Document Owner                    Carmen Kwok
 Editor / Company                  GSMA

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