Overview
The document sets out an architecture framework for Remote SIM Provisioning and management of embedded UICCs in consumer devices, with the aim of supporting global interoperability across operators and deployment scenarios. It describes the principles, industry roles, eUICC and device requirements, system components and interfaces, and profile and policy management. It also covers operational procedures for downloading and managing profiles, alongside security, certification and implementation topics in its annexes. The framework is intended for technical experts involved in operators, SIM solutions, devices, services and network infrastructure.
- eUICC
- Remote SIM Provisioning
- SM-DP+
- SM-DS
- LPA
- NFC
Overview generated automatically from the document's scope and outline. The document text is authoritative.
Changes since v2.3
13 clauses modified
Compared automatically clause by clause from the extracted text of both versions; differences only in layout, spacing or table cells are ignored. The documents are authoritative.
1.4 Definition of Termsmodified
…certificate as defined in RFC.5280 [1] and GlobalPlatform Certificate specifications GPC_SPE_034 [15][9]. An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM … Certified eUICC Provisioning and certified according to SGP.25the GSMA compliance Certified eUICC Protectionprogramme Profiledefined [25].in SGP.24 [38]. Note: Unless stated otherwise, the word eUICC in this specification refers to a Certified eUICC. A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for the Companion Device purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. Term Description A code entered by an End User required by the SM-DP+ for the Confirmation Code download of a Profile. Term Description Confirmation Code Required A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is required Flag or not. Refers to the hierarchy of User Intent and Confirmatio … anufacturer (EUM) The eUICC Manufacturer provides eUICC products. An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a factory eUICC Memory Reset state. … Term Description eUICC Test Memory Reset An action that deletes all post-issuance Test Profiles on an eUICC. Term Description A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited EUM EUM Certificate which can be used to verify eUICC Certificates. A Profile download which is set by an … ists. A process notifying the SM-DS on the availability of information on Event Registration either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC. … A pre-production eUICC whose functional or security certifications Field-Test eUICC are not yet completed by the EUM. Form Factor Physical manifestation of the UICC. GSMA Certificate Issuer A Certificate Authority accredited by GSMA. IC Dedicated Software As defined in BSI-CC-P … sistant (LPA) the LPD, LDS and LUI features. Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated Local Profile Management on the ESeu interface. … Term Description Local Profile Management Operations are enable Profile, disable Local Profile Management Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory Operation Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, set/edit nickname, add Profile, and edit default SM-DP+ address. Term Description Assurance that the LPA has not been compromised or affected. The assurance SHALL be provided to the various Remote SIM LPA Integrity Provisioning entities to en … non-telecommunication services. A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a Operator company providing wireless cellular network services. … Term Description A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network Operator Credentials Access Credentials, OTA Keys for Remote File/Application management, and authentication algorithm parameters. The credentials included in the Profile used in conjunction with OTA OTA Keys Platforms. Term Description A platform used by an Operator for the Remote File/Application OTA Platform management of enabled Profiles on eUICCs. Policy Enforcement A function that execute … ack based on previously used or outdated data. A Certificate used to authenticate other entities within the Remote Root Certificate SIM Provisioning framework. … Term Description A globally identified central access point for finding Events from Root SM-DS one or more SM-DP+(s). The Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either Service Provider as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement with an Operator. The Service Provider could also be the Operator. Term Description A secure and non-interceptable mechanism by which the End User Simple Confirmation confirms their action, e.g. by selecting Yes/No, OK/Cancel. SM-DP+ Certificat … nectivity to test equipment for the purpose of Test Profile testing the Device and the eUICC. A test Profile is not intended to store any Operator Credentials. … Term Description According to NIST SP 800-53r4 [18][18][18], a mechanism by which an End User (through an input Device) can communicate directly with the security functions of t … y policy. This mechanism can only be activated by the End User or the security functions of the information system and cannot be imitated by untrusted software. … Term Description Describes the direct, real time acquisition of the manual End User User Intent input on the LUI to trigger locally a Profile download or Profile Management operation.
1.5 Abbreviationsmodified
…y Domain - Profile ISD-R Issuer Security Domain - Root ISIM IP Multimedia Services Identity Module ITU International Telecoms Union LDS Local Discovery Service … Abbreviation Description LPA Local Profile Assistant LPD Local Profile Download LUI Local User Interface M4M Mifare4Mobile MFA Multi-Factor Authentication Abbreviation Description MNO Mobile Network Operator MNO-SD Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain MSISDN Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number NAA Network Acc… …
1.6 Referencesmodified
…ommunications System (UMTS); Numbering, addressing and identification The international identification plan for public networks [4] ITU E.212 and Subscriptions … Ref Document Number Title Trusted Connectivity Alliance (former SIMalliance): eUICC Profile Package - Interoperable Format Technical [5] TCAAPP Specification http://simalliance.org/euicc … to Indicate Requirement [6] RFC 2119 Levels”, S. Bradner http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt [7] 3GPP TS 21.133 3G security; Security threats and requirements … Ref Document Number Title GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC [8] SGP.02 Technical specification [9] GPC_SPE_034 GlobalPlatform Card Specification with its Amendments Specifica … 6] SGP.14 SGP.14 GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy v1.1 [27] EMVCo_Sec EMVCo Security Evaluation Process 5.1 – June 2016 [28] FS.09 FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v3 … Ref Document Number Title Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation [29] BSI-CC-PP-0084 Packages Recommendation for Key Derivation Using [30] NIST SP 800-108 Pseudorandom Functions Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key [31] BSI TR-02102-1 Lengths [32] ANSSI RGS v2 B1 Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 Annexe B1 Ref Document Number Title JIL-Application-of- Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar [33] Attack-Potential-to- Devices Smartcards-v2-9 Version 2.9, Jan 2013 Guideline … g_doc_en.html [36] SGP.23 RSP Test Specification Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key [37] RFC 8174 Words https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174 … [38] SGP.24 RSP Compliance Process
2.1 Basic Principlesmodified
…n of the eUICC and related provisioning systems. GlobalPlatform specifications SHALL be used as a framework of choice for the BAS2 implementation of the eUICC. … Principle no. Description The overall security of the eUICC in combination with the related management BAS3 processes SHALL at all times and under all circumstances be at least equivalen … This applies in particular to: the confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters; the integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI). … Principle no. Description The architecture SHALL support a level of security for all Profile content which is BAS6 at least equivalent to the current state of the art level of security … …
3.1 eUICC Manufacturermodified
…ificate to allow: EUM4 eUICC authentication and proof of certification to other entities; authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-DP+ and an eUICC. … Role no. Description The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any LPA EUM5 elements that reside in the eUICC and the compliance of the LPA with the requirements in Section 4.11.3. EUM6 Field-Test eUICCs SHALL be tracked by the EUM. Table 3: eUICC Manufacturer Role
4.3 eUICC Requirementsmodified
…. EUICC56 The Integrated eUICC SHALL be based on an Integrated TRE. An Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to execute the test cases defined in EUICC57 SGP.23 [36]. … For the purpose of integration and/or end-to-end testing, a Field-Test eUICC EUICC58 MAY contain certificates that chain up to the GSMA CI. Table 11: eUICC Requirements
4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirementsmodified
…smitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check. An eUICC SHALL provide information indicating if it is a Discrete eUICC or ELG15 an Integrated eUICC. … An eUICC SHALL indicate in the Eligibility Check Information if it is Field- ELG16 Test eUICC. Table 12: eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements Note: It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and could be used for the eligibility check procedure.
4.5 Device Requirementsmodified
…SM-DP+ SHALL only be determined by the bearer availability. DEV4 Note: The Companion Device MAY use any connectivity method available to connect to the SM-DP+. … Req no. Description Devices compliant with the GSMA NFC Handset Requirements [17] SHALL support the Open Mobile API [19] used by the Device applications to DEV5 exchange data with their counterpart applications running in the Enabled Profile on the eUICC. Req no. Description The implementation of the Remote SIM Provisioning specification in the DEV6 Device SHALL not impact the potential use of the SIM Lock mechanism defined in 3GPP… …
4.7.2 Provisioning Profile Requirementsmodified
…ALL be based on the same format structure as PPRO1 described for the Profile (Figure 2). A Provisioning Profile MAY be enabled by the LPA upon End User request … PPRO2 for operations defined in PPRO6 if establishment of the connectivity using PPRO2 the currently Enabled Profile is unsuccessful. If this results in an Operational Profile being disabled, the End User SHALL first give consent to the loss of c… …
4.8 Profile Metadata Requirementsmodified
… META11 Rules associated to the Profile. All Profiles SHALL be uniquely identified in the Profile Metadata as META12 Operational, Provisioning or Test Profile. … Req no. Description An Operator SHALL be able to access and update the following Profile Metadata of its Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is Enabled: META13 Service… …
4.10.2 SM-DP+ Requirementsmodified
… Packages on the eUICC. The SM-DP+ SHALL link a Protected Profile Package for binding to a SMDP4 specific eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator. … Req no. Description The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the linked SMDP5 Protected Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any SMDP6 Certified eUICC. Req no. Description Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound SMDP7 Profile Package delivered by the SM-DP+. Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP … e to the Operator. There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between any SM-DP+ and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the Profile. … SMDP22 Such a mechanism SHALL either be ordered by the Operator or be SMDP22 performed by the Operator itself. If such deletion mechanism is used, there Req no. Description will be no off-card entity responsible for managing the ISD-P of the installed Profile. SMDP23 The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid. SMDP24 The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid. Req no. Description The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Notification to the Operator SMDP25 informing them that a specific Bound Profile Package download is about to start. The SM-D … fined in SMDP36 GSMA SGP.22 [24]. If a Profile Package is not yet released for download then the LPA SHALL SMDP37 be informed by means of a specific error code. … An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to distinguish a Field-Test eUICC from a SMDP38 Certified eUICC through eUICC Eligibility Check Information. The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to be instructed by the Profile Owner to reject Profile download to Field-Test eUICCs. SMDP39 Note: The mechanism is out of scope of this document and it is left to the implementation. Req no. Description The SM-DP+ SHALL NOT perform a Profile download to a Field-Test SMDP40 eUICC if it has been instructed so by the Profile Owner as per SMDP39. Table 24: SM-DP+ Requirements
4.14.1 eUICC Certification Requirementsmodified
…ecure mechanism to update its eUICC Certificate. Where appropriate, the eUICC SHOULD be certified according to EMVCo CERTEU16 Security Evaluation process [27]. … Field-Test eUICCs SHALL use a certified hardware according to SGP.24 CERTEU17 [38]. Table 34: eUICC Certification Requirements
K.1 Document Historymodified
…rmen Kwok, V2.1 29/02/17 Phase 2 maintenance release Technology Group GSMA Carmen Kwok, V2.2 31/08/17 Phase 2 maintenance release RSPLEN GSMA Carmen Kwok, V2.3 … 30/06/2124/03/21 Phase 2 maintenance release ISAG GSMA Carmen Kwok, V2.4 03/08/21 Phase 2 maintenance release ISAG GSMA
Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Overview
- 1.2 Scope
- 1.3 Intended Audience
- 1.4 Definition of Terms
- 1.5 Abbreviations
- 1.6 References
- 1.7 Conventions
- 2 Principles
- 2.1 Basic Principles
- 2.2 Profile Principles
- 3 Roles
- 3.1 eUICC Manufacturer
- 3.2 Device Manufacturer
- 3.3 Operator and Service Provider
- 3.4 Subscriber and End User
- 3.5 Certificate Issuer
- 4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture
- 4.1 eUICC Architecture
- 4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
- 4.2 Interfaces
- 4.2.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
- 4.2.2 Operator – End User (ESop)
- 4.2.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)
- 4.2.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
- 4.2.5 SM-DP+ – LPD (ES9+)
- 4.2.6 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
- 4.2.7 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)
- 4.2.8 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)
- 4.2.9 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)
- 4.2.10 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)
- 4.2.11 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)
- 4.2.12 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)
- 4.2.13 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)
- 4.2.14 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)
- 4.2.15 General Interface Requirements
- 4.3 eUICC Requirements
- 4.4 eUICC Eligibility Check
- 4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements
- 4.5 Device Requirements
- 4.5.1 Device Capability Requirements
- 4.5.2 Device with Integrated eUICC
- 4.6 Device Initialisation
- 4.6.1 Device Reset Requirements
- 4.6.2 eUICC Memory Reset Requirements
- 4.6.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements
- 4.7 Profile Requirements
- 4.7.1 Test Profile Requirements
- 4.7.2 Provisioning Profile Requirements
- 4.8 Profile Metadata Requirements
- 4.9 NFC Requirements
- 4.10 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+)
- 4.10.1 SM-DP+ Overview
- 4.10.2 SM-DP+ Requirements
- 4.10.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements
- 4.11 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)
- 4.11.1 LPA Overview
- 4.11.2 Operational LPA Modes
- 4.11.3 LPA Requirements
- 4.11.4 LDS Requirements
- 4.12 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)
- 4.12.1 SM-DS Overview
- 4.12.2 SM-DS Implementation
- 4.12.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelines
- 4.12.4 SM-DS functions
- 4.12.5 SM-DS Requirements
- 4.12.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedure
- 4.12.7 Discovery Request Procedure
- 4.13 Profile Policy Management
- 4.13.1 Introduction
- 4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirements
- 4.13.3 Policy Rules
- 4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirements
- 4.14 Certification
- 4.14.1 eUICC Certification Requirements
- 4.14.2 Device Compliance Requirement
- 4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification Requirements
- 4.14.4 SM-DS Certification Requirements
- 4.14.5 LPA Certification Requirements
- 4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management Requirements
- 5 Operational Procedures
- 5.1 LPA Initiated Download
- 5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirements
- 5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedure
- 5.2 Profile Download with Activation Code
- 5.2.1 Activation Code Requirements
- 5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure
- 5.3 Local Profile Management
- 5.3.1 Local Profile Management Procedures
- A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)
- B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)
- B.1 Profile Production Procedure
- B.1.1 Profile Description Definition
- B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generation
- B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generation
- B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile
- C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)
- D eUICC Categories (Normative)
- E LPA Settings (Informative)
- F Certifications Chain and Security Model (Normative)
- F.1 Security Model
- G LPA Integrity (Normative)
- H Rules Authorisation Table (Informative)
- I LPA Invocation of the Provisioning Profile Example Flow (Informative)
- J Integrated eUICC Security Requirements (Normative)
- J.1 General Security Requirements
- J.2 Security Certification
- J.3 Conformance Claims
- J.4 Security Objectives
- J.5 Security Functional Requirements
- J.6 Identification
- K Document Management
- K.1 Document History
Version 2.4 03 August 2021
This is a Non-binding Permanent Reference Document of the GSMA
Security Classification: Non-confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other than those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association.
Copyright Notice Copyright © 2021 GSM Association
Disclaimer The GSM Association (“Association”) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document. The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.
Compliance Notice The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy.
[Note to editor: Include one of the following statements only; delete the other]: This Permanent Reference Document is classified by GSMA as an Industry Specification, as such it has been developed and is maintained by GSMA in accordance with the provisions set out in GSMA AA.35 - Procedures for Industry Specifications.
OR This Permanent Reference Document has been developed and is maintained by GSMA in accordance with the provisions set out in GSMA AA.34 - Policy and Procedures for Official Documents.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
This document provides an architecture approach as a proposed solution for the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices across all markets.
The main goal of the Architecture is to define a mechanism for the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices with the necessary credentials to gain mobile network access.
This version focuses on Devices for the consumer market.
Please note that SGP.21 V1.0 [23] has not been superceded.
1.2 Scope
The aim of this document is to define a common architecture framework to enable the Remote SIM Provisioning and management of the Embedded UICC (eUICC) in Devices. The adoption of this architecture framework will aim to provide the basis for ensuring global interoperability for Remote SIM Provisioning between Operators in different deployment scenarios.
1.3 Intended Audience
Technical experts working within Operators, SIM solution providers, Device vendors, standards organisations, network infrastructure vendors, Service Providers and other industry bodies.
1.4 Definition of Terms
Term Description
Information issued by an Operator/Service Provider to an End
Activation Code User. It is used by the End User to request for the download and
installation of a Profile.
A part of the Activation Code information provided by the
Activation Code Token
Operator/Service Provider to refer to a Subscription.
SM-DS used in cascade mode with a Root SM-DS to redirect Event
Alternative SM-DS Registration from a SM-DP+ to the Root SM-DS or direct Event
Registration from a SM-DP+ for an installed Profile.
A Protected Profile Package which has been cryptographically
Bound Profile Package
linked to a particular eUICC.
Certificate or Public Key A certificate as defined in RFC.5280 [1] and GlobalPlatform
Certificate specifications GPC_SPE_034 [15][9].
An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM
Provisioning and certified according to the GSMA compliance
Certified eUICC programme defined in SGP.24 [38].
Note: Unless stated otherwise, the word eUICC in this specification
refers to a Certified eUICC.
A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for the
Companion Device
purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.Term Description
A code entered by an End User required by the SM-DP+ for the
Confirmation Code
download of a Profile.
Confirmation Code Required A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is required
Flag or not.
Refers to the hierarchy of User Intent and Confirmation Request,
where:
User Intent is the first and lowest level
Confirmation Level
Simple Confirmation is the second level
Strong Confirmation is the third and highest level
Note: For examples of implementation, please refer to Annex C.
Describes a request for Strong Confirmation or a Simple
Confirmation Request
Confirmation as defined in this specification.
User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a
Device
mobile network. E.g. a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset.
An entity responsible for manufacturing Devices. The Device
Device Manufacturer Manufacturer MAY be responsible for the selection and insertion of
eUICCs in Devices.
A mode hidden from the End User that allows access to and use of
Device Test Mode
Test Profiles.
The state of a Profile where all files and applications (e.g. NAA)
Disabled Profile
present in the Profile are not selectable.
An interrogation of the Discovery Service by a Device for Event
Discovery Request
Records that are registered for its eUICC.
An eUICC implemented on discrete standalone hardware, including
Discrete eUICC its own dedicated volatile and non-volatile memory.
A Discrete eUICC can be removable or non-removable.
A UICC which enables the local management of Profiles in a
eUICC secure way.
Note: The term originates from “embedded UICC”.
The state of a Profile when its files and/or applications (e.g. NAA)
Enabled Profile
are selectable.
End User The person using the Device.
Information that pertains to the identity of an End User e.g.
End User Data personal details, name, address, biometric characteristics,
assigned identification numbers, etc.
eUICC Authorisation Used by the SM-DS to authenticate the eUICC.
A Certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC.
eUICC Certificate
This Certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate.
eUICC Eligibility Check The information set sent from the eUICC to the SM-DP+ to allow
Information eligibility checks.
eUICC Manufacturer (EUM) The eUICC Manufacturer provides eUICC products.
An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a factory
eUICC Memory Reset
state.Term Description
eUICC Test Memory Reset An action that deletes all post-issuance Test Profiles on an eUICC.
A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited EUM
EUM Certificate
which can be used to verify eUICC Certificates.
A Profile download which is set by an SM-DP+ on behalf of an
Event
Operator, to be processed by a specific eUICC.
Unique identifier of an Event for a specific EID generated by the
Event-ID
SM-DP+/SM-DS.
The set of information stored on the SM-DS for a specific Event, via
the Event Registration procedure. This information consists of
Event Record either:
the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DP+ address or
the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DS address
A query to the SM-DS (Root or Alternative) executed to verify Event
Event Record Query
Registration success or determine that an Event Record still exists.
A process notifying the SM-DS on the availability of information on
Event Registration
either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC.
A pre-production eUICC whose functional or security certifications
Field-Test eUICC
are not yet completed by the EUM.
Form Factor Physical manifestation of the UICC.
GSMA Certificate Issuer A Certificate Authority accredited by GSMA.
IC Dedicated Software As defined in BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29].
Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU-
ICCID
T E.118 [14][14].
Integrated eUICC An eUICC implemented on an Integrated TRE.
Integrated eUICC Test
An external interface for the purpose of testing eUICC functionality.
Interface
A TRE implemented inside a larger System-on-Chip (SoC),
Integrated TRE optionally making use of remote volatile and/or non-volatile
memory.
International Mobile Unique identifier owned and issued by Operators as defined in
Subscriber Identity 3GPP TS 23.003 [3] Section 2.2.
The process that associates a Protected Profile Package with a
specific eUICC so that a Profile Download including Bound Profile
Package generation can be triggered.
Link Profile
Note: This is normally an offline process, binding is an online
process happening during the communication between the SM-
DP+ and the eUICC.
A functional element in the Device or in the eUICC that provides
Local Profile Assistant (LPA)
the LPD, LDS and LUI features.
Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated
Local Profile Management
on the ESeu interface.Term Description
Local Profile Management Operations are enable Profile, disable
Local Profile Management Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory
Operation Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, set/edit nickname, add Profile,
and edit default SM-DP+ address.
Assurance that the LPA has not been compromised or affected.
The assurance SHALL be provided to the various Remote SIM
LPA Integrity Provisioning entities to ensure that the LPA can be trusted to
execute the actions requested
Note: This could be linked with a certification process.
Defines the Operation LPA Mode which is either LPA in the eUICC
LPA Mode
or in the Device.
Refers to processes that trigger Local Profile Management
LPA Procedures
Operations.
An entity providing access capability and communication services
Mobile Network Operator
to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure.
An entity providing access capability and communication services
Mobile Virtual Network
to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure but does
Operator
not have an allocation of spectrum.
A method of authentication in which an End User is only granted
access after successfully presenting several separate pieces of
Multi-Factor Authentication evidence to an authentication mechanism – typically at least two of
(MFA) the following categories: knowledge (something they know),
possession (something they have), and inherence (something they
are).
Application residing in a Profile providing authorisation to access a
Network Access Application
network.
Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [4] network. This
Network Access Credentials
MAY include data such as Ki/K and IMSI stored within a NAA.
NFC Device Device with NFC capability.
NFC eUICC eUICC with NFC capability.
An arbitrary random number generated for one time use, employed
Nonce
for cryptographic communication.
A report about a Profile download or Local Profile Management
Notification
Operation processed by the eUICC.
A list of SM-DP+ defined in the Profile containing SM-DP+s that are
Notification Receivers
to receive Notifications concerning the Profile.
A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned
on an eUICC for the purpose of providing services by the Operator.
Operational Profile The Profile SHALL be in support of a Subscription with the relevant
Operator and allow connectivity to a mobile network. Applications
MAY be included to provide non-telecommunication services.
A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a
Operator
company providing wireless cellular network services.Term Description
A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network
Operator Credentials Access Credentials, OTA Keys for Remote File/Application
management, and authentication algorithm parameters.
The credentials included in the Profile used in conjunction with OTA
OTA Keys
Platforms.
A platform used by an Operator for the Remote File/Application
OTA Platform
management of enabled Profiles on eUICCs.
Policy Enforcement A function that executes Policy Rules to implement a policy.
Defines the atomic action of a policy and the conditions under
Policy Rule
which it is executed.
A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a
Primary Device
Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.
A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an
Profile
eUICC for the purpose of providing services.
The description of a Profile in a format specific to the Operator;
Profile Description
example formats could be an Excel table, xml format, or plain text.
A combination of local and remote management operations (enable
Profile Management
Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, and query Profile Metadata)
Information pertaining to a Profile used for the purpose of Local
Profile Metadata
Profile Management.
The entity that controls the operations that can be performed upon
Profile Owner its Profile. With the exception of Test Profile, this is always an
Operator.
A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format
Profile Package
that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile [5][5].
The functional element within the Profile management system that
Profile Policy Enabler
interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules.
A policy control system that allows the Service Provider to
Profile Policy Management implement, manage and enforce its subscription terms and
conditions associated with the installed Profile.
Defines a qualification for or enforcement of an action to be
Profile Policy Rule
performed on a Profile when a certain condition occurs.
A Profile Package which has been encrypted for storage but not to
Protected Profile Package
a specific eUICC.
A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned
on an eUICC for the purposes of providing connectivity to a mobile
Provisioning Profile
network solely for the purpose of the provisioning of Profiles on the
eUICC.
Remote Memory Volatile or non-volatile memory residing outside of the TRE
The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, and deleting of a
Remote SIM Provisioning
Profile on an eUICC.
Replay Attack An attack based on previously used or outdated data.
A Certificate used to authenticate other entities within the Remote
Root Certificate
SIM Provisioning framework.Term Description
A globally identified central access point for finding Events from
Root SM-DS
one or more SM-DP+(s).
The Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either
Service Provider as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement
with an Operator. The Service Provider could also be the Operator.
A secure and non-interceptable mechanism by which the End User
Simple Confirmation
confirms their action, e.g. by selecting Yes/No, OK/Cancel.
SM-DP+ Certificate A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DP+.
SM-DS Certificate A Certificate used by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DS.
Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as
SMDPid part of the SM-DP+ Certificate.
Note: This is referred to as the smdpOid in SGP.22 [24].
A secure and non-interceptable mechanism to guarantee a higher
level of User Intent than Simple Confirmation by which the End
Strong Confirmation
User confirms their action, e.g., by inputting PIN or fingerprint,
repeating Simple Confirmation, entering Confirmation Code, etc.
An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a
Subscription with an Operator. The Subscriber is allowed to
Subscriber
subscribe and unsubscribe to services, as well as register an End
User or a list of End Users authorised to use these services.
Information that pertains to the identity of a Subscriber such as
contract details, authentication credentials, cryptographic keys etc.
Subscriber Data
Note: In many instances, the Subscriber is also the End User and
therefore Subscriber Data is likely to include End User Data.
A Subscription describes the commercial relationship between the
Subscription
Subscriber and the Service Provider.
This role prepares Profile Packages, secures each with a Profile
protection key, stores Profile protection keys in a secure manner as
well as the Protected Profile Packages in a Profile Package
Subscription Manager Data repository, and links the Protected Profile Packages to specified
Preparation+ (SM-DP+) EIDs.
The SM-DP+ binds Protected Profile Packages to the respective
EID and securely downloads these Bound Profile Packages to the
LPA of the respective eUICC.
Subscription Manager This is responsible for providing addresses of one or more SM-
Discovery Server (SM-DS) DP+(s) to a LDS.
A security module consisting of hardware and low-level software
providing resistance against software and hardware attacks,
Tamper Resistant Element
capable of securely hosting operating systems together with
applications and their confidential and cryptographic data.
A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an
eUICC to provide connectivity to test equipment for the purpose of
Test Profile
testing the Device and the eUICC. A test Profile is not intended to
store any Operator Credentials.Term Description
According to NIST SP 800-53r4 [18][18][18], a mechanism by
which an End User (through an input Device) can communicate
directly with the security functions of the information system with
Trusted Link the necessary confidence to support the system security policy.
This mechanism can only be activated by the End User or the
security functions of the information system and cannot be imitated
by untrusted software.
Describes the direct, real time acquisition of the manual End User
User Intent input on the LUI to trigger locally a Profile download or Profile
Management operation.1.5 Abbreviations
Abbreviation Description AC Activation Code ARA-M Access Rule Application - Master ARF Access Rule File AuC Authentication Centre BSS Business Support Services CI Certificate Issuer DNSCurve Domain Name System Curve DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions ECASD eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain EID Embedded UICC Identifier eSVN embedded UICC Specification Version Number ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute eUICC Embedded UICC EUM eUICC Manufacturer FASG Fraud and Security Group FFS For Further Study GSMA GSM Association GSMA CI GSMA Certificate Issuer HLR Home Location Register HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol ICCID Integrated Circuit Card Identifier IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity ISD-P Issuer Security Domain - Profile ISD-R Issuer Security Domain - Root ISIM IP Multimedia Services Identity Module ITU International Telecoms Union LDS Local Discovery Service
Abbreviation Description LPA Local Profile Assistant LPD Local Profile Download LUI Local User Interface M4M Mifare4Mobile MFA Multi-Factor Authentication MNO Mobile Network Operator MNO-SD Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain MSISDN Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number NAA Network Access Application OS Operating System OTA Over The Air PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy RAM Remote Application Management RAT Rules Authorisation Table RFM Remote File Management RMPF Remote Memory Protection Function SAS Security Accreditation Scheme SD Security Domain SIM Subscriber Identity Module SM-DP+ Subscription Manager - Data Preparation + SM-DS Subscription Manager - Discovery Server SSD Supplementary Secure Domain TL Trust Link TRE Tamper Resistant Element USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module
1.6 References
Ref Document Number Title
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
[1] RFC 5280
Revocation List (CRL) Profile
UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical
[2] ETSI TS 102 221
characteristics
Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+);
[3] 3GPP TS 23.003 Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS);
Numbering, addressing and identification
The international identification plan for public networks
[4] ITU E.212
and SubscriptionsRef Document Number Title
Trusted Connectivity Alliance (former SIMalliance): eUICC
Profile Package - Interoperable Format Technical
[5] TCAAPP
Specification
http://simalliance.org/euicc/euicc-technical-releases/
“Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
[6] RFC 2119 Levels”, S. Bradner
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
[7] 3GPP TS 21.133 3G security; Security threats and requirements
GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC
[8] SGP.02
Technical specification
[9] GPC_SPE_034 GlobalPlatform Card Specification with its Amendments
Specification of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1:
[10] 3GPP TS 35.231
Algorithm Specification
Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document
[11] 3GPP TS 35.205
1: General
Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document
[12] 3GPP TS 35.206
2: Algorithm Specification
FS.04 - Security Accreditation Scheme for UICC
[13] EUM SAS
Production – Standard
[14] ITU-T E.118 The International Telecommunication Charge Card
GlobalPlatform Device Technology Secure Element
[15] GPD_SPE_013
Access Control - Version 1.1
Personalisation of Mobile Equipment - Mobile functionality
[16] 3GPP TS 22.022
specification
[17] TS.26 GSMA NFC Handset Requirements
Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information
[18] NIST SP 800-53r4
Systems and Organisations – Revision 4
Trusted Connectivity Alliance (former SIMalliance) Open
[19] OMAPI
Mobile API Specification
[20] SGP.03 NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1
[21] SGP.05 Embedded UICC Protection Profile
[22] FS.08 FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3
[23] SGP.21 SGP.21 Architecture Specification - Version 1.0
[24] SGP.22 SGP.22 Technical Specification - Version 2.2
SGP.25 RSP eUICC for Consumer Device Protection
Profile
[25] SGP.25 NOTE: This document does not exist at the time of
writing, reference will be valid once the document is
available.
[26] SGP.14 SGP.14 GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy v1.1
[27] EMVCo_Sec EMVCo Security Evaluation Process 5.1 – June 2016
[28] FS.09 FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v3Ref Document Number Title
Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
[29] BSI-CC-PP-0084
Packages
Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
[30] NIST SP 800-108
Pseudorandom Functions
Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key
[31] BSI TR-02102-1
Lengths
[32] ANSSI RGS v2 B1 Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 Annexe B1
JIL-Application-of- Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar
[33] Attack-Potential-to- Devices
Smartcards-v2-9 Version 2.9, Jan 2013
Guideline for Using Cryptographic Standards in the
[34] NIST SP 800-175B
Federal Government: Cryptographic Mechanisms
SOG-IS Smartcards and similar devices CC supporting
[35] SOG-IS documents at this link:
https://www.sogis.eu/uk/supporting_doc_en.html
[36] SGP.23 RSP Test Specification
Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key
[37] RFC 8174 Words
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174
[38] SGP.24 RSP Compliance Process1.7 Conventions
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [6] and clarified by RFC8174 [37][37], when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here[6][6][6].
“FFS” or “For Further Study” means that it will be covered in the next version of SGP.21.
2 Principles
This section contains the principles related to the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning system for the Embedded UICC.
The solution based on the requirements described within this document has to be provided in a non-discriminatory manner.
2.1 Basic Principles
Principle no. Description
Existing standards and specifications SHALL be used where possible for the
BAS1
specification of the eUICC and related provisioning systems.
GlobalPlatform specifications SHALL be used as a framework of choice for the
BAS2
implementation of the eUICC.Principle no. Description
The overall security of the eUICC in combination with the related management
BAS3 processes SHALL at all times and under all circumstances be at least equivalent
to the current removable UICC and its provisioning processes.
The architecture of the eUICC and its Remote SIM Provisioning system SHALL
BAS4
comply with the requirements of 3GPP TS 21.133 [7].
The architecture SHALL support a level of security with respect to the protection
of Operator Credentials which is at least equivalent to the present levels of
BAS5 security. This applies in particular to:
the confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters;
the integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI).
The architecture SHALL support a level of security for all Profile content which is
BAS6
at least equivalent to the current state of the art level of security of the UICC.
The architecture SHALL NOT compromise the security and privacy of Subscriber
Data, nor the security and privacy of End User Data. Examples depending on
BAS7
territory include identities that can be used for tracking such as ICCID, MSISDN,
EID, IMSI Ki etc.
Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of this document. However,
BAS8 any data which could be used to identify an individual SHALL be treated as
personal data and subject to local regulations e.g. the EID, ICCID, etc.Table 1: Basic Principles
2.2 Profile Principles
Principle no. Description
Profiles are the property of and SHALL be under the control of the issuing
PRO1
Operator.
A Profile does not exist outside of an eUICC. I.e. a Profile is always located on a
PRO2
particular eUICC.
PRO3 A Profile SHALL be uniquely identified by its ICCID.
An Enabled Profile in combination with an eUICC SHALL be able to carry all
PRO4
logical characteristics of a UICC.
Once the Profile is enabled, all relevant UICC characteristics or features as
PRO5 described in ETSI 102 221 [2] specifications SHALL apply, with the exceptions
as defined within this specification.
It SHALL be possible to delete Profiles only when in a disabled state, with the
PRO6
exception of eUICC Memory Reset, and eUICC Test Memory Reset functions.
PRO7 Profile Management SHALL be governed by policy.
A Profile SHALL be either an Operational Profile, a Provisioning Profile or a Test
PRO8
Profile.Table 2: Profile Principles
3 Roles
3.1 eUICC Manufacturer
Role no. Description
The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the initial cryptographic
EUM1
configuration and security architecture of the eUICC.
EUM2 The eUICCs are delivered by the eUICC Manufacturer (EUM).
Relevant parts of the eUICC Manufacturer’s products and processes are
EUM3
certified by a GSMA-approved certification process.
The EUM issues the eUICC Certificate to allow:
EUM4 eUICC authentication and proof of certification to other entities;
authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-DP+ and an eUICC.
The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any LPA
EUM5 elements that reside in the eUICC and the compliance of the LPA with the
requirements in Section 4.11.3.
EUM6 Field-Test eUICCs SHALL be tracked by the EUM.Table 3: eUICC Manufacturer Role
3.2 Device Manufacturer
Role no. Description
The Device Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of any LPA
DM1 elements that reside on the Device and the compliance of the LPA with the
requirements in Section 4.11.
The Device Manufacturer is responsible for the implementation of
DM2 any application that resides on the Primary Device allowing Local User
Interface access to the Companion Device.Table 4: Device Manufacturer Role
3.3 Operator and Service Provider
This section describes the characteristics of the Operator and Service Provider roles relevant to this architecture and its operation. Other characteristics exist but are considered out of scope.
Role no. Description
OPE1 The Operator has access to a SM-DP+ via the ES2+ interface.
In the event that a Subscriber has selected a Service Provider, that Service
OPE2
Provider will initiate the provisioning of a Profile Package.
The Operator, potentially on behalf of the Service Provider, specifies the
OPE3 Profile characteristics and any features and applications analogous to
removable UICCs.
The Operator is able to use an OTA Platform to manage the content of its
OPE4
Enabled Profile in the eUICC (RAM, RFM).Table 5: Operator Role
3.4 Subscriber and End User
Role no. Description
The Subscriber is the contract partner of the Service Provider for the
SEU1 Subscription.
Note: The Subscriber MAY not be the End User.
The End User is a human and uses the Device and/or the services related to
SEU2
the Enabled Profile.Table 6: Subscriber and End User Role
3.5 Certificate Issuer
Role no. Description
The Certificate Issuer issues Certificates for GSMA accredited Remote SIM
CIS1 Provisioning entities and acts as a trusted third party for the purpose of
authenticating the entities of the system.
The Certificate Issuer communicates with the SM-DP+, SM-DS and the EUM
CIS2 through interfaces that are out of scope of this specification according to
SGP.14 [26].Table 7: Certificate Issuer Role
4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture
This section contains the functional description of the Remote SIM Provisioning system architecture for the Embedded UICC.
Figure 1: Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture
4.1 eUICC Architecture
4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
This section describes the internal high-level architecture of the eUICC. The eUICC architecture is similar to that used in the GSMA Remote SIM specification [8]. Profiles are provisioned based on the security framework defined in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].
Figure 2: Schematic Representation of the eUICC
4.1.1.1 ECASD
The Embedded UICC Controlling Authority Security Domain (ECASD) is responsible for the secure storage of credentials needed to support the required security domains on the eUICC.
There SHALL only be one ECASD on an eUICC. The ECASD SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during the eUICC manufacturing as described in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].
The ECASD SHALL contain the following:
eUICC private keys for creating signatures.
Associated Certificates for eUICC authentication.
The Certificate Issuers’ (CI) root public keys for verifying SM-DP+ and SM-DS
Certificates.
eUICC Manufacturers’ (EUMs) keyset for key/Certificate renewal.Additionally, the ECASD SHALL provide security functions used during key establishment and eUICC authentication.
4.1.1.2 ISD-R
The ISD-R is responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.
4.1.1.3 ISD-P
The ISD-P is a secure container (security domain) for the hosting of a Profile. The ISD-P is used for Profile download and installation in collaboration with the Profile Package interpreter for the decoding/interpretation of the received Bound Profile Package.
The ISD-P is the on-card representative of the SM-DP+.
4.1.1.4 MNO-SD
The MNO-SD is the on-card representative of the Operator. It contains the Operator’s Over- The-Air (OTA) Keys and provides a secure OTA channel.
4.1.1.5 Profile Policy Enabler
The eUICC Operating System (OS) service which offers Profile Policy Rules validation and enforcement.
4.1.1.6 Telecom Framework
The telecom framework is an operating system service that provides standardised network authentication algorithms to the NAAs hosted in the ISD-Ps. Furthermore, it offers the capability to configure the algorithms with the necessary parameters.
4.1.1.7 Profile Package Interpreter
The Profile Package interpreter is an eUICC operating system service that translates the Profile Package data into an installed Profile using the specific internal format of the target eUICC.
4.1.1.8 LPA Services
The LPA services provide necessary access to the services and data required by the LPA functions for the following:
1. The Root SM-DS address. 2. The optionally stored default SM-DP+ address. 3. Facilitates the reception of the Bound Profile Package in transfer from the LPA. 4. Provide information regarding the installed Profiles and their Profile Metadata. 5. Provides Local Profile Management. 6. Provides functions for the LPA to authenticate and interact with the SM-DS. 7. Ensures access to the EID is restricted to only the LPA.
4.2 Interfaces
Figure 3: Interfaces on the eUICC Architecture with the LPA in the Device
Configuration
4.2.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
The ES2+ interface is used by the Operator to order Profiles for specific eUICCs as well as other administrative functions.
4.2.2 Operator – End User (ESop)
ESop is the interface between the Operator and the End User.
This interface is out of scope of this specification.
4.2.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)
ESeu is the interface between the End User and the LUI.
In a Primary/Companion Device scenario the LUI used SHALL only reside within the Companion Device or its eUICC.
The ESeu interface is used to support the following requirements:
Req no. Description
The Local Profile Management Operations SHALL be executed only over
ESeu1
the ESeu interface.
Each Local Profile Management Operation SHALL be explicitly initiated by
ESeu2
the End User, and verified by User Intent.
The ESeu interface SHALL support the triggering and confirmation of the
ESeu3 Profile download and installation operation and Local Profile Management
Operations requested by the End User.Table 8: End User to LUI (ESeu) Interface Requirements
4.2.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
The ES6 interface is used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services.
4.2.5 SM-DP+ – LPD (ES9+)
The ES9+ interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the LPD.
4.2.6 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
The ES8+ interface provides a secure end-to-end channel between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC for the administration of the ISD-P and the associated Profile during download and installation.
4.2.7 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)
The ES12 interface allows any SM-DP+ to issue or remove Event Registrations on the SM- DS.
4.2.8 LDS – SM-DS (ES11)
The ES11 interface allows the LDS to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC.
4.2.9 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)
ESeum is the interface between the EUM and the eUICC. This interface is out of scope of this specification.
4.2.10 LDS – LPA Services (ES10a)
The ES10a interface is used by the LPA in the Device to get the configured addresses from the eUICC for Root SM-DS, and optionally the default SM-DP+.
4.2.11 LPD – LPA Services (ES10b)
The ES10b interface is used by the LPD in the Device and the LPA services to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.
4.2.12 LUI – LPA Services (ES10c)
The ES10c interface is used between the LUI in the Device and the LPA services for Local Profile Management by the End User.
4.2.13 SM-DS – SM-DS (ES15)
In the case of deployments with cascaded SM-DSs, the ES15 interface is used to connect the SM-DSs.
4.2.14 Device – SM-DP+ (Established Connection)
This connection will be provided either by:
An internet connectivity available or provided on the same Device where the LPA
resides
or
An internet connection shared from another Device via a local go-between connectionFigure 4: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to the
SM-DP+
4.2.15 General Interface Requirements
Req no. Description
INT1 All interfaces from the eUICC SHALL indicate the eSVN.
INT2 The behaviour of all interfaces SHALL support the indicated eSVN.
During the indication of the supported eSVN from the eUICC to the SM-
INT3 DP+, the eUICC version SHALL be used or the procedure SHALL fail. See
table below.
All communicating entities involved in Remote SIM Provisioning SHALL be
INT4 mutually authenticated. The Device and the eUICC are considered as one
entity in this context.Table 9: General Interface Requirements
Platform Version 1 (V1) Version 2 (V2) Version 3 (V3)
eUICC V1 Platform uses V1 Platform uses V1 or fails. Platform uses V1 or fails.
eUICC V2 ✗ Platform uses V2 Platform uses V2 or fails.
eUICC V3 ✗ ✗ Platform uses V3
Table 10: eUICC Version vs. Platform
4.3 eUICC Requirements
Req no. Description
The eUICC SHALL be a discrete or integrated tamper resistant component
consisting of hardware and software, capable of securely hosting
EUICC1 applications as well as confidential and cryptographic data.
Note: Wherever a distinction is required, the former is referred to as
Discrete eUICC, and the latter as Integrated eUICC.
EUICC2 A removable eUICC is packaged in a standardised ETSI Form Factor [2].
EUICC3 The Discrete eUICC SHALL be either removable or non-removable.
The behaviour of the eUICC with an Enabled Profile SHALL be equivalent
EUICC4
to the UICC.
EUICC5 The eUICC SHALL be able to contain zero or more Profiles.
EUICC6 At a maximum, only one Profile SHALL be enabled at any point in time.
The behaviour of a NAA USIM or ISIM within a Profile on an eUICC SHALL
be identical to a removable UICC NAAs USIM or ISIM.
EUICC7
Note: No changes to existing 3GPP/3GPP2 USIM, CSIM and ISIM
specifications are expected.
The eUICC SHALL support Milenage [11][12] and TUAK [10] algorithm
EUICC8
sets[10][10].
The ownership of the eUICC MAY change throughout its lifetime as can the
Device.
EUICC9
Note: According to CERTEU11, the EUM keyset belongs to the EUM for the
lifetime of the eUICC.Req no. Description
If any Profile Management operation does not complete successfully, the
EUICC10
eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request.
The eUICC SHALL contain an ECASD and ISD-R security domains installed
EUICC11
and personalised during manufacture.
It SHALL not be possible to delete or disable the ECASD after eUICC
EUICC12
manufacture.
The ISD-R SHALL be responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the
EUICC13
lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.
The ISD-R SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during eUICC
EUICC14
manufacturing as described in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].
The eUICC SHALL support an eUICC Memory Reset. This can only be
EUICC15
requested by the End User.
If the eUICC supports Test Profiles, the eUICC SHALL support eUICC Test
EUICC16
Memory Reset.
The eUICC SHALL support the eUICC Profile Package Interoperable format
EUICC17
as defined by Trusted Connectivity Alliance [5].
An ISD-R SHALL:
be created within an eUICC at the time of manufacture;
EUICC18
NOT be deleted or disabled;
NOT be able to perform any operations inside an ISD-P.
EUICC19 An eUICC MAY provide LPA functions.
EUICC20 An ISD-P SHALL be created by the ISD-R at the request of the SM-DP+.
Communication between the eUICC and the SM-DP+ SHALL be protected
EUICC21
in authenticity, integrity and confidentiality.
EUICC22 The eUICC SHALL NOT export Profiles installed on the eUICC.
The eUICC SHALL enforce an isolation of Profiles and prevent Profiles from
EUICC23 operating outside of their execution environment i.e. Profile SHALL run in a
sandbox.
The integrity of the Bound Profile Package SHALL be ensured during its
EUICC24
installation on the eUICC.
Profile keys and algorithm parameters SHALL NOT be extractable from the
EUICC26
eUICC.
All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a robust tamper-
EUICC27
resistant way and be resistant to side-channel attacks.
The Operator SHALL be able to update the OTA Keys in its Profile on the
EUICC28 eUICC in a secure and confidential way, reusing existing OTA Platform
mechanisms.
A downloaded Profile Package SHALL be installed on the eUICC in a
EUICC29
disabled state.
The eUICC SHALL always report its eSVN in the first communication during
EUICC30
the commencement of each session with the SM-DP+ or SM-DS.
The EUM SHALL install an eUICC Certificate in the eUICC used to
EUICC31
authenticate the eUICC and verify the eUICC certification.Req no. Description
The EUM SHALL install an EUM Certificate in the eUICC used to verify the
EUICC32
eUICC Certificate.
EUICC33 The eUICC SHALL have a means to authenticate itself to the SM-DS.
EUICC34 The eUICC SHALL protect itself against unauthorised access.
Upon Profile deletion, the eUICC SHALL ensure a complete deletion of all
EUICC35
data related to the Profile.
The eUICC SHALL only accept Profile Management operations sent from
EUICC36
the LPA in either the eUICC, or the Device.
The eUICC SHALL reject any Profile Management operations that are in
EUICC37
conflict with the Profile Policy Rules of the respective Profile.
If any Bound Profile Package download or installation does not complete
EUICC38 successfully, the eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was in before it
received the request.
The eUICC SHALL support GlobalPlatform Secure Element Access Control
EUICC39
[15].
There SHALL be a means to pre-set a default SM-DP+ address in the
EUICC40
eUICC.
EUICC41 The eUICC SHALL store the Root SM-DS address.
The eUICC SHALL be able to send a delete Notification to the LPA to notify
EUICC42
the Notification Receivers that the Profile has been deleted.
In EUICC42, if connectivity is not available to send the Notification of
EUICC43 deletion to the Notification Receivers, each Notification SHALL be retained
and sent as soon as connectivity becomes available again.
The delete Notification process SHALL also be executed for each deleted
EUICC44
Profile in case of eUICC Memory reset.
The eUICC SHALL support a set of standard functions and services
including, but not limited to Java Applications, USIM Toolkit functions and
GlobalPlatform features. The list of supported functions and services (e.g.
EUICC45 API package names and versions) SHALL be explicitly referenced within the
technical specification (SGP.22 [24]). A different set of functions and
services MAY be defined/supported according to the different Embedded
UICC categories as defined in Annex D. The eUICC SHALL support at least the following USIM Toolkit commands:
PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION including the following fields: local
info, IMEI, network measure results, date & time, access technology
TERMINAL PROFILE
EUICC46 ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD)
SEND SHORT MESSAGE
DISPLAY TEXT
GET INPUT
RING TONE
An eUICC SHALL support at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters
EUICC47 preloaded by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing, defined in GSMA
SGP.22 [24].Req no. Description
Each Notification SHALL be uniquely identifiable and SHALL be signed by
EUICC48
the eUICC.
Each Notification SHALL be protected against re-play attacks and signed by
EUICC49
the eUICC.
EUICC50 [Void]
EUICC51 [Void]
The Profile SHALL be able to contain a list of zero or more Notification
EUICC52
Receivers for each type of Notification.
The eUICC SHALL support SHA-1. Usage of SHA-1 SHALL be strictly
EUICC53
limited to applications inside the Profile where the use of SHA-1 is required.
The EID SHALL not be modifiable. The EID SHALL not be affected by any
EUICC54
of the procedures, including the change of the eUICC Private keys.
An Integrated eUICC SHALL conform to the additional requirements defined
EUICC55
in Annex J.
EUICC56 The Integrated eUICC SHALL be based on an Integrated TRE.
An Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to execute the test cases defined in
EUICC57
SGP.23 [36].
For the purpose of integration and/or end-to-end testing, a Field-Test eUICC
EUICC58
MAY contain certificates that chain up to the GSMA CI.Table 11: eUICC Requirements
4.4 eUICC Eligibility Check
The eUICC eligibility check enables a SM-DP+ to validate the eligibility of an eUICC for the installation of a Profile using information sent by the eUICC. The set of information sent by the eUICC to the SM-DP+ for eligibility checking purposes is referenced herein as the eUICC Eligibility Check Information. Some eUICC eligibility check parameters MAY be required due to Device capabilities which must be supported by the Profile/eUICC and delivered as part of the eUICC Eligibility Check Information set.
Note: Device capability refers to a Device feature or service-enabling function provided by the Device that MAY have a direct effect on the content of the Profile or the procedure used to download the Profile, and consequently requires support from the eUICC.
4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements
Req no. Description
The eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version it is supporting. This
ELG1 parameter SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC eligibility
check.
The eUICC SHALL include the available memory in the eUICC Eligibility
ELG2
Check Information.
The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information if it is unable
ELG3
to accept an additional Profile. The eUICC SHALL provide a valid current Certificate to the SM-DP+ signed
ELG4
by the EUM with the Eligibility Check Information.
The eUICC SHALL provide an identification of the EUM with the Eligibility
ELG5
Check Information.
The eUICC SHALL provide in the Eligibility Check Information, the current
ELG6
OS version.
The eUICC SHALL provide in the Eligibility Check Information Device
ELG7 enabler information relating to services that MAY need Profile support (e.g.
NFC enablers).
Eligibility Check Information SHALL be integrity and authenticity protected
ELG8
by the eUICC for its sending to the SM-DP+.
The eUICC SHALL indicate the application runtime environment version
ELG9
and libraries versions supported in eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
The eUICC SHALL indicate cryptographic algorithms and their respective
ELG10
key lengths supported in the eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
The eUICC SHALL declare in the Eligibility Check Information the list of
ELG11
supported CIs.
The eUICC SHALL indicate its current certification status in the Eligibility
ELG12
Check Information.
If the eUICC is NFC capable (e.g. CAT3) the Device SHALL indicate its
ELG13 support for the relevant NFC services including its current certification
status during the eUICC Eligibility Check.
The eUICC SHALL indicate its category (see Annex D). This parameter
ELG14
SHALL be transmitted to the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check.
An eUICC SHALL provide information indicating if it is a Discrete eUICC or
ELG15
an Integrated eUICC.
An eUICC SHALL indicate in the Eligibility Check Information if it is Field-
ELG16
Test eUICC.Table 12: eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements
Note: It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and could be used for the eligibility check procedure.
4.5 Device Requirements
Req no. Description
The Device SHALL conform to the terminal requirements within ETSI TS
DEV1
102 221 [2] with the exceptions as defined in this specification.
There SHALL be a means for the End User to obtain the EID through the
DEV2
Device software. This SHALL only be possible through the LUI.
If an eUICC is within the Device packaging, then the EID SHALL be printed
DEV3
in machine readable form on the Device packaging.
Bearer connection of the Companion Device to the SM-DP+ SHALL only
be determined by the bearer availability.
DEV4
Note: The Companion Device MAY use any connectivity method available
to connect to the SM-DP+.Req no. Description
Devices compliant with the GSMA NFC Handset Requirements [17] SHALL
support the Open Mobile API [19] used by the Device applications to
DEV5
exchange data with their counterpart applications running in the Enabled
Profile on the eUICC.
The implementation of the Remote SIM Provisioning specification in the
DEV6 Device SHALL not impact the potential use of the SIM Lock mechanism
defined in 3GPP TS 22.022 [16].[16]
In the case where the Device supports both the LPA in the Device, and the
DEV7 LPA in the eUICC, the Device SHALL have a mechanism (setting or
configuration parameter) that sets which LPA SHALL be used.
DEV8 The End User SHALL be able to modify the parameter defined in DEV7.
A Device that supports an embedded UICC without an LPA in the eUICC,
DEV9
SHALL provide LPA functions.
A Device that supports only an embedded UICC with an LPA in the eUICC,
DEV10
MAY provide LPA functions.
If the Device supports Device Test Modes, the Device SHALL support
DEV11 eUICC Test Memory Reset. eUICC Test Memory Reset can only be
requested by the End User when the Device is in Device Test Mode.
Where technically feasible, the Device SHALL implement a mechanism
allowing the End User to protect the access to the Device and its Profile
Management Operations with personal data. Implementation is OEM
DEV12
specific.
Note: This can be achieved by the implementation of a Device PIN lock,
fingerprint, password, facial recognition (etc.)
The End User SHOULD be able to enable/disable the mechanism
DEV13 described in DEV12. Implementation is OEM specific.
Note: The mechanism described in DEV12 should be enabled by default.
With respect to LPA41, a Device containing any additional feature that
affects the status of Operational Profiles SHOULD enforce the
Confirmation Level of the equivalent Local Profile Management Operations
defined in this specification. The mechanism and process of the
Confirmation Level is implementation specific. The End User SHOULD be
able to revoke/unset a cached Confirmation previously given, if any.DEV14
NOTE: In case the LPA or a Device application performs automatic Profile
management, the Device or the application must ensure that the End User
has been made fully aware of the conditions under which the service
operates.NOTE:The Device protects against abuse or malevolence of management of profiles as compared to the specified LPA functionalities.
Table 13: Device Requirements
4.5.1 Device Capability Requirements
Req no. Description
There SHALL be a mechanism that is able to provide the Device capabilities
DEVCAP1
to the SM-DP+.Table 14: Device Capability Requirements
4.5.2 Device with Integrated eUICC
Req no. Description
Access to any Remote Memory used by the TRE to store software and data
as defined in GS01 SHALL be protected against attacks on availability (e.g.
DIE1
Denial of Service, memory corruption, tampering) by other Device
components.
All Integrated TRE software and data stored in Remote Memory outside the
DIE2 SoC, per GS01 SHALL be protected against access by non Integrated TRE
components.Table 15: Device with Integrated eUICC Requirements
4.6 Device Initialisation
4.6.1 Device Reset Requirements
Req no. Description
It SHALL be possible for the End User to perform any type of Device reset
FAC1
without affecting the status of the eUICC.
The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the
FAC2
eUICC Memory Reset.
The Device SHALL by means of a secured procedure, trigger/request the
FAC3
eUICC Test Memory Reset.Table 16: Device Reset Requirements
4.6.2 eUICC Memory Reset Requirements
Req no. Description
eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC apart from
MEM1
pre-installed Profiles that are flagged as permanent.
eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC regardless of
MEM2 their Profile Policy Rules but not the Provisioning Profile or preinstalled Test
Profiles.
Strong Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to initiate eUICC Memory
MEM3
Reset.
In addition to MEM3, other secure means MAY be provided to perform the
eUICC Memory Reset function. The same level of security as is offered by
MEM4
the LUI based reset function SHALL apply. User Intent and Confirmation
Request SHALL apply.Table 17: eUICC Memory Reset Requirements
4.6.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements
Req no. Description
eUICC Test Memory Reset SHALL delete all post-issuance installed Test
MEMT1
Profiles on the eUICC including the Enabled Test Profile if any.
Simple Confirmation SHALL be verified in order to enable eUICC Test
MEMT2
Memory Reset.
If Test Profiles are not supported, then eUICC Test Memory Reset is not
MEMT3
required.Table 18: eUICC Test Memory Reset Requirements
4.7 Profile Requirements
4.7.1 Test Profile Requirements
Req no. Description
It is OPTIONAL for the removable eUICC to support the requirements of
TPRO1 Test Profiles described in this section. If Test Profiles are not supported, it
SHALL not be possible to download Test Profiles into the eUICC.
Test Profiles SHALL NOT be able to authenticate to an Operator’s mobile
network using Operator Credentials. The eUICC SHALL ensure that such
TPRO2
Profiles cannot be used to connect to any Operator’s mobile network even if
authentication information is contained in the Test Profile.
TPRO3 A Test Profile SHALL be installed in its own individual ISD-P.
TPRO4 Test Profiles MAY be pre-installed on the eUICC.
Test Profiles SHALL only be visible and usable when the Device is in
TPRO5
Device Test Mode.
It SHALL be possible to download, install, enable, disable or delete Test
TPRO6 Profiles in the eUICC only in Device Test Mode with the exception of the
eUICC Memory Reset operation.
Test Profiles, as with any other Profile, SHALL be managed through a
TPRO7
certified SM-DP+.
The enabling of a Test Profile SHALL override the ‘Disabling of this Profile
TPRO8
is not allowed’ (POL RULE1) Profile Policy Rule.
When the Device Test Mode is deactivated, the LPA SHALL disable any
TPRO9
enabled Test Profile.
When the Test Profile is disabled, the eUICC SHALL enable the Operational
TPRO10
Profile that was previously enabled, if any.
TPRO11 The Device Test Mode activation SHALL be obfuscated from the End User.
When exiting Device Test Mode, an End User notice SHALL be presented
TPRO12
to prompt the tester to perform an eUICC Test Memory Reset.Table 19: Test Profiles Requirements
The Device MAY implement a mechanism for connecting an external SIM card for the purpose of testing in the context of Device repair, without affecting the state of the eUICC.
4.7.2 Provisioning Profile Requirements
Req no. Description
Provisioning Profiles SHALL be based on the same format structure as
PPRO1
described for the Profile (Figure 2).
A Provisioning Profile MAY be enabled by the LPA upon End User request
for operations defined in PPRO6 if establishment of the connectivity using
PPRO2 the currently Enabled Profile is unsuccessful. If this results in an Operational
Profile being disabled, the End User SHALL first give consent to the loss of
communication provided by the Enabled Profile.
Provisioning Profiles and their associated Profile Metadata SHALL not be
PPRO3
visible to the End User on the LUI.
PPRO4 Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be selectable by the End User.
Provisioning Profiles SHALL not be deleted through any action by the End
PPRO5
User including the use of eUICC Memory Reset.
Provisioning Profile SHALL only be used for the intended purposes of
PPRO6 Profile downloading and related Profile maintenance functions. The
Provisioning Profile SHALL not be used as an Operational Profile.
PPRO7 PPRO6 SHALL be enforceable in the RSP architecture.Table 20: Provisioning Profile Requirements
4.8 Profile Metadata Requirements
Req no. Description
META1 All Profiles SHALL have associated Profile Metadata.
META2 The Profile Metadata SHALL be stored in the eUICC.
The Profile Metadata SHALL be accessible irrespective of the state of the
META3
Profile.
The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the Service Provider name.
META4 Note: EFSPN is already used in a different context outside of this
specification and could be blank.
META5 The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile.
The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of the
META6
Profile.
The Profile Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description
META7
of the Profile defined by the Operator/Service Provider.
META8 The eUICC SHALL support the ‘set/edit nickname’ function.
META9 The Profile Metadata SHALL always be available to the LUI.
The Profile Metadata SHALL include an OPTIONAL field to allow the display
META10
of an icon defined by the Operator/Service Provider for the respective Profile.
The Profile Metadata SHALL be able to include a copy of the Profile Policy
META11
Rules associated to the Profile.
All Profiles SHALL be uniquely identified in the Profile Metadata as
META12
Operational, Provisioning or Test Profile.Req no. Description
An Operator SHALL be able to access and update the following Profile
Metadata of its Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is Enabled:
META13 Service Provider name
Short description of the Profile
Icon of the Profile
Table 21: Profile Metadata Requirements4.9 NFC Requirements
An NFC Device and an NFC eUICC SHALL be compliant with the following list of requirements:
Req no. Description
NFC1 An NFC Device SHALL be compliant with GSMA TS 26 [17][17][17].
After installation of an Operational Profile, the NFC eUICC SHALL support
NFC2 all requirements as specified in the SGP.03 GSMA NFC UICC
Requirements Specification [20].
The NFC Device SHALL retrieve and enforce access control rules as
NFC3
specified in the GlobalPlatform SEAC specification [15].
The eUICC SHALL be able to generate proof that the Operational Profile
NFC4
has been deleted.
All NFC applications and NFC enabling applications (e.g. ARA-M, PPSE,
CRS, CREL, etc.) attached to an Operational Profile SHALL be included
NFC5 under the ISD-P created for the Profile, either under the MNO-SD or in an
SD hierarchy with a self-extradited SSD with authorised management
privilege.
The NFC eUICC solution SHALL be able to provide assurance to NFC
application Service Providers that the combination of an eUICC and
NFC6 Operational Profile is trusted. This solution SHALL be based on the CASD
that is part of the Operational Profile and scenario Push 2B and scenario 3
as specified by SGP.03 [20].
If the NFC eUICC is compliant with M4M, the eUICC SHALL reset all the
NFC7 M4M virtual cards associated to that Profile when a Profile containing M4M
applications is disabled.
The appropriate NFC related certification information SHALL be part of the
NFC8
information shared with the SM-DP+ during the eUICC Eligibility Check.
A NFC Device SHALL at least have an embedded eUICC or have the
NFC9 capability to support a removable eUICC that is compliant with CAT3 and
SGP.03 [20] in either instance.Table 22: NFC Requirements
4.10 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+)
4.10.1 SM-DP+ Overview
The SM-DP+ is responsible for the creation, generation, management and the protection of resulting Profiles upon the input/request of the Operator. It is also responsible for the delivery of a Profile within a Bound Profile Package, making the Bound Profile Package
available for the secure delivery. In addition, the SM-DP+ is responsible for requesting the creation of the ISD-P in the eUICC into which the Profile will be installed. The SM-DP+ will also be the off-card entity that will be responsible for the lifecycle management of the ISD-P that was created at its request. This is performed via the distinct functions listed below.
Figure 5: SM-DP+ Functions
Function name Description
Creates Profile Packages [i.e. Personalised Profiles, including (IMSI, Ki,
Profile Package ICCID…)] from Profile Descriptions agreed with Operators. This can be an
Generation off-line batch or real time process.
Profile Package Secures each Profile Package according to the security process creating
Protection the Protected Profile Package.
Profile Package Binds the Protected Profile Package to a target eUICC using the security
Binding process thus creating the Bound Profile Package.
Profile Package Temporarily stores Protected Profile Packages or Bound Profile Packages
Storage for subsequent delivery to the eUICC.
Profile Package Securely transmits and installs the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC
Delivery through the LPA.
SM-DS Event
Notifies the SM-DS of a pending operation for a specific eUICC.
RegistrationTable 23: SM-DP+ Function Descriptions
4.10.2 SM-DP+ Requirements
Req no. Description
SMDP1 The SM-DP+ SHALL act on behalf of an Operator.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to initiate the request for ISD-P creation as
SMDP2
part of the Bound Profile Package delivery.
The SM-DP+ SHALL establish an end-to-end secure channel to the eUICC
SMDP3
to download and install Bound Profile Packages on the eUICC.
The SM-DP+ SHALL link a Protected Profile Package for binding to a
SMDP4
specific eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator.Req no. Description
The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the linked
SMDP5
Protected Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any
SMDP6
Certified eUICC.
Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound
SMDP7
Profile Package delivered by the SM-DP+.
Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP+ after completing all
SMDP8
production steps, Profile Package Protection, and binding.
Communication session between the SM-DP+ and the LPA SHALL be
SMDP9
terminated by the SM-DP+ after execution of intended Operation(s).
End-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC involved
SMDP10 in the Profile download and installation SHALL be protected in terms of
integrity, authenticity and confidentiality.
Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected
SMDP11
through encryption.
On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile creation
SMDP12 and storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure deletion
procedures (logically and physically).
SM-DP+/eUICC communication SHALL incorporate Perfect Forward
SMDP13
Secrecy (PFS).
The transport used for the Bound Profile Package SHALL implement anti-
SMDP14
replay mechanisms between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
Connectivity to the SM-DP+ SHALL be aborted and an explicit error
message SHALL be triggered by the SM-DP+ upon failure to verify
SMDP15
authenticity of the connecting party. (No message SHALL be sent to the
connecting party)
After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound Profile
Package to the LPA, the transport encryption procedure SHALL be
renewed.
SMDP16
If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more
than a configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction SHALL be
terminated and the Operator SHALL be notified.
The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols whenever
SMDP17
available (e.g. DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.).
The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC Profile
SMDP18 Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by Trusted
Connectivity Alliance [5].
SMDP19 The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on demand.
SMDP20 It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk.
The SM-DP+ SHALL send a confirmation of the successfully completed
SMDP21
download and installation of a Profile to the Operator.
There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between any
SM-DP+ and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the Profile.
SMDP22
Such a mechanism SHALL either be ordered by the Operator or be
performed by the Operator itself. If such deletion mechanism is used, thereReq no. Description
will be no off-card entity responsible for managing the ISD-P of the installed
Profile.
SMDP23 The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid.
SMDP24 The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Notification to the Operator
SMDP25 informing them that a specific Bound Profile Package download is about to
start.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an eUICC Eligibility Check Information
SMDP26 report and other relevant information (e.g. Activation Code, ICCID, etc.) to
the Operator ahead of/prior to the eUICC Bound Profile Package download.
SMDP27 The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to perform Event Registrations to the SM-DS.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to request from an Alternative SM-DS not to
SMDP28
propagate the Event Registration to the Root SM-DS.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send a Profile delete Notification to the
SMDP29 Operator owning a Profile when a related delete Notification is received
from the eUICC.
The SM-DP+ SHALL support the following states for a Profile Package,
triggered by the Profile Owner:
SMDP30
A Profile Package is not released for Profile Package download.
A Profile Package is released for Profile Package download.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to select the elliptic curve parameter in the
SMDP31
Profile download procedure.
It SHALL be possible for a SM-DP+ to conduct an Event Record Query to a
SMDP32 (FFS) SM-DS (Root or Alternative) for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations
it owns.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event Record on
SMDP33 (FFS) the Root SM-DS or the Alternative SM-DS, identified by the EID or the
Event-ID over the ES12 interface.
Response to a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only occur where the
SMDP34 (FFS)
Root SM-DS or Alternative SM-DS validates the Event Record ownership.
Ownership validation of a SM-DP+ Event Record Query SHALL only use
SMDP35 (FFS) the requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components
of the Event Record held.
A SM-DP+ SHALL support all sets of elliptic curve parameters as defined in
SMDP36
GSMA SGP.22 [24].
If a Profile Package is not yet released for download then the LPA SHALL
SMDP37
be informed by means of a specific error code.
An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to distinguish a Field-Test eUICC from a
SMDP38
Certified eUICC through eUICC Eligibility Check Information.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to be instructed by the Profile Owner to reject
Profile download to Field-Test eUICCs.
SMDP39
Note: The mechanism is out of scope of this document and it is left to the
implementation.Req no. Description
The SM-DP+ SHALL NOT perform a Profile download to a Field-Test
SMDP40
eUICC if it has been instructed so by the Profile Owner as per SMDP39.Table 24: SM-DP+ Requirements
4.10.3 Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements
Req no. Description
The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be ignored if an SM-DP+
DF1
address is present in an AC being presented to the LUI.
The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC SHALL be accessible by the
DF2
LPA to establish a connection to this SM-DP+.
DF3 The default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC MAY be left blank.
If the default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC is blank, then the use of the
DF4 SM-DS discovery procedure or an SM-DP+ address in an AC SHALL be
required to establish the target SM-DP+.
DF5 [Void]Table 25: Default SM-DP+ Address on the eUICC Requirements
4.11 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)
Primary Device
User
End User
Interface ESeuUser Interface ESeu
LPA LUI
ES10c
eUICC
Companion
DeviceFigure 6: End User Interaction and Interfaces between a Primary and Companion
Device, where the Companion Device MAY have a UI
4.11.1 LPA Overview
This role exists both within the Device in conjunction with LPA Services provided by the eUICC, and within the eUICC with the LPA function provided by the eUICC. It provides three distinct functions, the Local User Interface (LUI), the Local Profile Download (LPD) and the Local Discovery Service (LDS) as described below. Whilst the eUICC alone cannot provide any of these functions without Device interaction, the specific level of interaction will depend upon the capability within the Device. The way this variability is implemented across different Devices and Device types is for further study.
Figure 7: LPA Functions
Function name Description
Local Discovery
Where required, the LDS is responsible for retrieving pending Event
Service
Records from the SM-DS.
(LDS)
This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound Profile
Local Profile Package in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile Package
Download from the SM-DP+ to the LPD in a single transaction, and (ii) the onward
(LPD) transfer of the Bound Profile Package into the eUICC in segments.
This function will depend on network, Device, and eUICC capabilities.
Local User Interface This function allows the End User to perform Local Profile Management
(LUI) on the Device. User Intent SHALL be enforced.Table 26: LPA Function Descriptions
4.11.2 Operational LPA Modes
When there is an LPA in the Device and in the eUICC, then the LPA to be used is specified by the Device settings (DEV7):
LPA in the Device LPA in the eUICC
4.11.2.1 LPA in the eUICC
LPA functions are provided by the eUICC.
Figure 8: LPA in the eUICC
4.11.2.2 LPA in the Device
LPA functions are provided by the Device.
Figure 9: LPA in the Device
4.11.3 LPA Requirements
Req no. Description
The LPA SHALL be responsible for instructing the eUICC to perform Local Profile
LPA1
Management Operations as per End User request.
A mechanism SHALL be implemented between any LPA elements outside the
LPA2 eUICC, and the eUICC to ensure that the communication is not compromised
wherever the LPA is located.
A secure mechanism SHALL be implemented between the LUI and the
LPA3
associated display or input applications on the Device.
Access to the LUI SHALL be protected according to current best practices. This
LPA4
SHALL be enforced by the Device OS.
LPA5 All Local Profile Management Operations SHALL require User Intent.
LPA6 LUI access SHALL require User Intent.
LPA7 The End User SHALL be able to easily access the list of installed Profiles.
LPA8 The LPA SHALL protect Profile Metadata from unauthorised access.
The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘enable’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA9
operation SHALL allow the End User to select the Profile to be enabled.
LPA10 The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘disable’ SHALL be supported.
The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘delete’ SHALL be supported. This
operation SHALL allow the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the eUICC.
LPA11
The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for the
deletion of the Profile. Strong Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This
operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Operational
LPA12
Profiles on the eUICC and relevant associated information through their Profile
Metadata.
The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’
SHOULD be supported. When supported, this operation SHALL allow the End
User to edit the default SM-DP+ address. Simple confirmation SHALL be
LPA13
enforced. If the LPA does not support ‘edit default SM-DP+ address’, alternative
Device-specific method(s) to edit the default SM-DP+ address SHALL be provided
to the End User.
The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be
supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as described
LPA14 in Section 4.6.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of
consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. Strong Confirmation SHALL be
enforced.
The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Test Memory Reset’ SHALL
LPA15 execute the eUICC Test Memory Reset as described in Section 4.6.3. Simple
Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
The Local Profile Management Operation ‘set/edit nickname’ SHOULD be
supported. This operation SHALL allow the End User to add or modify a nickname
LPA16 for the selected Profile. The operation SHALL NOT modify the Service Provider
name. If the LPA does not support ‘set/edit nickname’, alternative vendor-specific
methods to distinguish Profiles on the LUI SHOULD be provided by the LPA. The Local Profile Management Operation ‘add Profile’ SHALL be supported. This
operation SHALL allow the LPA to download and install a new Profile to the
eUICC.
At least three mechanisms SHALL be supported by the LPA depending on the
LPA17 type of Device where technically capable:
Profile download from default SM-DP+
Profile download via SM-DS service discovery
Profile download with Activation Code
Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
The LPA SHALL NOT be accessible by any applications other than those
LPA18 provided by the provider of the LPA for the sole purpose of enabling the services
and functions of the LPA.
LPA19 [Void]
The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Simple
LPA20
Confirmation located on the Device as described in this document.
LPA21 [Void]
LPA22 [Void]
LPA23 [Void]
LPA24 [Void]
LPA25 [Void]
LPA26 [Void]
When enforced, any Confirmation Request SHALL allow the End User to cancel
LPA27
the Local Profile Management Operation.
It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI of a Companion Device allowing input
LPA28
from an End User interface on the Primary Device.
When a Companion Device LUI allows input from a Primary Device, the
Companion Device LUI SHALL be able to restrict the actions that can be applied.
For example:
LPA29 not offer the eUICC Memory Reset;
only ‘enable’ and ‘disable’ operation are exposed.
Profile enabling is exposed only if no Profile is already enabled on the
Companion Device.
The LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be able to request an End User initiated
LPA30 action on the Companion Device before the establishment of any proximity secure
link (used for inputs into the LUI from another Device).
A point-to-point proximity secure link initiated by the End User and offering
LPA31 confidentiality and integrity SHALL be established between the Companion and
Primary Device for any input executed from the Primary Device.
When operating a Companion Device LUI from a Primary Device, any required
User Intent or Confirmation Request SHALL only be executed by the LPA on the
LPA32
Companion Device. The physical End User input MAY be done in either the
Primary or the Companion Device.
The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure
LPA33
measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI.
LPA34 [Void] The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the
LPA35 internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over
such connection, ES8+ and ES9+ interfaces can be established.
The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another
Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally
LPA36
shared Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over
such connection, ES8+, and ES9+ interfaces can be established.
The LPA SHALL be able to determine if connectivity to the SM-DP+ is available
LPA37
by any means.
The LPA SHALL be able to notify the End User that there is no connection to the
LPA38 internet and or no connection to the SM-DP+ in order to allow the End User to
enable or troubleshoot required connectivity.
LPA39 The LPA SHALL only be able to access the eUICC if it has assigned privileges.
LPA40 There SHALL only be one LPA on the Device.
The LPA MAY be extended to support additional features which are not described
in this specification.
LPA41 NOTE: These additional features could be (but not limited to) interaction with
entities external to LPA, automation or batch processing of Local Profile
Management Operations, etc.
The LPA including additional features SHALL maintain the interoperability of the
LPA41a
solution defined in this specification.
LPA42 [Void]
LPA43 When multiple Operational Profiles are installed, the Local Profile Management
Operation ‘enable’ SHALL first initiate the ‘disable’ operation for any Enabled
Profile prior to initiating the ‘enable’ operation for the selected Profile.
LPA44 The LPA SHALL be able to read the Profile Policy Rules.
LPA45 When a Profile with Profile Policy Rules is installed, in the case where End User
consent is requested, the LPA SHOULD display the consequences of the Profile
Policy Rule to the End User. This message SHALL be formulated in a descriptive
and non-discriminatory manner (e.g. for “Non-Delete” Profile Policy Rule: “The
profile that you are about to install cannot be deleted under the terms you have
agreed with your service provider. Approve installation YES/NO?”). Strong
Confirmation SHOULD be enforced.
LPA46 Prior to downloading a new Profile, the LPA SHALL check the condition for
whether the Enabled Profile, if any, has enabled POL RULE1. If this is the case, a
dedicated message SHALL be displayed identifying the consequences to the End
User. Examples of information that may be displayed would be:
Enabling of the new Profile will not be possible because the currently
Enabled Profile cannot be disabled.
The Profile name of the Enabled Profile.
For more information, the End User should contact the Profile Owner of this
Profile.
With displaying this message, the End User SHALL be able to decide on whether
to continue the download or to cancel the operation.
This dialogue MAY be combined with the regular End User Intent for confirming a
Profile download.LPA47 The communication between the End User interface of the Primary Device and
the LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be protected (confidentiality, integrity
and authentication).
LPA48 [Void]
LPA49 Confirmation Requests for consecutive Local Profile Management Operations
MAY be achieved in one step as long as the different actions are clearly explained
to the End User. For instance, upon installation of a new Profile, the LPA MAY
propose ‘add Profile’ and ‘enable’ into one single step with a single confirmation
only (e.g. “Do you want to install profile ‘ProfileName’ on your Device and enable
it? Yes / No / Install only”)
LPA50 When consecutive operations are achieved in one single step (LPA49), the
highest level of confirmation SHALL be applied - i.e. in the case of two operations
having respectively Strong and Simple Confirmation Requests, the single step
SHALL use the Strong Confirmation Request.
LPA51 The Local Profile Management Operations ‘enable’ (LPA9), ‘disable’ (LPA10), and
‘delete’ (LPA11) SHALL be able to trigger a Notification to the Notification
Receivers of the respective Profile being managed to indicate that this operation
was actioned. These Notifications are sent on a best effort basis and SHALL not
impact otherwise the operation.
LPA52 The LPA SHALL provide a Trusted Link from the End User to the eUICC through
the LUI.
The End User SHALL be able to configure the LPA such that the automatic Event
LPA53
Record retrieval from the SM-DS is disabled.
LPA54 The LPA SHALL be able to read any SM-DS and SM-DP+ addresses configured
in the eUICC.
It SHALL be possible to check the LPA Integrity. If the integrity check fails,
LPA55
communication between the eUICC and the LPA SHALL not occur.
LPA Integrity SHALL be ensured using the best practice methods on the targeted
LPA56
platform. See Annex G.
The polling mechanism in the LPA SHALL have two types of triggers; those that are
LPA57
event based, and those that are End User initiated.
Event based triggers for polling SHOULD include Device power-up when no
LPA58 Operational Profile is installed; in addition other triggers MAY be provided. Event
based triggers MAY be disabled by the End User.
End User initiated triggers for polling SHALL include:
The ‘Add Profile’ operation to trigger the default SM-DP+ if configured, and
LPA59
the Root SM-DS.
In addition, other manual triggers MAY be provided.
LPA60 [Void]
Error/retry handling of the LPA polling mechanism SHALL be implemented e.g.
LPA61 advise the End User to retry or automatically retry as appropriate. The
corresponding confirmation needs to be enforced in the retry cases.
As part of the initial Device setup, if no Operational Profile is already installed,
means SHALL be provided to the End User to retrieve pending Profiles waiting on
LPA62
the Default SM-DP+ if configured, via the Root SM-DS, and via the Activation
Code procedure. Simple Confirmation is required.
Note: Implementation is left to the OEM and retrieval does not need to happen
exactly during the initial Device setup if the End User, as an example, is informed
on how to retrieve these profiles after the setup.
The End User SHALL always be able to manually request the retrieval of any
waiting Event Record via the LPA if there is no default SM-DP+ address.
LPA63
Note: This may be achieved through the combination with existing operations –
e.g. pressing “Add Profile” would contact the server to retrieve an Event.
The Operator/Service Provider name SHALL be given in the signalling information
from the SM-DP+ to the LPA when initiating the download of a Profile and shown
LPA64
to the End User before the Profile is downloaded.
Simple Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
The LPA SHOULD present the EID to the End User as both text and in a defined
LPA65
scannable format (e.g. QR Code).
LPA66 [Void]
If the SM-DP+ stops the Profile download procedure, the LPA SHALL notify the
LPA67
End User.
LPA68 [Void]
Table 27: LPA Requirements4.11.4 LDS Requirements
Req no. Description
The LDS SHALL be able to read out the address described in EUICC Error!
LDS1 Reference source not found. and only use the address to connect to the
SM-DSTable 28: LDS Requirement
4.12 Subscription Manager – Discovery Service (SM-DS)
4.12.1 SM-DS Overview
The role of the SM-DS is to provide mechanisms that allow an SM-DP+ to inform the LDS within any Device that an SM-DP+ wishes to communicate with it. The purpose of the SM- DS to LDS communication SHALL be informing the LDS of a pending Event.
The principle of operation remains the same for all use cases. The SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration message for a target Device to a SM-DS.
In a simple deployment, only the Root SM-DS is configured on the eUICC. The Root SM-DS address is unique and filled in the eUICC. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM- DS using the same logical location. When the Root SM-DS has an Event-ID for the target Device it will respond with the SM-DP+ address, or if there is no Event-ID the response will be a null response.
In a deployment with cascaded SM-DSs, the SM-DP+ will send an Event Registration to an Alternative SM-DS, which may not be configured as the Root SM-DS on the eUICC. This Alternative SM-DS will cascade the Event Registration to the Root SM-DS. The LDS in the target Device polls the Root SM-DS and will receive the Alternative SM-DS address. It will
then request the Event from the Alternative SM-DS, which will respond with the SM-DP+ address.
Figure 10: Alternative Device to Root SM-DS Event Registration
Figure 11: Root SM-DS Event Registration
Figure 12: Alternative SM-DS Discovery
4.12.2 SM-DS Implementation
Two configurations of the SM-DS MAY exist: A Root SM-DS An Alternative SM-DS
Figure 13: SM-DS Implementation
Figure 13 shows both configurations. The Root SM-DS is configured at the time of Device manufacture and is invariant.
4.12.3 SM-DS Implementation Guidelines
The following statements SHOULD be considered when defining a technical implementation:
A competitive environment on the supply of SM-DS services SHOULD be favoured by
the approach.
There SHOULD be no single-points-of-failure.
Implementation SHOULD inherently provide both vertical and horizontal
performance/scalability.
There SHOULD be no need for pre-registration of Devices or eUICCs at a certain
SM-DS as required in SGP.02 [8] (GSMA Embedded SIM for the SM-SR).4.12.4 SM-DS functions
The SM-DS has three distinct functions:
Figure 14: SM-DS Functions
Function name Description
Event Registration Process by which an Event Record received from a SM-DP+ is stored.
Event Deletion Process by which an SM-DP+ can delete its own Event Record.
Provides all registered Event Records, upon Discovery Request from
Event Retrieval
any enquiring LDS.Table 29: SM-DS Function Descriptions
4.12.5 SM-DS Requirements
Req no. Description
The SM-DS SHALL enable a LDS to discover its own Event Records
SMDS1
registered by SM-DP+(s) or by Alternative SM-DS(s).
The SM-DS SHALL not be able to identify the nature of an Event.
SMDS2 Note: The nature of the Event may be ‘Profile Package available for
download’.
All valid Discovery Requests and Event Registrations SHALL be processed
SMDS3
in a non-discriminatory manner.
The SM-DS SHALL only accept Event Registrations from
any authorised and authenticated SM-DP+(s) having a valid
SMDS4
Certificate.
any authorised and authenticated SM-DS(s) having a valid Certificate.
The SM-DS SHALL only accept Discovery Requests authenticated by an
SMDS5
eUICC via the corresponding LDS.
The SM-DS and the SM-DP+ as well as connected SM-DSs SHALL be
SMDS6
mutually authenticated.
The SM-DS SHALL NOT have visibility of any data that may be used to
SMDS7
compromise the End User´s privacy.
The SM-DS SHALL support multiple concurrent Event Registrations per
SMDS8 eUICC and SHALL present to the LDS all currently valid Event Records in
the same order as they were received by the SM-DS (first in, first out).
SMDS9 The SM-DS SHALL only store Event Records destined for specific EIDs.
Subscriber Specific data and Profile related contents SHALL NOT be stored
SMDS10
within the SM-DS.
The SM-DS SHALL NOT allow the harvesting of any information such as
SMDS11
Operator, EIDs, Device Manufacturers, Devices, etc.
The SM-DS SHALL only return to the LDS, the Event Records related to the
SMDS12
served eUICC.
The SM-DS SHALL NOT have any contact with the Profile Packages e.g.
SMDS13
SHALL NOT store or process any Profile Package.
The SM-DS SHALL provide the same data regardless of the status of the
SMDS14
Device that queries it (i.e. consistent in time and in geographic location).
The SM-DS SHOULD NOT significantly impact the end-to-end provisioning
SMDS15
time.
SMDS16 The SM-DS SHALL provide defence against DoS attacks.
All communications to, from and between entities of the SM-DS SHALL be
SMDS17
encrypted.
The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event Records
SMDS18
registered on the SM-DS.
An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to delete any of its own Event
SMDS19 Records registered on the Root SM-DS (In response to an SM-DP+ delete
operation defined in SMDS18).Req no. Description
An Alternative SM-DS SHALL propagate the Event Record to the Root SM-
SMDS20
DS if requested by the SM-DP+.
If there are multiple Event Records registered on the SM-DS for one
SMDS21
eUICC, these SHALL all be sent as a single response.
An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to send an Event Record to an LDS either by
the Root SM-DS or via any Alternative SM-DS selected by the SM-DP+. If
SMDS22
an Alternative SM-DS is selected, the Event Record to the LDS SHALL
come from this Alternative SM-DS.
There SHALL be a unique Root SM-DS.
SMDS23 Note: This requirement does not forbid the potential load-balancing of this
Root SM-DS.
SMDS24 The Root SM-DS SHALL be managed by the GSMA.
It SHALL be possible for the Alternative SM-DS to conduct an Event Record
SMDS25 (FFS) Query to the Root SM-DS for the purpose of auditing Event Registrations it
owns.
A SM-DS response to an Event Record Query SHALL only confirm Event
SMDS26 (FFS)
Record existence and SHALL NOT include additional information.
An Alternative SM-DS SHALL be able to query the existence of an Event
SMDS27 (FFS) Record on the Root SM-DS, identified by the EID or the Event-ID over the
ES15 interface.
Response to a SM-DS Event Record query SHALL only occur where the
SMDS28 (FFS)
responder validates the Event Record ownership.
Ownership validation of a SM-DS Event Record Query SHALL only use the
SMDS29 (FFS) requester’s address or the submitted Event-ID against the components of
the Event Record held.
The SM-DS (Root or Alternative) MAY inform the SM-DP+ directly or via
SMDS30 (FFS) another SM-DS, that a Discovery Request from an authorised LDS has
been answered by issuing an Event Record.
The SM-DS SHALL only inform the Event Record’s owning SM-DP+ or SM-
SMDS31 (FFS)
DS that it has replied to a Discovery Request.Table 30 SM-DS Requirements
4.12.6 Event Registration/Deletion Procedure
The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with the Root SM-DS and an Alternative SM-DS (cascade mode).
Figure 15: Event Registration/Deletion Procedure
4.12.6.1 Event Registration Procedure
Starting Condition:
a. The SM-DP+ has an Event Registration action waiting for a target eUICC identified by
the EID.Procedure:
1. The SM-DP+ establishes a secure connection to an Alternative SM-DS of the
Profile Owner´s choice.
2. The SM-DP+ notifies the Alternative SM-DS about an Event Registration action.
3. to 4. The Alternative SM-DS registers and confirms the Event Registration.
5. The Alternative SM-DS establishes a secure connection to the Root SM-DS.
6. The Alternative SM-DS informs the Root SM-DS that for the given EID, an Event
Record is waiting at the Alternative SM-DS.7. The Root SM-DS registers the Event Registration. 8. The Root SM-DS confirms the receipt of the information.
4.12.6.2 Event Deletion Procedure
Starting Condition:
a. The SM-DP+ has an Event Deletion action waiting for a target eUICC identified by the
EIDProcedure:
1. The SM-DP+ establishes a secure connection to an Alternative SM-DS of the Profile
Owner´s choice.
2. The SM-DP+ notifies the Alternative SM-DS about an Event Deletion action.
3. to 4. The Alternative SM-DS deletes the Event Record and confirms the Event Deletion.
5. The Alternative SM-DS establishes a secure connection to the Root SM-DS.
6. The Alternative SM-DS informs the Root SM-DS that for the given EID, an Event
Record has to be deleted.
7. The Root SM-DS deletes the Event Record.
8. The Root SM-DS confirms the deletion of the Event Record.4.12.7 Discovery Request Procedure
The figure below shows the procedure for a deployment with an Alternative SM-DS and the Root SM-DS (cascade mode). #
Figure 16: Discovery Request Procedure
Procedure:
1. to 3. In order to generate a Discovery Request, the LDS requests the eUICC to generate
an eUICC Authorisation which contains (at least) the eUICC-Certificate and is
signed by the eUICC.
4. to 5. The LDS establishes a secure communication to the Root SM-DS.
6. The Root SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by checking the eUICC
Authorisation.
7. In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record is waiting, it delivers back:
a. The address of the SM-DP+, where an action is waiting.
or
b. The rest of the following actions:
i. The address of the Alternative SM-DS, where an Event Record can be
retrieved.
ii. The LDS establishes a secure connection to the Alternative SM-DS.
iii. The Alternative SM-DS verifies the authenticity of the eUICC by
checking the eUICC Authorisation.
iv. In case the eUICC is authentic and an Event Record has been
received, it delivers back the address of the SM-DP+, where an action
is waiting.
8. The LPA establishes a connection to the SM-DP+ and the waiting action can be
performed.4.13 Profile Policy Management
4.13.1 Introduction
The Profile Policy Management function provides mechanisms by which Service Providers are able to reinforce the conditions or policies (operational and business) under which services are provided to the Subscriber. In some instances this MAY also include the enforcement of the policies set by the Subscriber.
Profile Policy Management MAY also be applied with other already existing policy enforcement technologies which are also subject to agreement by the Subscriber.
The realisation of the Profile Policy Management function is based on two key elements. The first element is the Profile Policy Enabler which is contained within the eUICC. The second element is a set of defined Profile Policy Rules which are required for the actual enforcement of specific policies.
4.13.2 Profile Policy Management Requirements
Policy no. Description
POL1 A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only be configured within a Profile.
POL2 Each Profile MAY have Profile Policy Rules associated to itself.
POL3 A Profile Policy Rule SHALL only apply to the Profile that contains it.
POL4 Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be consistent across implementations.
Profile Policy Enforcement SHALL be able to resolve any Profile Policy Rule
POL5
conflict.Policy no. Description
The updating of a Profile’s Policy Rules SHALL be restricted to the Profile
POL6
Owner.
The mechanism used for the update of a Profile Policy Rule SHALL be
POL7
atomic.
POL8 The set of Profile Policy Rules SHALL be extensible for future releases.
There SHALL be a Profile Policy Rule scheme to allow extensibility of the
POL9 Policy Rules, e.g. described like ‘operational command, scope of
application, qualification’
A Profile Policy Rule SHALL be enforced whenever a Profile state change is
POL10
attempted.
Downloading and installing a Profile with the Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of
POL11 this Profile is not allowed’ (POL RULE1) SHALL only be possible if no other
Operational Profile is currently installed.
The LPA and the eUICC SHALL prevent the downloading and installation of
a Profile containing Profile Policy Rules that conflict with the Profile Policy
POL12 Rules of the already installed Profiles.
Note: The technical specification SHALL describe exhaustively each conflict
that MAY occur.
The LPA MAY cancel the Profile download procedure if it does not support
POL12a the downloading of Profiles containing Profile Policy Rules to a removable
eUICC regardless of its RAT.
An Operator SHALL be able to deactivate the Profile Policy Rules of its
Profile using the ES6 interface if the Profile is enabled.
POL13
Note: The activation of Profile Policy Rules on the ES6 interface is a
potential feature for a future release.
Before a Profile is installed with Profile Policy Rules, the End User SHALL
be able to be notified about the Profile Policy Rules and if notified, the
installation SHALL thereafter be conditional on End User Strong
POL14
Confirmation.
This prompting may not be needed if the installation is directly allowed by
the RAT.
The request for End User consent for the installation of Profile Policy Rules
POL15 and Profile download MAY be combined into a single prompt therefore
requiring a single confirmation by the End User.
Profile Policy Rules SHALL be enforced by the Profile Policy Enabler in the
POL16
eUICC.
The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL only support the Profile Policy Rules
POL17
defined in this specification.
The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL be capable of supporting all the Profile
POL18
Policy Rules as defined in this specification.
POL RULE3 SHALL be enforceable in all cases with the exception of the
enabling of a Provisioning Profile.
POL19
Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet
been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.Policy no. Description
Allowing the installation of a Profile with Profile Policy Rules SHALL be
POL20
subject to compliance with local regulatory requirements.Table 31: Profile Policy Management Requirements
4.13.3 Policy Rules
Policy no. Description
The Profile Policy Rule ‘Disabling of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be
POL RULE1
supported.
The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is not allowed’ SHALL be
POL RULE2
supported.
The Profile Policy Rule ‘Deletion of this Profile is required upon its
successful disabling’ SHALL be supported.
POL RULE3
Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet
been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.Table 32: Policy Rules Requirements
4.13.4 Profile Policy Enabler Requirements
Policy no. Description
The Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) SHALL be stored in the Profile Policy
POLPPE1
Enabler in the eUICC.
The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL enforce the contents of the installed RAT,
POLPPE2
if any, only at Profile installation time.
The RAT SHALL allow multiple Profile Owners to have Profile Policy Rules
POLPPE3
enabled in their Profiles.
The RAT SHALL be able to support specific configurations which allow a set
POLPPE4
of or all Profile Policy Rules for any Profile Owner.
The RAT SHALL only be installed at pre-issuance or during the initial
POLPPE5
Device setup provided there are no Operational Profiles installed.
POLPPE6 The RAT SHALL not be affected by the eUICC Memory Reset function.
To support identifiable regulatory requirement, a RAT SHALL be able to
POLPPE7 support a specific configuration which MAY forbid any Profile Owner to set a
specific Profile Policy Rule.
If POLPPE7 is set, this information SHALL be part of the eligibility check
POLPPE8
information shared between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
Where the RAT allows the Profile Policy Rules for the Profile being installed,
POLPPE9
installation SHALL proceed as stated in POL14.
The RAT SHALL be able to support a setting to display the consequences
POLPPE10
of the Profile Policy Rules to the End User before installation of the Profile.
POLPPE11 The OEM or EUM SHALL be responsible for providing the RAT.
A fixed RAT SHALL be implemented in the eUICC.
POLPPE12
Note: RAT configuration examples are described in Annex H.Table 33: Profile Policy Enabler Requirements
4.14 Certification
4.14.1 eUICC Certification Requirements
Req no. Description
CERTEU1 The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS UP certified [13][13][13].
The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance with
CERTEU2
GSMA SGP.22 [24].
The eUICC SHALL be certified according to the Protection Profile defined
CERTEU3
by the GSMA [25].
The eUICC Protection Profile SHALL at least include the following
CERTEU4 elements: ISD-R, Profile storage, isolation of Profiles, and Telecom
Framework.
The eUICC protection Profile SHALL be equivalent to the eUICC Protection
CERTEU5
Profile defined in SGP.05 [21][21][21].
The Evaluation Assurance Level of the eUICC Protection Profile SHALL be
CERTEU6 (at least) EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 (EAL 4+).
Note: A study needs to be performed in terms of assurance level by FASG.
The eUICC public key Certificate used for authentication SHALL contain the
CERTEU7
EID.
It SHALL be possible to obtain the technical reference of the product, for
example the Common Criteria certification report number and if applicable,
CERTEU8
the EMVco PCN (Platform Certification Number) associated with a specific
eUICC.
CERTEU9 The EUM Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.
The eUICC Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by the EUM using its EUM
CERTEU10 private key corresponding to its Certificate (CERTEU9Error! Reference
source not found.).
The eUICC private key(s) SHOULD not be modifiable. If they are, they
CERTEU11 should be modifiable only by the EUM that issued the corresponding
Certificate.
If the eUICC private key(s) are modifiable, it SHALL use the mechanism
CERTEU12 defined in the GlobalPlatform specification with a minimum security level
corresponding to the AES algorithm using a key length of 128 bits.
If the eUICC's EUM Certificate is updatable, then the eUICC SHALL
CERTEU13
support a secure mechanism to update its EUM Certificate.
If the eUICC's CI public keys are updatable, then the eUICC SHALL support
CERTEU14
a secure mechanism to update its CI public keys.
If the eUICC's Certificate is updatable, then the eUICC SHALL support a
CERTEU15
secure mechanism to update its eUICC Certificate.
Where appropriate, the eUICC SHOULD be certified according to EMVCo
CERTEU16
Security Evaluation process [27].
Field-Test eUICCs SHALL use a certified hardware according to SGP.24
CERTEU17
[38].Table 34: eUICC Certification Requirements
4.14.2 Device Compliance Requirement
Req no. Description
There SHALL be a compliance process for all parts of Local Profile
CERTDEV1
Management implementations in accordance with the GSMA.
The certification process for Integrated TRE using Remote Memory residing
outside the SoC as per DIE1 SHALL cover the Integrated TRE, internal and
CERTDEV2
external SoC interfaces used for Integrated eUICC implementation, and
Remote Memory residing outside the SoC.
The certification process for Integrated TRE implementions SHALL ensure
that software and data stored in Remote Memory residing outside the SoC
CERTDEV3
as per DIE1 are protected against confidentiality, integrity, and availability
attacks.
The certification process for Integrated TRE implementions SHALL ensure
CERTDEV4 that any interfaces between the Integrated TRE and the SoC are protected
against confidentiality and integrity attacks.Table 35: Device Compliance Requirement
4.14.3 SM-DP+ Certification Requirements
Req no. Description
The SM-DP+ provider SHALL be required to declare product (SM-DP+)
CERTDP1
compliance with GSMA SGP.22 V2.2 [24].
The SM-DP+ SHALL be certified according to FS.08 SAS-SM Standard
CERTDP2
v3 [22] and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v3 [28].
SM-DP+ elements SHALL use Hardware Security Modules (HSM) for
cryptographic related operations (key storage, derivation, cryptographic
CERTDP3 operations).
Note: This is to be covered by the SAS documents “HSM certified
according to FIPS 140-2 level 3 or higher”
The SM-DP+ SHALL implement privileges isolation (Log, Audit,
CERTDP4
Operation, and Administration).
The SM-DP+ SHALL implement operating system hardening
CERTDP5
mechanisms.
The SM-DP+ SHALL implement separation of control, user and
CERTDP6
administrative planes.
The SM-DP+ SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration
CERTDP7
operation.
SM-DP+ hard drives and backup mediums used for storing Profiles
CERTDP8
SHALL be ciphered.
The private keys of SM-DP+ Certificates used for mutual authentication
CERTDP9 and Profile Binding with eUICC SHALL be protected and stored in HSM
according to CERTDP3.
The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to mitigate
CERTDP10
against DoS attacks.
CERTDP11 The SM-DP+ SHALL log all Certificate authentication failures.
CERTDP12 The SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.Table 36: SM-DP+ Certification Requirements
4.14.4 SM-DS Certification Requirements
Req no. Description
The SM-DS provider SHALL be required to declare product compliance with
CERTDS1
GSMA SGP.22 [24].
The SM-DS SHALL be certified according to FS.08 SAS-SM Standard v3
CERTDS2
[22] and FS.09 SAS-SM Methodology v3 [28].
The SM-DS SHALL implement isolation of privileges (Log, Audit, Operation,
CERTDS3
and Administration).
CERTDS4 The SM-DS SHALL implement operating system hardening mechanisms.
The SM-DS SHALL implement separation of control, user and
CERTDS5
administrative planes.
The SM-DS SHALL use Multi-Factor Authentication and administration
CERTDS6
operation.
CERTDS7 SM-DS hard drives and backup mediums SHALL be ciphered.
CERTDS8 The SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be signed by a GSMA CI.Table 37: SM-DS Certification Requirements
4.14.5 LPA Certification Requirements
Req no. Description
There SHALL be a certification process for all the LPA elements
CERTLPA1
communicating with Remote SIM Provisioning entities.
The certification process SHALL ensure that Local Profile Management
CERTLPA2
Operations are sent by authorised LPA elements only.
The certification process SHALL ensure a mechanism exists to block
CERTLPA3
compromised LPAs.
CERTLPA4 The LPD SHALL authenticate the SM-DP+ during the TLS session.
CERTLPA5 The LDS SHALL authenticate the SM-DS during the TLS session.
The LPA SHALL only accept valid TLS Certificates as defined in
CERTLPA6
CERTPK10a for SM-DP+ and SM-DS authentication.Table 38: LPA Certification Requirements
4.14.6 Public Key Certificates Management Requirements
Req no. Description
CERTPK1 The eUICC SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+.
CERTPK2 The LPD SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+.
CERTPK3 The LDS SHALL verify the Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS.
The LDS authentication of an SM-DS using an invalid Public Key Certificate
CERTPK4
SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication SHALL stop.Req no. Description
The LPD authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK5 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11CERTPK1), and on-going
communication SHALL stop.
The SM-DP+ authentication of an eUICC using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK6 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication
SHALL stop.
The eUICC authentication of an SM-DP+ using an invalid Public Key
CERTPK7 Certificate SHALL fail (see CERTPK11), and on-going communication
SHALL stop.
The GSMA CI SHALL revoke the Public Key Certificate of any entities (SM-
CERTPK8
DP+, SM-DS, EUM) if it is compromised (e.g. private key theft).
CERTPK9 The eUICC SHALL be able to support a set of GSMA CIs.
A Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:
it has a valid signature
it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a trusted chain of Certificates up to a
GSMA CI. Certificate Path validation SHALL follow the process
defined in RFC 5280 0Error! Reference source not found..
CERTPK10
it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in the trust chain has been
revoked
it has not expired
If any of these applicable verifications fail, the Public Key Certificate SHALL
be considered as invalid.
A TLS Public Key Certificate SHALL be considered as valid if:
it has a valid signature
it is signed by a GSMA CI, or a public trusted CA, or a trusted chain of
Certificates up to a GSMA CI or a public trusted CA. Certificate Path
validation SHALL follow the process defined in RFC 5280 0Error!
CERTPK10a Reference source not found..
it has not been revoked, and no Certificate in its trust chain has been
revoked
it has not expired
If any of these applicable verifications fail, the TLS Public Key Certificate
SHALL be considered as invalid.
The eUICC, LPA, SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL have knowledge of revoked
Public Key Certificates.
CERTPK11
Note: This requirement also applies to TLS Certificates that chain to either
the GSMA CI or a public trusted CA.Table 39: Public Key Certificates Management Requirements
5 Operational Procedures
5.1 LPA Initiated Download
5.1.1 LPA Initiated Download Requirements
Req no. Description
The LPA SHALL use any Root SM-DS or default SM-DP+ address
LID1 populated on the eUICC if it has not been provided already by the Activation
Code.
In the context of LID1, if both a Root SM-DS and a default SM-DP+ address
LID2 are populated, the LPA SHALL first contact the SM-DP+ and then SM-DS to
initiate a Remote SIM Provisioning transaction.Table 40: LPA Initiated Download Requirements
5.1.2 LPA Initiated Download Procedure
This following procedure describes the Events that are part of the Profile Package download and installation procedure initiated by the LPA.
Figure 17: Profile Download Procedure
Start conditions:
a. The Subscriber has completed the Subscription process to the selected
Operator/Service Provider offer.
b. The Profile ordering process related to this Subscription has been completed
(i.e. an assigned Protected Profile Package is stored on the SM-DP+).
Procedure: 1. The LPA initiates Profile Package download and identifies the address of the
SM-DP+ where the Profile is stored and available for download (via e.g. URL,
QR code, manual input, etc.) as well as other information provided (e.g.
Token, SMDPId, Confirmation Code).
2. The LPA authenticates the SM-DP+ through establishing a TLS connection
with the SM-DP+, and verifying the SMDPid if such information has been
provided.
3. to 4. The LPA gets an eUICC challenge
5. to 6. The LPA sends the eUICC challenge and any other relevant information to the
SM-DP+.
7. to 9. The SM-DP+ signs the eUICC challenge, and generates a DP_Challenge to
be sent back to the eUICC.
10. The LPA sends the material received by the SM-DP+ and the AC Token to
the eUICC; the eUICC checks the SMDPid and authenticates the SM-DP+.
11. The eUICC sends back a signed set of information including the
DP_Challenge, the AC Token, the EID and its Certificate to the LPA.
12. The End User confirms the download of the Profile, optionally with the display
of the Profile name of the Operator.
13. The LPA sends the set of information received in Step 11 from the eUICC to
the SM-DP+.
14. The SM-DP+ verifies the signature; the eUICC is authenticated.
15. to 16. OPTIONAL: The eUICC Eligibility Check and Profile binding functions are
performed by the SM-DP+.
17. to 22. OPTIONAL
17. The Operator is notified about the Profile Package that is about to be
downloaded.
18. If the Operator has been notified, it MAY request to stop the download
process by indicating an error code to the SM-DP+.
19. If the Operator sends an error code to the SM-DP+, the SM-DP+ stops the
download process and indicates the error code to the LPA.
20. The LPA notifies the End User with an appropriate message.
21. to 22. The SM-DP+ MAY receive information from the Operator to prepare the
appropriate Profile Package.
23. to 25. The Bound Profile Package is sent to the eUICC and installed on the eUICC.
26. The Profile Package download report is sent from the SM-DP+ to the
Operator.
End Condition:a. The Profile is installed in the eUICC in a Disabled state
5.2 Profile Download with Activation Code
5.2.1 Activation Code Requirements
Req no. Description
Where used, the Activation Code SHALL trigger the download of a Bound
AC1
Profile Package from a specific SM-DP+.
The Activation Code SHALL comprise of the following parameters:
SM-DP+ address
AC2 Activation Code Token (Includes OPTIONAL Confirmation Code
Required Flag)
SMDPid (OPTIONAL)
The Activation Code Token SHALL be able to include a parameter indicating
whether a Confirmation Code is required or not.
If such a Confirmation Code is required, the LPA SHALL ask the End User to
AC3 input a Confirmation Code. The SM-DP+ SHALL verify the Confirmation Code
before delivering the Bound Profile Package.
Note: How the Confirmation Code is created and provided to the End User is
out of scope of this specification.
The Activation Code SHALL be verified by the SM-DP+ before delivering the
AC4
Bound Profile Package.
The Activation Code input in the LPA by the End User SHALL support at least
AC5
manual typing and QR code scanning.
All Activation Code procedures SHALL be implemented natively as part of the
AC6
LPA.
AC7 [Void]
Following the Activation Code procedure, the Profile Package download
AC8
procedure SHALL be used.
The Activation Code procedure SHALL preserve eco-system security, privacy
AC9
and validation of User Intent.
The Activation Code procedure SHALL be used for the sole purpose of
downloading a Profile package to the targeted eUICC. The Activation Code
AC10
procedure SHALL prevent sending IMEI and EID information to a non-
authenticated SM-DP+.
AC11 The Activation Code SHALL uniquely identify the Operator/Service Provider.
The Activation Code request to the SM-DP+ SHALL be extended by the LPA
AC12
with the EID after the specific SM-DP+ has been authenticated.Table 41: Activation Code Requirements
5.2.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure
The Activation Code procedure defines a common functionality which allows the Subscriber or the End User on behalf of the Subscriber to “activate” a Device by means of requesting the download of an Operational Profile from the Device itself.
Figure 18: Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure
Start Conditions:
a. A Subscription has been established by the Subscriber.
b. Activation Code material and optionally a Confirmation Code has been provided
to the SM-DP+ (Step 1), and an Activation Code has been provided to the End
User and optionally a Confirmation Code (side channel) (Step 2).Procedure: 3. The End User inputs the Activation Code to the LPA through the LUI.
4. The LPA parses the Activation Code parameters to recognise the SM-DP+ address, the Activation Code Token, the LPA Mode and optionally the SMDPid. In addition, the LPA MAY parse in the Activation Token the information that a Confirmation Code is required. 5. If the Confirmation Code parameter in the Activation Code Token is set to “require Confirmation Code”, the End User is prompted to input a Confirmation Code provided to them by the issuing Operator/Service Provider. 6. The Activation Code download procedure is initiated by the LPA. The LPA requests a nonceeUICC from the eUICC. 7. The eUICC creates a nonceeUICC associated with the supported eUICC Specification Version Number (eSVN). 8. The eUICC transmits the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to the LPA. 9. The LPA sends the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to the SM- DP+.
Note: Prior to this step a HTTPs session SHALL be established between the LPA and the SM-DP+ based on a public key of the Root Certificate stored in the Device which includes authentication using the TLS Certificate and checking for the presence of the SMDPid in the TLS Certificate used for the TLS session.
10. Upon receiving the nonceeUICC and the associated eSVN, the SM-DP+ creates
nonceSMDP and signs both the nonceSMDP and the nonceeUICC.
11. The SM-DP+ sends the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the LPA.
12. The LPA collects the Activation Code parameters as well as the Device information
needed for the eligibility procedure and optionally the Confirmation Code and
transmits them with the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the eUICC.
13. The eUICC checks the signature attached to the nonceeUICC. If the SMDPid is
configured in the AC, the eUICC checks that the SMDPid provided by the LPA and
the SMDPid in the SM-DP+ Certificate correspond. The SM-DP+ is at this stage
authenticated by the eUICC. The eUICC generates key material that will be used for
the session key establishment. The eUICC signs a set of information with the eUICC
private key which includes:
a. The nonceSMDP
b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the preparation
of the Bound Profile Package
c. Activation Code parameters
d. The Device and eUICC information
e. Optionally the Confirmation Code
14. The eUICC sends the signed set of information to the LPA in addition to:
a. The nonceSMDP
b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the preparation
of the Bound Profile Package
c. Activation Code parameters
d. The Device and eUICC information
e. The eUICC Certificate which includes the EID
f. The EUM Certificate
g. Optionally the Confirmation Code15. The LPA sends the whole set of information received from the eUICC to the SM-
DP+.
16. The SM-DP+ checks the EUM Certificate with the CI Public Key. The SM-DP+
checks the signature of the nonceSMDP; the eUICC is at this stage authenticated by
the SM-DP+.
17. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the eligibility check based on the transmitted information
(EID, Device information, eUICC information, eSVN).
18. The SM-DP+ checks the Activation Code parameters and optionally the Confirmation
Code to retrieve the referenced Profile Package.
19. The Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC:
a. The SM-DP+ establishes session keys with the eUICC.
b. A Bound Profile Package is prepared on the basis of the eUICC session key
material and is downloaded and installed on the eUICC.
c. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and the
Operator is notified by the SM-DP+.
d. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged by the eUICC
to the LPA which notifies the End User of the status.End Conditions:
a. A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a
Disabled state.
b. The LPA MAY offer the Profile for enablement by the End User.5.3 Local Profile Management
5.3.1 Local Profile Management Procedures
5.3.1.1 Enable Profile
This procedure performs the enabling of a target Profile. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.
Figure 19: Enable Profile Procedure
Start conditions:
a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC.
b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
Management.Procedure:
1. The End User makes a Profile enable request on the LPA.
2. User Intent is verified.
3. The LPA sends a Profile enable operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the
eUICC.
4. The ISD-R checks if applied Profile Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the
Profile to be enabled
5. If there is a conflict with Profile Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and
informs the End User via the LPA.
6. The target Profile is enabled.
7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the enabling of the Profile.
8. The End User is informed via the LPA.End conditions:
a. The target Profile is enabled.5.3.1.2 Disable Profile
Profile disabling can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.
Figure 20: Disable Profile Procedure
Start conditions:
a. The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC.
b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
Management.Procedure:
1. The End User makes a Profile disable request on the LPA.
2. User Intent is verified.
3. The LPA sends a Profile disable operation to the ISD-R on the eUICC.
4. The ISD-R checks if applied Profile Policy Rules on the target Profile permits the
Profile to be disabled.
5. If there is a conflict with Profile Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and
informs the End User via the LPA.
6. The ISD-R disables the target Profile.
7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the disabling of the Profile.
8. The End User is informed via the LPA.End conditions:
a. The target Profile is disabled.5.3.1.3 Delete Profile
Profile deletion can be achieved with the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.
Figure 21: Delete Profile Procedure
Start conditions:
a. The target Profile is disabled.
b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User
c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
Management.Procedure:
1. The End User makes a Profile deletion request on the LPA.
2. User Intent is verified.
3. The LPA sends a Profile deletion operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on
the eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
4. The ISD-R checks if applied Profile Policy Rules permits the Profile to be deleted.
5. If there is a conflict with Profile Policy Rules, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and
informs the End User via the LPA.
6. The ISD-R erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P. 7. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the Profile deletion.
8. The Profile Metadata for the target Profile is erased.
9. The End User is informed via the LPA.
10. The LPA sends delete Notifications to the Notification Receivers for Profile
deletion in the Profile.End conditions:
a. The target Profile is deleted.5.3.1.4 Add/Update Profile Nickname
Add/update nickname will allow the Subscriber or End User to attribute a nickname to a Profile for ease of use. Note that adding or changing a nickname SHALL NOT affect any other data or other Profile Metadata for that Profile.
Figure 22: Add/Update Profile Nickname Procedure
Start conditions:
a. User Intent has been verified.
b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
Management.Procedure:
1. The End User requests the update of the nickname on the LPA.
2. The LPA updates the Profile Metadata of the target Profile with the End User’s
choice of nickname in the eUICC.End conditions:
a. Profile Metadata of the target Profile has been updated with the End User’s choice
of nickname.5.3.1.5 Query Profile Metadata
This procedure will allow the End User to query the Profile Metadata of the Profiles accessible to the End User. The result SHALL display all (or parts of) the Profile Metadata for the selected Profile on the eUICC at the time of querying. No changes are made to any data on the eUICC as a result of this procedure.
Figure 23: Query Profile Metadata Procedure
Start conditions:
a. The LPA is authenticated to eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
Management.
b. The list of Profiles accessible to the End User is displayed by the LPA (LUI).Procedure:
1. The End User selects a Profile to query.
2. The LPA receives a query request from the End User.
3. The LPA requests Profile Metadata from the eUICC.
4. The LPA displays the Profile Metadata to the End User on the LUI.End conditions:
a. No change to Profile Metadata.5.3.1.6 eUICC Memory Reset
This procedure performs the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC including its associated Profile Metadata. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.
Note: A similar procedure will apply to perform the eUICC Test Memory Reset of the eUICC.
Figure 24: eUICC Memory Reset Procedure
Start conditions:
a. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
Management.
b. The eUICC Memory Reset option is displayed by the LPA (LUI).Procedure:
1. The End User makes an eUICC Memory Reset request on the LPA (LUI).
2. User Intent is verified.
3. The LPA (LUI) displays a message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ to
the End User.
4. The End User confirms the conformity with the consequences to the LPA.
5. The LPA sends an eUICC Memory Reset operation to the eUICC.
6. The eUICC deletes the Profile on the eUICC even if it is an Enabled Profile
including the Profile Metadata associated with it.
7. The eUICC informs the LPA of the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC.
8. The End User is informed via the LPA (LUI).
9. The LPA sends delete Notifications to all Notification Receivers for Profile deletion
in the Profile.End conditions:
a. The Profile is deleted from the eUICC.5.3.1.7 Add Profile with Activation Code
This procedure will allow the Subscriber to add a single Profile. This procedure will not enable the downloaded Profile, nor disable an Enabled Profile. Network connectivity is assumed. The download can be initiated by the input of an Activation Code.
Figure 25: Add Profile with Activation Code Procedure
Start conditions:
a. User Intent has been verified.
b. The download of a new Profile is allowed on the eUICC.
c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Profile
download.Procedure:
1. The End User obtains an Activation Code to add a Profile to their Device.
2. The LPA requests the End User to enter the Activation Code.
3. Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure as described in Section 5.2.2
starts.End conditions:
a. The Profile has been installed on the End User’s Device.
b. Profile Metadata has been updated from the Profile.5.3.1.8 Edit SM-DP+ Address
This procedure will allow the End User to edit a default SM-DP+ address on to the eUICC.
Figure 26: Edit SM-DP+ Address
Start conditions:
a. There is a default SM-DP+ address in the LPA.
b. The End User is willing to edit the default SM-DP+ addressProcedure:
1. The End User edits the SM-DP+ Address via the LPA.
2. Simple Confirmation from the End User is required.
3. The LPA sends the default SM-DP+ address for storage in the LPA Service.
4. The LPA Service informs the LPA of the storage of the default SM-DP+ address.
5. The End User is informed via the LPA.End conditions:
a. The target default SM-DP+ Address is edited in the LPA Services.A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)
New Profile on New Primary Device (Off Device Activation)
Risk Risk description
no.
INI1 Incomplete or corrupted Profile being pushed to the Subscriber.
Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles to
INI2
Devices.Table 42: New Profile on New Primary Device Risks
Profile Deletion
Risk Risk description
no.
Long term gathering of key materials due to a long term storage of delivered Profiles
IND1
after their disabling.
IND2 Loss of sensitive data from discarded media supports (hard drives…)
Malware launching coordinated or isolated deletion of one or several Profiles leading to a
IND3
loss of connectivity to an End User.
Accidental Profile deletion (e.g. unattended children…) leading to a loss of connectivity
IND4
to an End User.
Non-tech-savvy or malicious Subscriber repeatedly deleting Profiles and asking for them
IND5
to be reloaded leading to surcharge of provisioning servers.Table 43:Profile Deletion Risks
Profile Switch
Risk Risk description
no.
INP1 Malicious Profile switching originating from an internal party.
Human error leading to the switching of alternate Profiles leading to a loss of
INP2
connectivity.
Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to
INP3
a loss of connectivity.
Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to
INP4
major fraud scenarios.Table 44: Profile Switching Risks
Profile Swap Risk Risk description no. INS1 Race condition leading to the deactivation of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity.
Table 45: Profile Swapping Risks
Cryptographic Related Risks
Risk Risk description
no.
Loss or theft of private keys in one or several Profile Management components leading
INO1
to the loss of confidentiality on the whole chain.
Inability to revoke compromised Certificates leading to the loss of trust on the whole
INO2
Certificate chain.
INO3 Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful disclosure of key materials.
INO4 Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful compromise of key components.
Malicious or accidental revocation of Certificates leading to the denial of service on the
INO5
whole provisioning Certificate chain.
Use of temporary symmetric cryptographic or “generic” key material during the Profile
INO6 creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single point of
failure and attack being created.Table 46: Cryptographic Related Risks
Quality of Service
Risk Risk description
no.
Profile creation burst leading to the inability for the eUICC platforms to deliver expected
QoS1
service level.
Denial of service on delivery platforms leading to the inability to deliver expected
QoS2
service level.
Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a temporary or
QoS3
permanent inability to deliver a Profile.Table 47: Quality of Service Risks
Non-human or Unpredictable
Risk Risk description
no.
Catastrophic event such as floods, earthquakes, etc. leading to the destruction of a
EXC1
datacentre.
EXC2 Geopolitical/Human events leading to the destruction of a datacentre.
Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the
EXC3
provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, SIM vendor…).Table 48: Non-human or Unpredictable Risks
New Profile during Subscriber Journey
Risk Risk description
no.
EXN1 Malicious pairing of new Device using unattended Primary or Companion Device.
Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the loss of confidentiality during
EXN2
the provisioning of Profile operations.Risk Risk description
no.
Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the tampering of registration
EXN3
information during provisioning of Profile operations.
EXN4 Social engineering leading to the communication of OTP materials to attackers.
Man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping during Profile provisioning leading to the loss of
EXN5
confidentiality.
“Implicit authentication” (e.g. HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of
EXN6
authentication or Profile material.Table 49: New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks
Device Swap
Risk Risk description
no.
Malicious Subscriber using race condition scenarios leading to Profiles being activated
EXS1
on both Devices.
Malicious entity using weak swap procedures in order to compromise authentication
EXS2
vectors.Table 50: Device Swapping Risks
Loss of Privacy
Risk Risk description
no.
Improper handling, transport or disclosure of the EID or any user related data
PRI1
information leading to the use of the latter as a “super” user tracking identifier.
eUICC management commands leading to the creation of unexpected and unpredicted
PRI2 « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties to spy or
compromise Devices or the Subscriber themselves.Table 51: Loss of Privacy Risks
Others
Risk Risk description
no.
Compromising of exchanges between Profile Management actors leading to the critical
EXO1
loss of private keys.
EXO2 Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios.Table 52: Other Risks
Creation Process
Req Requirement description
no.
Profiles failing to be created SHALL be securely deleted or at least purged of
CRE1
authentication vectors.Req Requirement description
no.
Communication between systems participating in the Profile creation SHALL be
CRE2
protected in integrity and confidentiality.Table 53: Creation Process Requirements
B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)
B.1 Profile Production Procedure
This section describes a generic implementation. It should be regarded as an example only; specific implementation MAY be required to address specific security concerns.
Within the eUICC, the current functionality of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Just as with current UICCs, Profiles are the responsibility of the Operator and Profile production is performed upon their request and permission (if not produced by the Operators themselves).
The same Operator procedures as in the current UICCs SHALL apply.
Figure 27: Profile Production Procedure
Profile Production consists of three steps:
Profile Description definition: The SM-DP+ creates and registers a Profile
Description based on the Operational Profile Description.
Operator Credentials generation: The Operator asks the SM-DP+ to generate
Operator Credentials that will be used in the next step. This procedure is OPTIONAL
and will not be used if the Operator wants to generate the Operator Credentials
during Protected Profile Package generation.
Protected Profile Package generation: The Profile Packages will be created,
protected and stored. This step (batch type of operation or real time process) is only
performed after an order with the respective Operator. Contract conclusion and Link Profile: At the end of the contract conclusion, an
Activation Code is delivered to the End User and the Profile MAY be allocated for this
contract.Note: The generation of the Bound Profile Package is part of the Profile download with Activation Code procedure in Section 5.2.2.
B.1.1 Profile Description Definition
The Profile description definition MAY comprise of the following sequence:
Figure 28: Profile Description Procedure
Start Condition:
a. Contractual relationship between the Operator and the SM-DP+.Procedure:
1. The Operator defines its different Profile types (identified by a [non-standardised]
Profile Description ID) which contains the Network Access Application like USIM,
file structure, data and applications, etc.
2. The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Descriptions based on the Operators input with
the corresponding Profile Description ID.
3. The SM-DP+ confirms the Profile Description definition e.g. by sending the
corresponding Profile Description ID.Note: An Operator can define multiple Profile Descriptions with the SM-DP+
End Condition:
a. The Operator is able to order Protected Profile Packages based on Profile
Description IDs.B.1.2 Operator Credentials Generation
This procedure allows the Operator to allocate a set of Operator Credentials on the SM-DP+ without associating them to a specific ProfileDescriptionID. Operator Credentials generation MAY comprise of the following sequence:
Figure 29: Operator Credentials Generation
Start Condition:
a. IMSI, ICCID and other resources have been allocated by the Operator.
Procedure:
1. The Operator provides the IMSI, ICCID, type of credential to be created (e.g.
Milenage [11][12], TUAK [10] etc.) and other resources that MAY already be
allocated to the SM-DP+. It asks the SM-DP+ to securely generate and store a set
of Operator Credentials.
2. The SM-DP+ securely generates and stores a set of Operator Credentials based
on the Operator’s input with the corresponding IMSI, ICCID and other resources
provided.
3. The SM-DP+ confirms the generation of Operator Credentials and provides them
to the Operator.B.1.3 Protected Profile Package Generation
The Protected Profile Package Generation MAY comprise of the following sequence:
This procedure MAY apply between the Profile Description definition, and the Contract conclusion and Link Profile, depending on whether the Protected Profile Package is created on demand or prepared in advance.
Figure 30: Protected Profile Package Generation Procedure
Start Conditions:
a. Profile Description definitionProcedure:
1. The Operator orders the Protected Profile Package generation by providing the
SM-DP+ with the Profile Description ID and some corresponding Operator input
data (credentials e.g. ICCID, IMSI).The Operator input data required for Protected
Profile Package generation (IMSI, ICCID, K/Ki, OTA Keys, PIN, PUK, etc.) is
either created by the Operator (and provided to the SM-DP+) or by the SM-DP+
(and provided to the Operator).
2. The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Packages.
3. The SM-DP+ creates the Protected Profile Packages.
4. The SM-DP+ stores the Protected Profile Packages (securely).
5. The SM-DP+ confirms the Protected Profile Package generation, and eventually
sends the additional Operator input data created by the SM-DP+.
6. The Operator registers the Operator data in the Operator systems like HLR/AuC
and BSS.End Condition:
a. The ordered Protected Profile Packages are available at the SM-DP+. The
Operator is able to activate these Subscriptions and a Profile download can be
triggered upon binding to an EID.B.1.4 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile
The Activation Code has to be provided to the End User in order to achieve the Profile download procedure. The contract conclusion and Link Profile procedure describes different scenarios to link a contract with the Activation Code process. The following options are described below:
Activation Code with known EID: The EID is given by the Subscriber to the
Operator during the conclusion of the contract. Activation Code with unknown EID: The EID is not given by the Subscriber to
the Operator during the conclusion of the contract. The EID is only provided to
the SM-DP+ during the Profile download procedure and is given back from the
SM-DP+ to the Operator. Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator: The EID is not
immediately given by the Subscriber during the contract conclusion, but provided
in step two to the Operator.The contract reference MAY be, but not necessarily, any Activation Code parameter (e.g. token), ICCID or the IMSI.
In any case, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to allocate and link a Profile to the corresponding eUICC during the Profile download procedure.
B.1.4.1 Activation Code with Known EID
Figure 31: Activation Code with Known EID Procedure
Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure 31: Contract conclusion with known EID
1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator and provides the EID
during this process.
2. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator prior to Profile download
procedure’: The Operator allocates the Profile and sends the EID, IMSI and
ICCID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the different parameters and
confirms this to the Operator.
6. to 10. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+ prior to Profile download
procedure’: The Operator sends the EID, the IMSI and the Profile Description
ID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates an ICCID to a corresponding
Profile, links the different parameters and confirms the allocated ICCID and
the link to the Operator.
11. The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
corresponding information (contract reference).End Condition:
a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
Operator.
b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.B.1.4.2 Activation Code with Unknown EID
Figure 32: Activation Code with Unknown EID Procedure
Procedure: Steps 1-6 in Figure 32: Contract conclusion without EID
1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of
the target eUICC (EID).
2. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
(ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator.
6. The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
corresponding information (contract reference).End Condition:
a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
Operator.b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.
B.1.4.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator
Figure 33: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator
Procedure: Steps 1-11 in Figure 33Error! Reference source not found.: Activation Code with EID provided to the Operator
1. The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge of
the target eUICC (EID).
2. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
(ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator. 6. The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
corresponding information (contract reference).
7. After the Subscriber has chosen the Device/eUICC, the EID is provided
together with the contract reference to the Operator.
8. to 10. The Operator requests the linking of the eUICC (EID) and Profile (ICCID) by
the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the EID and the ICCID and confirms this to
the Operator.
11. The Operator confirms the linking of the EID to the corresponding contract to
the Subscriber.End Condition:
a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the
Operator.
b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future Profile download procedure request.C Local Profile Management Operations implementation (Informative)
This annex provides an example diagram for the implementation of Local Profile Management Operations and describes how the different Confirmation Levels MAY be applied.
Example flow for Device & LPA Strong Confirmation
access PIN setup / settings
Unpack Device
Power on & start setup
(new from factory)Manual setup
Set / enable
No
(skip)
device access
code / ID? First Access to LPA
(no installed profiles)
Yes Enter & confirm
PIN / ID
Manual user
Device access Device access setup
open restricted Set
No Yes
device
Enable & Set LPA lock?
No
access (SC) for eUICC
(skip)
management?
Yes No
Device
Lock separately lock set?
No
from device (flag) Yes
lock?
Enter device PIN /
Yes (flag) code to confirm
Enter & confirm
SC PIN / ID
Code
correct? No
LPA lock
restricted / SC set Yes LPA / SC set device
LPA access open lock restricted
(no SC set)
SC required
Yes SC as required on
on each SC
(flag) each LUI operation
event?
No (flag)SC inherited from prior SC input
Notes:
SC: Strong Confirmation
Stop Device access code (PIN / ID) refers
to device unlock mechanismFigure 34: Example Flow for Device & LPA Strong Confirmation Access PIN Setup /
Settings
D eUICC Categories (Normative)
The following table provides eUICCs categories defined for Remote SIM Provisioning products.
Role no. Description
Basic eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 64kB
CAT1
ISO interface PPS 96
BIP over HTTPS features Medium eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 384kB
ISO interface PPS 97
CAT2 BIP over HTTPS features
Processor >= 25MHz
Crypto processor >= 100MHz
Memory Protection Unit Contactless eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features:
Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM) : 1024kB
ISO interface PPS 97
CAT3 BIP over HTTPS features
Processor >= 25MHz
Crypto processor >= 100MHz
Memory Protection UnitTable 54: eUICC Categories
E LPA Settings (Informative)
Figure 35: LPA Settings
F Certifications Chain and Security Model (Normative)
: Manufacturing process
: Business process
CI : Remote Profile Management
: Local Profile Management
CI Cert Cert : Public key Certificate
CI CertEUM
SM-DP+ES9+: eUICC Cert, EUM Cert
ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert, eUICC Cert
eUICC ES10b: SM-DP+ Cert LPA
PK eUICC Cert, EUM Cert
ES10b:Figure 36: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the Device
: Manufacturing process
: Business process
: Remote Profile Management
CI : Local Profile Management
Cert : Public key CertificateCI Cert, CI Cert, CI Cert, SM-DS Cert EUM Cert SM-DP+ Cert
SM-DS EUM SM-DP+
ESeum: CI cert, EUM Cert,
ES9+: SM-DP+ Cert
ES9+: eUICC Cert,
ES11: eUICC Cert,ES11: SM-DS Cert
eUICC Cert
EUM Cert
EUM Cert ES10a: eUICC Cert, ES10b: eUICC Cert,
EUM Cert EUM Cert
LPA eUICC LPA
ES10a: SM-DS Cert ES10b: SM-DP+ CertFigure 37: Certificate Exchange with LPA in the eUICC
F.1 Security Model
The Security Model defines the trust relationships between all the active components of the eUICC ecosystem with an LPA in the Device.
The figure below shows only the end-to-end logical links where cryptographic keys and sensitive data are sent. The different links define the end-to-end trust relationship between entities. We distinguish a hierarchy of seven trust links with link 1 being the most significant and link 7 being the least significant. If trust link 1 is broken, all trust links will be broken as a result. If trust link 2 is broken, trust link 1 remains intact however all other Trusted Links are compromised or broken.
Figure 38: Trusted Link with LPA in the Device
Figure 39: Trusted Link with LPA in the eUICC
Trust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of
link involved compromises trust link
TL1 Trust introduced onto Out of The CI public key, The trust of the entire
the eUICC by the scope the EUM’s security model is
issuing EUM to enable Certificate, breached and all
future remote the EUM’s keyset, eUICCs issued under
management and the eUICC keys, the the model cannot be
authorisation by the OS, and the Security trusted.
SM-DP+ and possibly Domains.
the EUM: eUICC keysTrust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of
link involved compromises trust link
(EUM & CI keyset
eUICC Certificates).
TL2 Trust placed in the CI’s Out of The EUM and SM- Loss of Operator
verification of the scope DP+ Certificates. trust on the EUM and
EUM, SM-DP+, and SM-DP+
the resulting Certificate
issuance.
TL3 Trust placed in the ES2+ The eUICC Loss of Operator
activities for eUICC ES8+ Certificate or trust on the eUICC
eligibility and remote eligibility check and/or SM-DP+.
attestation from the failure.
ISD-R on the target
eUICC to the Operator
via the SM-DP+. Provides eUICC
Certificate, EID,
reference to its
certification and EUM
to the Operator and
SM-DP+.
TL4 Trust placed in the ES2+ SM-DP+ Certificate Loss of Operator
activities for Profile ES8+ eUICC Certificate or trust on the SM-DP+
data transfer from the eligibility check and/or eUICC.
Operator via the SM- failure.
DP+ to the ISD-R on
the target eUICC. Protects the Profile
and associated
credentials and keys
(NAAs, OTA keys,
ISD-R access, ISD-P
SD creation …) with
only the Operator, SM-
DP+ and the eUICC.
TL5 Trust placed in the ES2+ SM-DP+ Certificate Operator loss of trust
information exchange on SM-DP+.
between the Operator
and the SM-DP+ for
Link Profile requests.
TL6 Trust placed in the ESeu LPA security eUICC loss of trust
mechanisms provided on LPA.
by the LPA: Local
Profile Management,
Local ProfileTrust Description Interfaces Possible Impact of loss of
link involved compromises trust link
Management
Operations
TL7 Trust placed in the ES9+ LPA security or SM- SM-DP+ loss of trust
TLS session DP+ security. on LPA (in the
Device or the eUICC)
or LPA loss of trust
on the SM-DP+.TL8 Trust in the discovery ES11 LDS security or SM- LDS loss of trust on
process DS security. the SM-DS and vice
versa.
TL9 Trust in the discovery ES11 eUICC security or SM-DS loss of trust
process SM-DS security. on the eUICC and
vice versa.
TL10 Trust in the UI ESeu Device security Loss of trust on the
DeviceTable 55: Trusted Link Descriptions
Compromised Impacted Description Impact of loss of Countermeasures
element Links trust
eUICC TL1, TL3, The eUICC The eUICC can no Revoke the Certificate
TL4, TL9 keys and longer be trusted. of the eUICC.
EUM’s Keyset. MNO and SM-DP+
loss of trust on eUICC.
CI TL2 The EUM, SM- Loss of Operator trust Repair/Replace CI.
DS, and SM- in the EUM, SM-DS Generate new CI
DP+ and SM-DP+. Certificate and new
Certificates. Certificate for the
EUM, SM-DS and SM-
DP+ following the SAS
process. Remote repair of
already issued
eUICCs: new CI public
key.
EUM TL1, TL2 Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the
certification. Operator and SM-DP+ EUM. Remote repair
on the EUM and its of already issued
eUICCs. eUICCs: new EUM
Certificate, new
eUICC Certificate.Compromised Impacted Description Impact of loss of Countermeasures
element Links trust
SM-DP+ TL3, TL4, Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the SM-
TL5, TL7, certification. Operator, LPA, SM-DS DP+. New SM-DP+
TL8 and eUICC on the SM- Certificate.
DP+.
SM-DS TL8 Loss of SAS Loss of trust from the New SAS for the SM-
certification. Operator, LPA, SM- DS. New SM-DS
DP+ and eUICC on the Certificate.
SM-DS.
LPA TL6, TL7, LPA security Loss of trust from the LPA repair by the
TL8 failure. SM-DP+, SM-DS and Device Manufacturer.
eUICC on the LPA.
Device TL10 Device Loss of trust in the LUI in the eUICC self-
security failure Device UI protected with User
Intent capture
mechanisms (i.e.
Captcha Code)Table 56: Impact of Compromising Trusted Links and Countermeasures
The signer is responsible for the revocation of the Certificates it has signed. This section describes how the new Certificates are pushed to concerned entities according to the security model.
SM-DP+ trusts the CI EUM trusts the CI eUICC trusts the EUM and the CI
Req no. Description
The new SM-DP+ Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-
CERT1
DP+ by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
The new SM-DS Public Key Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the SM-DS
CERT2
by a GSMA CI upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
The new EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be issued to the EUM by a GSMA CI
CERT3
upon achievement of the GSMA SAS or CI repair.
The EUM Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the
CERT4 EUM
Note: See details in Section 4.1.1.1.
The CI Certificate(s) SHALL be loaded securely to the eUICC by the EUM
CERT5
Note: See details in Section 4.1.1.1.
CERT6 Certificates SHALL be revocable.
Neither the End User nor any other party SHALL be able to prevent
CERT7
Certificate revocation.
The End User SHALL not be allowed to use Remote SIM Provisioning
CERT8
functions with revoked Certificates.Req no. Description
The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DP+ SHALL be revoked if required
CERT9 (e.g. loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM
Provisioning certification requirements).
The Public Key Certificate of the SM-DS SHALL be revoked if required (e.g.
CERT10 loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning
certification requirements).
The Public Key Certificate of the EUM SHALL be revoked if required (e.g.
CERT11 loses or subsequently fails to achieve the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning
certification requirements).Table 57: Certificate Requirements
G LPA Integrity (Normative)
The LPA SHALL be protected against misuse or being compromised by means of implementing standard procedures.
For cases where the LPA is in the Device, the LPA integrity SHALL be guided by the following Device classes:
Device class Description Example of Devices
Devices with an open operating Smartphones, Tablets, Laptops,
system where mechanisms such as Advanced Wearables
Advanced secure boot and platform signing of
applications are available and used
to protect the LPA.
Devices without possibility to install Connected sensors, Simple
applications. The attack surface of Wearables, Single use case devices
the LPA is minimal due to the locked
Basic down nature of these Devices.
Simple mechanisms to ensure that
the LPA is not compromised SHALL
be taken.Table 58: Device Classes
H Rules Authorisation Table (Informative)
Annex H reflects the RAT table configuration(s) that MAY be configured in embedded UICC.
The RAT entries shown in Table 58 MAY be provisioned:
PR Operators User consent
POL RULE1 * YES
POL RULE2 * YES
Table 59: RAT configuration
Additional lines can be added to the RAT table to reflect agreement between some Operators and OEMs as needed. The OEM can also decide to add lines to the RAT table.
Note: POL RULE3 is defined for use in specific use cases that have not yet been fully defined and is not applicable for this version of the specification.
I LPA Invocation of the Provisioning Profile Example Flow (Informative)
J Integrated eUICC Security Requirements (Normative)
J.1 General Security Requirements
Requirement Description
An Integrated TRE MAY use a Remote Memory within the Device, dedicated
GS01
to the Integrated TRE, to store software and data.
All Integrated eUICC software and data which are stored outside the
Integrated TRE SHALL be protected by the Integrated TRE in order to ensure
GS02 their confidentiality, their integrity, and software side channel protection.
This includes protection against side-channel attacks such as cache-timing
attacks.
All Integrated TRE software and data, including context, SHALL only be
GS03 stored in protected memory as requested in paragraph 36 in BSI-CC-PP-
0084 [29].
All Integrated TRE software and data stored outside an Integrated TRE
GS04
SHALL be protected against replay attacks.
The Integrated TRE internal instruction and data buses SHALL be isolated
GS05
from the rest of the SoC.
The other SoC components SHALL have no access to the Integrated TRE
GS06
internal buses.
The Integrated TRE SHALL be the only entity to expose TRE data outside the
GS07
Integrated TRE.
The Integrated TRE SHOULD have priority access to Remote Memory as
GS08
defined in GS02 in cases of shared resource contention
All the credentials used to protect the data stored in the Remote Memory,
GS08a dedicated to the Integrated TRE as per requirements GS02 and GS03,
SHALL only be stored and used in the Integrated TRE.
The Integrated TRE SHALL be isolated from all other SoC components such
GS09 that no other SoC components can have access to assets inside the
Integrated TRE.
The Integrated TRE SHALL have a hardware and software protection means
GS10 that controls the access to every function of the Integrated TRE (e.g.
cryptographic unit).
The Integrated TRE SHALL process/execute its data/software in a dedicated
GS11
secure CPU contained within the Integrated TRE.
The Integrated TRE SHALL be resistant against hardware and software side-
GS12
channel attacks (e.g. DPA, cache-timing attacks, EMA etc.).
All Integrated TRE software and data SHALL be exclusively processed within
GS13
the Integrated TRE.
The Integrated TRE SHALL include in its security target the following threats
for software and data managed by the TRE, but stored outside the TRE:
GS14 leakage
probing
manipulationRequirement Description
The protection of software and data stored in Remote Memory as defined in
GS15 GS02 SHALL be managed by the Integrated TRE using means which are
independent of the Remote Memory implementation.
All cryptographic processing used by the Integrated TRE SHALL be
GS16
contained within the Integrated TRE.
All security mechanisms within the Integrated TRE SHALL withstand state of
GS17
the art attacks.
If Remote Memory outside the SoC is used, the combination of Integrated
GS18 TRE and Remote Memory SHALL implement mechanisms protecting access
to Remote Memory.
Integrated TRE implementations using Remote Memory outside the SoC
GS19 SHALL implement mechanisms protecting the integrity of Remote Memory
contents as defined in GS02.Table 60: General Security Requirements
PP-0084 Security IC +IC Dedicated Software
Device
SoC
Integrated TRESecure CPU Cryptographic Processing ... ... Instruction and data buses
Remote Memory Isolation/Firewall/ Protection Function Access Control
Remote Memory (optional)
Volatile Non-Volatile+Augmentation for Remote Memory/Isolation
Figure 40: Example of Optional Remote Memory Usage
Note: IC Dedicated Software including its authentication by the TRE, is covered by BSI-CC- PP-0084 [29] and is not required to be augmented by this annex.
J.2 Security Certification
Requirement Description
An Integrated TRE together with the RMPF SHALL be evaluated according to
BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29] augmented with the requirements defined in this
SC01 annex.
Note: The requirements relating to Remote Memory are only applicable when
that type of memory is used by the Integrated TRE.
Evidence of Isolation (for example GS05, GS06, GS07, GS09) SHALL be
SC02
assessed during evaluation.
Evidence of proper Life Cycle management of the Integrated TRE SHALL be
SC03
assessed during evaluation.Table 61: Security Certification Requirements
J.3 Conformance Claims
Requirement Description
The Integrated TRE SHALL claim in its security target, that it comprises of
Security IC and IC Dedicated Software regarded as a Security Integrated
CC01 Circuit which implements all functional aspects specified by the BSI-CC-PP-
0084 [29] protection profile augmented with the requirements defined in this
annex.
The Integrated TRE SHALL provide resistance to attackers with “high” attack
CC02
potential as defined by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 in [33].
The Integrated TRE SHALL be evaluated against the requirements, methods
CC03 of attacks and evaluation documents for smartcards and similar devices
published by SOG-IS [35].Table 62: Conformance Claims
J.4 Security Objectives
BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29] defines security problems related to the Security IC being evaluated and corresponding security objectives. Within BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29], the definitions do not take into account the implementation of the TRE within a SoC and the use of Remote Memory. In particular, Integrated TRE has to include additional security problems and objectives in its security target. The security target shall include the following in its security objectives:
Requirement Description
The Integrated TRE SHALL define, in its security target, a security objective
to protect software and data managed by the TRE and stored outside the
TRE against:
SO01
leakage
probing
manipulationTable 63: Security Objectives
J.5 Security Functional Requirements
Requirement Description
The Integrated TRE SHALL contain a Remote Memory Protection Function
IESFR01 (RMPF) to protect software and data to be stored in Remote Memory,
outside the TRE.
IESFR02 The RMPF SHALL reside in the Integrated TRE.
The RMPF SHALL ensure the following security properties: (1) confidentiality
(2) integrity and (3) replay-protection.
Note: these properties are intended to cover a range of possible attacks,
IESFR03
including replay of commands on the Remote Memory, rollback of data
stored in the Remote Memory, cloning the content of a Remote Memory from
another device, swapping or corrupting data within the Remote Memory, etc.
The RMPF SHALL use keys that are either:
IESFR04 derived from a secret TRE-unique seed(s), or;
randomly generated within the Integrated TRE
TRE-unique seed(s) used by RMPF SHALL be generated using a certified
IESFR05
random number generator as required by BSI-CC-PP-0084 [29].
TRE-unique seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be generated inside the
IESFR06
TRE.
The entropy of the TRE-unique seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be at
IESFR07
least 256 bits.
IESFR08 Randomly generated keys used by the RMPF shall be at least 256 bits.
The key derivation mechanism used by the RMPF SHALL be compliant with
NIST SP 800-108 [30][30] and SHALL use:
a block cipher with security strength equivalent to or greater than
IESFR09
AES-256, or
a hash function with security strength equivalent to or greater than
SHA-256,
IESFR10 The keys used by the RMPF SHALL be protected by the TRE.
IESFR11 Seed(s) used by the RMPF SHALL be restricted to the RMPF.
Confidentiality Requirements
The RMPF SHALL provide confidentiality based on encryption using a cipher
with security strength equivalent to, or greater than AES-256 and using a
IESFR12 suitable mode of operation approved by NIST in NIST SP 800-175B [34][18]
or recommended by BSI in BSI TR-02102-1 [31] or recommended by ANSSI
RGS v2 B1 [32].
Integrity and Authenticity
The RMPF SHALL use a cryptographic integrity mechanism with security
IESFR13
strength equivalent to, or greater than SHA-256. The RMPF SHALL provide authentication using a MAC of at least 128 bits
based
IESFR14
on a block cipher using a cipher with security strength equivalent to
or greater than AES-256, orRequirement Description
on a hash function with security strength equivalent to or greater
than SHA-256,
and using a mode of operation approved by NIST in NIST SP 800-175B [34]
or recommended by BSI in BSI TR-02102-1 [31] or recommended by ANSSI
RGS v2 B1 [32]. IESFR12 and IESFR14 MAY also be provided in combination by an
IESFR15
authenticated encryption mode fulfilling both requirements.
Replay protection
IESFR16 The RMPF SHALL detect any replay attack on the Integrated TRE.
The Integrated eUICC SHALL be resistant to replay attacks on the data
IESFR17
stored in Remote Memory.
The Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to verify that the data received from
the Remote Memory is not unsolicited.
Note: Solicited data received from the Remote Memory is data that the
IESFR18
Integrated eUICC did intend to retrieve at runtime from Remote Memory
and/or retrieved data that the Integrated eUICC was able to verify according
to the requirements set in this Annex.
The RMPF SHALL NOT process data if it is unable to detect a replay attack.
Note: Such a situation may arise e.g. if the RMPF uses a counter to detect
IESFR19
replay attacks and the counter expired or became unreliable for any other
reason.
Test Interface
The Integrated eUICC Test Interface SHALL NOT affect the security
IESFR20
requirements defined in this annex.
The Integrated eUICC Test Interface SHALL be compatible with commonly
IESFR21
used interfaces for smartcard testing.Table 64: Security Functional Requirements
J.6 Identification
Requirement Description
The Integrated eUICC SHALL allow the SM-DP+ to identify the type of the
Integrated TRE including its component configuration (e.g. use of internal or
ID01
Remote Memory, use of other optional components), its manufacturer, in
addition to the RSP OS provider.Table 65: Identification Requirement
K Document Management
K.1 Document History
Version Date Brief Description of Change Approval Editor /
Authority Company
First Release with amendments Carmen Kwok,
V1.0 23/12/15 PSMC
from Security review. GSMA
Carmen Kwok,
V2.0 25/08/16 Includes Phase 2 content PSMC
GSMA
Carmen Kwok,
V2.1 29/02/17 Phase 2 maintenance release Technology Group
GSMA
Carmen Kwok,
V2.2 31/08/17 Phase 2 maintenance release RSPLEN
GSMA
Carmen Kwok,
V2.3 24/03/21 Phase 2 maintenance release ISAG
GSMA
Carmen Kwok,
V2.4 03/08/21 Phase 2 maintenance release ISAG
GSMAOther Information Type Description Document Owner Carmen Kwok Editor / Company GSMA
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