Overview
This document sets out an architecture framework for remote SIM provisioning and management of embedded UICCs in consumer-market devices, with the aim of supporting interoperability across operators and deployment scenarios. It describes the roles of manufacturers, operators, service providers, subscribers, and certificate issuers, alongside eUICC, device, profile, metadata, and NFC requirements. It covers system components and interfaces, including the SM-DP+ and SM-DS, the Local Profile Assistant, profile policy management, certification, and operational procedures for downloading and managing profiles. The framework provides a shared basis for enabling devices to obtain the credentials needed for mobile network access.
- eUICC
- Remote SIM Provisioning
- SM-DP+
- SM-DS
- Local Profile Assistant
- NFC
Overview generated automatically from the document's scope and outline. The document text is authoritative.
Changes since v1.0
29 clauses modified, 66 clauses added, 18 clauses removed, 21 clauses renumbered
Compared automatically clause by clause from the extracted text of both versions; differences only in layout, spacing or table cells are ignored. The documents are authoritative.
1.1 Overviewmodified
…or the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices with the necessary credentials to gain mobile network access. This version focuses on Devices for the consumer market. … Please note that SGP.21 V1.0 [31] has not been deprecated.
1.4 Definition of Termsmodified
…ownload and installation of a Profile. A part of the Activation Code information provided by the Activation Code Token Operator/Service Provider to reference a … Profile.Subscription. SM-DS used in cascade mode with a Root SM-DS to redirect Event Alternative SM-DS Registration from a SM-DP+ to the Root SM-DS. Describes a mechanism for which the End User is confirming their Authenticated Confirmation action through a method involving the input of personalised information (e.g. PIN, fingerprint). A Protected Profile Package which has been encrypted for a target Bound Profile Package eUICC. Certificate or Public Key A certificate as defined in RFC.5280 [1] and GlobalPlatform Certificate specifications [11]. An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM Certified eUI … es of a Primary Device for the Companion Device purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. Term Description A code entered by an End User to authorise the usage of an … Confirmation Code Activation Code to confirm the download and installation of a Profile. Confirmation Code Profile.Required ForA addedparameter security,to indicate whether the OperatorConfirmation MAYCode chooseis torequired communicateFlag theor Confirmationnot. CodeRefers viato athe separatehierarchy deliveryof channel.User ConfirmationIntent Codeand RequiredConfirmation ARequest, parameterwhere: to indicateUser whetherIntent is the first and lowest level Confirmation CodeLevel is requiredSimple FlagConfirmation oris not.the Thesecond Datalevel Subset Authenticated Confirmation is athe listthird ofand Elementaryhighest Fileslevel Note: For examples of theimplementation, respectiveplease Datarefer Subsetto ProfileAnnex whoseC. contentDescribes SHALLa berequest storedfor inAuthenticated theConfirmation Metadataor ofa saidSimple Profile.Confirmation Request Confirmation as defined in this specification. User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a Device mobile network. E.g. a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset. AAn termentity generallyresponsible understoodfor inmanufacturing theDevices. industryThe to mean that the Device Factory Reset Device isManufacturer returnedManufacturer toMAY abe stateresponsible equivalentfor tothe aselection Factoryand State.insertion Furtherof definitioneUICCs isin beyondDevices. theA scopemode ofhidden thisto document.the AnEnd entityUser responsibleand forintended manufacturingto Devices.be Theused Deviceby Device ManufacturerTest ManufacturerMode MAYmaintenance bepeople. responsibleIt forallows theaccess selection and insertionuse of eUICCsthe inTest Devices.Profiles. Profile, the files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) of which are not Disabled Profile selectable over the UICC-Device interface. An interrogation of the Discovery Service by a Device for Event Discovery Request Records that are registered for its eUICC. UICC which enables the secure remote and/or local management Embedded UICC (eUICC) of Profiles. Profile, the files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) of which are Enabled Profile selectable over the UICC-Device interface. [18]0 A file whose content determines the ability of a Profile Owner to Enabling Configuration File make use of Profile Policy Rules. End User The person using the Device. Information that pertains to the identity of an End User suche.g. asEnd User Data personal details, name, address, biometric characteristics, assigned identification numbers, etc. EndFunction Userthat Dataenables Note:a InSM-DP+ manyto jurisdictionscheck (includingcertain EUinformation andeUICC US),Audit identifyingrelated data extends to indirectthe identifierseUICC (suchand asits ICCID,installed EID,Profiles. MSISDN,eUICC cookies,Authorisation etc)Token thatused areby linkablethe SM-DS to aauthenticate person'sthe realeUICC. identity when considered in combination with other data sources. A Certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC. eUICC Certificate This Certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate. eUICC Eligibility Check The information set sent from the eUICC to the SM-DP+ to allow Information eligibility checks. eUICC Manufacturer The eUICC Manufacturer provides eUICC products. Term Description An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a Factory eUICC Memory Reset State. An action that returns the eUICC to the state prior to installation of eUICC Test Memory Reset any post-issuance Test Profile. A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited EUM EUM Certificate which can be used EUM Certificate to verify eUICC Certificates. ThisA CertificateProfile candownload which is set by an SM-DP+ on behalf of an Event Operator, to be verifiedprocessed usingby a specific eUICC. Unique identifier of an Event for a specific EID generated by the RootEvent-ID Certificate.SM-DP+. The configuredset stateof information stored on the SM-DS for a specific Event, via the Event Registration procedure. This information consists of Event Record either: the DeviceEvent-ID, and/orEID, and SM-DP+ address or the eUICCEvent-ID, atEID, and SM-DS address A query to the pointSM-DS it(Root Factoryor StateAlternative) wasexecuted distributedto afterverify manufacture.Event TermEvent DescriptionRecord ManifestationQuery Registration success or determine that an Event Record still exists. A process notifying the SM-DS on the availability of information on Event Registration either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC. The configured state of the UICCeUICC asat specifiedthe inpoint ETSIit TSwas 102distributed 221Factory [2]State andafter manufacture. Form Factor ETSIPhysical TSmanifestation 102of 671the [3].UICC. GSMA Certificate Issuer A Certificate Authority accredited/approved by GSMA. Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU- T E.118 [19].0. ICCID Note: the ICCID throughout this specification is used to identify the Profile. International Mobile Refer to 3GPP 21.905 [4]. Subscriber Identity The pro … red. Link Profile Note: This is normally an offline process, binding is an online process happening during the communication between the SM- DP+ and the eUICC. … The Local Profile Assistant (LPA) describes the entity comprising of Local Profile Assistant the Local User Interface (LUI), the Local Profile Download (LPD) and the Local Discovery Service (LDS). Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated Local Profile Management on the ESeu interface. Local Profile Management Operations includeare enable Profile, disable Local Profile Management disable Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory Operation Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, edit nickname, add Profile, and addedit Profile.default SM-DP+ address. Term Description Assurance that the LPA has not been compromised or otherwise affected. The Metadataassurance isSHALL abe copyprovided ofto the Datavarious SubsetRemote ofLPA Integrity SIM Provisioning entities to ensure that the respectiveLPA Profilecan Metadatabe storedtrusted to execute the actions requested Note: This could be linked with a certification process. Defines the Operation LPA Mode which is either LPA in the eUICC forLPA informativeMode displayingor toin the EndDevice. UserInformation pertaining to a Profile that containsis stored in the informationeUICC listedand inis SectionMetadata 4.6.accessible by the LPA for the purpose of Local Profile Management. An entity providing access capability and communication services Mobile Network Operator to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure. An entity providing access capability and communication services Mobile Virtual Network to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure but does Operator not have an allocation of spectrum. A method of authentication in which an End User is only granted access after successfully presenting several separate pieces of Multi-Factor Authentication evidence to an authentication mechanism – typically at least two of (MFA) the following categories: knowledge (something they know), possession (something they have), and inherence (something they are). Network Access Application Refer to 3GPP 21.905 [4]. Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [5] network. This Network Access Credentials MAY include data such as Ki/K and IMSI stored within a NAA. NFC Device Device with NFC capability. NFC eUICC eUICC with NFC capability. An arbitrary random number generated for one time use, employed Nonce for cryptographic communication. A report about a Profile download or Remote/Local Profile Notification Management Operation processed by the eUICC. Operational Profile A Profile that allows connectivity to a mobile network. A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a Operator company providing wireless cellular network services. A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network Operator Credentials Access Credentials, OTA Keys for remoteRemote ProfileFile/Application Management,management, and authentication algorithm parameters. The credentials included in the Profile used in conjunction with OTA Keys OTA Keys Platforms. A platform used by an Operator for the remoteRemote managementFile/Application of OTA Platform management of enabled OperatorOperational Profiles on eUICCs,eUICCs. i.e.Principles usingreflected OTAin RAMa orset RFM.of rules that governs the behaviour of Policy the eUICC and/or entities involved in the remote management of the eUICC. Policy Enforcement A function that executes Policy Rules to implement a Policy. Term Description Defines the atomic action of a Policy and the conditions under Policy Rule which it is executed. A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a Primary Device Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. Term Description A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned on to an eUICC for the purposes of providing services by the Profile Operator. The Profile SHA … o the Operator; Profile Description example formats could be an Excel table, xml format, or plain text. A combination of local and remote management operations … (enable Profile Management (enable,Profile, disable,disable delete,Profile, delete Profile, and query)query Profile Metadata) Profile Owner The Operator identified by the IMSI in the Profile. A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format Profile Package that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile [6]. The functional element within the Profile management system that Profile Policy Enabler interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules. A policy control system that allows the Service Provider to Profile Policy Management implement, manage and enforce its subscription terms and conditions associated with the installed Profile. Defines the condition of the policy and the atomic action to be Profile Policy Rule taken by the Profile Policy Enabler. A Profile Package which has been encrypted for storage but not to Protected Profile Package a specific eUICC. A Profile that allows connectivity to a mobile network solely to Provisioning Profile provide the provisioning of Profiles. The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, switching, and Remote SIM Provisioning deleting of a Profile on an eUICC. A Certificate used to authenticate other entities within the Remote Root Certificate SIM Provisioning framework. A globally identified central access point for finding Events from Root SM-DS one or more SM-DP+(s). The Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either Service Provider as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement with an Operator. The Service Provider could also be the Operator. Describes a mechanism for which the End User is confirming their Simple Confirmation action through a confirmation (e.g yes or no). SM-DP+ Certificate A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DP+. SM-DS Certificate A Certificate used by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DS. Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as SMDPid part of the SM-DP+ Certificate. Term Description An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a Subscription with an Operator. The Subscriber is allowed to Subscriber subscribe and unsubscr … authorised to use these services. Information that pertains to the identity of a Subscriber such as contract details, authentication credentials, cryptographic … keys,keys etc. Subscriber Data Note: In many instances, the Subscriber is also the End User and therefore Subscriber Data is likely to include End User Data. A Subscription describes the commercial relationship between the Subscription Subscriber and the Service Provider. This role prepares Profile Packages, secures themeach with a Profile protection key, stores Profile protection keys in a secure manner andas well as the Protected Profile Packages in a Profile Package repository, Subscription Manager Data repository, and allocateslinks the Protected Profile Packages to specified EIDs. Preparation+ (SM-DP+) EIDs. The SM-DP+ binds Protected Profile Packages to the respective EID and securely downloads these Bound Profile Packages to the LPA of the respective eUICC. DescribesSubscription Manager This is responsible for providing addresses of one or more SM- Discovery Server (SM-DS) DP+(s) to a LDS. A Profile which when installed on an eUICC enables access to test Test Profile equipment for the direct,purpose realof timetesting acquisitionthe Device and validationthe eUICC. This will not include any Operator Credentials. According to NIST SP 800-53r4 0, a mechanism by which an End User (through an input Device) can communicate directly with the security functions of the information system with the necessary Trusted Path confidence to support the system security policy. This mechanism can only be activated by the End User Intentor the security functions of the information system and cannot be imitated by untrusted software. Describes the direct, real time acquisition of the manual End User instructionUser byIntent input on the LUI to trigger locally a Profile download or Profile Management operation.
1.5 Abbreviationsmodified
Abbreviation Description AC Activation Code ARA-M Access Rule Application - Master ARF Access Rule File AuC Authentication Centre BSS Business Support Services CI Certificate Issuer DNSCurve Domain Name System Curve DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions Abbreviation Description ECASD eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain EID Embedded UICC Identifier eSVN embedded Specification Version Number ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute eUICC Embedded UICC EUM eUICC Manufacturer FASG Fraud and Security Group FFS For Further Study GSMA GSM Association GSMA CI GSMA Certificate Issuer HLR Home Location Register HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol ICCID Integrated Circuit Card Identifier IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity ISD-P Issuer Security Domain - Profile ISD-R Issuer Security Domain - Root ISIM IP Multimedia Services Identity Module ITU International Telecoms Union LDS Local Discovery Service LPA Local Profile Assistant LPD Local Profile Download LUI Local User Interface M4M Mifare4Mobile MFA Multi-Factor Authentication MNO Mobile Network Operator MNO-SD Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain MSISDN Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number NAA Network Access Application OS Operating System OTA Over The Air PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy RAM Remote Application Management RAT Rules Authorisation Table RFM Remote File Management SAS Security Accreditation Scheme SD Security Domain SIM Subscriber Identity Module SM-DP+ Subscription Manager - Data Preparation + Abbreviation Description SM-DS Subscription Manager - Discovery Server SSD Supplementary Secure Domain USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module
1.6 Referencesmodified
Ref Document Number Title X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate [1] RFC 5280 Revocation List (CRL) Profile [2] ETSI TS 102 221 UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical [2] ETSI TS 102 221 characteristics Smart cards; Machine to Machine UICC; Physical and logical [3] ETSI TS 102 671 logical characteristics Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; [4] 3GPP 21.905 Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications The international identification plan for public networks and [5] ITU E.212 and Subscriptions SIMalliance: eUICC Profile Package - Interoperable Format [6] SIMAPP Format Technical Specification http://simalliance.org/euicc/euicc-technical-releases/ [7] ETSI TS 102 226 Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, [8] RFC 2119 Levels”, S. Bradner http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt [9] 3GPP TS 21.133 3G security; Security threats and requirements GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC [ … ication of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1: [12] 3GPP TS 35.231 Algorithm Specification 3GPP TS 35.205 Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document … 1: [13] 1: General Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document 2: [14] 3GPP TS 35.206 2: Algorithm Specification [15] RFC 7469 Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP FS.04 - Security Accreditation Scheme for UICC Production[15] – [16] EUM SAS StandardProduction [17]– SM-DPStandard SAS FS.08 - GSMA SAS Standard for Subscription Manager Roles[16] [18]SM-DP ETSISAS TSRoles 103 383 Smart Cards; Embedded UICC; Requirements [17] ETSI TS 103 383 Specification [19][18] ITU-T E.118 The International Telecommunication Charge Card Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity [19] 3GPP TS 31.102 Module (USIM) application Ref Document Number Title GlobalPlatform Device Technology Secure Element [20] GPD_SPE_013 Access Control - Version 1.1 Personalisation of Mobile Equipment - Mobile functionality [21] 3GPP TS 22.022 specification [22] TS.26 GSMA NFC Handset Requirements Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information [23] NIST SP 800-53r4 Systems and Organisations – Revision 4 [24] OMAPI SIMalliance Open Mobile API Specification [25] SGP.03 NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1 GlobalPlatform Device Technology – Secure Element [26] GPS_SPE_013 Access Control Wireless Application Protocol WAP-248-UAProf- [27] WAG UAProf 20011020-a [28] SGP.05 Embedded UICC Protection Profile GSMA SAS Standard for Subscription Manager Roles - [29] SGP.07 Version 1.0 or later [30] SGP.21 SGP.21 Architecture Specification - Version 1.0 [31] SGP.22 SGP.22 Technical Specification - Version 2.0
1.7 Conventionsmodified
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [8]. “FFS” or “For Further Study” means that it will be covered in SGP.22 V2.1.
2 Principlesmodified
This section contains the principles related to the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning system for the Embedded UICC. The solution based on the requirements described within this document has to be prov ided in a non-discriminatory manner.
2.1 Basic Principlesmodified
…d management BAS3 processes SHALL at all times and under all circumstances be at least equivalent to the current removable UICC and its provisioning processes. … Principle no. Description The architecture of the eUICC and its Remote SIM Provisioning system BAS4 SHALL BAS4 comply with the requirements of 3GPP TS 21.133 [9]. The architecture SHALL support a level of security with respect to the protection of Operator Credentials which is at least equalequivalent to the present levels of BAS5 security. This applies in particular to: BAS5 the confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters;parameters ; the integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI). The architecture SHALL support a level of security for all Profile content which BAS6 is BAS6 at least equalequivalent to the current state of the art level of security of the UICC. The architecture SHALL NOT compromise the security and privacy of Subscriber data,Data, nor the security and privacy of End User Data. Examples depending on BAS7 territory include identities that can be used for tracking such as ICCID, MSISDN, EID, IMSI Ki etc. Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of this document. However, BAS8 any data which could be used to identify an individual SHALL be BAS8 treated as personal data and insubject complianceto with local regulations e.g. the EID, ICCID, etc. Table 11: Basic Principles
2.2 Profile Principlesmodified
Principle no. Description Profiles are the property of and SHALL be under the control of the issuing PRO1 Operator. A Profile does not exist outside of an eUICC. I.e. a Profile is always located on PRO2 a PRO2 particular eUICC. PRO3 A Profile SHALL be uniquely identified.identified by its ICCID. An Enabled Profile in combination with an eUICC SHALL be able to carry all PRO4 logical characteristics of a UICC. Once the Profile is enabled, all relevant UICC characteristics or features as PRO5 described in ETSI 102 221 [2] specifications SHALL applyapply, with the exceptions as defined within this specification. Principle no. Description It SHALL be possible to delete Profiles only when in a disabled state, with the PRO6 exception of theeUICC Memory Reset, and eUICC Test Memory Reset functionfunctions. whichPRO7 deletesProfile allManagement Profiles.SHALL be governed by Policy. Table 22: Profile Principles
3.1 eUICC Manufacturermodified
Role no. Description The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the initial cryptographic EUM1 configuration and security architecture of the eUICC. EUM2 The eUICCs are delivered by the eUICC Manufacturer (EUM)(EUM). toRole otherno. partiesDescription EUM2 (e.g. the Device Manufacturer). Relevant parts of the eUICC Manufacturer’s products and processes are EUM3 certified by a GSMA-approved certification process. The EUM SHALL issue the eUICC Certificate to allow: EUM4 eUICC authentication and proof of certification to other entities; EUM4 authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-DP+ and an eUICC. BothThe storageeUICC andManufacturer communicationSHALL channelsbe responsible for the EUMimplementation Certificateof any EUM5 LPA elements that reside in the eUICC and Rootthe EUM5compliance Certificateof SHALLthe beLPA reliable.with the requirements in Section 4.10.3. Table 33: eUICC Manufacturer Role
3.2 Device Manufacturermodified
…er SHALL be responsible for the implementation of any DM1 LPA elements that reside on the Device and the compliance of the LPA with the requirements in Section … 4.8.2.4.10.2. The Device Manufacturer SHALL be responsible for the implementation of DM2 any application that resides on the Primary Device allowing User Interface access to the Companion Device. Table 44: Device Manufacturer Role
3.3 Operator and Service Providermodified
…this architecture and its operation. Other characteristics exist but are considered out of scope. Role no. Description OPE1 The Operator SHALL have access to a … SM-DP+.SM-DP+ via the ES2+ interface. In the event that a Subscriber has selected a Service Provider, that Service OPE2 Provider will initiate the provisioning of a Profile.Profile Package. The Operator, potentially on behalf of the Service Provider, specifies the OPE3 Profile characteristics and any features and applications analogous to Role no. Description removable UICCs. Operators SHALL be able to use an OTA Platform in order to manage the OPE4 content of their Enabled Profile in the eUICC (RAM, RFM). A Subscriber MAY have a relationship with any number of Service Providers OPE5 simultaneously. Table 55: Operator Role
3.4 Subscriber and End Usermodified
Role no. Description The Subscriber is the contract partner of the Service Provider for the SEU1 Subscription. Note: The Subscriber MAY not be the End User. Role no. Description The End User is a human and uses the Device and/or the services related to SEU2 the Enabled Profile. SEU3 There SHALL be a means for the End User to obtain the EID. Table 66: Subscriber and End User Role
3.5 Certificate Issuermodified
…ning entities CIS1 and acts as a trusted third party for the purpose of authenticating the entities of the system. The Certificate Issuer communicates with the … SM-DP+SM-DP+, SM-DS and the EUM through CIS2 through interfaces that are out of scope of this specification. Table 77: Certificate Issuer Role
4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecturemodified
This section contains the functional description of the architecture of the Remote SIM Provisioning system architecture for the Embedded UICC. Figure 1: Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture
4.1.1.1 ECASDmodified
The Embedded UICC Controlling Authority Security Domain (ECASD) is responsible for the secure storage of credentials requiredneeded to support the required security domains on the eUICC. There SHALL be only be one ECASD on an eUICC. The ECASD SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during the eUICC manufacturing as described in [11]. The ECASD SHALL have the following properties: Non-modifiable eUICC private keys for creating signaturessignatures. Associated Certificates for eUICC authenticationauthentication. The Certificate Issuers’ (CI) root public keys for verifying SM-DP+ CertificatesCertificates. eUICC Manufacturers’ (EUMs) keyset for key/Certificate renewal. Additionally, the ECASD SHALL provide security functions used during key establishment and eUICC authentication.
4.1.1.4 MNO-SDmodified was MNO–SD
4.1.1.5 Profile Policy Enableradded
The eUICC Operating System (OS) service which offers Profile Policy Rules validation and enforcement.
4.1.1.6 Telecom Frameworkrenumbered was 4.1.1.5
4.1.1.7 Profile Package Interpreterrenumbered was 4.1.1.6
4.1.1.8 LPA Servicesadded
The LPA services provide necessary access to the services and data required by the LPA functions for the following: 1. The optionally stored Root SM-DS and/or Default SM-DP+ addresses. 2. Facilitates the reception of the Bound Profile Package in transfer from the LPA. 3. Provide information regarding the installed Profiles and their Metadata. 4. Provides Local Profile Management. 5. Provides functions for the LPA to authenticate and interact with the SM-DS. 6. Ensures access to the EID is restricted to only the LPA.
4.1.1.7 LPA Servicesremoved
The LPA services provide necessary access to the services and data required by the LPA functions.
4.2 eUICC Requirementsmodified
Req no. Description EUICC1 The eUICC is a discrete tamper resistant hardware componentcomponent. EUICC2 An removable eUICC is packaged in a standardised ETSI Form EUICC1 Factor [2][2]. [3].EUICC3 EUICC2 The eUICC SHALL be either removable or non-removable. The behaviour of the eUICC with an Enabled Profile SHALL be similarequivalent EUICC4 to the EUICC3 UICC. EUICC4EUICC5 The eUICC SHALL be able to contain zero or onemore Profile.Profiles. EUICC5EUICC6 At a maximum, only one Profile SHALL be enabled at any point in time. The behaviour of a NAA USIM or ISIM within a Profile on an eUICC SHALL be identical to a removable UICC NAAs USIM or ISIM. EUICC6EUICC7 Note: No changes to existing 3GPP/3GPP2 USIM, CSIM and ISIM specifications are expected. EUICC8 The eUICC MAYSHALL implementsupport theMilenage TUAK00 algorithmand [12]TUAK in0 additionalgorithm tosets. EUICC7Req Milenageno. [13][14].Description The ownership of the eUICC MAY change throughout its lifetime as can the EUICC8EUICC9 Device. If any operation such as Profile enabling,Management Profileoperation disabling, and Profile EUICC9 download and installation does not complete successfully, the EUICC10 eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request. The eUICC SHALL contain an ECASD and ISD-R security domains installed EUICC10EUICC11 and personalised during manufacture. EUICC11EUICC12 The ECASD cannot be deleted or modified after eUICC manufacture. The ISD-R SHALL be responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the EUICC12EUICC13 lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps. Req no. Description The ISD-R SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during eUICC EUICC13EUICC14 manufacturing as described in [11]. The eUICC SHALL be able to support an eUICC Memory Reset. This can EUICC14EUICC15 only be requested by the End User. The eUICC SHALL be able to support an eUICC Test Memory Reset. This EUICC16 can only be requested by the End User when the Device is in Device Test Mode. The eUICC SHALL support the eUICC Profile Package Interoperable format EUICC15EUICC17 as defined by SIMalliance [6]. An ISD-R SHALL: be created within an eUICC at the time of manufacture; EUICC16EUICC18 NOT be deleted or disabled; NOT be able to perform any operations inside an ISD-P. EUICC17EUICC19 An eUICC MAY provide LPA functions. EUICC20 An ISD-P SHALL be created by the ISD-R at the request of the SM-DP+. IfCommunication a Profile download and installation does not terminate successfully, the EUICC18 Profile and the ISD-P SHALL be securely deleted. The eUICC SHALL ensure that the communication between the eUICC and EUICC19 the SM-DP+ participatingSHALL inbe the Profile creation is protected EUICC21 in authenticity, integrity,integrity and confidentiality. EUICC20EUICC22 The eUICC SHALL NOT export Profiles installed on the eUICC. The eUICC SHALL enforce an isolation of Profiles and prevent Profiles from EUICC21EUICC23 operating outside of their execution environment i.e. Profile SHALL run in a sandbox. The integrity of the Bound Profile Package SHALL be ensured during its EUICC22EUICC24 installation on the eUICC. EUICC23EUICC25 The eUICC SHALL be tamper resistant (physically and logically). Profile keys and algorithm parameters SHALL NOT be extractable from the EUICC24EUICC26 eUICC. All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a robust tamper- EUICC25EUICC27 resistant way and be resistant to side-channel attacks. The Operator SHALL be able to update the OTA Keys in its Profile on the EUICC26EUICC28 eUICC in a secure and confidential way, reusing existing OTA Platform mechanisms. A downloaded Profile Package SHALL be installed on the eUICC in a EUICC27EUICC29 disabled state. Req no. Description The eUICC SHALL enforcealways report its specification version number in the first EUICC30 communication during the commencement of each session with the SM- DP+ or SM-DS. The EUM SHALL install an eUICC Certificate in the eUICC used to verify EUICC31 the eUICC certification. The EUM SHALL install an EUM Certificate in the eUICC used to verify the EUICC32 eUICC Certificate. EUICC33 The eUICC SHALL have a mechanismmeans to ensureauthenticate thatto therethe isSM-DS. notEUICC34 moreThe EUICC28eUICC thanSHALL oneprotect itself against unauthorised access. Upon Profile installed.deletion, Note:the ThiseUICC mechanismSHALL enforcementensure isa dedicatedcomplete fordeletion phaseof 1.all EUICC35 data related to the Profile. The eUICC SHALL alwaysonly reportaccept itsProfile specificationManagement versionoperations numbersent from EUICC36 the LPA in either the firsteUICC, EUICC29or communicationthe duringDevice. The eUICC SHALL reject any Profile Management commands that are in EUICC37 conflict with the commencementPolicy Rules of eachthe session.respective TheProfile. EUMIf any Bound Profile Package download or installation does not complete EUICC38 successfully, the eUICC SHALL installmaintain anthe state it was in before it received the request. The eUICC CertificateSHALL support GlobalPlatform Secure Element Access Control EUICC39 0. There SHALL be a means to preset a default SM-DP+ address in the EUICC40 eUICC. EUICC41 The eUICC usedSHALL be able to verifystore EUICC30a Root SM-DS address. The eUICC SHALL be able to send a delete Notification to notify the SM- EUICC42 DP+ that the Profile was deleted. In EUICC42, if connectivity is not available to send the Notification of EUICC43 deletion to the SM-DP+, the Notification SHALL be retained and sent as soon as connectivity becomes available again. The delete Notification process SHALL also be executed for each deleted EUICC44 Profile in case of eUICC Certification.Memory reset. The EUMeUICC SHALL installsupport ana EUMset Certificateof standard functions and services including, but not limited to Java Applications, USIM Toolkit functions andGlobalPlatform features. The list of supported functions and services EUICC45 (e.g. API package names and versions) SHALL be explicitly referenced within the technical specification (SGP.22 0). A different set of functions and services MAY be defined/supported according to the different Embedded UICC categories as defined in Annex D. The eUICC SHALL support at least the following USIM Toolkit commands: PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION including the following fields: local info, IMEI, network measure results, date & time, access technology EUICC46 TERMINAL PROFILE ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD) SEND SHORT MESSAGE DISPLAY TEXT Req no. Description GET INPUT RING TONE An eUICC usedSHALL support at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters EUICC47 preloaded by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing, defined in GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0. Each Notification SHALL be uniquely identifiable and SHALL be signed by EUICC48 the eUICC. Each Notification (delete, pre-delete, disable) SHALL be re-play attack EUICC49 protected and signed by the eUICC. It SHALL be possible to verifyrequest through a Profile parameter a pre-delete EUICC50 (FFS) Notification to be sent notifying of a deletion which will be carried out by the EUICC31eUICC after the sending of the Notification has been attempted. In the event that a pre-delete Notification has been successfully attempted, the eUICC Certificate.SHALL delete the Profile for which the Notification attempt was EUICC51 (FFS) made. In the event that this Notification is unsuccessful but the Profile is deleted anyway, the Notification SHALL be retained and sent as soon as connectivity becomes available again. Table 88: eUICC Requirements
4.3 eUICC Eligibility Checkmodified
…eUICC. The set of information sent by the eUICC to the SM-DP+ for eligibility checking purposes is referenced herein as the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. … Some eUICC eligibility check parameters MAY be required due to Device capabilities which must be supported by the Profile/eUICC and delivered as part of the eUICC Eligibility Check Information set. Note: Device capability refers to a Device feature or service-enabling function provided by the Device that MAY have a direct effect on the content of the Profile or the procedure used to download the Profile, and in turn requires support from the eUICC.
4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirementsmodified
…eUICC Eligibility Check ELG1 Information. The eUICC SHALL include the available memory in the eUICC Eligibility ELG2 Check Information. The eUICC SHALL declare … whetherin athe ProfileEligibility Check Information if it is currentlyunable installedELG3 into accept an additional Profile. The eUICC SHALL provide a valid current Certificate to the ELG3SM-DP+ Eligibilitysigned CheckELG4 Information.by the EUM. ELG5 The eUICC SHALL provide an identification of the EUM. ELG6 The eUICC SHALL provide the current OS version. The eUICC SHALL provide Device enabler information relating to services ELG7 that MAY need Profile support (e.g. NFC enablers). Eligibility Check Information SHALL be integrity and authenticity protected ELG8 by ELG4 the eUICC for its sending to the SM-DP+. The eUICC SHALL indicate the application runtime environment version ELG9 and libraries versions supported in eUICC Eligibility Check Information. The eUICC SHALL indicate cryptographic algorithms and their respective ELG10 key lengths supported in the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. The eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version it is supporting. This ELG11 parameter SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility check. The eUICC SHALL indicate its current certification status. This parameter ELG12 SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility check. If the eUICC is NFC capable (e.g. CAT3) it SHALL indicate its support to the ELG13 relevant NFC services including its current certification status. The eUICC SHALL indicate its category (see Annex D). This parameter ELG14 SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check. Table 99: eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements Note: It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and could be used for the eligibility check procedure.
4.4 Device Requirementsmodified
Req no. Description The Device SHALL conform to the terminal requirements within ETSI TS DEV1 102 221 [2] orwith ETSIthe TSexceptions 102as 671defined [3].in this specification. There SHALL be a means for the End User to obtain the EID fromthrough the DEV2 Device.Device software. This SHALL only be possible through the LUI. If an eUICC is within the Device packaging, then the EID SHALL be printed DEV3 in machine readable form on the Device packaging. Bearer connection of the Companion Device to the SM-DP+ SHALL only be determined by the bearer availability. DEV4 Note: The Companion Device MAY use any connectivity method available to connect to the SM-DP+. Devices compliant with the GSMA NFC Handset Requirements 0 SHALL support the Open Mobile API 0 used by the Device applications to DEV5 exchange data with their counterpart applications running in the Enabled Profile on the eUICC. The implementation of the Remote SIM Provisioning specification in the DEV6 Device SHALL not impact the potential use of the SIM Lock mechanism defined in 3GPP TS 22.022 0 In the case where the Device supports both the LPA in the Device, and the DEV7 LPA in the eUICC, the Device SHALL have a mechanism (setting or configuration parameter) that sets which LPA SHALL be used. DEV8 The End User SHALL be able to modify the parameter defined in DEV7. Req no. Description A Device that supports an embedded UICC without an LPA in the eUICC, DEV9 SHALL provide LPA functions. A Device that supports only an embedded UICC with an LPA in the eUICC, DEV10 MAY provide LPA functions. Table 1010: Device Requirements
4.4.1 Device Capability Requirementsadded
Req no. Description There SHALL be a mechanism that is able to provide the Device capabilities DEVCAP1 to the SM-DP+. Table 11: Device Capability Requirements
4.5.1 Device Resetmodified was Device Factory Reset
Req no. Description It SHALL be possible for the End User to perform any type of Device reset FAC1 Invocationwithout affecting the status of the eUICC. The Device FactorySHALL Resetby means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the FAC2 eUICC Memory Reset. The Device SHALL NOTby impactmeans of a secured procedure, trigger/request the eUICC.FAC3 eUICC Test Memory Reset. Table 1112: Device Factory Reset Requirements
4.5.2 eUICC Memory Resetmodified
Req no. Description eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC includingapart thefrom MEM1 Enabledpre-installed ProfileProfiles ifthat any.are MEM2flagged Aas securedpermanent. meanseUICC Memory Reset SHALL bedelete providedall toProfiles enableon the eUICC Memoryregardless Reset.of SuchMEM2 meanstheir asPolicy describedRules inbut MEM2,not SHALLthe includeProvisioning anProfile itemor preinstalled Test Profiles. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be verified in theorder LUIto menuinitiate eUICC MEM3 ofMemory theReset. Device. In addition to MEM3, other secure means MAY be provided to perform the MEM4 eUICC Memory Reset function. The same level of security and User Intent as is offered by MEM4 the LUI based reset function SHALL apply. User Intent and Confirmation Request SHALL apply. Table 1213: eUICC Memory Reset Requirements
4.5.3 eUICC Test Memory Resetadded
Req no. Description eUICC Test Memory Reset SHALL delete all post-issuance installed Test MEMT1 Profiles on the eUICC including the Enabled Test Profile if any. Simple Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to enable eUICC Test MEMT2 Memory Reset. If Test Profiles are not supported, then eUICC Test Memory Reset is not MEMT3 required. Table 14: eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements
4.6 Profile Requirementsmodified was Metadata Requirements
eUICC Metadata = Copy of Profile 1 Data Subset Profile 1 {Data Subset} Profiles’ status (enabled / disabled) Figure 3: eUICC Metadata Representation Req no. Description All Profiles SHALL have a Data Subset which will be included in the META1 associated Metadata. When a Profile is installed, the Metadata SHALL be automatically copied by META2 the eUICC operating system from the Profile Data Subset during Profile installation. The Metadata SHALL at all times reflect the respective data in the Profile with META3 the exception of the nickname which can be edited by the End User. META4 The Metadata SHALL be exclusively stored in the eUICC. META5 The Metadata SHALL be accessible irrespective of the state of the Profile. The Metadata SHALL include a field for the Service Provider name. The Elementary File of the Profile associated with this data SHALL be META6 EFmetservice (a new EF TBD). Note: EFSPN is already used in a different context outside of this specification and could be blank. Req no. Description The Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile. The META7 Elementary File of the Profile associated with this data SHALL be EFiccid. The Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of the Profile. META8 The Elementary File of the Profile associated with this data SHALL be EFmetnick (a new EF TBD). The Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description of the META9 Profile defined by the Operator/Service Provider. The Elementary File of the Profile associated with this data SHALL be EFmettxt (a new EF TBD). META10 The nickname SHALL be End User editable. The Metadata SHALL always be available to the LUI to allow the End User to META11 be informed of installed Profiles in the eUICC. The Metadata SHALL include a field to allow the display of an icon defined by META12 the Operator/Service Provider for the respective Profile. Table 13 Metadata Requirements
4.6.1 Test Profilesadded
Req no. Description It is OPTIONAL for the removable eUICC to support the requirements of TPRO1 Test Profiles described in this section. If Test Profiles are not supported, it SHALL not be possible to download Test Profiles into the eUICC. Test Profiles SHALL NOT be able to authenticate to an Operator’s mobile network using Operator Credentials. The eUICC SHALL ensure that such TPRO2 Profiles cannot be used to connect to any Operator’s mobile network even if authentication information is contained in the Test Profile. TPRO3 A Test Profile SHALL be installed in its own individual ISD-P. TPRO4 Test Profiles MAY be pre-installed on the eUICC. Test Profiles SHALL only be visible and usable when the Device is in TPRO5 Device Test Mode. It SHALL be possible to download, install, enable, disable or delete Test TPRO6 Profiles in the eUICC only in Device Test Mode with the exception of the eUICC Memory Reset operation. Test Profiles, as with any other Profile, SHALL be managed through a TPRO7 certified SM-DP+. The enabling of a Test Profile SHALL override the do not disable Policy TPRO8 Rule. When the Device Test Mode is deactivated, the LPA SHALL disable any TPRO9 enabled Test Profile. When the Test Profile is disabled, the eUICC SHALL enable the Operational TPRO10 Profile that was previously enabled, if any. TPRO11 The Device Test Mode activation SHALL be obfuscated from the End User. When exiting Device Test Mode, an End User notice SHALL be presented TPRO12 to prompt the tester to perform an eUICC Test Memory Reset. Table 15: Test Profiles Requirements The Device MAY implement a mechanism for connecting an external SIM card for the purpose of testing in the context of Device repair, without affecting the state of the eUICC.
4.6.2 Provisioning Profileadded
Req no. Description Provisioning Profiles SHALL be based on the same format structure as PPRO1 described for the Profile (Figure 2). A Provisioning Profile MAY be enabled by the LPA upon End User request for operations defined in PPRO6 if establishment of the connectivity using PPRO2 the currently Enabled Profile is unsuccessful. If this results in an Operational Profile being disabled, the End User SHALL first give consent to the loss of communication provided by the Enabled Profile. Provisioning Profiles and their associated Metadata SHALL not be visible to PPRO3 the End User on the LUI. PPRO4 Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be selectable by the End User. Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be deleted through any action by the End PPRO5 User including the use of eUICC Memory Reset. Provisioning Profile SHALL only be used for the intended purposes of PPRO6 Profile downloading and related Profile maintenance functions. The Provisioning Profile SHALL not be used as an Operational Profile. PPRO7 PPRO6 SHALL be enforceable in the RSP architecture. Table 16: Provisioning Profile Requirements
4.7 Metadata Requirementsmodified was Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+)
Req no. Description META1 All Profiles SHALL have associated Metadata. META2 The Metadata SHALL be stored in the eUICC. META3 The Metadata SHALL be accessible irrespective of the state of the Profile. The Metadata SHALL include a field for the Service Provider name. META4 Note: EFSPN is already used in a different context outside of this specification and could be blank. META5 The Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile. The Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of the META6 Profile. The Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description of the META7 Profile defined by the Operator/Service Provider. META8 The nickname SHALL be editable by the End User. META9 The Metadata SHALL always be available to the LUI. The Metadata SHALL include an OPTIONAL field to allow the display of an META10 icon defined by the Operator/Service Provider for the respective Profile. The Metadata SHALL be able to include a copy of the Policy Rules META11 associated to the Profile. All Profiles SHALL be uniquely identified in the Metadata as Operational, META12 Provisioning or Test Profile. An Operator SHALL be able to access and update the following Metadata of META13 its Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is Enabled: Req no. Description Service Provider name Short description of the Profile Icon of the Profile Table 17: Metadata Requirements
4.8 NFC Requirementsadded
An NFC Device and an NFC eUICC SHALL be compliant with the following list of requirements: Req no. Description NFC1 An NFC Device SHALL be compliant with GSMA TS 26 0. After installation of an Operational Profile, the NFC eUICC SHALL support NFC2 all requirements as specified in the SGP.03 GSMA NFC UICC Requirements Specification 0. The NFC Device SHALL retrieve and enforce access control rules as NFC3 specified in the GlobalPlatform SEAC specification 0. The eUICC SHALL be able to generate proof that the Operational Profile NFC4 has been deleted. All NFC applications and NFC enabling applications (e.g. ARA-M, PPSE, CRS, CREL, etc.) attached to an Operational Profile SHALL be included NFC5 under the ISD-P created for the Profile, either under the MNO-SD or in an SD hierarchy with a self-extradited SSD with authorised management privilege. The NFC eUICC solution SHALL be able to provide assurance to NFC application Service Providers that the combination of an eUICC and NFC6 Operational Profile is trusted. This solution SHALL be based on the CASD that is part of the Operational Profile and scenario Push 2B and scenario 3 as specified by SGP.03 0. If the NFC eUICC is compliant with M4M, the eUICC SHALL reset all the NFC7 M4M virtual cards associated to that Profile when a Profile containing M4M applications is disabled. The appropriate NFC related certification information SHALL be part of the NFC8 information shared with the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check. A NFC Device SHALL at least have an embedded eUICC or have the NFC9 capability to support a removable eUICC that is compliant with CAT3 and SGP.03 0 in either instance. Table 18: NFC Requirements
4.9 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM -DP+)added
4.9.1 SM-DP+ Overviewrenumbered was 4.7.1
…ill be responsible for the lifecycle management of the ISD-P that was created at its request. This is performed via the distinct functions listed below. Figure … 4:3: SM-DP+ Functions Function name Description Creates Profile Packages (i.e. Personalised Profiles, including (IMSI, Ki, Profile Package ICCID,…)) from Profile Descriptions agreed with Operators. This can be an Generation off-line batch or real time process. Profile Package Secures each Profile Package according to the security process creating the Protection the Protected Profile Package. Profile Package Binds the Protected Profile Package to a target eUICC using the security Binding process thus creating the Bound Profile Package. Profile Package Temporarily stores Protected Profile Packages or Bound Profile Packages for Storage for subsequent delivery to the eUICC. Profile Package Securely transmits and installs the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC Delivery through the LPALPA. orSM-DS directlyEvent toNotifies the SM-DS of a pending operation for a specific eUICC. Registration Table 1419: SM-DP+ Function Descriptions
4.7.2 SM-DP+ Requirementsremoved
Req no. Description SMDP1 The SM-DP+ SHALL act on behalf of the Operator. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to initiate the request for ISD-P creation as part SMDP2 of the Bound Profile Package delivery. The SM-DP+ SHALL establish an end-to-end secure channel to the eUICC to SMDP3 download and install Bound Profile Packages via the LPA. The SM-DP+ SHALL allocate a Protected Profile Package for binding to a SMDP4 specific eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator. The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the allocated SMDP5 Protected Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any SMDP6 Certified eUICC. Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound SMDP7 Profile Package delivered by the SM-DP+. Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP+ after completing all SMDP8 production steps, Profile Package Protection, and binding. Once the Bound Profile Package is downloaded, the SM-DP+ SHALL NOT SMDP9 retain a network connection to the LPA/eUICC. End-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC involved in SMDP10 the Profile download and installation SHALL be protected in terms of integrity, authenticity and confidentiality. Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected SMDP11 through encryption. The SM-DP+ SHALL accept “Certificate pinning” operations up to server SMDP12 granularity (refer to [15]). On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile creation and SMDP13 storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure deletion procedures (logically and physically). SMDP14 Past communications associated with Bound Profile Package download and
Req no. Description installation between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC whenever intercepted by a third party, SHALL NOT be recoverable due to the compromise of a single long-term key (i.e. Perfect Forward Secrecy). The transport used for the Bound Profile Package SHALL implement anti- SMDP15 replay mechanisms between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC. Connectivity to the SM-DP+ SHALL be aborted and an explicit error message SMDP16 SHALL be triggered by the SM-DP+ upon failure to verify authenticity of the connecting party. (No message SHALL be sent to the connecting party) After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound Profile Package, the transport encryption procedure SHALL be renewed. SMDP17 If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more than a configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction SHALL be terminated and the Operator SHALL be notified. The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols whenever SMDP18 available (e.g. DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.). The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to avoid DoS SMDP19 attacks. SMDP20 The SM-DP+ SHALL log all Certificate authentication failures. The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC Profile SMDP21 Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by SIMalliance [6]. SMDP22 The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on demand. SMDP23 It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk. The SM-DP+ SHALL send a confirmation of the successfully completed SMDP24 download and installation of a Profile to the Operator. There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between the SM- DP+ and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the Profile. Such a SMDP25 mechanism SHALL either be ordered by the Operator or be performed by the Operator itself. If such deletion mechanism is used, there will be no off-card entity responsible for managing the ISD-P of the installed Profile. SMDP26 The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid. SMDP27 The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid.
Table 15 SM-DP+ Requirements
4.8.2 LPA Requirementsremoved
Req no. Description The LPA SHALL be responsible for instructing the eUICC to perform Local Profile LPA1 Management functions as per End User request. A mechanism SHALL be implemented between any LPA elements outside the LPA2 eUICC, and the eUICC to ensure that the communication is not compromised. A secure mechanism SHALL be implemented between the LUI and the associated LPA3 display or input applications on the Device. Access to the LUI application(s) SHALL be protected according to current best LPA4 practices. This SHALL be enforced by the Device OS. All Local Profile Management Operations SHALL require User Intent (no LPA5 automation). LPA6 LUI access SHALL require User Intent (no automation). LPA7 The End User SHALL be able to easily access the list of installed Profiles. LPA8 Profile Metadata SHALL be protected from unauthorised access. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘enable’ SHALL be supported. This LPA9 operation SHALL allow the End User to select the Profile. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘disable’ SHALL be supported. This LPA10 operation SHALL allow the End User to disable the Enabled Profile. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘delete’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the eUICC. LPA11 The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for the deletion of the Profile. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This LPA12 operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Profiles on the eUICC and relevant associated information through the Metadata. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as described LPA13 in Section 4.5.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ’edit nickname’ SHALL be supported. LPA14 This operation SHALL allow the End User to add or modify a nickname for the selected Profile. The operation SHALL NOT modify the Service Provider name. LPA15 The Local Profile Management Operation “add Profile” SHALL be supported. This
operation SHALL allow the LPA to request an Activation Code in order to download and install a new Profile to the eUICC. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The LPA SHALL NOT be accessible by any applications other than that developed LPA16 by the provider of the LPA for the sole purpose of enabling the services and functions of the LPA. The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Authenticated LPA17 Confirmation. The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Simple LPA18 Confirmation located on the Device. LPA19 Access to the LUI SHALL be protected by an Authenticated Confirmation. LPA20 The mechanism in LPA19 SHALL be selectable/unselectable by the End User. The mechanisms in LPA19 SHALL be prompted to be enabled by default but this LPA21 can be skipped by the End User. The Device SHALL implement a mechanism to protect the LPA access through an Authenticated Confirmation. This Authenticated Confirmation MAY be LPA22 implemented by using the mechanisms implemented in the Device such as phone lock code, fingerprint input, etc. The End User SHALL be able to define dedicated personalised information to LPA23 access the LPA. If the End User selects the protection of access to the LUI (LPA21), then the LPA24 subsequent Authenticated Confirmation at operation level MAY be replaced with a Simple Confirmation. When enforced, any User Intent SHALL allow the End User to cancel the Local LPA25 Profile Management Operation. It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI of a Companion Device allowing input LPA26 from an End User interface on the Primary Device. When a Companion Device LUI allows input from a Primary Device, the Companion Device LUI SHALL be able to restrict the actions that can be applied. For example: LPA27 not offer the eUICC Memory Reset; only ‘enable’ and ‘disable’ operation are exposed. Profile enabling is exposed only if no Profile is already enabled on the Companion Device. The LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be able to request an End User initiated LPA28 action on the Companion Device before the establishment of any proximity secure link (used for inputs into the LUI from another Device). A point-to-point proximity secure link initiated by the End User and offering LPA29 confidentiality and integrity SHALL be established between the Companion and Primary Device for any input executed from the Primary Device. Any required User Intent SHALL only be executed by the LPA on the Companion LPA30 Device. A User Intent input MAY be done in either the Primary or the Companion Device. The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure LPA31 measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI. LPA32 The End User Data used for the User Intent protection (e.g. PIN code, fingerprint)
SHALL be stored in a secure environment. The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the LPA33 internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over such connection, ES8+ and ES9+ can be established. The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally LPA34 shared Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over such connection, ES8+, and ES9+ can be established. The LPA SHALL be able to determine if a connection to the internet and or SM- LPA35 DP+ is available. The LPA SHALL be able to prompt the End User that there is no connection to LPA36 internet and or no connection to the SM-DP+, in order to allow the End User to enable or troubleshoot required connectivity. LPA37 The LPA SHALL only be able to access the eUICC if it has assigned privileges. LPA38 There SHALL only be one LPA on the Device. Any action where the End User MAY be unaware of the consequences about the LPA39 result of the operation, the LUI SHALL offer additional explanation prior to user acceptance. LPA40 The LPA SHALL only handle actions that are described in this specification. LPA41 The LPA SHALL have no part in or trigger the subscription selection process. LPA42 LPA procedures SHALL always be initiated by the LPA itself. LPA43 LPA procedures SHALL not be called by any external (non-LPA) processes.
Table 17 LPA Requirements
4.9.2 SM-DP+ Requirementsmodified was Operator – End User (ESop)
OutReq no. Description SMDP1 The SM-DP+ SHALL act on behalf of scopean Operator. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to initiate the request for ISD-P creation as SMDP2 part of thisthe document.Bound Profile Package delivery. Req no. Description The SM-DP+ SHALL establish an end-to-end secure channel to the eUICC SMDP3 to download and install Bound Profile Packages via the LPA or directly to the eUICC. The SM-DP+ SHALL link a Protected Profile Package for binding to a SMDP4 specific eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator. The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the linked SMDP5 Protected Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any SMDP6 Certified eUICC. Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound SMDP7 Profile Package delivered by the SM-DP+. Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP+ after completing all SMDP8 production steps, Profile Package Protection, and binding. Communication session between the SM-DP+ and the LPA SHALL be SMDP9 terminated by the SM-DP+ after execution of intended Operation(s). End-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC involved SMDP10 in the Profile download and installation SHALL be protected in terms of integrity, authenticity and confidentiality. Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected SMDP11 through encryption. On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile creation SMDP12 and storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure deletion procedures (logically and physically). SM-DP+/eUICC communication SHALL incorporate Perfect Forward SMDP13 Secrecy (PFS). The transport used for the Bound Profile Package SHALL implement anti- SMDP14 replay mechanisms between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC. Connectivity to the SM-DP+ SHALL be aborted and an explicit error message SHALL be triggered by the SM-DP+ upon failure to verify SMDP15 authenticity of the connecting party. (No message SHALL be sent to the connecting party) After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound Profile Package to the LPA, the transport encryption procedure SHALL be renewed. SMDP16 If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more than a configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction SHALL be terminated and the Operator SHALL be notified. The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols whenever SMDP17 available (e.g. DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.). The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC Profile SMDP18 Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by SIMalliance [6]. SMDP19 The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on demand. SMDP20 It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk. Req no. Description The SM-DP+ SHALL send a confirmation of the successfully completed SMDP21 download and installation of a Profile to the Operator. There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between any SM-DP+ and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the Profile. Such a mechanism SHALL either be ordered by the Operator or be SMDP22 performed by the Operator itself. If such deletion mechanism is used, there will be no off-card entity responsible for managing the ISD-P of the installed Profile. SMDP23 The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid. SMDP24 The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Notification to the Operator SMDP25 informing them that a specific Bound Profile Package download is about to start. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an eUICC Eligibility Check Information SMDP26 report and other relevant information (e.g. Activation Code, ICCID, etc.) to the Operator ahead of/prior to the eUICC Bound Profile Package download. SMDP27 The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to perform Event Registrations to the SM-DS. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to request from an Alternative SM-DS not to SMDP28 propagate the Event Registration to the Root SM-DS. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Profile delete Notification to the SMDP29 Operator owning a Profile when a related delete Notification is received from the eUICC. The SM-DP+ SHALL support the following states for a Profile Package, triggered by the Profile Owner: SMDP30 A Profile Package is not released for Profile Package download. A Profile Package is released for Profile Package download. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to select the elliptic curve parameter in the SMDP31 Profile download procedure. It SHALL be possible for a SM-DP+ to conduct an Event Record Query to a SMDP32 (FFS) SM-DS (Root or Alternative) for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations it owns. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event Record on SMDP33 (FFS) the Root SM-DS or the Alternative SM-DS, identified by the EID or the Event-ID over the ES12 interface. Response to a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only occur where the SMDP34 (FFS) Root SM-DS or Alternative SM-DS validates the Event Record ownership. Ownership validation of a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only use SMDP35 (FFS) the requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components of the Event Record held. A SM-DP+ SHALL support all sets of elliptic curve parameters as defined in SMDP36 GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0. Table 20: SM-DP+ Requirements
4.9.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICCadded
Req no. Description The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be ignored if an SM-DP+ DF1 address is present in an AC being presented to the LUI. The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be accessible by the DF2 LPA to establish a connection to this SM-DP+. DF3 The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC MAY be left blank. If the default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC is blank, then the use of the DF4 SM-DS discovery procedure or an SM-DP+ address in an AC SHALL be required to establish the target SM-DP+. No redirection SHALL be supported from a query to the default SM-DP+ DF5 (FFS) address. Table 21: Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements
4.10 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)renumbered was 4.8
Primary Device User End User Interface ESeu User Interface ESeu LPA LUI ES10c eUICC Companion Device Figure 5:4: End User Interaction and Interfaces between a Primary and Companion Device, where the Companion Device MAY have a UI
4.10.1 LPA Overviewrenumbered was 4.8.1
This role exists both within the Device and in conjunction with LPA Services provided by the eUICC, and within the eUICC with the LPA function provided by the eUICC. It provides twothree distinct functionsfunctions, the Local User Interface (LUI), the Local Profile Download (LPD) and the Local Discovery Service (LDS) as described below. Whilst the eUICC alone cannot provide any of these functions without Device interaction, the specific level of interaction will depend upon … of the LPA will be undertaken within the Device. The way this variability is implemented across different Devices and Device types is for further study. Figure … 6:5: LPA Functions Function name Description Local Discovery Service Where required, the LDS is responsible for retrieving pending Event Records from the SM-DS. (LDS) This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound Profile Package Local Profile Package in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile Package Download from the SM-DP+ Download to the LPD in a single transaction, and (ii) the onward (LPD) transfer of the Bound (LPD) Profile Package into the eUICC in segments. This function will depend on network, Device, and eUICC capabilities.capabilities . Local User Interface This function allows Localthe ProfileEnd ManagementUser onto theperform DeviceLocal byProfile theManagement End (LUI) User.on the Device. User Intent hasSHALL to be enforcedenforced. as required. Table 1622: LPA Function Descriptions
4.9.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)removed
Used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services.
4.9.5 LPA – SM-DP+ (ES14)removed
This interface will be provided either by:
An internet connectivity available or provided on the same Device where the LPA resides. or An internet connection shared from another Device via a local go-between connection
Figure 8: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to the SM-DP+
4.9.6 SM-DP+ – LPD (ES9+)removed
For Devices with an LPA, this interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the LPD.
4.9.8 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)removed
Out of scope of this document.
4.9.9 LPD – eUICC (ES10b)removed
The ES10b interface is used by the LPA to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.
4.9.10 LUI – eUICC (ES10c)removed
The ES10c interface is used for Local Profile Management by the End User.
4.9.11 General Interface Requirementsremoved
Req no. Description All interfaces from the eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version INT1 number. The behaviour of all interfaces SHALL support the indicated specification INT2 version number. During the indication of the supported specification version number from the INT3 eUICC to the SM-DP+, the eUICC version SHALL be used or the procedure SHALL fail. See table below. All communicating entities involved in remote Profile Management SHALL INT4 be mutually authenticated.
Table 19 General Interface Requirements
Platform Version 1 (V1) Version 2 (V2) Version 3 (V3)
eUICC V1 Platform uses V1 Platform uses V1 or fails. Platform uses V1 or fails.
eUICC V2 ✗ Platform uses V2 Platform uses V2 or fails.
eUICC V3 ✗ ✗ Platform uses V3
Table 20 eUICC Version vs Platform
4.10.1 eUICC Certificationremoved
Req no. Description CERTEU1 The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS certified [16]. The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance with CERTEU2 GSMA SGP.22 V1.0. CERTEU3 The eUICC Certificate SHALL be signed by the EUM.
Table 21 eUICC Certification Requirements
4.10.2 Operational LPA Modesmodified was SM-DP+ Certification
ReqWhen no.there Descriptionis Thean SM-DP+LPA providerin SHALLthe beDevice requiredand toin declarethe producteUICC, (SM-DP+)then CERTDP1the complianceLPA withto GSMA SGP.22 V1.0. The SM-DP+ SHALL be GSMAused SASis SM-DPspecified partby certifiedthe [17]Device excludingsettings the(DEV7): CERTDP2 communicationLPA within the SM-SR.Device CERTDP3 TheLPA SM-DP+in Certificate SHALL be signed by the GSMA CI. Table 22 SM-DP+ Certification RequirementseUICC
4.10.2.1 LPA in the eUICCadded
LPA functions are provided by the eUICC. Figure 6: LPA in the Euicc
4.10.2.2 LPA in the Deviceadded
LPA functions are provided by the Device. Figure 7: LPA in the Device
4.10.3 LPA Requirementsadded
Req no. Description The LPA SHALL be responsible for instructing the eUICC to perform Local Profile LPA1 Management functions as per End User request. A mechanism SHALL be implemented between any LPA elements outside the LPA2 eUICC, and the eUICC to ensure that the communication is not compromised wherever the LPA is located. A secure mechanism SHALL be implemented between the LUI and the LPA3 associated display or input applications on the Device. Access to the LUI application(s) SHALL be protected according to current best LPA4 practices. This SHALL be enforced by the Device OS. All Local Profile Management Operations SHALL require User Intent (no LPA5 automation). LPA6 LUI access SHALL require User Intent (no automation). LPA7 The End User SHALL be able to easily access the list of installed Profiles. LPA8 The LPA SHALL protect Profile Metadata from unauthorised access. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘enable’ SHALL be supported. This LPA9 operation SHALL allow the End User to select the Profile. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘disable’ SHALL be supported. This LPA10 operation SHALL allow the End User to disable the Enabled Profile. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘delete’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the eUICC. LPA11 The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for the deletion of the Profile. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This LPA12 operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Operational Profiles on the eUICC and relevant associated information through the Metadata. The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’ SHALL LPA13 be supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to edit the default SM- DP+ address. Simple confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as described LPA14 in Section 4.5.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Test Memory Reset’ SHALL be LPA15 supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Test Memory Reset as described in Section 4.5.3. Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The Local Profile Management Operation ’edit nickname’ SHALL be supported. LPA16 This operation SHALL allow the End User to add or modify a nickname for the selected Profile. The operation SHALL NOT modify the Service Provider name. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile’ SHALL be supported. This operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to the LPA17 eUICC. Three options SHALL be supported by the LPA: Profile download via default SM-DP+ Profile download via SM-DS services Profile download via Activation Code Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced except in the case of initial Device setup (LPA62). The LPA SHALL NOT be accessible by any applications other than those LPA18 provided by the provider of the LPA for the sole purpose of enabling the services and functions of the LPA. The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Authenticated LPA19 Confirmation. The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Simple LPA20 Confirmation located on the Device. LPA21 Access to the LUI SHALL be protected by an Authenticated Confirmation. LPA22 The mechanism in LPA21 SHALL be selectable/unselectable by the End User. The mechanisms in LPA21 SHALL be prompted to be enabled by default but this LPA23 can be skipped by the End User. The Device SHALL implement a mechanism to protect the LPA access through an Authenticated Confirmation. This Authenticated Confirmation MAY be LPA24 implemented by using the mechanisms implemented in the Device such as phone lock code, fingerprint input, etc. The End User SHALL be able to define dedicated personalised user credential to LPA25 access the LPA. If the End User selects the protection of access to the LUI (LPA23), then the LPA26 subsequent Authenticated Confirmation at operation level MAY be replaced with a Simple Confirmation. When enforced, any Confirmation Request SHALL allow the End User to cancel LPA27 the Local Profile Management Operation. It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI of a Companion Device allowing input LPA28 from an End User interface on the Primary Device. When a Companion Device LUI allows input from a Primary Device, the Companion Device LUI SHALL be able to restrict the actions that can be applied. For example: LPA29 not offer the eUICC Memory Reset; only ‘enable’ and ‘disable’ operation are exposed. Profile enabling is exposed only if no Profile is already enabled on the Companion Device. The LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be able to request an End User initiated LPA30 action on the Companion Device before the establishment of any proximity secure link (used for inputs into the LUI from another Device). A point-to-point proximity secure link initiated by the End User and offering LPA31 confidentiality and integrity SHALL be established between the Companion and Primary Device for any input executed from the Primary Device. When operating a Companion Device LUI from a Primary Device, any required User Intent or Confirmation Request SHALL only be executed by the LPA on the LPA32 Companion Device. The physical End User input MAY be done in either the Primary or the Companion Device. The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure LPA33 measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI. The End User Data used for the User Intent protection (e.g. PIN code, fingerprint) LPA34 SHALL be stored in a secure environment. The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the LPA35 internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over such connection, ES8+ and ES9+/ES5+ can be established. The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally LPA36 shared Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over such connection, ES8+, and ES9+/ES5+ can be established. The LPA SHALL be able to determine if connectivity to the SM-DP+ is available LPA37 by any means. The LPA SHALL be able to notify the End User that there is no connection to the LPA38 internet and or no connection to the SM-DP+ in order to allow the End User to enable or troubleshoot required connectivity. LPA39 The LPA SHALL only be able to access the eUICC if it has assigned privileges. LPA40 There SHALL only be one LPA on the Device. LPA41 The LPA SHALL only perform operations that are described in this specification. LPA42 LPA procedures SHALL not be called by any external (non-LPA) processes. LPA43 When multiple Operational Profiles are installed, the Local Profile Management Operation ‘enable‘ SHALL first initiate the ‘disable‘ operation for any Enabled Profile prior to initiating the ‘enable‘ operation for the selected Profile. LPA44 The LPA SHALL be able to read the Policy Rules. LPA45 When a Profile with Profile Policy Rules is installed, in the case where End User consent is requested, the LPA SHALL display the consequences of the Policy Rule to the End User. This message SHALL be formulated in a descriptive and non-discriminatory manner (e.g. for “Non-Delete” Policy Rule: “The profile that you are about to install cannot be deleted under the terms you have agreed with your service provider. Approve installation YES/NO?“). Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced with the exception listed in LPA17. LPA46 Prior to downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHALL check the condition for whether the Enabled Profile, if any, has enabled POL RULE1. If this is the case a dedicated message SHALL be displayed identifying the consequences to the End User. Examples of information that may be displayed would be: Enabling of the new Profile will not be possible because the currently Enabled Profile cannot be disabled. The Profile name of the Enabled Profile. For more information, the End User should contact the Profile Owner of this Profile. With displaying this message, the End User SHALL be able to decide on whether to continue the download or to cancel the operation. This dialogue MAY be combined with the regular End User Intent for confirming a Profile download. LPA47 The communication between the User Interface of the Primary Device and the LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be protected (confidentiality, integrity and authentication). LPA48 There SHALL be a mechanism to limit the validity of LPA26 if the End User quits the LPA menu or does not perform the operation within a period of time to avoid the abuse of bypassing the Authenticated Confirmation LPA49 Confirmation Requests for consecutive Local Profile Management Operations MAY be achieved in one step as long as the different actions are clearly explained to the End User. For instance, upon installation of a new Profile, the LPA MAY propose ‘add Profile’ and ‘enable’ into one single step with a single confirmation only (e.g. “Do you want to install profile ‘ProfileName’ on your Device and enable it? Yes / No / Install only”) LPA50 When consecutive operations are achieved in one single step (LPA49), the highest level of confirmation SHALL be applied - i.e. in the case of two operations having respectively Authenticated and Simple Confirmation Requests, the single step SHALL use the Authenticated Confirmation Request. LPA51 The Local Profile Management Operations ‘enable’ (LPA9), ‘disable’ (LPA10), ‘delete’ (LPA11) SHALL be able to trigger a Notification to the SM-DP+ of the respective Profile being managed to indicate that this operation was actioned. This Notification is sent on a best effort basis and SHALL not impact otherwise the operation. LPA52 The LPA SHALL provide a Trusted Link from the End User to the eUICC through the LUI. The End User SHALL be able to configure the LPA such that the automatic Event LPA53 Record retrieval from the SM-DS can be disabled. LPA54 The LPA SHALL be able to read any SM-DS and SM-DP+ addresses configured in the eUICC. It SHALL be possible to check the LPA Integrity. If the integrity check fails, LPA55 communication between the eUICC and the LPA SHALL not occur. LPA Integrity SHALL be ensured using the best practice methods on the targeted LPA56 platform. See Annex G. The polling mechanism in the LPA SHALL have two types of triggers; those that are LPA57 event based, and those that are End User initiated. Event based triggers for polling SHALL be provided. As a minimum this SHALL LPA58 include Device power-up; in addition other triggers MAY be provided. Event based triggers MAY be disabled by the End User. End User initiated triggers for polling SHALL include: The ‘Add Profile’ operation to trigger the default SM-DS if configured, and the LPA59 Root SM-DS. The ‘Update Profile’ operation to trigger the SM-DP+ stored in the Profile. In addition, other manual triggers MAY be provided. If a Profile Package is not yet released for download then the LPA SHALL be LPA60 informed by means of a specific error code. Error/retry handling of the LPA polling mechanism SHALL be implemented e.g. LPA61 advise the End User to retry or automatically retry as appropriate. The corresponding confirmation needs to be enforced in the retry cases. During initial Device setup, if no Operational Profile is already installed, the following procedure SHALL apply in this order: 1. If a default SM-DP+ address is configured, the LPA SHALL contact the LPA62 SM-DP+ to check for a waiting Profile. 2. If no Profile is waiting in (1), then the Root SM-DS address SHALL be contacted to check for the Notification of a waiting Profile. Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced for the procedure described above. The End User SHALL always be able to manually request the retrieval of any waiting Event Record via the LPA if there is no default SM-DP+ address. LPA63 Note: This may be achieved through the combination with existing operations – e.g. pressing “Add Profile” would contact the server to retrieve a Notification The Operator/Service Provider name SHALL be given in the signalling information from the SM-DP+ to the LPA when initiating the download of a Profile and shown LPA64 to the End User before the Profile is downloaded. Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced. The LPA SHOULD present the EID to the End User as both text and in a defined LPA65 scannable format (e.g. QR Code). For the case where a Profile to be disabled and deleted in a combined action is providing the only available connection, the pre-delete Notification SHALL be sent LPA66 (FFS) before the Profile is disabled. The failure of this attempt SHALL not block the deletion nor the connection teardown. If the SM-DP+ stops the Profile download procedure, the LPA SHALL be able to LPA67 notify the End User. Table 23: LPA Requirements
4.10.4 LDS Requirementsadded
Req no. Description The LDS SHALL be able to read out the address(es) described in EUICC LDS1 Error! Reference source not found. and only use the(se) address(es) to connect to the SM-DS Table 24: LDS Requirement
4.11 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)added
4.11.1 SM-DS Overviewadded
The role of the SM-DS is to provide mechanisms that allow an SM-DP+ to inform the LDS within any Device that an SM-DP+ wishes to communicate with it. The purpose of the SM- DS to LDS communication SHALL be informing the LDS of a pending Event The principle of operation remains the same for all use cases. The SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration message for a target Device to a SM-DS. In a simple deployment, only the Root SM-DS is configured on the eUICC. The Root SM-DS address is unique and filled in the eUICC. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM- DS using the same logical location. When the Root SM-DS has an Event-ID for the target Device it will respond with the SM-DP+ address, or if there is no Event-ID the response will be a null response. In a deployment with cascaded SM-DSs, the SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration to an Alternative SM-DS, which may not be configured as the Root SM-DS on the eUICC. This Alternative SM-DS will cascade the Event Registration to the Root SM-DSs. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM-DS and will receive the Alternative SM-DS address. It will then request the Event from the Alternative SM-DS, which will respond with the SM-DP+ address. Figure 8: Alternative Device to Root SM-DS Event Registration Figure 9: Root SM -DS Event Registration Figure 10: Alternative SM -DS Discovery
4.11.2 SM-DS Implementationadded
Two configurations of the SM-DS addresses on the eUICC MAY exist: A Root SM-DS address An Alternative SM-DS address Figure 11: SM-DS Implementation Figure 11 shows both configurations. The Root SM-DS is configured at the time of Device manufacture and is invariant.
4.11.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelinesadded
The following statements SHOULD be considered when defining a technical implementation: A competitive environment on the supply of SM-DS services SHOULD be favoured by the approach. There SHOULD be no single-points-of-failure. Implementation SHOULD inherently provide both vertical and horizontal performance/scalability. There SHOULD be no need for pre-registration of Devices or eUICCs at a certain SM-DS as required in SGP.02 0 (GSMA Embedded SIM for the SM-SR).
4.11.4 SM-DS functionsadded
The SM-DS has three distinct functions: Figure 12: SM-DS Functions Function name Description Event Registration Process by which an Event Record received from a SM-DP+ is stored. Event Deletion Process by which an SM-DP+ can delete its own Event Record. Provides all registered Event Records, upon Discovery Request from Event Retrieval any enquiring LDS. Table 25: SM-DS Function Descriptions
4.11.5 SM-DS Requirementsadded
Req no. Description The SM-DS SHALL enable a LDS to discover its own Event Records SMDS1 registered by SM-DP+(s) or by Alternative SM-DS(s). The SM-DS SHALL not be able to identify the nature of an Event. SMDS2 Note: The nature of the Event may be ‘Profile Package available for download’. All valid Discovery Requests and Event Registrations SHALL be processed SMDS3 in a non-discriminatory manner. The SM-DS SHALL only accept Event Registrations from any authorised and authenticated SM-DP+(s) having a valid SMDS4 Certificate. any authorised and authenticated SM-DS(s) or SM-DS(s) having a valid Certificate. The SM-DS SHALL only accept Discovery Requests authenticated by the SMDS5 corresponding eUICC via the LDS. The SM-DS and the SM-DP+ as well as connected SM-DSs SHALL be SMDS6 mutually authenticated. The SM-DS SHALL NOT have visibility of any data that may be used to SMDS7 compromise the End User´s privacy. The SM-DS SHALL support multiple concurrent Event Registrations per SMDS8 eUICC and SHALL present to the LDS all currently valid Event Records in the same order as they were received by the SM-DS (first in, first out). SMDS9 The SM-DS only stores Event Records destined for specific EIDs. Subscriber Specific data and Profile related contents SHALL NOT be stored SMDS10 within the SM-DS. The SM-DS SHALL NOT allow the harvesting of any information such as SMDS11 Operator, EIDs, Device Manufacturers, Devices, etc. The SM-DS SHALL only return to the LDS, the Event Records related to the SMDS12 served eUICC. The SM-DS SHALL NOT have any contact with the Profile Packages e.g. SMDS13 SHALL NOT store or process any Profile Package. The SM-DS SHALL provide the same data regardless of the status of the SMDS14 Device that queries it (i.e. consistent in time and in geographic location). The SM-DS SHOULD NOT significantly impact the end-to-end provisioning SMDS15 time. SMDS16 The SM-DS SHALL provide defence against DoS attacks. Req no. Description All communications to, from and between entities of the SM-DS SHALL be SMDS17 encrypted. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event Records SMDS18 registered on the SM-DS. An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event SMDS19 Records registered on the Root SM-DS (In response to an SM-DP+ delete operation defined in SMDS18). An Alternative SM-DS SHALL propagate the Event Record to the Root SM- SMDS20 DS if requested by the SM-DP+. If there are multiple Event Records registered on the SM-DS for one SMDS21 eUICC, these SHALL all be sent as a single response. An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an Event Record to an LDS either by the Root SM-DS or via any alternative one selected by the SM-DP+. If the SMDS22 alternative is chosen the Event Record to the LDS SHALL come from this alternative SM-DS. There SHALL be a unique Root SM-DS. SMDS23 Note: This requirement does not forbid the potential load-balancing of this Root SM-DS. SMDS24 The Root SM-DS SHALL be managed by the GSMA. It SHALL be possible for the Alternative SM-DS to conduct an Event Record SMDS25 (FFS) Query to the Root SM-DS for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations it owns. A SM-DS response to an Event Record Query SHALL only confirm Event SMDS26 (FFS) Record existence and SHALL NOT include additional information. An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event SMDS27 (FFS) Record on the Root SM-DS, identified by the EID or the Event-ID over the ES15 interface. Response to a SM-DS Event Record query SHALL only occur where the SMDS28 (FFS) responder validates the Event Record ownership. Ownership validation of a SM-DS Event Record Query SHALL only use the SMDS29 (FFS) requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components of the Event Record held. The SM-DS (Root or Alternative) MAY inform the SM-DP+ directly or via SMDS30 (FFS) another SM-DS, that a Discovery Request from an authorised LDS has been answered by issuing an Event Record. The SM-DS SHALL only inform the Event Record’s owning SM-DP+ or SM- SMDS31 (FFS) DS that it has replied to a Discovery Request. Table 26 SM-DS Requirements
4.11.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedureadded
The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with the Root SM-DS and an Alternative SM-DS (cascade mode). Figure 13: Event Registration/Deletion Procedure Starting Condition: a. The SM-DP+ has an action waiting for a target eUICC identified by the EID. Procedure: 1. The SM-DP+ establishes a secure connection to an Alternative SM-DS of the Profile Owner´s choice. 2. The SM-DP+ notifies the Alternative SM-DS about a pending action. 3. to 4. The Alternative SM-DS registers and confirms the Event Registration. 5. The Alternative SM-DS establishes a secure connection to the Root SM-DS. 6. The Alternative SM-DS informs the Root SM-DS that for the given EID, an Event Record is waiting at the Alternative SM-DS. 7. The Root SM-DS confirms the receipt of the information.
4.11.7 Discovery Request Procedureadded
The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with an Alternative SM-DS and the Root SM-DS (cascade mode). # Figure 14: Discovery Request Procedure Procedure: 1. to 3. In order to generate a Discovery Request, the LDS requests the eUICC to generate an eUICC Authorisation which contains (at least) the eUICC-Certificate and is signed by the eUICC. 4. to 5. The LDS establishes a secure communication to the Root SM-DS. 6. The Root SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by checking the eUICC Authorisation. 7. In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record is waiting, it delivers back: a. The address of the SM-DP+, where an action is waiting. or b. The rest of the following actions: i. The address of the Alternative SM-DS, where an Event Record can be retrieved. ii. The LDS establishes a secure connection to the Alternative SM-DS. iii. The Alternative SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by checking the eUICC Authorisation. iv. In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record has been received, it delivers back the address of the SM-DP+, where an action is waiting. 8. The LPA establishes a connection to the SM-DP+ and the waiting action can be performed.
4.12 Interfacesrenumbered was 4.9
Figure 7:15: Interfaces on the eUICC Architecture with the LPA in the Device Configuration
4.12.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)renumbered was 4.9.1
4.12.2 Operator – End User (ESop)added
This interface is out of scope of this specification.
4.12.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)renumbered was 4.9.3
ESeu is the interface between the End User and the LUI. In a Primary/Companion Device scenario the LUI used SHALL only reside onwithin the Companion Device.Device or its eUICC. The ESeu interface is used to support the following requirements: Req no. Description The Local Profile Management Operations SHALL be executed only over the ESeu1 the ESeu interface. Each Local Profile Management Operation SHALL be explicitly initiated by ESeu2 the End User, verified by User Intent. The ESeu interface SHALL support the triggering and confirmation of the Profile ESeu3 Profile download and installation operation. Table 1827: End User to LUI (ESeu) Interface Requirements
4.12.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)added
The ES6 interface is used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services.
4.12.5 SM-DP+ – LPA in the eUICC (ES5+)added
The ES5+ interface is used to provide a secure transport between the SM-DP+ and the LPA in the eUICC for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package.
4.12.6 SM-DP+ – LPD in the Device (ES9+)added
For Devices with an LPA, the ES9+ interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the LPD.
4.12.7 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)renumbered was 4.9.7
4.12.8 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)added
The ES12 interface allows any SM-DP+ to issue or remove Event Registrations on the SM- DS.
4.12.9 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)added
The ES11 interface allows the LDS to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC.
4.12.10 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)added
This interface is out of scope of this specification.
4.12.11 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)added
The ES10a interface is used between the LDS in the Device and the LPA Services to request the eUICC Authorisation to generate a Discovery Request.
4.12.12 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)added
The ES10b interface is used by the LPD in the Device and the LPA services to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.
4.12.13 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)added
The ES10c interface is used between the LUI in the Device and the LPA services for Local Profile Management by the End User.
4.12.14 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)added
In the case of deployments with cascaded SM-DSs, the ES15 interface is used to connect the SM-DSs.
4.12.15 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)added
This connection will be provided either by: An internet connectivity available or provided on the same Device where the LPA resides or An internet connection shared from another Device via a local go -between connection Figure 16: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to the SM-DP+
4.12.16 General Interface Requirementsadded
Req no. Description All interfaces from the eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version INT1 number. The behaviour of all interfaces SHALL support the indicated specification INT2 version number. During the indication of the supported specification version number from the INT3 eUICC to the SM-DP+, the eUICC version SHALL be used or the procedure SHALL fail. See table below. All communicating entities involved in Remote SIM Provisioning SHALL be INT4 mutually authenticated. The Device and the eUICC are considered as one entity in this context. Table 28: General Interface Requirements Platform Version 1 (V1) Version 2 (V2) Version 3 (V3) eUICC V1 Platform uses V1 Platform uses V1 or fails. Platform uses V1 or fails. eUICC V2 ✗ Platform uses V2 Platform uses V2 or fails. eUICC V3 ✗ ✗ Platform uses V3 Table 29: eUICC Version vs Platform
4.13 Profile Policy Managementadded
4.13.1 Introductionadded
The Profile Policy Management function provides mechanisms by which Service Providers are able to reinforce the conditions or policies (operational and business) under which services are provided to the Subscriber. In some instances this MAY also include the enforcement of the policies set by the Subscriber. Profile Policy Management MAY also be applied with other already existing policy enforcement technologies which are also subject to agreement by the Subscriber. The realisation of the Policy Management function is based on two key elements. The first element is the Profile Policy Enabler which is contained within the eUICC. The second element is a set of defined Profile Policy Rules which are required for the actual enforcement of specific policies.
4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirementsadded
Policy no. Description POL1 A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only be configured within a Profile. POL2 Each Profile MAY have Policy Rules associated to itself. POL3 A Policy Rule SHALL only apply to the Profile that contains it. POL4 Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be consistent across implementations. Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be able to resolve any Profile Policy Rule POL5 conflict. The updating of a Profile’s Policy Rules SHALL be restricted to the Profile POL6 Owner. POL7 The mechanism used for the update of a Policy Rule SHALL be atomic. POL8 The set of Profile Policy Rules SHALL be extensible for future releases. There SHALL be a Profile Policy Rule scheme to allow extensibility of the POL9 Policy Rules, e.g. described like ‘operational command, scope of application, qualification’ A Profile Policy Rule SHALL be enforced whenever a Profile state change is POL10 attempted. Downloading and installing a Profile with the Profile Policy Rule ‘Do not POL11 disable’ SHALL only be possible if no other Operational Profile is currently installed. The LPA and the eUICC SHALL prevent the downloading and installation of a Profile containing Profile Policy Rules that conflict with the Profile Policy POL12 Rules of the already installed Profiles. Note: The technical specification SHALL describe exhaustively each conflict that MAY occur. An Operator SHALL be able to deactivate the Profile Policy Rules of its POL13 Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is enabled. Note: The activation of Profile Policy Rules on the ES6 interface is FFS. Policy no. Description Before a Profile is installed with Profile Policy Rules, the End User SHALL be able to be notified about the Profile Policy Rules and if notified, the installation SHALL thereafter be conditional on End User Authenticated POL14 Confirmation. This prompting may not be needed if the installation is directly allowed by the RAT. The request for End User consent for the installation of Profile Policy Rules POL15 and Profile download MAY be combined into a single prompt therefore requiring a single confirmation by the End User. Profile Policy Rules SHALL be enforced by the Profile Policy Enabler in the POL16 eUICC. The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL only support the Profile Policy Rules POL17 defined in this specification. The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL be capable of supporting all the Profile POL18 Policy Rules as defined in this specification. POL RULE3 SHALL be enforceable in all cases with the exception of the enabling of a Provisioning Profile. POL19 Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification. Allowing the installation of a Profile with Profile Policy Rules SHALL be POL20 subject to compliance with local regulatory requirements. Table 30: Profile Policy Principles
4.13.3 Policy Rulesadded
Policy no. Description The Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be POL RULE1 supported. The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be POL RULE2 supported. The Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is required upon its successful disabling’ SHALL be supported. POL RULE3 Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification. Table 31: Policy Rules Requirements
4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirementsadded
Policy no. Description The Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) SHALL be stored in the Profile Policy POLPPE1 Enabler in the eUICC. The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL enforce the contents of the installed RAT, POLPPE2 if any, only at Profile installation time. The RAT SHALL allow multiple Profile Owners to have Policy Rules enabled POLPPE3 in their Profiles. Policy no. Description The RAT SHALL be able to support specific configurations which allow a set POLPPE4 of or all Profile Policy Rules for any Profile Owner. The RAT SHALL only be installed at pre-issuance or during the initial POLPPE5 Device setup provided there are no Operational Profiles installed. POLPPE6 The RAT SHALL not be affected by the eUICC Memory Reset function. To support identifiable regulatory requirement, a RAT SHALL be able to POLPPE7 support a specific configuration which MAY forbid any Profile Owner to set a specific Profile Policy Rule. If POLPPE7 is set, this information SHALL be part of the eligibility check POLPPE8 information shared between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC. Where the RAT allows the Profile Policy Rules for the Profile being installed, POLPPE9 installation SHALL proceed as stated in POL14. The RAT SHALL be able to support a setting to display the consequences POLPPE10 of the Profile Policy Rules to the End User before installation of the Profile. POLPPE11 The OEM or EUM SHALL be responsible for providing the RAT. A fixed RAT SHALL be implemented in the eUICC. POLPPE12 Note: The allowed RAT configuration(s) are detailed in Annex H. Table 32: Profile Policy Enabler Requirements
4.14 Certificationrenumbered was 4.10
4.14.1 eUICC Certificationadded
Req no. Description CERTEU1 The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS certified 0. The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance with CERTEU2 GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0. The eUICC SHALL be certified according to the Protection Profile defined CERTEU3 by the GSMA (TBD). The eUICC Protection Profile SHALL at least include the following CERTEU4 elements: platform service manager, ISD-R, Profile storage and isolation of Profiles. The eUICC protection Profile SHALL be equivalent to the eUICC Protection CERTEU5 Profile defined in SGP.05 0. The Evaluation Assurance Level of the eUICC Protection Profile SHALL be (at least) EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 (EAL 4+) or CERTEU6 equivalent. Note: A study needs to be performed in terms of assurance level by FASG. The eUICC public key Certificate used for authentication SHALL contain the CERTEU7 EID. The eUICC public key Certificate(s) SHALL contain the technical reference CERTEU8 of the product, for example the Common Criteria certification report number. CERTEU9 The EUM Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI. Req no. Description The eUICC Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by the EUM using its EUM CERTEU10 Certificate (CERTEU9Error! Reference source not found.). Table 33: eUICC Certification Requirements
4.14.2 Device Complianceadded
Req no. Description There SHALL be a compliance process for all parts of Local Profile CERTDEV1 Management implementations in accordance with the GSMA. Table 34: Device Certification Requirement
4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certificationadded
Req no. Description The SM-DP+ provider SHALL be required to declare product (SM-DP+) CERTDP1 compliance with GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0. CERTDP2 The SM-DP+ SHALL be certified according to GSMA SAS 0. SM-DP+ elements SHALL use Hardware Security Modules (HSM) for cryptographic related operations (key storage, derivation, cryptographic CERTDP3 operations). Note: This is to be covered by the SAS document “HSM certified according to FIPS 140-2 level 3 or higher” The SM-DP+ SHALL implement privileges isolation (Log, Audit, CERTDP4 Operation, and Administration). The SM-DP+ SHALL implement operating system hardening CERTDP5 mechanisms. The SM-DP+ SHALL implement separation of control, user and CERTDP6 administrative planes. The SM-DP+ SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration CERTDP7 operation. SM-DP+ hard drives and backup mediums used for storing Profiles CERTDP8 SHALL be ciphered. The private key of SM-DP+ Certificate used for mutual authentication CERTDP9 with eUICC SHALL be protected and stored in HSM according to CERTDP3. The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to mitigate CERTDP10 against DoS attacks. CERTDP11 The SM-DP+ SHALL log all Certificate authentication failures. CERTDP12 The SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI. Table 35: SM-DP+ Certification Requirements
4.14.4 SM-DS Certificationadded
Req no. Description The SM-DS provider SHALL be required to declare product compliance with CERTDS1 GSMA SGP.22 0. CERTDS2 The SM-DS SHALL be certified according to the relevant GSMA SAS. The SM-DS SHALL implement isolation of privileges (Log, Audit, Operation, CERTDS3 Administration). CERTDS4 The SM-DS SHALL implement operating system hardening mechanisms. The SM-DS SHALL implement separation of control, user and CERTDS5 administrative planes. The SM-DS SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration CERTDS6 operation. CERTDS7 SM-DS hard drives and backup mediums SHALL be ciphered. CERTDS8 The SM-DS Certificate SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI. Table 36: SM-DS Certification Requirements
4.14.5 LPA Certificationadded
Req no. Description There SHALL be a certification process for all the LPA elements CERTLPA1 communicating with Remote SIM Provisioning entities. The certification process SHALL ensure that Local Profile Management CERTLPA2 Operations are sent by authorised LPA elements only. The certification process SHALL ensure a mechanism exists to block CERTLPA3 compromised LPAs. CERTLPA4 The LPD SHALL authenticate the SM-DP+ during the TLS session. CERTLPA5 The LDS SHALL authenticate the SM-DS during the TLS session. The LPA SHALL only accept Certificates signed by a GSMA CI for server CERTLPA6 authentication. Table 37: LPA Certification Requirements
4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Managementadded
Req no. Description CERTPK1 The eUICC SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+. CERTPK2 The LPD SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+. CERTPK3 The LDS SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS. The LDS authentication of an SM-DS using an invalid Public Key Certificate CERTPK4 SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop. The LPD authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key CERTPK5 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11CERTPK1), and on-going communication SHALL stop. Req no. Description The SM-DP+ authentication of an eUICC using an invalid Public Key CERTPK6 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop. The eUICC authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key CERTPK7 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop. The GSMA CI SHALL revoke the Public Key Certificate of any entities (SM- CERTPK8 DP+, SM-DS, EUM) if it is compromised (e.g. private key theft). CERTPK9 The eUICC SHALL be able to support a set of GSMA CIs. A Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if: it has a valid signature it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a trusted chain of Certificates up to a GSMA CI. Certificate Path validation SHALL follow the process defined in RFC 5280 00. CERTPK10 it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in the trust chain has been revoked it has not expired If any of these applicable verifications fail, the Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as invalid. The eUICC, LPA, SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL have knowledge of revoked CERTPK11 Public Key Certificates. Table 38: Public Key Certificates Management Requirements
5.1 LPA Initiated Downloadadded
5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirementsadded
Req no. Description The LPA SHALL use any Root SM-DP+ or default SM-DS address LID1 populated on the eUICC if it has not been provided already by the Activation Code. In the context of LID1, if both a Root SM-DP+ and a default SM-DS address LID2 are populated, the LPA SHALL first contact the SM-DP+ and then SM-DS to initiate a Remote SIM Provisioning transaction. Table 39: LPA Initiated Download Requirements
5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedureadded
This following procedure describes the Events that are part of the Profile Package download and installation procedure initiated by the LPA. Figure 17: Profile Download Procedure Start conditions: a. The Subscriber has completed the Subscription process to the selected Operator/Service Provider offer. b. The Profile ordering process related to this Subscription has been completed (i.e. an assigned Protected Profile Package is stored on the SM-DP+). Procedure: 1. The LPA initiates Profile Package download and identifies the address of the SM-DP+ where the Profile is stored and available for download (via e.g. URL, QR code, manual input, etc) as well as other information provided (e.g. Token, SMDPId, Confirmation Code). 2. The LPA authenticates the SM-DP+ through establishing a TLS connection with the SM-DP+, and verifying the SMDPid if such information has been provided. 3. to 4. The LPA gets an eUICC challenge 5. to 6. The LPA sends the eUICC challenge and any other relevant information to the the SM-DP+. 7. to 9. The SM-DP+ signs the eUICC challenge, and generates a DP_Challenge to be sent back to the eUICC. 10. The LPA sends the material received by the SM-DP+ and the AC Token to the eUICC; the eUICC checks the SMDPid and authenticates the SM-DP+. 11. The eUICC sends back a signed set of information including the DP_Challenge, the AC Token, the EID and its Certificate to the LPA. 12. The End User confirms the download of the Profile, optionally with the display of the Profile name of the Operator. 13. The LPA sends the set of information received in Step 11 from the eUICC to the SM-DP+. 14. The SM-DP+ verifies the signature; the eUICC is authenticated. 15. to 16. OPTIONAL: The eUICC Eligibility Check and Profile binding functions are performed by the SM-DP+. 17. to 22. OPTIONAL 17. The Operator is notified about the Profile Package that is about to be downloaded. 18. If the Operator has been notified, it MAY request to stop the download process by indicating an error code to the SM-DP+. 19. If the Operator sends an error code to the SM-DP+, the SM-DP+ stops the download process and indicates the error code to the LPA. 20. The LPA notifies the End User with an appropriate message. 21. to 22. The SM-DP+ MAY receive information from the Operator to prepare the appropriate Profile Package. 23. to 25. The Bound Profile Package is sent to the eUICC and installed on the eUICC. 26. The Profile Package download report is sent from the SM-DP+ to the Operator. End Condition: a. The Profile is installed in the eUICC in a Disabled state
5.2 Profile Download with Activation Coderenumbered was 5.1
5.2.1 Activation Code Requirementsrenumbered was 5.1.1
Req no. Description TheWhere used, the Activation Code SHALL betrigger usedthe to download of a Bound AC1 Profile Package AC1 from a specific SM-DP+. The Activation Code SHALL comprise of the following parameters: SM-DP+ address AC2 Activation Code Token (Includes OPTIONAL Confirma … C5 manual typing and QR code scanning. All Activation Code procedures SHALL be implemented natively as part of the AC6 LPA. The Activation Code procedure SHALL … conditionally be automatically offered to the End User during initial Device set-up. AC7 This automatic setting SHALL NOT apply if a Profile is already provisioned. AC7 No Authenticated Confirmation is required. Note: For example this could be inappropriate from an open market cellular- enabled notebook computer. Following the Activation Code procedure, the Profile Package download AC8 procedure SHALL be used. The Activation Code procedure SHALL preserve eco-system secur … vice Provider. The Activation Code request to the SM-DP+ SHALL be extended by the LPA AC12 with the EID after the specific SM-DP+ has been authenticated. Table … 2340: Activation Code Requirements
5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedurerenumbered was 5.1.2
The Activation Code procedure defines a common functionality which allows the Subscriber or the End User on behalf of the Subscriber to “activate” a Device by means of requesting the download of an OperatorOperational Profile from the Device itself. Figure 9:18: Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure Start Conditions: a. A Subscription has been established by the Subscriber. b. An Activation Code has been prov … ts the Activation Code to the LPA through the LUI. 2. The LPA parses the Activation Code parameters to recognise the SM-DP+ address, the Activation Code Token, … the LPA Mode and optionally the SMDPid;SMDPid. inIn addition, the LPA MAY parse in the Activation Token the information that a Confirmation Code is required. 3. If the Confirmation Code parameter in the Activati … e supported eSVN to the SM- DP+. Note: Prior to this step a HTTPs session SHALL be established between the LPA and the SM-DP+ based on a public key of the Root … certificateCertificate stored in the Device which includes authentication using the TLS Certificate and checking for the presence of the SMDPid in the TLS Certificate used for the TLS session. 8. Upon receiving the nonceeUICC and the associated eSVN, the SM-DP+ creates nonceSMDP and signs both the nonceSMDP and the nonceeUIC… …
5.3 Local Profile Managementadded
5.3.1 Local Profile Management Proceduresrenumbered was 5.2
5.3.1.1 Enable Profileadded
This procedure performs the enabling of a target Profile. The request is given by the End User to the LPA. Figure 19: Enable Profile Procedure Start conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. Procedure: 1. The End User makes a Profile enable request on the LPA. 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA sends a Profile enable operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the eUICC. 4. The ISD-R checks if applied Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the Profile to be enabled 5. If there is a conflict with Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the End User via the LPA. 6. The target Profile is enabled. 7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the enabling of the Profile. 8. The End User is informed via the LPA. End conditions: a. The target Profile is enabled.
5.3.1.2 Disable Profileadded
Profile disabling can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA. Figure 20: Disable Profile Procedure Start conditions: a. The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. Procedure: 1. The End User makes a Profile disable request on the LPA. 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA sends a Profile disable operation to the ISD-R on the eUICC. 4. The ISD-R checks if applied Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the Profile to be disabled. 5. If there is a conflict with Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the End User via the LPA. 6. The ISD-R disables the target Profile. 7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the disabling of the Profile. 8. The End User is informed via the LPA. End conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled.
5.3.1.3 Delete Profileadded
Profile deletion can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA. Figure 21: Delete Profile Procedure Start conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. Procedure: 1. The End User makes a Profile deletion request on the LPA. 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA sends a Profile deletion operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile. 4. The ISD-R checks if applied Policy Rules permits the Profile to be deleted. 5. If there is a conflict with Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the End User via the LPA. 6. The ISD-R erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P. 7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the Profile deletion. 8. The Metadata for the target Profile is erased. 9. The End User is informed via the LPA. 10. The LPA sends a delete Notification to the SM-DP+ that originally installed the Profile. End conditions: a. The target Profile is deleted.
5.2.1 Enable Profileremoved
This procedure performs the enabling of a target Profile.The request is given by the End User to the LPA.
Figure 10: Enable Profile Procedure
Start conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management.
Procedure: 1. The End User makes a Profile enable request on the LPA. 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA sends a Profile enable operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the eUICC. 4. The target Profile is enabled. 5. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the enabling of the Profile. 6. The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions: a. The target Profile is enabled.
5.2.2 Disable Profileremoved
Profile disabling can be achieved by the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.
Figure 11: Disable Profile Procedure
Start conditions: a. The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management.
Procedure: 1. The End User makes a Profile disable request on the LPA. 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA sends a Profile disable operation to the ISD-R on the eUICC. 4. The ISD-R disables the target Profile. 5. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the disabling of the Profile. 6. The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled.
5.2.3 Delete Profileremoved
Profile deletion can be achieved by the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.
Figure 12: Delete Profile Procedure
Start conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management.
Procedure: 1. The End User makes a Profile deletion request on the LPA. 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA sends a Profile deletion operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile. 4. The ISD-R erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P. 5. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the Profile deletion. 6. The Metadata for the target Profile is erased. 7. The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions: a. The target Profile is deleted.
5.3.1.4 Add/Update Profile Nicknamerenumbered was 5.2.4
…ute a nickname to a Profile for ease of use. Note that adding or changing a nickname SHALL NOT affect any other data or other Metadata for that Profile. Figure … 13:22: Add/Update Profile Nickname Procedure Start conditions: a. User Intent has been verified. b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User. c. The LPA is … l Profile Management. Procedure: 1. The End User requests the update of the nickname on the LPA. 2. The LPA updates the Metadata of the target Profile with the … user’sEnd User’s choice of nickname in the eUICC. End conditions: a. Metadata of the target Profile has been updated with the user’sEnd User’s choice of nickname.
5.3.1.5 Query Profile Metadatarenumbered was 5.2.5
This procedure will allow the End User to query the metadataMetadata of the Profiles accessible to the End User. The result SHALL display all (or parts of) the Metadata for the selected Profile on the eUICC at the time of querying. No changes are made to any data on the eUICC as a result of this procedure. Figure 14:23: Query Profile Metadata Procedure Start conditions: a. The LPA is authenticated to eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. b. The list of Profiles accessible to the End User is displayed by the LPA(LUI). Procedure: 1. The End User selects a Profile to query. 2. The LPA receives a query request from the End User. 3. The LPA requests Profile Metadata from the eUICC. 4. The LPA displays the Profile Metadata to the End User on the LUI. End conditions: a. No change to Profile Metadata.
5.3.1.6 eUICC Memory Resetadded
This procedure performs the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC including its associated Profile Metadata. The request is given by the End User to the LPA. Note: A similar procedure will apply to perform the eUICC Test Memory Reset of the eUICC. Figure 24: eUICC Memory Reset Procedure Start conditions: a. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. b. The eUICC Memory Reset option is displayed by the LPA (LUI). Procedure: 1. The End User makes an eUICC Memory Reset request on the LPA (LUI). 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA (LUI) displays a message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ to the End User. 4. The End User confirms the conformity with the consequences to the LPA. 5. The LPA sends an eUICC Memory Reset operation to the eUICC. 6. The eUICC deletes the Profile on the eUICC even if it is an Enabled Profile including the Metadata associated with it. 7. The eUICC informs the LPA of the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC. 8. The End User is informed via the LPA (LUI). 9. The LPA sends a delete Notification to each SM-DP+ that originally installed the Profile. End conditions: a. The Profile is deleted from the eUICC.
5.2.6 eUICC Memory Resetremoved
This procedure performs the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC including its associated Profile Metadata. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.
Figure 15 eUICC Memory Reset Procedure Start conditions: a. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile Management. b. The eUICC Memory Reset option is displayed by the LPA (LUI).
Procedure: 1. The End User makes an eUICC Memory Reset request on the LPA (LUI). 2. User Intent is verified. 3. The LPA (LUI) displays a message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ to the End User. 4. The End User confirms the conformity with the consequences to the LPA. 5. The LPA sends an eUICC Memory Reset operation to the eUICC. 6. The eUICC deletes the Profile on the eUICC even if it is an Enabled Profile including the Metadata associated with it. 7. The eUICC informs the LPA of the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC. 8. The End User is informed via the LPA (LUI).
End conditions: a. The Profile is deleted from the eUICC.
5.3.1.7 Add Profile with Activation Coderenumbered was 5.2.7
…e downloaded Profile, nor disable an Enabled Profile. Network connectivity is assumed. The download can be initiated by the input of an Activation Code. Figure … 16:25: Add Profile with Activation Code Procedure Start conditions: a. User Intent has been verified. b. The Downloaddownload of a new Profile is allowed on the eUICC. c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Profile download. Procedure: 1. The End User obtains an Activation Code to add a Profile to histheir Device. 2. The LPA requests the End User to enter the Activation Code. 3. Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure as described in Section 5.1.25.2.2 starts. End conditions: a. The Profile has been installed on the End User’s Device. b. Profile Metadata has been updated from the Profile.
5.3.1.8 Edit SM-DP+ Addressadded
This procedure will allow the End User to edit a default SM-DP+ address on to the eUICC. Figure 26: Edit SM -DP+ Address Start conditions: a. There is a default SM-DP+ address in the LPA. b. The End User is willing to edit the default SM-DP+ address Procedure: 1. The End User edits the SM-DP+ Address via the LPA. 2. Simple Confirmation from the User is required. 3. The LPA sends the default SM-DP+ address for storage in the LPA Service. 4. The LPA Service informs the LPA of the storage of the default SM-DP+ address. 5. The End User is informed via the LPA. End conditions: a. The target default SM-DP+ Address is edited in the LPA Services.
A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)modified
… corrupted Profile being pushed to the Subscriber. Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles to INI2 Devices. Table … 2441: New Profile on New Primary Device Risks Profile Deletion Risk Risk description no. Long term gathering of key materials due to a long term storage of delivered … Non-tech-savvy or malicious Subscriber repeatedly deleting Profiles and asking for them IND5 to be reloaded leading to surcharge of provisioning servers. Table … 2542:Profile Profile Deletion Risks Profile Switch Risk Risk description no. INP1 Malicious Profile switching originating from an internal party. Human error leading to the switchin … ing to INP3 a loss of connectivity. Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to INP4 major fraud scenarios. Table … 2643: Profile Switching Risks Profile Swap Risk Risk description no. INS1 Race condition leading to the deactivation of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity. Table 2744: Profile Swapping Risks Cryptographic Related Risks Risk Risk description no. Loss or theft of private keys in one or several Profile Management components lead … aterial during the Profile INO6 creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single point of failure and attack being created. Table … 2845: Cryptographic Related Risks Quality of Service Risk Risk description no. Profile creation burst leading to the inability for the eUICC platforms to deliver exp … QoS2 service level. Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a temporary or QoS3 permanent inability to deliver a Profile. Table … 2946: Quality of Service Risks Non-human or Unpredictable Risk Risk description no. Catastrophic event such as floods, earthquakes, etc. leading to the destruction o … centre. Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the EXC3 provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, SIM vendor…). Table … 3047: Non-human or Unpredictable Risks New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risk Risk description no. EXN1 Malicious pairing of new Device using unattended Primary or Companion Device. Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the loss of confidentiality during EXN2 the provisioning of Profile operations. Risk Risk description no. Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the tampering of registration EXN3 information during provisioning of Profile operations. Risk Risk description no. EXN4 Social engineering leading to the communication of OTP materials to attackers. Man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping during Profile provisioning leading to the loss of EXN5 confidentiality. “Implicit authentication” (e.g. HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of EXN6 authentication or Profile material. Table 3148: New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks Device Swap Risk Risk description no. Malicious Subscriber using race condition scenarios leading to Profiles being activated EXS1 on both Devices. Malicious entity using weak swap procedures in order to compromise authentication EXS2 vectors. Table 3249: Device Swapping Risks Loss of Privacy Risk Risk description no. Improper handling, transport or disclosure of the EID or any user related data PRI1 information … cted and unpredicted PRI2 « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties to spy or compromise Devices or the Subscriber themselves. Table … 3350: Loss of Privacy Risks Others Risk Risk description no. Compromising of exchanges between Profile Management actors leading to the critical EXO1 loss of private keys. EXO2 Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios. Table 3451: Other Risks Creation Process Req Requirement description no. Profiles failing to be created SHALL be securely deleted or at least purged of CRE1 authentication vectors. Req Requirement description no. Communication between systems participating in the Profile creation SHALL be CRE2 protected in integrity and confidentiality. Table 3552: Creation Process Requirements
B.1 Profile Production Proceduremodified
This section describes a generic implementation. It should be regarded as an example only ; specific implementation MAY be required to address specific security concerns. Within the eUICC, the current functionality of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Just as with current UICCs, Profiles are the responsibility of the Operator and the Profile production is performed upon their request and permission (if not produced by the Operators themselves). The same Operator procedures as in the current UICCs SHALL apply. Figure 17:27: Profile Production Procedure The Profile Production consists of three steps: 1. Profile Description definition: The SM-DP+ creates and registers a Profile Description based on the OperatorOperational Profile Description. 2. Operator Credentials generation: The Operator asks the SM-DP+ to generate Operator Credentials that will be used in the next step. This procedure is OPTIONAL and will not be used if the Operator wants to generate the Operator Credentials during Protected Profile Package generation. Protected Profile Package generation: The Profile Packages will be created, protected and stored. This step (batch type of operation or real time process) is only performed after an order ofwith the respective Operator. 3. Contract conclusion and Link Profile: At the end of the contract conclusion, an Activation Code is delivered to the End User and the Profile MAY be allocated for this contract. Note: The generation of the Bound Profile Package is part of the Profile download with Activation Code procedure in Section 5.1.2.5.2.2.
B.1.1 Profile Description Definitionmodified
The Profile Descriptiondescription definition MAY comprise of the following sequences:sequence: Figure 18:28: Profile Description Procedure Start Conditions:Condition: a. Contractual relationship between the Operator and the SM-DP+. Procedure: 1. The Operator defines its different profileProfile types (identified by a [non-standardised] Profile Description ID) which contains the Network Access Application like USIM, file structure, data and application… …
B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generationadded
This procedure allows the Operator to allocate a set of Operator Credentials on the SM-DP+ without associating them to a specific ProfileDescriptionID. Operator Credentials generation MAY comprise of the following sequence: Figure 29: Operator Credentials Generation Start Condition: a. IMSI, ICCID and other resources have been allocated by the Operator . Procedure: 1. The Operator provides the IMSI, ICCID, type of credential to be created (e.g. Milenage00, TUAK 0 etc.) and other resources that MAY already be allocated to the SM-DP+. It asks the SM-DP+ to securely generate and store a set of Operator Credentials. 2. The SM-DP+ securely generates and stores a set of Operator Credentials based on the Operator’s input with the corresponding IMSI, ICCID and other resources provided. 3. The SM-DP+ confirms the generation of Operator Credentials and provides them to the Operator.
B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generationrenumbered was B.1.2
The Protected Profile Package Generation MAY comprise of the following sequences:sequence: This procedure MAY apply between the Profile Description definition, and the Contract conclusion and Link Profile, depending on whether the Protected Profile Package is created on demand or prepared in advance. Figure 19:30: Protected Profile Package Generation Procedure Start Conditions: a. Profile Description definition Procedure: 1. The Operator orders the Protected Profile Package generation by providing the SM- DP+SM-DP+ with the Profile Description ID and some corresponding Operator input data (credentials e.g. ICCID, IMSI).The Operator input data required for Protected Profil… …
B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profilerenumbered was B.1.3
…the contract. Activation Code with unknown EID: The EID is not given by the Subscriber to the Operator during the conclusion of the contract. The EID is only … providedprovide d to the SM-DP+ during the Profile download procedure and is given back from the SM-DP+ to the Operator. Activation codeCode with EID provided to the OperatorOperator: in step 2 of Figure 22: The EID is not immediately given by the Subscriber during the contract conclusion, but provided in step 2two to the Operator. The contract reference MAY be, but not necessarily, any Activation Code parameter (e.g. token), ICCID or the IMSI. In any case, the SM-DP+ SHA… …
B.1.4.1 Activation Code with Known EIDrenumbered was B.1.3.1
Figure 20:31: Activation Code with Known EID Procedure Procedure: Steps 1-11 inError!in ReferenceFigure source31: not found.: Contract conclusion with known EID 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator and provides the EID during this process. 2. to 5. Alternatively ‘IC … he EID, IMSI and ICCID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the different parameters and confirms this to the Operator. 6. to 10. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by … SM-DP+SM -DP+ prior to Profile download procedure’: The Operator sends the EID, the IMSI and the Profile Description ID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates an ICCID to a corr … ract reference). End Condition: a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the Operator. b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future … download Profile download procedure request.
B.1.4.2 Activation Code with Unknown EIDrenumbered was B.1.3.2
Figure 21:32: Activation Code with Unknown EID Procedure Procedure: Steps 1-6 inError!in ReferenceFigure source32: not found.: Contract conclusion without EID 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge aboutof the target eUICC (EID). 2. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the Profile (ICCID) 3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by … ract reference). End Condition: a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the Operator. b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future … download Profile download procedure request.
B.1.4.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operatoradded
Figure 33: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure 33Error! Reference source not found.: Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator 1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of the target eUICC (EID). 2. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the Profile (ICCID) 3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator. 6. The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the corresponding information (contract reference). 7. After the Subscriber has chosen the Device/eUICC, the EID is provided together with the contract reference to the Operator. 8. to 10. The Operator requests the linking of the eUICC (EID) and Profile (ICCID) by the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the EID and the ICCID and confirms this to the Operator. 11. The Operator confirms the linking of the EID to the corresponding contract to the Subscriber. End Condition: a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the Operator. b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.
C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)added
This annex provides an example diagram for the implementation of Local Profile Management Operations and describes how the different confirmation levels MAY be applied. Figure 34: Example Flow for Device & LPA Authenticated Confirmation Access PIN Setup / Settings
D eUICC Categories (Normative)added
The following table provides eUICCs categories defined for Remote SIM Provisioning products. Role no. Description Basic eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features: Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 64kB CAT1 ISO interface PPS 96 BIP over HTTPS features Medium eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features: Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 384kB ISO interface PPS 97 CAT2 BIP over HTTPS features Processor >= 25MHz Crypto processor >= 100MHz Memory Protection Unit Contactless eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features : Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 1024kB ISO interface PPS 97 CAT3 BIP over HTTPS features Processor >= 25MHz Crypto processor >= 100MHz Memory Protection Unit Table 53: eUICC Categories
D.1 eUICC Requirementadded
Req no. Description EUICCSHA1 The eUICC SHALL support SHA-1. Table 54: eUICC Requirement
E LPA Settings (Informative)added
Figure 35: LPA Settings
F Certifications Chain and Security Modeladded
: Manufacturing process : Business process CI : Remote Profile Management : Local Profile Management CI Cert Cert : Public key Certificate CI Cert EUM SM-DP+ ES9+: eUICC Cert, EUM Cert ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert, eUICC Cert eUICC ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert LPA PK eUICC Cert, EUM Cert ES10b: Figure 36: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the Device : Manufacturing process : Business process : Remote Profile Management CI : Local Profile Management Cert : Public key Certificate CI Cert, CI Cert, CI Cert, SM-DS Cert EUM Cert SM-DP+ Cert SM-DS EUM SM-DP+ ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert, ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert ES9+: eUICC Cert, ES11: eUICC Cert, ES11: SM-DS Cert eUICC Cert EUM Cert EUM Cert ES10a: eUICC Cert, ES10b: eUICC Cert, EUM Cert EUM Cert LPA eUICC LPA ES10a: SM-DS Cert ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert Figure 37: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the eUICC
F.1 Security Modeladded
The Security Model defines the trust relationships between all the active components of the eUICC ecosystem with an LPA in the Device. The figure below shows only the end-to-end logical links where cryptographic keys and sensitive data are sent. The different links define the end-to-end trust relationship between entities. We distinguish a hierarchy of seven trust links with link 1 being the most significant and link 7 being the least significant. If trust link 1 is broken, all trust links will be broken as a result. If trust link 2 is broken, trust link 1 remains intact however all other trusted links are compromised or broken. Figure 38: Trusted Link with LPA in the Device Figure 39: Trusted Link with LPA in the eUICC Trust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of link involved compromises trust link TL1 Trust introduced onto Out of The CI public key, The trust of the entire the eUICC by the scope the EUM’s security model is issuing EUM to enable Certificate, breached and all future remote the EUM’s keyset, eUICCs issued under management and the eUICC keys, the the model cannot be authorisation by the OS, and the Security trusted. SM-DP+ and possibly Domains. the EUM: eUICC keys Trust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of link involved compromises trust link (EUM & CI keyset eUICC Certificates). TL2 Trust placed in the CI’s Out of The EUM and SM- Loss of Operator verification of the scope DP+ Certificates. trust on the EUM and EUM, SM-DP+, and SM-DP+ the resulting Certificate issuance. TL3 Trust placed in the ES2+ The eUICC Loss of Operator activities for eUICC ES8+ Certificate or trust on the eUICC eligibility and remote eligibility check and/or SM-DP+. attestation from the failure. ISD-R on the target eUICC to the Operator via the SM-DP+. Provides eUICC Certificate, EID, reference to its certification and EUM to the Operator and SM-DP+. TL4 Trust placed in the ES2+ SM-DP+ Certificate Loss of Operator activities for Profile ES8+ eUICC Certificate or trust on the SM-DP+ data transfer from the eligibility check and/or eUICC. Operator via the SM- failure. DP+ to the ISD-R on the target eUICC. Protects the Profile and associated credentials and keys (NAAs, OTA keys, ISD-R access, ISD-P SD creation …) with only the Operator, SM- DP+ and the eUICC. TL5 Trust placed in the ES2+ SM-DP+ Certificate Operator loss of trust information exchange on SM-DP+. between the Operator and the SM-DP+ for Link Profile requests. TL6 Trust placed in the ESeu LPA security eUICC loss of trust mechanisms provided on LPA. by the LPA: Local Profile Management, Local Profile Trust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of link involved compromises trust link Management Operations TL7 Trust placed in the ES9+ LPA security or SM- SM-DP+ loss of trust TLS session DP+ security. on LPA or LPA loss of trust on the SM- DP+. TL8 Trust in the discovery ES11 LDS security or SM- LDS loss of trust on process DS security. the SM-DS and vice versa. TL9 Trust placed on TLS ES5+ eUICC security or SM-DP+ loss of trust session SM-DP+ security. on the eUICC and vice versa TL10 Trust in the discovery ES11 eUICC security or SM-DS loss of trust process SM-DS security. on the eUICC and vice versa. TL11 Trust in the UI ESeu Device security Loss of trust on the Device Table 55: Trusted Link Descriptions Compromised Impacted Description Impact of loss of Countermeasures element Paths trust eUICC SP1, SP3, The eUICC The eUICC can no Revoke the Certificate SP4, SP9, keys and longer be trusted. of the eUICC. SP10 EUM’s Keyset. MNO and SM-DP+ loss of trust on eUICC. CI SP2 The EUM, SM- Loss of Operator trust Repair/Replace CI. DS, and SM- in the EUM, SM-DS Generate new CI DP+ and SM-DP+. Certificate and new Certificates. Certificate for the EUM, SM-DS and SM- DP+ following the SAS process. Remote repair of already issued eUICCs: new CI public key. EUM SP1, SP2 Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the certification. Operator and SM-DP+ EUM. Remote repair on the EUM and its of already issued eUICCs. eUICCs: new EUM Certificate, new eUICC Certificate. Compromised Impacted Description Impact of loss of Countermeasures element Paths trust SM-DP+ SP3, SP4, Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the SM- SP5, SP7, certification. Operator, LPA, SM-DS DP+. New SM-DP+ SP8 and eUICC on the SM- Certificate. DP+. SM-DS SP8 Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the SM- certification. Operator, LPA, SM- DS. New SM-DS DP+ and eUICC on the Certificate. SM-DS. LPA SP6, SP7, LPA security Loss of trust from the LPA repair by the SP8 failure. SM-DP+, SM-DS and Device Manufacturer. eUICC on the LPA. Device SP11 Device Loss of trust in the LUI in the eUICC self- security failure Device UI protected with User Intent capture mechanisms (i.e. Captcha Code) Table 56: Impact of Compromising Trusted Links and Countermeasures The signer is responsible for the revocation of the Certificates it has signe d. This section describes how the new Certificates are pushed to concerned entities according to the security model. SM-DP+ trusts the CI EUM trusts the CI eUICC trusts the EUM and the CI Req no. Description The new SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM- CERT1 DP+ by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair. The new SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-DS CERT2 by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair. The new EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the EUM by a GSMA CI CERT3 upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair. The EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the CERT4 EUM Note: See details in section 4.1.1.1. The CI Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the EUM CERT5 Note: See details in section 4.1.1.1. CERT6 Certificates SHALL be revocable. Neither the End User nor any other party SHALL be able to prevent CERT7 Certificate revocation. The End User SHALL not be allowed to use Remote SIM Provisioning CERT8 functions with revoked Certificates. Req no. Description The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+ SHALL be revoked if required CERT9 (e.g. loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification requirements). The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS SHALL be revoked if required (e.g. CERT10 loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification requirements). The Public Key Certificate of the EUM SHALL be revoked if required (e.g. CERT11 loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning certification requirements). Table 57: Certificate Requirements
G LPA Integrityadded
The LPA must be protected against misuse or being compromised by means of implementing standard procedures. For cases where the LPA is in the Device, the LPA integrity SHALL be guided by the following Device classes: Device class Description Example of Devices Devices with an open operating Smartphones, Tablets, Laptops, system where mechanisms such as Advanced Wearables Advanced secure boot and platform signing of applications are available and used to protect the LPA. Devices without possibility to install Connected sensors, Simple applications. The attack surface of Wearables, Single use case devices the LPA is minimal due to the locked Basic down nature of these Devices. Simple mechanisms to ensure that the LPA is not compromised SHALL be taken. Table 58: Device Classes
H Rules Authorisation Table (Normative)added
Annex H reflects the RAT table configuration(s) that SHALL be configured in embedded UICC. Legend: The following colours apply Line color Mandatory to be included Optional The following RAT SHALL apply to all products PR Operators User consent Mandatory part POL RULE1 * YES of the RAT table POL RULE2 * YES Table 59: RAT configuration Additional lines can be added to the RAT table to reflect agreement between some Operators and OEMs as needed. The OEM can also decide to add lines to the RAT table. PR Operators User consent POL RULE 1 Operator1 NO Mandatory part POL RULE1 * YES of the RAT table POL RULE2 * YES Table 60: RAT configuration Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.
I Document Managementadded
I.1 Document Historyadded
Version Date Brief Description of Change Approval Editor / Authority Company First Release with amendments Carmen Kwok, V1.0 03/12/15 PSMC from Security review. GSMA Carmen Kwok, V2.0 15/07/16 Includes Phase 2 content PSMC GSMA
B.1.3.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator in Step 2removed
Figure 22: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator in Step 2
Procedure: Steps 1-11 inError! Reference source not found.: Activation code with EID provided to the Operator in Step 2
1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge about the target eUICC (EID). 2. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator. 6. The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the corresponding information (contract reference). 7. After the Subscriber has chosen the Device/eUICC, the EID is provided together with the contract reference to the Operator. 8. to 10. The Operator requests the linking of the eUICC (EID) and Profile (ICCID) by the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the EID and the ICCID and confirm this to the Operator. 11. The Operator confirms the linking of the EID to the corresponding contract to the Subscriber.
End Condition: a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the Operator. b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future download Profile procedure request.
C Document Managementremoved
C.1 Document Historyremoved
Version Date Brief Description of Change Approval Editor / Authority Company First Release with amendments Carmen Kwok, V1.0 03/12/15 PSMC from Security review. GSMA
Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Overview
- 1.2 Scope
- 1.3 Intended Audience
- 1.4 Definition of Terms
- 1.5 Abbreviations
- 1.6 References
- 1.7 Conventions
- 2 Principles
- 2.1 Basic Principles
- 2.2 Profile Principles
- 3 Roles
- 3.1 eUICC Manufacturer
- 3.2 Device Manufacturer
- 3.3 Operator and Service Provider
- 3.4 Subscriber and End User
- 3.5 Certificate Issuer
- 4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture
- 4.1 eUICC Architecture
- 4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
- 4.2 eUICC Requirements
- 4.3 eUICC Eligibility Check
- 4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements
- 4.4 Device Requirements
- 4.4.1 Device Capability Requirements
- 4.5 Device Initiated Requirements
- 4.5.1 Device Reset
- 4.5.2 eUICC Memory Reset
- 4.5.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset
- 4.6 Profile Requirements
- 4.6.1 Test Profiles
- 4.6.2 Provisioning Profile
- 4.7 Metadata Requirements
- 4.8 NFC Requirements
- 4.9 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM -DP+)
- 4.9.1 SM-DP+ Overview
- 4.9.2 SM-DP+ Requirements
- 4.9.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC
- 4.10 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)
- 4.10.1 LPA Overview
- 4.10.2 Operational LPA Modes
- 4.10.3 LPA Requirements
- 4.10.4 LDS Requirements
- 4.11 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)
- 4.11.1 SM-DS Overview
- 4.11.2 SM-DS Implementation
- 4.11.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelines
- 4.11.4 SM-DS functions
- 4.11.5 SM-DS Requirements
- 4.11.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedure
- 4.11.7 Discovery Request Procedure
- 4.12 Interfaces
- 4.12.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
- 4.12.2 Operator – End User (ESop)
- 4.12.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)
- 4.12.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
- 4.12.5 SM-DP+ – LPA in the eUICC (ES5+)
- 4.12.6 SM-DP+ – LPD in the Device (ES9+)
- 4.12.7 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
- 4.12.8 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)
- 4.12.9 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)
- 4.12.10 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)
- 4.12.11 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)
- 4.12.12 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)
- 4.12.13 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)
- 4.12.14 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)
- 4.12.15 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)
- 4.12.16 General Interface Requirements
- 4.13 Profile Policy Management
- 4.13.1 Introduction
- 4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirements
- 4.13.3 Policy Rules
- 4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirements
- 4.14 Certification
- 4.14.1 eUICC Certification
- 4.14.2 Device Compliance
- 4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification
- 4.14.4 SM-DS Certification
- 4.14.5 LPA Certification
- 4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management
- 5 Operational Procedures
- 5.1 LPA Initiated Download
- 5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirements
- 5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedure
- 5.2 Profile Download with Activation Code
- 5.2.1 Activation Code Requirements
- 5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure
- 5.3 Local Profile Management
- 5.3.1 Local Profile Management Procedures
- A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)
- B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)
- B.1 Profile Production Procedure
- B.1.1 Profile Description Definition
- B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generation
- B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generation
- B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile
- C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)
- D eUICC Categories (Normative)
- D.1 eUICC Requirement
- E LPA Settings (Informative)
- F Certifications Chain and Security Model
- F.1 Security Model
- G LPA Integrity
- H Rules Authorisation Table (Normative)
- I Document Management
- I.1 Document History
RSP Architecture
Version 2.0
23 August 2016This is a Non-binding Permanent Reference Document of the GSMA
Security Classification: Non-confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is confidential to the Association and is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and inf ormation contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other t han those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association.
Copyright Notice Copy right © 2016 GSM Association
Disclaimer The GSM Association (“Association”) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document. The inf ormation contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.
Antitrust Notice The inf ormation contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
This document provides an architecture approach as a proposed solution for the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices across all markets.
The main goal of the Architecture is to define a mechanism for the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices with the necessary credentials to gain mobile network access.
This version focuses on Devices for the consumer market.
Please note that SGP.21 V1.0 [31] has not been deprecated.
1.2 Scope
The aim of this document is to define a common architecture framework to enable the Remote SIM Provisioning and management of the Embedded UICC (eUICC) in Devices. The adoption of this architecture framework will aim to provide the basis for ensuring global interoperability for Remote SIM Provisioning between Operators in different deployment scenarios.
1.3 Intended Audience
Technical experts working within Operators, SIM solution providers, Device vendors, standards organisations, network infrastructure vendors, Service Providers and other industry bodies.
1.4 Definition of Terms
Term Description
Information issued by an Operator/Service Provider to an End
Activation Code User. It is used by the End User to request for the download and
installation of a Profile.
A part of the Activation Code information provided by the
Activation Code Token
Operator/Service Provider to reference a Subscription.
SM-DS used in cascade mode with a Root SM-DS to redirect Event
Alternative SM-DS
Registration from a SM-DP+ to the Root SM-DS.
Describes a mechanism for which the End User is confirming their
Authenticated Confirmation action through a method involving the input of personalised
information (e.g. PIN, fingerprint).
A Protected Profile Package which has been encrypted for a target
Bound Profile Package
eUICC.
Certificate or Public Key A certificate as defined in RFC.5280 [1] and GlobalPlatform
Certificate specifications [11].
An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM
Certified eUICC Provisioning and certified according to a GSMA eUICC protection
Profile.
A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for the
Companion Device
purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.Term Description
A code entered by an End User to authorise the usage of an
Confirmation Code Activation Code to confirm the download and installation of a
Profile.
Confirmation Code Required A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is required
Flag or not.
Refers to the hierarchy of User Intent and Confirmation Request,
where:
User Intent is the first and lowest level
Confirmation Level
Simple Confirmation is the second level
Authenticated Confirmation is the third and highest level
Note: For examples of implementation, please refer to Annex C.
Describes a request for Authenticated Confirmation or a Simple
Confirmation Request
Confirmation as defined in this specification.
User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a
Device
mobile network. E.g. a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset.
An entity responsible for manufacturing Devices. The Device
Device Manufacturer Manufacturer MAY be responsible for the selection and insertion of
eUICCs in Devices.
A mode hidden to the End User and intended to be used by
Device Test Mode
maintenance people. It allows access and use of the Test Profiles.
Profile, the files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) of which are not
Disabled Profile
selectable over the UICC-Device interface.
An interrogation of the Discovery Service by a Device for Event
Discovery Request
Records that are registered for its eUICC.
UICC which enables the secure remote and/or local management
Embedded UICC (eUICC)
of Profiles.
Profile, the files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) of which are
Enabled Profile
selectable over the UICC-Device interface. 0
A file whose content determines the ability of a Profile Owner to
Enabling Configuration File
make use of Profile Policy Rules.
End User The person using the Device.
Information that pertains to the identity of an End User e.g.
End User Data personal details, name, address, biometric characteristics,
assigned identification numbers, etc.
Function that enables a SM-DP+ to check certain information
eUICC Audit
related to the eUICC and its installed Profiles.
eUICC Authorisation Token used by the SM-DS to authenticate the eUICC.
A Certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC.
eUICC Certificate
This Certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate.
eUICC Eligibility Check The information set sent from the eUICC to the SM-DP+ to allow
Information eligibility checks.
eUICC Manufacturer The eUICC Manufacturer provides eUICC products.Term Description
An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a Factory
eUICC Memory Reset
State.
An action that returns the eUICC to the state prior to installation of
eUICC Test Memory Reset
any post-issuance Test Profile.
A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited EUM
EUM Certificate
which can be used to verify eUICC Certificates.
A Profile download which is set by an SM-DP+ on behalf of an
Event
Operator, to be processed by a specific eUICC.
Unique identifier of an Event for a specific EID generated by the
Event-ID
SM-DP+.
The set of information stored on the SM-DS for a specific Event, via
the Event Registration procedure. This information consists of
Event Record either:
the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DP+ address or
the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DS address
A query to the SM-DS (Root or Alternative) executed to verify Event
Event Record Query
Registration success or determine that an Event Record still exists.
A process notifying the SM-DS on the availability of information on
Event Registration
either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC.
The configured state of the eUICC at the point it was distributed
Factory State
after manufacture.
Form Factor Physical manifestation of the UICC.
GSMA Certificate Issuer A Certificate Authority accredited/approved by GSMA.
Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU-
T E.118 0.
ICCID
Note: the ICCID throughout this specification is used to identify the
Profile.
International Mobile
Refer to 3GPP 21.905 [4].
Subscriber Identity
The process that associates a Protected Profile Package with a
specific eUICC so that a Profile Download including Bound Profile
Package generation can be triggered.
Link Profile
Note: This is normally an offline process, binding is an online
process happening during the communication between the SM-
DP+ and the eUICC.
The Local Profile Assistant (LPA) describes the entity comprising of
Local Profile Assistant the Local User Interface (LUI), the Local Profile Download (LPD)
and the Local Discovery Service (LDS).
Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated
Local Profile Management
on the ESeu interface.
Local Profile Management Operations are enable Profile, disable
Local Profile Management Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory
Operation Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, edit nickname, add Profile, and
edit default SM-DP+ address.Term Description
Assurance that the LPA has not been compromised or otherwise
affected. The assurance SHALL be provided to the various Remote
LPA Integrity SIM Provisioning entities to ensure that the LPA can be trusted to
execute the actions requested
Note: This could be linked with a certification process.
Defines the Operation LPA Mode which is either LPA in the eUICC
LPA Mode
or in the Device.
Information pertaining to a Profile that is stored in the eUICC and is
Metadata accessible by the LPA for the purpose of Local Profile
Management.
An entity providing access capability and communication services
Mobile Network Operator
to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure.
An entity providing access capability and communication services
Mobile Virtual Network
to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure but does
Operator
not have an allocation of spectrum.
A method of authentication in which an End User is only granted
access after successfully presenting several separate pieces of
Multi-Factor Authentication evidence to an authentication mechanism – typically at least two of
(MFA) the following categories: knowledge (something they know),
possession (something they have), and inherence (something they
are).
Network Access Application Refer to 3GPP 21.905 [4].
Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [5] network. This
Network Access Credentials
MAY include data such as Ki/K and IMSI stored within a NAA.
NFC Device Device with NFC capability.
NFC eUICC eUICC with NFC capability.
An arbitrary random number generated for one time use, employed
Nonce
for cryptographic communication.
A report about a Profile download or Remote/Local Profile
Notification
Management Operation processed by the eUICC.
Operational Profile A Profile that allows connectivity to a mobile network.
A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a
Operator
company providing wireless cellular network services.
A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network
Operator Credentials Access Credentials, OTA Keys for Remote File/Application
management, and authentication algorithm parameters.
The credentials included in the Profile used in conjunction with OTA
OTA Keys
Platforms.
A platform used by an Operator for the Remote File/Application
OTA Platform
management of enabled Operational Profiles on eUICCs.
Principles reflected in a set of rules that governs the behaviour of
Policy the eUICC and/or entities involved in the remote management of
the eUICC.
Policy Enforcement A function that executes Policy Rules to implement a Policy.Term Description
Defines the atomic action of a Policy and the conditions under
Policy Rule
which it is executed.
A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a
Primary Device
Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.
A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned
on to an eUICC for the purposes of providing services by the
Profile Operator. The Profile SHALL be in support of a Subscription with
the relevant Operator. Applications MAY be included to provide
non-telecommunication services.
The description of a Profile in a format specific to the Operator;
Profile Description
example formats could be an Excel table, xml format, or plain text.
A combination of local and remote management operations (enable
Profile Management
Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, and query Profile Metadata)
Profile Owner The Operator identified by the IMSI in the Profile.
A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format
Profile Package
that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile [6].
The functional element within the Profile management system that
Profile Policy Enabler
interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules.
A policy control system that allows the Service Provider to
Profile Policy Management implement, manage and enforce its subscription terms and
conditions associated with the installed Profile.
Defines the condition of the policy and the atomic action to be
Profile Policy Rule
taken by the Profile Policy Enabler.
A Profile Package which has been encrypted for storage but not to
Protected Profile Package
a specific eUICC.
A Profile that allows connectivity to a mobile network solely to
Provisioning Profile
provide the provisioning of Profiles.
The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, switching, and
Remote SIM Provisioning
deleting of a Profile on an eUICC.
A Certificate used to authenticate other entities within the Remote
Root Certificate
SIM Provisioning framework.
A globally identified central access point for finding Events from
Root SM-DS
one or more SM-DP+(s).
The Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either
Service Provider as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement
with an Operator. The Service Provider could also be the Operator.
Describes a mechanism for which the End User is confirming their
Simple Confirmation
action through a confirmation (e.g yes or no).
SM-DP+ Certificate A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DP+.
SM-DS Certificate A Certificate used by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DS.
Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as
SMDPid
part of the SM-DP+ Certificate.Term Description
An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a
Subscription with an Operator. The Subscriber is allowed to
Subscriber
subscribe and unsubscribe to services, as well as register an End
User or a list of End Users authorised to use these services.
Information that pertains to the identity of a Subscriber such as
contract details, authentication credentials, cryptographic keys etc.
Subscriber Data
Note: In many instances, the Subscriber is also the End User and
therefore Subscriber Data is likely to include End User Data.
A Subscription describes the commercial relationship between the
Subscription
Subscriber and the Service Provider.
This role prepares Profile Packages, secures each with a Profile
protection key, stores Profile protection keys in a secure manner as
well as the Protected Profile Packages in a Profile Package
Subscription Manager Data repository, and links the Protected Profile Packages to specified
Preparation+ (SM-DP+) EIDs.
The SM-DP+ binds Protected Profile Packages to the respective
EID and securely downloads these Bound Profile Packages to the
LPA of the respective eUICC.
Subscription Manager This is responsible for providing addresses of one or more SM-
Discovery Server (SM-DS) DP+(s) to a LDS.
A Profile which when installed on an eUICC enables access to test
Test Profile equipment for the purpose of testing the Device and the eUICC.
This will not include any Operator Credentials.
According to NIST SP 800-53r4 0, a mechanism by which an End
User (through an input Device) can communicate directly with the
security functions of the information system with the necessary
Trusted Path confidence to support the system security policy. This mechanism
can only be activated by the End User or the security functions of
the information system and cannot be imitated by untrusted
software.
Describes the direct, real time acquisition of the manual End User
User Intent input on the LUI to trigger locally a Profile download or Profile
Management operation.1.5 Abbreviations
Abbreviation Description AC Activation Code ARA-M Access Rule Application - Master ARF Access Rule File AuC Authentication Centre BSS Business Support Services CI Certificate Issuer DNSCurve Domain Name System Curve DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions
Abbreviation Description ECASD eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain EID Embedded UICC Identifier eSVN embedded Specification Version Number ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute eUICC Embedded UICC EUM eUICC Manufacturer FASG Fraud and Security Group FFS For Further Study GSMA GSM Association GSMA CI GSMA Certificate Issuer HLR Home Location Register HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol ICCID Integrated Circuit Card Identifier IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity ISD-P Issuer Security Domain - Profile ISD-R Issuer Security Domain - Root ISIM IP Multimedia Services Identity Module ITU International Telecoms Union LDS Local Discovery Service LPA Local Profile Assistant LPD Local Profile Download LUI Local User Interface M4M Mifare4Mobile MFA Multi-Factor Authentication MNO Mobile Network Operator MNO-SD Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain MSISDN Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number NAA Network Access Application OS Operating System OTA Over The Air PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy RAM Remote Application Management RAT Rules Authorisation Table RFM Remote File Management SAS Security Accreditation Scheme SD Security Domain SIM Subscriber Identity Module SM-DP+ Subscription Manager - Data Preparation +
Abbreviation Description SM-DS Subscription Manager - Discovery Server SSD Supplementary Secure Domain USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module
1.6 References
Ref Document Number Title
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
[1] RFC 5280
Revocation List (CRL) Profile
UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical
[2] ETSI TS 102 221
characteristics
Smart cards; Machine to Machine UICC; Physical and
[3] ETSI TS 102 671
logical characteristics
Technical Specification Group Services and System
[4] 3GPP 21.905
Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications
The international identification plan for public networks
[5] ITU E.212
and Subscriptions
SIMalliance: eUICC Profile Package - Interoperable
[6] SIMAPP Format Technical Specification
http://simalliance.org/euicc/euicc-technical-releases/
[7] ETSI TS 102 226 Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications
“Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
[8] RFC 2119 Levels”, S. Bradner
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
[9] 3GPP TS 21.133 3G security; Security threats and requirements
GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC
[10] SGP.02
Technical specification
[11] GPC_SPE_034 GlobalPlatform Card Specification with its Amendments
Specification of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1:
[12] 3GPP TS 35.231
Algorithm Specification
3GPP TS 35.205 Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document
[13]
1: General
Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document
[14] 3GPP TS 35.206
2: Algorithm Specification
FS.04 - Security Accreditation Scheme for UICC
[15] EUM SAS
Production – Standard
FS.08 - GSMA SAS Standard for Subscription Manager
[16] SM-DP SAS
Roles
Smart Cards; Embedded UICC; Requirements
[17] ETSI TS 103 383
Specification
[18] ITU-T E.118 The International Telecommunication Charge Card
Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity
[19] 3GPP TS 31.102
Module (USIM) applicationRef Document Number Title
GlobalPlatform Device Technology Secure Element
[20] GPD_SPE_013
Access Control - Version 1.1
Personalisation of Mobile Equipment - Mobile functionality
[21] 3GPP TS 22.022
specification
[22] TS.26 GSMA NFC Handset Requirements
Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information
[23] NIST SP 800-53r4
Systems and Organisations – Revision 4
[24] OMAPI SIMalliance Open Mobile API Specification
[25] SGP.03 NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1
GlobalPlatform Device Technology – Secure Element
[26] GPS_SPE_013
Access Control
Wireless Application Protocol WAP-248-UAProf-
[27] WAG UAProf
20011020-a
[28] SGP.05 Embedded UICC Protection Profile
GSMA SAS Standard for Subscription Manager Roles -
[29] SGP.07
Version 1.0 or later
[30] SGP.21 SGP.21 Architecture Specification - Version 1.0
[31] SGP.22 SGP.22 Technical Specification - Version 2.01.7 Conventions
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [8].
“FFS” or “For Further Study” means that it will be covered in SGP.22 V2.1.
2 Principles
This section contains the principles related to the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning system for the Embedded UICC.
The solution based on the requirements described within this document has to be prov ided in a non-discriminatory manner.
2.1 Basic Principles
Principle no. Description
Existing standards and specifications SHALL be used where possible for the
BAS1
specification of the eUICC and related provisioning systems.
GlobalPlatform specifications SHALL be used as a framework of choice for the
BAS2
implementation of the eUICC.
The overall security of the eUICC in combination with the related management
BAS3 processes SHALL at all times and under all circumstances be at least equivalent
to the current removable UICC and its provisioning processes.Principle no. Description
The architecture of the eUICC and its Remote SIM Provisioning system SHALL
BAS4
comply with the requirements of 3GPP TS 21.133 [9].
The architecture SHALL support a level of security with respect to the protection
of Operator Credentials which is at least equivalent to the present levels of
BAS5 security. This applies in particular to:
the confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters ;
the integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI).
The architecture SHALL support a level of security for all Profile content which is
BAS6
at least equivalent to the current state of the art level of security of the UICC.
The architecture SHALL NOT compromise the security and privacy of Subscriber
Data, nor the security and privacy of End User Data. Examples depending on
BAS7
territory include identities that can be used for tracking such as ICCID, MSISDN,
EID, IMSI Ki etc.
Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of this document. However,
BAS8 any data which could be used to identify an individual SHALL be treated as
personal data and subject to local regulations e.g. the EID, ICCID, etc.Table 1: Basic Principles
2.2 Profile Principles
Principle no. Description
Profiles are the property of and SHALL be under the control of the issuing
PRO1
Operator.
A Profile does not exist outside of an eUICC. I.e. a Profile is always located on a
PRO2
particular eUICC.
PRO3 A Profile SHALL be uniquely identified by its ICCID.
An Enabled Profile in combination with an eUICC SHALL be able to carry all
PRO4
logical characteristics of a UICC.
Once the Profile is enabled, all relevant UICC characteristics or features as
PRO5 described in ETSI 102 221 [2] specifications SHALL apply, with the exceptions
as defined within this specification.
It SHALL be possible to delete Profiles only when in a disabled state, with the
PRO6
exception of eUICC Memory Reset, and eUICC Test Memory Reset functions.
PRO7 Profile Management SHALL be governed by Policy.Table 2: Profile Principles
3 Roles
3.1 eUICC Manufacturer
Role no. Description
The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the initial cryptographic
EUM1
configuration and security architecture of the eUICC.
EUM2 The eUICCs are delivered by the eUICC Manufacturer (EUM).Role no. Description
Relevant parts of the eUICC Manufacturer’s products and processes are
EUM3
certified by a GSMA-approved certification process.
The EUM SHALL issue the eUICC Certificate to allow:
EUM4 eUICC authentication and proof of certification to other entities;
authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-DP+ and an eUICC.
The eUICC Manufacturer SHALL be responsible for the implementation of any
EUM5 LPA elements that reside in the eUICC and the compliance of the LPA with the
requirements in Section 4.10.3.Table 3: eUICC Manufacturer Role
3.2 Device Manufacturer
Role no. Description
The Device Manufacturer SHALL be responsible for the implementation of any
DM1 LPA elements that reside on the Device and the compliance of the LPA with
the requirements in Section 4.10.2.
The Device Manufacturer SHALL be responsible for the implementation of
DM2 any application that resides on the Primary Device allowing User Interface
access to the Companion Device.Table 4: Device Manufacturer Role
3.3 Operator and Service Provider
This section describes the characteristics of the Operator and Service Provider roles relevant to this architecture and its operation. Other characteristics exist but are considered out of scope.
Role no. Description
OPE1 The Operator SHALL have access to a SM-DP+ via the ES2+ interface.
In the event that a Subscriber has selected a Service Provider, that Service
OPE2
Provider will initiate the provisioning of a Profile Package.
The Operator, potentially on behalf of the Service Provider, specifies the
OPE3 Profile characteristics and any features and applications analogous to
removable UICCs.
Operators SHALL be able to use an OTA Platform in order to manage the
OPE4
content of their Enabled Profile in the eUICC (RAM, RFM).
A Subscriber MAY have a relationship with any number of Service Providers
OPE5
simultaneously.Table 5: Operator Role
3.4 Subscriber and End User
Role no. Description
The Subscriber is the contract partner of the Service Provider for the
SEU1 Subscription.
Note: The Subscriber MAY not be the End User.Role no. Description
The End User is a human and uses the Device and/or the services related to
SEU2
the Enabled Profile.Table 6: Subscriber and End User Role
3.5 Certificate Issuer
Role no. Description
The Certificate Issuer issues Certificates for Remote SIM Provisioning entities
CIS1 and acts as a trusted third party for the purpose of authenticating the entities
of the system.
The Certificate Issuer communicates with the SM-DP+, SM-DS and the EUM
CIS2
through interfaces that are out of scope of this specification.Table 7: Certificate Issuer Role
4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture
This section contains the functional description of the Remote SIM Provisioning system architecture for the Embedded UICC.
Figure 1: Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture
4.1 eUICC Architecture
4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
This section describes the internal high-level architecture of the eUICC. It SHOULD be noted that the eUICC architecture is similar to that used in the GSMA Remote SIM specification [10]. Profiles are provisioned based on the security framework defined in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [11].
Figure 2: Schematic Representation of the eUICC
4.1.1.1 ECASD
The Embedded UICC Controlling Authority Security Domain (ECASD) is responsible for the secure storage of credentials needed to support the required security domains on the eUICC.
There SHALL only be one ECASD on an eUICC. The ECASD SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during the eUICC manufacturing as described in [11].
The ECASD SHALL have the following properties:
Non-modifiable eUICC private keys for creating signatures. Associated Certificates for eUICC authentication. The Certificate Issuers’ (CI) root public keys for verifying SM-DP+ Certificates. eUICC Manufacturers’ (EUMs) keyset for key/Certificate renewal.
Additionally, the ECASD SHALL provide security functions used during key establishment and eUICC authentication.
4.1.1.2 ISD-R
The ISD-R is responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.
4.1.1.3 ISD-P
The ISD-P is a secure container (security domain) for the hosting of a Profile. The ISD-P is used for Profile download and installation in collaboration with the Profile Package interpreter for the decoding/interpretation of the received Bound Profile Package.
The ISD-P is the on-card representative of the SM-DP+.
4.1.1.4 MNO-SD
The MNO-SD is the on-card representative of the Operator. It contains the Operator’s Over- The-Air (OTA) Keys and provides a secure OTA channel.
4.1.1.5 Profile Policy Enabler
The eUICC Operating System (OS) service which offers Profile Policy Rules validation and enforcement.
4.1.1.6 Telecom Framework
The telecom framework is an operating system service that provides standardised network authentication algorithms to the NAAs hosted in the ISD-Ps. Furthermore, it offers the capability to configure the algorithms with the necessary parameters.
4.1.1.7 Profile Package Interpreter
The Profile Package interpreter is an eUICC operating system service that translates the Profile Package data into an installed Profile using the specific internal format of the target eUICC.
4.1.1.8 LPA Services
The LPA services provide necessary access to the services and data required by the LPA functions for the following:
1. The optionally stored Root SM-DS and/or Default SM-DP+ addresses. 2. Facilitates the reception of the Bound Profile Package in transfer from the LPA. 3. Provide information regarding the installed Profiles and their Metadata. 4. Provides Local Profile Management. 5. Provides functions for the LPA to authenticate and interact with the SM-DS. 6. Ensures access to the EID is restricted to only the LPA.
4.2 eUICC Requirements
Req no. Description
EUICC1 The eUICC is a discrete tamper resistant hardware component.
EUICC2 An removable eUICC is packaged in a standardised ETSI Form Factor [2].
EUICC3 The eUICC SHALL be either removable or non-removable.
The behaviour of the eUICC with an Enabled Profile SHALL be equivalent
EUICC4
to the UICC.
EUICC5 The eUICC SHALL be able to contain zero or more Profiles.
EUICC6 At a maximum, only one Profile SHALL be enabled at any point in time.
The behaviour of a NAA USIM or ISIM within a Profile on an eUICC SHALL
be identical to a removable UICC NAAs USIM or ISIM.
EUICC7
Note: No changes to existing 3GPP/3GPP2 USIM, CSIM and ISIM
specifications are expected.
EUICC8 The eUICC SHALL support Milenage 00 and TUAK 0 algorithm sets.Req no. Description
The ownership of the eUICC MAY change throughout its lifetime as can the
EUICC9
Device.
If any Profile Management operation does not complete successfully, the
EUICC10
eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request.
The eUICC SHALL contain an ECASD and ISD-R security domains installed
EUICC11
and personalised during manufacture.
EUICC12 The ECASD cannot be deleted or modified after eUICC manufacture.
The ISD-R SHALL be responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the
EUICC13
lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.
The ISD-R SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during eUICC
EUICC14
manufacturing as described in [11].
The eUICC SHALL be able to support an eUICC Memory Reset. This can
EUICC15
only be requested by the End User.
The eUICC SHALL be able to support an eUICC Test Memory Reset. This
EUICC16 can only be requested by the End User when the Device is in Device Test
Mode.
The eUICC SHALL support the eUICC Profile Package Interoperable format
EUICC17
as defined by SIMalliance [6].
An ISD-R SHALL:
be created within an eUICC at the time of manufacture;
EUICC18
NOT be deleted or disabled;
NOT be able to perform any operations inside an ISD-P.
EUICC19 An eUICC MAY provide LPA functions.
EUICC20 An ISD-P SHALL be created by the ISD-R at the request of the SM-DP+.
Communication between the eUICC and the SM-DP+ SHALL be protected
EUICC21
in authenticity, integrity and confidentiality.
EUICC22 The eUICC SHALL NOT export Profiles installed on the eUICC.
The eUICC SHALL enforce an isolation of Profiles and prevent Profiles from
EUICC23 operating outside of their execution environment i.e. Profile SHALL run in a
sandbox.
The integrity of the Bound Profile Package SHALL be ensured during its
EUICC24
installation on the eUICC.
EUICC25 The eUICC SHALL be tamper resistant (physically and logically).
Profile keys and algorithm parameters SHALL NOT be extractable from the
EUICC26
eUICC.
All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a robust tamper-
EUICC27
resistant way and be resistant to side-channel attacks.
The Operator SHALL be able to update the OTA Keys in its Profile on the
EUICC28 eUICC in a secure and confidential way, reusing existing OTA Platform
mechanisms.
A downloaded Profile Package SHALL be installed on the eUICC in a
EUICC29
disabled state.Req no. Description
The eUICC SHALL always report its specification version number in the first
EUICC30 communication during the commencement of each session with the SM-
DP+ or SM-DS.
The EUM SHALL install an eUICC Certificate in the eUICC used to verify
EUICC31
the eUICC certification.
The EUM SHALL install an EUM Certificate in the eUICC used to verify the
EUICC32
eUICC Certificate.
EUICC33 The eUICC SHALL have a means to authenticate to the SM-DS.
EUICC34 The eUICC SHALL protect itself against unauthorised access.
Upon Profile deletion, the eUICC SHALL ensure a complete deletion of all
EUICC35
data related to the Profile.
The eUICC SHALL only accept Profile Management operations sent from
EUICC36
the LPA in either the eUICC, or the Device.
The eUICC SHALL reject any Profile Management commands that are in
EUICC37
conflict with the Policy Rules of the respective Profile.
If any Bound Profile Package download or installation does not complete
EUICC38 successfully, the eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it
received the request.
The eUICC SHALL support GlobalPlatform Secure Element Access Control
EUICC39
0.
There SHALL be a means to preset a default SM-DP+ address in the
EUICC40
eUICC.
EUICC41 The eUICC SHALL be able to store a Root SM-DS address.
The eUICC SHALL be able to send a delete Notification to notify the SM-
EUICC42
DP+ that the Profile was deleted.
In EUICC42, if connectivity is not available to send the Notification of
EUICC43 deletion to the SM-DP+, the Notification SHALL be retained and sent as
soon as connectivity becomes available again.
The delete Notification process SHALL also be executed for each deleted
EUICC44
Profile in case of eUICC Memory reset.
The eUICC SHALL support a set of standard functions and services
including, but not limited to Java Applications, USIM Toolkit functions
andGlobalPlatform features. The list of supported functions and services
EUICC45 (e.g. API package names and versions) SHALL be explicitly referenced
within the technical specification (SGP.22 0). A different set of functions and
services MAY be defined/supported according to the different Embedded
UICC categories as defined in Annex D. The eUICC SHALL support at least the following USIM Toolkit commands:
PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION including the following fields: local
info, IMEI, network measure results, date & time, access technology
EUICC46 TERMINAL PROFILE
ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD)
SEND SHORT MESSAGE
DISPLAY TEXTReq no. Description
GET INPUT
RING TONE
An eUICC SHALL support at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters
EUICC47 preloaded by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing, defined in GSMA
SGP.22 V2.0 0.
Each Notification SHALL be uniquely identifiable and SHALL be signed by
EUICC48
the eUICC.
Each Notification (delete, pre-delete, disable) SHALL be re-play attack
EUICC49
protected and signed by the eUICC.
It SHALL be possible to request through a Profile parameter a pre-delete
EUICC50 (FFS) Notification to be sent notifying of a deletion which will be carried out by the
eUICC after the sending of the Notification has been attempted.
In the event that a pre-delete Notification has been successfully attempted,
the eUICC SHALL delete the Profile for which the Notification attempt was
EUICC51 (FFS) made. In the event that this Notification is unsuccessful but the Profile is
deleted anyway, the Notification SHALL be retained and sent as soon as
connectivity becomes available again.Table 8: eUICC Requirements
4.3 eUICC Eligibility Check
The eUICC eligibility check enables a SM-DP+ to validate the eligibility of an eUICC for the installation of a Profile using information sent by the eUICC. The set of information sent by the eUICC to the SM-DP+ for eligibility checking purposes is referenced herein as the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. Some eUICC eligibility check parameters MAY be required due to Device capabilities which must be supported by the Profile/eUICC and delivered as part of the eUICC Eligibility Check Information set.
Note: Device capability refers to a Device feature or service-enabling function provided by the Device that MAY have a direct effect on the content of the Profile or the procedure used to download the Profile, and in turn requires support from the eUICC.
4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements
Req no. Description
The eUICC SHALL include the eSVN in the eUICC Eligibility Check
ELG1
Information.
The eUICC SHALL include the available memory in the eUICC Eligibility
ELG2
Check Information.
The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it is unable
ELG3
to accept an additional Profile.
The eUICC SHALL provide a valid current Certificate to the SM-DP+ signed
ELG4
by the EUM.
ELG5 The eUICC SHALL provide an identification of the EUM.
ELG6 The eUICC SHALL provide the current OS version. The eUICC SHALL provide Device enabler information relating to services
ELG7
that MAY need Profile support (e.g. NFC enablers).
Eligibility Check Information SHALL be integrity and authenticity protected
ELG8
by the eUICC for its sending to the SM-DP+.
The eUICC SHALL indicate the application runtime environment version
ELG9
and libraries versions supported in eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
The eUICC SHALL indicate cryptographic algorithms and their respective
ELG10
key lengths supported in the eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
The eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version it is supporting. This
ELG11 parameter SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility
check.
The eUICC SHALL indicate its current certification status. This parameter
ELG12
SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility check.
If the eUICC is NFC capable (e.g. CAT3) it SHALL indicate its support to the
ELG13
relevant NFC services including its current certification status.
The eUICC SHALL indicate its category (see Annex D). This parameter
ELG14
SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check.Table 9: eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements
Note: It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and could be used for the eligibility check procedure.
4.4 Device Requirements
Req no. Description
The Device SHALL conform to the terminal requirements within ETSI TS
DEV1
102 221 [2] with the exceptions as defined in this specification.
There SHALL be a means for the End User to obtain the EID through the
DEV2
Device software. This SHALL only be possible through the LUI.
If an eUICC is within the Device packaging, then the EID SHALL be printed
DEV3
in machine readable form on the Device packaging.
Bearer connection of the Companion Device to the SM-DP+ SHALL only
be determined by the bearer availability.
DEV4
Note: The Companion Device MAY use any connectivity method available
to connect to the SM-DP+.
Devices compliant with the GSMA NFC Handset Requirements 0 SHALL
support the Open Mobile API 0 used by the Device applications to
DEV5
exchange data with their counterpart applications running in the Enabled
Profile on the eUICC.
The implementation of the Remote SIM Provisioning specification in the
DEV6 Device SHALL not impact the potential use of the SIM Lock mechanism
defined in 3GPP TS 22.022 0
In the case where the Device supports both the LPA in the Device, and the
DEV7 LPA in the eUICC, the Device SHALL have a mechanism (setting or
configuration parameter) that sets which LPA SHALL be used.
DEV8 The End User SHALL be able to modify the parameter defined in DEV7.Req no. Description
A Device that supports an embedded UICC without an LPA in the eUICC,
DEV9
SHALL provide LPA functions.
A Device that supports only an embedded UICC with an LPA in the eUICC,
DEV10
MAY provide LPA functions.Table 10: Device Requirements
4.4.1 Device Capability Requirements
Req no. Description
There SHALL be a mechanism that is able to provide the Device capabilities
DEVCAP1
to the SM-DP+.Table 11: Device Capability Requirements
4.5 Device Initiated Requirements
4.5.1 Device Reset
Req no. Description
It SHALL be possible for the End User to perform any type of Device reset
FAC1
without affecting the status of the eUICC.
The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the
FAC2
eUICC Memory Reset.
The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the
FAC3
eUICC Test Memory Reset.Table 12: Device Reset Requirements
4.5.2 eUICC Memory Reset
Req no. Description
eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC apart from
MEM1
pre-installed Profiles that are flagged as permanent.
eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC regardless of
MEM2 their Policy Rules but not the Provisioning Profile or preinstalled Test
Profiles.
Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to initiate eUICC
MEM3
Memory Reset.
In addition to MEM3, other secure means MAY be provided to perform the
eUICC Memory Reset function. The same level of security as is offered by
MEM4
the LUI based reset function SHALL apply. User Intent and Confirmation
Request SHALL apply.Table 13: eUICC Memory Reset Requirements
4.5.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset
Req no. Description
eUICC Test Memory Reset SHALL delete all post-issuance installed Test
MEMT1
Profiles on the eUICC including the Enabled Test Profile if any.
Simple Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to enable eUICC Test
MEMT2
Memory Reset.
If Test Profiles are not supported, then eUICC Test Memory Reset is not
MEMT3
required.Table 14: eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements
4.6 Profile Requirements
4.6.1 Test Profiles
Req no. Description
It is OPTIONAL for the removable eUICC to support the requirements of
TPRO1 Test Profiles described in this section. If Test Profiles are not supported, it
SHALL not be possible to download Test Profiles into the eUICC.
Test Profiles SHALL NOT be able to authenticate to an Operator’s mobile
network using Operator Credentials. The eUICC SHALL ensure that such
TPRO2
Profiles cannot be used to connect to any Operator’s mobile network even if
authentication information is contained in the Test Profile.
TPRO3 A Test Profile SHALL be installed in its own individual ISD-P.
TPRO4 Test Profiles MAY be pre-installed on the eUICC.
Test Profiles SHALL only be visible and usable when the Device is in
TPRO5
Device Test Mode.
It SHALL be possible to download, install, enable, disable or delete Test
TPRO6 Profiles in the eUICC only in Device Test Mode with the exception of the
eUICC Memory Reset operation.
Test Profiles, as with any other Profile, SHALL be managed through a
TPRO7
certified SM-DP+.
The enabling of a Test Profile SHALL override the do not disable Policy
TPRO8
Rule.
When the Device Test Mode is deactivated, the LPA SHALL disable any
TPRO9
enabled Test Profile.
When the Test Profile is disabled, the eUICC SHALL enable the Operational
TPRO10
Profile that was previously enabled, if any.
TPRO11 The Device Test Mode activation SHALL be obfuscated from the End User.
When exiting Device Test Mode, an End User notice SHALL be presented
TPRO12
to prompt the tester to perform an eUICC Test Memory Reset.Table 15: Test Profiles Requirements
The Device MAY implement a mechanism for connecting an external SIM card for the purpose of testing in the context of Device repair, without affecting the state of the eUICC.
4.6.2 Provisioning Profile
Req no. Description
Provisioning Profiles SHALL be based on the same format structure as
PPRO1
described for the Profile (Figure 2).
A Provisioning Profile MAY be enabled by the LPA upon End User request
for operations defined in PPRO6 if establishment of the connectivity using
PPRO2 the currently Enabled Profile is unsuccessful. If this results in an Operational
Profile being disabled, the End User SHALL first give consent to the loss of
communication provided by the Enabled Profile.
Provisioning Profiles and their associated Metadata SHALL not be visible to
PPRO3
the End User on the LUI.
PPRO4 Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be selectable by the End User.
Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be deleted through any action by the End
PPRO5
User including the use of eUICC Memory Reset.
Provisioning Profile SHALL only be used for the intended purposes of
PPRO6 Profile downloading and related Profile maintenance functions. The
Provisioning Profile SHALL not be used as an Operational Profile.
PPRO7 PPRO6 SHALL be enforceable in the RSP architecture.Table 16: Provisioning Profile Requirements
4.7 Metadata Requirements
Req no. Description
META1 All Profiles SHALL have associated Metadata.
META2 The Metadata SHALL be stored in the eUICC.
META3 The Metadata SHALL be accessible irrespective of the state of the Profile.
The Metadata SHALL include a field for the Service Provider name.
META4 Note: EFSPN is already used in a different context outside of this
specification and could be blank.
META5 The Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile.
The Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of the
META6
Profile.
The Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description of the
META7
Profile defined by the Operator/Service Provider.
META8 The nickname SHALL be editable by the End User.
META9 The Metadata SHALL always be available to the LUI.
The Metadata SHALL include an OPTIONAL field to allow the display of an
META10
icon defined by the Operator/Service Provider for the respective Profile.
The Metadata SHALL be able to include a copy of the Policy Rules
META11
associated to the Profile.
All Profiles SHALL be uniquely identified in the Metadata as Operational,
META12
Provisioning or Test Profile.
An Operator SHALL be able to access and update the following Metadata of
META13
its Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is Enabled:Req no. Description
Service Provider name
Short description of the Profile
Icon of the Profile
Table 17: Metadata Requirements4.8 NFC Requirements
An NFC Device and an NFC eUICC SHALL be compliant with the following list of requirements:
Req no. Description
NFC1 An NFC Device SHALL be compliant with GSMA TS 26 0.
After installation of an Operational Profile, the NFC eUICC SHALL support
NFC2 all requirements as specified in the SGP.03 GSMA NFC UICC
Requirements Specification 0.
The NFC Device SHALL retrieve and enforce access control rules as
NFC3
specified in the GlobalPlatform SEAC specification 0.
The eUICC SHALL be able to generate proof that the Operational Profile
NFC4
has been deleted.
All NFC applications and NFC enabling applications (e.g. ARA-M, PPSE,
CRS, CREL, etc.) attached to an Operational Profile SHALL be included
NFC5 under the ISD-P created for the Profile, either under the MNO-SD or in an
SD hierarchy with a self-extradited SSD with authorised management
privilege.
The NFC eUICC solution SHALL be able to provide assurance to NFC
application Service Providers that the combination of an eUICC and
NFC6 Operational Profile is trusted. This solution SHALL be based on the CASD
that is part of the Operational Profile and scenario Push 2B and scenario 3
as specified by SGP.03 0.
If the NFC eUICC is compliant with M4M, the eUICC SHALL reset all the
NFC7 M4M virtual cards associated to that Profile when a Profile containing M4M
applications is disabled.
The appropriate NFC related certification information SHALL be part of the
NFC8
information shared with the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check.
A NFC Device SHALL at least have an embedded eUICC or have the
NFC9 capability to support a removable eUICC that is compliant with CAT3 and
SGP.03 0 in either instance.Table 18: NFC Requirements
4.9 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM -DP+)
4.9.1 SM-DP+ Overview
The SM-DP+ is responsible for the creation, generation, management and the protection of resulting Profiles upon the input/request of the Operator. It is also responsible for the delivery of a Profile within a Bound Profile Package, making the Bound Profile Package available for the secure delivery. In addition, the SM-DP+ is responsible for requesting the creation of the ISD-P in the eUICC into which the Profile will be installed. The SM-DP+ will
also be the off-card entity that will be responsible for the lifecycle management of the ISD-P that was created at its request. This is performed via the distinct functions listed below.
Figure 3: SM-DP+ Functions
Function name Description
Creates Profile Packages (i.e. Personalised Profiles, including (IMSI, Ki,
Profile Package ICCID,…)) from Profile Descriptions agreed with Operators. This can be an
Generation off-line batch or real time process.
Profile Package Secures each Profile Package according to the security process creating
Protection the Protected Profile Package.
Profile Package Binds the Protected Profile Package to a target eUICC using the security
Binding process thus creating the Bound Profile Package.
Profile Package Temporarily stores Protected Profile Packages or Bound Profile Packages
Storage for subsequent delivery to the eUICC.
Profile Package Securely transmits and installs the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC
Delivery through the LPA.
SM-DS Event
Notifies the SM-DS of a pending operation for a specific eUICC.
RegistrationTable 19: SM-DP+ Function Descriptions
4.9.2 SM-DP+ Requirements
Req no. Description
SMDP1 The SM-DP+ SHALL act on behalf of an Operator.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to initiate the request for ISD-P creation as
SMDP2
part of the Bound Profile Package delivery.Req no. Description
The SM-DP+ SHALL establish an end-to-end secure channel to the eUICC
SMDP3 to download and install Bound Profile Packages via the LPA or directly to
the eUICC.
The SM-DP+ SHALL link a Protected Profile Package for binding to a
SMDP4
specific eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator.
The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the linked
SMDP5
Protected Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any
SMDP6
Certified eUICC.
Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound
SMDP7
Profile Package delivered by the SM-DP+.
Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP+ after completing all
SMDP8
production steps, Profile Package Protection, and binding.
Communication session between the SM-DP+ and the LPA SHALL be
SMDP9
terminated by the SM-DP+ after execution of intended Operation(s).
End-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC involved
SMDP10 in the Profile download and installation SHALL be protected in terms of
integrity, authenticity and confidentiality.
Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected
SMDP11
through encryption.
On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile creation
SMDP12 and storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure deletion
procedures (logically and physically).
SM-DP+/eUICC communication SHALL incorporate Perfect Forward
SMDP13
Secrecy (PFS).
The transport used for the Bound Profile Package SHALL implement anti-
SMDP14
replay mechanisms between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
Connectivity to the SM-DP+ SHALL be aborted and an explicit error
message SHALL be triggered by the SM-DP+ upon failure to verify
SMDP15
authenticity of the connecting party. (No message SHALL be sent to the
connecting party)
After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound Profile
Package to the LPA, the transport encryption procedure SHALL be
renewed.
SMDP16
If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more
than a configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction SHALL be
terminated and the Operator SHALL be notified.
The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols whenever
SMDP17
available (e.g. DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.).
The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC Profile
SMDP18
Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by SIMalliance [6].
SMDP19 The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on demand.
SMDP20 It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk.Req no. Description
The SM-DP+ SHALL send a confirmation of the successfully completed
SMDP21
download and installation of a Profile to the Operator.
There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between any
SM-DP+ and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the Profile.
Such a mechanism SHALL either be ordered by the Operator or be
SMDP22
performed by the Operator itself. If such deletion mechanism is used, there
will be no off-card entity responsible for managing the ISD-P of the installed
Profile.
SMDP23 The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid.
SMDP24 The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Notification to the Operator
SMDP25 informing them that a specific Bound Profile Package download is about to
start.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an eUICC Eligibility Check Information
SMDP26 report and other relevant information (e.g. Activation Code, ICCID, etc.) to
the Operator ahead of/prior to the eUICC Bound Profile Package download.
SMDP27 The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to perform Event Registrations to the SM-DS.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to request from an Alternative SM-DS not to
SMDP28
propagate the Event Registration to the Root SM-DS.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Profile delete Notification to the
SMDP29 Operator owning a Profile when a related delete Notification is received
from the eUICC.
The SM-DP+ SHALL support the following states for a Profile Package,
triggered by the Profile Owner:
SMDP30
A Profile Package is not released for Profile Package download.
A Profile Package is released for Profile Package download.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to select the elliptic curve parameter in the
SMDP31
Profile download procedure.
It SHALL be possible for a SM-DP+ to conduct an Event Record Query to a
SMDP32 (FFS) SM-DS (Root or Alternative) for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations
it owns.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event Record on
SMDP33 (FFS) the Root SM-DS or the Alternative SM-DS, identified by the EID or the
Event-ID over the ES12 interface.
Response to a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only occur where the
SMDP34 (FFS)
Root SM-DS or Alternative SM-DS validates the Event Record ownership.
Ownership validation of a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only use
SMDP35 (FFS) the requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components
of the Event Record held.
A SM-DP+ SHALL support all sets of elliptic curve parameters as defined in
SMDP36
GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0.Table 20: SM-DP+ Requirements
4.9.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC
Req no. Description
The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be ignored if an SM-DP+
DF1
address is present in an AC being presented to the LUI.
The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be accessible by the
DF2
LPA to establish a connection to this SM-DP+.
DF3 The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC MAY be left blank.
If the default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC is blank, then the use of the
DF4 SM-DS discovery procedure or an SM-DP+ address in an AC SHALL be
required to establish the target SM-DP+.
No redirection SHALL be supported from a query to the default SM-DP+
DF5 (FFS)
address.Table 21: Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements
4.10 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)
Primary Device
User
End User
Interface ESeuUser Interface ESeu
LPA LUI
ES10c
eUICC
Companion
DeviceFigure 4: End User Interaction and Interfaces between a Primary and Companion
Device, where the Companion Device MAY have a UI
4.10.1 LPA Overview
This role exists both within the Device in conjunction with LPA Services provided by the eUICC, and within the eUICC with the LPA function provided by the eUICC. It provides three distinct functions, the Local User Interface (LUI), the Local Profile Download (LPD) and the Local Discovery Service (LDS) as described below. Whilst the eUICC alone cannot provide any of these functions without Device interaction, the specific level of interaction will depend upon the capability within the Device. Therefore, the functions of the LPA will be undertaken within the Device. The way this variability is implemented across different Devices and Device types is for further study.
Figure 5: LPA Functions
Function name Description
Local Discovery
Service Where required, the LDS is responsible for retrieving pending Event
Records from the SM-DS.
(LDS)
This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound Profile
Local Profile Package in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile Package
Download from the SM-DP+ to the LPD in a single transaction, and (ii) the onward
(LPD) transfer of the Bound Profile Package into the eUICC in segments.
This function will depend on network, Device, and eUICC capabilities .
Local User Interface This function allows the End User to perform Local Profile Management
(LUI) on the Device. User Intent SHALL be enforced.Table 22: LPA Function Descriptions
4.10.2 Operational LPA Modes
When there is an LPA in the Device and in the eUICC, then the LPA to be used is specified by the Device settings (DEV7):
LPA in the Device LPA in the eUICC
4.10.2.1 LPA in the eUICC
LPA functions are provided by the eUICC.
Figure 6: LPA in the Euicc
4.10.2.2 LPA in the Device
LPA functions are provided by the Device.
Figure 7: LPA in the Device
4.10.3 LPA Requirements
Req no. Description
The LPA SHALL be responsible for instructing the eUICC to perform Local Profile
LPA1
Management functions as per End User request.
A mechanism SHALL be implemented between any LPA elements outside the
LPA2 eUICC, and the eUICC to ensure that the communication is not compromised
wherever the LPA is located.
A secure mechanism SHALL be implemented between the LUI and the
LPA3
associated display or input applications on the Device.
Access to the LUI application(s) SHALL be protected according to current best
LPA4
practices. This SHALL be enforced by the Device OS.
All Local Profile Management Operations SHALL require User Intent (no
LPA5
automation).
LPA6 LUI access SHALL require User Intent (no automation).
LPA7 The End User SHALL be able to easily access the list of installed Profiles.
LPA8 The LPA SHALL protect Profile Metadata from unauthorised access.
The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘enable’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA9
operation SHALL allow the End User to select the Profile.
The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘disable’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA10
operation SHALL allow the End User to disable the Enabled Profile.
The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘delete’ SHALL be supported. This
operation SHALL allow the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the eUICC.
LPA11
The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for the
deletion of the Profile. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA12 operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Operational
Profiles on the eUICC and relevant associated information through the Metadata.
The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’ SHALL
LPA13 be supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to edit the default SM-
DP+ address. Simple confirmation SHALL be enforced.
The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be
supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as described
LPA14 in Section 4.5.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of
consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be
enforced.
The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Test Memory Reset’ SHALL be
LPA15 supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Test Memory Reset as
described in Section 4.5.3. Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
The Local Profile Management Operation ’edit nickname’ SHALL be supported.
LPA16 This operation SHALL allow the End User to add or modify a nickname for the
selected Profile. The operation SHALL NOT modify the Service Provider name.
The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile’ SHALL be supported. This
operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to the
LPA17
eUICC.
Three options SHALL be supported by the LPA: Profile download via default SM-DP+
Profile download via SM-DS services
Profile download via Activation Code
Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced except in the case of initial
Device setup (LPA62).
The LPA SHALL NOT be accessible by any applications other than those
LPA18 provided by the provider of the LPA for the sole purpose of enabling the services
and functions of the LPA.
The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Authenticated
LPA19
Confirmation.
The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Simple
LPA20
Confirmation located on the Device.
LPA21 Access to the LUI SHALL be protected by an Authenticated Confirmation.
LPA22 The mechanism in LPA21 SHALL be selectable/unselectable by the End User.
The mechanisms in LPA21 SHALL be prompted to be enabled by default but this
LPA23
can be skipped by the End User.
The Device SHALL implement a mechanism to protect the LPA access through an
Authenticated Confirmation. This Authenticated Confirmation MAY be
LPA24
implemented by using the mechanisms implemented in the Device such as phone
lock code, fingerprint input, etc.
The End User SHALL be able to define dedicated personalised user credential to
LPA25
access the LPA.
If the End User selects the protection of access to the LUI (LPA23), then the
LPA26 subsequent Authenticated Confirmation at operation level MAY be replaced with a
Simple Confirmation.
When enforced, any Confirmation Request SHALL allow the End User to cancel
LPA27
the Local Profile Management Operation.
It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI of a Companion Device allowing input
LPA28
from an End User interface on the Primary Device.
When a Companion Device LUI allows input from a Primary Device, the
Companion Device LUI SHALL be able to restrict the actions that can be applied.
For example:
LPA29 not offer the eUICC Memory Reset;
only ‘enable’ and ‘disable’ operation are exposed.
Profile enabling is exposed only if no Profile is already enabled on the
Companion Device.
The LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be able to request an End User initiated
LPA30 action on the Companion Device before the establishment of any proximity secure
link (used for inputs into the LUI from another Device).
A point-to-point proximity secure link initiated by the End User and offering
LPA31 confidentiality and integrity SHALL be established between the Companion and
Primary Device for any input executed from the Primary Device.
When operating a Companion Device LUI from a Primary Device, any required
User Intent or Confirmation Request SHALL only be executed by the LPA on the
LPA32
Companion Device. The physical End User input MAY be done in either the
Primary or the Companion Device. The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure
LPA33
measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI.
The End User Data used for the User Intent protection (e.g. PIN code, fingerprint)
LPA34
SHALL be stored in a secure environment.
The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the
LPA35 internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over
such connection, ES8+ and ES9+/ES5+ can be established.
The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another
Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally
LPA36
shared Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over
such connection, ES8+, and ES9+/ES5+ can be established.
The LPA SHALL be able to determine if connectivity to the SM-DP+ is available
LPA37
by any means.
The LPA SHALL be able to notify the End User that there is no connection to the
LPA38 internet and or no connection to the SM-DP+ in order to allow the End User to
enable or troubleshoot required connectivity.
LPA39 The LPA SHALL only be able to access the eUICC if it has assigned privileges.
LPA40 There SHALL only be one LPA on the Device.
LPA41 The LPA SHALL only perform operations that are described in this specification.
LPA42 LPA procedures SHALL not be called by any external (non-LPA) processes.
LPA43 When multiple Operational Profiles are installed, the Local Profile Management
Operation ‘enable‘ SHALL first initiate the ‘disable‘ operation for any Enabled
Profile prior to initiating the ‘enable‘ operation for the selected Profile.
LPA44 The LPA SHALL be able to read the Policy Rules.
LPA45 When a Profile with Profile Policy Rules is installed, in the case where End User
consent is requested, the LPA SHALL display the consequences of the Policy
Rule to the End User. This message SHALL be formulated in a descriptive and
non-discriminatory manner (e.g. for “Non-Delete” Policy Rule: “The profile that you
are about to install cannot be deleted under the terms you have agreed with your
service provider. Approve installation YES/NO?“). Authenticated Confirmation
SHALL be enforced with the exception listed in LPA17.
LPA46 Prior to downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHALL check the condition for
whether the Enabled Profile, if any, has enabled POL RULE1. If this is the case a
dedicated message SHALL be displayed identifying the consequences to the End
User. Examples of information that may be displayed would be:
Enabling of the new Profile will not be possible because the currently
Enabled Profile cannot be disabled.
The Profile name of the Enabled Profile.
For more information, the End User should contact the Profile Owner of this
Profile.
With displaying this message, the End User SHALL be able to decide on whether
to continue the download or to cancel the operation.
This dialogue MAY be combined with the regular End User Intent for confirming a
Profile download.LPA47 The communication between the User Interface of the Primary Device and the LUI
of the Companion Device SHALL be protected (confidentiality, integrity and
authentication).
LPA48 There SHALL be a mechanism to limit the validity of LPA26 if the End User quits
the LPA menu or does not perform the operation within a period of time to avoid
the abuse of bypassing the Authenticated Confirmation
LPA49 Confirmation Requests for consecutive Local Profile Management Operations
MAY be achieved in one step as long as the different actions are clearly explained
to the End User. For instance, upon installation of a new Profile, the LPA MAY
propose ‘add Profile’ and ‘enable’ into one single step with a single confirmation
only (e.g. “Do you want to install profile ‘ProfileName’ on your Device and enable
it? Yes / No / Install only”)
LPA50 When consecutive operations are achieved in one single step (LPA49), the
highest level of confirmation SHALL be applied - i.e. in the case of two operations
having respectively Authenticated and Simple Confirmation Requests, the single
step SHALL use the Authenticated Confirmation Request.
LPA51 The Local Profile Management Operations ‘enable’ (LPA9), ‘disable’ (LPA10),
‘delete’ (LPA11) SHALL be able to trigger a Notification to the SM-DP+ of the
respective Profile being managed to indicate that this operation was actioned.
This Notification is sent on a best effort basis and SHALL not impact otherwise the
operation.
LPA52 The LPA SHALL provide a Trusted Link from the End User to the eUICC through
the LUI.
The End User SHALL be able to configure the LPA such that the automatic Event
LPA53
Record retrieval from the SM-DS can be disabled.
LPA54 The LPA SHALL be able to read any SM-DS and SM-DP+ addresses configured
in the eUICC.
It SHALL be possible to check the LPA Integrity. If the integrity check fails,
LPA55
communication between the eUICC and the LPA SHALL not occur.
LPA Integrity SHALL be ensured using the best practice methods on the targeted
LPA56
platform. See Annex G.
The polling mechanism in the LPA SHALL have two types of triggers; those that are
LPA57
event based, and those that are End User initiated.
Event based triggers for polling SHALL be provided. As a minimum this SHALL
LPA58 include Device power-up; in addition other triggers MAY be provided. Event based
triggers MAY be disabled by the End User.
End User initiated triggers for polling SHALL include:
The ‘Add Profile’ operation to trigger the default SM-DS if configured, and the
LPA59 Root SM-DS.
The ‘Update Profile’ operation to trigger the SM-DP+ stored in the Profile.
In addition, other manual triggers MAY be provided.
If a Profile Package is not yet released for download then the LPA SHALL be
LPA60
informed by means of a specific error code.
Error/retry handling of the LPA polling mechanism SHALL be implemented e.g.
LPA61 advise the End User to retry or automatically retry as appropriate. The
corresponding confirmation needs to be enforced in the retry cases. During initial Device setup, if no Operational Profile is already installed, the
following procedure SHALL apply in this order:
1. If a default SM-DP+ address is configured, the LPA SHALL contact the
LPA62 SM-DP+ to check for a waiting Profile.
2. If no Profile is waiting in (1), then the Root SM-DS address SHALL be
contacted to check for the Notification of a waiting Profile.
Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced for the procedure described above.
The End User SHALL always be able to manually request the retrieval of any
waiting Event Record via the LPA if there is no default SM-DP+ address.
LPA63
Note: This may be achieved through the combination with existing operations –
e.g. pressing “Add Profile” would contact the server to retrieve a Notification
The Operator/Service Provider name SHALL be given in the signalling information
from the SM-DP+ to the LPA when initiating the download of a Profile and shown
LPA64
to the End User before the Profile is downloaded.
Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
The LPA SHOULD present the EID to the End User as both text and in a defined
LPA65
scannable format (e.g. QR Code).
For the case where a Profile to be disabled and deleted in a combined action is
providing the only available connection, the pre-delete Notification SHALL be sent
LPA66 (FFS)
before the Profile is disabled. The failure of this attempt SHALL not block the
deletion nor the connection teardown.
If the SM-DP+ stops the Profile download procedure, the LPA SHALL be able to
LPA67
notify the End User.Table 23: LPA Requirements
4.10.4 LDS Requirements
Req no. Description
The LDS SHALL be able to read out the address(es) described in EUICC
LDS1 Error! Reference source not found. and only use the(se) address(es) to
connect to the SM-DSTable 24: LDS Requirement
4.11 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)
4.11.1 SM-DS Overview
The role of the SM-DS is to provide mechanisms that allow an SM-DP+ to inform the LDS within any Device that an SM-DP+ wishes to communicate with it. The purpose of the SM- DS to LDS communication SHALL be informing the LDS of a pending Event
The principle of operation remains the same for all use cases. The SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration message for a target Device to a SM-DS.
In a simple deployment, only the Root SM-DS is configured on the eUICC. The Root SM-DS address is unique and filled in the eUICC. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM- DS using the same logical location. When the Root SM-DS has an Event-ID for the target Device it will respond with the SM-DP+ address, or if there is no Event-ID the response will be a null response.
In a deployment with cascaded SM-DSs, the SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration to an Alternative SM-DS, which may not be configured as the Root SM-DS on the eUICC. This Alternative SM-DS will cascade the Event Registration to the Root SM-DSs. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM-DS and will receive the Alternative SM-DS address. It will then request the Event from the Alternative SM-DS, which will respond with the SM-DP+ address.
Figure 8: Alternative Device to Root SM-DS Event Registration
Figure 9: Root SM -DS Event Registration
Figure 10: Alternative SM -DS Discovery
4.11.2 SM-DS Implementation
Two configurations of the SM-DS addresses on the eUICC MAY exist: A Root SM-DS address An Alternative SM-DS address
Figure 11: SM-DS Implementation
Figure 11 shows both configurations. The Root SM-DS is configured at the time of Device manufacture and is invariant.
4.11.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelines
The following statements SHOULD be considered when defining a technical implementation:
A competitive environment on the supply of SM-DS services SHOULD be favoured by
the approach.
There SHOULD be no single-points-of-failure.
Implementation SHOULD inherently provide both vertical and horizontal
performance/scalability.
There SHOULD be no need for pre-registration of Devices or eUICCs at a certain
SM-DS as required in SGP.02 0 (GSMA Embedded SIM for the SM-SR).4.11.4 SM-DS functions
The SM-DS has three distinct functions:
Figure 12: SM-DS Functions
Function name Description
Event Registration Process by which an Event Record received from a SM-DP+ is stored.
Event Deletion Process by which an SM-DP+ can delete its own Event Record.
Provides all registered Event Records, upon Discovery Request from
Event Retrieval
any enquiring LDS.Table 25: SM-DS Function Descriptions
4.11.5 SM-DS Requirements
Req no. Description
The SM-DS SHALL enable a LDS to discover its own Event Records
SMDS1
registered by SM-DP+(s) or by Alternative SM-DS(s).
The SM-DS SHALL not be able to identify the nature of an Event.
SMDS2 Note: The nature of the Event may be ‘Profile Package available for
download’.
All valid Discovery Requests and Event Registrations SHALL be processed
SMDS3
in a non-discriminatory manner.
The SM-DS SHALL only accept Event Registrations from
any authorised and authenticated SM-DP+(s) having a valid
SMDS4 Certificate.
any authorised and authenticated SM-DS(s) or SM-DS(s) having a
valid Certificate.
The SM-DS SHALL only accept Discovery Requests authenticated by the
SMDS5
corresponding eUICC via the LDS.
The SM-DS and the SM-DP+ as well as connected SM-DSs SHALL be
SMDS6
mutually authenticated.
The SM-DS SHALL NOT have visibility of any data that may be used to
SMDS7
compromise the End User´s privacy.
The SM-DS SHALL support multiple concurrent Event Registrations per
SMDS8 eUICC and SHALL present to the LDS all currently valid Event Records in
the same order as they were received by the SM-DS (first in, first out).
SMDS9 The SM-DS only stores Event Records destined for specific EIDs.
Subscriber Specific data and Profile related contents SHALL NOT be stored
SMDS10
within the SM-DS.
The SM-DS SHALL NOT allow the harvesting of any information such as
SMDS11
Operator, EIDs, Device Manufacturers, Devices, etc.
The SM-DS SHALL only return to the LDS, the Event Records related to the
SMDS12
served eUICC.
The SM-DS SHALL NOT have any contact with the Profile Packages e.g.
SMDS13
SHALL NOT store or process any Profile Package.
The SM-DS SHALL provide the same data regardless of the status of the
SMDS14
Device that queries it (i.e. consistent in time and in geographic location).
The SM-DS SHOULD NOT significantly impact the end-to-end provisioning
SMDS15
time.
SMDS16 The SM-DS SHALL provide defence against DoS attacks.Req no. Description
All communications to, from and between entities of the SM-DS SHALL be
SMDS17
encrypted.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event Records
SMDS18
registered on the SM-DS.
An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event
SMDS19 Records registered on the Root SM-DS (In response to an SM-DP+ delete
operation defined in SMDS18).
An Alternative SM-DS SHALL propagate the Event Record to the Root SM-
SMDS20
DS if requested by the SM-DP+.
If there are multiple Event Records registered on the SM-DS for one
SMDS21
eUICC, these SHALL all be sent as a single response.
An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an Event Record to an LDS either by
the Root SM-DS or via any alternative one selected by the SM-DP+. If the
SMDS22
alternative is chosen the Event Record to the LDS SHALL come from this
alternative SM-DS.
There SHALL be a unique Root SM-DS.
SMDS23 Note: This requirement does not forbid the potential load-balancing of this
Root SM-DS.
SMDS24 The Root SM-DS SHALL be managed by the GSMA.
It SHALL be possible for the Alternative SM-DS to conduct an Event Record
SMDS25 (FFS) Query to the Root SM-DS for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations it
owns.
A SM-DS response to an Event Record Query SHALL only confirm Event
SMDS26 (FFS)
Record existence and SHALL NOT include additional information.
An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event
SMDS27 (FFS) Record on the Root SM-DS, identified by the EID or the Event-ID over the
ES15 interface.
Response to a SM-DS Event Record query SHALL only occur where the
SMDS28 (FFS)
responder validates the Event Record ownership.
Ownership validation of a SM-DS Event Record Query SHALL only use the
SMDS29 (FFS) requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components of
the Event Record held.
The SM-DS (Root or Alternative) MAY inform the SM-DP+ directly or via
SMDS30 (FFS) another SM-DS, that a Discovery Request from an authorised LDS has
been answered by issuing an Event Record.
The SM-DS SHALL only inform the Event Record’s owning SM-DP+ or SM-
SMDS31 (FFS)
DS that it has replied to a Discovery Request.Table 26 SM-DS Requirements
4.11.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedure
The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with the Root SM-DS and an Alternative SM-DS (cascade mode).
Figure 13: Event Registration/Deletion Procedure
Starting Condition:
a. The SM-DP+ has an action waiting for a target eUICC identified by the EID.
Procedure:
1. The SM-DP+ establishes a secure connection to an Alternative SM-DS of the
Profile Owner´s choice.
2. The SM-DP+ notifies the Alternative SM-DS about a pending action.
3. to 4. The Alternative SM-DS registers and confirms the Event Registration.
5. The Alternative SM-DS establishes a secure connection to the Root SM-DS.
6. The Alternative SM-DS informs the Root SM-DS that for the given EID, an Event
Record is waiting at the Alternative SM-DS.
7. The Root SM-DS confirms the receipt of the information.4.11.7 Discovery Request Procedure
The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with an Alternative SM-DS and the Root SM-DS (cascade mode). #
Figure 14: Discovery Request Procedure
Procedure:
1. to 3. In order to generate a Discovery Request, the LDS requests the eUICC to generate
an eUICC Authorisation which contains (at least) the eUICC-Certificate and is
signed by the eUICC.
4. to 5. The LDS establishes a secure communication to the Root SM-DS.
6. The Root SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by checking the eUICC
Authorisation.
7. In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record is waiting, it delivers back:
a. The address of the SM-DP+, where an action is waiting.
or
b. The rest of the following actions: i. The address of the Alternative SM-DS, where an Event Record can be
retrieved.
ii. The LDS establishes a secure connection to the Alternative SM-DS.
iii. The Alternative SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by
checking the eUICC Authorisation.
iv. In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record has been
received, it delivers back the address of the SM-DP+, where an action
is waiting.
8. The LPA establishes a connection to the SM-DP+ and the waiting action can be
performed.4.12 Interfaces
Figure 15: Interfaces on the eUICC Architecture with the LPA in the Device
Configuration
4.12.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
The ES2+ interface is used by the Operator to order Profiles for specific eUICCs as well as other administrative functions.
4.12.2 Operator – End User (ESop)
This interface is out of scope of this specification.
4.12.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)
ESeu is the interface between the End User and the LUI.
In a Primary/Companion Device scenario the LUI used SHALL only reside within the Companion Device or its eUICC.
The ESeu interface is used to support the following requirements:
Req no. Description
The Local Profile Management Operations SHALL be executed only over
ESeu1
the ESeu interface.
Each Local Profile Management Operation SHALL be explicitly initiated by
ESeu2
the End User, verified by User Intent.
The ESeu interface SHALL support the triggering and confirmation of the
ESeu3
Profile download and installation operation.Table 27: End User to LUI (ESeu) Interface Requirements
4.12.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
The ES6 interface is used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services.
4.12.5 SM-DP+ – LPA in the eUICC (ES5+)
The ES5+ interface is used to provide a secure transport between the SM-DP+ and the LPA in the eUICC for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package.
4.12.6 SM-DP+ – LPD in the Device (ES9+)
For Devices with an LPA, the ES9+ interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the LPD.
4.12.7 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
The ES8+ interface provides a secure end-to-end channel between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC for the administration of the ISD-P and the associated Profile during download and installation. It is an enhanced version of the existing ES8 interface, providing Perfect Forward Secrecy.
4.12.8 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)
The ES12 interface allows any SM-DP+ to issue or remove Event Registrations on the SM- DS.
4.12.9 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)
The ES11 interface allows the LDS to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC.
4.12.10 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)
This interface is out of scope of this specification.
4.12.11 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)
The ES10a interface is used between the LDS in the Device and the LPA Services to request the eUICC Authorisation to generate a Discovery Request.
4.12.12 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)
The ES10b interface is used by the LPD in the Device and the LPA services to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.
4.12.13 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)
The ES10c interface is used between the LUI in the Device and the LPA services for Local Profile Management by the End User.
4.12.14 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)
In the case of deployments with cascaded SM-DSs, the ES15 interface is used to connect the SM-DSs.
4.12.15 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)
This connection will be provided either by:
An internet connectivity available or provided on the same Device where the LPA
resides
or
An internet connection shared from another Device via a local go -between connectionFigure 16: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to the
SM-DP+
4.12.16 General Interface Requirements
Req no. Description
All interfaces from the eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version
INT1
number.
The behaviour of all interfaces SHALL support the indicated specification
INT2
version number.
During the indication of the supported specification version number from the
INT3 eUICC to the SM-DP+, the eUICC version SHALL be used or the procedure
SHALL fail. See table below.
All communicating entities involved in Remote SIM Provisioning SHALL be
INT4 mutually authenticated. The Device and the eUICC are considered as one
entity in this context.Table 28: General Interface Requirements
Platform Version 1 (V1) Version 2 (V2) Version 3 (V3)
eUICC V1 Platform uses V1 Platform uses V1 or fails. Platform uses V1 or fails.
eUICC V2 ✗ Platform uses V2 Platform uses V2 or fails.
eUICC V3 ✗ ✗ Platform uses V3
Table 29: eUICC Version vs Platform
4.13 Profile Policy Management
4.13.1 Introduction
The Profile Policy Management function provides mechanisms by which Service Providers are able to reinforce the conditions or policies (operational and business) under which services are provided to the Subscriber. In some instances this MAY also include the enforcement of the policies set by the Subscriber.
Profile Policy Management MAY also be applied with other already existing policy enforcement technologies which are also subject to agreement by the Subscriber.
The realisation of the Policy Management function is based on two key elements. The first element is the Profile Policy Enabler which is contained within the eUICC. The second element is a set of defined Profile Policy Rules which are required for the actual enforcement of specific policies.
4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirements
Policy no. Description
POL1 A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only be configured within a Profile.
POL2 Each Profile MAY have Policy Rules associated to itself.
POL3 A Policy Rule SHALL only apply to the Profile that contains it.
POL4 Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be consistent across implementations.
Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be able to resolve any Profile Policy Rule
POL5
conflict.
The updating of a Profile’s Policy Rules SHALL be restricted to the Profile
POL6
Owner.
POL7 The mechanism used for the update of a Policy Rule SHALL be atomic.
POL8 The set of Profile Policy Rules SHALL be extensible for future releases.
There SHALL be a Profile Policy Rule scheme to allow extensibility of the
POL9 Policy Rules, e.g. described like ‘operational command, scope of
application, qualification’
A Profile Policy Rule SHALL be enforced whenever a Profile state change is
POL10
attempted.
Downloading and installing a Profile with the Profile Policy Rule ‘Do not
POL11 disable’ SHALL only be possible if no other Operational Profile is currently
installed.
The LPA and the eUICC SHALL prevent the downloading and installation of
a Profile containing Profile Policy Rules that conflict with the Profile Policy
POL12 Rules of the already installed Profiles.
Note: The technical specification SHALL describe exhaustively each conflict
that MAY occur.
An Operator SHALL be able to deactivate the Profile Policy Rules of its
POL13 Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is enabled.
Note: The activation of Profile Policy Rules on the ES6 interface is FFS.Policy no. Description
Before a Profile is installed with Profile Policy Rules, the End User SHALL
be able to be notified about the Profile Policy Rules and if notified, the
installation SHALL thereafter be conditional on End User Authenticated
POL14
Confirmation.
This prompting may not be needed if the installation is directly allowed by
the RAT.
The request for End User consent for the installation of Profile Policy Rules
POL15 and Profile download MAY be combined into a single prompt therefore
requiring a single confirmation by the End User.
Profile Policy Rules SHALL be enforced by the Profile Policy Enabler in the
POL16
eUICC.
The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL only support the Profile Policy Rules
POL17
defined in this specification.
The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL be capable of supporting all the Profile
POL18
Policy Rules as defined in this specification.
POL RULE3 SHALL be enforceable in all cases with the exception of the
enabling of a Provisioning Profile.
POL19
Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet
been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.
Allowing the installation of a Profile with Profile Policy Rules SHALL be
POL20
subject to compliance with local regulatory requirements.Table 30: Profile Policy Principles
4.13.3 Policy Rules
Policy no. Description
The Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be
POL RULE1
supported.
The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be
POL RULE2
supported.
The Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is required upon its successful
disabling’ SHALL be supported.
POL RULE3
Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet
been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.Table 31: Policy Rules Requirements
4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirements
Policy no. Description
The Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) SHALL be stored in the Profile Policy
POLPPE1
Enabler in the eUICC.
The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL enforce the contents of the installed RAT,
POLPPE2
if any, only at Profile installation time.
The RAT SHALL allow multiple Profile Owners to have Policy Rules enabled
POLPPE3
in their Profiles.Policy no. Description
The RAT SHALL be able to support specific configurations which allow a set
POLPPE4
of or all Profile Policy Rules for any Profile Owner.
The RAT SHALL only be installed at pre-issuance or during the initial
POLPPE5
Device setup provided there are no Operational Profiles installed.
POLPPE6 The RAT SHALL not be affected by the eUICC Memory Reset function.
To support identifiable regulatory requirement, a RAT SHALL be able to
POLPPE7 support a specific configuration which MAY forbid any Profile Owner to set a
specific Profile Policy Rule.
If POLPPE7 is set, this information SHALL be part of the eligibility check
POLPPE8
information shared between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
Where the RAT allows the Profile Policy Rules for the Profile being installed,
POLPPE9
installation SHALL proceed as stated in POL14.
The RAT SHALL be able to support a setting to display the consequences
POLPPE10
of the Profile Policy Rules to the End User before installation of the Profile.
POLPPE11 The OEM or EUM SHALL be responsible for providing the RAT.
A fixed RAT SHALL be implemented in the eUICC.
POLPPE12
Note: The allowed RAT configuration(s) are detailed in Annex H.Table 32: Profile Policy Enabler Requirements
4.14 Certification
4.14.1 eUICC Certification
Req no. Description
CERTEU1 The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS certified 0.
The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance with
CERTEU2
GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0.
The eUICC SHALL be certified according to the Protection Profile defined
CERTEU3
by the GSMA (TBD).
The eUICC Protection Profile SHALL at least include the following
CERTEU4 elements: platform service manager, ISD-R, Profile storage and isolation of
Profiles.
The eUICC protection Profile SHALL be equivalent to the eUICC Protection
CERTEU5
Profile defined in SGP.05 0.
The Evaluation Assurance Level of the eUICC Protection Profile SHALL be
(at least) EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 (EAL 4+) or
CERTEU6
equivalent.
Note: A study needs to be performed in terms of assurance level by FASG.
The eUICC public key Certificate used for authentication SHALL contain the
CERTEU7
EID.
The eUICC public key Certificate(s) SHALL contain the technical reference
CERTEU8
of the product, for example the Common Criteria certification report number.
CERTEU9 The EUM Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.Req no. Description
The eUICC Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by the EUM using its EUM
CERTEU10
Certificate (CERTEU9Error! Reference source not found.).Table 33: eUICC Certification Requirements
4.14.2 Device Compliance
Req no. Description
There SHALL be a compliance process for all parts of Local Profile
CERTDEV1
Management implementations in accordance with the GSMA.Table 34: Device Certification Requirement
4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification
Req no. Description
The SM-DP+ provider SHALL be required to declare product (SM-DP+)
CERTDP1
compliance with GSMA SGP.22 V2.0 0.
CERTDP2 The SM-DP+ SHALL be certified according to GSMA SAS 0.
SM-DP+ elements SHALL use Hardware Security Modules (HSM) for
cryptographic related operations (key storage, derivation, cryptographic
CERTDP3 operations).
Note: This is to be covered by the SAS document “HSM certified
according to FIPS 140-2 level 3 or higher”
The SM-DP+ SHALL implement privileges isolation (Log, Audit,
CERTDP4
Operation, and Administration).
The SM-DP+ SHALL implement operating system hardening
CERTDP5
mechanisms.
The SM-DP+ SHALL implement separation of control, user and
CERTDP6
administrative planes.
The SM-DP+ SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration
CERTDP7
operation.
SM-DP+ hard drives and backup mediums used for storing Profiles
CERTDP8
SHALL be ciphered.
The private key of SM-DP+ Certificate used for mutual authentication
CERTDP9 with eUICC SHALL be protected and stored in HSM according to
CERTDP3.
The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to mitigate
CERTDP10
against DoS attacks.
CERTDP11 The SM-DP+ SHALL log all Certificate authentication failures.
CERTDP12 The SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.Table 35: SM-DP+ Certification Requirements
4.14.4 SM-DS Certification
Req no. Description
The SM-DS provider SHALL be required to declare product compliance with
CERTDS1
GSMA SGP.22 0.
CERTDS2 The SM-DS SHALL be certified according to the relevant GSMA SAS.
The SM-DS SHALL implement isolation of privileges (Log, Audit, Operation,
CERTDS3
Administration).
CERTDS4 The SM-DS SHALL implement operating system hardening mechanisms.
The SM-DS SHALL implement separation of control, user and
CERTDS5
administrative planes.
The SM-DS SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration
CERTDS6
operation.
CERTDS7 SM-DS hard drives and backup mediums SHALL be ciphered.
CERTDS8 The SM-DS Certificate SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.Table 36: SM-DS Certification Requirements
4.14.5 LPA Certification
Req no. Description
There SHALL be a certification process for all the LPA elements
CERTLPA1
communicating with Remote SIM Provisioning entities.
The certification process SHALL ensure that Local Profile Management
CERTLPA2
Operations are sent by authorised LPA elements only.
The certification process SHALL ensure a mechanism exists to block
CERTLPA3
compromised LPAs.
CERTLPA4 The LPD SHALL authenticate the SM-DP+ during the TLS session.
CERTLPA5 The LDS SHALL authenticate the SM-DS during the TLS session.
The LPA SHALL only accept Certificates signed by a GSMA CI for server
CERTLPA6
authentication.Table 37: LPA Certification Requirements
4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management
Req no. Description
CERTPK1 The eUICC SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+.
CERTPK2 The LPD SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+.
CERTPK3 The LDS SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS.
The LDS authentication of an SM-DS using an invalid Public Key Certificate
CERTPK4
SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop.
The LPD authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK5 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11CERTPK1), and on-going
communication SHALL stop.Req no. Description
The SM-DP+ authentication of an eUICC using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK6 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication
SHALL stop.
The eUICC authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK7 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication
SHALL stop.
The GSMA CI SHALL revoke the Public Key Certificate of any entities (SM-
CERTPK8
DP+, SM-DS, EUM) if it is compromised (e.g. private key theft).
CERTPK9 The eUICC SHALL be able to support a set of GSMA CIs.
A Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:
it has a valid signature
it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a trusted chain of Certificates up to a
GSMA CI. Certificate Path validation SHALL follow the process
defined in RFC 5280 00.
CERTPK10
it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in the trust chain has been
revoked
it has not expired
If any of these applicable verifications fail, the Public Key Certificate SHALL
be considered as invalid.
The eUICC, LPA, SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL have knowledge of revoked
CERTPK11
Public Key Certificates.Table 38: Public Key Certificates Management Requirements
5 Operational Procedures
5.1 LPA Initiated Download
5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirements
Req no. Description
The LPA SHALL use any Root SM-DP+ or default SM-DS address
LID1 populated on the eUICC if it has not been provided already by the Activation
Code.
In the context of LID1, if both a Root SM-DP+ and a default SM-DS address
LID2 are populated, the LPA SHALL first contact the SM-DP+ and then SM-DS to
initiate a Remote SIM Provisioning transaction.Table 39: LPA Initiated Download Requirements
5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedure
This following procedure describes the Events that are part of the Profile Package download and installation procedure initiated by the LPA.
Figure 17: Profile Download Procedure
Start conditions:
a. The Subscriber has completed the Subscription process to the selected
Operator/Service Provider offer.
b. The Profile ordering process related to this Subscription has been completed
(i.e. an assigned Protected Profile Package is stored on the SM-DP+).
Procedure: 1. The LPA initiates Profile Package download and identifies the address of the
SM-DP+ where the Profile is stored and available for download (via e.g. URL,
QR code, manual input, etc) as well as other information provided (e.g.
Token, SMDPId, Confirmation Code).
2. The LPA authenticates the SM-DP+ through establishing a TLS connection
with the SM-DP+, and verifying the SMDPid if such information has been
provided.
3. to 4. The LPA gets an eUICC challenge
5. to 6. The LPA sends the eUICC challenge and any other relevant information to the
the SM-DP+.
7. to 9. The SM-DP+ signs the eUICC challenge, and generates a DP_Challenge to
be sent back to the eUICC.
10. The LPA sends the material received by the SM-DP+ and the AC Token to
the eUICC; the eUICC checks the SMDPid and authenticates the SM-DP+.
11. The eUICC sends back a signed set of information including the
DP_Challenge, the AC Token, the EID and its Certificate to the LPA.
12. The End User confirms the download of the Profile, optionally with the display
of the Profile name of the Operator.
13. The LPA sends the set of information received in Step 11 from the eUICC to
the SM-DP+.
14. The SM-DP+ verifies the signature; the eUICC is authenticated.
15. to 16. OPTIONAL: The eUICC Eligibility Check and Profile binding functions are
performed by the SM-DP+.
17. to 22. OPTIONAL
17. The Operator is notified about the Profile Package that is about to be
downloaded.
18. If the Operator has been notified, it MAY request to stop the download
process by indicating an error code to the SM-DP+.
19. If the Operator sends an error code to the SM-DP+, the SM-DP+ stops the
download process and indicates the error code to the LPA.
20. The LPA notifies the End User with an appropriate message.
21. to 22. The SM-DP+ MAY receive information from the Operator to prepare the
appropriate Profile Package.
23. to 25. The Bound Profile Package is sent to the eUICC and installed on the eUICC.
26. The Profile Package download report is sent from the SM-DP+ to the
Operator.
End Condition:a. The Profile is installed in the eUICC in a Disabled state
5.2 Profile Download with Activation Code
5.2.1 Activation Code Requirements
Req no. Description
Where used, the Activation Code SHALL trigger the download of a Bound
AC1
Profile Package from a specific SM-DP+.
The Activation Code SHALL comprise of the following parameters:
SM-DP+ address
AC2 Activation Code Token (Includes OPTIONAL Confirmation Code
Required Flag)
SMDPid (OPTIONAL)
The Activation Code Token SHALL be able to include a parameter indicating
whether a Confirmation Code is required or not.
If such a Confirmation Code is required, the LPA SHALL ask the End User to
AC3 input a Confirmation Code. The SM-DP+ SHALL verify the Confirmation Code
before delivering the Bound Profile Package.
Note: How the Confirmation Code is created and provided to the End User is
out of scope of this specification.
The Activation Code SHALL be verified by the SM-DP+ before delivering the
AC4
Bound Profile Package.
The Activation Code input in the LPA by the End User SHALL support at least
AC5
manual typing and QR code scanning.
All Activation Code procedures SHALL be implemented natively as part of the
AC6
LPA.
The Activation Code procedure SHALL conditionally be automatically offered
to the End User during initial Device set-up.
This automatic setting SHALL NOT apply if a Profile is already provisioned.
AC7
No Authenticated Confirmation is required.
Note: For example this could be inappropriate from an open market cellular-
enabled notebook computer.
Following the Activation Code procedure, the Profile Package download
AC8
procedure SHALL be used.
The Activation Code procedure SHALL preserve eco-system security, privacy
AC9
and validation of User Intent.
The Activation Code procedure SHALL be used for the sole purpose of
downloading a Profile package to the targeted eUICC. The Activation Code
AC10
procedure SHALL prevent sending IMEI and EID information to a non-
authenticated SM-DP+.
AC11 The Activation Code SHALL uniquely identify the Operator/Service Provider.
The Activation Code request to the SM-DP+ SHALL be extended by the LPA
AC12
with the EID after the specific SM-DP+ has been authenticated.Table 40: Activation Code Requirements
5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure
The Activation Code procedure defines a common functionality which allows the Subscriber or the End User on behalf of the Subscriber to “activate” a Device by means of requesting the download of an Operational Profile from the Device itself.
Figure 18: Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure
Start Conditions:
a. A Subscription has been established by the Subscriber.
b. An Activation Code has been provided to the End User and optionally a
Confirmation Code (side channel).Procedure:
1. The End User inputs the Activation Code to the LPA through the LUI.
2. The LPA parses the Activation Code parameters to recognise the SM-DP+
address, the Activation Code Token, the LPA Mode and optionally the SMDPid.
In addition, the LPA MAY parse in the Activation Token the information that a
Confirmation Code is required.
3. If the Confirmation Code parameter in the Activation Code Token is set to
“require Confirmation Code”, the End User is prompted to input a Confirmation
Code provided to them by the issuing Operator/Service Provider.
4. The Activation Code download procedure is initiated by the LPA. The LPA
requests a nonceeUICC from the eUICC.
5. The eUICC creates a nonceeUICC associated with the supported eUICC
specification version number (eSVN).
6. The eUICC transmits the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to
the LPA.
7. The LPA sends the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to the SM-
DP+.Note: Prior to this step a HTTPs session SHALL be established between the LPA and the SM-DP+ based on a public key of the Root Certificate stored in the Device which includes authentication using the TLS Certificate and checking for the presence of the SMDPid in the TLS Certificate used for the TLS session.
8. Upon receiving the nonceeUICC and the associated eSVN, the SM-DP+ creates
nonceSMDP and signs both the nonceSMDP and the nonceeUICC.
9. The SM-DP+ sends the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the LPA.
10. The LPA collects the Activation Code parameters as well as the Device
information needed for the eligibility procedure and optionally the Confirmation
Code and transmits them with the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the
eUICC.
11. The eUICC checks the signature attached to the nonceeUICC. If the SMDPid is
configured in the AC, the eUICC checks that the SMDPid provided by the LPA
and the SMDPid in the SM-DP+ Certificate correspond. The SM-DP+ is at this
stage authenticated by the eUICC. The eUICC generates key material that will
be used for the session key establishment.The eUICC signs a set of information
with the eUICC private key which includes:
a. The nonceSMDP
b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the
preparation of the Bound Profile Package
c. Activation Code parameters
d. The Device and eUICC information
e. Optionally the Confirmation Code
12. The eUICC sends the signed set of information to the LPA in addition to:
a. The nonceSMDP
b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the
preparation of the Bound Profile Package
c. Activation Code parameters d. The Device and eUICC information
e. The eUICC Certificate which includes the EID
f. The EUM Certificate
g. Optionally the Confirmation Code
13. The LPA sends the whole set of information received from the eUICC to the SM-
DP+.
14. The SM-DP+ checks the EUM Certificate with the CI Public Key. The SM-DP+
checks the signature of the nonceSMDP; the eUICC is at this stage
authenticated by the SM-DP+.
15. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the eligibility check based on the transmitted
information (EID, Device information, eUICC information, eSVN).
16. The SM-DP+ checks the Activation Code parameters and optionally the
Confirmation Code to retrieve the referenced Profile Package.
17. The Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC:
a. The SM-DP+ establishes session keys with the eUICC.
b. A Bound Profile Package is prepared on the basis of the eUICC session key
material and is downloaded and installed on the eUICC.
c. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and the
Operator is notified by the SM-DP+.
d. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged by the
eUICC to the LPA which notifies the End User of the status.End Conditions:
a. A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a
Disabled state.
b. The LPA MAY offer the Profile for enablement by the End User.5.3 Local Profile Management
5.3.1 Local Profile Management Procedures
5.3.1.1 Enable Profile
This procedure performs the enabling of a target Profile. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.
Figure 19: Enable Profile Procedure
Start conditions:
a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC.
b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
Management.Procedure:
1. The End User makes a Profile enable request on the LPA.
2. User Intent is verified.
3. The LPA sends a Profile enable operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the
eUICC.
4. The ISD-R checks if applied Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the Profile
to be enabled
5. If there is a conflict with Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs
the End User via the LPA.
6. The target Profile is enabled.
7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the enabling of the Profile.
8. The End User is informed via the LPA.End conditions:
a. The target Profile is enabled.5.3.1.2 Disable Profile
Profile disabling can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.
Figure 20: Disable Profile Procedure
Start conditions:
a. The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC.
b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
Management.Procedure:
1. The End User makes a Profile disable request on the LPA.
2. User Intent is verified.
3. The LPA sends a Profile disable operation to the ISD-R on the eUICC.
4. The ISD-R checks if applied Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the Profile
to be disabled.
5. If there is a conflict with Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs
the End User via the LPA.
6. The ISD-R disables the target Profile.
7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the disabling of the Profile.
8. The End User is informed via the LPA.End conditions:
a. The target Profile is disabled.5.3.1.3 Delete Profile
Profile deletion can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.
Figure 21: Delete Profile Procedure
Start conditions:
a. The target Profile is disabled.
b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User
c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
Management.Procedure:
1. The End User makes a Profile deletion request on the LPA.
2. User Intent is verified.
3. The LPA sends a Profile deletion operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on
the eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
4. The ISD-R checks if applied Policy Rules permits the Profile to be deleted.
5. If there is a conflict with Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs
the End User via the LPA.
6. The ISD-R erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P. 7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the Profile deletion.
8. The Metadata for the target Profile is erased.
9. The End User is informed via the LPA.
10. The LPA sends a delete Notification to the SM-DP+ that originally installed the
Profile.End conditions:
a. The target Profile is deleted.5.3.1.4 Add/Update Profile Nickname
Add/update nickname will allow the Subscriber or End User to attribute a nickname to a Profile for ease of use. Note that adding or changing a nickname SHALL NOT affect any other data or other Metadata for that Profile.
Figure 22: Add/Update Profile Nickname Procedure
Start conditions:
a. User Intent has been verified.
b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
Management.Procedure:
1. The End User requests the update of the nickname on the LPA.
2. The LPA updates the Metadata of the target Profile with the End User’s choice of
nickname in the eUICC.End conditions:
a. Metadata of the target Profile has been updated with the End User’s choice of
nickname.5.3.1.5 Query Profile Metadata
This procedure will allow the End User to query the Metadata of the Profiles accessible to the End User. The result SHALL display all (or parts of) the Metadata for the selected Profile on the eUICC at the time of querying. No changes are made to any data on the eUICC as a result of this procedure.
Figure 23: Query Profile Metadata Procedure
Start conditions:
a. The LPA is authenticated to eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
Management.
b. The list of Profiles accessible to the End User is displayed by the LPA(LUI).Procedure:
1. The End User selects a Profile to query.
2. The LPA receives a query request from the End User.
3. The LPA requests Profile Metadata from the eUICC.
4. The LPA displays the Profile Metadata to the End User on the LUI.End conditions:
a. No change to Profile Metadata.5.3.1.6 eUICC Memory Reset
This procedure performs the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC including its associated Profile Metadata. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.
Note: A similar procedure will apply to perform the eUICC Test Memory Reset of the eUICC.
Figure 24: eUICC Memory Reset Procedure
Start conditions:
a. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
Management.
b. The eUICC Memory Reset option is displayed by the LPA (LUI).Procedure:
1. The End User makes an eUICC Memory Reset request on the LPA (LUI).
2. User Intent is verified.
3. The LPA (LUI) displays a message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ to
the End User.
4. The End User confirms the conformity with the consequences to the LPA.
5. The LPA sends an eUICC Memory Reset operation to the eUICC.
6. The eUICC deletes the Profile on the eUICC even if it is an Enabled Profile
including the Metadata associated with it.
7. The eUICC informs the LPA of the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC.
8. The End User is informed via the LPA (LUI).
9. The LPA sends a delete Notification to each SM-DP+ that originally installed the
Profile.End conditions:
a. The Profile is deleted from the eUICC.5.3.1.7 Add Profile with Activation Code
This procedure will allow the Subscriber to add a single Profile. This procedure will not enable the downloaded Profile, nor disable an Enabled Profile. Network connectivity is assumed. The download can be initiated by the input of an Activation Code.
Figure 25: Add Profile with Activation Code Procedure
Start conditions:
a. User Intent has been verified.
b. The download of a new Profile is allowed on the eUICC.
c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Profile
download.Procedure:
1. The End User obtains an Activation Code to add a Profile to their Device.
2. The LPA requests the End User to enter the Activation Code.
3. Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure as described in Section 5.2.2
starts.End conditions:
a. The Profile has been installed on the End User’s Device.
b. Profile Metadata has been updated from the Profile.5.3.1.8 Edit SM-DP+ Address
This procedure will allow the End User to edit a default SM-DP+ address on to the eUICC.
Figure 26: Edit SM -DP+ Address
Start conditions:
a. There is a default SM-DP+ address in the LPA.
b. The End User is willing to edit the default SM-DP+ addressProcedure:
1. The End User edits the SM-DP+ Address via the LPA.
2. Simple Confirmation from the User is required.
3. The LPA sends the default SM-DP+ address for storage in the LPA Service.
4. The LPA Service informs the LPA of the storage of the default SM-DP+ address.
5. The End User is informed via the LPA.End conditions:
a. The target default SM-DP+ Address is edited in the LPA Services.A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)
New Profile on New Primary Device (Off Device Activation)
Risk Risk description
no.
INI1 Incomplete or corrupted Profile being pushed to the Subscriber.
Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles to
INI2
Devices.Table 41: New Profile on New Primary Device Risks
Profile Deletion
Risk Risk description
no.
Long term gathering of key materials due to a long term storage of delivered Profiles
IND1
after their disabling.
IND2 Loss of sensitive data from discarded media supports (hard drives…)
Malware launching coordinated or isolated deletion of one or several Profiles leading to a
IND3
loss of connectivity to an End User.
Accidental Profile deletion (e.g. unattended children…) leading to a loss of connectivity
IND4
to an End User.
Non-tech-savvy or malicious Subscriber repeatedly deleting Profiles and asking for them
IND5
to be reloaded leading to surcharge of provisioning servers.Table 42:Profile Deletion Risks
Profile Switch
Risk Risk description
no.
INP1 Malicious Profile switching originating from an internal party.
Human error leading to the switching of alternate Profiles leading to a loss of
INP2
connectivity.
Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to
INP3
a loss of connectivity.
Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to
INP4
major fraud scenarios.Table 43: Profile Switching Risks
Profile Swap Risk Risk description no. INS1 Race condition leading to the deactivation of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity.
Table 44: Profile Swapping Risks
Cryptographic Related Risks
Risk Risk description
no.
Loss or theft of private keys in one or several Profile Management components leading
INO1
to the loss of confidentiality on the whole chain.
Inability to revoke compromised Certificates leading to the loss of trust on the whole
INO2
Certificate chain.
INO3 Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful disclosure of key materials.
INO4 Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful compromise of key components.
Malicious or accidental revocation of Certificates leading to the denial of service on the
INO5
whole provisioning Certificate chain.
Use of temporary symmetric cryptographic or “generic” key material during the Profile
INO6 creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single point of
failure and attack being created.Table 45: Cryptographic Related Risks
Quality of Service
Risk Risk description
no.
Profile creation burst leading to the inability for the eUICC platforms to deliver expected
QoS1
service level.
Denial of service on delivery platforms leading to the inability to deliver expected
QoS2
service level.
Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a temporary or
QoS3
permanent inability to deliver a Profile.Table 46: Quality of Service Risks
Non-human or Unpredictable
Risk Risk description
no.
Catastrophic event such as floods, earthquakes, etc. leading to the destruction of a
EXC1
datacentre.
EXC2 Geopolitical/Human events leading to the destruction of a datacentre.
Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the
EXC3
provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, SIM vendor…).Table 47: Non-human or Unpredictable Risks
New Profile during Subscriber Journey
Risk Risk description
no.
EXN1 Malicious pairing of new Device using unattended Primary or Companion Device.
Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the loss of confidentiality during
EXN2
the provisioning of Profile operations.Risk Risk description
no.
Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the tampering of registration
EXN3
information during provisioning of Profile operations.
EXN4 Social engineering leading to the communication of OTP materials to attackers.
Man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping during Profile provisioning leading to the loss of
EXN5
confidentiality.
“Implicit authentication” (e.g. HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of
EXN6
authentication or Profile material.Table 48: New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks
Device Swap
Risk Risk description
no.
Malicious Subscriber using race condition scenarios leading to Profiles being activated
EXS1
on both Devices.
Malicious entity using weak swap procedures in order to compromise authentication
EXS2
vectors.Table 49: Device Swapping Risks
Loss of Privacy
Risk Risk description
no.
Improper handling, transport or disclosure of the EID or any user related data
PRI1
information leading to the use of the latter as a “super” user tracking identifier.
eUICC management commands leading to the creation of unexpected and unpredicted
PRI2 « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties to spy or
compromise Devices or the Subscriber themselves.Table 50: Loss of Privacy Risks
Others
Risk Risk description
no.
Compromising of exchanges between Profile Management actors leading to the critical
EXO1
loss of private keys.
EXO2 Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios.Table 51: Other Risks
Creation Process
Req Requirement description
no.
Profiles failing to be created SHALL be securely deleted or at least purged of
CRE1
authentication vectors.Req Requirement description
no.
Communication between systems participating in the Profile creation SHALL be
CRE2
protected in integrity and confidentiality.Table 52: Creation Process Requirements
B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)
B.1 Profile Production Procedure
This section describes a generic implementation. It should be regarded as an example only ; specific implementation MAY be required to address specific security concerns.
Within the eUICC, the current functionality of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Just as with current UICCs, Profiles are the responsibility of the Operator and Profile production is performed upon their request and permission (if not produced by the Operators themselves).
The same Operator procedures as in the current UICCs SHALL apply.
Figure 27: Profile Production Procedure
Profile Production consists of three steps:
Profile Description definition: The SM-DP+ creates and registers a Profile
Description based on the Operational Profile Description.
Operator Credentials generation: The Operator asks the SM-DP+ to generate
Operator Credentials that will be used in the next step. This procedure is OPTIONAL
and will not be used if the Operator wants to generate the Operator Credentials
during Protected Profile Package generation.
Protected Profile Package generation: The Profile Packages will be created,
protected and stored. This step (batch type of operation or real time process) is only
performed after an order with the respective Operator. Contract conclusion and Link Profile: At the end of the contract conclusion, an
Activation Code is delivered to the End User and the Profile MAY be allocated for this
contract.Note: The generation of the Bound Profile Package is part of the Profile download with Activation Code procedure in Section 5.2.2.
B.1.1 Profile Description Definition
The Profile description definition MAY comprise of the following sequence:
Figure 28: Profile Description Procedure
Start Condition:
a. Contractual relationship between the Operator and the SM-DP+.Procedure:
1. The Operator defines its different Profile types (identified by a [non-standardised]
Profile Description ID) which contains the Network Access Application like USIM,
file structure, data and applications, etc.
2. The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Descriptions based on the Operators input with
the corresponding Profile Description ID.
3. The SM-DP+ confirms the Profile Description definition e.g. by sending the
corresponding Profile Description ID.Note: An Operator can define multiple Profile Descriptions with the SM-DP+
End Condition:
a. The Operator is able to order Protected Profile Packages based on Profile
Description IDs.B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generation
This procedure allows the Operator to allocate a set of Operator Credentials on the SM-DP+ without associating them to a specific ProfileDescriptionID. Operator Credentials generation MAY comprise of the following sequence:
Figure 29: Operator Credentials Generation
Start Condition:
a. IMSI, ICCID and other resources have been allocated by the Operator .
Procedure:
1. The Operator provides the IMSI, ICCID, type of credential to be created (e.g.
Milenage00, TUAK 0 etc.) and other resources that MAY already be allocated to
the SM-DP+. It asks the SM-DP+ to securely generate and store a set of
Operator Credentials.
2. The SM-DP+ securely generates and stores a set of Operator Credentials based
on the Operator’s input with the corresponding IMSI, ICCID and other resources
provided.
3. The SM-DP+ confirms the generation of Operator Credentials and provides them
to the Operator.B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generation
The Protected Profile Package Generation MAY comprise of the following sequence:
This procedure MAY apply between the Profile Description definition, and the Contract conclusion and Link Profile, depending on whether the Protected Profile Package is created on demand or prepared in advance.
Figure 30: Protected Profile Package Generation Procedure
Start Conditions:
a. Profile Description definitionProcedure:
1. The Operator orders the Protected Profile Package generation by providing the
SM-DP+ with the Profile Description ID and some corresponding Operator input
data (credentials e.g. ICCID, IMSI).The Operator input data required for Protected
Profile Package generation (IMSI, ICCID, K/Ki, OTA Keys, PIN, PUK, etc.) is
either created by the Operator (and provided to the SM-DP+) or by the SM-DP+
(and provided to the Operator).
2. The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Packages.
3. The SM-DP+ creates the Protected Profile Packages.
4. The SM-DP+ stores the Protected Profile Packages (securely).
5. The SM-DP+ confirms the Protected Profile Package generation, and eventually
sends the additional Operator input data created by the SM-DP+.
6. The Operator registers the Operator data in the Operator systems like HLR/AuC
and BSS.End Condition:
a. The ordered Protected Profile Packages are available at the SM-DP+. The
Operator is able to activate these Subscriptions and a Profile download can be
triggered upon binding to an EID.B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile
The Activation Code has to be provided to the End User in order to achieve the Profile download procedure. The contract conclusion and Link Profile procedure describes different scenarios to link a contract with the Activation Code process. The following options are described below:
Activation Code with known EID: The EID is given by the Subscriber to the
Operator during the conclusion of the contract. Activation Code with unknown EID: The EID is not given by the Subscriber to
the Operator during the conclusion of the contract. The EID is only provide d to
the SM-DP+ during the Profile download procedure and is given back from the
SM-DP+ to the Operator. Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator: The EID is not
immediately given by the Subscriber during the contract conclusion, but provided
in step two to the Operator.The contract reference MAY be, but not necessarily, any Activation Code parameter (e.g. token), ICCID or the IMSI.
In any case, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to allocate and link a Profile to the corresponding eUICC during the Profile download procedure.
B.1.4.1 Activation Code with Known EID
Figure 31: Activation Code with Known EID Procedure
Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure 31: Contract conclusion with known EID
1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator and provides the EID
during this process.
2. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator prior to Profile download
procedure’: The Operator allocates the Profile and sends the EID, IMSI and
ICCID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the different parameters and
confirms this to the Operator.
6. to 10. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM -DP+ prior to Profile download
procedure’: The Operator sends the EID, the IMSI and the Profile Description
ID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates an ICCID to a corresponding
Profile, links the different parameters and confirms the allocated ICCID and
the link to the Operator.
11. The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
corresponding information (contract reference).End Condition:
a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
Operator.
b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.B.1.4.2 Activation Code with Unknown EID
Figure 32: Activation Code with Unknown EID Procedure
Procedure: Steps 1-6 in Figure 32: Contract conclusion without EID
1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of
the target eUICC (EID).
2. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
(ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator.
6. The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
corresponding information (contract reference).End Condition:
a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
Operator.b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.
B.1.4.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator
Figure 33: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator
Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure 33Error! Reference source not found.: Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator
1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of
the target eUICC (EID).
2. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
(ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator. 6. The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
corresponding information (contract reference).
7. After the Subscriber has chosen the Device/eUICC, the EID is provided
together with the contract reference to the Operator.
8. to 10. The Operator requests the linking of the eUICC (EID) and Profile (ICCID) by
the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the EID and the ICCID and confirms this to
the Operator.
11. The Operator confirms the linking of the EID to the corresponding contract to
the Subscriber.End Condition:
a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
Operator.
b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)
This annex provides an example diagram for the implementation of Local Profile Management Operations and describes how the different confirmation levels MAY be applied.
Figure 34: Example Flow for Device & LPA Authenticated Confirmation Access PIN
Setup / Settings
D eUICC Categories (Normative)
The following table provides eUICCs categories defined for Remote SIM Provisioning products.
Role no. Description
Basic eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 64kB
CAT1
ISO interface PPS 96
BIP over HTTPS features Medium eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 384kB
ISO interface PPS 97
CAT2 BIP over HTTPS features
Processor >= 25MHz
Crypto processor >= 100MHz
Memory Protection Unit Contactless eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features :
Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 1024kB
ISO interface PPS 97
CAT3 BIP over HTTPS features
Processor >= 25MHz
Crypto processor >= 100MHz
Memory Protection UnitTable 53: eUICC Categories
D.1 eUICC Requirement
Req no. Description EUICCSHA1 The eUICC SHALL support SHA-1.
Table 54: eUICC Requirement
E LPA Settings (Informative)
Figure 35: LPA Settings
F Certifications Chain and Security Model
: Manufacturing process
: Business process
CI : Remote Profile Management
: Local Profile Management
CI Cert Cert : Public key Certificate
CI CertEUM
SM-DP+ES9+: eUICC Cert, EUM Cert
ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert, eUICC Cert
eUICC ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert LPA
PK eUICC Cert, EUM Cert
ES10b:Figure 36: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the Device
: Manufacturing process
: Business process
: Remote Profile Management
CI : Local Profile Management
Cert : Public key CertificateCI Cert, CI Cert, CI Cert, SM-DS Cert EUM Cert SM-DP+ Cert
SM-DS EUM SM-DP+
ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert,
ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert
ES9+: eUICC Cert,
ES11: eUICC Cert,ES11: SM-DS Cert
eUICC Cert
EUM Cert
EUM Cert ES10a: eUICC Cert, ES10b: eUICC Cert,
EUM Cert EUM Cert
LPA eUICC LPA
ES10a: SM-DS Cert ES10b: SM-DP+ CertFigure 37: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the eUICC
F.1 Security Model
The Security Model defines the trust relationships between all the active components of the eUICC ecosystem with an LPA in the Device.
The figure below shows only the end-to-end logical links where cryptographic keys and sensitive data are sent. The different links define the end-to-end trust relationship between entities. We distinguish a hierarchy of seven trust links with link 1 being the most significant and link 7 being the least significant. If trust link 1 is broken, all trust links will be broken as a result. If trust link 2 is broken, trust link 1 remains intact however all other trusted links are compromised or broken.
Figure 38: Trusted Link with LPA in the Device
Figure 39: Trusted Link with LPA in the eUICC
Trust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of
link involved compromises trust link
TL1 Trust introduced onto Out of The CI public key, The trust of the entire
the eUICC by the scope the EUM’s security model is
issuing EUM to enable Certificate, breached and all
future remote the EUM’s keyset, eUICCs issued under
management and the eUICC keys, the the model cannot be
authorisation by the OS, and the Security trusted.
SM-DP+ and possibly Domains.
the EUM: eUICC keysTrust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of
link involved compromises trust link
(EUM & CI keyset
eUICC Certificates).
TL2 Trust placed in the CI’s Out of The EUM and SM- Loss of Operator
verification of the scope DP+ Certificates. trust on the EUM and
EUM, SM-DP+, and SM-DP+
the resulting Certificate
issuance.
TL3 Trust placed in the ES2+ The eUICC Loss of Operator
activities for eUICC ES8+ Certificate or trust on the eUICC
eligibility and remote eligibility check and/or SM-DP+.
attestation from the failure.
ISD-R on the target
eUICC to the Operator
via the SM-DP+. Provides eUICC
Certificate, EID,
reference to its
certification and EUM
to the Operator and
SM-DP+.
TL4 Trust placed in the ES2+ SM-DP+ Certificate Loss of Operator
activities for Profile ES8+ eUICC Certificate or trust on the SM-DP+
data transfer from the eligibility check and/or eUICC.
Operator via the SM- failure.
DP+ to the ISD-R on
the target eUICC. Protects the Profile
and associated
credentials and keys
(NAAs, OTA keys,
ISD-R access, ISD-P
SD creation …) with
only the Operator, SM-
DP+ and the eUICC.
TL5 Trust placed in the ES2+ SM-DP+ Certificate Operator loss of trust
information exchange on SM-DP+.
between the Operator
and the SM-DP+ for
Link Profile requests.
TL6 Trust placed in the ESeu LPA security eUICC loss of trust
mechanisms provided on LPA.
by the LPA: Local
Profile Management,
Local ProfileTrust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of
link involved compromises trust link
Management
Operations
TL7 Trust placed in the ES9+ LPA security or SM- SM-DP+ loss of trust
TLS session DP+ security. on LPA or LPA loss
of trust on the SM-
DP+.TL8 Trust in the discovery ES11 LDS security or SM- LDS loss of trust on
process DS security. the SM-DS and vice
versa.
TL9 Trust placed on TLS ES5+ eUICC security or SM-DP+ loss of trust
session SM-DP+ security. on the eUICC and
vice versa
TL10 Trust in the discovery ES11 eUICC security or SM-DS loss of trust
process SM-DS security. on the eUICC and
vice versa.
TL11 Trust in the UI ESeu Device security Loss of trust on the
DeviceTable 55: Trusted Link Descriptions
Compromised Impacted Description Impact of loss of Countermeasures
element Paths trust
eUICC SP1, SP3, The eUICC The eUICC can no Revoke the Certificate
SP4, SP9, keys and longer be trusted. of the eUICC.
SP10 EUM’s Keyset. MNO and SM-DP+
loss of trust on eUICC.
CI SP2 The EUM, SM- Loss of Operator trust Repair/Replace CI.
DS, and SM- in the EUM, SM-DS Generate new CI
DP+ and SM-DP+. Certificate and new
Certificates. Certificate for the
EUM, SM-DS and SM-
DP+ following the SAS
process. Remote repair of
already issued
eUICCs: new CI public
key.
EUM SP1, SP2 Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the
certification. Operator and SM-DP+ EUM. Remote repair
on the EUM and its of already issued
eUICCs. eUICCs: new EUM
Certificate, new
eUICC Certificate.Compromised Impacted Description Impact of loss of Countermeasures
element Paths trust
SM-DP+ SP3, SP4, Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the SM-
SP5, SP7, certification. Operator, LPA, SM-DS DP+. New SM-DP+
SP8 and eUICC on the SM- Certificate.
DP+.
SM-DS SP8 Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the SM-
certification. Operator, LPA, SM- DS. New SM-DS
DP+ and eUICC on the Certificate.
SM-DS.
LPA SP6, SP7, LPA security Loss of trust from the LPA repair by the
SP8 failure. SM-DP+, SM-DS and Device Manufacturer.
eUICC on the LPA.
Device SP11 Device Loss of trust in the LUI in the eUICC self-
security failure Device UI protected with User
Intent capture
mechanisms (i.e.
Captcha Code)Table 56: Impact of Compromising Trusted Links and Countermeasures
The signer is responsible for the revocation of the Certificates it has signe d. This section describes how the new Certificates are pushed to concerned entities according to the security model.
SM-DP+ trusts the CI EUM trusts the CI eUICC trusts the EUM and the CI
Req no. Description
The new SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-
CERT1
DP+ by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
The new SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-DS
CERT2
by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
The new EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the EUM by a GSMA CI
CERT3
upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
The EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the
CERT4 EUM
Note: See details in section 4.1.1.1.
The CI Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the EUM
CERT5
Note: See details in section 4.1.1.1.
CERT6 Certificates SHALL be revocable.
Neither the End User nor any other party SHALL be able to prevent
CERT7
Certificate revocation.
The End User SHALL not be allowed to use Remote SIM Provisioning
CERT8
functions with revoked Certificates.Req no. Description
The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+ SHALL be revoked if required
CERT9 (e.g. loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM
Provisioning certification requirements).
The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS SHALL be revoked if required (e.g.
CERT10 loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning
certification requirements).
The Public Key Certificate of the EUM SHALL be revoked if required (e.g.
CERT11 loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning
certification requirements).Table 57: Certificate Requirements
G LPA Integrity
The LPA must be protected against misuse or being compromised by means of implementing standard procedures.
For cases where the LPA is in the Device, the LPA integrity SHALL be guided by the following Device classes:
Device class Description Example of Devices
Devices with an open operating Smartphones, Tablets, Laptops,
system where mechanisms such as Advanced Wearables
Advanced secure boot and platform signing of
applications are available and used
to protect the LPA.
Devices without possibility to install Connected sensors, Simple
applications. The attack surface of Wearables, Single use case devices
the LPA is minimal due to the locked
Basic down nature of these Devices.
Simple mechanisms to ensure that
the LPA is not compromised SHALL
be taken.Table 58: Device Classes
H Rules Authorisation Table (Normative)
Annex H reflects the RAT table configuration(s) that SHALL be configured in embedded UICC.
Legend: The following colours apply
Line color
Mandatory to be included
Optional
The following RAT SHALL apply to all products
PR Operators User consent
Mandatory part POL RULE1 * YES
of the RAT table
POL RULE2 * YESTable 59: RAT configuration
Additional lines can be added to the RAT table to reflect agreement between some Operators and OEMs as needed. The OEM can also decide to add lines to the RAT table.
PR Operators User consent
POL RULE 1 Operator1 NO
Mandatory part POL RULE1 * YES
of the RAT table
POL RULE2 * YESTable 60: RAT configuration
Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.
I Document Management
I.1 Document History
Version Date Brief Description of Change Approval Editor /
Authority Company
First Release with amendments Carmen Kwok,
V1.0 03/12/15 PSMC
from Security review. GSMA
Carmen Kwok,
V2.0 15/07/16 Includes Phase 2 content PSMC
GSMAOther Information Type Description Document Owner Carmen Kwok Editor / Company GSMA
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