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GSMA · Specification

SGP.21v1.0

RSP Architecture

Defines a common architecture framework for remotely provisioning and managing eUICCs in consumer devices to enable mobile network access and interoperability.

Version
v1.0
  1. v3.12023-12-01
  2. v3.02022-03-28
  3. v2.72026-04-24
  4. v2.62024-09-20
  5. v2.52022-11-18
  6. v2.42021-08-03
  7. v2.32021-06-30
  8. v2.22017-09-01
  9. v2.12017-02-27
  10. v2.02016-08-23
  11. v1.02015-12-23
Issued
2015-12-23
Source
Original PDF

A formatted version of this document is not available yet; the text below is extracted clause by clause, so tables and figures may be incomplete.

Overview

The document sets out an architecture approach for Remote SIM Provisioning of consumer devices across markets. It defines principles, stakeholder roles, and the architecture and requirements for the eUICC, device, eligibility checks, metadata, SM-DP+, and Local Profile Assistant. It also covers interfaces, certification, profile download using an activation code, and local profile management procedures. The framework aims to support global interoperability among operators across different deployment scenarios.

  • eUICC
  • Remote SIM Provisioning
  • SM-DP+
  • Local Profile Assistant
  • activation code

Overview generated automatically from the document's scope and outline. The document text is authoritative.

Contents
  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 1.1 Overview
  3. 1.2 Scope
  4. 1.3 Intended Audience
  5. 1.4 Definition of Terms
  6. 1.5 Abbreviations
  7. 1.6 References
  8. 1.7 Conventions
  9. 2 Principles
  10. 2.1 Basic Principles
  11. 2.2 Profile Principles
  12. 3 Roles
  13. 3.1 eUICC Manufacturer
  14. 3.2 Device Manufacturer
  15. 3.3 Operator and Service Provider
  16. 3.4 Subscriber and End User
  17. 3.5 Certificate Issuer
  18. 4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture
  19. 4.1 eUICC Architecture
  20. 4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
  21. 4.2 eUICC Requirements
  22. 4.3 eUICC Eligibility Check
  23. 4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements
  24. 4.4 Device Requirements
  25. 4.5 Device Initiated Requirements
  26. 4.5.1 Device Factory Reset
  27. 4.5.2 eUICC Memory Reset
  28. 4.6 Metadata Requirements
  29. 4.7 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+)
  30. 4.7.1 SM-DP+ Overview
  31. 4.7.2 SM-DP+ Requirements
  32. 4.8 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)
  33. 4.8.1 LPA Overview
  34. 4.8.2 LPA Requirements
  35. 4.9 Interfaces
  36. 4.9.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
  37. 4.9.2 Operator – End User (ESop)
  38. 4.9.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)
  39. 4.9.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
  40. 4.9.5 LPA – SM-DP+ (ES14)
  41. 4.9.6 SM-DP+ – LPD (ES9+)
  42. 4.9.7 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
  43. 4.9.8 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)
  44. 4.9.9 LPD – eUICC (ES10b)
  45. 4.9.10 LUI – eUICC (ES10c)
  46. 4.9.11 General Interface Requirements
  47. 4.10 Certification
  48. 4.10.1 eUICC Certification
  49. 4.10.2 SM-DP+ Certification
  50. 5 Operational Procedures
  51. 5.1 Profile Download with Activation Code
  52. 5.1.1 Activation Code Requirements
  53. 5.1.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure
  54. 5.2 Local Profile Management Procedures
  55. 5.2.1 Enable Profile
  56. 5.2.2 Disable Profile
  57. 5.2.3 Delete Profile
  58. 5.2.4 Add/Update Profile Nickname
  59. 5.2.5 Query Profile Metadata
  60. 5.2.6 eUICC Memory Reset
  61. 5.2.7 Add Profile with Activation Code
  62. A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)
  63. B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)
  64. B.1 Profile Production Procedure
  65. B.1.1 Profile Description Definition
  66. B.1.2 Protected Profile Package Generation
  67. B.1.3 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile
  68. C Document Management
  69. C.1 Document History
   RSP Architecture
                  Version 1.0
23 December 2015

This is a Non-binding Permanent Reference Document of the GSMA

Security Classification: Non-confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is confidential to the Association and is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other than those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association.

Copyright Notice Copyright © 2015 GSM Association

Disclaimer The GSM Association (“Association”) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document. The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.

Antitrust Notice The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy.

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This document provides an architecture approach as a proposed solution for the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices across all markets.

The main goal of the Architecture is to define a mechanism for the Remote SIM Provisioning of Devices with the necessary credentials to gain mobile network access.

This version focuses on Devices for the consumer market.

1.2 Scope

The aim of this document is to define a common architecture framework to enable the Remote SIM Provisioning and management of the Embedded UICC (eUICC) in Devices. The adoption of this architecture framework will aim to provide the basis for ensuring global interoperability for Remote SIM Provisioning between Operators in different deployment scenarios.

1.3 Intended Audience

Technical experts working within Operators, SIM solution providers, Device vendors, standards organisations, network infrastructure vendors, Service Providers and other industry bodies.

1.4 Definition of Terms

Term                          Description
                              Information issued by an Operator/Service Provider to an End
Activation Code               User. It is used by the End User to request for the download and
                              installation of a Profile.
                              A part of the Activation Code information provided by the
Activation Code Token
                              Operator/Service Provider to reference a Profile.
                              Describes a mechanism for which the End User is confirming their
Authenticated Confirmation    action through a method involving the input of personalised
                              information (e.g. PIN, fingerprint).
                              A Protected Profile Package which has been encrypted for a target
Bound Profile Package
                              eUICC.
                              A certificate as defined in RFC.5280 [1] and GlobalPlatform
Certificate
                              specifications [11].
                              An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM
Certified eUICC               Provisioning and certified according to a GSMA eUICC protection
                              Profile.
                              A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for the
Companion Device
                              purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.
Term                          Description
                              A code entered by an End User to authorise the usage of an
                              Activation Code to confirm the download and installation of a
Confirmation Code             Profile. For added security, the Operator MAY choose to
                              communicate the Confirmation Code via a separate delivery
                              channel.
Confirmation Code Required    A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is required
Flag                          or not.
                              The Data Subset is a list of Elementary Files of the respective
Data Subset                   Profile whose content SHALL be stored in the Metadata of said
                              Profile.
                              User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a
Device
                              mobile network. E.g. a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset.
                              A term generally understood in the industry to mean that the
Device Factory Reset          Device is returned to a state equivalent to a Factory State. Further
                              definition is beyond the scope of this document.
                              An entity responsible for manufacturing Devices. The Device
Device Manufacturer           Manufacturer MAY be responsible for the selection and insertion of
                              eUICCs in Devices.
                              Profile, the files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) of which are not
Disabled Profile
                              selectable over the UICC-Device interface.
                              UICC which enables the secure remote and/or local management
Embedded UICC (eUICC)
                              of Profiles.
                              Profile, the files and/or applications (e.g. NAA) of which are
Enabled Profile
                              selectable over the UICC-Device interface. ‎[18]
End User                      The person using the Device.
                              Information that pertains to the identity of an End User such as
                              personal details, name, address, biometric characteristics,
                              assigned identification numbers, etc.
End User Data                 Note: In many jurisdictions (including EU and US), identifying data
                              extends to indirect identifiers (such as ICCID, EID, MSISDN,
                              cookies, etc) that are linkable to a person's real identity when
                              considered in combination with other data sources.
                              A Certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC.
eUICC Certificate
                              This Certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate.
eUICC Eligibility Check       The information set sent from the eUICC to the SM-DP+ to allow
Information                   eligibility checks.
eUICC Manufacturer            The eUICC Manufacturer provides eUICC products.
                              An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a Factory
eUICC Memory Reset
                              State.
                              A Certificate issued to a GSMA accredited EUM which can be used
EUM Certificate               to verify eUICC Certificates.
                              This Certificate can be verified using the Root Certificate.
                              The configured state of the Device and/or the eUICC at the point it
Factory State
                              was distributed after manufacture.
Term                          Description
                              Manifestation of the UICC as specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [2] and
Form Factor
                              ETSI TS 102 671 [3].
                              Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU-
                              T E.118 [19].
ICCID
                              Note: the ICCID throughout this specification is used to identify the
                              Profile.
International Mobile
                              Refer to 3GPP 21.905 [4].
Subscriber Identity
                              The process that associates a Protected Profile Package with a
                              specific eUICC so that a Profile Download including Bound Profile
                              Package generation can be triggered.
Link Profile
                              Note: This is normally an offline process, binding is an online
                              process happening during the communication between the SM-
                              DP+ and the eUICC.
                              Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated
Local Profile Management
                              on the ESeu interface.
                              Local Profile Management Operations include enable Profile,
Local Profile Management
                              disable Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC
Operation
                              Memory Reset, edit nickname, and add Profile.
                              The Metadata is a copy of the Data Subset of the respective Profile
Metadata                      stored in the eUICC for informative displaying to the End User that
                              contains the information listed in Section ‎4.6.
                              An entity providing access capability and communication services
Mobile Network Operator
                              to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure.
                              An entity providing access capability and communication services
Mobile Virtual Network
                              to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure but does
Operator
                              not have an allocation of spectrum.
Network Access Application    Refer to 3GPP 21.905 [4].
                              Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [5] network. This
Network Access Credentials
                              MAY include data such as Ki/K and IMSI stored within a NAA.
                              An arbitrary random number generated for one time use, employed
Nonce
                              for cryptographic communication.
                              A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a
Operator
                              company providing wireless cellular network services.
                              A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network
Operator Credentials          Access Credentials, OTA Keys for remote Profile Management,
                              and authentication algorithm parameters.
                              The credentials included in the Profile used in conjunction with
OTA Keys
                              OTA Platforms.
                              A platform used by an Operator for the remote management of
OTA Platform
                              enabled Operator Profiles on eUICCs, i.e. using OTA RAM or RFM.
                              A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a
Primary Device
                              Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning.
Term                          Description
                              A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned
                              on to an eUICC for the purposes of providing services by the
Profile                       Operator. The Profile SHALL be in support of a Subscription with
                              the relevant Operator. Applications MAY be included to provide
                              non-telecommunication services.
                              The description of a Profile in a format specific to the Operator;
Profile Description
                              example formats could be an Excel table, xml format, or plain text.
                              A combination of local and remote management operations
Profile Management
                              (enable, disable, delete, and query)
                              A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format
Profile Package
                              that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile [6].
                              A Profile Package which has been encrypted for storage but not to
Protected Profile Package
                              a specific eUICC.
                              The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, switching, and
Remote SIM Provisioning
                              deleting of a Profile on an eUICC.
                              A Certificate used to authenticate other entities within the Remote
Root Certificate
                              SIM Provisioning framework.
                              The Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either
Service Provider              as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement
                              with an Operator. The Service Provider could also be the Operator.
                              Describes a mechanism for which the End User is confirming their
Simple Confirmation
                              action through a confirmation (e.g yes or no).
                              Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as
SMDPid
                              part of the SM-DP+ Certificate.
                              An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a
                              Subscription with an Operator. The Subscriber is allowed to
Subscriber
                              subscribe and unsubscribe to services, as well as register an End
                              User or a list of End Users authorised to use these services.
                              Information that pertains to the identity of a Subscriber such as
                              contract details, authentication credentials, cryptographic keys, etc.
Subscriber Data
                              Note: In many instances, the Subscriber is also the End User and
                              therefore Subscriber Data is likely to include End User Data.
                              A Subscription describes the commercial relationship between the
Subscription
                              Subscriber and the Service Provider.
                              This role prepares Profile Packages, secures them with a Profile
                              protection key, stores Profile protection keys in a secure manner
                              and the Protected Profile Packages in a Profile Package repository,
Subscription Manager Data
                              and allocates the Protected Profile Packages to specified EIDs.
Preparation+ (SM-DP+)
                              The SM-DP+ binds Protected Profile Packages to the respective
                              EID and securely downloads these Bound Profile Packages to the
                              LPA of the respective eUICC.
                              Describes the direct, real time acquisition and validation of the
User Intent                   manual End User instruction by the LUI to trigger locally a Profile
                              download or Profile Management operation.

1.5 Abbreviations

Abbreviation                  Description
AC                            Activation Code
AuC                           Authentication Centre
BSS                           Business Support Services
CI                            Certificate Issuer
DNSCurve                      Domain Name System Curve
DNSSEC                        Domain Name System Security Extensions
ECASD                         eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain
EID                           Embedded UICC Identifier
eSVN                          embedded Specification Version Number
ETSI                          European Telecommunications Standards Institute
eUICC                         Embedded UICC
EUM                           eUICC Manufacturer
GSMA                          GSM Association
HLR                           Home Location Register
HTTP                          Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ICCID                         Integrated Circuit Card Identifier
IMSI                          International Mobile Subscriber Identity
ISD-P                         Issuer Security Domain - Profile
ISD-R                         Issuer Security Domain - Root
ISIM                          IP Multimedia Services Identity Module
ITU                           International Telecoms Union
LPA                           Local Profile Assistant
LPD                           Local Profile Download
LUI                           Local User Interface
MNO                           Mobile Network Operator
MNO-SD                        Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain
MSISDN                        Mobile Subscriber International Subscriber Directory Number
NAA                           Network Access Application
OTA                           Over The Air
RAM                           Remote Application Management
RFM                           Remote File Management
SAS                           Security Accreditation Scheme
SD                            Security Domain
SIM                           Subscriber Identity Module
SM-DP+                        Subscription Manager - Data Preparation +
USIM                          Universal Subscriber Identity Module

1.6 References

Ref        Document Number       Title
                                   X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
 [1]       RFC 5280
                                   Revocation List (CRL) Profile
 [2]       ETSI TS 102 221         UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics
                                   Smart cards; Machine to Machine UICC; Physical and logical
 [3]       ETSI TS 102 671
                                   characteristics
                                   Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects;
 [4]       3GPP 21.905
                                   Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications
                                   The international identification plan for public networks and
 [5]       ITU E.212
                                   Subscriptions
                                  SIMalliance: eUICC Profile Package - Interoperable Format
 [6]       SIMAPP                 Technical Specification
                                  http://simalliance.org/euicc/euicc-technical-releases/
 [7]       ETSI TS 102 226         Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications
                                   “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”,
 [8]       RFC 2119                S. Bradner
                                   http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
 [9]       3GPP TS 21.133          3G security; Security threats and requirements
                                   GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC
 [10]      SGP.02
                                   Technical specification
 [11]      GPC_SPE_034             GlobalPlatform Card Specification with its Amendments
                                   Specification of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1:
 [12]      3GPP TS 35.231
                                   Algorithm Specification
           3GPP TS 35.205          Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document 1:
 [13]
                                   General
                                   Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document 2:
 [14]      3GPP TS 35.206
                                   Algorithm Specification
 [15]      RFC 7469                Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP
                                   FS.04 - Security Accreditation Scheme for UICC Production –
 [16]      EUM SAS
                                   Standard
 [17]      SM-DP SAS               FS.08 - GSMA SAS Standard for Subscription Manager Roles
 [18]      ETSI TS 103 383         Smart Cards; Embedded UICC; Requirements Specification
 [19]      ITU-T E.118             The International Telecommunication Charge Card

1.7 Conventions

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [8].

2 Principles

This section contains the principles related to the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning system for the Embedded UICC.

2.1 Basic Principles

Principle no.      Description
                   Existing standards and specifications SHALL be used where possible for the
BAS1
                   specification of the eUICC and related provisioning systems.
                   GlobalPlatform specifications SHALL be used as a framework of choice for the
BAS2
                   implementation of the eUICC.
                   The overall security of the eUICC in combination with the related management
BAS3               processes SHALL at all times and under all circumstances be at least
                   equivalent to the current removable UICC and its provisioning processes.
                   The architecture of the eUICC and its Remote SIM Provisioning system
BAS4
                   SHALL comply with the requirements of 3GPP TS 21.133 [9].
                   The architecture SHALL support a level of security with respect to the
                   protection of Operator Credentials which is at least equal to the present levels
                   of security. This applies in particular to:
BAS5
                           the confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication
                            parameters;
                           the integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI).
                   The architecture SHALL support a level of security for all Profile content which
BAS6
                   is at least equal to the current state of the art level of security of the UICC.
                   The architecture SHALL NOT compromise the security and privacy of
                   Subscriber data, nor the security and privacy of End User Data. Examples
BAS7
                   include identities that can be used for tracking such as ICCID, MSISDN, EID,
                   IMSI Ki etc.
                   Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of this document.
                   However, any data which could be used to identify an individual SHALL be
BAS8
                   treated as personal data and in compliance with local regulations e.g. the EID,
                   ICCID, etc.

Table 1 Basic Principles

2.2 Profile Principles

Principle no.      Description
                   Profiles are the property of and SHALL be under the control of the issuing
PRO1
                   Operator.
                   A Profile does not exist outside of an eUICC. I.e. a Profile is always located on
PRO2
                   a particular eUICC.
PRO3               A Profile SHALL be uniquely identified.
                   An Enabled Profile in combination with an eUICC SHALL be able to carry all
PRO4
                   logical characteristics of a UICC.
                   Once the Profile is enabled, all relevant UICC characteristics or features as
PRO5               described in ETSI 102 221 [2] specifications SHALL apply with the exceptions
                   as defined within this specification.
Principle no.      Description
                   It SHALL be possible to delete Profiles only when in a disabled state, with the
PRO6
                   exception of the eUICC Memory Reset function which deletes all Profiles.

Table 2 Profile Principles

3 Roles

3.1 eUICC Manufacturer

Role no.           Description
                   The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the initial cryptographic
EUM1
                   configuration and security architecture of the eUICC.
                   The eUICCs are delivered by the eUICC Manufacturer (EUM) to other parties
EUM2
                   (e.g. the Device Manufacturer).
                   Relevant parts of the eUICC Manufacturer’s products and processes are
EUM3
                   certified by a GSMA-approved certification process.
                   The EUM SHALL issue the eUICC Certificate to allow:
                          eUICC authentication and proof of certification to other entities;
EUM4
                          authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-DP+ and an
                           eUICC.
                   Both storage and communication channels for the EUM Certificate and Root
EUM5
                   Certificate SHALL be reliable.

Table 3 eUICC Manufacturer Role

3.2 Device Manufacturer

Role no.           Description
                   The Device Manufacturer SHALL be responsible for the implementation of any
DM1                LPA elements that reside on the Device and the compliance of the LPA with
                   the requirements in Section ‎4.8.2.
                   The Device Manufacturer SHALL be responsible for the implementation of
DM2                any application that resides on the Primary Device allowing User Interface
                   access to the Companion Device.

Table 4 Device Manufacturer Role

3.3 Operator and Service Provider

This section describes the characteristics of the Operator and Service Provider roles relevant to this architecture and its operation. Other characteristics exist but are considered out of scope.

Role no.           Description
OPE1               The Operator SHALL have access to a SM-DP+.
                   In the event that a Subscriber has selected a Service Provider, that Service
OPE2
                   Provider will initiate the provisioning of a Profile.
                   The Operator, potentially on behalf of the Service Provider, specifies the
OPE3
                   Profile characteristics and any features and applications analogous to
Role no.           Description
                   removable UICCs.
                   Operators SHALL be able to use an OTA Platform in order to manage the
OPE4
                   content of their Enabled Profile in the eUICC (RAM, RFM).
                   A Subscriber MAY have a relationship with any number of Service Providers
OPE5
                   simultaneously.

Table 5 Operator Role

3.4 Subscriber and End User

Role no.           Description
                   The Subscriber is the contract partner of the Service Provider for the
SEU1               Subscription.
                   Note: The Subscriber MAY not be the End User.
                   The End User is a human and uses the Device and/or the services related to
SEU2
                   the Enabled Profile.
SEU3               There SHALL be a means for the End User to obtain the EID.

Table 6 Subscriber and End User Role

3.5 Certificate Issuer

Role no.           Description
                   The Certificate Issuer issues Certificates for Remote SIM Provisioning entities
CIS1               and acts as a trusted third party for the purpose of authenticating the entities
                   of the system.
                   The Certificate Issuer communicates with the SM-DP+ and the EUM through
CIS2
                   interfaces that are out of scope of this specification.

Table 7 Certificate Issuer Role

4 Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture

This section contains the functional description of the architecture of the Remote SIM Provisioning system for the Embedded UICC.

Figure 1: Remote SIM Provisioning System Architecture

4.1 eUICC Architecture

4.1.1 eUICC Architecture Overview

This section describes the internal high-level architecture of the eUICC. It SHOULD be noted that the eUICC architecture is similar to that used in the GSMA Remote SIM specification [10]. Profiles are provisioned based on the security framework defined in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [11].

Figure 2: Schematic Representation of the eUICC

4.1.1.1 ECASD

The Embedded UICC Controlling Authority Security Domain (ECASD) is responsible for the secure storage of credentials required to support the required security domains on the eUICC.

There SHALL be only one ECASD on an eUICC. The ECASD SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during the eUICC manufacturing as described in [11].

The ECASD SHALL have the following properties:
         Non-modifiable eUICC private keys for creating signatures
         Associated Certificates for eUICC authentication
         The Certificate Issuers’ (CI) root public keys for verifying SM-DP+ Certificates
         eUICC Manufacturers’ (EUMs) keyset for key/Certificate renewal.

Additionally, the ECASD SHALL provide security functions used during key establishment and eUICC authentication.

4.1.1.2 ISD-R

The ISD-R is responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.

4.1.1.3 ISD-P

The ISD-P is a secure container (security domain) for the hosting of a Profile. The ISD-P is used for Profile download and installation in collaboration with the Profile Package interpreter for the decoding/interpretation of the received Bound Profile Package.

The ISD-P is the on-card representative of the SM-DP+.

4.1.1.4 MNO–SD

The MNO-SD is the on-card representative of the Operator. It contains the Operator’s Over- The-Air (OTA) Keys and provides a secure OTA channel.

4.1.1.5 Telecom Framework

The telecom framework is an operating system service that provides standardised network authentication algorithms to the NAAs hosted in the ISD-Ps. Furthermore, it offers the capability to configure the algorithms with the necessary parameters.

4.1.1.6 Profile Package Interpreter

The Profile Package interpreter is an eUICC operating system service that translates the Profile Package data into an installed Profile using the specific internal format of the target eUICC.

4.1.1.7 LPA Services

The LPA services provide necessary access to the services and data required by the LPA functions.

4.2 eUICC Requirements

Req no.               Description
                      The eUICC is a discrete hardware component in a standardised ETSI Form
EUICC1
                      Factor [2] [3].
EUICC2                The eUICC SHALL be either removable or non-removable.
                      The behaviour of the eUICC with an Enabled Profile SHALL be similar to the
EUICC3
                      UICC.
EUICC4                The eUICC SHALL be able to contain zero or one Profile.
EUICC5                At a maximum, only one Profile SHALL be enabled at any point in time.
                      The behaviour of a NAA USIM or ISIM within a Profile on an eUICC SHALL
                      be identical to a removable UICC NAAs USIM or ISIM.
EUICC6
                      Note: No changes to existing 3GPP/3GPP2 USIM, CSIM and ISIM
                      specifications are expected.
                      The eUICC MAY implement the TUAK algorithm ‎[12] in addition to
EUICC7
                      Milenage ‎[13]‎[14].
                      The ownership of the eUICC MAY change throughout its lifetime as can the
EUICC8
                      Device.
                      If any operation such as Profile enabling, Profile disabling, and Profile
EUICC9                download and installation does not complete successfully, the eUICC
                      SHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request.
                      The eUICC SHALL contain an ECASD and ISD-R security domains installed
EUICC10
                      and personalised during manufacture.
EUICC11               The ECASD cannot be deleted or modified after eUICC manufacture.
                      The ISD-R SHALL be responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and the
EUICC12
                      lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.
Req no.               Description
                      The ISD-R SHALL be installed and personalised by the EUM during eUICC
EUICC13
                      manufacturing as described in [11].
                      The eUICC SHALL be able to support an eUICC Memory Reset. This can
EUICC14
                      only be requested by the End User.
                      The eUICC SHALL support the eUICC Profile Package Interoperable format
EUICC15
                      as defined by SIMalliance [6].
                      An ISD-R SHALL:
                           be created within an eUICC at the time of manufacture;
EUICC16
                           NOT be deleted or disabled;
                           NOT be able to perform any operations inside an ISD-P.
EUICC17               An ISD-P SHALL be created by the ISD-R at the request of the SM-DP+.
                      If a Profile download and installation does not terminate successfully, the
EUICC18
                      Profile and the ISD-P SHALL be securely deleted.
                      The eUICC SHALL ensure that the communication between the eUICC and
EUICC19               the SM-DP+ participating in the Profile creation is protected in authenticity,
                      integrity, and confidentiality.
EUICC20               The eUICC SHALL NOT export Profiles installed on the eUICC.
                      The eUICC SHALL enforce an isolation of Profiles and prevent Profiles from
EUICC21               operating outside of their execution environment i.e. Profile SHALL run in a
                      sandbox.
                      The integrity of the Bound Profile Package SHALL be ensured during its
EUICC22
                      installation on the eUICC.
EUICC23               The eUICC SHALL be tamper resistant (physically and logically).
                      Profile keys and algorithm parameters SHALL NOT be extractable from the
EUICC24
                      eUICC.
                      All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a robust tamper-
EUICC25
                      resistant way and be resistant to side-channel attacks.
                      The Operator SHALL be able to update the OTA Keys in its Profile on the
EUICC26               eUICC in a secure and confidential way, reusing existing OTA Platform
                      mechanisms.
                      A downloaded Profile Package SHALL be installed on the eUICC in a
EUICC27
                      disabled state.
                      The eUICC SHALL enforce a mechanism to ensure that there is not more
EUICC28               than one Profile installed.
                      Note: This mechanism enforcement is dedicated for phase 1.
                      The eUICC SHALL always report its specification version number in the first
EUICC29
                      communication during the commencement of each session.
                      The EUM SHALL install an eUICC Certificate in the eUICC used to verify
EUICC30
                      the eUICC Certification.
                      The EUM SHALL install an EUM Certificate in the eUICC used to verify the
EUICC31
                      eUICC Certificate.

Table 8 eUICC Requirements

4.3 eUICC Eligibility Check

The eUICC eligibility check enables a SM-DP+ to validate the eligibility of an eUICC for the installation of a Profile using information sent by the eUICC. The set of information sent by the eUICC to the SM-DP+ for eligibility checking purposes is referenced herein as the eUICC Eligibility Check Information.

4.3.1 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements

Req no.               Description
                      The eUICC SHALL include the eSVN in the eUICC Eligibility Check
ELG1
                      Information.
                      The eUICC SHALL include the available memory in the eUICC Eligibility
ELG2
                      Check Information.
                      The eUICC SHALL declare whether a Profile is currently installed in the
ELG3
                      Eligibility Check Information.
                      Eligibility Check Information SHALL be integrity and authenticity protected by
ELG4
                      the eUICC for its sending to the SM-DP+.
                      Table 9 eUICC Eligibility Check Requirements
Note: It is assumed that the EID is normally shared to the SM-DP+ by other means and
could be used for the eligibility check procedure.

4.4 Device Requirements

Req no.               Description
                      The Device SHALL conform to the terminal requirements within ETSI TS
DEV1
                      102 221 [2] or ETSI TS 102 671 [3].
                      There SHALL be a means for the End User to obtain the EID from the
DEV2
                      Device.
                      If an eUICC is within the Device packaging, then the EID SHALL be printed
DEV3
                      in machine readable form on the Device packaging.
                      Bearer connection of the Companion Device to the SM-DP+ SHALL only
                      be determined by the bearer availability.
DEV4
                      Note: The Companion Device MAY use any connectivity method available
                      to connect to the SM-DP+.

Table 10 Device Requirements

4.5 Device Initiated Requirements

4.5.1 Device Factory Reset

Req no.               Description
FAC1                  Invocation of Device Factory Reset SHALL NOT impact the eUICC.

Table 11 Device Factory Reset Requirements

4.5.2 eUICC Memory Reset

Req no.               Description
                      eUICC Memory Reset SHALL delete all Profiles on the eUICC including the
MEM1
                      Enabled Profile if any.
MEM2                  A secured means SHALL be provided to enable eUICC Memory Reset.
                      Such means as described in MEM2, SHALL include an item in the LUI menu
MEM3
                      of the Device.
                      In addition to MEM3, other secure means MAY be provided to perform the
MEM4                  eUICC Memory Reset function. The same level of security and User Intent as
                      is offered by the LUI based reset function SHALL apply.

Table 12 eUICC Memory Reset Requirements

4.6 Metadata Requirements

                                                    eUICC
Metadata = Copy of
  Profile 1 Data
     Subset
                                         Profile 1
                                       {Data Subset}
  Profiles’ status
(enabled / disabled)

Figure 3: eUICC Metadata Representation

Req no.            Description
                   All Profiles SHALL have a Data Subset which will be included in the
META1
                   associated Metadata.
                   When a Profile is installed, the Metadata SHALL be automatically copied by
META2              the eUICC operating system from the Profile Data Subset during Profile
                   installation.
                   The Metadata SHALL at all times reflect the respective data in the Profile with
META3
                   the exception of the nickname which can be edited by the End User.
META4              The Metadata SHALL be exclusively stored in the eUICC.
META5              The Metadata SHALL be accessible irrespective of the state of the Profile.
                   The Metadata SHALL include a field for the Service Provider name. The
                   Elementary File of the Profile associated with this data SHALL be
META6              EFmetservice (a new EF TBD).
                   Note: EFSPN is already used in a different context outside of this specification
                   and could be blank.
Req no.            Description
                   The Metadata SHALL include a field for the ICCID of the Profile. The
META7
                   Elementary File of the Profile associated with this data SHALL be EFiccid.
                   The Metadata SHALL include a field for the End User nickname of the Profile.
META8              The Elementary File of the Profile associated with this data SHALL be
                   EFmetnick (a new EF TBD).
                   The Metadata SHALL include a field for containing a short description of the
META9              Profile defined by the Operator/Service Provider. The Elementary File of the
                   Profile associated with this data SHALL be EFmettxt (a new EF TBD).
META10             The nickname SHALL be End User editable.
                   The Metadata SHALL always be available to the LUI to allow the End User to
META11
                   be informed of installed Profiles in the eUICC.
                   The Metadata SHALL include a field to allow the display of an icon defined by
META12
                   the Operator/Service Provider for the respective Profile.

Table 13 Metadata Requirements

4.7 Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+)

4.7.1 SM-DP+ Overview

The SM-DP+ is responsible for the creation, generation, management and the protection of resulting Profiles upon the input/request of the Operator. It is also responsible for the delivery of a Profile within a Bound Profile Package, making the Bound Profile Package available for the secure delivery. In addition, the SM-DP+ is responsible for requesting the creation of the ISD-P in the eUICC into which the Profile will be installed. The SM-DP+ will also be the off-card entity that will be responsible for the lifecycle management of the ISD-P that was created at its request. This is performed via the distinct functions listed below.

Figure 4: SM-DP+ Functions

Function name         Description
                      Creates Profile Packages (i.e. Personalised Profiles, including (IMSI, Ki,
Profile Package       ICCID,…)) from Profile Descriptions agreed with Operators. This can be an
Generation            off-line batch or real time process.
Profile Package       Secures each Profile Package according to the security process creating the
Protection            Protected Profile Package.
Profile Package       Binds the Protected Profile Package to a target eUICC using the security
Binding               process thus creating the Bound Profile Package.
Profile Package       Temporarily stores Protected Profile Packages or Bound Profile Packages for
Storage               subsequent delivery to the eUICC.
Profile Package       Securely transmits and installs the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC
Delivery              through the LPA or directly to the eUICC.

Table 14 SM-DP+ Function Descriptions

4.7.2 SM-DP+ Requirements

Req no.               Description
SMDP1                 The SM-DP+ SHALL act on behalf of the Operator.
                      The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to initiate the request for ISD-P creation as part
SMDP2
                      of the Bound Profile Package delivery.
                      The SM-DP+ SHALL establish an end-to-end secure channel to the eUICC to
SMDP3
                      download and install Bound Profile Packages via the LPA.
                      The SM-DP+ SHALL allocate a Protected Profile Package for binding to a
SMDP4
                      specific eUICC only at the request of the respective Operator.
                      The SM-DP+ SHALL create a Bound Profile Package from the allocated
SMDP5
                      Protected Profile Package only at the request of the respective eUICC.
                      The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create a Bound Profile Package for any
SMDP6
                      Certified eUICC.
                      Only the target eUICC SHALL be able to decrypt the content of a Bound
SMDP7
                      Profile Package delivered by the SM-DP+.
                      Profile Packages SHALL only leave the SM-DP+ after completing all
SMDP8
                      production steps, Profile Package Protection, and binding.
                      Once the Bound Profile Package is downloaded, the SM-DP+ SHALL NOT
SMDP9
                      retain a network connection to the LPA/eUICC.
                      End-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC involved in
SMDP10                the Profile download and installation SHALL be protected in terms of integrity,
                      authenticity and confidentiality.
                      Profile Packages stored within the SM-DP+ SHALL always be protected
SMDP11
                      through encryption.
                      The SM-DP+ SHALL accept “Certificate pinning” operations up to server
SMDP12
                      granularity (refer to [15]).
                      On the SM-DP+, backups as well as used data within the Profile creation and
SMDP13                storage infrastructure SHALL be discarded using secure deletion procedures
                      (logically and physically).
SMDP14                Past communications associated with Bound Profile Package download and
Req no.               Description
                      installation between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC whenever intercepted by a
                      third party, SHALL NOT be recoverable due to the compromise of a single
                      long-term key (i.e. Perfect Forward Secrecy).
                      The transport used for the Bound Profile Package SHALL implement anti-
SMDP15
                      replay mechanisms between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
                      Connectivity to the SM-DP+ SHALL be aborted and an explicit error message
SMDP16                SHALL be triggered by the SM-DP+ upon failure to verify authenticity of the
                      connecting party. (No message SHALL be sent to the connecting party)
                      After a configurable number of failed attempts to download a Bound Profile
                      Package, the transport encryption procedure SHALL be renewed.
SMDP17                If subsequent attempts to download the Bound Profile Package fail more than
                      a configurable number of times, the provisioning transaction SHALL be
                      terminated and the Operator SHALL be notified.
                      The SM-DP+ SHALL use a secure version of Internet protocols whenever
SMDP18
                      available (e.g. DNSSEC, DNSCurve, etc.).
                      The SM-DP+ SHALL implement rate-limiting mechanisms to avoid DoS
SMDP19
                      attacks.
SMDP20                The SM-DP+ SHALL log all Certificate authentication failures.
                      The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare Profile Packages following the eUICC Profile
SMDP21
                      Package Interoperable Format Specification as defined by SIMalliance [6].
SMDP22                The SM-DP+ SHALL be able to create Bound Profile Packages on demand.
SMDP23                It SHALL be possible for the SM-DP+ to create Profile Packages in bulk.
                      The SM-DP+ SHALL send a confirmation of the successfully completed
SMDP24
                      download and installation of a Profile to the Operator.
                      There SHALL be a mechanism to remove any relationship between the SM-
                      DP+ and the ISD-P following the successful installation of the Profile. Such a
SMDP25                mechanism SHALL either be ordered by the Operator or be performed by the
                      Operator itself. If such deletion mechanism is used, there will be no off-card
                      entity responsible for managing the ISD-P of the installed Profile.
SMDP26                The SM-DP+ SHALL be globally uniquely identified by its SMDPid.
SMDP27                The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL include the SMDPid.

Table 15 SM-DP+ Requirements

4.8 Local Profile Assistant (LPA)

Primary Device

  User
                                   End User
Interface         ESeu
  User
Interface        ESeu
       LPA
LUI

ES10c

eUICC
                          Companion
                            Device

Figure 5: End User Interaction and Interfaces between a Primary and Companion

Device, where the Companion Device MAY have a UI

4.8.1 LPA Overview

This role exists within the Device and in conjunction with LPA Services provided by the eUICC. It provides two distinct functions as described below. Whilst the eUICC alone cannot provide any of these functions without Device interaction, the specific level of interaction will depend upon the capability within the Device. Therefore, the functions of the LPA will be undertaken within the Device. The way this variability is implemented across different Devices and Device types is for further study.

Figure 6: LPA Functions

Function name          Description
                       This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound Profile Package
Local Profile          in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile Package from the SM-DP+
Download               to the LPD in a single transaction, and (ii) the onward transfer of the Bound
(LPD)                  Profile Package into the eUICC in segments.
                       This function will depend on network, Device, and eUICC capabilities.
Local User Interface   This function allows Local Profile Management on the Device by the End
(LUI)                  User. User Intent has to be enforced as required.

Table 16 LPA Function Descriptions

4.8.2 LPA Requirements

Req no.          Description
                 The LPA SHALL be responsible for instructing the eUICC to perform Local Profile
LPA1
                 Management functions as per End User request.
                 A mechanism SHALL be implemented between any LPA elements outside the
LPA2
                 eUICC, and the eUICC to ensure that the communication is not compromised.
                 A secure mechanism SHALL be implemented between the LUI and the associated
LPA3
                 display or input applications on the Device.
                 Access to the LUI application(s) SHALL be protected according to current best
LPA4
                 practices. This SHALL be enforced by the Device OS.
                 All Local Profile Management Operations SHALL require User Intent (no
LPA5
                 automation).
LPA6             LUI access SHALL require User Intent (no automation).
LPA7             The End User SHALL be able to easily access the list of installed Profiles.
LPA8             Profile Metadata SHALL be protected from unauthorised access.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘enable’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA9
                 operation SHALL allow the End User to select the Profile.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘disable’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA10
                 operation SHALL allow the End User to disable the Enabled Profile.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation, ‘delete’ SHALL be supported. This
                 operation SHALL allow the End User to delete a Disabled Profile from the eUICC.
LPA11
                 The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of consequences for the deletion
                 of the Profile. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be enforced.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation ‘query’ SHALL be supported. This
LPA12            operation SHALL allow the End User to view the list of installed Profiles on the
                 eUICC and relevant associated information through the Metadata.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ SHALL be
                 supported. This operation SHALL execute the eUICC Memory Reset as described
LPA13            in Section ‎4.5.2. The End User SHALL acknowledge the message of
                 consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’. Authenticated Confirmation SHALL be
                 enforced.
                 The Local Profile Management Operation ’edit nickname’ SHALL be supported.
LPA14            This operation SHALL allow the End User to add or modify a nickname for the
                 selected Profile. The operation SHALL NOT modify the Service Provider name.
LPA15            The Local Profile Management Operation “add Profile” SHALL be supported. This
                operation SHALL allow the LPA to request an Activation Code in order to
                download and install a new Profile to the eUICC. Authenticated Confirmation
                SHALL be enforced.
                The LPA SHALL NOT be accessible by any applications other than that developed
LPA16           by the provider of the LPA for the sole purpose of enabling the services and
                functions of the LPA.
                The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Authenticated
LPA17
                Confirmation.
                The LPA provider SHALL enforce a secure and non-interceptable Simple
LPA18
                Confirmation located on the Device.
LPA19           Access to the LUI SHALL be protected by an Authenticated Confirmation.
LPA20           The mechanism in LPA19 SHALL be selectable/unselectable by the End User.
                The mechanisms in LPA19 SHALL be prompted to be enabled by default but this
LPA21
                can be skipped by the End User.
                The Device SHALL implement a mechanism to protect the LPA access through an
                Authenticated Confirmation. This Authenticated Confirmation MAY be
LPA22
                implemented by using the mechanisms implemented in the Device such as phone
                lock code, fingerprint input, etc.
                The End User SHALL be able to define dedicated personalised information to
LPA23
                access the LPA.
                If the End User selects the protection of access to the LUI (LPA21), then the
LPA24           subsequent Authenticated Confirmation at operation level MAY be replaced with a
                Simple Confirmation.
                When enforced, any User Intent SHALL allow the End User to cancel the Local
LPA25
                Profile Management Operation.
                It SHALL be possible to expose the LUI of a Companion Device allowing input
LPA26
                from an End User interface on the Primary Device.
                When a Companion Device LUI allows input from a Primary Device, the
                Companion Device LUI SHALL be able to restrict the actions that can be applied.
                For example:
LPA27                  not offer the eUICC Memory Reset;
                       only ‘enable’ and ‘disable’ operation are exposed.
                       Profile enabling is exposed only if no Profile is already enabled on the
                        Companion Device.
                The LUI of the Companion Device SHALL be able to request an End User initiated
LPA28           action on the Companion Device before the establishment of any proximity secure
                link (used for inputs into the LUI from another Device).
                A point-to-point proximity secure link initiated by the End User and offering
LPA29           confidentiality and integrity SHALL be established between the Companion and
                Primary Device for any input executed from the Primary Device.
                Any required User Intent SHALL only be executed by the LPA on the Companion
LPA30           Device. A User Intent input MAY be done in either the Primary or the Companion
                Device.
                The Device Manufacturer of the Companion Device SHALL implement a secure
LPA31
                measure to ensure integrity and eligibility of any application accessing the LUI.
LPA32           The End User Data used for the User Intent protection (e.g. PIN code, fingerprint)
                SHALL be stored in a secure environment.
                The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any on-Device and existing connection to the
LPA33           internet, such as Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi direct, in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over
                such connection, ES8+ and ES9+ can be established.
                The LPA SHALL be able to utilise any internet connection offered by another
                Device, via other connectivity mechanisms such as cabled tethering, locally
LPA34
                shared Wi-Fi connections or Bluetooth in order to reach out to the SM-DP+. Over
                such connection, ES8+, and ES9+ can be established.
                The LPA SHALL be able to determine if a connection to the internet and or SM-
LPA35
                DP+ is available.
                The LPA SHALL be able to prompt the End User that there is no connection to
LPA36           internet and or no connection to the SM-DP+, in order to allow the End User to
                enable or troubleshoot required connectivity.
LPA37           The LPA SHALL only be able to access the eUICC if it has assigned privileges.
LPA38           There SHALL only be one LPA on the Device.
                Any action where the End User MAY be unaware of the consequences about the
LPA39           result of the operation, the LUI SHALL offer additional explanation prior to user
                acceptance.
LPA40           The LPA SHALL only handle actions that are described in this specification.
LPA41           The LPA SHALL have no part in or trigger the subscription selection process.
LPA42           LPA procedures SHALL always be initiated by the LPA itself.
LPA43           LPA procedures SHALL not be called by any external (non-LPA) processes.

Table 17 LPA Requirements

4.9 Interfaces

Figure 7: Interfaces on the eUICC Architecture with the LPA in the Device

Configuration

4.9.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)

The ES2+ interface is used by the Operator to order Profiles for specific eUICCs as well as other administrative functions.

4.9.2 Operator – End User (ESop)

Out of scope of this document.

4.9.3 End User - LUI (ESeu)

ESeu is the interface between the End User and the LUI.

In a Primary/Companion Device scenario the LUI used SHALL only reside on the Companion Device.

The ESeu interface is used to support the following requirements:

Req no.              Description
                     The Local Profile Management Operations SHALL be executed only over the
ESeu1
                     ESeu interface.
                     Each Local Profile Management Operation SHALL be explicitly initiated by
ESeu2
                     the End User, verified by User Intent.
                     The ESeu SHALL support the triggering and confirmation of the Profile
ESeu3
                     download and installation operation.

Table 18 End User to LUI (ESeu) Interface Requirements

4.9.4 Operator – eUICC (ES6)

Used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services.

4.9.5 LPA – SM-DP+ (ES14)

This interface will be provided either by:

     An internet connectivity available or provided on the same Device where the LPA
      resides.
      or
     An internet connection shared from another Device via a local go-between
      connection

Figure 8: Example Connection Methods for Companion Devices to reach out to the

SM-DP+

4.9.6 SM-DP+ – LPD (ES9+)

For Devices with an LPA, this interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the LPD.

4.9.7 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)

The ES8+ interface provides a secure end-to-end channel between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC for the administration of the ISD-P and the associated Profile during download and installation. It is an enhanced version of the existing ES8 interface, providing Perfect Forward Secrecy.

4.9.8 EUM – eUICC (ESeum)

Out of scope of this document.

4.9.9 LPD – eUICC (ES10b)

The ES10b interface is used by the LPA to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.

4.9.10 LUI – eUICC (ES10c)

The ES10c interface is used for Local Profile Management by the End User.

4.9.11 General Interface Requirements

Req no.              Description
                     All interfaces from the eUICC SHALL indicate the specification version
INT1
                     number.
                     The behaviour of all interfaces SHALL support the indicated specification
INT2
                     version number.
                     During the indication of the supported specification version number from the
INT3                 eUICC to the SM-DP+, the eUICC version SHALL be used or the procedure
                     SHALL fail. See table below.
                     All communicating entities involved in remote Profile Management SHALL
INT4
                     be mutually authenticated.

Table 19 General Interface Requirements

Platform     Version 1 (V1)            Version 2 (V2)              Version 3 (V3)
eUICC V1     Platform uses V1     Platform uses V1 or fails.   Platform uses V1 or fails.
eUICC V2            ✗                  Platform uses V2        Platform uses V2 or fails.
eUICC V3            ✗                         ✗                    Platform uses V3

Table 20 eUICC Version vs Platform

4.10 Certification

4.10.1 eUICC Certification

Req no.              Description
CERTEU1              The EUM SHALL be GSMA SAS certified ‎[16].
                     The EUM SHALL be required to declare eUICC product compliance with
CERTEU2
                     GSMA SGP.22 V1.0.
CERTEU3              The eUICC Certificate SHALL be signed by the EUM.

Table 21 eUICC Certification Requirements

4.10.2 SM-DP+ Certification

Req no.              Description
                     The SM-DP+ provider SHALL be required to declare product (SM-DP+)
CERTDP1
                     compliance with GSMA SGP.22 V1.0.
                     The SM-DP+ SHALL be GSMA SAS SM-DP part certified ‎[17] excluding the
CERTDP2
                     communication with the SM-SR.
CERTDP3              The SM-DP+ Certificate SHALL be signed by the GSMA CI.

Table 22 SM-DP+ Certification Requirements

5 Operational Procedures

5.1 Profile Download with Activation Code

5.1.1 Activation Code Requirements

Req no.            Description
                   The Activation Code SHALL be used to download a Bound Profile Package
AC1
                   from a specific SM-DP+.
                   The Activation Code SHALL comprise of the following parameters:
                           SM-DP+ address
AC2                        Activation Code Token (Includes OPTIONAL Confirmation Code
                            Required Flag)
                           SMDPid (OPTIONAL)
                   The Activation Code Token SHALL be able to include a parameter indicating
                   whether a Confirmation Code is required or not.
                   If such a Confirmation Code is required, the LPA SHALL ask the End User to
AC3                input a Confirmation Code. The SM-DP+ SHALL verify the Confirmation Code
                   before delivering the Bound Profile Package.
                   Note: How the Confirmation Code is created and provided to the End User is
                   out of scope of this specification.
                   The Activation Code SHALL be verified by the SM-DP+ before delivering the
AC4
                   Bound Profile Package.
                   The Activation Code input in the LPA by the End User SHALL support at least
AC5
                   manual typing and QR code scanning.
                   All Activation Code procedures SHALL be implemented natively as part of the
AC6
                   LPA.
                   The Activation Code procedure SHALL be automatically offered to the End
                   User during initial Device set-up.
AC7
                   This automatic setting SHALL NOT apply if a Profile is already provisioned.
                   No Authenticated Confirmation is required.
                   Following the Activation Code procedure, the Profile Package download
AC8
                   procedure SHALL be used.
                   The Activation Code procedure SHALL preserve eco-system security, privacy
AC9
                   and validation of User Intent.
                   The Activation Code procedure SHALL be used for the sole purpose of
                   downloading a Profile package to the targeted eUICC. The Activation Code
AC10
                   procedure SHALL prevent sending IMEI and EID information to a non-
                   authenticated SM-DP+.
AC11               The Activation Code SHALL uniquely identify the Operator/Service Provider.
                   The Activation Code request to the SM-DP+ SHALL be extended by the LPA
AC12
                   with the EID after the specific SM-DP+ has been authenticated.

Table 23 Activation Code Requirements

5.1.2 Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure

The Activation Code procedure defines a common functionality which allows the Subscriber or the End User on behalf of the Subscriber to “activate” a Device by means of requesting the download of an Operator Profile from the Device itself.

Figure 9: Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure

Start Conditions:
   a. A Subscription has been established by the Subscriber.
   b. An Activation Code has been provided to the End User and optionally a Confirmation
      Code (side channel).
Procedure:
   1. The End User inputs the Activation Code to the LPA through the LUI.
   2. The LPA parses the Activation Code parameters to recognise the SM-DP+ address,
      the Activation Code Token, and optionally the SMDPid; in addition, the LPA MAY
      parse in the Activation Token the information that a Confirmation Code is required.
   3. If the Confirmation Code parameter in the Activation Code Token is set to “require
      Confirmation Code”, the End User is prompted to input a Confirmation Code provided
      to them by the issuing Operator/Service Provider.
   4. The Activation Code download procedure is initiated by the LPA. The LPA requests a
      nonceeUICC from the eUICC.
   5. The eUICC creates a nonceeUICC associated with the supported eUICC
      specification version number (eSVN).
   6. The eUICC transmits the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to the
      LPA.
   7. The LPA sends the nonceeUICC associated with the supported eSVN to the SM-
      DP+.

Note: Prior to this step a HTTPs session SHALL be established between the LPA and the SM-DP+ based on a public key of the Root certificate stored in the Device used for the TLS session.

8. Upon receiving the nonceeUICC and the associated eSVN, the SM-DP+ creates
    nonceSMDP and signs both the nonceSMDP and the nonceeUICC.
9. The SM-DP+ sends the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the LPA.
10. The LPA collects the Activation Code parameters as well as the Device information
    needed for the eligibility procedure and optionally the Confirmation Code and
    transmits them with the signed nonceeUICC and nonceSMDP to the eUICC.
11. The eUICC checks the signature attached to the nonceeUICC. If the SMDPid is
    configured in the AC, the eUICC checks that the SMDPid provided by the LPA and
    the SMDPid in the SM-DP+ Certificate correspond. The SM-DP+ is at this stage
    authenticated by the eUICC. The eUICC generates key material that will be used for
    the session key establishment.The eUICC signs a set of information with the eUICC
    private key which includes:
        a. The nonceSMDP
        b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the
            preparation of the Bound Profile Package
        c. Activation Code parameters
        d. The Device and eUICC information
        e. Optionally the Confirmation Code
12. The eUICC sends the signed set of information to the LPA in addition to:
        a. The nonceSMDP
        b. Key material created by the eUICC to calculate session keys for the
           preparation of the Bound Profile Package
        c. Activation Code parameters
        d. The Device and eUICC information
        e. The eUICC Certificate which includes the EID
        f. The EUM Certificate
        g. Optionally the Confirmation Code
13. The LPA sends the whole set of information received from the eUICC to the SM-
    DP+.
14. The SM-DP+ checks the EUM Certificate with the CI Public Key. The SM-DP+
    checks the signature of the nonceSMDP; the eUICC is at this stage authenticated by
    the SM-DP+.
15. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the eligibility check based on the transmitted information
    (EID, Device information, eUICC information, eSVN).
16. The SM-DP+ checks the Activation Code parameters and optionally the Confirmation
    Code to retrieve the referenced Profile Package.
17. The Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC:
        a. The SM-DP+ establishes session keys with the eUICC.
        b. A Bound Profile Package is prepared on the basis of the eUICC session key
           material and is downloaded and installed on the eUICC.
        c. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and the
           Operator is notified by the SM-DP+.
        d. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged by the
           eUICC to the LPA which notifies the End User of the status.
End Conditions:
   a. A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a
      Disabled state.
   b. The LPA MAY offer the Profile for enablement by the End User.

5.2 Local Profile Management Procedures

5.2.1 Enable Profile

This procedure performs the enabling of a target Profile.The request is given by the End User to the LPA.

Figure 10: Enable Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
      a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC.
      b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
      c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
         Management.
Procedure:
      1. The End User makes a Profile enable request on the LPA.
      2. User Intent is verified.
      3. The LPA sends a Profile enable operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the
         eUICC.
      4. The target Profile is enabled.
      5. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the enabling of the Profile.
      6. The End User is informed via the LPA.
End conditions:
      a. The target Profile is enabled.

5.2.2 Disable Profile

Profile disabling can be achieved by the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.

Figure 11: Disable Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
   a. The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC.
   b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
   c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
      Management.
Procedure:
   1.   The End User makes a Profile disable request on the LPA.
   2.   User Intent is verified.
   3.   The LPA sends a Profile disable operation to the ISD-R on the eUICC.
   4.   The ISD-R disables the target Profile.
   5.   The ISD-R informs the LPA of the disabling of the Profile.
   6.   The End User is informed via the LPA.

End conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled.

5.2.3 Delete Profile

Profile deletion can be achieved by the following procedure. The request is given by the End User on the LPA.

Figure 12: Delete Profile Procedure

Start conditions:
   a. The target Profile is disabled.
   b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User
   c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
      Management.
Procedure:
   1. The End User makes a Profile deletion request on the LPA.
   2. User Intent is verified.
   3. The LPA sends a Profile deletion operation for the target Profile to the ISD-R on the
      eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
   4. The ISD-R erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P.
   5. The ISD-R informs the LPA of the Profile deletion.
   6. The Metadata for the target Profile is erased.
   7. The End User is informed via the LPA.

End conditions: a. The target Profile is deleted.

5.2.4 Add/Update Profile Nickname

Add/update nickname will allow the Subscriber or End User to attribute a nickname to a Profile for ease of use. Note that adding or changing a nickname SHALL NOT affect any other data or other Metadata for that Profile.

Figure 13: Add/Update Profile Nickname Procedure

Start conditions:
   a. User Intent has been verified.
   b. The target Profile has been chosen by the End User.
   c. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
      Management.
Procedure:
   1. The End User requests the update of the nickname on the LPA.
   2. The LPA updates the Metadata of the target Profile with the user’s choice of
      nickname in the eUICC.

End conditions: a. Metadata of the target Profile has been updated with the user’s choice of nickname.

5.2.5 Query Profile Metadata

This procedure will allow the End User to query the metadata of the Profiles accessible to the End User. The result SHALL display all (or parts of) the Metadata for the selected Profile on the eUICC at the time of querying. No changes are made to any data on the eUICC as a result of this procedure.

Figure 14: Query Profile Metadata Procedure

Start conditions:
   a. The LPA is authenticated to eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
      Management.
   b. The list of Profiles accessible to the End User is displayed by the LPA(LUI).

Procedure: 1. The End User selects a Profile to query. 2. LPA receives a query request from the User.

3. LPA requests Profile Metadata from the eUICC. 4. LPA displays Profile Metadata to the User on the LUI.

End conditions: a. No change to Profile Metadata.

5.2.6 eUICC Memory Reset

This procedure performs the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC including its associated Profile Metadata. The request is given by the End User to the LPA.

                        Figure 15 eUICC Memory Reset Procedure
Start conditions:
   a. The LPA is authenticated to the eUICC as legitimate for performing Local Profile
      Management.
   b. The eUICC Memory Reset option is displayed by the LPA (LUI).
Procedure:
   1. The End User makes an eUICC Memory Reset request on the LPA (LUI).
   2. User Intent is verified.
   3. The LPA (LUI) displays a message of consequences of ‘eUICC Memory Reset’ to the
      End User.
   4. The End User confirms the conformity with the consequences to the LPA.
   5. The LPA sends an eUICC Memory Reset operation to the eUICC.
   6. The eUICC deletes the Profile on the eUICC even if it is an Enabled Profile including
      the Metadata associated with it.
   7. The eUICC informs the LPA of the eUICC Memory Reset of the eUICC.
   8. The End User is informed via the LPA (LUI).

End conditions: a. The Profile is deleted from the eUICC.

5.2.7 Add Profile with Activation Code

This procedure will allow the Subscriber to add a single Profile. This procedure will not enable the downloaded Profile, nor disable an Enabled Profile. Network connectivity is assumed. The download can be initiated by the input of an Activation Code.

Figure 16: Add Profile with Activation Code Procedure

Start conditions: a. User Intent has been verified. b. The Download of a new Profile is allowed on the eUICC. c. The LPA is authenticated to eUICC as legitimate for performing Profile download.

Procedure:
   1. The End User obtains an Activation Code to add a Profile to his Device.
   2. The LPA requests the End User to enter the Activation Code.
   3. Profile Download with Activation Code Procedure as described in Section ‎5.1.2
      starts.

End conditions: a. The Profile has been installed on the User’s Device. b. Profile Metadata has been updated from the Profile.

A Security Threats, Risks and Creation Process Requirements (Informative)

New Profile on New Primary Device (Off Device Activation)
Risk     Risk description
no.
INI1     Incomplete or corrupted Profile being pushed to the Subscriber.
         Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles to
INI2
         Devices.
                     Table 24 New Profile on New Primary Device Risks
Profile Deletion
Risk     Risk description
no.
         Long term gathering of key materials due to a long term storage of delivered Profiles
IND1
         after their disabling.
IND2     Loss of sensitive data from discarded media supports (hard drives…)
         Malware launching coordinated or isolated deletion of one or several Profiles leading to a
IND3
         loss of connectivity to an End User.
         Accidental Profile deletion (e.g. unattended children…) leading to a loss of connectivity
IND4
         to an End User.
         Non-tech-savvy or malicious Subscriber repeatedly deleting Profiles and asking for them
IND5
         to be reloaded leading to surcharge of provisioning servers.
                                 Table 25 Profile Deletion Risks
Profile Switch
Risk     Risk description
no.
INP1     Malicious Profile switching originating from an internal party.
         Human error leading to the switching of alternate Profiles leading to a loss of
INP2
         connectivity.
         Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to
INP3
         a loss of connectivity.
         Malware launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to
INP4
         major fraud scenarios.
                                Table 26 Profile Switching Risks
Profile Swap
Risk     Risk description
no.
INS1     Race condition leading to the deactivation of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity.

Table 27 Profile Swapping Risks

Cryptographic Related Risks
Risk    Risk description
no.
        Loss or theft of private keys in one or several Profile Management components leading
INO1
        to the loss of confidentiality on the whole chain.
        Inability to revoke compromised Certificates leading to the loss of trust on the whole
INO2
        Certificate chain.
INO3    Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful disclosure of key materials.
INO4    Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful compromise of key components.
        Malicious or accidental revocation of Certificates leading to the denial of service on the
INO5
        whole provisioning Certificate chain.
        Use of temporary symmetric cryptographic or “generic” key material during the Profile
INO6    creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single point of
        failure and attack being created.
                            Table 28 Cryptographic Related Risks
Quality of Service
Risk      Risk description
no.
          Profile creation burst leading to the inability for the eUICC platforms to deliver expected
QoS1
          service level.
          Denial of service on delivery platforms leading to the inability to deliver expected
QoS2
          service level.
          Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a temporary or
QoS3
          permanent inability to deliver a Profile.
                               Table 29 Quality of Service Risks
Non-human or Unpredictable
Risk      Risk description
no.
          Catastrophic event such as floods, earthquakes, etc. leading to the destruction of a
EXC1
          datacentre.
EXC2      Geopolitical/Human events leading to the destruction of a datacentre.
          Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the
EXC3
          provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, SIM vendor…).

Table 30 Non-human or Unpredictable Risks

New Profile during Subscriber Journey
Risk      Risk description
no.
EXN1      Malicious pairing of new Device using unattended Primary or Companion Device.
          Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the loss of confidentiality during
EXN2
          the provisioning of Profile operations.
          Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the tampering of registration
EXN3
          information during provisioning of Profile operations.
Risk      Risk description
no.
EXN4      Social engineering leading to the communication of OTP materials to attackers.
          Man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping during Profile provisioning leading to the loss of
EXN5
          confidentiality.
          “Implicit authentication” (e.g. HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of
EXN6
          authentication or Profile material.
                  Table 31 New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks
Device Swap
Risk      Risk description
no.
          Malicious Subscriber using race condition scenarios leading to Profiles being activated
EXS1
          on both Devices.
          Malicious entity using weak swap procedures in order to compromise authentication
EXS2
          vectors.
                                Table 32 Device Swapping Risks
Loss of Privacy
Risk      Risk description
no.
          Improper handling, transport or disclosure of the EID or any user related data
PRI1
          information leading to the use of the latter as a “super” user tracking identifier.
          eUICC management commands leading to the creation of unexpected and unpredicted
PRI2      « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties to spy or
          compromise Devices or the Subscriber themselves.
                                 Table 33 Loss of Privacy Risks
Others
Risk      Risk description
no.
          Compromising of exchanges between Profile Management actors leading to the critical
EXO1
          loss of private keys.
EXO2      Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios.
                                       Table 34 Other Risks
Creation Process
Req       Requirement description
no.
          Profiles failing to be created SHALL be securely deleted or at least purged of
CRE1
          authentication vectors.
          Communication between systems participating in the Profile creation SHALL be
CRE2
          protected in integrity and confidentiality.

Table 35 Creation Process Requirements

B Profile Production Procedure (Informative)

B.1 Profile Production Procedure

Within the eUICC, the current functionality of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Just as with current UICCs, Profiles are the responsibility of the Operator and the Profile production is performed upon their request and permission (if not produced by the Operators themselves).

The same Operator procedures as in the current UICCs SHALL apply.

Figure 17: Profile Production Procedure

The Profile Production consists of three steps:

1. Profile Description definition: The SM-DP+ creates and registers a Profile
   Description based on the Operator Profile Description.
2. Protected Profile Package generation: The Profile Packages will be created,
   protected and stored. This step (batch type of operation or real time process) is only
   performed after an order of the respective Operator.
3. Contract conclusion and Link Profile: At the end of the contract conclusion, an
   Activation Code is delivered to the End User and the Profile MAY be allocated for this
   contract.

Note: The generation of the Bound Profile Package is part of the Profile download with Activation Code procedure in Section ‎5.1.2.

B.1.1 Profile Description Definition

The Profile Description definition MAY comprise of the following sequences:

Figure 18: Profile Description Procedure

Start Conditions: a. Contractual relationship between the Operator and the SM-DP+.

Procedure:
   1. The Operator defines its different profile types (identified by a [non-standardised]
      Profile Description ID) which contains the Network Access Application like USIM, file
      structure, data and applications, etc.
   2. The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Descriptions based on the Operators input with the
      corresponding Profile Description ID.
   3. The SM-DP+ confirms the Profile Description definition e.g. by sending the
      corresponding Profile Description ID.

Note: An Operator can define multiple Profile Descriptions with the SM-DP+

End Condition:
   a. The Operator is able to order Protected Profile Packages based on Profile
      Description IDs.

B.1.2 Protected Profile Package Generation

The Protected Profile Package Generation MAY comprise of the following sequences:

This procedure MAY apply between the Profile Description definition, and the Contract conclusion and Link Profile, depending on whether the Protected Profile Package is created on demand or prepared in advance.

Figure 19: Protected Profile Package Generation Procedure

Start Conditions: a. Profile Description definition

Procedure:
   1. The Operator orders the Protected Profile Package generation by providing the SM-
      DP+ with the Profile Description ID and some corresponding Operator input data
      (credentials e.g. ICCID, IMSI).The Operator input data required for Protected Profile
      Package generation (IMSI, ICCID, K/Ki, OTA Keys, PIN, PUK, etc.) is either created
      by the Operator (and provided to the SM-DP+) or by the SM-DP+ (and provided to
      the Operator).
2. The SM-DP+ creates the Profile Packages.
3. The SM-DP+ creates the Protected Profile Packages.
4. The SM-DP+ stores the Protected Profile Packages (securely).
5. The SM-DP+ confirms the Protected Profile Package generation, and eventually
   sends the additional Operator input data created by the SM-DP+.
6. The Operator registers the Operator data in the Operator systems like HLR/AuC and
   BSS.
End Condition:
   a. The ordered Protected Profile Packages are available at the SM-DP+. The Operator
      is able to activate these Subscriptions and a Profile download can be triggered upon
      binding to an EID.

B.1.3 Contract Conclusion and Link Profile

The Activation Code has to be provided to the End User in order to achieve the Profile download procedure. The contract conclusion and Link Profile procedure describes different scenarios to link a contract with the Activation Code process. The following options are described below:

    Activation Code with known EID: The EID is given by the Subscriber to the
     Operator during the conclusion of the contract.
    Activation Code with unknown EID: The EID is not given by the Subscriber to
     the Operator during the conclusion of the contract. The EID is only provided to
     the SM-DP+ during the Profile download procedure and is given back from the
     SM-DP+ to the Operator.
    Activation code with EID provided to the Operator in step 2 of Figure 22:
     The EID is not immediately given by the Subscriber during the contract
     conclusion, but provided in step 2 to the Operator.

The contract reference MAY be, but not necessarily, any Activation Code parameter (e.g. token), ICCID or the IMSI.

In any case, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to allocate and link a Profile to the corresponding eUICC during the Profile download procedure.

B.1.3.1 Activation Code with Known EID

Figure 20: Activation Code with Known EID Procedure

Procedure: Steps 1-11 inError! Reference source not found.: Contract conclusion with known EID

1.        The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator and provides the EID
          during this process.
2. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator prior to Profile download
          procedure’: The Operator allocates the Profile and sends the EID, IMSI and
          ICCID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the different parameters and
          confirms this to the Operator.
6. to 10. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+ prior to Profile download
          procedure’: The Operator sends the EID, the IMSI and the Profile Description
          ID to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates an ICCID to a corresponding
          Profile, links the different parameters and confirms the allocated ICCID and
          the link to the Operator.
11.       The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
          corresponding information (contract reference).

End Condition: a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the Operator. b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future download Profile procedure request.

B.1.3.2 Activation Code with Unknown EID

Figure 21: Activation Code with Unknown EID Procedure

Procedure:
Steps 1-6 inError! Reference source not found.: Contract conclusion without EID
1.       The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge
         about the target eUICC (EID).
2.       Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
         Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
         template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
         (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator.
6.       The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
         corresponding information (contract reference).

End Condition: a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the Operator. b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future download Profile procedure request.

B.1.3.3 Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator in Step 2

Figure 22: Activation Code with EID Provided to the Operator in Step 2

Procedure: Steps 1-11 inError! Reference source not found.: Activation code with EID provided to the Operator in Step 2

1.       The Subscriber concludes a contract with the Operator without knowledge
         about the target eUICC (EID).
2.       Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by Operator’: The Operator allocates the
         Profile (ICCID)
3. to 5. Alternatively ‘ICCID allocation by SM-DP+’: The Operator sends the Profile
          template (ID) to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ allocates a corresponding Profile
          (ICCID) and sends the allocated ICCID to the Operator.
 6.         The Operator confirms the contract conclusion to the Subscriber with the
            corresponding information (contract reference).
 7.         After the Subscriber has chosen the Device/eUICC, the EID is provided
            together with the contract reference to the Operator.
 8. to 10. The Operator requests the linking of the eUICC (EID) and Profile (ICCID) by
            the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ links the EID and the ICCID and confirm this to the
            Operator.
11.         The Operator confirms the linking of the EID to the corresponding contract to
            the Subscriber.

End Condition: a. The Subscriber has concluded a contract and a valid Subscription with the Operator. b. The SM-DP+ is informed about a future download Profile procedure request.

C Document Management

C.1 Document History

Version    Date          Brief Description of Change         Approval              Editor /
                                                             Authority             Company
                         First Release with amendments                             Carmen Kwok,
V1.0       03/12/15                                          PSMC
                         from Security review.                                     GSMA
Other Information
Type                              Description
Document Owner                    Carmen Kwok
Editor / Company                  GSMA

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