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GSMA · Specification

SGP.21v2.0

RSP Architecture

Defines a common architecture for remotely provisioning and managing device eUICCs so devices can receive credentials for mobile network access.

Version
v2.0
  1. v3.12023-12-01
  2. v3.02022-03-28
  3. v2.72026-04-24
  4. v2.62024-09-20
  5. v2.52022-11-18
  6. v2.42021-08-03
  7. v2.32021-06-30
  8. v2.22017-09-01
  9. v2.12017-02-27
  10. v2.02016-08-23
  11. v1.02015-12-23
Issued
2016-08-23
Source
Original PDF

A formatted version of this document is not available yet; the text below is extracted clause by clause, so tables and figures may be incomplete.

Overview

This document sets out an architecture framework for remote SIM provisioning and management of embedded UICCs in consumer-market devices, with the aim of supporting interoperability across operators and deployment scenarios. It describes the roles of manufacturers, operators, service providers, subscribers, and certificate issuers, alongside eUICC, device, profile, metadata, and NFC requirements. It covers system components and interfaces, including the SM-DP+ and SM-DS, the Local Profile Assistant, profile policy management, certification, and operational procedures for downloading and managing profiles. The framework provides a shared basis for enabling devices to obtain the credentials needed for mobile network access.

  • eUICC
  • Remote SIM Provisioning
  • SM-DP+
  • SM-DS
  • Local Profile Assistant
  • NFC

Overview generated automatically from the document's scope and outline. The document text is authoritative.

Changes since v1.0

29 clauses modified, 66 clauses added, 18 clauses removed, 21 clauses renumbered

Compared automatically clause by clause from the extracted text of both versions; differences only in layout, spacing or table cells are ignored. The documents are authoritative.

1.1 Overviewmodified

…or the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices with the necessary credentials to gain mobile network access. This version focuses on Devices for the consumer market. … Please note that SGP.21 V1.0 [31] has not been deprecated.

1.4 Definition of Termsmodified

…ownload and installation of a Profile. A part of the Activation Code information provided by the Activation Code Token Operator/Service Provider to reference a … Profile.Subscription. SM-DS used in cascade mode with a Root SM-DS to redirect Event Alternative SM-DS Registration from a SM-DP+ to the Root SM-DS. Describes a mechanism for which the End User is confirming their Authenticated Confirmation action through a method involving the input of personalised information (e.g. PIN, fingerprint). A Protected Profile Package which has been encrypted for a target Bound Profile Package eUICC. Certificate or Public Key A certificate as defined in RFC.5280 [1] and GlobalPlatform Certificate specifications [11]. An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM Certified eUI … es of a Primary Device for the Companion Device purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. Term Description A code entered by an End User to authorise the usage of an … Confirmation Code Activation Code to confirm the download and installation of a Profile. Confirmation Code Profile.Required ForA addedparameter security,to indicate whether the OperatorConfirmation MAYCode chooseis torequired communicateFlag theor Confirmationnot. CodeRefers viato athe separatehierarchy deliveryof channel.User ConfirmationIntent Codeand RequiredConfirmation ARequest, parameterwhere: to indicateUser whetherIntent is the first and lowest level Confirmation CodeLevel is requiredSimple FlagConfirmation oris not.the Thesecond Datalevel Subset Authenticated Confirmation is athe listthird ofand Elementaryhighest Fileslevel Note: For examples of theimplementation, respectiveplease Datarefer Subsetto ProfileAnnex whoseC. contentDescribes SHALLa berequest storedfor inAuthenticated theConfirmation Metadataor ofa saidSimple Profile.Confirmation Request Confirmation as defined in this specification. User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a Device mobile network. E.g. a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset. AAn termentity generallyresponsible understoodfor inmanufacturing theDevices. industryThe to mean that the Device Factory Reset Device isManufacturer returnedManufacturer toMAY abe stateresponsible equivalentfor tothe aselection Factoryand State.insertion Furtherof definitioneUICCs isin beyondDevices. theA scopemode ofhidden thisto document.the AnEnd entityUser responsibleand forintended manufacturingto Devices.be Theused Deviceby Device ManufacturerTest ManufacturerMode MAYmaintenance bepeople. responsibleIt forallows theaccess selection and insertionuse of eUICCsthe inTest Devices.Profiles. Profile, the files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) of which are not Disabled Profile selectable over the UICC-Device interface. An interrogation of the Discovery Service by a Device for Event Discovery Request Records that are registered for its eUICC. UICC which enables the secure remote and/or local management Embedded UICC (eUICC) of Profiles. Profile, the files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) of which are Enabled Profile selectable over the UICC-Device interface. ‎[18]0 A file whose content determines the ability of a Profile Owner to Enabling Configuration File make use of Profile Policy Rules. End User The person using the Device. Information that pertains to the identity of an End User suche.g. asEnd User Data personal details, name, address, biometric characteristics, assigned identification numbers, etc. EndFunction Userthat Dataenables Note:a InSM-DP+ manyto jurisdictionscheck (includingcertain EUinformation andeUICC US),Audit identifyingrelated data extends to indirectthe identifierseUICC (suchand asits ICCID,installed EID,Profiles. MSISDN,eUICC cookies,Authorisation etc)Token thatused areby linkablethe SM-DS to aauthenticate person'sthe realeUICC. identity when considered in combination with other data sources. A Certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC. eUICC Certificate This Certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate. eUICC Eligibility Check The information set sent from the eUICC to the SM-DP+ to allow Information eligibility checks. eUICC Manufacturer The eUICC Manufacturer provides eUICC products. Term Description An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a Factory eUICC Memory Reset State. An action that returns the eUICC to the state prior to installation of eUICC Test Memory Reset any post-issuance Test Profile. A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited EUM EUM Certificate which can be used EUM Certificate to verify eUICC Certificates. ThisA CertificateProfile candownload which is set by an SM-DP+ on behalf of an Event Operator, to be verifiedprocessed usingby a specific eUICC. Unique identifier of an Event for a specific EID generated by the RootEvent-ID Certificate.SM-DP+. The configuredset stateof information stored on the SM-DS for a specific Event, via the Event Registration procedure. This information consists of Event Record either:  the DeviceEvent-ID, and/orEID, and SM-DP+ address or  the eUICCEvent-ID, atEID, and SM-DS address A query to the pointSM-DS it(Root Factoryor StateAlternative) wasexecuted distributedto afterverify manufacture.Event TermEvent DescriptionRecord ManifestationQuery Registration success or determine that an Event Record still exists. A process notifying the SM-DS on the availability of information on Event Registration either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC. The configured state of the UICCeUICC asat specifiedthe inpoint ETSIit TSwas 102distributed 221Factory [2]State andafter manufacture. Form Factor ETSIPhysical TSmanifestation 102of 671the [3].UICC. GSMA Certificate Issuer A Certificate Authority accredited/approved by GSMA. Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU- T E.118 [19].0. ICCID Note: the ICCID throughout this specification is used to identify the Profile. International Mobile Refer to 3GPP 21.905 [4]. Subscriber Identity The pro … red. Link Profile Note: This is normally an offline process, binding is an online process happening during the communication between the SM- DP+ and the eUICC. … The Local Profile Assistant (LPA) describes the entity comprising of Local Profile Assistant the Local User Interface (LUI), the Local Profile Download (LPD) and the Local Discovery Service (LDS). Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated Local Profile Management on the ESeu interface. Local Profile Management Operations includeare enable Profile, disable Local Profile Management disable Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory Operation Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, edit nickname, add Profile, and addedit Profile.default SM-DP+ address. Term Description Assurance that the LPA has not been compromised or otherwise affected. The Metadataassurance isSHALL abe copyprovided ofto the Datavarious SubsetRemote ofLPA Integrity SIM Provisioning entities to ensure that the respectiveLPA Profilecan Metadatabe storedtrusted to execute the actions requested Note: This could be linked with a certification process. Defines the Operation LPA Mode which is either LPA in the eUICC forLPA informativeMode displayingor toin the EndDevice. UserInformation pertaining to a Profile that containsis stored in the informationeUICC listedand inis SectionMetadata ‎4.6.accessible by the LPA for the purpose of Local Profile Management. An entity providing access capability and communication services Mobile Network Operator to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure. An entity providing access capability and communication services Mobile Virtual Network to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure but does Operator not have an allocation of spectrum. A method of authentication in which an End User is only granted access after successfully presenting several separate pieces of Multi-Factor Authentication evidence to an authentication mechanism – typically at least two of (MFA) the following categories: knowledge (something they know), possession (something they have), and inherence (something they are). Network Access Application Refer to 3GPP 21.905 [4]. Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [5] network. This Network Access Credentials MAY include data such as Ki/K and IMSI stored within a NAA. NFC Device Device with NFC capability. NFC eUICC eUICC with NFC capability. An arbitrary random number generated for one time use, employed Nonce for cryptographic communication. A report about a Profile download or Remote/Local Profile Notification Management Operation processed by the eUICC. Operational Profile A Profile that allows connectivity to a mobile network. A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a Operator company providing wireless cellular network services. A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network Operator Credentials Access Credentials, OTA Keys for remoteRemote ProfileFile/Application Management,management, and authentication algorithm parameters. The credentials included in the Profile used in conjunction with OTA Keys OTA Keys Platforms. A platform used by an Operator for the remoteRemote managementFile/Application of OTA Platform management of enabled OperatorOperational Profiles on eUICCs,eUICCs. i.e.Principles usingreflected OTAin RAMa orset RFM.of rules that governs the behaviour of Policy the eUICC and/or entities involved in the remote management of the eUICC. Policy Enforcement A function that executes Policy Rules to implement a Policy. Term Description Defines the atomic action of a Policy and the conditions under Policy Rule which it is executed. A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a Primary Device Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. Term Description A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned on to an eUICC for the purposes of providing services by the Profile Operator. The Profile SHA … o the Operator; Profile Description example formats could be an Excel table, xml format, or plain text. A combination of local and remote management operations … (enable Profile Management (enable,Profile, disable,disable delete,Profile, delete Profile, and query)query Profile Metadata) Profile Owner The Operator identified by the IMSI in the Profile. A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format Profile Package that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile [6]. The functional element within the Profile management system that Profile Policy Enabler interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules. A policy control system that allows the Service Provider to Profile Policy Management implement, manage and enforce its subscription terms and conditions associated with the installed Profile. Defines the condition of the policy and the atomic action to be Profile Policy Rule taken by the Profile Policy Enabler. A Profile Package which has been encrypted for storage but not to Protected Profile Package a specific eUICC. A Profile that allows connectivity to a mobile network solely to Provisioning Profile provide the provisioning of Profiles. The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, switching, and Remote SIM Provisioning deleting of a Profile on an eUICC. A Certificate used to authenticate other entities within the Remote Root Certificate SIM Provisioning framework. A globally identified central access point for finding Events from Root SM-DS one or more SM-DP+(s). The Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either Service Provider as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement with an Operator. The Service Provider could also be the Operator. Describes a mechanism for which the End User is confirming their Simple Confirmation action through a confirmation (e.g yes or no). SM-DP+ Certificate A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DP+. SM-DS Certificate A Certificate used by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DS. Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as SMDPid part of the SM-DP+ Certificate. Term Description An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a Subscription with an Operator. The Subscriber is allowed to Subscriber subscribe and unsubscr … authorised to use these services. Information that pertains to the identity of a Subscriber such as contract details, authentication credentials, cryptographic … keys,keys etc. Subscriber Data Note: In many instances, the Subscriber is also the End User and therefore Subscriber Data is likely to include End User Data. A Subscription describes the commercial relationship between the Subscription Subscriber and the Service Provider. This role prepares Profile Packages, secures themeach with a Profile protection key, stores Profile protection keys in a secure manner andas well as the Protected Profile Packages in a Profile Package repository, Subscription Manager Data repository, and allocateslinks the Protected Profile Packages to specified EIDs. Preparation+ (SM-DP+) EIDs. The SM-DP+ binds Protected Profile Packages to the respective EID and securely downloads these Bound Profile Packages to the LPA of the respective eUICC. DescribesSubscription Manager This is responsible for providing addresses of one or more SM- Discovery Server (SM-DS) DP+(s) to a LDS. A Profile which when installed on an eUICC enables access to test Test Profile equipment for the direct,purpose realof timetesting acquisitionthe Device and validationthe eUICC. This will not include any Operator Credentials. According to NIST SP 800-53r4 0, a mechanism by which an End User (through an input Device) can communicate directly with the security functions of the information system with the necessary Trusted Path confidence to support the system security policy. This mechanism can only be activated by the End User Intentor the security functions of the information system and cannot be imitated by untrusted software. Describes the direct, real time acquisition of the manual End User instructionUser byIntent input on the LUI to trigger locally a Profile download or Profile Management operation.

1.5 Abbreviationsmodified

Abbreviation Description AC Activation Code ARA-M Access Rule Application - Master ARF Access Rule File AuC Authentication Centre BSS Business Support Services CI Certificate Issuer DNSCurve Domain Name System Curve DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions Abbreviation Description ECASD eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain EID Embedded UICC Identifier eSVN embedded Specification Version Number ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute eUICC Embedded UICC EUM eUICC Manufacturer FASG Fraud and Security Group FFS For Further Study GSMA GSM Association GSMA CI GSMA Certificate Issuer HLR Home Location Register HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol ICCID Integrated Circuit Card Identifier IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity ISD-P Issuer Security Domain - Profile ISD-R Issuer Security Domain - Root ISIM IP Multimedia Services Identity Module ITU International Telecoms Union LDS Local Discovery Service LPA Local Profile Assistant LPD Local Profile Download LUI Local User Interface M4M Mifare4Mobile MFA Multi-Factor Authentication MNO Mobile Network Operator MNO-SD Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain MSISDN Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number NAA Network Access Application OS Operating System OTA Over The Air PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy RAM Remote Application Management RAT Rules Authorisation Table RFM Remote File Management SAS Security Accreditation Scheme SD Security Domain SIM Subscriber Identity Module SM-DP+ Subscription Manager - Data Preparation + Abbreviation Description SM-DS Subscription Manager - Discovery Server SSD Supplementary Secure Domain USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module

1.6 Referencesmodified

Ref Document Number Title X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate [1] RFC 5280 Revocation List (CRL) Profile [2] ETSI TS 102 221 UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical [2] ETSI TS 102 221 characteristics Smart cards; Machine to Machine UICC; Physical and logical [3] ETSI TS 102 671 logical characteristics Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; [4] 3GPP 21.905 Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications The international identification plan for public networks and [5] ITU E.212 and Subscriptions SIMalliance: eUICC Profile Package - Interoperable Format [6] SIMAPP Format Technical Specification http://simalliance.org/euicc/euicc-technical-releases/ [7] ETSI TS 102 226 Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, [8] RFC 2119 Levels”, S. Bradner http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt [9] 3GPP TS 21.133 3G security; Security threats and requirements GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC [ … ication of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1: [12] 3GPP TS 35.231 Algorithm Specification 3GPP TS 35.205 Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document … 1: [13] 1: General Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document 2: [14] 3GPP TS 35.206 2: Algorithm Specification [15] RFC 7469 Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP FS.04 - Security Accreditation Scheme for UICC Production[15] – [16] EUM SAS StandardProduction [17]– SM-DPStandard SAS FS.08 - GSMA SAS Standard for Subscription Manager Roles[16] [18]SM-DP ETSISAS TSRoles 103 383 Smart Cards; Embedded UICC; Requirements [17] ETSI TS 103 383 Specification [19][18] ITU-T E.118 The International Telecommunication Charge Card Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity [19] 3GPP TS 31.102 Module (USIM) application Ref Document Number Title GlobalPlatform Device Technology Secure Element [20] GPD_SPE_013 Access Control - Version 1.1 Personalisation of Mobile Equipment - Mobile functionality [21] 3GPP TS 22.022 specification [22] TS.26 GSMA NFC Handset Requirements Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information [23] NIST SP 800-53r4 Systems and Organisations – Revision 4 [24] OMAPI SIMalliance Open Mobile API Specification [25] SGP.03 NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1 GlobalPlatform Device Technology – Secure Element [26] GPS_SPE_013 Access Control Wireless Application Protocol WAP-248-UAProf- [27] WAG UAProf 20011020-a [28] SGP.05 Embedded UICC Protection Profile GSMA SAS Standard for Subscription Manager Roles - [29] SGP.07 Version 1.0 or later [30] SGP.21 SGP.21 Architecture Specification - Version 1.0 [31] SGP.22 SGP.22 Technical Specification - Version 2.0

1.7 Conventionsmodified

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [8]. “FFS” or “For Further Study” means that it will be covered in SGP.22 V2.1.

2 Principlesmodified

This section contains the principles related to the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning system for the Embedded UICC. The solution based on the requirements described within this document has to be prov ided in a non-discriminatory manner.

2.1 Basic Principlesmodified

…d management BAS3 processes SHALL at all times and under all circumstances be at least equivalent to the current removable UICC and its provisioning processes. … Principle no. Description The architecture of the eUICC and its Remote SIM Provisioning system BAS4 SHALL BAS4 comply with the requirements of 3GPP TS 21.133 [9]. The architecture SHALL support a level of security with respect to the protection of Operator Credentials which is at least equalequivalent to the present levels of BAS5 security. This applies in particular to: BAS5  the confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters;parameters ;  the integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI). The architecture SHALL support a level of security for all Profile content which BAS6 is BAS6 at least equalequivalent to the current state of the art level of security of the UICC. The architecture SHALL NOT compromise the security and privacy of Subscriber data,Data, nor the security and privacy of End User Data. Examples depending on BAS7 territory include identities that can be used for tracking such as ICCID, MSISDN, EID, IMSI Ki etc. Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of this document. However, BAS8 any data which could be used to identify an individual SHALL be BAS8 treated as personal data and insubject complianceto with local regulations e.g. the EID, ICCID, etc. Table 11: Basic Principles

2.2 Profile Principlesmodified

Principle no. Description Profiles are the property of and SHALL be under the control of the issuing PRO1 Operator. A Profile does not exist outside of an eUICC. I.e. a Profile is always located on PRO2 a PRO2 particular eUICC. PRO3 A Profile SHALL be uniquely identified.identified by its ICCID. An Enabled Profile in combination with an eUICC SHALL be able to carry all PRO4 logical characteristics of a UICC. Once the Profile is enabled, all relevant UICC characteristics or features as PRO5 described in ETSI 102 221 [2] specifications SHALL applyapply, with the exceptions as defined within this specification. Principle no. Description It SHALL be possible to delete Profiles only when in a disabled state, with the PRO6 exception of theeUICC Memory Reset, and eUICC Test Memory Reset functionfunctions. whichPRO7 deletesProfile allManagement Profiles.SHALL be governed by Policy. Table 22: Profile Principles

3.1 eUICC Manufacturermodified

Role no. Description The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the initial cryptographic EUM1 configuration and security architecture of the eUICC. EUM2 The eUICCs are delivered by the eUICC Manufacturer (EUM)(EUM). toRole otherno. partiesDescription EUM2 (e.g. the Device Manufacturer). Relevant parts of the eUICC Manufacturer’s products and processes are EUM3 certified by a GSMA-approved certification process. The EUM SHALL issue the eUICC Certificate to allow: EUM4  eUICC authentication and proof of certification to other entities; EUM4  authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-DP+ and an eUICC. BothThe storageeUICC andManufacturer communicationSHALL channelsbe responsible for the EUMimplementation Certificateof any EUM5 LPA elements that reside in the eUICC and Rootthe EUM5compliance Certificateof SHALLthe beLPA reliable.with the requirements in Section 4.10.3. Table 33: eUICC Manufacturer Role

3.2 Device Manufacturermodified

…er SHALL be responsible for the implementation of any DM1 LPA elements that reside on the Device and the compliance of the LPA with the requirements in Section … ‎4.8.2.4.10.2. The Device Manufacturer SHALL be responsible for the implementation of DM2 any application that resides on the Primary Device allowing User Interface access to the Companion Device. Table 44: Device Manufacturer Role

3.3 Operator and Service Providermodified

…this architecture and its operation. Other characteristics exist but are considered out of scope. Role no. Description OPE1 The Operator SHALL have access to a … SM-DP+.SM-DP+ via the ES2+ interface. In the event that a Subscriber has selected a Service Provider, that Service OPE2 Provider will initiate the provisioning of a Profile.Profile Package. The Operator, potentially on behalf of the Service Provider, specifies the OPE3 Profile characteristics and any features and applications analogous to Role no. Description removable UICCs. Operators SHALL be able to use an OTA Platform in order to manage the OPE4 content of their Enabled Profile in the eUICC (RAM, RFM). A Subscriber MAY have a relationship with any number of Service Providers OPE5 simultaneously. Table 55: Operator Role

3.4 Subscriber and End Usermodified

Role no. Description The Subscriber is the contract partner of the Service Provider for the SEU1 Subscription. Note: The Subscriber MAY not be the End User. Role no. Description The End User is a human and uses the Device and/or the services related to SEU2 the Enabled Profile. SEU3 There SHALL be a means for the End User to obtain the EID. Table 66: Subscriber and End User Role

3.5 Certificate Issuermodified

…ning entities CIS1 and acts as a trusted third party for the purpose of authenticating the entities of the system. The Certificate Issuer communicates with the … SM-DP+SM-DP+, SM-DS and the EUM through CIS2 through interfaces that are out of scope of this specification. Table 77: Certificate Issuer Role

4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecturemodified

This section contains the functional description of the architecture of the Remote SIM Provisioning system architecture for the Embedded UICC. Figure 1: Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture

4.1.1.1 ECASDmodified

The Embedded UICC Controlling Authority Security Domain (ECASD) is responsible for the secure storage of credentials requiredneeded to support the required security domains on the eUICC. There SHALL be only be one ECASD on an eUICC. The ECASD SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during the eUICC manufacturing as described in [11]. The ECASD SHALL have the following properties:  Non-modifiable eUICC private keys for creating signaturessignatures.  Associated Certificates for eUICC authenticationauthentication.  The Certificate Issuers’ (CI) root public keys for verifying SM-DP+ CertificatesCertificates.  eUICC Manufacturers’ (EUMs) keyset for key/Certificate renewal. Additionally, the ECASD SHALL provide security functions used during key establishment and eUICC authentication.

4.1.1.4 MNO-SDmodified was MNO–SD

4.1.1.5 Profile Policy Enableradded

The eUICC Operating System (OS) service which offers Profile Policy Rules validation and enforcement.

4.1.1.6 Telecom Frameworkrenumbered was 4.1.1.5

4.1.1.7 Profile Package Interpreterrenumbered was 4.1.1.6

4.1.1.8 LPA Servicesadded

The LPA services provide necessary access to the services and data required by the LPA functions for the following: 1. The optionally stored Root SM-DS and/or Default SM-DP+ addresses. 2. Facilitates the reception of the Bound Profile Package in transfer from the LPA. 3. Provide information regarding the installed Profiles and their Metadata. 4. Provides Local Profile Management. 5. Provides functions for the LPA to authenticate and interact with the SM-DS. 6. Ensures access to the EID is restricted to only the LPA.

4.1.1.7 LPA Servicesremoved

The LPA services provide necessary access to the services and data required by the LPA functions.

4.2 eUICC Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description EUICC1 The eUICC is a discrete tamper resistant hardware componentcomponent. EUICC2 An removable eUICC is packaged in a standardised ETSI Form EUICC1 Factor [2][2]. [3].EUICC3 EUICC2 The eUICC SHALL be either removable or non-removable. The behaviour of the eUICC with an Enabled Profile SHALL be similarequivalent EUICC4 to the EUICC3 UICC. EUICC4EUICC5 The eUICC SHALL be able to contain zero or onemore Profile.Profiles. EUICC5EUICC6 At a maximum, only one Profile SHALL be enabled at any point in time. The behaviour of a NAA USIM or ISIM within a Profile on an eUICC SHALL be identical to a removable UICC NAAs USIM or ISIM. EUICC6EUICC7 Note: No changes to existing 3GPP/3GPP2 USIM, CSIM and ISIM specifications are expected. EUICC8 The eUICC MAYSHALL implementsupport theMilenage TUAK00 algorithmand ‎[12]TUAK in0 additionalgorithm tosets. EUICC7Req Milenageno. ‎[13]‎[14].Description The ownership of the eUICC MAY change throughout its lifetime as can the EUICC8EUICC9 Device. If any operation such as Profile enabling,Management Profileoperation disabling, and Profile EUICC9 download and installation does not complete successfully, the EUICC10 eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request. The eUICC SHALL contain an ECASD and ISD-R security domains installed EUICC10EUICC11 and personalised during manufacture. EUICC11EUICC12 The ECASD cannot be deleted or modified after eUICC manufacture. The ISD-R SHALL be responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the EUICC12EUICC13 lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps. Req no. Description The ISD-R SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during eUICC EUICC13EUICC14 manufacturing as described in [11]. The eUICC SHALL be able to support an eUICC Memory Reset. This can EUICC14EUICC15 only be requested by the End User. The eUICC SHALL be able to support an eUICC Test Memory Reset. This EUICC16 can only be requested by the End User when the Device is in Device Test Mode. The eUICC SHALL support the eUICC Profile Package Interoperable format EUICC15EUICC17 as defined by SIMalliance [6]. An ISD-R SHALL:  be created within an eUICC at the time of manufacture; EUICC16EUICC18  NOT be deleted or disabled;  NOT be able to perform any operations inside an ISD-P. EUICC17EUICC19 An eUICC MAY provide LPA functions. EUICC20 An ISD-P SHALL be created by the ISD-R at the request of the SM-DP+. IfCommunication a Profile download and installation does not terminate successfully, the EUICC18 Profile and the ISD-P SHALL be securely deleted. The eUICC SHALL ensure that the communication between the eUICC and EUICC19 the SM-DP+ participatingSHALL inbe the Profile creation is protected EUICC21 in authenticity, integrity,integrity and confidentiality. EUICC20EUICC22 The eUICC SHALL NOT export Profiles installed on the eUICC. The eUICC SHALL enforce an isolation of Profiles and prevent Profiles from EUICC21EUICC23 operating outside of their execution environment i.e. Profile SHALL run in a sandbox. The integrity of the Bound Profile Package SHALL be ensured during its EUICC22EUICC24 installation on the eUICC. EUICC23EUICC25 The eUICC SHALL be tamper resistant (physically and logically). Profile keys and algorithm parameters SHALL NOT be extractable from the EUICC24EUICC26 eUICC. All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a robust tamper- EUICC25EUICC27 resistant way and be resistant to side-channel attacks. The Operator SHALL be able to update the OTA Keys in its Profile on the EUICC26EUICC28 eUICC in a secure and confidential way, reusing existing OTA Platform mechanisms. A downloaded Profile Package SHALL be installed on the eUICC in a EUICC27EUICC29 disabled state. Req no. Description The eUICC SHALL enforcealways report its specification version number in the first EUICC30 communication during the commencement of each session with the SM- DP+ or SM-DS. The EUM SHALL install an eUICC Certificate in the eUICC used to verify EUICC31 the eUICC certification. The EUM SHALL install an EUM Certificate in the eUICC used to verify the EUICC32 eUICC Certificate. EUICC33 The eUICC SHALL have a mechanismmeans to ensureauthenticate thatto therethe isSM-DS. notEUICC34 moreThe EUICC28eUICC thanSHALL oneprotect itself against unauthorised access. Upon Profile installed.deletion, Note:the ThiseUICC mechanismSHALL enforcementensure isa dedicatedcomplete fordeletion phaseof 1.all EUICC35 data related to the Profile. The eUICC SHALL alwaysonly reportaccept itsProfile specificationManagement versionoperations numbersent from EUICC36 the LPA in either the firsteUICC, EUICC29or communicationthe duringDevice. The eUICC SHALL reject any Profile Management commands that are in EUICC37 conflict with the commencementPolicy Rules of eachthe session.respective TheProfile. EUMIf any Bound Profile Package download or installation does not complete EUICC38 successfully, the eUICC SHALL installmaintain anthe state it was in before it received the request. The eUICC CertificateSHALL support GlobalPlatform Secure Element Access Control EUICC39 0. There SHALL be a means to preset a default SM-DP+ address in the EUICC40 eUICC. EUICC41 The eUICC usedSHALL be able to verifystore EUICC30a Root SM-DS address. The eUICC SHALL be able to send a delete Notification to notify the SM- EUICC42 DP+ that the Profile was deleted. In EUICC42, if connectivity is not available to send the Notification of EUICC43 deletion to the SM-DP+, the Notification SHALL be retained and sent as soon as connectivity becomes available again. The delete Notification process SHALL also be executed for each deleted EUICC44 Profile in case of eUICC Certification.Memory reset. The EUMeUICC SHALL installsupport ana EUMset Certificateof standard functions and services including, but not limited to Java Applications, USIM Toolkit functions andGlobalPlatform features. The list of supported functions and services EUICC45 (e.g. API package names and versions) SHALL be explicitly referenced within the technical specification (SGP.22 0). A different set of functions and services MAY be defined/supported according to the different Embedded UICC categories as defined in Annex D. The eUICC SHALL support at least the following USIM Toolkit commands:  PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION including the following fields: local info, IMEI, network measure results, date & time, access technology EUICC46  TERMINAL PROFILE  ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD)  SEND SHORT MESSAGE  DISPLAY TEXT Req no. Description  GET INPUT  RING TONE An eUICC usedSHALL support at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters EUICC47 preloaded by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing, defined in GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0. Each Notification SHALL be uniquely identifiable and SHALL be signed by EUICC48 the eUICC. Each Notification (delete, pre-delete, disable) SHALL be re-play attack EUICC49 protected and signed by the eUICC. It SHALL be possible to verifyrequest through a Profile parameter a pre-delete EUICC50 (FFS) Notification to be sent notifying of a deletion which will be carried out by the EUICC31eUICC after the sending of the Notification has been attempted. In the event that a pre-delete Notification has been successfully attempted, the eUICC Certificate.SHALL delete the Profile for which the Notification attempt was EUICC51 (FFS) made. In the event that this Notification is unsuccessful but the Profile is deleted anyway, the Notification SHALL be retained and sent as soon as connectivity becomes available again. Table 88: eUICC Requirements

4.3 eUICC Eligibility Checkmodified

…eUICC. The set of information sent by the eUICC to the SM-DP+ for eligibility checking purposes is referenced herein as the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. … Some eUICC eligibility check parameters MAY be required due to Device capabilities which must be supported by the Profile/eUICC and delivered as part of the eUICC Eligibility Check Information set. Note: Device capability refers to a Device feature or service-enabling function provided by the Device that MAY have a direct effect on the content of the Profile or the procedure used to download the Profile, and in turn requires support from the eUICC.

4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirementsmodified

…eUICC Eligibility Check ELG1 Information. The eUICC SHALL include the available memory in the eUICC Eligibility ELG2 Check Information. The eUICC SHALL declare … whetherin athe ProfileEligibility Check Information if it is currentlyunable installedELG3 into accept an additional Profile. The eUICC SHALL provide a valid current Certificate to the ELG3SM-DP+ Eligibilitysigned CheckELG4 Information.by the EUM. ELG5 The eUICC SHALL provide an identification of the EUM. ELG6 The eUICC SHALL provide the current OS version. The eUICC SHALL provide Device enabler information relating to services ELG7 that MAY need Profile support (e.g. NFC enablers). Eligibility Check Information SHALL be integrity and authenticity protected ELG8 by ELG4 the eUICC for its sending to the SM-DP+. The eUICC SHALL indicate the application runtime environment version ELG9 and libraries versions supported in eUICC Eligibility Check Information. The eUICC SHALL indicate cryptographic algorithms and their respective ELG10 key lengths supported in the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. The eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version it is supporting. This ELG11 parameter SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility check. The eUICC SHALL indicate its current certification status. This parameter ELG12 SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility check. If the eUICC is NFC capable (e.g. CAT3) it SHALL indicate its support to the ELG13 relevant NFC services including its current certification status. The eUICC SHALL indicate its category (see Annex D). This parameter ELG14 SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check. Table 99: eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements Note: It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and could be used for the eligibility check procedure.

4.4 Device Requirementsmodified

Req no. Description The Device SHALL conform to the terminal requirements within ETSI TS DEV1 102 221 [2] orwith ETSIthe TSexceptions 102as 671defined [3].in this specification. There SHALL be a means for the End User to obtain the EID fromthrough the DEV2 Device.Device software. This SHALL only be possible through the LUI. If an eUICC is within the Device packaging, then the EID SHALL be printed DEV3 in machine readable form on the Device packaging. Bearer connection of the Companion Device to the SM-DP+ SHALL only be determined by the bearer availability. DEV4 Note: The Companion Device MAY use any connectivity method available to connect to the SM-DP+. Devices compliant with the GSMA NFC Handset Requirements 0 SHALL support the Open Mobile API 0 used by the Device applications to DEV5 exchange data with their counterpart applications running in the Enabled Profile on the eUICC. The implementation of the Remote SIM Provisioning specification in the DEV6 Device SHALL not impact the potential use of the SIM Lock mechanism defined in 3GPP TS 22.022 0 In the case where the Device supports both the LPA in the Device, and the DEV7 LPA in the eUICC, the Device SHALL have a mechanism (setting or configuration parameter) that sets which LPA SHALL be used. DEV8 The End User SHALL be able to modify the parameter defined in DEV7. Req no. Description A Device that supports an embedded UICC without an LPA in the eUICC, DEV9 SHALL provide LPA functions. A Device that supports only an embedded UICC with an LPA in the eUICC, DEV10 MAY provide LPA functions. Table 1010: Device Requirements

4.4.1 Device Capability Requirementsadded

Req no. Description There SHALL be a mechanism that is able to provide the Device capabilities DEVCAP1 to the SM-DP+. Table 11: Device Capability Requirements

4.5.1 Device Resetmodified was Device Factory Reset

Req no. Description It SHALL be possible for the End User to perform any type of Device reset FAC1 Invocationwithout affecting the status of the eUICC. The Device FactorySHALL Resetby means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the FAC2 eUICC Memory Reset. The Device SHALL NOTby impactmeans of a secured procedure, trigger/request the eUICC.FAC3 eUICC Test Memory Reset. Table 1112: Device Factory Reset Requirements

4.5.2 eUICC Memory Resetmodified

Req no. Description eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC includingapart thefrom MEM1 Enabledpre-installed ProfileProfiles ifthat any.are MEM2flagged Aas securedpermanent. meanseUICC Memory Reset SHALL bedelete providedall toProfiles enableon the eUICC Memoryregardless Reset.of SuchMEM2 meanstheir asPolicy describedRules inbut MEM2,not SHALLthe includeProvisioning anProfile itemor preinstalled Test Profiles. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be verified in theorder LUIto menuinitiate eUICC MEM3 ofMemory theReset. Device. In addition to MEM3, other secure means MAY be provided to perform the MEM4 eUICC Memory Reset function. The same level of security and User Intent as is offered by MEM4 the LUI based reset function SHALL apply. User Intent and Confirmation Request SHALL apply. Table 1213: eUICC Memory Reset Requirements

4.5.3 eUICC Test Memory Resetadded

Req no. Description eUICC Test Memory Reset SHALL delete all post-issuance installed Test MEMT1 Profiles on the eUICC including the Enabled Test Profile if any. Simple Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to enable eUICC Test MEMT2 Memory Reset. If Test Profiles are not supported, then eUICC Test Memory Reset is not MEMT3 required. Table 14: eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements

4.6 Profile Requirementsmodified was Metadata Requirements

eUICC Metadata = Copy of Profile 1 Data Subset Profile 1 {Data Subset} Profiles’ status (enabled / disabled) Figure 3: eUICC Metadata Representation Req no. Description All Profiles SHALL have a Data Subset which will be included in the META1 associated Metadata. When a Profile is installed, the Metadata SHALL be automatically copied by META2 the eUICC operating system from the Profile Data Subset during Profile installation. The Metadata SHALL at all times reflect the respective data in the Profile with META3 the exception of the nickname which can be edited by the End User. META4 The Metadata SHALL be exclusively stored in the eUICC. META5 The Metadata SHALL be accessible irrespective of the state of the Profile. The Metadata SHALL include a field for the Service Provider name. The Elementary File of the Profile associated with this data SHALL be META6 EFmetservice (a new EF TBD). Note: EFSPN is already used in a different context outside of this specification and could be blank. Req no. Description The Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile. The META7 Elementary File of the Profile associated with this data SHALL be EFiccid. The Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of the Profile. META8 The Elementary File of the Profile associated with this data SHALL be EFmetnick (a new EF TBD). The Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description of the META9 Profile defined by the Operator/Service Provider. The Elementary File of the Profile associated with this data SHALL be EFmettxt (a new EF TBD). META10 The nickname SHALL be End User editable. The Metadata SHALL always be available to the LUI to allow the End User to META11 be informed of installed Profiles in the eUICC. The Metadata SHALL include a field to allow the display of an icon defined by META12 the Operator/Service Provider for the respective Profile. Table 13 Metadata Requirements

4.6.1 Test Profilesadded

Req no. Description It is OPTIONAL for the removable eUICC to support the requirements of TPRO1 Test Profiles described in this section. If Test Profiles are not supported, it SHALL not be possible to download Test Profiles into the eUICC. Test Profiles SHALL NOT be able to authenticate to an Operator’s mobile network using Operator Credentials. The eUICC SHALL ensure that such TPRO2 Profiles cannot be used to connect to any Operator’s mobile network even if authentication information is contained in the Test Profile. TPRO3 A Test Profile SHALL be installed in its own individual ISD-P. TPRO4 Test Profiles MAY be pre-installed on the eUICC. Test Profiles SHALL only be visible and usable when the Device is in TPRO5 Device Test Mode. It SHALL be possible to download, install, enable, disable or delete Test TPRO6 Profiles in the eUICC only in Device Test Mode with the exception of the eUICC Memory Reset operation. Test Profiles, as with any other Profile, SHALL be managed through a TPRO7 certified SM-DP+. The enabling of a Test Profile SHALL override the do not disable Policy TPRO8 Rule. When the Device Test Mode is deactivated, the LPA SHALL disable any TPRO9 enabled Test Profile. When the Test Profile is disabled, the eUICC SHALL enable the Operational TPRO10 Profile that was previously enabled, if any. TPRO11 The Device Test Mode activation SHALL be obfuscated from the End User. When exiting Device Test Mode, an End User notice SHALL be presented TPRO12 to prompt the tester to perform an eUICC Test Memory Reset. Table 15: Test Profiles Requirements The Device MAY implement a mechanism for connecting an external SIM card for the purpose of testing in the context of Device repair, without affecting the state of the eUICC.

4.6.2 Provisioning Profileadded

Req no. Description Provisioning Profiles SHALL be based on the same format structure as PPRO1 described for the Profile (Figure 2). A Provisioning Profile MAY be enabled by the LPA upon End User request for operations defined in PPRO6 if establishment of the connectivity using PPRO2 the currently Enabled Profile is unsuccessful. If this results in an Operational Profile being disabled, the End User SHALL first give consent to the loss of communication provided by the Enabled Profile. Provisioning Profiles and their associated Metadata SHALL not be visible to PPRO3 the End User on the LUI. PPRO4 Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be selectable by the End User. Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be deleted through any action by the End PPRO5 User including the use of eUICC Memory Reset. Provisioning Profile SHALL only be used for the intended purposes of PPRO6 Profile downloading and related Profile maintenance functions. The Provisioning Profile SHALL not be used as an Operational Profile. PPRO7 PPRO6 SHALL be enforceable in the RSP architecture. Table 16: Provisioning Profile Requirements

4.7 Metadata Requirementsmodified was Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+)

Req no. Description META1 All Profiles SHALL have associated Metadata. META2 The Metadata SHALL be stored in the eUICC. META3 The Metadata SHALL be accessible irrespective of the state of the Profile. The Metadata SHALL include a field for the Service Provider name. META4 Note: EFSPN is already used in a different context outside of this specification and could be blank. META5 The Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile. The Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of the META6 Profile. The Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description of the META7 Profile defined by the Operator/Service Provider. META8 The nickname SHALL be editable by the End User. META9 The Metadata SHALL always be available to the LUI. The Metadata SHALL include an OPTIONAL field to allow the display of an META10 icon defined by the Operator/Service Provider for the respective Profile. The Metadata SHALL be able to include a copy of the Policy Rules META11 associated to the Profile. All Profiles SHALL be uniquely identified in the Metadata as Operational, META12 Provisioning or Test Profile. An Operator SHALL be able to access and update the following Metadata of META13 its Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is Enabled: Req no. Description  Service Provider name  Short description of the Profile  Icon of the Profile Table 17: Metadata Requirements

4.8 NFC Requirementsadded

An NFC Device and an NFC eUICC SHALL be compliant with the following list of requirements: Req no. Description NFC1 An NFC Device SHALL be compliant with GSMA TS 26 0. After installation of an Operational Profile, the NFC eUICC SHALL support NFC2 all requirements as specified in the SGP.03 GSMA NFC UICC Requirements Specification 0. The NFC Device SHALL retrieve and enforce access control rules as NFC3 specified in the GlobalPlatform SEAC specification 0. The eUICC SHALL be able to generate proof that the Operational Profile NFC4 has been deleted. All NFC applications and NFC enabling applications (e.g. ARA-M, PPSE, CRS, CREL, etc.) attached to an Operational Profile SHALL be included NFC5 under the ISD-P created for the Profile, either under the MNO-SD or in an SD hierarchy with a self-extradited SSD with authorised management privilege. The NFC eUICC solution SHALL be able to provide assurance to NFC application Service Providers that the combination of an eUICC and NFC6 Operational Profile is trusted. This solution SHALL be based on the CASD that is part of the Operational Profile and scenario Push 2B and scenario 3 as specified by SGP.03 0. If the NFC eUICC is compliant with M4M, the eUICC SHALL reset all the NFC7 M4M virtual cards associated to that Profile when a Profile containing M4M applications is disabled. The appropriate NFC related certification information SHALL be part of the NFC8 information shared with the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check. A NFC Device SHALL at least have an embedded eUICC or have the NFC9 capability to support a removable eUICC that is compliant with CAT3 and SGP.03 0 in either instance. Table 18: NFC Requirements

4.9 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM -DP+)added

4.9.1 SM-DP+ Overviewrenumbered was 4.7.1

…ill be responsible for the lifecycle management of the ISD-P that was created at its request. This is performed via the distinct functions listed below. Figure … 4:3: SM-DP+ Functions Function name Description Creates Profile Packages (i.e. Personalised Profiles, including (IMSI, Ki, Profile Package ICCID,…)) from Profile Descriptions agreed with Operators. This can be an Generation off-line batch or real time process. Profile Package Secures each Profile Package according to the security process creating the Protection the Protected Profile Package. Profile Package Binds the Protected Profile Package to a target eUICC using the security Binding process thus creating the Bound Profile Package. Profile Package Temporarily stores Protected Profile Packages or Bound Profile Packages for Storage for subsequent delivery to the eUICC. Profile Package Securely transmits and installs the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC Delivery through the LPALPA. orSM-DS directlyEvent toNotifies the SM-DS of a pending operation for a specific eUICC. Registration Table 1419: SM-DP+ Function Descriptions

4.7.2 SM-DP+ Requirementsremoved

Req no. Description SMDP1 The SM-DP+ SHALL act on behalf of the Operator. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to initiate the request for ISD-P creation as part SMDP2 of the Bound Profile Package delivery. The SM-DP+ SHALL establish an end-to-end secure channel to the eUICC to SMDP3 download and install Bound Profile Packages via the LPA. The SM-DP+ SHALL allocate a Protected Profile Package for binding to a SMDP4 specific eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator. The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the allocated SMDP5 Protected Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any SMDP6 Certified eUICC. Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound SMDP7 Profile Package delivered by the SM-DP+. Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP+ after completing all SMDP8 production steps, Profile Package Protection, and binding. Once the Bound Profile Package is downloaded, the SM-DP+ SHALL NOT SMDP9 retain a network connection to the LPA/eUICC. End-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC involved in SMDP10 the Profile download and installation SHALL be protected in terms of integrity, authenticity and confidentiality. Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected SMDP11 through encryption. The SM-DP+ SHALL accept “Certificate pinning” operations up to server SMDP12 granularity (refer to [15]). On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile creation and SMDP13 storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure deletion procedures (logically and physically). SMDP14 Past communications associated with Bound Profile Package download and Req no. Description installation between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC whenever intercepted by a third party, SHALL NOT be recoverable due to the compromise of a single long-term key (i.e. Perfect Forward Secrecy). The transport used for the Bound Profile Package SHALL implement anti- SMDP15 replay mechanisms between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC. Connectivity to the SM-DP+ SHALL be aborted and an explicit error message SMDP16 SHALL be triggered by the SM-DP+ upon failure to verify authenticity of the connecting party. (No message SHALL be sent to the connecting party) After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound Profile Package, the transport encryption procedure SHALL be renewed. SMDP17 If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more than a configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction SHALL be terminated and the Operator SHALL be notified. The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols whenever SMDP18 available (e.g. DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.). The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to avoid DoS SMDP19 attacks. SMDP20 The SM-DP+ SHALL log all Certificate authentication failures. The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC Profile SMDP21 Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by SIMalliance [6]. SMDP22 The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on demand. SMDP23 It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk. The SM-DP+ SHALL send a confirmation of the successfully completed SMDP24 download and installation of a Profile to the Operator. There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between the SM- DP+ and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the Profile. Such a SMDP25 mechanism SHALL either be ordered by the Operator or be performed by the Operator itself. If such deletion mechanism is used, there will be no off-card entity responsible for managing the ISD-P of the installed Profile. SMDP26 The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid. SMDP27 The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid. Table 15 SM-DP+ Requirements

4.8.2 LPA Requirementsremoved

Req no. Description The LPA SHALL be responsible for instructing the eUICC to perform Local Profile LPA1 Management functions as per End User request. A mechanism SHALL be implemented between any LPA elements outside the LPA2 eUICC, and the eUICC to ensure that the communication is not compromised. A secure mechanism SHALL be implemented between the LUI and the associated LPA3 display or input applications on the Device. Access to the LUI application(s) SHALL be protected according to current best LPA4 practices. This SHALL be enforced by the Device OS. All Local Profile Management Operations SHALL require User Intent (no LPA5 automation). LPA6 LUI access SHALL require User Intent (no automation). LPA7 The End User SHALL be able to easily access the list of installed Profiles. LPA8 Profile Metadata SHALL be protected from unauthorised access. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘enable’ SHALL be supported. This LPA9 operation SHALL allow the End User to select the Profile. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘disable’ SHALL be supported. This LPA10 operation SHALL allow the End User to disable the Enabled Profile. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘delete’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the eUICC. LPA11 The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for the deletion of the Profile. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This LPA12 operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Profiles on the eUICC and relevant associated information through the Metadata. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as described LPA13 in Section ‎4.5.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ’edit nickname’ SHALL be supported. LPA14 This operation SHALL allow the End User to add or modify a nickname for the selected Profile. The operation SHALL NOT modify the Service Provider name. LPA15 The Local Profile Management Operation “add Profile” SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL allow the LPA to request an Activation Code in order to download and install a new Profile to the eUICC. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The LPA SHALL NOT be accessible by any applications other than that developed LPA16 by the provider of the LPA for the sole purpose of enabling the services and functions of the LPA. The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Authenticated LPA17 Confirmation. The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Simple LPA18 Confirmation located on the Device. LPA19 Access to the LUI SHALL be protected by an Authenticated Confirmation. LPA20 The mechanism in LPA19 SHALL be selectable/unselectable by the End User. The mechanisms in LPA19 SHALL be prompted to be enabled by default but this LPA21 can be skipped by the End User. The Device SHALL implement a mechanism to protect the LPA access through an Authenticated Confirmation. This Authenticated Confirmation MAY be LPA22 implemented by using the mechanisms implemented in the Device such as phone lock code, fingerprint input, etc. The End User SHALL be able to define dedicated personalised information to LPA23 access the LPA. If the End User selects the protection of access to the LUI (LPA21), then the LPA24 subsequent Authenticated Confirmation at operation level MAY be replaced with a Simple Confirmation. When enforced, any User Intent SHALL allow the End User to cancel the Local LPA25 Profile Management Operation. It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI of a Companion Device allowing input LPA26 from an End User interface on the Primary Device. When a Companion Device LUI allows input from a Primary Device, the Companion Device LUI SHALL be able to restrict the actions that can be applied. For example: LPA27  not offer the eUICC Memory Reset;  only ‘enable’ and ‘disable’ operation are exposed.  Profile enabling is exposed only if no Profile is already enabled on the Companion Device. The LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be able to request an End User initiated LPA28 action on the Companion Device before the establishment of any proximity secure link (used for inputs into the LUI from another Device). A point-to-point proximity secure link initiated by the End User and offering LPA29 confidentiality and integrity SHALL be established between the Companion and Primary Device for any input executed from the Primary Device. Any required User Intent SHALL only be executed by the LPA on the Companion LPA30 Device. A User Intent input MAY be done in either the Primary or the Companion Device. The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure LPA31 measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI. LPA32 The End User Data used for the User Intent protection (e.g. PIN code, fingerprint) SHALL be stored in a secure environment. The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the LPA33 internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over such connection, ES8+ and ES9+ can be established. The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally LPA34 shared Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over such connection, ES8+, and ES9+ can be established. The LPA SHALL be able to determine if a connection to the internet and or SM- LPA35 DP+ is available. The LPA SHALL be able to prompt the End User that there is no connection to LPA36 internet and or no connection to the SM-DP+, in order to allow the End User to enable or troubleshoot required connectivity. LPA37 The LPA SHALL only be able to access the eUICC if it has assigned privileges. LPA38 There SHALL only be one LPA on the Device. Any action where the End User MAY be unaware of the consequences about the LPA39 result of the operation, the LUI SHALL offer additional explanation prior to user acceptance. LPA40 The LPA SHALL only handle actions that are described in this specification. LPA41 The LPA SHALL have no part in or trigger the subscription selection process. LPA42 LPA procedures SHALL always be initiated by the LPA itself. LPA43 LPA procedures SHALL not be called by any external (non-LPA) processes. Table 17 LPA Requirements

4.9.2 SM-DP+ Requirementsmodified was Operator – End User (ESop)

OutReq no. Description SMDP1 The SM-DP+ SHALL act on behalf of scopean Operator. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to initiate the request for ISD-P creation as SMDP2 part of thisthe document.Bound Profile Package delivery. Req no. Description The SM-DP+ SHALL establish an end-to-end secure channel to the eUICC SMDP3 to download and install Bound Profile Packages via the LPA or directly to the eUICC. The SM-DP+ SHALL link a Protected Profile Package for binding to a SMDP4 specific eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator. The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the linked SMDP5 Protected Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any SMDP6 Certified eUICC. Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound SMDP7 Profile Package delivered by the SM-DP+. Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP+ after completing all SMDP8 production steps, Profile Package Protection, and binding. Communication session between the SM-DP+ and the LPA SHALL be SMDP9 terminated by the SM-DP+ after execution of intended Operation(s). End-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC involved SMDP10 in the Profile download and installation SHALL be protected in terms of integrity, authenticity and confidentiality. Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected SMDP11 through encryption. On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile creation SMDP12 and storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure deletion procedures (logically and physically). SM-DP+/eUICC communication SHALL incorporate Perfect Forward SMDP13 Secrecy (PFS). The transport used for the Bound Profile Package SHALL implement anti- SMDP14 replay mechanisms between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC. Connectivity to the SM-DP+ SHALL be aborted and an explicit error message SHALL be triggered by the SM-DP+ upon failure to verify SMDP15 authenticity of the connecting party. (No message SHALL be sent to the connecting party) After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound Profile Package to the LPA, the transport encryption procedure SHALL be renewed. SMDP16 If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more than a configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction SHALL be terminated and the Operator SHALL be notified. The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols whenever SMDP17 available (e.g. DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.). The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC Profile SMDP18 Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by SIMalliance [6]. SMDP19 The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on demand. SMDP20 It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk. Req no. Description The SM-DP+ SHALL send a confirmation of the successfully completed SMDP21 download and installation of a Profile to the Operator. There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between any SM-DP+ and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the Profile. Such a mechanism SHALL either be ordered by the Operator or be SMDP22 performed by the Operator itself. If such deletion mechanism is used, there will be no off-card entity responsible for managing the ISD-P of the installed Profile. SMDP23 The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid. SMDP24 The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Notification to the Operator SMDP25 informing them that a specific Bound Profile Package download is about to start. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an eUICC Eligibility Check Information SMDP26 report and other relevant information (e.g. Activation Code, ICCID, etc.) to the Operator ahead of/prior to the eUICC Bound Profile Package download. SMDP27 The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to perform Event Registrations to the SM-DS. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to request from an Alternative SM-DS not to SMDP28 propagate the Event Registration to the Root SM-DS. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Profile delete Notification to the SMDP29 Operator owning a Profile when a related delete Notification is received from the eUICC. The SM-DP+ SHALL support the following states for a Profile Package, triggered by the Profile Owner: SMDP30  A Profile Package is not released for Profile Package download.  A Profile Package is released for Profile Package download. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to select the elliptic curve parameter in the SMDP31 Profile download procedure. It SHALL be possible for a SM-DP+ to conduct an Event Record Query to a SMDP32 (FFS) SM-DS (Root or Alternative) for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations it owns. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event Record on SMDP33 (FFS) the Root SM-DS or the Alternative SM-DS, identified by the EID or the Event-ID over the ES12 interface. Response to a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only occur where the SMDP34 (FFS) Root SM-DS or Alternative SM-DS validates the Event Record ownership. Ownership validation of a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only use SMDP35 (FFS) the requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components of the Event Record held. A SM-DP+ SHALL support all sets of elliptic curve parameters as defined in SMDP36 GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0. Table 20: SM-DP+ Requirements

4.9.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICCadded

Req no. Description The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be ignored if an SM-DP+ DF1 address is present in an AC being presented to the LUI. The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be accessible by the DF2 LPA to establish a connection to this SM-DP+. DF3 The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC MAY be left blank. If the default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC is blank, then the use of the DF4 SM-DS discovery procedure or an SM-DP+ address in an AC SHALL be required to establish the target SM-DP+. No redirection SHALL be supported from a query to the default SM-DP+ DF5 (FFS) address. Table 21: Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements

4.10 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)renumbered was 4.8

Primary Device User End User Interface ESeu User Interface ESeu LPA LUI ES10c eUICC Companion Device Figure 5:4: End User Interaction and Interfaces between a Primary and Companion Device, where the Companion Device MAY have a UI

4.10.1 LPA Overviewrenumbered was 4.8.1

This role exists both within the Device and in conjunction with LPA Services provided by the eUICC, and within the eUICC with the LPA function provided by the eUICC. It provides twothree distinct functionsfunctions, the Local User Interface (LUI), the Local Profile Download (LPD) and the Local Discovery Service (LDS) as described below. Whilst the eUICC alone cannot provide any of these functions without Device interaction, the specific level of interaction will depend upon … of the LPA will be undertaken within the Device. The way this variability is implemented across different Devices and Device types is for further study. Figure … 6:5: LPA Functions Function name Description Local Discovery Service Where required, the LDS is responsible for retrieving pending Event Records from the SM-DS. (LDS) This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound Profile Package Local Profile Package in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile Package Download from the SM-DP+ Download to the LPD in a single transaction, and (ii) the onward (LPD) transfer of the Bound (LPD) Profile Package into the eUICC in segments. This function will depend on network, Device, and eUICC capabilities.capabilities . Local User Interface This function allows Localthe ProfileEnd ManagementUser onto theperform DeviceLocal byProfile theManagement End (LUI) User.on the Device. User Intent hasSHALL to be enforcedenforced. as required. Table 1622: LPA Function Descriptions

4.9.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)removed

Used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services.

4.9.5 LPA – SM-DP+ (ES14)removed

This interface will be provided either by:  An internet connectivity available or provided on the same Device where the LPA resides. or  An internet connection shared from another Device via a local go-between connection Figure 8: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to the SM-DP+

4.9.6 SM-DP+ – LPD (ES9+)removed

For Devices with an LPA, this interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the LPD.

4.9.8 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)removed

Out of scope of this document.

4.9.9 LPD – eUICC (ES10b)removed

The ES10b interface is used by the LPA to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.

4.9.10 LUI – eUICC (ES10c)removed

The ES10c interface is used for Local Profile Management by the End User.

4.9.11 General Interface Requirementsremoved

Req no. Description All interfaces from the eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version INT1 number. The behaviour of all interfaces SHALL support the indicated specification INT2 version number. During the indication of the supported specification version number from the INT3 eUICC to the SM-DP+, the eUICC version SHALL be used or the procedure SHALL fail. See table below. All communicating entities involved in remote Profile Management SHALL INT4 be mutually authenticated. Table 19 General Interface Requirements Platform Version 1 (V1) Version 2 (V2) Version 3 (V3) eUICC V1 Platform uses V1 Platform uses V1 or fails. Platform uses V1 or fails. eUICC V2 ✗ Platform uses V2 Platform uses V2 or fails. eUICC V3 ✗ ✗ Platform uses V3 Table 20 eUICC Version vs Platform

4.10.1 eUICC Certificationremoved

Req no. Description CERTEU1 The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS certified ‎[16]. The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance with CERTEU2 GSMA SGP.22 V1.0. CERTEU3 The eUICC Certificate SHALL be signed by the EUM. Table 21 eUICC Certification Requirements

4.10.2 Operational LPA Modesmodified was SM-DP+ Certification

ReqWhen no.there Descriptionis Thean SM-DP+LPA providerin SHALLthe beDevice requiredand toin declarethe producteUICC, (SM-DP+)then CERTDP1the complianceLPA withto GSMA SGP.22 V1.0. The SM-DP+ SHALL be GSMAused SASis SM-DPspecified partby certifiedthe ‎[17]Device excludingsettings the(DEV7): CERTDP2 communicationLPA within the SM-SR.Device CERTDP3 TheLPA SM-DP+in Certificate SHALL be signed by the GSMA CI. Table 22 SM-DP+ Certification RequirementseUICC

4.10.2.1 LPA in the eUICCadded

LPA functions are provided by the eUICC. Figure 6: LPA in the Euicc

4.10.2.2 LPA in the Deviceadded

LPA functions are provided by the Device. Figure 7: LPA in the Device

4.10.3 LPA Requirementsadded

Req no. Description The LPA SHALL be responsible for instructing the eUICC to perform Local Profile LPA1 Management functions as per End User request. A mechanism SHALL be implemented between any LPA elements outside the LPA2 eUICC, and the eUICC to ensure that the communication is not compromised wherever the LPA is located. A secure mechanism SHALL be implemented between the LUI and the LPA3 associated display or input applications on the Device. Access to the LUI application(s) SHALL be protected according to current best LPA4 practices. This SHALL be enforced by the Device OS. All Local Profile Management Operations SHALL require User Intent (no LPA5 automation). LPA6 LUI access SHALL require User Intent (no automation). LPA7 The End User SHALL be able to easily access the list of installed Profiles. LPA8 The LPA SHALL protect Profile Metadata from unauthorised access. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘enable’ SHALL be supported. This LPA9 operation SHALL allow the End User to select the Profile. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘disable’ SHALL be supported. This LPA10 operation SHALL allow the End User to disable the Enabled Profile. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘delete’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the eUICC. LPA11 The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for the deletion of the Profile. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This LPA12 operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Operational Profiles on the eUICC and relevant associated information through the Metadata. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’ SHALL LPA13 be supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to edit the default SM- DP+ address. Simple confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as described LPA14 in Section 4.5.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Test Memory Reset’ SHALL be LPA15 supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Test Memory Reset as described in Section 4.5.3. Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ’edit nickname’ SHALL be supported. LPA16 This operation SHALL allow the End User to add or modify a nickname for the selected Profile. The operation SHALL NOT modify the Service Provider name. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to the LPA17 eUICC. Three options SHALL be supported by the LPA:  Profile download via default SM-DP+  Profile download via SM-DS services  Profile download via Activation Code Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced except in the case of initial Device setup (LPA62). The LPA SHALL NOT be accessible by any applications other than those LPA18 provided by the provider of the LPA for the sole purpose of enabling the services and functions of the LPA. The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Authenticated LPA19 Confirmation. The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Simple LPA20 Confirmation located on the Device. LPA21 Access to the LUI SHALL be protected by an Authenticated Confirmation. LPA22 The mechanism in LPA21 SHALL be selectable/unselectable by the End User. The mechanisms in LPA21 SHALL be prompted to be enabled by default but this LPA23 can be skipped by the End User. The Device SHALL implement a mechanism to protect the LPA access through an Authenticated Confirmation. This Authenticated Confirmation MAY be LPA24 implemented by using the mechanisms implemented in the Device such as phone lock code, fingerprint input, etc. The End User SHALL be able to define dedicated personalised user credential to LPA25 access the LPA. If the End User selects the protection of access to the LUI (LPA23), then the LPA26 subsequent Authenticated Confirmation at operation level MAY be replaced with a Simple Confirmation. When enforced, any Confirmation Request SHALL allow the End User to cancel LPA27 the Local Profile Management Operation. It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI of a Companion Device allowing input LPA28 from an End User interface on the Primary Device. When a Companion Device LUI allows input from a Primary Device, the Companion Device LUI SHALL be able to restrict the actions that can be applied. For example: LPA29  not offer the eUICC Memory Reset;  only ‘enable’ and ‘disable’ operation are exposed.  Profile enabling is exposed only if no Profile is already enabled on the Companion Device. The LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be able to request an End User initiated LPA30 action on the Companion Device before the establishment of any proximity secure link (used for inputs into the LUI from another Device). A point-to-point proximity secure link initiated by the End User and offering LPA31 confidentiality and integrity SHALL be established between the Companion and Primary Device for any input executed from the Primary Device. When operating a Companion Device LUI from a Primary Device, any required User Intent or Confirmation Request SHALL only be executed by the LPA on the LPA32 Companion Device. The physical End User input MAY be done in either the Primary or the Companion Device. The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure LPA33 measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI. The End User Data used for the User Intent protection (e.g. PIN code, fingerprint) LPA34 SHALL be stored in a secure environment. The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the LPA35 internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over such connection, ES8+ and ES9+/ES5+ can be established. The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally LPA36 shared Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over such connection, ES8+, and ES9+/ES5+ can be established. The LPA SHALL be able to determine if connectivity to the SM-DP+ is available LPA37 by any means. The LPA SHALL be able to notify the End User that there is no connection to the LPA38 internet and or no connection to the SM-DP+ in order to allow the End User to enable or troubleshoot required connectivity. LPA39 The LPA SHALL only be able to access the eUICC if it has assigned privileges. LPA40 There SHALL only be one LPA on the Device. LPA41 The LPA SHALL only perform operations that are described in this specification. LPA42 LPA procedures SHALL not be called by any external (non-LPA) processes. LPA43 When multiple Operational Profiles are installed, the Local Profile Management Operation ‘enable‘ SHALL first initiate the ‘disable‘ operation for any Enabled Profile prior to initiating the ‘enable‘ operation for the selected Profile. LPA44 The LPA SHALL be able to read the Policy Rules. LPA45 When a Profile with Profile Policy Rules is installed, in the case where End User consent is requested, the LPA SHALL display the consequences of the Policy Rule to the End User. This message SHALL be formulated in a descriptive and non-discriminatory manner (e.g. for “Non-Delete” Policy Rule: “The profile that you are about to install cannot be deleted under the terms you have agreed with your service provider. Approve installation YES/NO?“). Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced with the exception listed in LPA17. LPA46 Prior to downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHALL check the condition for whether the Enabled Profile, if any, has enabled POL RULE1. If this is the case a dedicated message SHALL be displayed identifying the consequences to the End User. Examples of information that may be displayed would be:  Enabling of the new Profile will not be possible because the currently Enabled Profile cannot be disabled.  The Profile name of the Enabled Profile.  For more information, the End User should contact the Profile Owner of this Profile. With displaying this message, the End User SHALL be able to decide on whether to continue the download or to cancel the operation. This dialogue MAY be combined with the regular End User Intent for confirming a Profile download. LPA47 The communication between the User Interface of the Primary Device and the LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be protected (confidentiality, integrity and authentication). LPA48 There SHALL be a mechanism to limit the validity of LPA26 if the End User quits the LPA menu or does not perform the operation within a period of time to avoid the abuse of bypassing the Authenticated Confirmation LPA49 Confirmation Requests for consecutive Local Profile Management Operations MAY be achieved in one step as long as the different actions are clearly explained to the End User. For instance, upon installation of a new Profile, the LPA MAY propose ‘add Profile’ and ‘enable’ into one single step with a single confirmation only (e.g. “Do you want to install profile ‘ProfileName’ on your Device and enable it? Yes / No / Install only”) LPA50 When consecutive operations are achieved in one single step (LPA49), the highest level of confirmation SHALL be applied - i.e. in the case of two operations having respectively Authenticated and Simple Confirmation Requests, the single step SHALL use the Authenticated Confirmation Request. LPA51 The Local Profile Management Operations ‘enable’ (LPA9), ‘disable’ (LPA10), ‘delete’ (LPA11) SHALL be able to trigger a Notification to the SM-DP+ of the respective Profile being managed to indicate that this operation was actioned. This Notification is sent on a best effort basis and SHALL not impact otherwise the operation. LPA52 The LPA SHALL provide a Trusted Link from the End User to the eUICC through the LUI. The End User SHALL be able to configure the LPA such that the automatic Event LPA53 Record retrieval from the SM-DS can be disabled. LPA54 The LPA SHALL be able to read any SM-DS and SM-DP+ addresses configured in the eUICC. It SHALL be possible to check the LPA Integrity. If the integrity check fails, LPA55 communication between the eUICC and the LPA SHALL not occur. LPA Integrity SHALL be ensured using the best practice methods on the targeted LPA56 platform. See Annex G. The polling mechanism in the LPA SHALL have two types of triggers; those that are LPA57 event based, and those that are End User initiated. Event based triggers for polling SHALL be provided. As a minimum this SHALL LPA58 include Device power-up; in addition other triggers MAY be provided. Event based triggers MAY be disabled by the End User. End User initiated triggers for polling SHALL include:  The ‘Add Profile’ operation to trigger the default SM-DS if configured, and the LPA59 Root SM-DS.  The ‘Update Profile’ operation to trigger the SM-DP+ stored in the Profile.  In addition, other manual triggers MAY be provided. If a Profile Package is not yet released for download then the LPA SHALL be LPA60 informed by means of a specific error code. Error/retry handling of the LPA polling mechanism SHALL be implemented e.g. LPA61 advise the End User to retry or automatically retry as appropriate. The corresponding confirmation needs to be enforced in the retry cases. During initial Device setup, if no Operational Profile is already installed, the following procedure SHALL apply in this order: 1. If a default SM-DP+ address is configured, the LPA SHALL contact the LPA62 SM-DP+ to check for a waiting Profile. 2. If no Profile is waiting in (1), then the Root SM-DS address SHALL be contacted to check for the Notification of a waiting Profile. Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced for the procedure described above. The End User SHALL always be able to manually request the retrieval of any waiting Event Record via the LPA if there is no default SM-DP+ address. LPA63 Note: This may be achieved through the combination with existing operations – e.g. pressing “Add Profile” would contact the server to retrieve a Notification The Operator/Service Provider name SHALL be given in the signalling information from the SM-DP+ to the LPA when initiating the download of a Profile and shown LPA64 to the End User before the Profile is downloaded. Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The LPA SHOULD present the EID to the End User as both text and in a defined LPA65 scannable format (e.g. QR Code). For the case where a Profile to be disabled and deleted in a combined action is providing the only available connection, the pre-delete Notification SHALL be sent LPA66 (FFS) before the Profile is disabled. The failure of this attempt SHALL not block the deletion nor the connection teardown. If the SM-DP+ stops the Profile download procedure, the LPA SHALL be able to LPA67 notify the End User. Table 23: LPA Requirements

4.10.4 LDS Requirementsadded

Req no. Description The LDS SHALL be able to read out the address(es) described in EUICC LDS1 Error! Reference source not found. and only use the(se) address(es) to connect to the SM-DS Table 24: LDS Requirement

4.11 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)added

4.11.1 SM-DS Overviewadded

The role of the SM-DS is to provide mechanisms that allow an SM-DP+ to inform the LDS within any Device that an SM-DP+ wishes to communicate with it. The purpose of the SM- DS to LDS communication SHALL be informing the LDS of a pending Event The principle of operation remains the same for all use cases. The SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration message for a target Device to a SM-DS. In a simple deployment, only the Root SM-DS is configured on the eUICC. The Root SM-DS address is unique and filled in the eUICC. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM- DS using the same logical location. When the Root SM-DS has an Event-ID for the target Device it will respond with the SM-DP+ address, or if there is no Event-ID the response will be a null response. In a deployment with cascaded SM-DSs, the SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration to an Alternative SM-DS, which may not be configured as the Root SM-DS on the eUICC. This Alternative SM-DS will cascade the Event Registration to the Root SM-DSs. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM-DS and will receive the Alternative SM-DS address. It will then request the Event from the Alternative SM-DS, which will respond with the SM-DP+ address. Figure 8: Alternative Device to Root SM-DS Event Registration Figure 9: Root SM -DS Event Registration Figure 10: Alternative SM -DS Discovery

4.11.2 SM-DS Implementationadded

Two configurations of the SM-DS addresses on the eUICC MAY exist:  A Root SM-DS address  An Alternative SM-DS address Figure 11: SM-DS Implementation Figure 11 shows both configurations. The Root SM-DS is configured at the time of Device manufacture and is invariant.

4.11.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelinesadded

The following statements SHOULD be considered when defining a technical implementation:  A competitive environment on the supply of SM-DS services SHOULD be favoured by the approach.  There SHOULD be no single-points-of-failure.  Implementation SHOULD inherently provide both vertical and horizontal performance/scalability.  There SHOULD be no need for pre-registration of Devices or eUICCs at a certain SM-DS as required in SGP.02 0 (GSMA Embedded SIM for the SM-SR).

4.11.4 SM-DS functionsadded

The SM-DS has three distinct functions: Figure 12: SM-DS Functions Function name Description Event Registration Process by which an Event Record received from a SM-DP+ is stored. Event Deletion Process by which an SM-DP+ can delete its own Event Record. Provides all registered Event Records, upon Discovery Request from Event Retrieval any enquiring LDS. Table 25: SM-DS Function Descriptions

4.11.5 SM-DS Requirementsadded

Req no. Description The SM-DS SHALL enable a LDS to discover its own Event Records SMDS1 registered by SM-DP+(s) or by Alternative SM-DS(s). The SM-DS SHALL not be able to identify the nature of an Event. SMDS2 Note: The nature of the Event may be ‘Profile Package available for download’. All valid Discovery Requests and Event Registrations SHALL be processed SMDS3 in a non-discriminatory manner. The SM-DS SHALL only accept Event Registrations from  any authorised and authenticated SM-DP+(s) having a valid SMDS4 Certificate.  any authorised and authenticated SM-DS(s) or SM-DS(s) having a valid Certificate. The SM-DS SHALL only accept Discovery Requests authenticated by the SMDS5 corresponding eUICC via the LDS. The SM-DS and the SM-DP+ as well as connected SM-DSs SHALL be SMDS6 mutually authenticated. The SM-DS SHALL NOT have visibility of any data that may be used to SMDS7 compromise the End User´s privacy. The SM-DS SHALL support multiple concurrent Event Registrations per SMDS8 eUICC and SHALL present to the LDS all currently valid Event Records in the same order as they were received by the SM-DS (first in, first out). SMDS9 The SM-DS only stores Event Records destined for specific EIDs. Subscriber Specific data and Profile related contents SHALL NOT be stored SMDS10 within the SM-DS. The SM-DS SHALL NOT allow the harvesting of any information such as SMDS11 Operator, EIDs, Device Manufacturers, Devices, etc. The SM-DS SHALL only return to the LDS, the Event Records related to the SMDS12 served eUICC. The SM-DS SHALL NOT have any contact with the Profile Packages e.g. SMDS13 SHALL NOT store or process any Profile Package. The SM-DS SHALL provide the same data regardless of the status of the SMDS14 Device that queries it (i.e. consistent in time and in geographic location). The SM-DS SHOULD NOT significantly impact the end-to-end provisioning SMDS15 time. SMDS16 The SM-DS SHALL provide defence against DoS attacks. Req no. Description All communications to, from and between entities of the SM-DS SHALL be SMDS17 encrypted. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event Records SMDS18 registered on the SM-DS. An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event SMDS19 Records registered on the Root SM-DS (In response to an SM-DP+ delete operation defined in SMDS18). An Alternative SM-DS SHALL propagate the Event Record to the Root SM- SMDS20 DS if requested by the SM-DP+. If there are multiple Event Records registered on the SM-DS for one SMDS21 eUICC, these SHALL all be sent as a single response. An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an Event Record to an LDS either by the Root SM-DS or via any alternative one selected by the SM-DP+. If the SMDS22 alternative is chosen the Event Record to the LDS SHALL come from this alternative SM-DS. There SHALL be a unique Root SM-DS. SMDS23 Note: This requirement does not forbid the potential load-balancing of this Root SM-DS. SMDS24 The Root SM-DS SHALL be managed by the GSMA. It SHALL be possible for the Alternative SM-DS to conduct an Event Record SMDS25 (FFS) Query to the Root SM-DS for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations it owns. A SM-DS response to an Event Record Query SHALL only confirm Event SMDS26 (FFS) Record existence and SHALL NOT include additional information. An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event SMDS27 (FFS) Record on the Root SM-DS, identified by the EID or the Event-ID over the ES15 interface. Response to a SM-DS Event Record query SHALL only occur where the SMDS28 (FFS) responder validates the Event Record ownership. Ownership validation of a SM-DS Event Record Query SHALL only use the SMDS29 (FFS) requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components of the Event Record held. The SM-DS (Root or Alternative) MAY inform the SM-DP+ directly or via SMDS30 (FFS) another SM-DS, that a Discovery Request from an authorised LDS has been answered by issuing an Event Record. The SM-DS SHALL only inform the Event Record’s owning SM-DP+ or SM- SMDS31 (FFS) DS that it has replied to a Discovery Request. Table 26 SM-DS Requirements

4.11.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedureadded

The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with the Root SM-DS and an Alternative SM-DS (cascade mode). Figure 13: Event Registration/Deletion Procedure Starting Condition: a. The SM-DP+ has an action waiting for a target eUICC identified by the EID. Procedure: 1. The SM-DP+ establishes a secure connection to an Alternative SM-DS of the Profile Owner´s choice. 2. The SM-DP+ notifies the Alternative SM-DS about a pending action. 3. to 4. The Alternative SM-DS registers and confirms the Event Registration. 5. The Alternative SM-DS establishes a secure connection to the Root SM-DS. 6. The Alternative SM-DS informs the Root SM-DS that for the given EID, an Event Record is waiting at the Alternative SM-DS. 7. The Root SM-DS confirms the receipt of the information.

4.11.7 Discovery Request Procedureadded

The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with an Alternative SM-DS and the Root SM-DS (cascade mode). # Figure 14: Discovery Request Procedure Procedure: 1. to 3. In order to generate a Discovery Request, the LDS requests the eUICC to generate an eUICC Authorisation which contains (at least) the eUICC-Certificate and is signed by the eUICC. 4. to 5. The LDS establishes a secure communication to the Root SM-DS. 6. The Root SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by checking the eUICC Authorisation. 7. In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record is waiting, it delivers back: a. The address of the SM-DP+, where an action is waiting. or b. The rest of the following actions: i. The address of the Alternative SM-DS, where an Event Record can be retrieved. ii. The LDS establishes a secure connection to the Alternative SM-DS. iii. The Alternative SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by checking the eUICC Authorisation. iv. In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record has been received, it delivers back the address of the SM-DP+, where an action is waiting. 8. The LPA establishes a connection to the SM-DP+ and the waiting action can be performed.

4.12 Interfacesrenumbered was 4.9

Figure 7:15: Interfaces on the eUICC Architecture with the LPA in the Device Configuration

4.12.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)renumbered was 4.9.1

4.12.2 Operator – End User (ESop)added

This interface is out of scope of this specification.

4.12.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)renumbered was 4.9.3

ESeu is the interface between the End User and the LUI. In a Primary/Companion Device scenario the LUI used SHALL only reside onwithin the Companion Device.Device or its eUICC. The ESeu interface is used to support the following requirements: Req no. Description The Local Profile Management Operations SHALL be executed only over the ESeu1 the ESeu interface. Each Local Profile Management Operation SHALL be explicitly initiated by ESeu2 the End User, verified by User Intent. The ESeu interface SHALL support the triggering and confirmation of the Profile ESeu3 Profile download and installation operation. Table 1827: End User to LUI (ESeu) Interface Requirements

4.12.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)added

The ES6 interface is used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services.

4.12.5 SM-DP+ – LPA in the eUICC (ES5+)added

The ES5+ interface is used to provide a secure transport between the SM-DP+ and the LPA in the eUICC for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package.

4.12.6 SM-DP+ – LPD in the Device (ES9+)added

For Devices with an LPA, the ES9+ interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the LPD.

4.12.7 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)renumbered was 4.9.7

4.12.8 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)added

The ES12 interface allows any SM-DP+ to issue or remove Event Registrations on the SM- DS.

4.12.9 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)added

The ES11 interface allows the LDS to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC.

4.12.10 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)added

This interface is out of scope of this specification.

4.12.11 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)added

The ES10a interface is used between the LDS in the Device and the LPA Services to request the eUICC Authorisation to generate a Discovery Request.

4.12.12 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)added

The ES10b interface is used by the LPD in the Device and the LPA services to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.

4.12.13 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)added

The ES10c interface is used between the LUI in the Device and the LPA services for Local Profile Management by the End User.

4.12.14 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)added

In the case of deployments with cascaded SM-DSs, the ES15 interface is used to connect the SM-DSs.

4.12.15 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)added

This connection will be provided either by:  An internet connectivity available or provided on the same Device where the LPA resides or  An internet connection shared from another Device via a local go -between connection Figure 16: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to the SM-DP+

4.12.16 General Interface Requirementsadded

Req no. Description All interfaces from the eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version INT1 number. The behaviour of all interfaces SHALL support the indicated specification INT2 version number. During the indication of the supported specification version number from the INT3 eUICC to the SM-DP+, the eUICC version SHALL be used or the procedure SHALL fail. See table below. All communicating entities involved in Remote SIM Provisioning SHALL be INT4 mutually authenticated. The Device and the eUICC are considered as one entity in this context. Table 28: General Interface Requirements Platform Version 1 (V1) Version 2 (V2) Version 3 (V3) eUICC V1 Platform uses V1 Platform uses V1 or fails. Platform uses V1 or fails. eUICC V2 ✗ Platform uses V2 Platform uses V2 or fails. eUICC V3 ✗ ✗ Platform uses V3 Table 29: eUICC Version vs Platform

4.13 Profile Policy Managementadded

4.13.1 Introductionadded

The Profile Policy Management function provides mechanisms by which Service Providers are able to reinforce the conditions or policies (operational and business) under which services are provided to the Subscriber. In some instances this MAY also include the enforcement of the policies set by the Subscriber. Profile Policy Management MAY also be applied with other already existing policy enforcement technologies which are also subject to agreement by the Subscriber. The realisation of the Policy Management function is based on two key elements. The first element is the Profile Policy Enabler which is contained within the eUICC. The second element is a set of defined Profile Policy Rules which are required for the actual enforcement of specific policies.

4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirementsadded

Policy no. Description POL1 A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only be configured within a Profile. POL2 Each Profile MAY have Policy Rules associated to itself. POL3 A Policy Rule SHALL only apply to the Profile that contains it. POL4 Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be consistent across implementations. Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be able to resolve any Profile Policy Rule POL5 conflict. The updating of a Profile’s Policy Rules SHALL be restricted to the Profile POL6 Owner. POL7 The mechanism used for the update of a Policy Rule SHALL be atomic. POL8 The set of Profile Policy Rules SHALL be extensible for future releases. There SHALL be a Profile Policy Rule scheme to allow extensibility of the POL9 Policy Rules, e.g. described like ‘operational command, scope of application, qualification’ A Profile Policy Rule SHALL be enforced whenever a Profile state change is POL10 attempted. Downloading and installing a Profile with the Profile Policy Rule ‘Do not POL11 disable’ SHALL only be possible if no other Operational Profile is currently installed. The LPA and the eUICC SHALL prevent the downloading and installation of a Profile containing Profile Policy Rules that conflict with the Profile Policy POL12 Rules of the already installed Profiles. Note: The technical specification SHALL describe exhaustively each conflict that MAY occur. An Operator SHALL be able to deactivate the Profile Policy Rules of its POL13 Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is enabled. Note: The activation of Profile Policy Rules on the ES6 interface is FFS. Policy no. Description Before a Profile is installed with Profile Policy Rules, the End User SHALL be able to be notified about the Profile Policy Rules and if notified, the installation SHALL thereafter be conditional on End User Authenticated POL14 Confirmation. This prompting may not be needed if the installation is directly allowed by the RAT. The request for End User consent for the installation of Profile Policy Rules POL15 and Profile download MAY be combined into a single prompt therefore requiring a single confirmation by the End User. Profile Policy Rules SHALL be enforced by the Profile Policy Enabler in the POL16 eUICC. The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL only support the Profile Policy Rules POL17 defined in this specification. The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL be capable of supporting all the Profile POL18 Policy Rules as defined in this specification. POL RULE3 SHALL be enforceable in all cases with the exception of the enabling of a Provisioning Profile. POL19 Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification. Allowing the installation of a Profile with Profile Policy Rules SHALL be POL20 subject to compliance with local regulatory requirements. Table 30: Profile Policy Principles

4.13.3 Policy Rulesadded

Policy no. Description The Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be POL RULE1 supported. The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be POL RULE2 supported. The Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is required upon its successful disabling’ SHALL be supported. POL RULE3 Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification. Table 31: Policy Rules Requirements

4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirementsadded

Policy no. Description The Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) SHALL be stored in the Profile Policy POLPPE1 Enabler in the eUICC. The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL enforce the contents of the installed RAT, POLPPE2 if any, only at Profile installation time. The RAT SHALL allow multiple Profile Owners to have Policy Rules enabled POLPPE3 in their Profiles. Policy no. Description The RAT SHALL be able to support specific configurations which allow a set POLPPE4 of or all Profile Policy Rules for any Profile Owner. The RAT SHALL only be installed at pre-issuance or during the initial POLPPE5 Device setup provided there are no Operational Profiles installed. POLPPE6 The RAT SHALL not be affected by the eUICC Memory Reset function. To support identifiable regulatory requirement, a RAT SHALL be able to POLPPE7 support a specific configuration which MAY forbid any Profile Owner to set a specific Profile Policy Rule. If POLPPE7 is set, this information SHALL be part of the eligibility check POLPPE8 information shared between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC. Where the RAT allows the Profile Policy Rules for the Profile being installed, POLPPE9 installation SHALL proceed as stated in POL14. The RAT SHALL be able to support a setting to display the consequences POLPPE10 of the Profile Policy Rules to the End User before installation of the Profile. POLPPE11 The OEM or EUM SHALL be responsible for providing the RAT. A fixed RAT SHALL be implemented in the eUICC. POLPPE12 Note: The allowed RAT configuration(s) are detailed in Annex H. Table 32: Profile Policy Enabler Requirements

4.14 Certificationrenumbered was 4.10

4.14.1 eUICC Certificationadded

Req no. Description CERTEU1 The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS certified 0. The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance with CERTEU2 GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0. The eUICC SHALL be certified according to the Protection Profile defined CERTEU3 by the GSMA (TBD). The eUICC Protection Profile SHALL at least include the following CERTEU4 elements: platform service manager, ISD-R, Profile storage and isolation of Profiles. The eUICC protection Profile SHALL be equivalent to the eUICC Protection CERTEU5 Profile defined in SGP.05 0. The Evaluation Assurance Level of the eUICC Protection Profile SHALL be (at least) EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 (EAL 4+) or CERTEU6 equivalent. Note: A study needs to be performed in terms of assurance level by FASG. The eUICC public key Certificate used for authentication SHALL contain the CERTEU7 EID. The eUICC public key Certificate(s) SHALL contain the technical reference CERTEU8 of the product, for example the Common Criteria certification report number. CERTEU9 The EUM Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI. Req no. Description The eUICC Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by the EUM using its EUM CERTEU10 Certificate (CERTEU9Error! Reference source not found.). Table 33: eUICC Certification Requirements

4.14.2 Device Complianceadded

Req no. Description There SHALL be a compliance process for all parts of Local Profile CERTDEV1 Management implementations in accordance with the GSMA. Table 34: Device Certification Requirement

4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certificationadded

Req no. Description The SM-DP+ provider SHALL be required to declare product (SM-DP+) CERTDP1 compliance with GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0. CERTDP2 The SM-DP+ SHALL be certified according to GSMA SAS 0. SM-DP+ elements SHALL use Hardware Security Modules (HSM) for cryptographic related operations (key storage, derivation, cryptographic CERTDP3 operations). Note: This is to be covered by the SAS document “HSM certified according to FIPS 140-2 level 3 or higher” The SM-DP+ SHALL implement privileges isolation (Log, Audit, CERTDP4 Operation, and Administration). The SM-DP+ SHALL implement operating system hardening CERTDP5 mechanisms. The SM-DP+ SHALL implement separation of control, user and CERTDP6 administrative planes. The SM-DP+ SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration CERTDP7 operation. SM-DP+ hard drives and backup mediums used for storing Profiles CERTDP8 SHALL be ciphered. The private key of SM-DP+ Certificate used for mutual authentication CERTDP9 with eUICC SHALL be protected and stored in HSM according to CERTDP3. The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to mitigate CERTDP10 against DoS attacks. CERTDP11 The SM-DP+ SHALL log all Certificate authentication failures. CERTDP12 The SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI. Table 35: SM-DP+ Certification Requirements

4.14.4 SM-DS Certificationadded

Req no. Description The SM-DS provider SHALL be required to declare product compliance with CERTDS1 GSMA SGP.22 0. CERTDS2 The SM-DS SHALL be certified according to the relevant GSMA SAS. The SM-DS SHALL implement isolation of privileges (Log, Audit, Operation, CERTDS3 Administration). CERTDS4 The SM-DS SHALL implement operating system hardening mechanisms. The SM-DS SHALL implement separation of control, user and CERTDS5 administrative planes. The SM-DS SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration CERTDS6 operation. CERTDS7 SM-DS hard drives and backup mediums SHALL be ciphered. CERTDS8 The SM-DS Certificate SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI. Table 36: SM-DS Certification Requirements

4.14.5 LPA Certificationadded

Req no. Description There SHALL be a certification process for all the LPA elements CERTLPA1 communicating with Remote SIM Provisioning entities. The certification process SHALL ensure that Local Profile Management CERTLPA2 Operations are sent by authorised LPA elements only. The certification process SHALL ensure a mechanism exists to block CERTLPA3 compromised LPAs. CERTLPA4 The LPD SHALL authenticate the SM-DP+ during the TLS session. CERTLPA5 The LDS SHALL authenticate the SM-DS during the TLS session. The LPA SHALL only accept Certificates signed by a GSMA CI for server CERTLPA6 authentication. Table 37: LPA Certification Requirements

4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Managementadded

Req no. Description CERTPK1 The eUICC SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+. CERTPK2 The LPD SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+. CERTPK3 The LDS SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS. The LDS authentication of an SM-DS using an invalid Public Key Certificate CERTPK4 SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop. The LPD authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key CERTPK5 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11CERTPK1), and on-going communication SHALL stop. Req no. Description The SM-DP+ authentication of an eUICC using an invalid Public Key CERTPK6 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop. The eUICC authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key CERTPK7 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop. The GSMA CI SHALL revoke the Public Key Certificate of any entities (SM- CERTPK8 DP+, SM-DS, EUM) if it is compromised (e.g. private key theft). CERTPK9 The eUICC SHALL be able to support a set of GSMA CIs. A Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:  it has a valid signature  it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a trusted chain of Certificates up to a GSMA CI. Certificate Path validation SHALL follow the process defined in RFC 5280 00. CERTPK10  it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in the trust chain has been revoked  it has not expired If any of these applicable verifications fail, the Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as invalid. The eUICC, LPA, SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL have knowledge of revoked CERTPK11 Public Key Certificates. Table 38: Public Key Certificates Management Requirements

5.1 LPA Initiated Downloadadded

5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirementsadded

Req no. Description The LPA SHALL use any Root SM-DP+ or default SM-DS address LID1 populated on the eUICC if it has not been provided already by the Activation Code. In the context of LID1, if both a Root SM-DP+ and a default SM-DS address LID2 are populated, the LPA SHALL first contact the SM-DP+ and then SM-DS to initiate a Remote SIM Provisioning transaction. Table 39: LPA Initiated Download Requirements

5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedureadded

This following procedure describes the Events that are part of the Profile Package download and installation procedure initiated by the LPA. Figure 17: Profile Download Procedure Start conditions: a. The Subscriber has completed the Subscription process to the selected Operator/Service Provider offer. b. The Profile ordering process related to this Subscription has been completed (i.e. an assigned Protected Profile Package is stored on the SM-DP+). Procedure: 1. The LPA initiates Profile Package download and identifies the address of the SM-DP+ where the Profile is stored and available for download (via e.g. URL, QR code, manual input, etc) as well as other information provided (e.g. Token, SMDPId, Confirmation Code). 2. The LPA authenticates the SM-DP+ through establishing a TLS connection with the SM-DP+, and verifying the SMDPid if such information has been provided. 3. to 4. The LPA gets an eUICC challenge 5. to 6. The LPA sends the eUICC challenge and any other relevant information to the the SM-DP+. 7. to 9. The SM-DP+ signs the eUICC challenge, and generates a DP_Challenge to be sent back to the eUICC. 10. The LPA sends the material received by the SM-DP+ and the AC Token to the eUICC; the eUICC checks the SMDPid and authenticates the SM-DP+. 11. The eUICC sends back a signed set of information including the DP_Challenge, the AC Token, the EID and its Certificate to the LPA. 12. The End User confirms the download of the Profile, optionally with the display of the Profile name of the Operator. 13. The LPA sends the set of information received in Step 11 from the eUICC to the SM-DP+. 14. The SM-DP+ verifies the signature; the eUICC is authenticated. 15. to 16. OPTIONAL: The eUICC Eligibility Check and Profile binding functions are performed by the SM-DP+. 17. to 22. OPTIONAL 17. The Operator is notified about the Profile Package that is about to be downloaded. 18. If the Operator has been notified, it MAY request to stop the download process by indicating an error code to the SM-DP+. 19. If the Operator sends an error code to the SM-DP+, the SM-DP+ stops the download process and indicates the error code to the LPA. 20. The LPA notifies the End User with an appropriate message. 21. to 22. The SM-DP+ MAY receive information from the Operator to prepare the appropriate Profile Package. 23. to 25. The Bound Profile Package is sent to the eUICC and installed on the eUICC. 26. The Profile Package download report is sent from the SM-DP+ to the Operator. End Condition: a. The Profile is installed in the eUICC in a Disabled state

5.2 Profile Download with Activation Coderenumbered was 5.1

5.2.1 Activation Code Requirementsrenumbered was 5.1.1

Req no. Description TheWhere used, the Activation Code SHALL betrigger usedthe to download of a Bound AC1 Profile Package AC1 from a specific SM-DP+. The Activation Code SHALL comprise of the following parameters:  SM-DP+ address AC2  Activation Code Token (Includes OPTIONAL Confirma … C5 manual typing and QR code scanning. All Activation Code procedures SHALL be implemented natively as part of the AC6 LPA. The Activation Code procedure SHALL … conditionally be automatically offered to the End User during initial Device set-up. AC7 This automatic setting SHALL NOT apply if a Profile is already provisioned. AC7 No Authenticated Confirmation is required. Note: For example this could be inappropriate from an open market cellular- enabled notebook computer. Following the Activation Code procedure, the Profile Package download AC8 procedure SHALL be used. The Activation Code procedure SHALL preserve eco-system secur … vice Provider. The Activation Code request to the SM-DP+ SHALL be extended by the LPA AC12 with the EID after the specific SM-DP+ has been authenticated. Table … 2340: Activation Code Requirements

5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedurerenumbered was 5.1.2

The Activation Code procedure defines a common functionality which allows the Subscriber or the End User on behalf of the Subscriber to “activate” a Device by means of requesting the download of an OperatorOperational Profile from the Device itself. Figure 9:18: Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure Start Conditions: a. A Subscription has been established by the Subscriber. b. An Activation Code has been prov … ts the Activation Code to the LPA through the LUI. 2. The LPA parses the Activation Code parameters to recognise the SM-DP+ address, the Activation Code Token, … the LPA Mode and optionally the SMDPid;SMDPid. inIn addition, the LPA MAY parse in the Activation Token the information that a Confirmation Code is required. 3. If the Confirmation Code parameter in the Activati … e supported eSVN to the SM- DP+. Note: Prior to this step a HTTPs session SHALL be established between the LPA and the SM-DP+ based on a public key of the Root … certificateCertificate stored in the Device which includes authentication using the TLS Certificate and checking for the presence of the SMDPid in the TLS Certificate used for the TLS session. 8. Upon receiving the nonceeUICC and the associated eSVN, the SM-DP+ creates nonceSMDP and signs both the nonceSMDP and the nonceeUIC… …

5.3 Local Profile Managementadded

5.3.1 Local Profile Management Proceduresrenumbered was 5.2

5.3.1.1 Enable Profileadded

This procedure performs the enabling of a target Profile. The request is given by the End User to the LPA. Figure 19: Enable Profile Procedure Start conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. Procedure: 1. The End User makes a Profile enable request on the LPA. 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA sends a Profile enable operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the eUICC. 4. The ISD-R checks if applied Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the Profile to be enabled 5. If there is a conflict with Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the End User via the LPA. 6. The target Profile is enabled. 7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the enabling of the Profile. 8. The End User is informed via the LPA. End conditions: a. The target Profile is enabled.

5.3.1.2 Disable Profileadded

Profile disabling can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA. Figure 20: Disable Profile Procedure Start conditions: a. The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. Procedure: 1. The End User makes a Profile disable request on the LPA. 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA sends a Profile disable operation to the ISD-R on the eUICC. 4. The ISD-R checks if applied Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the Profile to be disabled. 5. If there is a conflict with Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the End User via the LPA. 6. The ISD-R disables the target Profile. 7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the disabling of the Profile. 8. The End User is informed via the LPA. End conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled.

5.3.1.3 Delete Profileadded

Profile deletion can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA. Figure 21: Delete Profile Procedure Start conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. Procedure: 1. The End User makes a Profile deletion request on the LPA. 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA sends a Profile deletion operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile. 4. The ISD-R checks if applied Policy Rules permits the Profile to be deleted. 5. If there is a conflict with Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the End User via the LPA. 6. The ISD-R erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P. 7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the Profile deletion. 8. The Metadata for the target Profile is erased. 9. The End User is informed via the LPA. 10. The LPA sends a delete Notification to the SM-DP+ that originally installed the Profile. End conditions: a. The target Profile is deleted.

5.2.1 Enable Profileremoved

This procedure performs the enabling of a target Profile.The request is given by the End User to the LPA. Figure 10: Enable Profile Procedure Start conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. Procedure: 1. The End User makes a Profile enable request on the LPA. 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA sends a Profile enable operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the eUICC. 4. The target Profile is enabled. 5. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the enabling of the Profile. 6. The End User is informed via the LPA. End conditions: a. The target Profile is enabled.

5.2.2 Disable Profileremoved

Profile disabling can be achieved by the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA. Figure 11: Disable Profile Procedure Start conditions: a. The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. Procedure: 1. The End User makes a Profile disable request on the LPA. 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA sends a Profile disable operation to the ISD-R on the eUICC. 4. The ISD-R disables the target Profile. 5. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the disabling of the Profile. 6. The End User is informed via the LPA. End conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled.

5.2.3 Delete Profileremoved

Profile deletion can be achieved by the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA. Figure 12: Delete Profile Procedure Start conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. Procedure: 1. The End User makes a Profile deletion request on the LPA. 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA sends a Profile deletion operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile. 4. The ISD-R erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P. 5. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the Profile deletion. 6. The Metadata for the target Profile is erased. 7. The End User is informed via the LPA. End conditions: a. The target Profile is deleted.

5.3.1.4 Add/Update Profile Nicknamerenumbered was 5.2.4

…ute a nickname to a Profile for ease of use. Note that adding or changing a nickname SHALL NOT affect any other data or other Metadata for that Profile. Figure … 13:22: Add/Update Profile Nickname Procedure Start conditions: a. User Intent has been verified. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is … l Profile Management. Procedure: 1. The End User requests the update of the nickname on the LPA. 2. The LPA updates the Metadata of the target Profile with the … user’sEnd User’s choice of nickname in the eUICC. End conditions: a. Metadata of the target Profile has been updated with the user’sEnd User’s choice of nickname.

5.3.1.5 Query Profile Metadatarenumbered was 5.2.5

This procedure will allow the End User to query the metadataMetadata of the Profiles accessible to the End User. The result SHALL display all (or parts of) the Metadata for the selected Profile on the eUICC at the time of querying. No changes are made to any data on the eUICC as a result of this procedure. Figure 14:23: Query Profile Metadata Procedure Start conditions: a. The LPA is authenticated to eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. b. The list of Profiles accessible to the End User is displayed by the LPA(LUI). Procedure: 1. The End User selects a Profile to query. 2. The LPA receives a query request from the End User. 3. The LPA requests Profile Metadata from the eUICC. 4. The LPA displays the Profile Metadata to the End User on the LUI. End conditions: a. No change to Profile Metadata.

5.3.1.6 eUICC Memory Resetadded

This procedure performs the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC including its associated Profile Metadata. The request is given by the End User to the LPA. Note: A similar procedure will apply to perform the eUICC Test Memory Reset of the eUICC. Figure 24: eUICC Memory Reset Procedure Start conditions: a. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. b. The eUICC Memory Reset option is displayed by the LPA (LUI). Procedure: 1. The End User makes an eUICC Memory Reset request on the LPA (LUI). 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA (LUI) displays a message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ to the End User. 4. The End User confirms the conformity with the consequences to the LPA. 5. The LPA sends an eUICC Memory Reset operation to the eUICC. 6. The eUICC deletes the Profile on the eUICC even if it is an Enabled Profile including the Metadata associated with it. 7. The eUICC informs the LPA of the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC. 8. The End User is informed via the LPA (LUI). 9. The LPA sends a delete Notification to each SM-DP+ that originally installed the Profile. End conditions: a. The Profile is deleted from the eUICC.

5.2.6 eUICC Memory Resetremoved

This procedure performs the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC including its associated Profile Metadata. The request is given by the End User to the LPA. Figure 15 eUICC Memory Reset Procedure Start conditions: a. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. b. The eUICC Memory Reset option is displayed by the LPA (LUI). Procedure: 1. The End User makes an eUICC Memory Reset request on the LPA (LUI). 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA (LUI) displays a message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ to the End User. 4. The End User confirms the conformity with the consequences to the LPA. 5. The LPA sends an eUICC Memory Reset operation to the eUICC. 6. The eUICC deletes the Profile on the eUICC even if it is an Enabled Profile including the Metadata associated with it. 7. The eUICC informs the LPA of the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC. 8. The End User is informed via the LPA (LUI). End conditions: a. The Profile is deleted from the eUICC.

5.3.1.7 Add Profile with Activation Coderenumbered was 5.2.7

…e downloaded Profile, nor disable an Enabled Profile. Network connectivity is assumed. The download can be initiated by the input of an Activation Code. Figure … 16:25: Add Profile with Activation Code Procedure Start conditions: a. User Intent has been verified. b. The Downloaddownload of a new Profile is allowed on the eUICC. c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Profile download. Procedure: 1. The End User obtains an Activation Code to add a Profile to histheir Device. 2. The LPA requests the End User to enter the Activation Code. 3. Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure as described in Section ‎5.1.25.2.2 starts. End conditions: a. The Profile has been installed on the End User’s Device. b. Profile Metadata has been updated from the Profile.

5.3.1.8 Edit SM-DP+ Addressadded

This procedure will allow the End User to edit a default SM-DP+ address on to the eUICC. Figure 26: Edit SM -DP+ Address Start conditions: a. There is a default SM-DP+ address in the LPA. b. The End User is willing to edit the default SM-DP+ address Procedure: 1. The End User edits the SM-DP+ Address via the LPA. 2. Simple Confirmation from the User is required. 3. The LPA sends the default SM-DP+ address for storage in the LPA Service. 4. The LPA Service informs the LPA of the storage of the default SM-DP+ address. 5. The End User is informed via the LPA. End conditions: a. The target default SM-DP+ Address is edited in the LPA Services.

A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)modified

… corrupted Profile being pushed to the Subscriber. Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles to INI2 Devices. Table … 2441: New Profile on New Primary Device Risks Profile Deletion Risk Risk description no. Long term gathering of key materials due to a long term storage of delivered … Non-tech-savvy or malicious Subscriber repeatedly deleting Profiles and asking for them IND5 to be reloaded leading to surcharge of provisioning servers. Table … 2542:Profile Profile Deletion Risks Profile Switch Risk Risk description no. INP1 Malicious Profile switching originating from an internal party. Human error leading to the switchin … ing to INP3 a loss of connectivity. Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to INP4 major fraud scenarios. Table … 2643: Profile Switching Risks Profile Swap Risk Risk description no. INS1 Race condition leading to the deactivation of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity. Table 2744: Profile Swapping Risks Cryptographic Related Risks Risk Risk description no. Loss or theft of private keys in one or several Profile Management components lead … aterial during the Profile INO6 creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single point of failure and attack being created. Table … 2845: Cryptographic Related Risks Quality of Service Risk Risk description no. Profile creation burst leading to the inability for the eUICC platforms to deliver exp … QoS2 service level. Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a temporary or QoS3 permanent inability to deliver a Profile. Table … 2946: Quality of Service Risks Non-human or Unpredictable Risk Risk description no. Catastrophic event such as floods, earthquakes, etc. leading to the destruction o … centre. Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the EXC3 provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, SIM vendor…). Table … 3047: Non-human or Unpredictable Risks New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risk Risk description no. EXN1 Malicious pairing of new Device using unattended Primary or Companion Device. Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the loss of confidentiality during EXN2 the provisioning of Profile operations. Risk Risk description no. Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the tampering of registration EXN3 information during provisioning of Profile operations. Risk Risk description no. EXN4 Social engineering leading to the communication of OTP materials to attackers. Man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping during Profile provisioning leading to the loss of EXN5 confidentiality. “Implicit authentication” (e.g. HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of EXN6 authentication or Profile material. Table 3148: New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks Device Swap Risk Risk description no. Malicious Subscriber using race condition scenarios leading to Profiles being activated EXS1 on both Devices. Malicious entity using weak swap procedures in order to compromise authentication EXS2 vectors. Table 3249: Device Swapping Risks Loss of Privacy Risk Risk description no. Improper handling, transport or disclosure of the EID or any user related data PRI1 information … cted and unpredicted PRI2 « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties to spy or compromise Devices or the Subscriber themselves. Table … 3350: Loss of Privacy Risks Others Risk Risk description no. Compromising of exchanges between Profile Management actors leading to the critical EXO1 loss of private keys. EXO2 Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios. Table 3451: Other Risks Creation Process Req Requirement description no. Profiles failing to be created SHALL be securely deleted or at least purged of CRE1 authentication vectors. Req Requirement description no. Communication between systems participating in the Profile creation SHALL be CRE2 protected in integrity and confidentiality. Table 3552: Creation Process Requirements

B.1 Profile Production Proceduremodified

This section describes a generic implementation. It should be regarded as an example only ; specific implementation MAY be required to address specific security concerns. Within the eUICC, the current functionality of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Just as with current UICCs, Profiles are the responsibility of the Operator and the Profile production is performed upon their request and permission (if not produced by the Operators themselves). The same Operator procedures as in the current UICCs SHALL apply. Figure 17:27: Profile Production Procedure The Profile Production consists of three steps: 1. Profile Description definition: The SM-DP+ creates and registers a Profile Description based on the OperatorOperational Profile Description. 2. Operator Credentials generation: The Operator asks the SM-DP+ to generate Operator Credentials that will be used in the next step. This procedure is OPTIONAL and will not be used if the Operator wants to generate the Operator Credentials during Protected Profile Package generation.  Protected Profile Package generation: The Profile Packages will be created, protected and stored. This step (batch type of operation or real time process) is only performed after an order ofwith the respective Operator. 3. Contract conclusion and Link Profile: At the end of the contract conclusion, an Activation Code is delivered to the End User and the Profile MAY be allocated for this contract. Note: The generation of the Bound Profile Package is part of the Profile download with Activation Code procedure in Section ‎5.1.2.5.2.2.

B.1.1 Profile Description Definitionmodified

The Profile Descriptiondescription definition MAY comprise of the following sequences:sequence: Figure 18:28: Profile Description Procedure Start Conditions:Condition: a. Contractual relationship between the Operator and the SM-DP+. Procedure: 1. The Operator defines its different profileProfile types (identified by a [non-standardised] Profile Description ID) which contains the Network Access Application like USIM, file structure, data and application… …

B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generationadded

This procedure allows the Operator to allocate a set of Operator Credentials on the SM-DP+ without associating them to a specific ProfileDescriptionID. Operator Credentials generation MAY comprise of the following sequence: Figure 29: Operator Credentials Generation Start Condition: a. IMSI, ICCID and other resources have been allocated by the Operator . Procedure: 1. The Operator provides the IMSI, ICCID, type of credential to be created (e.g. Milenage00, TUAK 0 etc.) and other resources that MAY already be allocated to the SM-DP+. It asks the SM-DP+ to securely generate and store a set of Operator Credentials. 2. The SM-DP+ securely generates and stores a set of Operator Credentials based on the Operator’s input with the corresponding IMSI, ICCID and other resources provided. 3. The SM-DP+ confirms the generation of Operator Credentials and provides them to the Operator.

B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generationrenumbered was B.1.2

The Protected Profile Package Generation MAY comprise of the following sequences:sequence: This procedure MAY apply between the Profile Description definition, and the Contract conclusion and Link Profile, depending on whether the Protected Profile Package is created on demand or prepared in advance. Figure 19:30: Protected Profile Package Generation Procedure Start Conditions: a. Profile Description definition Procedure: 1. The Operator orders the Protected Profile Package generation by providing the SM- DP+SM-DP+ with the Profile Description ID and some corresponding Operator input data (credentials e.g. ICCID, IMSI).The Operator input data required for Protected Profil… …

B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profilerenumbered was B.1.3

…the contract.  Activation Code with unknown EID: The EID is not given by the Subscriber to the Operator during the conclusion of the contract. The EID is only … providedprovide d to the SM-DP+ during the Profile download procedure and is given back from the SM-DP+ to the Operator.  Activation codeCode with EID provided to the OperatorOperator: in step 2 of Figure 22: The EID is not immediately given by the Subscriber during the contract conclusion, but provided in step 2two to the Operator. The contract reference MAY be, but not necessarily, any Activation Code parameter (e.g. token), ICCID or the IMSI. In any case, the SM-DP+ SHA… …

B.1.4.1 Activation Code with Known EIDrenumbered was B.1.3.1

Figure 20:31: Activation Code with Known EID Procedure Procedure: Steps 1-11 inError!in ReferenceFigure source31: not found.: Contract conclusion with known EID 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator and provides the EID during this process. 2. to 5. Alternatively ‘IC … he EID, IMSI and ICCID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the different parameters and confirms this to the Operator. 6. to 10. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by … SM-DP+SM -DP+ prior to Profile download procedure’: The Operator sends the EID, the IMSI and the Profile Description ID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates an ICCID to a corr … ract reference). End Condition: a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the Operator. b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future … download Profile download procedure request.

B.1.4.2 Activation Code with Unknown EIDrenumbered was B.1.3.2

Figure 21:32: Activation Code with Unknown EID Procedure Procedure: Steps 1-6 inError!in ReferenceFigure source32: not found.: Contract conclusion without EID 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge aboutof the target eUICC (EID). 2. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the Profile (ICCID) 3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by … ract reference). End Condition: a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the Operator. b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future … download Profile download procedure request.

B.1.4.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operatoradded

Figure 33: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure 33Error! Reference source not found.: Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of the target eUICC (EID). 2. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the Profile (ICCID) 3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator. 6. The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the corresponding information (contract reference). 7. After the Subscriber has chosen the Device/eUICC, the EID is provided together with the contract reference to the Operator. 8. to 10. The Operator requests the linking of the eUICC (EID) and Profile (ICCID) by the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the EID and the ICCID and confirms this to the Operator. 11. The Operator confirms the linking of the EID to the corresponding contract to the Subscriber. End Condition: a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the Operator. b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)added

This annex provides an example diagram for the implementation of Local Profile Management Operations and describes how the different confirmation levels MAY be applied. Figure 34: Example Flow for Device & LPA Authenticated Confirmation Access PIN Setup / Settings

D eUICC Categories (Normative)added

The following table provides eUICCs categories defined for Remote SIM Provisioning products. Role no. Description Basic eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:  Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 64kB CAT1  ISO interface PPS 96  BIP over HTTPS features Medium eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:  Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 384kB  ISO interface PPS 97 CAT2  BIP over HTTPS features  Processor >= 25MHz  Crypto processor >= 100MHz  Memory Protection Unit Contactless eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features :  Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 1024kB  ISO interface PPS 97 CAT3  BIP over HTTPS features  Processor >= 25MHz  Crypto processor >= 100MHz  Memory Protection Unit Table 53: eUICC Categories

D.1 eUICC Requirementadded

Req no. Description EUICCSHA1 The eUICC SHALL support SHA-1. Table 54: eUICC Requirement

E LPA Settings (Informative)added

Figure 35: LPA Settings

F Certifications Chain and Security Modeladded

: Manufacturing process : Business process CI : Remote Profile Management : Local Profile Management CI Cert Cert : Public key Certificate CI Cert EUM SM-DP+ ES9+: eUICC Cert, EUM Cert ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert, eUICC Cert eUICC ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert LPA PK eUICC Cert, EUM Cert ES10b: Figure 36: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the Device : Manufacturing process : Business process : Remote Profile Management CI : Local Profile Management Cert : Public key Certificate CI Cert, CI Cert, CI Cert, SM-DS Cert EUM Cert SM-DP+ Cert SM-DS EUM SM-DP+ ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert, ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert ES9+: eUICC Cert, ES11: eUICC Cert, ES11: SM-DS Cert eUICC Cert EUM Cert EUM Cert ES10a: eUICC Cert, ES10b: eUICC Cert, EUM Cert EUM Cert LPA eUICC LPA ES10a: SM-DS Cert ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert Figure 37: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the eUICC

F.1 Security Modeladded

The Security Model defines the trust relationships between all the active components of the eUICC ecosystem with an LPA in the Device. The figure below shows only the end-to-end logical links where cryptographic keys and sensitive data are sent. The different links define the end-to-end trust relationship between entities. We distinguish a hierarchy of seven trust links with link 1 being the most significant and link 7 being the least significant. If trust link 1 is broken, all trust links will be broken as a result. If trust link 2 is broken, trust link 1 remains intact however all other trusted links are compromised or broken. Figure 38: Trusted Link with LPA in the Device Figure 39: Trusted Link with LPA in the eUICC Trust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of link involved compromises trust link TL1 Trust introduced onto Out of The CI public key, The trust of the entire the eUICC by the scope the EUM’s security model is issuing EUM to enable Certificate, breached and all future remote the EUM’s keyset, eUICCs issued under management and the eUICC keys, the the model cannot be authorisation by the OS, and the Security trusted. SM-DP+ and possibly Domains. the EUM: eUICC keys Trust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of link involved compromises trust link (EUM & CI keyset eUICC Certificates). TL2 Trust placed in the CI’s Out of The EUM and SM- Loss of Operator verification of the scope DP+ Certificates. trust on the EUM and EUM, SM-DP+, and SM-DP+ the resulting Certificate issuance. TL3 Trust placed in the ES2+ The eUICC Loss of Operator activities for eUICC ES8+ Certificate or trust on the eUICC eligibility and remote eligibility check and/or SM-DP+. attestation from the failure. ISD-R on the target eUICC to the Operator via the SM-DP+. Provides eUICC Certificate, EID, reference to its certification and EUM to the Operator and SM-DP+. TL4 Trust placed in the ES2+ SM-DP+ Certificate Loss of Operator activities for Profile ES8+ eUICC Certificate or trust on the SM-DP+ data transfer from the eligibility check and/or eUICC. Operator via the SM- failure. DP+ to the ISD-R on the target eUICC. Protects the Profile and associated credentials and keys (NAAs, OTA keys, ISD-R access, ISD-P SD creation …) with only the Operator, SM- DP+ and the eUICC. TL5 Trust placed in the ES2+ SM-DP+ Certificate Operator loss of trust information exchange on SM-DP+. between the Operator and the SM-DP+ for Link Profile requests. TL6 Trust placed in the ESeu LPA security eUICC loss of trust mechanisms provided on LPA. by the LPA: Local Profile Management, Local Profile Trust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of link involved compromises trust link Management Operations TL7 Trust placed in the ES9+ LPA security or SM- SM-DP+ loss of trust TLS session DP+ security. on LPA or LPA loss of trust on the SM- DP+. TL8 Trust in the discovery ES11 LDS security or SM- LDS loss of trust on process DS security. the SM-DS and vice versa. TL9 Trust placed on TLS ES5+ eUICC security or SM-DP+ loss of trust session SM-DP+ security. on the eUICC and vice versa TL10 Trust in the discovery ES11 eUICC security or SM-DS loss of trust process SM-DS security. on the eUICC and vice versa. TL11 Trust in the UI ESeu Device security Loss of trust on the Device Table 55: Trusted Link Descriptions Compromised Impacted Description Impact of loss of Countermeasures element Paths trust eUICC SP1, SP3, The eUICC The eUICC can no Revoke the Certificate SP4, SP9, keys and longer be trusted. of the eUICC. SP10 EUM’s Keyset. MNO and SM-DP+ loss of trust on eUICC. CI SP2 The EUM, SM- Loss of Operator trust Repair/Replace CI. DS, and SM- in the EUM, SM-DS Generate new CI DP+ and SM-DP+. Certificate and new Certificates. Certificate for the EUM, SM-DS and SM- DP+ following the SAS process. Remote repair of already issued eUICCs: new CI public key. EUM SP1, SP2 Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the certification. Operator and SM-DP+ EUM. Remote repair on the EUM and its of already issued eUICCs. eUICCs: new EUM Certificate, new eUICC Certificate. Compromised Impacted Description Impact of loss of Countermeasures element Paths trust SM-DP+ SP3, SP4, Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the SM- SP5, SP7, certification. Operator, LPA, SM-DS DP+. New SM-DP+ SP8 and eUICC on the SM- Certificate. DP+. SM-DS SP8 Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the SM- certification. Operator, LPA, SM- DS. New SM-DS DP+ and eUICC on the Certificate. SM-DS. LPA SP6, SP7, LPA security Loss of trust from the LPA repair by the SP8 failure. SM-DP+, SM-DS and Device Manufacturer. eUICC on the LPA. Device SP11 Device Loss of trust in the LUI in the eUICC self- security failure Device UI protected with User Intent capture mechanisms (i.e. Captcha Code) Table 56: Impact of Compromising Trusted Links and Countermeasures The signer is responsible for the revocation of the Certificates it has signe d. This section describes how the new Certificates are pushed to concerned entities according to the security model.  SM-DP+ trusts the CI  EUM trusts the CI  eUICC trusts the EUM and the CI Req no. Description The new SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM- CERT1 DP+ by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair. The new SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-DS CERT2 by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair. The new EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the EUM by a GSMA CI CERT3 upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair. The EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the CERT4 EUM Note: See details in section 4.1.1.1. The CI Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the EUM CERT5 Note: See details in section 4.1.1.1. CERT6 Certificates SHALL be revocable. Neither the End User nor any other party SHALL be able to prevent CERT7 Certificate revocation. The End User SHALL not be allowed to use Remote SIM Provisioning CERT8 functions with revoked Certificates. Req no. Description The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+ SHALL be revoked if required CERT9 (e.g. loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification requirements). The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS SHALL be revoked if required (e.g. CERT10 loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification requirements). The Public Key Certificate of the EUM SHALL be revoked if required (e.g. CERT11 loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification requirements). Table 57: Certificate Requirements

G LPA Integrityadded

The LPA must be protected against misuse or being compromised by means of implementing standard procedures. For cases where the LPA is in the Device, the LPA integrity SHALL be guided by the following Device classes: Device class Description Example of Devices Devices with an open operating Smartphones, Tablets, Laptops, system where mechanisms such as Advanced Wearables Advanced secure boot and platform signing of applications are available and used to protect the LPA. Devices without possibility to install Connected sensors, Simple applications. The attack surface of Wearables, Single use case devices the LPA is minimal due to the locked Basic down nature of these Devices. Simple mechanisms to ensure that the LPA is not compromised SHALL be taken. Table 58: Device Classes

H Rules Authorisation Table (Normative)added

Annex H reflects the RAT table configuration(s) that SHALL be configured in embedded UICC. Legend: The following colours apply Line color Mandatory to be included Optional The following RAT SHALL apply to all products PR Operators User consent Mandatory part POL RULE1 * YES of the RAT table POL RULE2 * YES Table 59: RAT configuration Additional lines can be added to the RAT table to reflect agreement between some Operators and OEMs as needed. The OEM can also decide to add lines to the RAT table. PR Operators User consent POL RULE 1 Operator1 NO Mandatory part POL RULE1 * YES of the RAT table POL RULE2 * YES Table 60: RAT configuration Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.

I Document Managementadded

I.1 Document Historyadded

Version Date Brief Description of Change Approval Editor / Authority Company First Release with amendments Carmen Kwok, V1.0 03/12/15 PSMC from Security review. GSMA Carmen Kwok, V2.0 15/07/16 Includes Phase 2 content PSMC GSMA

B.1.3.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator in Step 2removed

Figure 22: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator in Step 2 Procedure: Steps 1-11 inError! Reference source not found.: Activation code with EID provided to the Operator in Step 2 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge about the target eUICC (EID). 2. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the Profile (ICCID) 3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator. 6. The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the corresponding information (contract reference). 7. After the Subscriber has chosen the Device/eUICC, the EID is provided together with the contract reference to the Operator. 8. to 10. The Operator requests the linking of the eUICC (EID) and Profile (ICCID) by the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the EID and the ICCID and confirm this to the Operator. 11. The Operator confirms the linking of the EID to the corresponding contract to the Subscriber. End Condition: a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the Operator. b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future download Profile procedure request.

C Document Managementremoved

C.1 Document Historyremoved

Version Date Brief Description of Change Approval Editor / Authority Company First Release with amendments Carmen Kwok, V1.0 03/12/15 PSMC from Security review. GSMA

Contents
  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 1.1 Overview
  3. 1.2 Scope
  4. 1.3 Intended Audience
  5. 1.4 Definition of Terms
  6. 1.5 Abbreviations
  7. 1.6 References
  8. 1.7 Conventions
  9. 2 Principles
  10. 2.1 Basic Principles
  11. 2.2 Profile Principles
  12. 3 Roles
  13. 3.1 eUICC Manufacturer
  14. 3.2 Device Manufacturer
  15. 3.3 Operator and Service Provider
  16. 3.4 Subscriber and End User
  17. 3.5 Certificate Issuer
  18. 4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture
  19. 4.1 eUICC Architecture
  20. 4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
  21. 4.2 eUICC Requirements
  22. 4.3 eUICC Eligibility Check
  23. 4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements
  24. 4.4 Device Requirements
  25. 4.4.1 Device Capability Requirements
  26. 4.5 Device Initiated Requirements
  27. 4.5.1 Device Reset
  28. 4.5.2 eUICC Memory Reset
  29. 4.5.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset
  30. 4.6 Profile Requirements
  31. 4.6.1 Test Profiles
  32. 4.6.2 Provisioning Profile
  33. 4.7 Metadata Requirements
  34. 4.8 NFC Requirements
  35. 4.9 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM -DP+)
  36. 4.9.1 SM-DP+ Overview
  37. 4.9.2 SM-DP+ Requirements
  38. 4.9.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC
  39. 4.10 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)
  40. 4.10.1 LPA Overview
  41. 4.10.2 Operational LPA Modes
  42. 4.10.3 LPA Requirements
  43. 4.10.4 LDS Requirements
  44. 4.11 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)
  45. 4.11.1 SM-DS Overview
  46. 4.11.2 SM-DS Implementation
  47. 4.11.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelines
  48. 4.11.4 SM-DS functions
  49. 4.11.5 SM-DS Requirements
  50. 4.11.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedure
  51. 4.11.7 Discovery Request Procedure
  52. 4.12 Interfaces
  53. 4.12.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
  54. 4.12.2 Operator – End User (ESop)
  55. 4.12.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)
  56. 4.12.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
  57. 4.12.5 SM-DP+ – LPA in the eUICC (ES5+)
  58. 4.12.6 SM-DP+ – LPD in the Device (ES9+)
  59. 4.12.7 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
  60. 4.12.8 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)
  61. 4.12.9 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)
  62. 4.12.10 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)
  63. 4.12.11 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)
  64. 4.12.12 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)
  65. 4.12.13 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)
  66. 4.12.14 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)
  67. 4.12.15 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)
  68. 4.12.16 General Interface Requirements
  69. 4.13 Profile Policy Management
  70. 4.13.1 Introduction
  71. 4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirements
  72. 4.13.3 Policy Rules
  73. 4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirements
  74. 4.14 Certification
  75. 4.14.1 eUICC Certification
  76. 4.14.2 Device Compliance
  77. 4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification
  78. 4.14.4 SM-DS Certification
  79. 4.14.5 LPA Certification
  80. 4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management
  81. 5 Operational Procedures
  82. 5.1 LPA Initiated Download
  83. 5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirements
  84. 5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedure
  85. 5.2 Profile Download with Activation Code
  86. 5.2.1 Activation Code Requirements
  87. 5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure
  88. 5.3 Local Profile Management
  89. 5.3.1 Local Profile Management Procedures
  90. A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)
  91. B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)
  92. B.1 Profile Production Procedure
  93. B.1.1 Profile Description Definition
  94. B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generation
  95. B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generation
  96. B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile
  97. C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)
  98. D eUICC Categories (Normative)
  99. D.1 eUICC Requirement
  100. E LPA Settings (Informative)
  101. F Certifications Chain and Security Model
  102. F.1 Security Model
  103. G LPA Integrity
  104. H Rules Authorisation Table (Normative)
  105. I Document Management
  106. I.1 Document History
RSP Architecture
     Version 2.0
     23 August 2016

This is a Non-binding Permanent Reference Document of the GSMA

Security Classification: Non-confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is confidential to the Association and is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and inf ormation contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other t han those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association.

Copyright Notice Copy right © 2016 GSM Association

Disclaimer The GSM Association (“Association”) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document. The inf ormation contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.

Antitrust Notice The inf ormation contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy.

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This document provides an architecture approach as a proposed solution for the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices across all markets.

The main goal of the Architecture is to define a mechanism for the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices with the necessary credentials to gain mobile network access.

This version focuses on Devices for the consumer market.

Please note that SGP.21 V1.0 [31] has not been deprecated.

1.2 Scope

The aim of this document is to define a common architecture framework to enable the Remote SIM Provisioning and management of the Embedded UICC (eUICC) in Devices. The adoption of this architecture framework will aim to provide the basis for ensuring global interoperability for Remote SIM Provisioning between Operators in different deployment scenarios.

1.3 Intended Audience

Technical experts working within Operators, SIM solution providers, Device vendors, standards organisations, network infrastructure vendors, Service Providers and other industry bodies.

1.4 Definition of Terms

Term                         Description
                             Information issued by an Operator/Service Provider to an End
Activation Code              User. It is used by the End User to request for the download and
                             installation of a Profile.
                             A part of the Activation Code information provided by the
Activation Code Token
                             Operator/Service Provider to reference a Subscription.
                             SM-DS used in cascade mode with a Root SM-DS to redirect Event
Alternative SM-DS
                             Registration from a SM-DP+ to the Root SM-DS.
                             Describes a mechanism for which the End User is confirming their
Authenticated Confirmation   action through a method involving the input of personalised
                             information (e.g. PIN, fingerprint).
                             A Protected Profile Package which has been encrypted for a target
Bound Profile Package
                             eUICC.
Certificate or Public Key    A certificate as defined in RFC.5280 [1] and GlobalPlatform
Certificate                  specifications [11].
                             An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM
Certified eUICC              Provisioning and certified according to a GSMA eUICC protection
                             Profile.
                             A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for the
Companion Device
                             purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.
Term                          Description
                              A code entered by an End User to authorise the usage of an
Confirmation Code             Activation Code to confirm the download and installation of a
                              Profile.
Confirmation Code Required    A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is required
Flag                          or not.
                              Refers to the hierarchy of User Intent and Confirmation Request,
                              where:
                                 User Intent is the first and lowest level
Confirmation Level
                                 Simple Confirmation is the second level
                                 Authenticated Confirmation is the third and highest level
                              Note: For examples of implementation, please refer to Annex C.
                              Describes a request for Authenticated Confirmation or a Simple
Confirmation Request
                              Confirmation as defined in this specification.
                              User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a
Device
                              mobile network. E.g. a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset.
                              An entity responsible for manufacturing Devices. The Device
Device Manufacturer           Manufacturer MAY be responsible for the selection and insertion of
                              eUICCs in Devices.
                              A mode hidden to the End User and intended to be used by
Device Test Mode
                              maintenance people. It allows access and use of the Test Profiles.
                              Profile, the files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) of which are not
Disabled Profile
                              selectable over the UICC-Device interface.
                              An interrogation of the Discovery Service by a Device for Event
Discovery Request
                              Records that are registered for its eUICC.
                              UICC which enables the secure remote and/or local management
Embedded UICC (eUICC)
                              of Profiles.
                              Profile, the files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) of which are
Enabled Profile
                              selectable over the UICC-Device interface. 0
                              A file whose content determines the ability of a Profile Owner to
Enabling Configuration File
                              make use of Profile Policy Rules.
End User                      The person using the Device.
                              Information that pertains to the identity of an End User e.g.
End User Data                 personal details, name, address, biometric characteristics,
                              assigned identification numbers, etc.
                              Function that enables a SM-DP+ to check certain information
eUICC Audit
                              related to the eUICC and its installed Profiles.
eUICC Authorisation           Token used by the SM-DS to authenticate the eUICC.
                              A Certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC.
eUICC Certificate
                              This Certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate.
eUICC Eligibility Check       The information set sent from the eUICC to the SM-DP+ to allow
Information                   eligibility checks.
eUICC Manufacturer            The eUICC Manufacturer provides eUICC products.
Term                         Description
                             An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a Factory
eUICC Memory Reset
                             State.
                             An action that returns the eUICC to the state prior to installation of
eUICC Test Memory Reset
                             any post-issuance Test Profile.
                             A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited EUM
EUM Certificate
                             which can be used to verify eUICC Certificates.
                             A Profile download which is set by an SM-DP+ on behalf of an
Event
                             Operator, to be processed by a specific eUICC.
                             Unique identifier of an Event for a specific EID generated by the
Event-ID
                             SM-DP+.
                             The set of information stored on the SM-DS for a specific Event, via
                             the Event Registration procedure. This information consists of
Event Record                 either:
                                 the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DP+ address or
                                 the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DS address
                             A query to the SM-DS (Root or Alternative) executed to verify Event
Event Record Query
                             Registration success or determine that an Event Record still exists.
                             A process notifying the SM-DS on the availability of information on
Event Registration
                             either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC.
                             The configured state of the eUICC at the point it was distributed
Factory State
                             after manufacture.
Form Factor                  Physical manifestation of the UICC.
GSMA Certificate Issuer      A Certificate Authority accredited/approved by GSMA.
                             Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU-
                             T E.118 0.
ICCID
                             Note: the ICCID throughout this specification is used to identify the
                             Profile.
International Mobile
                             Refer to 3GPP 21.905 [4].
Subscriber Identity
                             The process that associates a Protected Profile Package with a
                             specific eUICC so that a Profile Download including Bound Profile
                             Package generation can be triggered.
Link Profile
                             Note: This is normally an offline process, binding is an online
                             process happening during the communication between the SM-
                             DP+ and the eUICC.
                             The Local Profile Assistant (LPA) describes the entity comprising of
Local Profile Assistant      the Local User Interface (LUI), the Local Profile Download (LPD)
                             and the Local Discovery Service (LDS).
                             Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated
Local Profile Management
                             on the ESeu interface.
                             Local Profile Management Operations are enable Profile, disable
Local Profile Management     Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory
Operation                    Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, edit nickname, add Profile, and
                             edit default SM-DP+ address.
Term                          Description
                              Assurance that the LPA has not been compromised or otherwise
                              affected. The assurance SHALL be provided to the various Remote
LPA Integrity                 SIM Provisioning entities to ensure that the LPA can be trusted to
                              execute the actions requested
                              Note: This could be linked with a certification process.
                              Defines the Operation LPA Mode which is either LPA in the eUICC
LPA Mode
                              or in the Device.
                              Information pertaining to a Profile that is stored in the eUICC and is
Metadata                      accessible by the LPA for the purpose of Local Profile
                              Management.
                              An entity providing access capability and communication services
Mobile Network Operator
                              to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure.
                              An entity providing access capability and communication services
Mobile Virtual Network
                              to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure but does
Operator
                              not have an allocation of spectrum.
                              A method of authentication in which an End User is only granted
                              access after successfully presenting several separate pieces of
Multi-Factor Authentication   evidence to an authentication mechanism – typically at least two of
(MFA)                         the following categories: knowledge (something they know),
                              possession (something they have), and inherence (something they
                              are).
Network Access Application    Refer to 3GPP 21.905 [4].
                              Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [5] network. This
Network Access Credentials
                              MAY include data such as Ki/K and IMSI stored within a NAA.
NFC Device                    Device with NFC capability.
NFC eUICC                     eUICC with NFC capability.
                              An arbitrary random number generated for one time use, employed
Nonce
                              for cryptographic communication.
                              A report about a Profile download or Remote/Local Profile
Notification
                              Management Operation processed by the eUICC.
Operational Profile           A Profile that allows connectivity to a mobile network.
                              A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a
Operator
                              company providing wireless cellular network services.
                              A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network
Operator Credentials          Access Credentials, OTA Keys for Remote File/Application
                              management, and authentication algorithm parameters.
                              The credentials included in the Profile used in conjunction with OTA
OTA Keys
                              Platforms.
                              A platform used by an Operator for the Remote File/Application
OTA Platform
                              management of enabled Operational Profiles on eUICCs.
                              Principles reflected in a set of rules that governs the behaviour of
Policy                        the eUICC and/or entities involved in the remote management of
                              the eUICC.
Policy Enforcement            A function that executes Policy Rules to implement a Policy.
Term                         Description
                             Defines the atomic action of a Policy and the conditions under
Policy Rule
                             which it is executed.
                             A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a
Primary Device
                             Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.
                             A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned
                             on to an eUICC for the purposes of providing services by the
Profile                      Operator. The Profile SHALL be in support of a Subscription with
                             the relevant Operator. Applications MAY be included to provide
                             non-telecommunication services.
                             The description of a Profile in a format specific to the Operator;
Profile Description
                             example formats could be an Excel table, xml format, or plain text.
                             A combination of local and remote management operations (enable
Profile Management
                             Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, and query Profile Metadata)
Profile Owner                The Operator identified by the IMSI in the Profile.
                             A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format
Profile Package
                             that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile [6].
                             The functional element within the Profile management system that
Profile Policy Enabler
                             interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules.
                             A policy control system that allows the Service Provider to
Profile Policy Management    implement, manage and enforce its subscription terms and
                             conditions associated with the installed Profile.
                             Defines the condition of the policy and the atomic action to be
Profile Policy Rule
                             taken by the Profile Policy Enabler.
                             A Profile Package which has been encrypted for storage but not to
Protected Profile Package
                             a specific eUICC.
                             A Profile that allows connectivity to a mobile network solely to
Provisioning Profile
                             provide the provisioning of Profiles.
                             The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, switching, and
Remote SIM Provisioning
                             deleting of a Profile on an eUICC.
                             A Certificate used to authenticate other entities within the Remote
Root Certificate
                             SIM Provisioning framework.
                             A globally identified central access point for finding Events from
Root SM-DS
                             one or more SM-DP+(s).
                             The Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either
Service Provider             as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement
                             with an Operator. The Service Provider could also be the Operator.
                             Describes a mechanism for which the End User is confirming their
Simple Confirmation
                             action through a confirmation (e.g yes or no).
SM-DP+ Certificate           A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DP+.
SM-DS Certificate            A Certificate used by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DS.
                             Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as
SMDPid
                             part of the SM-DP+ Certificate.
Term                         Description
                             An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a
                             Subscription with an Operator. The Subscriber is allowed to
Subscriber
                             subscribe and unsubscribe to services, as well as register an End
                             User or a list of End Users authorised to use these services.
                             Information that pertains to the identity of a Subscriber such as
                             contract details, authentication credentials, cryptographic keys etc.
Subscriber Data
                             Note: In many instances, the Subscriber is also the End User and
                             therefore Subscriber Data is likely to include End User Data.
                             A Subscription describes the commercial relationship between the
Subscription
                             Subscriber and the Service Provider.
                             This role prepares Profile Packages, secures each with a Profile
                             protection key, stores Profile protection keys in a secure manner as
                             well as the Protected Profile Packages in a Profile Package
Subscription Manager Data    repository, and links the Protected Profile Packages to specified
Preparation+ (SM-DP+)        EIDs.
                             The SM-DP+ binds Protected Profile Packages to the respective
                             EID and securely downloads these Bound Profile Packages to the
                             LPA of the respective eUICC.
Subscription Manager         This is responsible for providing addresses of one or more SM-
Discovery Server (SM-DS)     DP+(s) to a LDS.
                             A Profile which when installed on an eUICC enables access to test
Test Profile                 equipment for the purpose of testing the Device and the eUICC.
                             This will not include any Operator Credentials.
                             According to NIST SP 800-53r4 0, a mechanism by which an End
                             User (through an input Device) can communicate directly with the
                             security functions of the information system with the necessary
Trusted Path                 confidence to support the system security policy. This mechanism
                             can only be activated by the End User or the security functions of
                             the information system and cannot be imitated by untrusted
                             software.
                             Describes the direct, real time acquisition of the manual End User
User Intent                  input on the LUI to trigger locally a Profile download or Profile
                             Management operation.

1.5 Abbreviations

Abbreviation                 Description
AC                           Activation Code
ARA-M                        Access Rule Application - Master
ARF                          Access Rule File
AuC                          Authentication Centre
BSS                          Business Support Services
CI                           Certificate Issuer
DNSCurve                     Domain Name System Curve
DNSSEC                       Domain Name System Security Extensions
Abbreviation                 Description
ECASD                        eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain
EID                          Embedded UICC Identifier
eSVN                         embedded Specification Version Number
ETSI                         European Telecommunications Standards Institute
eUICC                        Embedded UICC
EUM                          eUICC Manufacturer
FASG                         Fraud and Security Group
FFS                          For Further Study
GSMA                         GSM Association
GSMA CI                      GSMA Certificate Issuer
HLR                          Home Location Register
HTTP                         Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ICCID                        Integrated Circuit Card Identifier
IMSI                         International Mobile Subscriber Identity
ISD-P                        Issuer Security Domain - Profile
ISD-R                        Issuer Security Domain - Root
ISIM                         IP Multimedia Services Identity Module
ITU                          International Telecoms Union
LDS                          Local Discovery Service
LPA                          Local Profile Assistant
LPD                          Local Profile Download
LUI                          Local User Interface
M4M                          Mifare4Mobile
MFA                          Multi-Factor Authentication
MNO                          Mobile Network Operator
MNO-SD                       Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain
MSISDN                       Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number
NAA                          Network Access Application
OS                           Operating System
OTA                          Over The Air
PFS                          Perfect Forward Secrecy
RAM                          Remote Application Management
RAT                          Rules Authorisation Table
RFM                          Remote File Management
SAS                          Security Accreditation Scheme
SD                           Security Domain
SIM                          Subscriber Identity Module
SM-DP+                       Subscription Manager - Data Preparation +
Abbreviation                 Description
SM-DS                        Subscription Manager - Discovery Server
SSD                          Supplementary Secure Domain
USIM                         Universal Subscriber Identity Module

1.6 References

Ref          Document Number Title
                                      X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
      [1]      RFC 5280
                                      Revocation List (CRL) Profile
                                      UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical
      [2]      ETSI TS 102 221
                                      characteristics
                                      Smart cards; Machine to Machine UICC; Physical and
      [3]      ETSI TS 102 671
                                      logical characteristics
                                      Technical Specification Group Services and System
      [4]      3GPP 21.905
                                      Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications
                                      The international identification plan for public networks
      [5]      ITU E.212
                                      and Subscriptions
                                      SIMalliance: eUICC Profile Package - Interoperable
      [6]      SIMAPP                 Format Technical Specification
                                      http://simalliance.org/euicc/euicc-technical-releases/
      [7]      ETSI TS 102 226        Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications
                                      “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
      [8]      RFC 2119               Levels”, S. Bradner
                                      http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
      [9]      3GPP TS 21.133         3G security; Security threats and requirements
                                      GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC
      [10]     SGP.02
                                      Technical specification
      [11]     GPC_SPE_034            GlobalPlatform Card Specification with its Amendments
                                      Specification of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1:
      [12]     3GPP TS 35.231
                                      Algorithm Specification
               3GPP TS 35.205         Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document
      [13]
                                      1: General
                                      Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document
      [14]     3GPP TS 35.206
                                      2: Algorithm Specification
                                      FS.04 - Security Accreditation Scheme for UICC
      [15]     EUM SAS
                                      Production – Standard
                                      FS.08 - GSMA SAS Standard for Subscription Manager
      [16]     SM-DP SAS
                                      Roles
                                      Smart Cards; Embedded UICC; Requirements
      [17]     ETSI TS 103 383
                                      Specification
      [18]     ITU-T E.118            The International Telecommunication Charge Card
                                      Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity
      [19]     3GPP TS 31.102
                                      Module (USIM) application
Ref           Document Number Title
                                       GlobalPlatform Device Technology Secure Element
      [20]     GPD_SPE_013
                                       Access Control - Version 1.1
                                       Personalisation of Mobile Equipment - Mobile functionality
      [21]     3GPP TS 22.022
                                       specification
      [22]     TS.26                   GSMA NFC Handset Requirements
                                       Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information
      [23]     NIST SP 800-53r4
                                       Systems and Organisations – Revision 4
      [24]     OMAPI                   SIMalliance Open Mobile API Specification
      [25]     SGP.03                  NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1
                                       GlobalPlatform Device Technology – Secure Element
      [26]     GPS_SPE_013
                                       Access Control
                                       Wireless Application Protocol WAP-248-UAProf-
      [27]     WAG UAProf
                                       20011020-a
      [28]     SGP.05                  Embedded UICC Protection Profile
                                       GSMA SAS Standard for Subscription Manager Roles -
      [29]     SGP.07
                                       Version 1.0 or later
      [30]     SGP.21                  SGP.21 Architecture Specification - Version 1.0
      [31]     SGP.22                  SGP.22 Technical Specification - Version 2.0

1.7 Conventions

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [8].

“FFS” or “For Further Study” means that it will be covered in SGP.22 V2.1.

2 Principles

This section contains the principles related to the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning system for the Embedded UICC.

The solution based on the requirements described within this document has to be prov ided in a non-discriminatory manner.

2.1 Basic Principles

Principle no. Description
                Existing standards and specifications SHALL be used where possible for the
BAS1
                specification of the eUICC and related provisioning systems.
                GlobalPlatform specifications SHALL be used as a framework of choice for the
BAS2
                implementation of the eUICC.
                The overall security of the eUICC in combination with the related management
BAS3            processes SHALL at all times and under all circumstances be at least equivalent
                to the current removable UICC and its provisioning processes.
Principle no. Description
                The architecture of the eUICC and its Remote SIM Provisioning system SHALL
BAS4
                comply with the requirements of 3GPP TS 21.133 [9].
                The architecture SHALL support a level of security with respect to the protection
                of Operator Credentials which is at least equivalent to the present levels of
BAS5            security. This applies in particular to:
                    the confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters ;
                   the integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI).
                The architecture SHALL support a level of security for all Profile content which is
BAS6
                at least equivalent to the current state of the art level of security of the UICC.
                The architecture SHALL NOT compromise the security and privacy of Subscriber
                Data, nor the security and privacy of End User Data. Examples depending on
BAS7
                territory include identities that can be used for tracking such as ICCID, MSISDN,
                EID, IMSI Ki etc.
                Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of this document. However,
BAS8            any data which could be used to identify an individual SHALL be treated as
                personal data and subject to local regulations e.g. the EID, ICCID, etc.

Table 1: Basic Principles

2.2 Profile Principles

Principle no. Description
                Profiles are the property of and SHALL be under the control of the issuing
PRO1
                Operator.
                A Profile does not exist outside of an eUICC. I.e. a Profile is always located on a
PRO2
                particular eUICC.
PRO3            A Profile SHALL be uniquely identified by its ICCID.
                An Enabled Profile in combination with an eUICC SHALL be able to carry all
PRO4
                logical characteristics of a UICC.
                Once the Profile is enabled, all relevant UICC characteristics or features as
PRO5            described in ETSI 102 221 [2] specifications SHALL apply, with the exceptions
                as defined within this specification.
                It SHALL be possible to delete Profiles only when in a disabled state, with the
PRO6
                exception of eUICC Memory Reset, and eUICC Test Memory Reset functions.
PRO7            Profile Management SHALL be governed by Policy.

Table 2: Profile Principles

3 Roles

3.1 eUICC Manufacturer

Role no.           Description
                   The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the initial cryptographic
EUM1
                   configuration and security architecture of the eUICC.
EUM2               The eUICCs are delivered by the eUICC Manufacturer (EUM).
Role no.           Description
                   Relevant parts of the eUICC Manufacturer’s products and processes are
EUM3
                   certified by a GSMA-approved certification process.
                   The EUM SHALL issue the eUICC Certificate to allow:
EUM4                  eUICC authentication and proof of certification to other entities;
                       authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-DP+ and an eUICC.
                   The eUICC Manufacturer SHALL be responsible for the implementation of any
EUM5               LPA elements that reside in the eUICC and the compliance of the LPA with the
                   requirements in Section 4.10.3.

Table 3: eUICC Manufacturer Role

3.2 Device Manufacturer

Role no.           Description
                   The Device Manufacturer SHALL be responsible for the implementation of any
DM1                LPA elements that reside on the Device and the compliance of the LPA with
                   the requirements in Section 4.10.2.
                   The Device Manufacturer SHALL be responsible for the implementation of
DM2                any application that resides on the Primary Device allowing User Interface
                   access to the Companion Device.

Table 4: Device Manufacturer Role

3.3 Operator and Service Provider

This section describes the characteristics of the Operator and Service Provider roles relevant to this architecture and its operation. Other characteristics exist but are considered out of scope.

Role no.           Description
OPE1               The Operator SHALL have access to a SM-DP+ via the ES2+ interface.
                   In the event that a Subscriber has selected a Service Provider, that Service
OPE2
                   Provider will initiate the provisioning of a Profile Package.
                   The Operator, potentially on behalf of the Service Provider, specifies the
OPE3               Profile characteristics and any features and applications analogous to
                   removable UICCs.
                   Operators SHALL be able to use an OTA Platform in order to manage the
OPE4
                   content of their Enabled Profile in the eUICC (RAM, RFM).
                   A Subscriber MAY have a relationship with any number of Service Providers
OPE5
                   simultaneously.

Table 5: Operator Role

3.4 Subscriber and End User

Role no.           Description
                   The Subscriber is the contract partner of the Service Provider for the
SEU1               Subscription.
                   Note: The Subscriber MAY not be the End User.
Role no.           Description
                   The End User is a human and uses the Device and/or the services related to
SEU2
                   the Enabled Profile.

Table 6: Subscriber and End User Role

3.5 Certificate Issuer

Role no.           Description
                   The Certificate Issuer issues Certificates for Remote SIM Provisioning entities
CIS1               and acts as a trusted third party for the purpose of authenticating the entities
                   of the system.
                   The Certificate Issuer communicates with the SM-DP+, SM-DS and the EUM
CIS2
                   through interfaces that are out of scope of this specification.

Table 7: Certificate Issuer Role

4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture

This section contains the functional description of the Remote SIM Provisioning system architecture for the Embedded UICC.

Figure 1: Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture

4.1 eUICC Architecture

4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview

This section describes the internal high-level architecture of the eUICC. It SHOULD be noted that the eUICC architecture is similar to that used in the GSMA Remote SIM specification [10]. Profiles are provisioned based on the security framework defined in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [11].

Figure 2: Schematic Representation of the eUICC

4.1.1.1 ECASD

The Embedded UICC Controlling Authority Security Domain (ECASD) is responsible for the secure storage of credentials needed to support the required security domains on the eUICC.

There SHALL only be one ECASD on an eUICC. The ECASD SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during the eUICC manufacturing as described in [11].

The ECASD SHALL have the following properties:

      Non-modifiable eUICC private keys for creating signatures.
      Associated Certificates for eUICC authentication.
      The Certificate Issuers’ (CI) root public keys for verifying SM-DP+ Certificates.
      eUICC Manufacturers’ (EUMs) keyset for key/Certificate renewal.

Additionally, the ECASD SHALL provide security functions used during key establishment and eUICC authentication.

4.1.1.2 ISD-R

The ISD-R is responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.

4.1.1.3 ISD-P

The ISD-P is a secure container (security domain) for the hosting of a Profile. The ISD-P is used for Profile download and installation in collaboration with the Profile Package interpreter for the decoding/interpretation of the received Bound Profile Package.

The ISD-P is the on-card representative of the SM-DP+.

4.1.1.4 MNO-SD

The MNO-SD is the on-card representative of the Operator. It contains the Operator’s Over- The-Air (OTA) Keys and provides a secure OTA channel.

4.1.1.5 Profile Policy Enabler

The eUICC Operating System (OS) service which offers Profile Policy Rules validation and enforcement.

4.1.1.6 Telecom Framework

The telecom framework is an operating system service that provides standardised network authentication algorithms to the NAAs hosted in the ISD-Ps. Furthermore, it offers the capability to configure the algorithms with the necessary parameters.

4.1.1.7 Profile Package Interpreter

The Profile Package interpreter is an eUICC operating system service that translates the Profile Package data into an installed Profile using the specific internal format of the target eUICC.

4.1.1.8 LPA Services

The LPA services provide necessary access to the services and data required by the LPA functions for the following:

1.   The optionally stored Root SM-DS and/or Default SM-DP+ addresses.
2.   Facilitates the reception of the Bound Profile Package in transfer from the LPA.
3.   Provide information regarding the installed Profiles and their Metadata.
4.   Provides Local Profile Management.
5.   Provides functions for the LPA to authenticate and interact with the SM-DS.
6.   Ensures access to the EID is restricted to only the LPA.

4.2 eUICC Requirements

Req no.                  Description
EUICC1                   The eUICC is a discrete tamper resistant hardware component.
EUICC2                   An removable eUICC is packaged in a standardised ETSI Form Factor [2].
EUICC3                   The eUICC SHALL be either removable or non-removable.
                         The behaviour of the eUICC with an Enabled Profile SHALL be equivalent
EUICC4
                         to the UICC.
EUICC5                   The eUICC SHALL be able to contain zero or more Profiles.
EUICC6                   At a maximum, only one Profile SHALL be enabled at any point in time.
                         The behaviour of a NAA USIM or ISIM within a Profile on an eUICC SHALL
                         be identical to a removable UICC NAAs USIM or ISIM.
EUICC7
                         Note: No changes to existing 3GPP/3GPP2 USIM, CSIM and ISIM
                         specifications are expected.
EUICC8                   The eUICC SHALL support Milenage 00 and TUAK 0 algorithm sets.
Req no.               Description
                      The ownership of the eUICC MAY change throughout its lifetime as can the
EUICC9
                      Device.
                      If any Profile Management operation does not complete successfully, the
EUICC10
                      eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request.
                      The eUICC SHALL contain an ECASD and ISD-R security domains installed
EUICC11
                      and personalised during manufacture.
EUICC12               The ECASD cannot be deleted or modified after eUICC manufacture.
                      The ISD-R SHALL be responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the
EUICC13
                      lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.
                      The ISD-R SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during eUICC
EUICC14
                      manufacturing as described in [11].
                      The eUICC SHALL be able to support an eUICC Memory Reset. This can
EUICC15
                      only be requested by the End User.
                      The eUICC SHALL be able to support an eUICC Test Memory Reset. This
EUICC16               can only be requested by the End User when the Device is in Device Test
                      Mode.
                      The eUICC SHALL support the eUICC Profile Package Interoperable format
EUICC17
                      as defined by SIMalliance [6].
                      An ISD-R SHALL:
                         be created within an eUICC at the time of manufacture;
EUICC18
                         NOT be deleted or disabled;
                         NOT be able to perform any operations inside an ISD-P.
EUICC19               An eUICC MAY provide LPA functions.
EUICC20               An ISD-P SHALL be created by the ISD-R at the request of the SM-DP+.
                      Communication between the eUICC and the SM-DP+ SHALL be protected
EUICC21
                      in authenticity, integrity and confidentiality.
EUICC22               The eUICC SHALL NOT export Profiles installed on the eUICC.
                      The eUICC SHALL enforce an isolation of Profiles and prevent Profiles from
EUICC23               operating outside of their execution environment i.e. Profile SHALL run in a
                      sandbox.
                      The integrity of the Bound Profile Package SHALL be ensured during its
EUICC24
                      installation on the eUICC.
EUICC25               The eUICC SHALL be tamper resistant (physically and logically).
                      Profile keys and algorithm parameters SHALL NOT be extractable from the
EUICC26
                      eUICC.
                      All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a robust tamper-
EUICC27
                      resistant way and be resistant to side-channel attacks.
                      The Operator SHALL be able to update the OTA Keys in its Profile on the
EUICC28               eUICC in a secure and confidential way, reusing existing OTA Platform
                      mechanisms.
                      A downloaded Profile Package SHALL be installed on the eUICC in a
EUICC29
                      disabled state.
Req no.               Description
                      The eUICC SHALL always report its specification version number in the first
EUICC30               communication during the commencement of each session with the SM-
                      DP+ or SM-DS.
                      The EUM SHALL install an eUICC Certificate in the eUICC used to verify
EUICC31
                      the eUICC certification.
                      The EUM SHALL install an EUM Certificate in the eUICC used to verify the
EUICC32
                      eUICC Certificate.
EUICC33               The eUICC SHALL have a means to authenticate to the SM-DS.
EUICC34               The eUICC SHALL protect itself against unauthorised access.
                      Upon Profile deletion, the eUICC SHALL ensure a complete deletion of all
EUICC35
                      data related to the Profile.
                      The eUICC SHALL only accept Profile Management operations sent from
EUICC36
                      the LPA in either the eUICC, or the Device.
                      The eUICC SHALL reject any Profile Management commands that are in
EUICC37
                      conflict with the Policy Rules of the respective Profile.
                      If any Bound Profile Package download or installation does not complete
EUICC38               successfully, the eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it
                      received the request.
                      The eUICC SHALL support GlobalPlatform Secure Element Access Control
EUICC39
                      0.
                      There SHALL be a means to preset a default SM-DP+ address in the
EUICC40
                      eUICC.
EUICC41               The eUICC SHALL be able to store a Root SM-DS address.
                      The eUICC SHALL be able to send a delete Notification to notify the SM-
EUICC42
                      DP+ that the Profile was deleted.
                      In EUICC42, if connectivity is not available to send the Notification of
EUICC43               deletion to the SM-DP+, the Notification SHALL be retained and sent as
                      soon as connectivity becomes available again.
                      The delete Notification process SHALL also be executed for each deleted
EUICC44
                      Profile in case of eUICC Memory reset.
                      The eUICC SHALL support a set of standard functions and services
                      including, but not limited to Java Applications, USIM Toolkit functions
                      andGlobalPlatform features. The list of supported functions and services
EUICC45               (e.g. API package names and versions) SHALL be explicitly referenced
                      within the technical specification (SGP.22 0). A different set of functions and
                      services MAY be defined/supported according to the different Embedded
                      UICC categories as defined in Annex D.
                      The eUICC SHALL support at least the following USIM Toolkit commands:
                         PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION including the following fields: local
                          info, IMEI, network measure results, date & time, access technology
EUICC46                  TERMINAL PROFILE
                         ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD)
                         SEND SHORT MESSAGE
                         DISPLAY TEXT
Req no.               Description
                         GET INPUT
                         RING TONE
                      An eUICC SHALL support at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters
EUICC47               preloaded by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing, defined in GSMA
                      SGP.22 V2.0 0.
                      Each Notification SHALL be uniquely identifiable and SHALL be signed by
EUICC48
                      the eUICC.
                      Each Notification (delete, pre-delete, disable) SHALL be re-play attack
EUICC49
                      protected and signed by the eUICC.
                      It SHALL be possible to request through a Profile parameter a pre-delete
EUICC50 (FFS)         Notification to be sent notifying of a deletion which will be carried out by the
                      eUICC after the sending of the Notification has been attempted.
                      In the event that a pre-delete Notification has been successfully attempted,
                      the eUICC SHALL delete the Profile for which the Notification attempt was
EUICC51 (FFS)         made. In the event that this Notification is unsuccessful but the Profile is
                      deleted anyway, the Notification SHALL be retained and sent as soon as
                      connectivity becomes available again.

Table 8: eUICC Requirements

4.3 eUICC Eligibility Check

The eUICC eligibility check enables a SM-DP+ to validate the eligibility of an eUICC for the installation of a Profile using information sent by the eUICC. The set of information sent by the eUICC to the SM-DP+ for eligibility checking purposes is referenced herein as the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. Some eUICC eligibility check parameters MAY be required due to Device capabilities which must be supported by the Profile/eUICC and delivered as part of the eUICC Eligibility Check Information set.

Note: Device capability refers to a Device feature or service-enabling function provided by the Device that MAY have a direct effect on the content of the Profile or the procedure used to download the Profile, and in turn requires support from the eUICC.

4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     The eUICC SHALL include the eSVN in the eUICC Eligibility Check
ELG1
                     Information.
                     The eUICC SHALL include the available memory in the eUICC Eligibility
ELG2
                     Check Information.
                     The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it is unable
ELG3
                     to accept an additional Profile.
                     The eUICC SHALL provide a valid current Certificate to the SM-DP+ signed
ELG4
                     by the EUM.
ELG5                 The eUICC SHALL provide an identification of the EUM.
ELG6                 The eUICC SHALL provide the current OS version.
                     The eUICC SHALL provide Device enabler information relating to services
ELG7
                     that MAY need Profile support (e.g. NFC enablers).
                     Eligibility Check Information SHALL be integrity and authenticity protected
ELG8
                     by the eUICC for its sending to the SM-DP+.
                     The eUICC SHALL indicate the application runtime environment version
ELG9
                     and libraries versions supported in eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
                     The eUICC SHALL indicate cryptographic algorithms and their respective
ELG10
                     key lengths supported in the eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
                     The eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version it is supporting. This
ELG11                parameter SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility
                     check.
                     The eUICC SHALL indicate its current certification status. This parameter
ELG12
                     SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility check.
                     If the eUICC is NFC capable (e.g. CAT3) it SHALL indicate its support to the
ELG13
                     relevant NFC services including its current certification status.
                     The eUICC SHALL indicate its category (see Annex D). This parameter
ELG14
                     SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check.

Table 9: eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements

Note: It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and could be used for the eligibility check procedure.

4.4 Device Requirements

Req no.               Description
                      The Device SHALL conform to the terminal requirements within ETSI TS
DEV1
                      102 221 [2] with the exceptions as defined in this specification.
                      There SHALL be a means for the End User to obtain the EID through the
DEV2
                      Device software. This SHALL only be possible through the LUI.
                      If an eUICC is within the Device packaging, then the EID SHALL be printed
DEV3
                      in machine readable form on the Device packaging.
                      Bearer connection of the Companion Device to the SM-DP+ SHALL only
                      be determined by the bearer availability.
DEV4
                      Note: The Companion Device MAY use any connectivity method available
                      to connect to the SM-DP+.
                      Devices compliant with the GSMA NFC Handset Requirements 0 SHALL
                      support the Open Mobile API 0 used by the Device applications to
DEV5
                      exchange data with their counterpart applications running in the Enabled
                      Profile on the eUICC.
                      The implementation of the Remote SIM Provisioning specification in the
DEV6                  Device SHALL not impact the potential use of the SIM Lock mechanism
                      defined in 3GPP TS 22.022 0
                      In the case where the Device supports both the LPA in the Device, and the
DEV7                  LPA in the eUICC, the Device SHALL have a mechanism (setting or
                      configuration parameter) that sets which LPA SHALL be used.
DEV8                  The End User SHALL be able to modify the parameter defined in DEV7.
Req no.               Description
                      A Device that supports an embedded UICC without an LPA in the eUICC,
DEV9
                      SHALL provide LPA functions.
                      A Device that supports only an embedded UICC with an LPA in the eUICC,
DEV10
                      MAY provide LPA functions.

Table 10: Device Requirements

4.4.1 Device Capability Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     There SHALL be a mechanism that is able to provide the Device capabilities
DEVCAP1
                     to the SM-DP+.

Table 11: Device Capability Requirements

4.5 Device Initiated Requirements

4.5.1 Device Reset

Req no.              Description
                     It SHALL be possible for the End User to perform any type of Device reset
FAC1
                     without affecting the status of the eUICC.
                     The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the
FAC2
                     eUICC Memory Reset.
                     The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the
FAC3
                     eUICC Test Memory Reset.

Table 12: Device Reset Requirements

4.5.2 eUICC Memory Reset

Req no.              Description
                     eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC apart from
MEM1
                     pre-installed Profiles that are flagged as permanent.
                     eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC regardless of
MEM2                 their Policy Rules but not the Provisioning Profile or preinstalled Test
                     Profiles.
                     Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to initiate eUICC
MEM3
                     Memory Reset.
                     In addition to MEM3, other secure means MAY be provided to perform the
                     eUICC Memory Reset function. The same level of security as is offered by
MEM4
                     the LUI based reset function SHALL apply. User Intent and Confirmation
                     Request SHALL apply.

Table 13: eUICC Memory Reset Requirements

4.5.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset

Req no.              Description
                     eUICC Test Memory Reset SHALL delete all post-issuance installed Test
MEMT1
                     Profiles on the eUICC including the Enabled Test Profile if any.
                     Simple Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to enable eUICC Test
MEMT2
                     Memory Reset.
                     If Test Profiles are not supported, then eUICC Test Memory Reset is not
MEMT3
                     required.

Table 14: eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements

4.6 Profile Requirements

4.6.1 Test Profiles

Req no.              Description
                     It is OPTIONAL for the removable eUICC to support the requirements of
TPRO1                Test Profiles described in this section. If Test Profiles are not supported, it
                     SHALL not be possible to download Test Profiles into the eUICC.
                     Test Profiles SHALL NOT be able to authenticate to an Operator’s mobile
                     network using Operator Credentials. The eUICC SHALL ensure that such
TPRO2
                     Profiles cannot be used to connect to any Operator’s mobile network even if
                     authentication information is contained in the Test Profile.
TPRO3                A Test Profile SHALL be installed in its own individual ISD-P.
TPRO4                Test Profiles MAY be pre-installed on the eUICC.
                     Test Profiles SHALL only be visible and usable when the Device is in
TPRO5
                     Device Test Mode.
                     It SHALL be possible to download, install, enable, disable or delete Test
TPRO6                Profiles in the eUICC only in Device Test Mode with the exception of the
                     eUICC Memory Reset operation.
                     Test Profiles, as with any other Profile, SHALL be managed through a
TPRO7
                     certified SM-DP+.
                     The enabling of a Test Profile SHALL override the do not disable Policy
TPRO8
                     Rule.
                     When the Device Test Mode is deactivated, the LPA SHALL disable any
TPRO9
                     enabled Test Profile.
                     When the Test Profile is disabled, the eUICC SHALL enable the Operational
TPRO10
                     Profile that was previously enabled, if any.
TPRO11               The Device Test Mode activation SHALL be obfuscated from the End User.
                     When exiting Device Test Mode, an End User notice SHALL be presented
TPRO12
                     to prompt the tester to perform an eUICC Test Memory Reset.

Table 15: Test Profiles Requirements

The Device MAY implement a mechanism for connecting an external SIM card for the purpose of testing in the context of Device repair, without affecting the state of the eUICC.

4.6.2 Provisioning Profile

Req no.              Description
                     Provisioning Profiles SHALL be based on the same format structure as
PPRO1
                     described for the Profile (Figure 2).
                     A Provisioning Profile MAY be enabled by the LPA upon End User request
                     for operations defined in PPRO6 if establishment of the connectivity using
PPRO2                the currently Enabled Profile is unsuccessful. If this results in an Operational
                     Profile being disabled, the End User SHALL first give consent to the loss of
                     communication provided by the Enabled Profile.
                     Provisioning Profiles and their associated Metadata SHALL not be visible to
PPRO3
                     the End User on the LUI.
PPRO4                Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be selectable by the End User.
                     Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be deleted through any action by the End
PPRO5
                     User including the use of eUICC Memory Reset.
                     Provisioning Profile SHALL only be used for the intended purposes of
PPRO6                Profile downloading and related Profile maintenance functions. The
                     Provisioning Profile SHALL not be used as an Operational Profile.
PPRO7                PPRO6 SHALL be enforceable in the RSP architecture.

Table 16: Provisioning Profile Requirements

4.7 Metadata Requirements

Req no.             Description
META1               All Profiles SHALL have associated Metadata.
META2               The Metadata SHALL be stored in the eUICC.
META3               The Metadata SHALL be accessible irrespective of the state of the Profile.
                    The Metadata SHALL include a field for the Service Provider name.
META4               Note: EFSPN is already used in a different context outside of this
                    specification and could be blank.
META5               The Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile.
                    The Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of the
META6
                    Profile.
                    The Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description of the
META7
                    Profile defined by the Operator/Service Provider.
META8               The nickname SHALL be editable by the End User.
META9               The Metadata SHALL always be available to the LUI.
                    The Metadata SHALL include an OPTIONAL field to allow the display of an
META10
                    icon defined by the Operator/Service Provider for the respective Profile.
                    The Metadata SHALL be able to include a copy of the Policy Rules
META11
                    associated to the Profile.
                    All Profiles SHALL be uniquely identified in the Metadata as Operational,
META12
                    Provisioning or Test Profile.
                    An Operator SHALL be able to access and update the following Metadata of
META13
                    its Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is Enabled:
Req no.              Description
                        Service Provider name
                        Short description of the Profile
                        Icon of the Profile
                            Table 17: Metadata Requirements

4.8 NFC Requirements

An NFC Device and an NFC eUICC SHALL be compliant with the following list of requirements:

Req no.               Description
NFC1                  An NFC Device SHALL be compliant with GSMA TS 26 0.
                      After installation of an Operational Profile, the NFC eUICC SHALL support
NFC2                  all requirements as specified in the SGP.03 GSMA NFC UICC
                      Requirements Specification 0.
                      The NFC Device SHALL retrieve and enforce access control rules as
NFC3
                      specified in the GlobalPlatform SEAC specification 0.
                      The eUICC SHALL be able to generate proof that the Operational Profile
NFC4
                      has been deleted.
                      All NFC applications and NFC enabling applications (e.g. ARA-M, PPSE,
                      CRS, CREL, etc.) attached to an Operational Profile SHALL be included
NFC5                  under the ISD-P created for the Profile, either under the MNO-SD or in an
                      SD hierarchy with a self-extradited SSD with authorised management
                      privilege.
                      The NFC eUICC solution SHALL be able to provide assurance to NFC
                      application Service Providers that the combination of an eUICC and
NFC6                  Operational Profile is trusted. This solution SHALL be based on the CASD
                      that is part of the Operational Profile and scenario Push 2B and scenario 3
                      as specified by SGP.03 0.
                      If the NFC eUICC is compliant with M4M, the eUICC SHALL reset all the
NFC7                  M4M virtual cards associated to that Profile when a Profile containing M4M
                      applications is disabled.
                      The appropriate NFC related certification information SHALL be part of the
NFC8
                      information shared with the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check.
                      A NFC Device SHALL at least have an embedded eUICC or have the
NFC9                  capability to support a removable eUICC that is compliant with CAT3 and
                      SGP.03 0 in either instance.

Table 18: NFC Requirements

4.9 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM -DP+)

4.9.1 SM-DP+ Overview

The SM-DP+ is responsible for the creation, generation, management and the protection of resulting Profiles upon the input/request of the Operator. It is also responsible for the delivery of a Profile within a Bound Profile Package, making the Bound Profile Package available for the secure delivery. In addition, the SM-DP+ is responsible for requesting the creation of the ISD-P in the eUICC into which the Profile will be installed. The SM-DP+ will

also be the off-card entity that will be responsible for the lifecycle management of the ISD-P that was created at its request. This is performed via the distinct functions listed below.

Figure 3: SM-DP+ Functions

Function name        Description
                     Creates Profile Packages (i.e. Personalised Profiles, including (IMSI, Ki,
Profile Package      ICCID,…)) from Profile Descriptions agreed with Operators. This can be an
Generation           off-line batch or real time process.
Profile Package      Secures each Profile Package according to the security process creating
Protection           the Protected Profile Package.
Profile Package      Binds the Protected Profile Package to a target eUICC using the security
Binding              process thus creating the Bound Profile Package.
Profile Package      Temporarily stores Protected Profile Packages or Bound Profile Packages
Storage              for subsequent delivery to the eUICC.
Profile Package      Securely transmits and installs the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC
Delivery             through the LPA.
SM-DS Event
                     Notifies the SM-DS of a pending operation for a specific eUICC.
Registration

Table 19: SM-DP+ Function Descriptions

4.9.2 SM-DP+ Requirements

Req no.              Description
SMDP1                The SM-DP+ SHALL act on behalf of an Operator.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to initiate the request for ISD-P creation as
SMDP2
                     part of the Bound Profile Package delivery.
Req no.              Description
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL establish an end-to-end secure channel to the eUICC
SMDP3                to download and install Bound Profile Packages via the LPA or directly to
                     the eUICC.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL link a Protected Profile Package for binding to a
SMDP4
                     specific eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the linked
SMDP5
                     Protected Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any
SMDP6
                     Certified eUICC.
                     Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound
SMDP7
                     Profile Package delivered by the SM-DP+.
                     Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP+ after completing all
SMDP8
                     production steps, Profile Package Protection, and binding.
                     Communication session between the SM-DP+ and the LPA SHALL be
SMDP9
                     terminated by the SM-DP+ after execution of intended Operation(s).
                     End-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC involved
SMDP10               in the Profile download and installation SHALL be protected in terms of
                     integrity, authenticity and confidentiality.
                     Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected
SMDP11
                     through encryption.
                     On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile creation
SMDP12               and storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure deletion
                     procedures (logically and physically).
                     SM-DP+/eUICC communication SHALL incorporate Perfect Forward
SMDP13
                     Secrecy (PFS).
                     The transport used for the Bound Profile Package SHALL implement anti-
SMDP14
                     replay mechanisms between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
                     Connectivity to the SM-DP+ SHALL be aborted and an explicit error
                     message SHALL be triggered by the SM-DP+ upon failure to verify
SMDP15
                     authenticity of the connecting party. (No message SHALL be sent to the
                     connecting party)
                     After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound Profile
                     Package to the LPA, the transport encryption procedure SHALL be
                     renewed.
SMDP16
                     If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more
                     than a configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction SHALL be
                     terminated and the Operator SHALL be notified.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols whenever
SMDP17
                     available (e.g. DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.).
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC Profile
SMDP18
                     Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by SIMalliance [6].
SMDP19               The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on demand.
SMDP20               It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk.
Req no.              Description
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL send a confirmation of the successfully completed
SMDP21
                     download and installation of a Profile to the Operator.
                     There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between any
                     SM-DP+ and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the Profile.
                     Such a mechanism SHALL either be ordered by the Operator or be
SMDP22
                     performed by the Operator itself. If such deletion mechanism is used, there
                     will be no off-card entity responsible for managing the ISD-P of the installed
                     Profile.
SMDP23               The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid.
SMDP24               The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Notification to the Operator
SMDP25               informing them that a specific Bound Profile Package download is about to
                     start.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an eUICC Eligibility Check Information
SMDP26               report and other relevant information (e.g. Activation Code, ICCID, etc.) to
                     the Operator ahead of/prior to the eUICC Bound Profile Package download.
SMDP27               The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to perform Event Registrations to the SM-DS.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to request from an Alternative SM-DS not to
SMDP28
                     propagate the Event Registration to the Root SM-DS.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Profile delete Notification to the
SMDP29               Operator owning a Profile when a related delete Notification is received
                     from the eUICC.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL support the following states for a Profile Package,
                     triggered by the Profile Owner:
SMDP30
                         A Profile Package is not released for Profile Package download.
                         A Profile Package is released for Profile Package download.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to select the elliptic curve parameter in the
SMDP31
                     Profile download procedure.
                     It SHALL be possible for a SM-DP+ to conduct an Event Record Query to a
SMDP32 (FFS)         SM-DS (Root or Alternative) for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations
                     it owns.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event Record on
SMDP33 (FFS)         the Root SM-DS or the Alternative SM-DS, identified by the EID or the
                     Event-ID over the ES12 interface.
                     Response to a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only occur where the
SMDP34 (FFS)
                     Root SM-DS or Alternative SM-DS validates the Event Record ownership.
                     Ownership validation of a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only use
SMDP35 (FFS)         the requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components
                     of the Event Record held.
                     A SM-DP+ SHALL support all sets of elliptic curve parameters as defined in
SMDP36
                     GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0.

Table 20: SM-DP+ Requirements

4.9.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC

Req no.              Description
                     The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be ignored if an SM-DP+
DF1
                     address is present in an AC being presented to the LUI.
                     The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be accessible by the
DF2
                     LPA to establish a connection to this SM-DP+.
DF3                  The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC MAY be left blank.
                     If the default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC is blank, then the use of the
DF4                  SM-DS discovery procedure or an SM-DP+ address in an AC SHALL be
                     required to establish the target SM-DP+.
                     No redirection SHALL be supported from a query to the default SM-DP+
DF5 (FFS)
                     address.

Table 21: Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements

4.10 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)

Primary Device

  User
                                       End User
Interface           ESeu
  User
Interface         ESeu
        LPA
LUI

ES10c

eUICC
                          Companion
                            Device

Figure 4: End User Interaction and Interfaces between a Primary and Companion

Device, where the Companion Device MAY have a UI

4.10.1 LPA Overview

This role exists both within the Device in conjunction with LPA Services provided by the eUICC, and within the eUICC with the LPA function provided by the eUICC. It provides three distinct functions, the Local User Interface (LUI), the Local Profile Download (LPD) and the Local Discovery Service (LDS) as described below. Whilst the eUICC alone cannot provide any of these functions without Device interaction, the specific level of interaction will depend upon the capability within the Device. Therefore, the functions of the LPA will be undertaken within the Device. The way this variability is implemented across different Devices and Device types is for further study.

Figure 5: LPA Functions

Function name               Description
Local Discovery
Service                     Where required, the LDS is responsible for retrieving pending Event
                            Records from the SM-DS.
(LDS)
                            This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound Profile
Local Profile               Package in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile Package
Download                    from the SM-DP+ to the LPD in a single transaction, and (ii) the onward
(LPD)                       transfer of the Bound Profile Package into the eUICC in segments.
                            This function will depend on network, Device, and eUICC capabilities .
Local User Interface        This function allows the End User to perform Local Profile Management
(LUI)                       on the Device. User Intent SHALL be enforced.

Table 22: LPA Function Descriptions

4.10.2 Operational LPA Modes

When there is an LPA in the Device and in the eUICC, then the LPA to be used is specified by the Device settings (DEV7):

     LPA in the Device
     LPA in the eUICC

4.10.2.1 LPA in the eUICC

LPA functions are provided by the eUICC.

Figure 6: LPA in the Euicc

4.10.2.2 LPA in the Device

LPA functions are provided by the Device.

Figure 7: LPA in the Device

4.10.3 LPA Requirements

Req no.         Description
                The LPA SHALL be responsible for instructing the eUICC to perform Local Profile
LPA1
                Management functions as per End User request.
                A mechanism SHALL be implemented between any LPA elements outside the
LPA2            eUICC, and the eUICC to ensure that the communication is not compromised
                wherever the LPA is located.
                A secure mechanism SHALL be implemented between the LUI and the
LPA3
                associated display or input applications on the Device.
                Access to the LUI application(s) SHALL be protected according to current best
LPA4
                practices. This SHALL be enforced by the Device OS.
                All Local Profile Management Operations SHALL require User Intent (no
LPA5
                automation).
LPA6            LUI access SHALL require User Intent (no automation).
LPA7            The End User SHALL be able to easily access the list of installed Profiles.
LPA8            The LPA SHALL protect Profile Metadata from unauthorised access.
                The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘enable’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA9
                operation SHALL allow the End User to select the Profile.
                The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘disable’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA10
                operation SHALL allow the End User to disable the Enabled Profile.
                The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘delete’ SHALL be supported. This
                operation SHALL allow the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the eUICC.
LPA11
                The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for the
                deletion of the Profile. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA12           operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Operational
                Profiles on the eUICC and relevant associated information through the Metadata.
                The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’ SHALL
LPA13           be supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to edit the default SM-
                DP+ address. Simple confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be
                supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as described
LPA14           in Section 4.5.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of
                consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be
                enforced.
                The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Test Memory Reset’ SHALL be
LPA15           supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Test Memory Reset as
                described in Section 4.5.3. Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                The Local Profile Management Operation ’edit nickname’ SHALL be supported.
LPA16           This operation SHALL allow the End User to add or modify a nickname for the
                selected Profile. The operation SHALL NOT modify the Service Provider name.
                The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile’ SHALL be supported. This
                operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to the
LPA17
                eUICC.
                Three options SHALL be supported by the LPA:
                   Profile download via default SM-DP+
                   Profile download via SM-DS services
                   Profile download via Activation Code
                Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced except in the case of initial
                Device setup (LPA62).
                The LPA SHALL NOT be accessible by any applications other than those
LPA18           provided by the provider of the LPA for the sole purpose of enabling the services
                and functions of the LPA.
                The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Authenticated
LPA19
                Confirmation.
                The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Simple
LPA20
                Confirmation located on the Device.
LPA21           Access to the LUI SHALL be protected by an Authenticated Confirmation.
LPA22           The mechanism in LPA21 SHALL be selectable/unselectable by the End User.
                The mechanisms in LPA21 SHALL be prompted to be enabled by default but this
LPA23
                can be skipped by the End User.
                The Device SHALL implement a mechanism to protect the LPA access through an
                Authenticated Confirmation. This Authenticated Confirmation MAY be
LPA24
                implemented by using the mechanisms implemented in the Device such as phone
                lock code, fingerprint input, etc.
                The End User SHALL be able to define dedicated personalised user credential to
LPA25
                access the LPA.
                If the End User selects the protection of access to the LUI (LPA23), then the
LPA26           subsequent Authenticated Confirmation at operation level MAY be replaced with a
                Simple Confirmation.
                When enforced, any Confirmation Request SHALL allow the End User to cancel
LPA27
                the Local Profile Management Operation.
                It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI of a Companion Device allowing input
LPA28
                from an End User interface on the Primary Device.
                When a Companion Device LUI allows input from a Primary Device, the
                Companion Device LUI SHALL be able to restrict the actions that can be applied.
                For example:
LPA29              not offer the eUICC Memory Reset;
                   only ‘enable’ and ‘disable’ operation are exposed.
                   Profile enabling is exposed only if no Profile is already enabled on the
                    Companion Device.
                The LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be able to request an End User initiated
LPA30           action on the Companion Device before the establishment of any proximity secure
                link (used for inputs into the LUI from another Device).
                A point-to-point proximity secure link initiated by the End User and offering
LPA31           confidentiality and integrity SHALL be established between the Companion and
                Primary Device for any input executed from the Primary Device.
                When operating a Companion Device LUI from a Primary Device, any required
                User Intent or Confirmation Request SHALL only be executed by the LPA on the
LPA32
                Companion Device. The physical End User input MAY be done in either the
                Primary or the Companion Device.
                The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure
LPA33
                measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI.
                The End User Data used for the User Intent protection (e.g. PIN code, fingerprint)
LPA34
                SHALL be stored in a secure environment.
                The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the
LPA35           internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over
                such connection, ES8+ and ES9+/ES5+ can be established.
                The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another
                Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally
LPA36
                shared Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over
                such connection, ES8+, and ES9+/ES5+ can be established.
                The LPA SHALL be able to determine if connectivity to the SM-DP+ is available
LPA37
                by any means.
                The LPA SHALL be able to notify the End User that there is no connection to the
LPA38           internet and or no connection to the SM-DP+ in order to allow the End User to
                enable or troubleshoot required connectivity.
LPA39           The LPA SHALL only be able to access the eUICC if it has assigned privileges.
LPA40           There SHALL only be one LPA on the Device.
LPA41           The LPA SHALL only perform operations that are described in this specification.
LPA42           LPA procedures SHALL not be called by any external (non-LPA) processes.
LPA43           When multiple Operational Profiles are installed, the Local Profile Management
                Operation ‘enable‘ SHALL first initiate the ‘disable‘ operation for any Enabled
                Profile prior to initiating the ‘enable‘ operation for the selected Profile.
LPA44           The LPA SHALL be able to read the Policy Rules.
LPA45           When a Profile with Profile Policy Rules is installed, in the case where End User
                consent is requested, the LPA SHALL display the consequences of the Policy
                Rule to the End User. This message SHALL be formulated in a descriptive and
                non-discriminatory manner (e.g. for “Non-Delete” Policy Rule: “The profile that you
                are about to install cannot be deleted under the terms you have agreed with your
                service provider. Approve installation YES/NO?“). Authenticated Confirmation
                SHALL be enforced with the exception listed in LPA17.
LPA46           Prior to downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHALL check the condition for
                whether the Enabled Profile, if any, has enabled POL RULE1. If this is the case a
                dedicated message SHALL be displayed identifying the consequences to the End
                User. Examples of information that may be displayed would be:
                   Enabling of the new Profile will not be possible because the currently
                    Enabled Profile cannot be disabled.
                   The Profile name of the Enabled Profile.
                    For more information, the End User should contact the Profile Owner of this
                      Profile.
                With displaying this message, the End User SHALL be able to decide on whether
                to continue the download or to cancel the operation.
                This dialogue MAY be combined with the regular End User Intent for confirming a
                Profile download.
LPA47           The communication between the User Interface of the Primary Device and the LUI
                of the Companion Device SHALL be protected (confidentiality, integrity and
                authentication).
LPA48           There SHALL be a mechanism to limit the validity of LPA26 if the End User quits
                the LPA menu or does not perform the operation within a period of time to avoid
                the abuse of bypassing the Authenticated Confirmation
LPA49           Confirmation Requests for consecutive Local Profile Management Operations
                MAY be achieved in one step as long as the different actions are clearly explained
                to the End User. For instance, upon installation of a new Profile, the LPA MAY
                propose ‘add Profile’ and ‘enable’ into one single step with a single confirmation
                only (e.g. “Do you want to install profile ‘ProfileName’ on your Device and enable
                it? Yes / No / Install only”)
LPA50           When consecutive operations are achieved in one single step (LPA49), the
                highest level of confirmation SHALL be applied - i.e. in the case of two operations
                having respectively Authenticated and Simple Confirmation Requests, the single
                step SHALL use the Authenticated Confirmation Request.
LPA51           The Local Profile Management Operations ‘enable’ (LPA9), ‘disable’ (LPA10),
                ‘delete’ (LPA11) SHALL be able to trigger a Notification to the SM-DP+ of the
                respective Profile being managed to indicate that this operation was actioned.
                This Notification is sent on a best effort basis and SHALL not impact otherwise the
                operation.
LPA52           The LPA SHALL provide a Trusted Link from the End User to the eUICC through
                the LUI.
                The End User SHALL be able to configure the LPA such that the automatic Event
LPA53
                Record retrieval from the SM-DS can be disabled.
LPA54           The LPA SHALL be able to read any SM-DS and SM-DP+ addresses configured
                in the eUICC.
                It SHALL be possible to check the LPA Integrity. If the integrity check fails,
LPA55
                communication between the eUICC and the LPA SHALL not occur.
                LPA Integrity SHALL be ensured using the best practice methods on the targeted
LPA56
                platform. See Annex G.
                The polling mechanism in the LPA SHALL have two types of triggers; those that are
LPA57
                event based, and those that are End User initiated.
                Event based triggers for polling SHALL be provided. As a minimum this SHALL
LPA58           include Device power-up; in addition other triggers MAY be provided. Event based
                triggers MAY be disabled by the End User.
                End User initiated triggers for polling SHALL include:
                   The ‘Add Profile’ operation to trigger the default SM-DS if configured, and the
LPA59               Root SM-DS.
                   The ‘Update Profile’ operation to trigger the SM-DP+ stored in the Profile.
                   In addition, other manual triggers MAY be provided.
                If a Profile Package is not yet released for download then the LPA SHALL be
LPA60
                informed by means of a specific error code.
                Error/retry handling of the LPA polling mechanism SHALL be implemented e.g.
LPA61           advise the End User to retry or automatically retry as appropriate. The
                corresponding confirmation needs to be enforced in the retry cases.
                During initial Device setup, if no Operational Profile is already installed, the
                following procedure SHALL apply in this order:
                     1. If a default SM-DP+ address is configured, the LPA SHALL contact the
LPA62                   SM-DP+ to check for a waiting Profile.
                     2. If no Profile is waiting in (1), then the Root SM-DS address SHALL be
                        contacted to check for the Notification of a waiting Profile.
                Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced for the procedure described above.
                The End User SHALL always be able to manually request the retrieval of any
                waiting Event Record via the LPA if there is no default SM-DP+ address.
LPA63
                Note: This may be achieved through the combination with existing operations –
                e.g. pressing “Add Profile” would contact the server to retrieve a Notification
                The Operator/Service Provider name SHALL be given in the signalling information
                from the SM-DP+ to the LPA when initiating the download of a Profile and shown
LPA64
                to the End User before the Profile is downloaded.
                Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                The LPA SHOULD present the EID to the End User as both text and in a defined
LPA65
                scannable format (e.g. QR Code).
                For the case where a Profile to be disabled and deleted in a combined action is
                providing the only available connection, the pre-delete Notification SHALL be sent
LPA66 (FFS)
                before the Profile is disabled. The failure of this attempt SHALL not block the
                deletion nor the connection teardown.
                If the SM-DP+ stops the Profile download procedure, the LPA SHALL be able to
LPA67
                notify the End User.

Table 23: LPA Requirements

4.10.4 LDS Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     The LDS SHALL be able to read out the address(es) described in EUICC
LDS1                 Error! Reference source not found. and only use the(se) address(es) to
                     connect to the SM-DS

Table 24: LDS Requirement

4.11 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)

4.11.1 SM-DS Overview

The role of the SM-DS is to provide mechanisms that allow an SM-DP+ to inform the LDS within any Device that an SM-DP+ wishes to communicate with it. The purpose of the SM- DS to LDS communication SHALL be informing the LDS of a pending Event

The principle of operation remains the same for all use cases. The SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration message for a target Device to a SM-DS.

In a simple deployment, only the Root SM-DS is configured on the eUICC. The Root SM-DS address is unique and filled in the eUICC. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM- DS using the same logical location. When the Root SM-DS has an Event-ID for the target Device it will respond with the SM-DP+ address, or if there is no Event-ID the response will be a null response.

In a deployment with cascaded SM-DSs, the SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration to an Alternative SM-DS, which may not be configured as the Root SM-DS on the eUICC. This Alternative SM-DS will cascade the Event Registration to the Root SM-DSs. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM-DS and will receive the Alternative SM-DS address. It will then request the Event from the Alternative SM-DS, which will respond with the SM-DP+ address.

Figure 8: Alternative Device to Root SM-DS Event Registration

Figure 9: Root SM -DS Event Registration

Figure 10: Alternative SM -DS Discovery

4.11.2 SM-DS Implementation

Two configurations of the SM-DS addresses on the eUICC MAY exist:  A Root SM-DS address  An Alternative SM-DS address

Figure 11: SM-DS Implementation

Figure 11 shows both configurations. The Root SM-DS is configured at the time of Device manufacture and is invariant.

4.11.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelines

The following statements SHOULD be considered when defining a technical implementation:
    A competitive environment on the supply of SM-DS services SHOULD be favoured by
       the approach.
    There SHOULD be no single-points-of-failure.
    Implementation SHOULD inherently provide both vertical and horizontal
       performance/scalability.
    There SHOULD be no need for pre-registration of Devices or eUICCs at a certain
       SM-DS as required in SGP.02 0 (GSMA Embedded SIM for the SM-SR).

4.11.4 SM-DS functions

The SM-DS has three distinct functions:

Figure 12: SM-DS Functions

Function name            Description
Event Registration       Process by which an Event Record received from a SM-DP+ is stored.
Event Deletion           Process by which an SM-DP+ can delete its own Event Record.
                         Provides all registered Event Records, upon Discovery Request from
Event Retrieval
                         any enquiring LDS.

Table 25: SM-DS Function Descriptions

4.11.5 SM-DS Requirements

Req no.               Description
                      The SM-DS SHALL enable a LDS to discover its own Event Records
SMDS1
                      registered by SM-DP+(s) or by Alternative SM-DS(s).
                      The SM-DS SHALL not be able to identify the nature of an Event.
SMDS2                 Note: The nature of the Event may be ‘Profile Package available for
                      download’.
                      All valid Discovery Requests and Event Registrations SHALL be processed
SMDS3
                      in a non-discriminatory manner.
                      The SM-DS SHALL only accept Event Registrations from
                         any authorised and authenticated SM-DP+(s) having a valid
SMDS4                     Certificate.
                         any authorised and authenticated SM-DS(s) or SM-DS(s) having a
                          valid Certificate.
                      The SM-DS SHALL only accept Discovery Requests authenticated by the
SMDS5
                      corresponding eUICC via the LDS.
                      The SM-DS and the SM-DP+ as well as connected SM-DSs SHALL be
SMDS6
                      mutually authenticated.
                      The SM-DS SHALL NOT have visibility of any data that may be used to
SMDS7
                      compromise the End User´s privacy.
                      The SM-DS SHALL support multiple concurrent Event Registrations per
SMDS8                 eUICC and SHALL present to the LDS all currently valid Event Records in
                      the same order as they were received by the SM-DS (first in, first out).
SMDS9                 The SM-DS only stores Event Records destined for specific EIDs.
                      Subscriber Specific data and Profile related contents SHALL NOT be stored
SMDS10
                      within the SM-DS.
                      The SM-DS SHALL NOT allow the harvesting of any information such as
SMDS11
                      Operator, EIDs, Device Manufacturers, Devices, etc.
                      The SM-DS SHALL only return to the LDS, the Event Records related to the
SMDS12
                      served eUICC.
                      The SM-DS SHALL NOT have any contact with the Profile Packages e.g.
SMDS13
                      SHALL NOT store or process any Profile Package.
                      The SM-DS SHALL provide the same data regardless of the status of the
SMDS14
                      Device that queries it (i.e. consistent in time and in geographic location).
                      The SM-DS SHOULD NOT significantly impact the end-to-end provisioning
SMDS15
                      time.
SMDS16                The SM-DS SHALL provide defence against DoS attacks.
Req no.               Description
                      All communications to, from and between entities of the SM-DS SHALL be
SMDS17
                      encrypted.
                      The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event Records
SMDS18
                      registered on the SM-DS.
                      An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event
SMDS19                Records registered on the Root SM-DS (In response to an SM-DP+ delete
                      operation defined in SMDS18).
                      An Alternative SM-DS SHALL propagate the Event Record to the Root SM-
SMDS20
                      DS if requested by the SM-DP+.
                      If there are multiple Event Records registered on the SM-DS for one
SMDS21
                      eUICC, these SHALL all be sent as a single response.
                      An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an Event Record to an LDS either by
                      the Root SM-DS or via any alternative one selected by the SM-DP+. If the
SMDS22
                      alternative is chosen the Event Record to the LDS SHALL come from this
                      alternative SM-DS.
                      There SHALL be a unique Root SM-DS.
SMDS23                Note: This requirement does not forbid the potential load-balancing of this
                      Root SM-DS.
SMDS24                The Root SM-DS SHALL be managed by the GSMA.
                      It SHALL be possible for the Alternative SM-DS to conduct an Event Record
SMDS25 (FFS)          Query to the Root SM-DS for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations it
                      owns.
                      A SM-DS response to an Event Record Query SHALL only confirm Event
SMDS26 (FFS)
                      Record existence and SHALL NOT include additional information.
                      An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event
SMDS27 (FFS)          Record on the Root SM-DS, identified by the EID or the Event-ID over the
                      ES15 interface.
                      Response to a SM-DS Event Record query SHALL only occur where the
SMDS28 (FFS)
                      responder validates the Event Record ownership.
                      Ownership validation of a SM-DS Event Record Query SHALL only use the
SMDS29 (FFS)          requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components of
                      the Event Record held.
                      The SM-DS (Root or Alternative) MAY inform the SM-DP+ directly or via
SMDS30 (FFS)          another SM-DS, that a Discovery Request from an authorised LDS has
                      been answered by issuing an Event Record.
                      The SM-DS SHALL only inform the Event Record’s owning SM-DP+ or SM-
SMDS31 (FFS)
                      DS that it has replied to a Discovery Request.

Table 26 SM-DS Requirements

4.11.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedure

The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with the Root SM-DS and an Alternative SM-DS (cascade mode).

Figure 13: Event Registration/Deletion Procedure

Starting Condition:

a.       The SM-DP+ has an action waiting for a target eUICC identified by the EID.

Procedure:

1.       The SM-DP+ establishes a secure connection to an Alternative SM-DS of the
         Profile Owner´s choice.
2.       The SM-DP+ notifies the Alternative SM-DS about a pending action.
3. to 4. The Alternative SM-DS registers and confirms the Event Registration.
5.       The Alternative SM-DS establishes a secure connection to the Root SM-DS.
6.       The Alternative SM-DS informs the Root SM-DS that for the given EID, an Event
         Record is waiting at the Alternative SM-DS.
7.       The Root SM-DS confirms the receipt of the information.

4.11.7 Discovery Request Procedure

The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with an Alternative SM-DS and the
Root SM-DS (cascade mode).     #

Figure 14: Discovery Request Procedure

Procedure:
1. to 3. In order to generate a Discovery Request, the LDS requests the eUICC to generate
         an eUICC Authorisation which contains (at least) the eUICC-Certificate and is
         signed by the eUICC.
4. to 5. The LDS establishes a secure communication to the Root SM-DS.
6.       The Root SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by checking the eUICC
         Authorisation.
7.       In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record is waiting, it delivers back:
            a. The address of the SM-DP+, where an action is waiting.
               or
            b. The rest of the following actions:
                    i. The address of the Alternative SM-DS, where an Event Record can be
                       retrieved.
                   ii. The LDS establishes a secure connection to the Alternative SM-DS.
                 iii. The Alternative SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by
                       checking the eUICC Authorisation.
                 iv. In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record has been
                       received, it delivers back the address of the SM-DP+, where an action
                       is waiting.
8.      The LPA establishes a connection to the SM-DP+ and the waiting action can be
        performed.

4.12 Interfaces

Figure 15: Interfaces on the eUICC Architecture with the LPA in the Device

Configuration

4.12.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)

The ES2+ interface is used by the Operator to order Profiles for specific eUICCs as well as other administrative functions.

4.12.2 Operator – End User (ESop)

This interface is out of scope of this specification.

4.12.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)

ESeu is the interface between the End User and the LUI.

In a Primary/Companion Device scenario the LUI used SHALL only reside within the Companion Device or its eUICC.

The ESeu interface is used to support the following requirements:

Req no.              Description
                     The Local Profile Management Operations SHALL be executed only over
ESeu1
                     the ESeu interface.
                     Each Local Profile Management Operation SHALL be explicitly initiated by
ESeu2
                     the End User, verified by User Intent.
                     The ESeu interface SHALL support the triggering and confirmation of the
ESeu3
                     Profile download and installation operation.

Table 27: End User to LUI (ESeu) Interface Requirements

4.12.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)

The ES6 interface is used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services.

4.12.5 SM-DP+ – LPA in the eUICC (ES5+)

The ES5+ interface is used to provide a secure transport between the SM-DP+ and the LPA in the eUICC for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package.

4.12.6 SM-DP+ – LPD in the Device (ES9+)

For Devices with an LPA, the ES9+ interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the LPD.

4.12.7 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)

The ES8+ interface provides a secure end-to-end channel between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC for the administration of the ISD-P and the associated Profile during download and installation. It is an enhanced version of the existing ES8 interface, providing Perfect Forward Secrecy.

4.12.8 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)

The ES12 interface allows any SM-DP+ to issue or remove Event Registrations on the SM- DS.

4.12.9 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)

The ES11 interface allows the LDS to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC.

4.12.10 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)

This interface is out of scope of this specification.

4.12.11 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)

The ES10a interface is used between the LDS in the Device and the LPA Services to request the eUICC Authorisation to generate a Discovery Request.

4.12.12 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)

The ES10b interface is used by the LPD in the Device and the LPA services to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.

4.12.13 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)

The ES10c interface is used between the LUI in the Device and the LPA services for Local Profile Management by the End User.

4.12.14 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)

In the case of deployments with cascaded SM-DSs, the ES15 interface is used to connect the SM-DSs.

4.12.15 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)

This connection will be provided either by:

     An internet connectivity available or provided on the same Device where the LPA
      resides
      or
     An internet connection shared from another Device via a local go -between connection

Figure 16: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to the

SM-DP+

4.12.16 General Interface Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     All interfaces from the eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version
INT1
                     number.
                     The behaviour of all interfaces SHALL support the indicated specification
INT2
                     version number.
                     During the indication of the supported specification version number from the
INT3                 eUICC to the SM-DP+, the eUICC version SHALL be used or the procedure
                     SHALL fail. See table below.
                     All communicating entities involved in Remote SIM Provisioning SHALL be
INT4                 mutually authenticated. The Device and the eUICC are considered as one
                     entity in this context.

Table 28: General Interface Requirements

Platform      Version 1 (V1)           Version 2 (V2)               Version 3 (V3)
eUICC V1      Platform uses V1      Platform uses V1 or fails.   Platform uses V1 or fails.
eUICC V2             ✗                 Platform uses V2          Platform uses V2 or fails.
eUICC V3             ✗                          ✗                   Platform uses V3

Table 29: eUICC Version vs Platform

4.13 Profile Policy Management

4.13.1 Introduction

The Profile Policy Management function provides mechanisms by which Service Providers are able to reinforce the conditions or policies (operational and business) under which services are provided to the Subscriber. In some instances this MAY also include the enforcement of the policies set by the Subscriber.

Profile Policy Management MAY also be applied with other already existing policy enforcement technologies which are also subject to agreement by the Subscriber.

The realisation of the Policy Management function is based on two key elements. The first element is the Profile Policy Enabler which is contained within the eUICC. The second element is a set of defined Profile Policy Rules which are required for the actual enforcement of specific policies.

4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirements

Policy no.           Description
POL1                 A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only be configured within a Profile.
POL2                 Each Profile MAY have Policy Rules associated to itself.
POL3                 A Policy Rule SHALL only apply to the Profile that contains it.
POL4                 Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be consistent across implementations.
                     Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be able to resolve any Profile Policy Rule
POL5
                     conflict.
                     The updating of a Profile’s Policy Rules SHALL be restricted to the Profile
POL6
                     Owner.
POL7                 The mechanism used for the update of a Policy Rule SHALL be atomic.
POL8                 The set of Profile Policy Rules SHALL be extensible for future releases.
                     There SHALL be a Profile Policy Rule scheme to allow extensibility of the
POL9                 Policy Rules, e.g. described like ‘operational command, scope of
                     application, qualification’
                     A Profile Policy Rule SHALL be enforced whenever a Profile state change is
POL10
                     attempted.
                     Downloading and installing a Profile with the Profile Policy Rule ‘Do not
POL11                disable’ SHALL only be possible if no other Operational Profile is currently
                     installed.
                     The LPA and the eUICC SHALL prevent the downloading and installation of
                     a Profile containing Profile Policy Rules that conflict with the Profile Policy
POL12                Rules of the already installed Profiles.
                     Note: The technical specification SHALL describe exhaustively each conflict
                     that MAY occur.
                     An Operator SHALL be able to deactivate the Profile Policy Rules of its
POL13                Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is enabled.
                     Note: The activation of Profile Policy Rules on the ES6 interface is FFS.
Policy no.           Description
                     Before a Profile is installed with Profile Policy Rules, the End User SHALL
                     be able to be notified about the Profile Policy Rules and if notified, the
                     installation SHALL thereafter be conditional on End User Authenticated
POL14
                     Confirmation.
                     This prompting may not be needed if the installation is directly allowed by
                     the RAT.
                     The request for End User consent for the installation of Profile Policy Rules
POL15                and Profile download MAY be combined into a single prompt therefore
                     requiring a single confirmation by the End User.
                     Profile Policy Rules SHALL be enforced by the Profile Policy Enabler in the
POL16
                     eUICC.
                     The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL only support the Profile Policy Rules
POL17
                     defined in this specification.
                     The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL be capable of supporting all the Profile
POL18
                     Policy Rules as defined in this specification.
                     POL RULE3 SHALL be enforceable in all cases with the exception of the
                     enabling of a Provisioning Profile.
POL19
                     Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet
                     been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.
                     Allowing the installation of a Profile with Profile Policy Rules SHALL be
POL20
                     subject to compliance with local regulatory requirements.

Table 30: Profile Policy Principles

4.13.3 Policy Rules

Policy no.            Description
                      The Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be
POL RULE1
                      supported.
                      The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be
POL RULE2
                      supported.
                      The Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is required upon its successful
                      disabling’ SHALL be supported.
POL RULE3
                      Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet
                      been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.

Table 31: Policy Rules Requirements

4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirements

Policy no.           Description
                     The Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) SHALL be stored in the Profile Policy
POLPPE1
                     Enabler in the eUICC.
                     The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL enforce the contents of the installed RAT,
POLPPE2
                     if any, only at Profile installation time.
                     The RAT SHALL allow multiple Profile Owners to have Policy Rules enabled
POLPPE3
                     in their Profiles.
Policy no.           Description
                     The RAT SHALL be able to support specific configurations which allow a set
POLPPE4
                     of or all Profile Policy Rules for any Profile Owner.
                     The RAT SHALL only be installed at pre-issuance or during the initial
POLPPE5
                     Device setup provided there are no Operational Profiles installed.
POLPPE6              The RAT SHALL not be affected by the eUICC Memory Reset function.
                     To support identifiable regulatory requirement, a RAT SHALL be able to
POLPPE7              support a specific configuration which MAY forbid any Profile Owner to set a
                     specific Profile Policy Rule.
                     If POLPPE7 is set, this information SHALL be part of the eligibility check
POLPPE8
                     information shared between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
                     Where the RAT allows the Profile Policy Rules for the Profile being installed,
POLPPE9
                     installation SHALL proceed as stated in POL14.
                     The RAT SHALL be able to support a setting to display the consequences
POLPPE10
                     of the Profile Policy Rules to the End User before installation of the Profile.
POLPPE11             The OEM or EUM SHALL be responsible for providing the RAT.
                     A fixed RAT SHALL be implemented in the eUICC.
POLPPE12
                     Note: The allowed RAT configuration(s) are detailed in Annex H.

Table 32: Profile Policy Enabler Requirements

4.14 Certification

4.14.1 eUICC Certification

Req no.              Description
CERTEU1              The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS certified 0.
                     The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance with
CERTEU2
                     GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0.
                     The eUICC SHALL be certified according to the Protection Profile defined
CERTEU3
                     by the GSMA (TBD).
                     The eUICC Protection Profile SHALL at least include the following
CERTEU4              elements: platform service manager, ISD-R, Profile storage and isolation of
                     Profiles.
                     The eUICC protection Profile SHALL be equivalent to the eUICC Protection
CERTEU5
                     Profile defined in SGP.05 0.
                     The Evaluation Assurance Level of the eUICC Protection Profile SHALL be
                     (at least) EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 (EAL 4+) or
CERTEU6
                     equivalent.
                     Note: A study needs to be performed in terms of assurance level by FASG.
                     The eUICC public key Certificate used for authentication SHALL contain the
CERTEU7
                     EID.
                     The eUICC public key Certificate(s) SHALL contain the technical reference
CERTEU8
                     of the product, for example the Common Criteria certification report number.
CERTEU9              The EUM Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.
Req no.              Description
                     The eUICC Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by the EUM using its EUM
CERTEU10
                     Certificate (CERTEU9Error! Reference source not found.).

Table 33: eUICC Certification Requirements

4.14.2 Device Compliance

Req no.             Description
                    There SHALL be a compliance process for all parts of Local Profile
CERTDEV1
                    Management implementations in accordance with the GSMA.

Table 34: Device Certification Requirement

4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification

Req no.                Description
                       The SM-DP+ provider SHALL be required to declare product (SM-DP+)
CERTDP1
                       compliance with GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0.
CERTDP2                The SM-DP+ SHALL be certified according to GSMA SAS 0.
                       SM-DP+ elements SHALL use Hardware Security Modules (HSM) for
                       cryptographic related operations (key storage, derivation, cryptographic
CERTDP3                operations).
                       Note: This is to be covered by the SAS document “HSM certified
                       according to FIPS 140-2 level 3 or higher”
                       The SM-DP+ SHALL implement privileges isolation (Log, Audit,
CERTDP4
                       Operation, and Administration).
                       The SM-DP+ SHALL implement operating system hardening
CERTDP5
                       mechanisms.
                       The SM-DP+ SHALL implement separation of control, user and
CERTDP6
                       administrative planes.
                       The SM-DP+ SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration
CERTDP7
                       operation.
                       SM-DP+ hard drives and backup mediums used for storing Profiles
CERTDP8
                       SHALL be ciphered.
                       The private key of SM-DP+ Certificate used for mutual authentication
CERTDP9                with eUICC SHALL be protected and stored in HSM according to
                       CERTDP3.
                       The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to mitigate
CERTDP10
                       against DoS attacks.
CERTDP11               The SM-DP+ SHALL log all Certificate authentication failures.
CERTDP12               The SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.

Table 35: SM-DP+ Certification Requirements

4.14.4 SM-DS Certification

Req no.              Description
                     The SM-DS provider SHALL be required to declare product compliance with
CERTDS1
                     GSMA SGP.22 0.
CERTDS2              The SM-DS SHALL be certified according to the relevant GSMA SAS.
                     The SM-DS SHALL implement isolation of privileges (Log, Audit, Operation,
CERTDS3
                     Administration).
CERTDS4              The SM-DS SHALL implement operating system hardening mechanisms.
                     The SM-DS SHALL implement separation of control, user and
CERTDS5
                     administrative planes.
                     The SM-DS SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration
CERTDS6
                     operation.
CERTDS7              SM-DS hard drives and backup mediums SHALL be ciphered.
CERTDS8              The SM-DS Certificate SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.

Table 36: SM-DS Certification Requirements

4.14.5 LPA Certification

Req no.              Description
                     There SHALL be a certification process for all the LPA elements
CERTLPA1
                     communicating with Remote SIM Provisioning entities.
                     The certification process SHALL ensure that Local Profile Management
CERTLPA2
                     Operations are sent by authorised LPA elements only.
                     The certification process SHALL ensure a mechanism exists to block
CERTLPA3
                     compromised LPAs.
CERTLPA4             The LPD SHALL authenticate the SM-DP+ during the TLS session.
CERTLPA5             The LDS SHALL authenticate the SM-DS during the TLS session.
                     The LPA SHALL only accept Certificates signed by a GSMA CI for server
CERTLPA6
                     authentication.

Table 37: LPA Certification Requirements

4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management

Req no.              Description
CERTPK1              The eUICC SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+.
CERTPK2              The LPD SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+.
CERTPK3              The LDS SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS.
                     The LDS authentication of an SM-DS using an invalid Public Key Certificate
CERTPK4
                     SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop.
                     The LPD authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK5              Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11CERTPK1), and on-going
                     communication SHALL stop.
Req no.              Description
                     The SM-DP+ authentication of an eUICC using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK6              Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication
                     SHALL stop.
                     The eUICC authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK7              Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication
                     SHALL stop.
                     The GSMA CI SHALL revoke the Public Key Certificate of any entities (SM-
CERTPK8
                     DP+, SM-DS, EUM) if it is compromised (e.g. private key theft).
CERTPK9              The eUICC SHALL be able to support a set of GSMA CIs.
                     A Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:
                         it has a valid signature
                         it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a trusted chain of Certificates up to a
                          GSMA CI. Certificate Path validation SHALL follow the process
                          defined in RFC 5280 00.
CERTPK10
                         it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in the trust chain has been
                          revoked
                         it has not expired
                     If any of these applicable verifications fail, the Public Key Certificate SHALL
                     be considered as invalid.
                     The eUICC, LPA, SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL have knowledge of revoked
CERTPK11
                     Public Key Certificates.

Table 38: Public Key Certificates Management Requirements

5 Operational Procedures

5.1 LPA Initiated Download

5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     The LPA SHALL use any Root SM-DP+ or default SM-DS address
LID1                 populated on the eUICC if it has not been provided already by the Activation
                     Code.
                     In the context of LID1, if both a Root SM-DP+ and a default SM-DS address
LID2                 are populated, the LPA SHALL first contact the SM-DP+ and then SM-DS to
                     initiate a Remote SIM Provisioning transaction.

Table 39: LPA Initiated Download Requirements

5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedure

This following procedure describes the Events that are part of the Profile Package download and installation procedure initiated by the LPA.

Figure 17: Profile Download Procedure

Start conditions:

    a.         The Subscriber has completed the Subscription process to the selected
               Operator/Service Provider offer.
    b.         The Profile ordering process related to this Subscription has been completed
               (i.e. an assigned Protected Profile Package is stored on the SM-DP+).
Procedure:
    1.         The LPA initiates Profile Package download and identifies the address of the
               SM-DP+ where the Profile is stored and available for download (via e.g. URL,
               QR code, manual input, etc) as well as other information provided (e.g.
               Token, SMDPId, Confirmation Code).
    2.         The LPA authenticates the SM-DP+ through establishing a TLS connection
               with the SM-DP+, and verifying the SMDPid if such information has been
               provided.
    3. to 4. The LPA gets an eUICC challenge
    5. to 6. The LPA sends the eUICC challenge and any other relevant information to the
               the SM-DP+.
    7. to 9. The SM-DP+ signs the eUICC challenge, and generates a DP_Challenge to
               be sent back to the eUICC.
    10.        The LPA sends the material received by the SM-DP+ and the AC Token to
               the eUICC; the eUICC checks the SMDPid and authenticates the SM-DP+.
    11.        The eUICC sends back a signed set of information including the
               DP_Challenge, the AC Token, the EID and its Certificate to the LPA.
    12.        The End User confirms the download of the Profile, optionally with the display
               of the Profile name of the Operator.
    13.        The LPA sends the set of information received in Step 11 from the eUICC to
               the SM-DP+.
    14.        The SM-DP+ verifies the signature; the eUICC is authenticated.
    15. to 16. OPTIONAL: The eUICC Eligibility Check and Profile binding functions are
               performed by the SM-DP+.
    17. to 22. OPTIONAL
    17.        The Operator is notified about the Profile Package that is about to be
               downloaded.
    18.        If the Operator has been notified, it MAY request to stop the download
               process by indicating an error code to the SM-DP+.
    19.        If the Operator sends an error code to the SM-DP+, the SM-DP+ stops the
               download process and indicates the error code to the LPA.
    20.        The LPA notifies the End User with an appropriate message.
    21. to 22. The SM-DP+ MAY receive information from the Operator to prepare the
               appropriate Profile Package.
    23. to 25. The Bound Profile Package is sent to the eUICC and installed on the eUICC.
    26.        The Profile Package download report is sent from the SM-DP+ to the
               Operator.
End Condition:
a.     The Profile is installed in the eUICC in a Disabled state

5.2 Profile Download with Activation Code

5.2.1 Activation Code Requirements

Req no.            Description
                   Where used, the Activation Code SHALL trigger the download of a Bound
AC1
                   Profile Package from a specific SM-DP+.
                   The Activation Code SHALL comprise of the following parameters:
                      SM-DP+ address
AC2                   Activation Code Token (Includes OPTIONAL Confirmation Code
                       Required Flag)
                      SMDPid (OPTIONAL)
                   The Activation Code Token SHALL be able to include a parameter indicating
                   whether a Confirmation Code is required or not.
                   If such a Confirmation Code is required, the LPA SHALL ask the End User to
AC3                input a Confirmation Code. The SM-DP+ SHALL verify the Confirmation Code
                   before delivering the Bound Profile Package.
                   Note: How the Confirmation Code is created and provided to the End User is
                   out of scope of this specification.
                   The Activation Code SHALL be verified by the SM-DP+ before delivering the
AC4
                   Bound Profile Package.
                   The Activation Code input in the LPA by the End User SHALL support at least
AC5
                   manual typing and QR code scanning.
                   All Activation Code procedures SHALL be implemented natively as part of the
AC6
                   LPA.
                   The Activation Code procedure SHALL conditionally be automatically offered
                   to the End User during initial Device set-up.
                   This automatic setting SHALL NOT apply if a Profile is already provisioned.
AC7
                   No Authenticated Confirmation is required.
                   Note: For example this could be inappropriate from an open market cellular-
                   enabled notebook computer.
                   Following the Activation Code procedure, the Profile Package download
AC8
                   procedure SHALL be used.
                   The Activation Code procedure SHALL preserve eco-system security, privacy
AC9
                   and validation of User Intent.
                   The Activation Code procedure SHALL be used for the sole purpose of
                   downloading a Profile package to the targeted eUICC. The Activation Code
AC10
                   procedure SHALL prevent sending IMEI and EID information to a non-
                   authenticated SM-DP+.
AC11               The Activation Code SHALL uniquely identify the Operator/Service Provider.
                   The Activation Code request to the SM-DP+ SHALL be extended by the LPA
AC12
                   with the EID after the specific SM-DP+ has been authenticated.

Table 40: Activation Code Requirements

5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure

The Activation Code procedure defines a common functionality which allows the Subscriber or the End User on behalf of the Subscriber to “activate” a Device by means of requesting the download of an Operational Profile from the Device itself.

Figure 18: Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure

Start Conditions:
    a.     A Subscription has been established by the Subscriber.
    b.     An Activation Code has been provided to the End User and optionally a
           Confirmation Code (side channel).
Procedure:
   1.      The End User inputs the Activation Code to the LPA through the LUI.
   2.      The LPA parses the Activation Code parameters to recognise the SM-DP+
           address, the Activation Code Token, the LPA Mode and optionally the SMDPid.
           In addition, the LPA MAY parse in the Activation Token the information that a
           Confirmation Code is required.
   3.      If the Confirmation Code parameter in the Activation Code Token is set to
           “require Confirmation Code”, the End User is prompted to input a Confirmation
           Code provided to them by the issuing Operator/Service Provider.
   4.      The Activation Code download procedure is initiated by the LPA. The LPA
           requests a nonceeUICC from the eUICC.
   5.      The eUICC creates a nonceeUICC associated with the supported eUICC
           specification version number (eSVN).
   6.      The eUICC transmits the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to
           the LPA.
   7.      The LPA sends the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to the SM-
           DP+.

Note: Prior to this step a HTTPs session SHALL be established between the LPA and the SM-DP+ based on a public key of the Root Certificate stored in the Device which includes authentication using the TLS Certificate and checking for the presence of the SMDPid in the TLS Certificate used for the TLS session.

8.     Upon receiving the nonceeUICC and the associated eSVN, the SM-DP+ creates
       nonceSMDP and signs both the nonceSMDP and the nonceeUICC.
9.     The SM-DP+ sends the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the LPA.
10.    The LPA collects the Activation Code parameters as well as the Device
       information needed for the eligibility procedure and optionally the Confirmation
       Code and transmits them with the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the
       eUICC.
11.    The eUICC checks the signature attached to the nonceeUICC. If the SMDPid is
       configured in the AC, the eUICC checks that the SMDPid provided by the LPA
       and the SMDPid in the SM-DP+ Certificate correspond. The SM-DP+ is at this
       stage authenticated by the eUICC. The eUICC generates key material that will
       be used for the session key establishment.The eUICC signs a set of information
       with the eUICC private key which includes:
       a. The nonceSMDP
       b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the
           preparation of the Bound Profile Package
       c. Activation Code parameters
       d. The Device and eUICC information
       e. Optionally the Confirmation Code
12.    The eUICC sends the signed set of information to the LPA in addition to:
       a. The nonceSMDP
       b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the
           preparation of the Bound Profile Package
       c. Activation Code parameters
         d. The Device and eUICC information
         e. The eUICC Certificate which includes the EID
         f. The EUM Certificate
         g. Optionally the Confirmation Code
13.      The LPA sends the whole set of information received from the eUICC to the SM-
         DP+.
14.      The SM-DP+ checks the EUM Certificate with the CI Public Key. The SM-DP+
         checks the signature of the nonceSMDP; the eUICC is at this stage
         authenticated by the SM-DP+.
15.      The SM-DP+ proceeds with the eligibility check based on the transmitted
         information (EID, Device information, eUICC information, eSVN).
16.      The SM-DP+ checks the Activation Code parameters and optionally the
         Confirmation Code to retrieve the referenced Profile Package.
17.      The Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC:
          a. The SM-DP+ establishes session keys with the eUICC.
          b. A Bound Profile Package is prepared on the basis of the eUICC session key
              material and is downloaded and installed on the eUICC.
          c. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and the
              Operator is notified by the SM-DP+.
          d. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged by the
              eUICC to the LPA which notifies the End User of the status.
End Conditions:
        a.     A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a
               Disabled state.
        b.     The LPA MAY offer the Profile for enablement by the End User.

5.3 Local Profile Management

5.3.1 Local Profile Management Procedures

5.3.1.1 Enable Profile

This procedure performs the enabling of a target Profile. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.

Figure 19: Enable Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC.
    b.    The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
    c.    The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
          Management.
Procedure:
    1.    The End User makes a Profile enable request on the LPA.
    2.    User Intent is verified.
    3.    The LPA sends a Profile enable operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the
          eUICC.
    4.    The ISD-R checks if applied Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the Profile
          to be enabled
    5.    If there is a conflict with Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs
          the End User via the LPA.
    6.    The target Profile is enabled.
    7.    The ISD-R informs the LPA of the enabling of the Profile.
    8.    The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions:
    a.    The target Profile is enabled.

5.3.1.2 Disable Profile

Profile disabling can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.

Figure 20: Disable Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC.
    b.    The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
    c.    The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
          Management.
Procedure:
    1.    The End User makes a Profile disable request on the LPA.
    2.    User Intent is verified.
    3.    The LPA sends a Profile disable operation to the ISD-R on the eUICC.
    4.    The ISD-R checks if applied Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the Profile
          to be disabled.
    5.    If there is a conflict with Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs
          the End User via the LPA.
    6.    The ISD-R disables the target Profile.
    7.    The ISD-R informs the LPA of the disabling of the Profile.
    8.    The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions:
    a.    The target Profile is disabled.

5.3.1.3 Delete Profile

Profile deletion can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.

Figure 21: Delete Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    The target Profile is disabled.
    b.    The target Profile has been chosen by the End User
    c.    The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
          Management.
Procedure:
    1.    The End User makes a Profile deletion request on the LPA.
    2.    User Intent is verified.
    3.    The LPA sends a Profile deletion operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on
          the eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
    4.    The ISD-R checks if applied Policy Rules permits the Profile to be deleted.
    5.    If there is a conflict with Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs
          the End User via the LPA.
    6.    The ISD-R erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P.
 7.    The ISD-R informs the LPA of the Profile deletion.
 8.    The Metadata for the target Profile is erased.
 9.    The End User is informed via the LPA.
10.    The LPA sends a delete Notification to the SM-DP+ that originally installed the
       Profile.
End conditions:
    a.    The target Profile is deleted.

5.3.1.4 Add/Update Profile Nickname

Add/update nickname will allow the Subscriber or End User to attribute a nickname to a Profile for ease of use. Note that adding or changing a nickname SHALL NOT affect any other data or other Metadata for that Profile.

Figure 22: Add/Update Profile Nickname Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    User Intent has been verified.
    b.    The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
    c.    The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
          Management.
Procedure:
    1.    The End User requests the update of the nickname on the LPA.
    2.    The LPA updates the Metadata of the target Profile with the End User’s choice of
          nickname in the eUICC.
End conditions:
    a.    Metadata of the target Profile has been updated with the End User’s choice of
          nickname.

5.3.1.5 Query Profile Metadata

This procedure will allow the End User to query the Metadata of the Profiles accessible to the End User. The result SHALL display all (or parts of) the Metadata for the selected Profile on the eUICC at the time of querying. No changes are made to any data on the eUICC as a result of this procedure.

Figure 23: Query Profile Metadata Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    The LPA is authenticated to eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
          Management.
    b.    The list of Profiles accessible to the End User is displayed by the LPA(LUI).
Procedure:
    1.    The End User selects a Profile to query.
    2.    The LPA receives a query request from the End User.
    3.    The LPA requests Profile Metadata from the eUICC.
    4.    The LPA displays the Profile Metadata to the End User on the LUI.
End conditions:
    a.    No change to Profile Metadata.

5.3.1.6 eUICC Memory Reset

This procedure performs the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC including its associated Profile Metadata. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.

Note: A similar procedure will apply to perform the eUICC Test Memory Reset of the eUICC.

Figure 24: eUICC Memory Reset Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
          Management.
    b.    The eUICC Memory Reset option is displayed by the LPA (LUI).
Procedure:
    1.    The End User makes an eUICC Memory Reset request on the LPA (LUI).
    2.    User Intent is verified.
    3.    The LPA (LUI) displays a message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ to
          the End User.
    4.    The End User confirms the conformity with the consequences to the LPA.
    5.    The LPA sends an eUICC Memory Reset operation to the eUICC.
    6.    The eUICC deletes the Profile on the eUICC even if it is an Enabled Profile
          including the Metadata associated with it.
    7.    The eUICC informs the LPA of the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC.
    8.    The End User is informed via the LPA (LUI).
    9.    The LPA sends a delete Notification to each SM-DP+ that originally installed the
          Profile.
End conditions:
    a.    The Profile is deleted from the eUICC.

5.3.1.7 Add Profile with Activation Code

This procedure will allow the Subscriber to add a single Profile. This procedure will not enable the downloaded Profile, nor disable an Enabled Profile. Network connectivity is assumed. The download can be initiated by the input of an Activation Code.

Figure 25: Add Profile with Activation Code Procedure

Start conditions:
    a.    User Intent has been verified.
    b.    The download of a new Profile is allowed on the eUICC.
    c.    The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Profile
          download.
Procedure:
    1.    The End User obtains an Activation Code to add a Profile to their Device.
    2.    The LPA requests the End User to enter the Activation Code.
    3.    Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure as described in Section 5.2.2
          starts.
End conditions:
    a.    The Profile has been installed on the End User’s Device.
    b.    Profile Metadata has been updated from the Profile.

5.3.1.8 Edit SM-DP+ Address

This procedure will allow the End User to edit a default SM-DP+ address on to the eUICC.

Figure 26: Edit SM -DP+ Address

Start conditions:
    a.    There is a default SM-DP+ address in the LPA.
    b.    The End User is willing to edit the default SM-DP+ address
Procedure:
    1.    The End User edits the SM-DP+ Address via the LPA.
    2.    Simple Confirmation from the User is required.
    3.    The LPA sends the default SM-DP+ address for storage in the LPA Service.
    4.    The LPA Service informs the LPA of the storage of the default SM-DP+ address.
    5.    The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions:
    a.    The target default SM-DP+ Address is edited in the LPA Services.

A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)

New Profile on New Primary Device (Off Device Activation)
 Risk     Risk description
 no.
 INI1     Incomplete or corrupted Profile being pushed to the Subscriber.
          Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles to
 INI2
          Devices.

Table 41: New Profile on New Primary Device Risks

Profile Deletion
 Risk     Risk description
 no.
          Long term gathering of key materials due to a long term storage of delivered Profiles
 IND1
          after their disabling.
 IND2     Loss of sensitive data from discarded media supports (hard drives…)
          Malware launching coordinated or isolated deletion of one or several Profiles leading to a
 IND3
          loss of connectivity to an End User.
          Accidental Profile deletion (e.g. unattended children…) leading to a loss of connectivity
 IND4
          to an End User.
          Non-tech-savvy or malicious Subscriber repeatedly deleting Profiles and asking for them
 IND5
          to be reloaded leading to surcharge of provisioning servers.

Table 42:Profile Deletion Risks

Profile Switch
 Risk     Risk description
 no.
 INP1     Malicious Profile switching originating from an internal party.
          Human error leading to the switching of alternate Profiles leading to a loss of
 INP2
          connectivity.
          Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to
 INP3
          a loss of connectivity.
          Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to
 INP4
          major fraud scenarios.

Table 43: Profile Switching Risks

Profile Swap
 Risk     Risk description
 no.
 INS1     Race condition leading to the deactivation of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity.

Table 44: Profile Swapping Risks

Cryptographic Related Risks
 Risk     Risk description
 no.
          Loss or theft of private keys in one or several Profile Management components leading
 INO1
          to the loss of confidentiality on the whole chain.
          Inability to revoke compromised Certificates leading to the loss of trust on the whole
 INO2
          Certificate chain.
 INO3     Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful disclosure of key materials.
 INO4     Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful compromise of key components.
          Malicious or accidental revocation of Certificates leading to the denial of service on the
 INO5
          whole provisioning Certificate chain.
          Use of temporary symmetric cryptographic or “generic” key material during the Profile
 INO6     creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single point of
          failure and attack being created.

Table 45: Cryptographic Related Risks

Quality of Service
 Risk      Risk description
 no.
           Profile creation burst leading to the inability for the eUICC platforms to deliver expected
 QoS1
           service level.
           Denial of service on delivery platforms leading to the inability to deliver expected
 QoS2
           service level.
           Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a temporary or
 QoS3
           permanent inability to deliver a Profile.

Table 46: Quality of Service Risks

Non-human or Unpredictable
 Risk      Risk description
 no.
           Catastrophic event such as floods, earthquakes, etc. leading to the destruction of a
 EXC1
           datacentre.
 EXC2      Geopolitical/Human events leading to the destruction of a datacentre.
           Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the
 EXC3
           provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, SIM vendor…).

Table 47: Non-human or Unpredictable Risks

New Profile during Subscriber Journey
 Risk      Risk description
 no.
 EXN1      Malicious pairing of new Device using unattended Primary or Companion Device.
           Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the loss of confidentiality during
 EXN2
           the provisioning of Profile operations.
Risk      Risk description
no.
          Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the tampering of registration
EXN3
          information during provisioning of Profile operations.
EXN4      Social engineering leading to the communication of OTP materials to attackers.
          Man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping during Profile provisioning leading to the loss of
EXN5
          confidentiality.
          “Implicit authentication” (e.g. HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of
EXN6
          authentication or Profile material.

Table 48: New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks

Device Swap
 Risk      Risk description
 no.
           Malicious Subscriber using race condition scenarios leading to Profiles being activated
 EXS1
           on both Devices.
           Malicious entity using weak swap procedures in order to compromise authentication
 EXS2
           vectors.

Table 49: Device Swapping Risks

Loss of Privacy
 Risk      Risk description
 no.
           Improper handling, transport or disclosure of the EID or any user related data
 PRI1
           information leading to the use of the latter as a “super” user tracking identifier.
           eUICC management commands leading to the creation of unexpected and unpredicted
 PRI2      « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties to spy or
           compromise Devices or the Subscriber themselves.

Table 50: Loss of Privacy Risks

Others
 Risk      Risk description
 no.
           Compromising of exchanges between Profile Management actors leading to the critical
 EXO1
           loss of private keys.
 EXO2      Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios.

Table 51: Other Risks

Creation Process
 Req       Requirement description
 no.
           Profiles failing to be created SHALL be securely deleted or at least purged of
 CRE1
           authentication vectors.
Req       Requirement description
no.
          Communication between systems participating in the Profile creation SHALL be
CRE2
          protected in integrity and confidentiality.

Table 52: Creation Process Requirements

B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)

B.1 Profile Production Procedure

This section describes a generic implementation. It should be regarded as an example only ; specific implementation MAY be required to address specific security concerns.

Within the eUICC, the current functionality of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Just as with current UICCs, Profiles are the responsibility of the Operator and Profile production is performed upon their request and permission (if not produced by the Operators themselves).

The same Operator procedures as in the current UICCs SHALL apply.

Figure 27: Profile Production Procedure

Profile Production consists of three steps:

   Profile Description definition: The SM-DP+ creates and registers a Profile
    Description based on the Operational Profile Description.
   Operator Credentials generation: The Operator asks the SM-DP+ to generate
    Operator Credentials that will be used in the next step. This procedure is OPTIONAL
    and will not be used if the Operator wants to generate the Operator Credentials
    during Protected Profile Package generation.
   Protected Profile Package generation: The Profile Packages will be created,
    protected and stored. This step (batch type of operation or real time process) is only
    performed after an order with the respective Operator.
     Contract conclusion and Link Profile: At the end of the contract conclusion, an
      Activation Code is delivered to the End User and the Profile MAY be allocated for this
      contract.

Note: The generation of the Bound Profile Package is part of the Profile download with Activation Code procedure in Section 5.2.2.

B.1.1 Profile Description Definition

The Profile description definition MAY comprise of the following sequence:

Figure 28: Profile Description Procedure

Start Condition:
    a.      Contractual relationship between the Operator and the SM-DP+.
Procedure:
    1.      The Operator defines its different Profile types (identified by a [non-standardised]
            Profile Description ID) which contains the Network Access Application like USIM,
            file structure, data and applications, etc.
    2.      The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Descriptions based on the Operators input with
            the corresponding Profile Description ID.
    3.      The SM-DP+ confirms the Profile Description definition e.g. by sending the
            corresponding Profile Description ID.

Note: An Operator can define multiple Profile Descriptions with the SM-DP+

End Condition:
    a.      The Operator is able to order Protected Profile Packages based on Profile
            Description IDs.

B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generation

This procedure allows the Operator to allocate a set of Operator Credentials on the SM-DP+ without associating them to a specific ProfileDescriptionID. Operator Credentials generation MAY comprise of the following sequence:

Figure 29: Operator Credentials Generation

Start Condition:

a.    IMSI, ICCID and other resources have been allocated by the Operator .

Procedure:

1.    The Operator provides the IMSI, ICCID, type of credential to be created (e.g.
      Milenage00, TUAK 0 etc.) and other resources that MAY already be allocated to
      the SM-DP+. It asks the SM-DP+ to securely generate and store a set of
      Operator Credentials.
2.    The SM-DP+ securely generates and stores a set of Operator Credentials based
      on the Operator’s input with the corresponding IMSI, ICCID and other resources
      provided.
3.    The SM-DP+ confirms the generation of Operator Credentials and provides them
      to the Operator.

B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generation

The Protected Profile Package Generation MAY comprise of the following sequence:

This procedure MAY apply between the Profile Description definition, and the Contract conclusion and Link Profile, depending on whether the Protected Profile Package is created on demand or prepared in advance.

Figure 30: Protected Profile Package Generation Procedure

Start Conditions:
    a.    Profile Description definition
Procedure:
    1.    The Operator orders the Protected Profile Package generation by providing the
          SM-DP+ with the Profile Description ID and some corresponding Operator input
          data (credentials e.g. ICCID, IMSI).The Operator input data required for Protected
          Profile Package generation (IMSI, ICCID, K/Ki, OTA Keys, PIN, PUK, etc.) is
          either created by the Operator (and provided to the SM-DP+) or by the SM-DP+
          (and provided to the Operator).
    2.    The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Packages.
    3.    The SM-DP+ creates the Protected Profile Packages.
    4.    The SM-DP+ stores the Protected Profile Packages (securely).
    5.    The SM-DP+ confirms the Protected Profile Package generation, and eventually
          sends the additional Operator input data created by the SM-DP+.
    6.    The Operator registers the Operator data in the Operator systems like HLR/AuC
          and BSS.
End Condition:
    a.       The ordered Protected Profile Packages are available at the SM-DP+. The
             Operator is able to activate these Subscriptions and a Profile download can be
             triggered upon binding to an EID.

B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile

The Activation Code has to be provided to the End User in order to achieve the Profile download procedure. The contract conclusion and Link Profile procedure describes different scenarios to link a contract with the Activation Code process. The following options are described below:

    Activation Code with known EID: The EID is given by the Subscriber to the
     Operator during the conclusion of the contract.
    Activation Code with unknown EID: The EID is not given by the Subscriber to
     the Operator during the conclusion of the contract. The EID is only provide d to
     the SM-DP+ during the Profile download procedure and is given back from the
     SM-DP+ to the Operator.
    Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator: The EID is not
     immediately given by the Subscriber during the contract conclusion, but provided
     in step two to the Operator.

The contract reference MAY be, but not necessarily, any Activation Code parameter (e.g. token), ICCID or the IMSI.

In any case, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to allocate and link a Profile to the corresponding eUICC during the Profile download procedure.

B.1.4.1 Activation Code with Known EID

Figure 31: Activation Code with Known EID Procedure

Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure 31: Contract conclusion with known EID

1.        The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator and provides the EID
          during this process.
2. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator prior to Profile download
          procedure’: The Operator allocates the Profile and sends the EID, IMSI and
          ICCID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the different parameters and
          confirms this to the Operator.
6. to 10. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM -DP+ prior to Profile download
          procedure’: The Operator sends the EID, the IMSI and the Profile Description
          ID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates an ICCID to a corresponding
          Profile, links the different parameters and confirms the allocated ICCID and
          the link to the Operator.
11.       The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
          corresponding information (contract reference).
End Condition:
       a.     The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
              Operator.
       b.     The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

B.1.4.2 Activation Code with Unknown EID

Figure 32: Activation Code with Unknown EID Procedure

Procedure: Steps 1-6 in Figure 32: Contract conclusion without EID

1.       The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of
         the target eUICC (EID).
2.       Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
         Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
         template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
         (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator.
6.       The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
         corresponding information (contract reference).
End Condition:
    a.       The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
             Operator.
b.          The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

B.1.4.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator

Figure 33: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator

Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure 33Error! Reference source not found.: Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator

1.           The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of
             the target eUICC (EID).
2.           Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
             Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5.     Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
             template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
             (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator.
 6.       The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
          corresponding information (contract reference).
7.        After the Subscriber has chosen the Device/eUICC, the EID is provided
          together with the contract reference to the Operator.
8. to 10. The Operator requests the linking of the eUICC (EID) and Profile (ICCID) by
          the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the EID and the ICCID and confirms this to
          the Operator.
11.       The Operator confirms the linking of the EID to the corresponding contract to
          the Subscriber.
End Condition:
    a.        The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
              Operator.
    b.        The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.

C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)

This annex provides an example diagram for the implementation of Local Profile Management Operations and describes how the different confirmation levels MAY be applied.

Figure 34: Example Flow for Device & LPA Authenticated Confirmation Access PIN

Setup / Settings

D eUICC Categories (Normative)

The following table provides eUICCs categories defined for Remote SIM Provisioning products.

Role no.         Description
                 Basic eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
                    Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 64kB
CAT1
                    ISO interface PPS 96
                     BIP over HTTPS features
                 Medium eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
                     Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 384kB
                     ISO interface PPS 97
CAT2                 BIP over HTTPS features
                     Processor >= 25MHz
                     Crypto processor >= 100MHz
                     Memory Protection Unit
                 Contactless eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features :
                    Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 1024kB
                     ISO interface PPS 97
CAT3                 BIP over HTTPS features
                     Processor >= 25MHz
                     Crypto processor >= 100MHz
                     Memory Protection Unit

Table 53: eUICC Categories

D.1 eUICC Requirement

Req no.               Description
EUICCSHA1             The eUICC SHALL support SHA-1.

Table 54: eUICC Requirement

E LPA Settings (Informative)

Figure 35: LPA Settings

F Certifications Chain and Security Model

                                                                                : Manufacturing process
                                                                                : Business process
                      CI                                                        : Remote Profile Management
                                                                                : Local Profile Management
CI Cert                                                                    Cert : Public key Certificate
                                      CI Cert
EUM
                                                                                                                        SM-DP+

ES9+: eUICC Cert, EUM Cert

                                                                                                                                                            ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert
ESeum: CI cert, EUM
Cert, eUICC Cert
eUICC                                                      ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert                                                  LPA
                                                           PK eUICC Cert, EUM Cert
                                                         ES10b:

Figure 36: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the Device

                                                 : Manufacturing process
                                                 : Business process
                                                 : Remote Profile Management
CI                                               : Local Profile Management
                                            Cert : Public key Certificate
 CI Cert,                                        CI Cert,                                               CI Cert,
SM-DS Cert                                      EUM Cert                                              SM-DP+ Cert
SM-DS                                                                                 EUM                                                                                     SM-DP+
                                                                                           ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert,
                                                                                                                                                                                                      ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert
                                                                                                                                                                                ES9+: eUICC Cert,
ES11: eUICC Cert,

ES11: SM-DS Cert

                                                                                             eUICC Cert
                                                                                                                                                                                EUM Cert
EUM Cert
                              ES10a: eUICC Cert,                                                                           ES10b: eUICC Cert,
                                  EUM Cert                                                                                     EUM Cert
LPA                                                                            eUICC                                                                                            LPA
                              ES10a: SM-DS Cert                                                                          ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert

Figure 37: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the eUICC

F.1 Security Model

The Security Model defines the trust relationships between all the active components of the eUICC ecosystem with an LPA in the Device.

The figure below shows only the end-to-end logical links where cryptographic keys and sensitive data are sent. The different links define the end-to-end trust relationship between entities. We distinguish a hierarchy of seven trust links with link 1 being the most significant and link 7 being the least significant. If trust link 1 is broken, all trust links will be broken as a result. If trust link 2 is broken, trust link 1 remains intact however all other trusted links are compromised or broken.

Figure 38: Trusted Link with LPA in the Device

Figure 39: Trusted Link with LPA in the eUICC

Trust       Description             Interfaces   Possible               Impact of loss of
link                                involved     compromises            trust link
TL1         Trust introduced onto   Out of       The CI public key,     The trust of the entire
            the eUICC by the        scope        the EUM’s              security model is
            issuing EUM to enable                Certificate,           breached and all
            future remote                        the EUM’s keyset,      eUICCs issued under
            management and                       the eUICC keys, the    the model cannot be
            authorisation by the                 OS, and the Security   trusted.
            SM-DP+ and possibly                  Domains.
            the EUM: eUICC keys
Trust       Description                 Interfaces   Possible               Impact of loss of
link                                    involved     compromises            trust link
            (EUM & CI keyset
            eUICC Certificates).
TL2         Trust placed in the CI’s    Out of       The EUM and SM-        Loss of Operator
            verification of the         scope        DP+ Certificates.      trust on the EUM and
            EUM, SM-DP+, and                                                SM-DP+
            the resulting Certificate
            issuance.
TL3         Trust placed in the         ES2+         The eUICC              Loss of Operator
            activities for eUICC        ES8+         Certificate or         trust on the eUICC
            eligibility and remote                   eligibility check      and/or SM-DP+.
            attestation from the                     failure.
            ISD-R on the target
            eUICC to the Operator
            via the SM-DP+.
            Provides eUICC
            Certificate, EID,
            reference to its
            certification and EUM
            to the Operator and
            SM-DP+.
TL4         Trust placed in the         ES2+         SM-DP+ Certificate     Loss of Operator
            activities for Profile      ES8+         eUICC Certificate or   trust on the SM-DP+
            data transfer from the                   eligibility check      and/or eUICC.
            Operator via the SM-                     failure.
            DP+ to the ISD-R on
            the target eUICC.
            Protects the Profile
            and associated
            credentials and keys
            (NAAs, OTA keys,
            ISD-R access, ISD-P
            SD creation …) with
            only the Operator, SM-
            DP+ and the eUICC.
TL5         Trust placed in the         ES2+         SM-DP+ Certificate     Operator loss of trust
            information exchange                                            on SM-DP+.
            between the Operator
            and the SM-DP+ for
            Link Profile requests.
TL6         Trust placed in the         ESeu         LPA security           eUICC loss of trust
            mechanisms provided                                             on LPA.
            by the LPA: Local
            Profile Management,
            Local Profile
Trust       Description                Interfaces    Possible                 Impact of loss of
link                                   involved      compromises              trust link
            Management
            Operations
TL7         Trust placed in the        ES9+          LPA security or SM-      SM-DP+ loss of trust
            TLS session                              DP+ security.            on LPA or LPA loss
                                                                              of trust on the SM-
                                                                              DP+.
TL8         Trust in the discovery     ES11          LDS security or SM-      LDS loss of trust on
            process                                  DS security.             the SM-DS and vice
                                                                              versa.
TL9         Trust placed on TLS        ES5+          eUICC security or        SM-DP+ loss of trust
            session                                  SM-DP+ security.         on the eUICC and
                                                                              vice versa
TL10        Trust in the discovery     ES11          eUICC security or        SM-DS loss of trust
            process                                  SM-DS security.          on the eUICC and
                                                                              vice versa.
TL11        Trust in the UI            ESeu          Device security          Loss of trust on the
                                                                              Device

Table 55: Trusted Link Descriptions

Compromised Impacted              Description       Impact of loss of         Countermeasures
element     Paths                                   trust
eUICC             SP1, SP3,       The eUICC         The eUICC can no          Revoke the Certificate
                  SP4, SP9,       keys and          longer be trusted.        of the eUICC.
                  SP10            EUM’s Keyset.     MNO and SM-DP+
                                                    loss of trust on eUICC.
CI                SP2             The EUM, SM- Loss of Operator trust         Repair/Replace CI.
                                  DS, and SM-   in the EUM, SM-DS             Generate new CI
                                  DP+           and SM-DP+.                   Certificate and new
                                  Certificates.                               Certificate for the
                                                                              EUM, SM-DS and SM-
                                                                              DP+ following the SAS
                                                                              process.
                                                                              Remote repair of
                                                                              already issued
                                                                              eUICCs: new CI public
                                                                              key.
EUM               SP1, SP2        Loss of SAS       Loss of trust from the    New SAS for the
                                  certification.    Operator and SM-DP+       EUM. Remote repair
                                                    on the EUM and its        of already issued
                                                    eUICCs.                   eUICCs: new EUM
                                                                              Certificate, new
                                                                              eUICC Certificate.
Compromised Impacted            Description        Impact of loss of        Countermeasures
element     Paths                                  trust
SM-DP+            SP3, SP4,     Loss of SAS        Loss of trust from the   New SAS for the SM-
                  SP5, SP7,     certification.     Operator, LPA, SM-DS     DP+. New SM-DP+
                  SP8                              and eUICC on the SM-     Certificate.
                                                   DP+.
SM-DS             SP8           Loss of SAS        Loss of trust from the   New SAS for the SM-
                                certification.     Operator, LPA, SM-       DS. New SM-DS
                                                   DP+ and eUICC on the     Certificate.
                                                   SM-DS.
LPA               SP6, SP7,     LPA security       Loss of trust from the   LPA repair by the
                  SP8           failure.           SM-DP+, SM-DS and        Device Manufacturer.
                                                   eUICC on the LPA.
Device            SP11          Device             Loss of trust in the     LUI in the eUICC self-
                                security failure   Device UI                protected with User
                                                                            Intent capture
                                                                            mechanisms (i.e.
                                                                            Captcha Code)

Table 56: Impact of Compromising Trusted Links and Countermeasures

The signer is responsible for the revocation of the Certificates it has signe d. This section describes how the new Certificates are pushed to concerned entities according to the security model.

   SM-DP+ trusts the CI
   EUM trusts the CI
   eUICC trusts the EUM and the CI
Req no.              Description
                     The new SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-
CERT1
                     DP+ by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
                     The new SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-DS
CERT2
                     by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
                     The new EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the EUM by a GSMA CI
CERT3
                     upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
                     The EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the
CERT4                EUM
                     Note: See details in section 4.1.1.1.
                     The CI Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the EUM
CERT5
                     Note: See details in section 4.1.1.1.
CERT6                Certificates SHALL be revocable.
                     Neither the End User nor any other party SHALL be able to prevent
CERT7
                     Certificate revocation.
                     The End User SHALL not be allowed to use Remote SIM Provisioning
CERT8
                     functions with revoked Certificates.
Req no.             Description
                    The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+ SHALL be revoked if required
CERT9               (e.g. loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM
                    Provisioning certification requirements).
                    The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS SHALL be revoked if required (e.g.
CERT10              loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning
                    certification requirements).
                    The Public Key Certificate of the EUM SHALL be revoked if required (e.g.
CERT11              loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning
                    certification requirements).

Table 57: Certificate Requirements

G LPA Integrity

The LPA must be protected against misuse or being compromised by means of implementing standard procedures.

For cases where the LPA is in the Device, the LPA integrity SHALL be guided by the following Device classes:

Device class         Description                              Example of Devices
                     Devices with an open operating           Smartphones, Tablets, Laptops,
                     system where mechanisms such as          Advanced Wearables
Advanced             secure boot and platform signing of
                     applications are available and used
                     to protect the LPA.
                     Devices without possibility to install   Connected sensors, Simple
                     applications. The attack surface of      Wearables, Single use case devices
                     the LPA is minimal due to the locked
Basic                down nature of these Devices.
                     Simple mechanisms to ensure that
                     the LPA is not compromised SHALL
                     be taken.

Table 58: Device Classes

H Rules Authorisation Table (Normative)

Annex H reflects the RAT table configuration(s) that SHALL be configured in embedded UICC.

Legend: The following colours apply

Line color

Mandatory to be included

Optional

The following RAT SHALL apply to all products

PR                 Operators   User consent
Mandatory part            POL RULE1                  *            YES
of the RAT table
                          POL RULE2                  *            YES

Table 59: RAT configuration

Additional lines can be added to the RAT table to reflect agreement between some Operators and OEMs as needed. The OEM can also decide to add lines to the RAT table.

PR                Operators   User consent
POL RULE 1             Operator1        NO
Mandatory part             POL RULE1                 *            YES
of the RAT table
                           POL RULE2                 *            YES

Table 60: RAT configuration

Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.

I Document Management

I.1 Document History

Version Date             Brief Description of Change        Approval             Editor /
                                                            Authority            Company
                         First Release with amendments                           Carmen Kwok,
V1.0        03/12/15                                        PSMC
                         from Security review.                                   GSMA
                                                                                 Carmen Kwok,
V2.0        15/07/16     Includes Phase 2 content           PSMC
                                                                                 GSMA
Other Information
 Type                              Description
 Document Owner                    Carmen Kwok
 Editor / Company                  GSMA

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