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GSMA · Specification

SGP.01v4.0

Embedded SIM Remote Provisioning Architecture

Defines an architecture for remotely provisioning and managing embedded UICCs in hard-to-reach devices, including local profile switching.

Version
v4.0
  1. v4.32022-11-18
  2. v4.22020-07-07
  3. v4.12020-06-05
  4. v4.02019-02-25
  5. v1.12014-01-30
Issued
2019-02-25
Source
Original PDF

A formatted version of this document is not available yet; the text below is extracted clause by clause, so tables and figures may be incomplete.

Partial extraction: some headings could not be matched to the table of contents; text outside numbered clauses is shown where it occurs.

Overview

The document establishes a common architecture framework for remote provisioning and management of embedded UICCs in devices that are not easily reachable. It describes the eUICC ecosystem, profile attributes, system roles, procedures, policy control, and interfaces among operators, service providers, devices, eUICCs, and subscription-management functions. It also sets out a security model, risk analysis, and compliance requirements for key components. The framework is intended to support interoperability across operators and deployment scenarios while maintaining security for operators and subscribers.

  • eUICC
  • profiles
  • SM-DP
  • SM-SR
  • ElGamal key agreement
  • certificate chain

Overview generated automatically from the document's scope and outline. The document text is authoritative.

Changes since v1.1

85 clauses modified, 24 clauses added, 11 clauses removed

Compared automatically clause by clause from the extracted text of both versions; differences only in layout, spacing or table cells are ignored. The documents are authoritative.

1.1 Overviewmodified

Many machine-to-machineMachine to Machine (M2M) Devices will not be easily reachable for the purpose of Provisioning a Subscription. This willdocument requireprovides aan newarchitecture solutionapproach to accommodate this special situation. The requirement is to define a mechanism for ‘over the air’ remote Provisioning of machine- to-machine Devices with the necessary credentials to gain mobile network access, under the assumption that the same or similar authentication protocols as today will be used. The MNO will have to be able to respond to requests to change Subscription (contract) from one MNO A to a differentproposed MNOsolution B,for without having physical access to the Embedded UICC in the Device in question. This document describes an architecture which, when implemented, will enable remote Provisioning and Subscription management,management of Devices, while at the same time maintaining at least the same level of security both for network operators and CustomersSubscribers as present solutions. ThisAdditionally includesthis thedocument safedescribes keepinga ofsolution MNOto Networkbe Accessable Credentials,to suchlocally asswitch keysto forspecific cryptographicoptionally functions,supported andProfiles, identifiersi.e. suchfor astesting/certification IMSIor andfor otheremergency Customer identities used.cases.

1.2 Voidmodified was Scoping the Problem

This document addresses:  The Machine-to-Machine use cases as described in GSMA ‘Embedded SIM Task Force Requirements and Use Cases’ Version 1.0 [1]. This solution is not intended to apply to traditional consumer telecommunication devices as they are not concerned with the problem statement above.  Architecture of the remote Provisioning system for Embedded UICCs i.e. its components and the related interfaces. The GSMA’s Embedded UICC Ecosystem document [2], and the principles and assumptions stated in section 2 will support its definition.  Security of the remote Provisioning system for Embedded UICCs.  SM-SR and SM-DP integration options within network infrastructure.  The necessary aspects of the Embedded UICC architecture and its external interface to ensure compatibility with the GSMA architecture prior to delivery of an ETSI standard.  The standardisation of the Embedded UICC remote Provisioning architecture where appropriate.

1.3 Scopemodified was Document Purpose

The aim of this document is to define a common global architecture framework to enable the remote Provisioning and management of the Embedded UICC (eUICC) in machine-to- machine Devices which are not easily reachable.reachable, Theand adoptionadditionally of a commonway architectureto frameworklocally willswitch provideto aspecific basisProfiles for ensuringtesting/certification globalor interoperabilityemergency betweencases. potentiallyThe differentadoption MNOof deploymentthis scenariosarchitecture whileframework utilisingwill aaim standardisedto eUICCprovide platform.a Thisbasis documentfor identifiesensuring theglobal individualinteroperability Rolesfor andRemote theProvisioning potential Actors as well as the interfaces between eachOperators of the Roles in thedifferent architecture.deployment scenarios.

1.4 Intended Audiencemodified

Technical experts working within MNOs,Operators, SIM solution providers, machine to machine Device vendors, standards organisations, network infrastructure vendors, Telecommunication Service Providers and other industry bodies.

1.5 Definition of Termsmodified

Term Description AnPhysical actor is a physical entity (person, company or organisation) that can assume a role in the functional Actor architecture. It is Actor possible for an actor to assume multiple Roles in the same functional architecture. A paying party, legally responsible juridical person or Customer entity. Equ … es include: Utility meter, car and camera. A UICC which is not easily accessible or replaceable, is Embedded UICC not intended to be removed or replaced in the … terminal,Device, and enables the secure changing of Subscriptions. Term Description An Operational Profile with a Profile Attribute allocated, indicating that this Profile is an Emergency Profile. An Emergency Profile complies with regulatory Emergency Profile requirements and only provides the capability to make Emergency Calls and receive calls from an Emergency centre (e.g. Public Safety Answering Point) This is an attribute allocated to a Profile which, when set, Emergency Profile Attribute identifies the Emergency Profile. The state of a Profile when its files and/or applications Enabled Profile (e.g., NAA) are selectable over the UICC-Terminal interface. A certificate issued by the EUM for a specific, individual, eUICC Certificate eUICC. This certificate iscan certifiedbe byverified using the EUM Certificate. Supplier of the eUICCeUICCs modules and resident software (for eUICC Manufacturer (suchexample as firmware and operating system) AMechanism certificateto issuedcorrect toexisting afeatures GSMAon accreditedan EUMeUICC toby issueeUICC EUMOS CertificateUpdate the original OS Manufacturer when the eUICC Certificates.is Thisin the field. A certificate isissued certifiedto bya theGSMA Rootaccredited Certificate.EUM which can be used to verify eUICC basedCertificates. mechanismEUM whichCertificate enablesThis thecertificate Profilecan withbe Fall-backverified Mechanismusing Fall-backthe AttributeGSMA set.CI Certificate. This is an attribute ofallocated to a Profile which, when set, identifies the Profile to be enabled by the Fall-backFall-Back Mechanism.Fall-Back Fall-back Attribute Mechanism or by the execution of the Disable Profile function on another Profile. Only one Profile on the eUICC can have the Fall-backFall-Back attribute set at a time. eUICC based mechanism which enables the Profile with Fall-Back Mechanism Fall-Back Attribute set when the Enabled Profile loses network connectivity. Manifestation of UICC. Specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [3] Form Factor [102221] and ETSI TS 102 671 [102671].[8]. Profile generated by the SM-DP following the MNO’sOperator’s Generic Profile specifications, but without the MNO’sOperator’s credentials and any specific data linked to the future targeted eUICC. TermSelf-signed Descriptioncertificate Uniqueof numberthe CI, used to identifyauthenticate theGSMA ProvisioningCI orCertificate Operationalcertificates issued to other entities. Unique number to identify a Profile in aan eUICCeUICC. The Integrated Circuit Card ID Note:ICCID is coded as defined by ITU-T E.118 [24]. Unique identifier owned and issued by Operators as International Mobile Subscriber Identity defined in 3GPP TS 23.003 [25]. Term Description A function of the ICCIDinterface throughoutbetween thisa documentDevice isand usedan eUICC that provides the capability for a Device to identifylocally Local Disable disable the Emergency Profile (Provisioningon andthe OperationaleUICC Profile)without Uniqueinvolvement identifierof administeredan bySM-SR regionaland/or authoritiesSM-DP. andA allocatedfunction toof Mobilethe networkinterface Operatorsbetween toa provisionDevice withinand Internationalan MobileeUICC Subscriberthat Identityprovides theirthe Networkcapability Accessfor Applicationsa Device to locally Local Enable enable Devicesthe toEmergency attachProfile toon athe networkeUICC andwithout useinvolvement services.of Anan entitySM-SR providingand/or accessSM-DP. capabilityA andService communicationProvider Mobilerelying Networkon an Operator servicesproviding tothe itsM2M CustomersService throughProvider a(M2M mobileSP) networkProfiles infrastructure.on the eUICC. An application residing on a UICC which provides Network Access Application authorisation to access a network.network E.g.for example a USIM application. Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [E212][16] Network Access Credentials network. This mayMAY include data such as Ki/K and IMSI stored within a NAA. A Profile containing one or more Network Access Applications and associated Network Access Credentials Operational Profile and MNO’sOperator’s (e.g. STK) applications and 3rd party applications. A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator Operator; a company providing wireless cellular network services. Set of credentials owned by Mobilean Network Operator, including Network Access Credentials, OTA Keys for remote Operator Credentials remote Profile management and authentication algorithm parameters. A Profile whose Policy Rules have become Orphaned Profile unmanageable, e.g.for example due to the termination of the Customer’sSubscriber’s contract with the MNO.Operator. The credentials included in the Profile, used in conjunction OTA Keys conjunction with OTA Platforms. An MNOOperator platform used for remote management of UICCs OTA Platform andUICCs enabledof MNOEnabled profilesOperator Profiles on eUICCs. Un-personalised Profile with the addition of the Personalised Profile Personalisation Data for the eUICC targeted by the MNO.Operator. Set of data derived from the input data provided by the MNOOperator and generated by the SM-DP (e.g. NAC, Keys, etc.) Personalisation Data etc.) and dedicated to the personalisation of a unique Personalised Profile. Term Description A set of functions related to thethe, transport, enabling, disabling and deletion of a Profile onand the transport of Profile Management functions to an eUICC. Platform Platform Management Management actions are protected by Platform Platform Management Management Credentials shared between the SM-SR and the ISD-R. Platform Management does not affect the contents of a Profile. Term Description Data required within an eUICC so that a secured communication can be set up between an external entity Platform Management Credentials and the eUICC in order toto, transport, enable, disable and delete Profiles on the eUICC.eUICC and to transport Profile Management functions. Principles reflected in a set of rules that governs the Policy behaviour of eUICC and/or entities involved in the remote management of the eUICC. A function tha … . Defines the atomic action of a Policy and the conditions Policy Rule under which it is executed. Combination of a file structure, data and applications to be … Profile provisioned onto, or present on, an eUICC.eUICC and which Profile allows, when enabled, the access to a specific mobile network infrastructure. Description of a Profile in a format specific to the MNO; Profile Description Operator; Example formats include Excel table, xml format and plain text. Execution of certain Platform Management commands Profile Lifecycle Management by the M2M SP on a Profile, based on prior PLMA from the Operator owning the Profile. Authorisation given by an Operator to an M2M SP to Profile Lifecycle Management permit Profile Lifecycle Management. Such Authorisation (PLMA) authorisations are managed by the SM-SR. A set of functions related to the transport, downloading, installation and content update of a Profile in a dedicated Profile Management ISD-P on Profile Management the eUICC. Download and installation are protected by Profile InstallerManagement Credentials shared between the SM-DP and the ISD-P. Data required within an eUICC so that a Profile Profile InstallerManagement Credentials downloaded from an external entity can be decrypted and installed on the eUICC The downloading and installation of a Profile into an Provisioning eUICC. Term Description A Profile containing one or more Network Access Applications, and associated Network Access Credentials which, when installed on an eUICC, enables access to Provisioning Profile access to communication network(s), only to provide transport capability for eUICC management and Profile management between the eUICC and an SM-SR. A special purpose con … access a mobile network only for the purpose of management of Operational Profiles on the eUICC. Roles Roles are representing a logical grouping of functions. … A certificate used to authenticate and authorise the entity Root Certificate that issues EUM Certificates. An element or set of elements within the ecosystem sharing a common level of trust and securely managed by Security Realm by a single administrative authority. No specific level of trust is to be assumed. Term Description An entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a Subscription with a Telecommunication Service Provider. The subscriber is allowed to subscribe Subscriber and unsubscribe to Subscriber services, to register a user or a list of users authorised to enjoy thesethose services, and also to set the limits relative to the use that associated users make of these services Describes the commercial relationship between the Subscription Subscriber and the Telecommunication Service Provider. Role that prepares Operationalthe andProfiles Provisioningto Profilesbe securely Subscription Manager Data Preparation to be securely provisioned on the eUICC and manages the secure Preparation download and installation of thethese Profile ononto the eUICC Role that securely performs functions whichof allowPlatform secureSubscription transportManager ofSecure bothRouting PlatformManagement commands and Profilethe managementtransport Subscriptionof ManagerProfile SecureManagement Routingcommands. commandsEntity inthat orderprovides Subscriptions to load,Subscribers enable,either disableas andpart deleteof Profilesan onOperator theor eUICC.as Actora whoparty provideswith servicesa towholesale itsTelecommunication serviceService SubscribersProvider onagreement with an Operator. The Telecommunication Service Provider acould contractualalso basisbe the Operator. A combination of data and whoapplications isto responsiblebe provisioned on an eUICC to provide connectivity to test equipment Test Profile for the servicespurpose offered.of testing the Device and the eUICC. A Test Profile does not allow access to an ITU-E.212 [16] network. Representation of the Profile (e.g. script) without any Un-personalised Profile personalised data in a machine readable format. This format can be processed by a targeted eUICC type.

1.6 Abbreviationsmodified

Abbreviation Description AID Application Identifier CASD Controlling Authority Security Domain CI Certificate Issuer ECASD eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain DAP Data Authentication Pattern DPID ID of the relevant SM-DP EUMECASD eUICC ManufacturerCertificate Authority Security Domain ECKA Elliptic Curve Key Agreement algorithm EID eUICC-ID EIS eUICC Information Set EncP Encrypted and integrity protected Personalised Profile EPS Evolved Packet System ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute EUM eUICC Manufacturer eUICC Embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card GP GlobalPlatform GPCS GlobalPlatform Card Specification GSMA GSM Association Abbreviation Description ICCID Integrated Circuit Card ID IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity ISD Issuer Security Domain ISD-P Issuer Security Domain Profile ISD-R Issuer Security Domain Root ISO International Standards Organisation ITU International Telecoms Union KDF Key Derivation Function LTE Long Term Evolution M2M Machine to Machine MNOM2M MobileSP NetworkMachine Operatorto Machine Service Provider MNO-SD Mobile Network Operator Security Domain NAA Network Access Application OTA Over The Air PLMA Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation POL1 Policy Rules within the Profile Policy Rules associated to a Profile and stored in the POL2 relevant EIS at the SM-SR PRF Pseudo Random Function Abbreviation Description SAS Security Accreditation Scheme SCP Secure Channel Protocol SD Security Domain ShS Shared Secret SIM Subscriber Identity Module SM Subscription Manager SM-DP Subscription Manager Data Preparation SM-SR Subscription Manager Secure Routing SRID ID of the relevant SM-SR SSD Supplementary Security Domain STK SIM Tool Kit TLS Transport Layer Security UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module XML Extensible Markup Language W3C World Wide Web Consortium

1.7 Referencesmodified

Document Ref Number Title GSMA ‘Embedded SIM Task Force Requirements and Use [1] NAVoid Cases’Void Version[2] 1.0Void EmbeddedVoid SIMUICC-Terminal Fastinterface; TrackPhysical Working Group – Eco-system, [2] 12ESWG1_10r8 Roles and Commerciallogical Relationships[3] [102221] ETSI TS 102 221 UICC-Terminalcharacteristics interface;Administrative Physicalcommands andfor logicaltelecommunications characteristics[4] [102222] ETSI TS 102 222 Administrative commands for telecommunications applications [102223][5] ETSI TS 102 223 Smart Cards; Card Application Toolkit (CAT) Document[6] Ref Number Title [102225] ETSI TS 102 225 Secured packet structure for UICC based applications [102226][7] ETSI TS 102 226 Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications Smart cards; Machine to Machine UICC; Physical and logical[8] [102671] ETSI TS 102 671 logical characteristics [103383][9] ETSI TS 103 383 Embedded UICC; Requirements Specification [GPCS][10] GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2.1 GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2.1 UICC [11] Configuration [GPUICC] v1.0.1 GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment A: [AmdA][12] Confidential Card Content Management, v1.0.1 GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment B: [AmdB][13] v1.0.1 Document Ref Number Title GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment D: [AmdD][14] Secure Channel Protocol 03, v1.1 GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment E: [AmdE][15] Security Upgrade for Card Content Management v1.0 The international identification plan for public networks and[16] [E212] ITU E.212 and Subscriptions [21133][17] 3GPP TS 21.133 3G Security, Security Threats and Requirements Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity Module[18] [31102] 3GPP TS 31.102 Module (USIM) application Characteristics of the IP Multimedia Services Identity Module[19] [31103] 3GPP TS 31.103 Module (ISIM) application NIST SP 800-57 Part NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key[20] [NIST] 1 Key Management – Part 1: General (Revision 3) Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [21] RFC 2119 Levels, S. Bradner http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt FS.08 – Security Accreditaion Scheme for Subscription [22] FS.08 Manager - Standard v3 FS.04 - Security Accreditation Scheme for UICC [23] FS.04 Production – Standard v8 [24] ITU-T E.118 The international telecommunication charge card Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); [25] 3GPP TS 23.003 Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Numbering, addressing and identification [26] SGP.14 GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy Version 1.1 [27] SGP.05 Embedded UICC Protection Profile Version 1.1 Common test environments for User Equipment (UE); [28] 3GPP TS 34.108 Conformance testing

1.8 Conventionsadded

The key words "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY" in this document SHALL be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [2119].

2.1 Basic Principlesmodified

BPR1 The solution shallSHALL reflect the most important UICC-related use cases and adequately support them in a context where the eUICC hardware is not easily accessible or removable from the machine to machine Device. It is possible, due to the different nature of the eUICC, that not all current use cases can be covered. BPR2 The solution shallSHALL be designed to enable new business opportunities, e.g. in M2M segments, while keeping the proven benefits of the current UICC. BPR3 The security of the eUICC a … e at least as good as with the current removable UICC and its Provisioning processes. BPR4 Any function, feature or service which is possible on a current UICC … shallSHALL be possible on the eUICC. BPR5 The access to functions, features or services on the eUICC shallSHALL be identical to the current UICC, i.e. transparent for the terminal and the user. BPR6 The remote management of functions, features or services on the eUICC shallSHALL have minimal impact on the operator’s existing systems and infrastructure. This shallSHALL be achieved by using existing standards and specifications as far as possible. BPR7 Keep it simple. Complexity is understood as a risk factor. A reasonably limited functional approach will support the time-to-market expectations and mayMAY evolve with future requirements and improvements. BPR8 3rd-party applications which are outside of an Operational Profile are out of the scope of this document. BPR9 Each entity shallSHALL be responsible for its operations. BPR10 The applications and file system within a disabled Operational Profile are neither locally or remotely selectable.

2.2.1 Use of Existing Standardsmodified

STD1 The definition of the eUICC and the related Provisioning systems shallSHALL be as efficient as possible, in terms of efforts and costs for all involved parties. This shallSHALL be achieved by using existing standards and specifications where possible. STD2 Global PlatformGlobalPlatform specifications will be considered as a framework of choice for the implementation of the eUICC.

2.2.2 Machine to Machine Device Impactmodified

DEV1 The implementation of the eUICC ecosystem will have minimal impact on the Device. DEV2 No security certification requirementsrequirement will be placed on the Device. DEV3 No new certification requirementsrequirement will be placed on the Device. DEV4 Any Device approval impact shallSHALL be covered under existing Device type approval or certification schemes and be independent of the certification of the eUICC. DEV5 The communication module within the Device shallSHALL conform to the terminal requirements within ETSI TS 102 221 [102221][13] for all standardised ETSI Form Factors. DEV6 The Device manufacturer shallSHALL ensure that there is a method for the owner of the Device or Telecommunication Service Provider to access the eUICC identification (EID). DEV7 The Device manufacturer shouldSHOULD print the eUICC identification (EID) on the Device so that it is human readable.

2.2.3 Securitymodified

…ble UICC and its Provisioning processes. SEC2 The architecture of the eUICC and its remote Provisioning system complies with the requirements of 3GPP TS 21.133 … [21133][17] “3G Security, Security Threats and Requirements”. SEC3 The architecture must support a level of security with respect to protection of Operator Credentials whi … ticular to:  The confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters.  The integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI). SEC4 Certification … willSHALL becomebe mandatory for the eUICCeUICC. because the entity which contains the Operator Credentials may be no longer under the design control of the MNO. SEC5 The remote Provisioning architecture must avoid compromising the security of CustomerSubscriber data. SEC6 A trusted system is a system that is relied upon to a specified extent to enforce a specified security Policy. A trust model is defined as part of the security related project deliverables. SEC7 For remote Platform and Profile management, all entities involved in the management have to be mutually authenticated.

2.2.4 Regulatorymodified

REG1 Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of the Embedded SIM Fast Track workingSIMworking group. Regulatory issues will be referred to the GSMA regulatory team.

2.3 The eUICC Ecosystemmodified

ECO1 SubscriptionRemote subscription management functions are provided by two Roles – the SM-DP and the SM-SR. ECO2 1. Profile management is governed by Policy Rules that are contained in the MNO’sOperator’s Profile and in the SM-SR. 2. Policy Rules are enforced by the eUICC and the SM-SR on behalf of the MNO.Operator. 3. Control of Policy Rules lies with the MNOs.Operators.

2.3.1.1 eUICC Manufacturermodified

MAN1 1. The manufacturereUICC ofManufacturer the(EUM) eUICC provides eUICCs containing a Provisioning Profile and/or one or more Operational Profiles. 2. The eUICCs are delivered to the machine to machine Device manufacturer. 3. Related Platform Management Credentials are forwardedsent to the SM-SR to be associated with each eUICC. 4. The eUICCEUM Manufacturer is responsible for the initial cryptographic configuration and security architecture of the eUICC. 5. The relevantEUM partsproduction ofsite theSHALL be SAS-UP [23] certified. 6. The eUICC Manufacturer’smanufacturer productsMAY andalso processesprovide areeUICCs certifiedcontaining byan Emergency Profile. 7. The eUICC Manufacturer MAY provide eUICCs also containing a GSMA-approvedTest certificationProfile. process.EUM. MAN2 The EUM shallSHALL issue the eUICC Certificate to allow:  the eUICC authentication and certification to other entities;  the authenticated keyset establishment between aan SM-DP and an eUICC;  the authenticated keyset establishment between aan SM-SR and an eUICC. MAN3 The EUM Certificate and RootGSMA CI Certificate shallSHALL be delivered to other entities using reliable storage and communication channels. MAN4 The EUM shallSHALL provide services, tools, scripts or documentation to the SM-DP enabling it to create an Un-personalised Profile for a eUICC produced by the EUM. It is not the role of the EUM to create the Un-Personalised profileProfile on behalf of the SM-DP. MAN5 In case the eUICC OS Update mechanism is used, the EUM SHALL ensure the eUICC affected by such mechanism maintains the same level of security and functional compliance.

2.3.1.2 Device Manufacturermodified was Machine to Machine Device Manufacturer

DMA1 1. The Device manufacturer builds machine to machine Devices which comprise a communication module and an eUICC.eUICC containing at least a Provisioning Profile or Operational Profile that is enabled. 2. A Provisioning Profile and/oror Operational Profile maySHALL be enabledenabled. byNOTE: default. Note: Any Enabled Profile requires the agreement of the respective MNO.Operator.

2.3.1.3 Operatormodified was Mobile Network Operator (MNO)

MNO1 1. The MNOOperator provides mobile network connectivity. 2. The MNOOperator selects at least one SM-DP. 3. The MNOOperator shallSHALL have a direct interface to the SM-SR. 4. In the event that a CustomerSubscriber has selected an MNO,Operator, that MNOOperator initiates the download of a particular Profile to an identified target eUICC subject to current Policy Rules. 5. The MNOOperator specifies the Profile characteristics and any features and applications, analogous to current UICCs. The MNOOperator owns the Profile. 6. Profiles can be generated at the time the download is ordered. 7. To achieve a transparent fit with existing UICC processes and interfaces, Profiles can also be ordered in bulk, then securely stored at the SM-DP until ordered for download. SASSAS-SM [22] requirements shallSHALL apply. 8. The MNOOperator defines the Policy Rules that control the Profile management when this Profile is enabled. 9. After the download is ordered the MNOOperator shallSHALL be able to check and validate the certification and capabilities (manufacturer, memory size, algorithms etc.) of the target eUICC before the download of the Profile is started. 10. The MNOOperator shallSHALL receive confirmation of the successfully completed download and installation of the Profile. 11. The enabled MNOOperator shallSHALL be able to use an OTA Platform in order to manage the content of its enabled Profile in the eUICC. MNO2 Upon request from a CustomerSubscriber the MNOOperator shallSHALL be able to declare to the relevant entities a machine to machine Device as stolen so that appropriate measures can be taken. MNO3 An MNOOperator shouldSHOULD provide only limited service to a Device using a Provisioning Profile; the mechanism the MNOOperator uses to enforce this limited service is out of scope of this architecture. MNO4 An Operator SHALL be able to send Platform Management commands and Profile Management commands to manage its own Profiles  either to an SM-DP to be transmitted to an SM-SR  either directly to an SM-SR These commands SHALL be executed only if the targeted Profile is owned by the Operator. MNO5 The Operator SHALL be able to receive reports of a Profile status changes of its own Profiles, irrespective of the cause of the Profile status change. MNO6 An Operator SHALL be able to define PLMAs for its own Profiles. No other entity than the Operator SHALL be able to define PLMA. MNO7 The Operator SHALL be able to set and unset PLMAs whereby the M2M SP SHALL be able to receive a report about this change of authorisation. MNO8 An Operator SHALL be able to grant PLMA to an M2M SP for:  Commands to enable, disable, delete a Profile.  Management (set or unset) of the Fall-Back Attribute of a Profile.  Management (set or unset) of the Emergency Profile Attribute of a Profile.  The reception of reports related to enabling, disabling, deleting, and management of the Fall-Back Attribute of a Profile.  The reception of reports related to management of the Emergency Profile Attribute of a Profile. MNO9 MNO4 SHALL be independent of any given PLMA to an M2M SP. MNO10 An Operator SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR,  the setting of the Fall-Back Attribute on its Profile,  the setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute on its Profile if another Profile has the Emergency Profile Attribute set, if and only if the appropriate PLMA have been set by the Operator owning the Profile with the Fall-Back Attribute or the Profile with the Emergency Profile Attribute to be unset. MNO11 An Operator SHALL be able to send Profile Lifecycle Management commands to enable, disable and delete Profiles, targeting its own Profiles, issued by an M2M SP on an M2M SP/Operator interface. The Operator SHALL be able to send these commands  either to an SM-DP to be transmitted to an SM-SR  either directly to an SM-SR. These commands SHALL be executed only if the targeted Profile is owned by the Operator and PLMA has been set by the Operator owning the Profile , for the M2M SP. MNO12 The Operator SHALL be able to route Profile change status reports to the M2M SP that is authorised on this Profile when M2M SP is using an Operator/M2M SP interface as specified in MNO11. MNO13 The Operator SHALL be able to receive a report of setting the Emergency Profile Attribute of any Profile on the eUICC. NOTE: The Operator MAY provide an interface to the M2M SP in order to allow the M2M SP to trigger Profile installation or perform Profile Lifecycle Management related to the Operator’s Profiles. This interface is out of scope of this specification.

2.3.1.4 Operator Subscribermodified was MNO Customer

CUS1 1. The MNOOperator CustomerSubscriber is the actual contract partner of the MNOOperator for the Subscription. HeIt mayMAY not be identical to the end user. 2. The MNOOperator CustomerSubscriber uses a machine to machine Device equipped with a eUICC from the Device manufacturer and a Profile (Subscription) from a selected MNO.Operator. 3. Prior to the download of a Profile the MNOOperator CustomerSubscriber must provide hishis/her implicit or explicit acceptance. 4. The MNOOperator CustomerSubscriber SHALL have means to directly or indirectly identifiesobtain the machine to machine Device.Device identifier. The identification of the machine to machine Device shallSHALL implicitly or explicitly identify the eUICC.

2.3.1.5 End Usermodified

END1 1. The end user uses the machine to machine Device and the services related to the Enabled Profile. 2. The end user canMAY be identical to the MNOOperator Customer.Subscriber. 3. The eUICC is transparent to the end user. 4. The end user’s relationship is with an MNOOperator CustomerSubscriber or the MNOOperator directly.

2.3.1.6 Subscription Manager – Data Preparation (SM-DP)modified

SMDP1 1. The SM-DP acts on behalf of the MNO.Operator. 2. The SM-DP receives a Profile Description from the MNOOperator and creates Un- personalised Profile accordingly. The SM-DP mayMAY have to utilise tools provided by the EUM to create the Un-personalised Profile. The information exchanged between the SM-DP and EUM is not standardised and mayMAY differ between different entities. 3. The SM-DP generates Personalisation Data for the targeted eUICC (e.g. Network Access Credentials and other data) based upon input data from the MNO.Operator. 4. The SM-DP builds Personalised Profiles for the targeted eUICC. 5. The SM-DP shallSHALL secure the Profile package with the Profile InstallerManagement Credentials of the targeted eUICC. 6. The SM-DP installs the Personalised Profile on the eUICC through the SM-SR. SMDP2 On request by the MNOOperator the SM-DP also initiates Profile enabling, andProfile disabling, Profile deletion and Fall-Back/Emergency Profile Attribute management requests to the eUICC via the SM-SR. SMDP3 The SM-DP establishes a secure and authenticated channel to the eUICC to download and install Profiles on to the eUICC. SMDP4 The interface between the SM-DP and the SM-SR shallSHALL have proper security level defined in order to support secure delivery of Profiles tothrough the SM-SR. SMDP5 The SM-DP must always receive a request from an MNOOperator to send a Profile via an SM-SM-SR SR to an eUICC. SMDP6 The SM-DP shallSHALL at least be GSMA SASSAS-SM [22] certified. SMDP7 Given any eUICC, the SM-DP shallSHALL be able to generate a Personalised Profile for this eUICC. SMDP8 The SM-DP and MNOOperator are the only entities allowed to establish a secure and authenticated channel to the eUICC to manage a Profile. SMDP9 The MNOOperator shallSHALL be able to interface to an SM-DP of the MNO’sOperator’s choosing to serve any MNOOperator approved eUICC. SMDP10 The SM-DP shallSHALL be able to generate a Personalised Profile that can be downloaded and installed on the eUICC targeted by the MNO.Operator. SMDP11 The SM-DP shallSHALL support the Profile ordering procedure described in section 3.5.3 of this document. SMDP12 The SM-DP SHALL be able to forward to the corresponding Operator any status change, including Attribute changes, of a Profile reported by the SM-SR to the SM-DP independently of the cause of the Profile change. SMDP13 The SM-DP certificate SHALL be issued by a GSMA CI. SMDP14 The SM-DP SHALL authenticate the Operator before executing Profile Management or forwarding Platform Management commands from this Operator to the SM-SR. SMDP15 On request by the Operator the SM-DP SHALL be able to set, delete or retrieve PLMA in an SM-SR managing the Operator PLMA, as described in section 3.5.15. SMDP16 The SM-DP SHALL be able to forward to the corresponding Operator the setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute for any Profile on the eUICC reported by the SM-SR.

2.3.1.7 Subscription Manager – Secure Routing (SM-SR)modified

… transport channel to the eUICC to manage the eUICC platform. SMSR2 The SM-SR loads, enables, disables and deletes Profiles on the eUICC in accordance with the … MNO’sOperator’s Policy Rules.Rules and PLMAs. SMSR3 The SM-SR obtains the Platform Management Credentials of the eUICC from the eUICCEUM Manufacturer or fromestablishes them through the previous SM-SR. SMSR4 Only one SM-SR can be associated with an eUICC at any point in time, but it can be changed during the lifetime of the eUICC. SMSR5 The interface between the SM-SR and the eUICC shallSHALL have proper security level defined in order to support the secure delivery to, and management of, Profiles in the eUICC. SMSR6 1. The SM-SR shallSHALL notNOT handle Operator Credentials in clear text. 2. The SM-SR has secure communications channels to the SM-DP, eUICCeUICC, Operator and MNO.M2M SP. 3. The SM-SR shallSHALL at least be GSMA SAS-likeSAS-SM [22]- certified. The SM-SR shallSHALL be able to determine whether an eUICC is available for remote SMSR7 management. SMSR8 The SM-SR shallSHALL be non-discriminatory with regards to other entities within the ecosystem. SMSR9 The SM-SR certificate SHALL be issued by a GSMA CI. SMSR10 The SM-SR SHALL support Profile Lifecycle Management. through an interface with an M2M SP. SMSR11 The SM-SR SHALL support the PLMA function through an interface with an Operator as described in section 3.5.15. SMSR12 The SM-SR SHALL authenticate the Operator and check that the Operator is the owner of the Profile before executing Platform Management commands. SMSR13 The SM-SR SHALL authenticate the M2M SP and check that the M2M SP is authorised by the Operator through PLMA before executing Profile Lifecycle Management on the Profile owned by the Operator who has given the PLMA. If no PLMA is given, only the Operator is able to execute Platform Management on its Profiles. SMSR14 The SM-SR SHALL be able to report any status change of a Profile, to 1. a corresponding Operator owning the affected Profile and interfacing with the SM-SR or 2. an M2M SP having PLMA set for the affected Profile and interfacing with the SM-SR or 3. a corresponding SM-DP being in charge of the affected Profile and interfacing with the SM-SR This SHALL be independent of the cause of the Profile change and SHALL also cover the case where the Operator acts on behalf of the M2M SP as described in MNO11. SMSR15 In case of SM-SR change, no PLMA SHALL be transferred to the new SM-SR. SMSR16 The SM-SR SHALL ensure no PLMAs are granted for:  The setting of POL2  The setting of other PLMAs

2.3.1.8 Certificate Issuermodified

…es and acts as a trusted third party for the purpose of authentication of the entities of the system. The Certificate Issuer provides certificates for the EUM, … SM-SR,SM-SR SM-DP and MNO.SM-DP. CIS2 CIS3 The Certificate Issuer communicates with the MNO, SM-SR, SM-DP and EUM through interfaces that are outdefined ofin scopeSGP.14 of this specification.[26].

2.3.1.9 Initiatormodified

…rious entities. The Initiator is in INT1 charge of initiating specific procedures. For the purpose of the procedures defined within this document the Initiator … canMAY be INT2 assumed to be aan MNO.Operator or an M2M SP, having PLMAs set for the affected Operator Profiles. INT3 At any time, only one entity mayMAY assume the Initiator role. INT4 The interface between the Initiator and the SM-SR is based on the interfaces defined in this document. INT5 The Initiator shallSHALL be authorised and authenticated by the SM-SR. 2.3.1.10M2M Service Provider An M2M SP MAY have a direct interface to the SM-SR to perform Profile M2MSP1 Lifecycle Management for which PLMAs have been set by the Operator. An M2M SP SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR the enabling of a Profile M2MSP2 for which PLMAs have been set by the Operator. An M2M SP SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR the disabling of a Profile M2MSP3 for which PLMAs have been set by the Operator. An M2M SP SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR the deletion of a Profile M2MSP4 for which PLMAs have been set by the Operator. An M2M SP SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR the setting of the Fall- M2MSP4-B Back Attribute on a Profile, if and only if the appropriate PLMA has been set by both the Operator whose Profile has the Fall-Back Attribute currently set, and the Operator whose Profile will have the Fall-Back Attribute set by the request. A M2M SP SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR the setting of the M2MSP4-C Emergency Profile Attribute on a Profile, if and only if the appropriate PLMA has been set by the Operator whose Profile will have the Emergency Profile Attribute set by the request. In case a Profile exists that already has the Emergency Profile Attribute set, an M2M SP SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR the setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute on a Profile, if and only if the appropriate PLMAs have been set by both, the Operator whose Profile has the Emergency Profile Attribute currently set, and the Operator whose Profile will have the Emergency Profile Attribute set by the request. M2MSP5 The M2M SP SHALL be able to receive reports of a Profile enabling, disabling, or deletion and Fall-Back or Emergency Profile Attribute change, based on a Platform Management command executed by an SM-SR, irrespective of the cause of the changes to the Profile. M2MSP6 The M2M SP SHALL be able to receive reports whenever its PLMAs have been changed. M2MSP7 The reception of reports in M2MSP5 SHALL be configured via PLMAs.

2.4 The eUICCmodified

…ne Device perspective, the behaviour of the eUICC is generally identical to the UICC. EUICC4 1. The eUICC can contain one or more Profiles. 2. Only one Profile … shallSHALL be enabled at any point in time. 3. Void. 4. Void. 5. Void. 6. All relevant UICC specifications SHALL apply. EUICC4- The eUICC shallSHALL contain a Profile with Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set. OnlyB The eUICC SHALL NOT contain more than one Profile canwith have the Fall-Back Attribute set. 4. The Profile with Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set cannotSHALL NOT be deleted. 5.The setting of the Fall-Back Attribute SHALL be managed by the SM-SR. EUICC4- The eUICC MAY contain a Profile with Emergency Profile Attribute set. C The eUICC SHALL NOT contain more than one Profile with the Emergency Profile Attribute set. A Profile SHALL NOT have the Emergency Profile attribute and the Fall-Back attribute set at the same time. The setting of the Fall-backEmergency Profile Attribute isSHALL be managed by the SM-SR. 6.EUICC4- AllThe relevanteUICC UICCMAY specificationscontain shalla apply.Test Profile. D The eUICC SHALL NOT contain more than one Test Profile. The eUICC SHALL ensure that the Test Profile does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set or the Emergency Profile Attribute set. EUICC4- The eUICC SHALL ensure that the Profile Attribute requirements described in 2.5 are E fulfilled. EUICC5 The behaviour of a (U)SIM or ISIM within a Profile on an eUICC is expected to be identical to a present (U)SIM or ISIM. No changes to existing 3GPP (U)SIM and ISIM specifications are expected. EUICC6 The eUICC shallSHALL implement the Milenage network authentication algorithm. EUICC7 The eUICC shouldSHOULD implement the TUAK algorithm in addition to Milenage when TUAK is included within 3GPP specifications. EUICC8 The ownership of the physical eUICC mayMAY change throughout its lifetime. EUICC9 The eUICC shallSHALL contain the identityaddress of its associated SM-SR and have a means to authenticate it. EUICC10 eUICCs delivered by the eUICCEUM ManufacturerSHALL shall always be registered to an SM-SM-SR. SR. EUICC11 If any command, such as Profile enabling, Profile disabling and Profile download and installation does not complete successfully, the eUICC shallSHALL maintain the state it was in before it received the request. EUICC12 The eUICC MAY support Local Enable and Local Disable functions of an Emergency Profile without interaction with the SM-SR. EUICC12- The eUICC MAY support Local Enable and Local Disable functions of a Test Profile B without interaction with the SM-SR. EUICC13 The eUICC SHALL NOT send a report to the SM-SR when an Emergency Profile has been enabled using the Local Enable function. EUICC14 The eUICC SHALL enable the previously enabled Profile when the Emergency Profile has been disabled using the Local Disable function. EUICC15 When an Emergency Profile has been disabled using the Local Disable function the eUICC MAY send a report to the SM-SR. EUICC16 The eUICC supporting Local Enable and Local Disable SHALL allow these functions only for the Emergency Profile. EUICC17 In case the execution of the Local Disable fails (e.g. previously enabled Profile deleted, previously enabled Profile not providing network connectivity), the eUICC SHALL trigger the Fall-Back Mechanism. EUICC18 The eUICC MAY support Local Enable and Local Disable functions for a Test Profile without interaction with the SM-SR. EUICC19 The eUICC SHALL NOT send a report to the SM-SR when the Test Profile has been enabled using the Local Enable function. EUICC20 The eUICC SHALL enable the previously enabled Profile when the Test Profile has been disabled using the Local Disable function. EUICC21 When a Test Profile has been disabled using the Local Disable function the eUICC MAY send a report to the SM-SR. EUICC22 In case the execution of the Local Disable fails (e.g. previously enabled Profile deleted, previously enabled Profile not providing network connectivity), the eUICC SHALL trigger the Fall-Back Mechanism. EUICC23 The eUICC SHALL perform the necessary action to ensure that the values of the Test Profile are in accordance with 3GPP TS 34.108 [28] and to ensure that the Test Profile does not allow access to an ITU-E.212 [16] network. EUICC24 In case the execution of the Local Disable fails, the eUICC triggering the Fall-Back Mechanism SHALL ensure that the previously enabled Profile is the Profile that was enabled before the Local Enable.

2.4.1 Profilesmodified

PRO1 Profiles are the property of the issuing MNO.Operator. PROPRO2 2 Profiles shallSHALL be uniquely identified. PROPRO3 3 1. Only one Profile shallSHALL be enabled at any point in time. 2. Other Profiles mayMAY exist on the Embedded UICC, but the Enabling/Disabling of ProfilesProfiles, except an Emergency Profile and a Test Profile, always remains an action that is executed only by the SM-SR acting on behalf of the Operator, except under specific circumstances described by PRO11 or by an M2M SP based on PLMAs set by the Operator. 3. ActionsEnable/Disable/Delete shallactions SHALL be undertaken according to Policy Rules. PROPRO4 4 1. A Profile is under the control of the issuing MNO.Operator. The Operator MAY delegate part of the Profile Lifecycle Management via PLMAs. 2. A Profile in combination with a eUICC carries all logical characteristics of a UICC. All relevant UICC specifications shallSHALL apply with the exceptions defined by the eUICC specifications. PROPRO5 5 Each Profile shallSHALL be isolated within its own dedicated secure container. The GlobalPlatform’s Security Domain framework shallSHALL be considered. PROPRO6 6 Profiles canMAY be used either for Provisioning (Provisioning Profile), for operation (Operational Profile) or for operationtesting (Operational(Test Profile). They are clearly distinguished. 1. An Operational Profile mayMAY be used as a Provisioning Profile. 2. A Provisioning Profile shallSHALL notNOT be used as an Operational Profile. PRO3. 7A ThereTest willProfile alwaysSHALL NOT be oneused as a Provisioning or Operational Profile. PROPRO7 8There SHALL be zero or one Provisioning Profile. PRO8 There mayMAY be several Operational Profiles. PROPRO9 9 Installed Profiles canSHALL have one of the following states:  enabled  disabled PROPRO10 10 In all operational uses the eUICC shallSHALL enforce that one, and only one, Profile is enabled at any point in time. PROPRO11 11 There willSHALL be a capability for eUICC–initiated enabling of the Profile with Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set.set, in the case of loss of network connectivity. In case this mechanism is used, the POL1 “disabled not allowed” and “Profile deletion is mandatory when it is disabled” SHALL be ignored. PRO11-B In case a Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set is enabled by the eUICC as per PRO11, the eUICC SHALL inform its associated SM-SR. The Profile with Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set will consequently provide network connectivity to allow the SM-SR to remotely manage the eUICC. PROPRO12 12The Therelocal willProfile management SHALL only be nopossible: local ProfileUnder managementspecific circumstances described by thePRO11 machine toFor machineEmergency Device.Profile PRO 13For Test Profile PRO13 A Profile contains parameters for an authentication algorithm (e.g. OPc, ri, ci for the Milenage algorithm) but not the algorithm itself. PROPRO14 14 The eUICC mayMAY support other network authentication algorithms; if such algorithms are supported, the eUICC shallSHALL implement a mechanism to configure its parameters. Note:NOTE: The accessibility of these other network authentication algorithms to Profiles is out of the scope of this document. PROPRO15 15 A Profile contains a subset of Policy Rules to control external Profile management actions. PROPRO16 16 A Profile mayMAY contain identifiers for entities in the ecosystem, keys, PINs, certificates, algorithm parameters, as well as first and second level applications. (Ref: ETSI TS 102 221 [102221][3]). )PRO17 PRO 17 Any function, feature or service which is possible on a current UICC shallSHALL be possible in an Operational Profile on an eUICC. PROPRO18 18 The access to functions, features or services in a Profile on an eUICC shallSHALL be identical to the current UICC, i.e. transparent for the terminal and the user. PROPRO19 19 The remote management of functions, features or services in a Profile on an eUICC shallSHALL have minimal impact on the operator’s existing systems and infrastructure. PROPRO20 20 Profiles are stored only in the SM-DP and installed on the eUICC; they are not stored anywhere else and are encrypted in transit. PRO21 It SHALL be possible to update a Test Profile with restriction defined by the EUICC23. PRO22 The deletion of the Test Profile SHALL NOT be possible. PRO23 It SHALL NOT be possible to remotely enable or disable the Test Profile.

2.4.2 Policies & Policy Controlmodified

…nal states of the Profile. These state transitions are:  disabling  enabling  deletion PPC2 Update-access to a Profile’s Policy is restricted to the issuing … MNO.Operator. PPC3 The Policy Rules of a disabled Profile can only apply to itself. The Policy Rules of a disabled Profile cannot affect any other Profile.Profile, except for the reasons listed by PPC4. PPC4 If the previously Enabled Profile has the POL1 rule “disable not allowed” set, then the eUICC SHALL only switch back to this Profile: as long as POL1 rule “disable not allowed” is set, it SHALL only be possible to delete this Profile by the Master Delete function.

2.5 Profile Attributesadded

In this version of the specification the following Profile Attributes are defined: - Fall-Back Attribute - Emergency Profile Attribute PRA1 A Profile Attribute MAY be set for a Profile. PRA2 The support of the Emergency Profile Attribute is optional. PRA3 If a specific Profile Attribute is supported, it SHALL be possible to set such Profile Attribute for a Profile. PRA4 A Profile SHALL NOT have the Fall-Back Attribute and the Emergency Profile Attribute set at the same time.

3.1 Architecture Diagrammodified

… below represents the eUICC remote Provisioning system. Details of the Roles, the associated functions and interfaces are described in section 3.3 and Annex A. … CI SM-DP Operator EUM SM-SR M2M SP SM-SR eUICC Device Interfaces in Scope CI interfaces Out Of Scope (Partially defined) Out of Scope Figure 1: eUICC Remote Provisioning System

3.2.1 Security Domainsmodified

…onfigured via GP privileges (e.g. Delegated or Authorised Management, DAP Verification, Token Management, Global Delete), by the Provisioning of keys (e.g. for … SCP02/03SCP03 or SCP80/81) and by associating an SD to another SD with other rights, by associating an SD to itself (and thus removing all management rights of a superior SD … all its contents. In earlier versions, the ISD (Issuer Security Domain) had several unique privileges. However, in the latest GlobalPlatform Card Specification … [GPCS],[10], it is also configured via privileges, and except for being there in the beginning, no major specific feature remains. This shouldSHOULD allow MNOsOperators to have the same benefits as they do today with the current ISD in a UICC. The way forward is:  To build the eUICC on a structure of SDs, and  To define addi… …

3.2.2 Card Architecturemodified

This section describes how Profiles shouldSHOULD be designed, for example, using an extended version of the concepts and information models from GlobalGlobalPlatform Platform Card Specification [GPCS].[10]. Profiles are contained within security domains (SD) on the eUICC, thus making the security mechanisms of SDs available. Further information can be found in [GPCS].[10]. The following figure outlines a schematic representation of the eUICC. Figure 2:Schematic Representation of the eUICC The operating system (OS) contains the basic platform features, e.g. support of the features defined in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [GPCS].[10]. The ECASD (eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain):  Is created within an eUICC at time of manufacture;manufacturing;  Cannot be deleted or disabled after delivery;  Is based on the concept of CASD from Global Platform (see [GPCS],[10], [AmdA][12] and [AmdE]);[15]);  Is configured by the eUICCEUM Manufacturer at pre-issuance;  Contains a non-modifiable eUICC private key, the associated Certificate, the CI’s root public keys and the EUM keyset for key/certificate ren … the on-card representative of the SM-SR that executes the Platform Management commands (see the functions for Platform Management in section 3.3.1.3). An ISD-R … shall:SHALL: a) Be created within an eUICC at time of manufacture;manufacturing; b) Be associated to an SM-SR; c) Not be deleted or disabled; d) Provides a secure OTA channel using Platform Management Credentials (SCP80 or SCP81 as defined in [GPCS])[10]) to the SM-SR; e) Implement a key establishment protocol for the support of the change of SM-SR; f) Offers wrapping and unwrapping service of the transport part during Profile download; g) Be able to create new ISD-Ps with the required cumulative granted memory quota(CGM) (Note:NOTE: memory quota management at SM-SR level is for further study);study; h) Not be able to create any SD except an ISD-P; i) Executes Platform Management functions in accordance to the Policy Rules; j) Not be able to perform any operation inside an ISD-P. The ISD-P (ISD-Profile) is the on-card representative of the MNO,Operator, or SM-DP if delegated by the MNO.Operator. An ISD-P shall:SHALL: a) Be a separate and independent entity on the eUICCeUICC; b) Contain a Profile including MNO-SD, Connectivity Parameters, file system, NAAs and Policy Rules; c) Contain a state machine related to creating, enabling and disabling the Profile; d) Contain keys for Profile management f … Profile is installed; h) Provide SCP03 capabilities to secure its communication with the SM-DP; i) Be able to contain a CASD. This CASD is optional within the … profileProfile and provides services only to security domains of the Profile and only when the Profile is in Enabled state. The MNO-SD is the on-card representative of the MNO.Operator. An MNO-SD shall:SHALL: j)a) Be associated to itself; k)b) Contain the MNOOperator OTA Keys; l)c) Provide a secure OTA channel (SCP80 or SCP81 as defined in [102225][6] and [102226]);[7]); m)d) Have the capability to host Supplementary Security Domains. Once the Profile is installed in its ISD-P on the eUICC, the Profile and ISD-P shallSHALL be considered to be in union and thereafter it is the state of the ISD-P that is managed. The SM-DP performs the Profile Management functions (see section 3.3.1.2) on the ISD-P during the load and install phase. The MNO-SD is managed by an MNOOperator OTA Platform once the Profile is enabled. The MNO-SD is managed in an equivalent way to the ISD of a current UICC. The Platform Service Manager is an OS servic … ntained in the ISD-P are the well-known card structure with applications, SDs for other entities, the file system (MF tree, ADFs, etc.) (as per ETSI TS 102 221 … [102221][3] and 3GPP TS 31 102 [31102])[18]) and the Policy Rules.

3.2.3 State Diagram for an ISD-Pmodified

The states and state transitions for an ISD-P are as follows: After an ISD-P is created and keys are set up, the SM-DP, on behalf of the MNO,Operator, can create a Profile containing SDs, applications, NAAs, and the file system. When the Profile is installed, the SM-DP sets the state of the ISD-P to disabled, effectively handing it over to t … y SM -SR by SM -SR enabled Download and installation Phase Operational Phase Figure 3: ISD-P State Diagram In the created state shown in the diagram above, the … profileProfile is downloaded and installed in the ISD-P. In the created, disabled or deleted state, the Profile is not visible to the machine to machine DeviceDevice.

3.3.1.1 Functions for Data Preparationmodified

Un-personalised Profile Creation Un-personalised Profile Creation covers the building of the Un-personalised Profile based on the MNO’sOperator’s Profile Description and the type of eUICC targeted. The SM-DP generates the Un-personalised Profile using the services, scripts, tools or documentation provided by the EUMOperator. of the target eUICC(s). The information exchanged between the SM-DP and EUM is not standardised and may differ between different entities. It is assumed the SM-DP tests the Un-personalised Profile with a sample of the target eUICC. The MNOOperator validates the Un-personalised Profile by testing a sample of the target eUICC personalised with a test Personalised Profile created from the Un-personalised Profile developed by the SM-DP. The downloadable Profile SHALL be provided in a standardised format. Profile Ordering Profile ordering covers the processes for the preparation and generation of the Personalised Profiles by the SM-DP based on the input data provided by the MNOOperator to the SM-DP. The input data includes (but is not limited to):  The quantity of the profilesProfiles to be generated;  IMSI value(s) or range;  ICCID value(s) or range;  Un-personalised Profile type(s);  Information about the target eUICC(s), such as the EID. How and when the input data is provided by the MNOOperator to the SM-DP is out of scope. Generation of Personalisation Data This function creates the credential and key values (e.g. NAC, PINs, OTA Keys) in a secure environment based on the input data provided by the MNOOperator (e.g. IMSI, ICCID). Profile Personalisation SM-DP inserts the Personalisation Data into the Un-personalised Profile with respect to the order placed by the MNO.Operator. This function addresses the procedures which ensure a created Personalised Profile can only be installed on a specific eUICC. EUM Services, Scripts, Tools or Documentation To allow any SM-DP to undertake the above functions on any eUICC,eUICC the services, scripts, tools or the documentation supplied by the EUM must support at least the following eUICC attributes which mayMAY be delivered by the MNO.Operator. Some attributes are related to the function of Un-personalised Profile Creation and some to Profile Personalisation and in some cases the function to which they apply mayMAY be dependent on the particular eUICC. The attributes are:  Applications (and assignment of the applications) to be loadedused –or loaded, including USIM, ISIM, CAT and third party application SSDs;  Algorithm selection, algorithm parameter assignment, and algorithm parameter loading within the eU … ures to support other applications – both SIM- based and device-based applications. The information exchanged between the SM-DP and EUM is not standardised and … mayMAY differ between different entities.

3.3.1.2 Functions for Profile Managementmodified

…ion of the targeted eUICC for installing the Profile in preparation.  Verification of the eUICC certification. Profile Download and Installation Function This … dealsfunction withallows the download and installation of a Personalised Profile into the targeted eUICC. Profile Content Update Function This is realisedhandled by an MNOOperator OTA Platform. Policy Rules Update Function This coversfunction theupdates update of the Policy Rules. The Policy Rules to be updated mayMAY be the ones in the SM-SR, or the ones within a Profile already installed in the ISD-P on the eUICC. Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Function This covers the setting, unsetting and status enquiry of the PLMA in the SM-SR, initiated by the Operator.

3.3.1.3 Functions for Platform Managementmodified

ISD-P Creation Function This dealsfunction withcreates the creation of an ISD-P inwithin the eUICC in preparation for Profile content to be loaded. ISD-P Deletion Function This dealsfunction withallows the deletion of an ISD-P. ISD-P deletion is the permanent removal of an ISD-P along with its content previously loaded and installed on the eUICC. TheAn deletion of an ISD-P can onlybe happendeleted only when it is in disabled state (see state diagram in section 3.2.3). Master Delete Function ThisThe dealsMaster withDelete Function allows the deletion of an Orphaned Profile without the Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set regardless of the Profile’s policy rules. This function will delete the Profile and its ISD-P. The deletion of a Profile can only happen when the Profile is in disabled state.state and its Fall-Back Attribute is not set. Profile Enabling Function This dealsfunction withis theused enablingto ofEnable a Profile.Profile in Disable state. This will make the applications and files within the Profile visible to and selectable by the machineM2M to machine Device subject to relevant access control. Profile Disabling Function This dealsfunction withis theused disablingto ofDisable a Profile.Profile in Enable state. This will make all applications and files within the Profile invisible to and not selectable by the machine to machine Device. Set Fall-backFall-Back Attribute This dealsfunction withsets the settingFall-Back of the Fall-back Attribute of thea Profile(s)Profile on the eUICC Transport Function Transport function refers to the establishing of the communication channel between the SM- SR and the ISD-R on the eUICC. Security of transport channel between the SM-SR and eUICC is also addressed by this function. Note:NOTE: The eUICC within a machine to machine Device mayMAY be contacted over different type of network systems (such as GSM, GPRS, UMTS, or EPS) by the SM-SR. Furthermore, the SM-SR will need to interface with the concerned network system accordingly. For instance the SM-SR would need to use SMPP to be able to communicate with SMS, or it mayMAY need to connect to an IMS gateway in order to establish an IP-based communication with the eUICC. These communications are being provided by the active Subscription. Policy Enforcement Function This deals with the enforcement of the policy rules on the eUICC and at the SM-SR..SM-SR.

3.3.1.4 Functions for eUICC Managementmodified

eUICC Registration Function This dealsfunction withis thecalled registrationto ofregister an eUICC in aan SM-SR. SM-SR Change Function This dealsfunction withis called to initiate the change the change of aan SM-SR for an eUICC. SM-SR change is the transfer of the EIS for an eUICC from one SM-SR to another SM-SR and the establishment of new key set, in the ISD-R, between the new SM-SR and the eUICC.

3.3.1.5 eUICC Functionsmodified

Fall-backFall-Back Function This dealsfunction withactivates the enablingFall-Back ofMechanism thethat Profile with Fall-back Attribute set. This function automatically disables the currently Enabled Profile and enables the Profile with Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set. For example, in the case of permanent loss of network connectivity for the Enabled Profile.

3.3.1.6 Device Functionsadded

Local Enable of the Emergency Profile This function enables the Device to enable the Emergency Profile. Local Disable of the Emergency Profile This function enables the Device to disable the Emergency Profile. Local Enable of the Test Profile This function enables the Device to enable the Test Profile. Local Disable of the Emergency Profile This function enables the Device to disable the Test Profile.

3.3.2 Voidmodified was Assignment of Functions to Relevant Actors and Roles

Function MNO SM-DP SM-SR eUICC Data Preparation: Un-personalised Profile Creation X Profile Ordering X Generation of Personalisation Data X X Profile Personalisation X Profile Management: eUICC eligibility verification X X X Profile Download and Installation X Profile Content Update X Policy Rules Update X Platform Management: ISD-P Creation X ISD-P Deletion X Master Delete X Profile Enabling X Profile Disabling X Set Fall-back Attribute X Transport X Policy Enforcement X X eUICC Management: eUICC Registration X SM-SR Change X eUICC Functions: Fall-back Function X

3.4.1 General Content of a Profile Installed on an eUICCmodified

The following data is part of a Profile:  The Applications and files as defined in the relevant specifications (in particular 3GPP TS 31.102 [31102],[18], 3GPP TS 31.103 [31103][19] and ETSI TS 102 221 [102221]).[3]). In addition to the above, the following data which is not included in the above standards:  The algorithm parameters associated with its corresponding Network… …

3.4.2 Access to the Content of a Profilemodified

For the machine to machine Device the Enabled Profile is equivalent to an UICC. For an MNOOperator OTA Platform, the Enabled Profile is equivalent to an UICC as per ETSI TS 102 225 [102225],[6], TS 102 226 [102226][7] and TS 102 223 [102223].[5]. The Policy Rules POL1 attached to the Profile are managed through the MNOOperator OTA Platform, as per the rest of the content of the Profile. An applet in the Enabled Profile will work the same manner as an applet in an UICC as per relevant ETSI and 3GPP standards.

3.5 Proceduresmodified

The procedures described in this section involve both interactions between the Roles of the business environment (e.g. between a CustomerSubscriber and a Telecommunication Service Provider) and between entities of the remote Provisioning architecture (e.g. between eUICC and SM-SR). For each procedure the main steps as well as the … ICC Registration at SM-SR To register a newly manufactured eUICC at a given SM-SR as a prerequisite for subsequent remote management 2 Profile Ordering For the … MNOOperator to order at the SM-DP a quantity of Profiles ready for download 3 Profile Download and Installation To download a Profile to a given eUICC 4 Master Delete To d … M-SR 6 Profile Enabling via SM-DP To enable a Profile in a given eUICC via SM-DP 7 Profile Disabling To disable the Enabled Profile and enable the Profile with … Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set. 8 ISD-P Deletion To delete a Profile and its ISD-P from a given eUICC via SM-SR. 9 ISD-P Deletion via SM-DP To delete a Profile and its ISD-P from a given eUICC via SM-DP. 10 SM-SR Change To change the SM-SR of a given eUICC 11 ISD-P Key Establishment Key establishment procedure between the SM-DP and the ISD-PISD-P. NOTE: This procedure is part of the Profile Download and Installation procedure. 12 Fall-backFall-Back Mechanism To enable the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set in a given eUICC 13 eUICC Certificate Check To verify whether the targeted eUICC is certified. 14 ProfileLifecycle Management To set, to delete or to enquire the status of PLMA in Authorisation Function the SM-SR 15 Profile Enabling via M2M SP To enable a Profile in a given eUICC via M2M SP. 16 Profile Disabling via M2M SP To disable the enabled Profile and to enable the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set via M2M SP. 17 ISD-P Deletion via M2M SP To delete a Profile and its ISD-P from a given eUICC via M2M SP.

3.5.1 eUICC Registration at SM-SRmodified

eUICCs are manufactured, according to given standards, generally independent from machine to machine Device makers, mobile operators or Telecommunication Service Providers. The machine to machine Device manufacturers can select any certified eUICC that fits their purpose and order it in the necessary quantity directly from the EUM. AsIn aorder mandatoryto stepallow insubscription themanagement productionprocedures, process and prior to shipment, the EUM registers the eUICC at a selected SM-SM-SR. SR. This means that related information which is relevant throughout its further lifetime, in particular the Platform Management Credentials, Provisioning MSISDN, are stored in the SM-SR database. Without this step, remote access to the eUICC for the purpose of subscription management will be impossible. Note:NOTE: It is assumed that at this stage the eUICC does contain a Provisioning Profile and is linked to an active Provisioning Subscription. How the Provisioning operator is selected and the nature of the related commercial and technical agreements between the EUM and the Provisioning MNOOperator are out of scope of this document. The following represents a functional representation of the eUICC Information Set: EIS = { EID, Type, Version, Production Da … Profile 1: Profile Type, ISD-P AID, ICCID, MSISDN, State, DPID, Allocated Memory, POL2 … Profile n: … } } The eUICC registration comprises the following steps: … EUM SM-SR 1. eUICC registration request (EIS) 2. EIS registration in database 3. eUICC registration confirmation (EID) Figure 4: eUICC Registration at SM-SR Start Condition: eUICCs are produced and a Provisioning Profile is loaded and active in the Provisioning operator’s networ … taining the EIS. 2. The SM-SR stores the EIS in its database, with EID as the key parameter. 3. The SM-SR confirms the successful registration towards the EUM. … The confirmation message includes the EID. End Condition: The eUICC is registered at the SM-SR and ready for ProfilePlatform download.and ItProfile canManagement nowoperations. be shipped to the machine to machine Device manufacturer. Each eUICC mayMAY only be registered at one SM-SR. The communication link between the EUM and the SM-SR shallSHALL be secure. Following registration and shipment, the eUICCs are embedded into machine to machine Devices during the Device manufacturing process.

3.5.2 Un-personalised Profile Verification (Proprietary)modified

Within the eUICC, the current functional scope of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Similar to the verification of classic UICCs, Profiles shallSHALL be verified by the entity that creates the Profile, the SM-DP. For the verification of a Profile by the SM-DP, a similar procedure as for a classic UICC shallSHALL be used. One of the differences is that physical test eUICCs are only personalised by the SM-DP. Note:NOTE: The Profile verification processes and interfaces are not standardised and mayMAY differ between MNOsOperators and SM-DPs (Profile validation strategy, which tests mayMAY be performed by the MNO,Operator, which mayMAY be done by the SM-DP, what mayMAY be exchanged between the MNOOperator and SM-DP, how this interface is secured, etc.). For example, the Profile verification procedure mayMAY comprise the following steps: Start Condition: a. The Profile Description has been provided by the MNOOperator to the SM-DP and the Un- personalizedpersonalised Profile has been generated by the SM-DP in a separate process. b. The SM-DP has sample eUICCs of a specific type. Procedure: 1. The MNOOperator provides a test subscription to the selected SM-DP, as well as data such as applets, POL1 and Profile type. Other data, e.g. keys or ICCID, mayMAY be generated by the SM-DP. 2. The SM-DP creates a test Personalised Profile (Un-personalised Profile personalised with test data, including the data received from the MNO),Operator), then downloads and installs it onto an eUICC sample. 3. The SM-DP performs the necessary validation procedure to verify the combination of the eUICC sample and… …

3.5.3 Profile Ordering (Proprietary)modified

Within the eUICC, the current functional scope of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Just as with current UICCs, Profiles are ordered under the responsibility of the MNO.Operator. The same procedures shallSHALL apply with the only difference being that the UICCs are not produced in physical form but are kept at the SM-DP as Profiles. Note:NOTE: Profile ordering processes and interfaces are not standardised and mayMAY differ between MNOs.Operators. For example, the Profile ordering mayMAY comprise the following steps: Figure 5: Profile Ordering Start Conditions: a. An Un-personalised Profile has been created by the SM-DP based on the Profile Description provided by the MNO.Operator. b. The MNOOperator has a demand for a quantity of eUICC Profiles. c. The Un-personalised Profile has been validated on the target eUICC type using the Un-personalised Profile verification procedure in section 3.5.2 Procedure: 1. The MNOOperator provides an order to a selected SM-DP. The order contains production data such as the quantity and a Start-IMSI, an IMSI range or a list of IMSIs and a referen … e eUICC and SM-SR can also be delivered in this context. 2. The SM-DP then starts production, i.e. personalisation of Profiles using the data received from the … MNO.Operator. Other data, e.g. keys or ICCID, mayMAY be generated by the SM-SM-DP DP during the personalisation process. The Profiles are stored within the SM-DP. 3. Order completion is confirmed to the MNO,Operator, including all data necessary to register the Profiles in the MNO’sOperator’s backend systems. Each Profile is uniquely identified at least by its ICCID. 4. The MNOOperator installs the Profiles in the related systems, e.g. HLR, AuC, CRM. These procedures are no different from current UICC registration processes at the MNO.Operator. End Condition: The ordered quantity of Profiles is now ready for the Profile download procedure. Related Operator Credentials are available to the MNO.Operator.

3.5.4 Profile Download and Installationmodified

In order for the machine to machine Device to be used for communication services, the eUICC must be loaded with at least one Operational Profile. In general, this will be done over-the-air, using … he Provisioning Profile is used. The Profile download and installation procedure follows the following steps: Figure 6: Profile Download Start Conditions: a. A … CustomerSubscriber has subscribed to a selected MNO.Operator. b. The EID of the target eUICC and the SRID are known by the MNO.Operator. c. A Profile ordering procedure has been completed with a selected SM-DP. d. The target eUICC is integrated into a machine to machine Device and is associated to an SM-SR. e. The MNOOperator mayMAY activate the related Subscription in the network by the ICCID. Procedure: 1. The MNOOperator sends a Profile Download request to the SM-DP. The request must include the relevant information to allow the identification of the SM-SR, the target EID and ICCID. The MNOOperator mayMAY also ask the SM-DP to enable the Profile once it is downloaded and installed. 2. Based on the information provided by the MNO,Operator, the SM-DP identifies the SM-SR, where the eUICC is currently registered. 3. The SM-SR and the SM-DP authenticate each other if not already authenticated. 4. The SM-DP requests from the SM-SR the EIS for athat particular eUICC, identified by its EID. 5. Based on the EID, the SM-SR retrieves the EIS. 6. The SM-SR sends the relevant information from the EIS to the requesting SM-DP. Note:NOTE: The rationale for saying “relevant information from the EIS” is that the SM-SR will not provide information to the SM-DP that is not appropriate for the partic … tion from the EIS. 8. If a problem is detected with the eligibility of the eUICC, the SM-DP aborts the procedure and returns an error message to the requesting … MNOOperator. and the SM-SR. 9. If no problem is detected with the eligibility of the eUICC, the SM-DP issues an installation request for the ISD-P to the SM-SR. 10. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if not already authenticated. 11. The SM-SR contacts the ISD-R on the eUICC for ISD-P installation and an empty ISD-PISD- P is created in the eUICC. This is confirmed back to the SM-DP. 12. The SM-DP authenticatesand the eUICC authenticate each other and a shared key set is established between the ISD-P and the SM-DP.SM-DP through the SM-SR. The Key Establishment Procedure is described in Security Section 4.5. 13. Now the SM-DP selects the Personalised Profile (e.g. based on the ICCID or Profile type) and protects it using the new ISD-P key set, yieldingproducing the encrypted and integrity protected Profile EncP. 14. The SM-DP asks the SM-SR to establish a secure transport channel between the ISD-RISD- R on the eUICC and the SM-SR. This secure transport channel is for protection of Profile management commands not the Profile itself. 15. The SM-DP initiates the P … to the eUICC using a secure channel between the SM-DP and the newly created ISD-P on the eUICC, and within the established secure transport channel between the … SM-SM-SR SR and the ISD-R on the eUICC. 16. The eUICC sends the result of the installation and state of the ISD-PProfile to the SM-DP. The MNOOperator owner of the profileProfile decides whether, at the end of profileProfile installation, the SCP03 key set in the ISD-P shallSHALL be removed by the SM-DP, retained by the SM-DP or be handed over to the MNO.Operator. Note:NOTE: If the MNOOperator decides that the key set is retained by the SM-DP the MNOOperator can instruct the SM-DP to handover or delete the key set at a later point in time. 17. SM-DP sends the result of the installation and state of the ISD-PProfile to the SM-SR. This message includes the relevant EIS elements for this Profile. 18. The SM-SR updates its database. If the download and installation was successful, the SM-SR inserts a new Profile record into the EIS, with the status “disabled”. 19. The SM-SR confirms the status of the Profile download and installation back to the SM-DP. This message includes the relevant parts of the EIS. 20. If the MNOOperator asked the SM-DP to enable the Profile once it is downloaded and installed, the SM-DP executes the Profile Enabling via SM-DP procedure (see 3.5.7). 21. The SM-DP confirms the status of the download and installation back to the MNO.Operator. This message canincludes include the EID and the information to identify the Profile. End Condition: An ISD-P has been created in the eUICC for the MNO,Operator, containing a Profile in disabled or enabled state. The SM-SR has updated the EIS for this eUICC accordingly. The MNO may activate the related Subscription in the network.

3.5.5 Master Deletemodified

This procedure deletes an Orphaned Profile without the Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set regardless of the Profile’s policyPolicy rules. The successful execution of this procedure requires the authorisation of both the Initiator and the SM-DP. Note:NOTE: The actor who assumes the role of the initiator needs to be determined. In the example below we can assume the initiator will be the new MNOOperator with the authorisation of the Customer.Subscriber. Figure 7: Master Delete Start Conditions: a. There is an Orphaned Profile on a eUICC which is, for example, blocking the loading of another Profile. b. The Orp … d. The Orphaned Profile is disabled. Procedure: 1. The Initiator sends a master delete request to the SM-SR. The request includes the target EID and the ICCID … (or other unique identifier) of the target Profile. The request includes the Initiator’s authorisation (Auth 1) for the master delete. 2. The SM-SR sends the authorisation request together with the initiator authorisation (Auth 1) to the SM-DP associated with the target Profile. The SM-DP verifies the authorisation (Auth 1). 3. The SM-DP also requests authorisation from the MNOOperator owner of the target Profile. Note:NOTE: The definition of this interface is out of the scope of this document. 4. If the MNOOperator authorises the deletion or if there is no response from the MNO,Operator, the SM-SM-DP DP sends a response to the SM-SR containing the SM-DP’s authorisation (Auth 2) for the master delete. If the SM-DP does not give its authorisation for the master d … -R, authenticate each other if not already authenticated. 6. The SM-SR sends the master delete request to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The request includes the ICCID … (or other unique identifier) of the target Profile and the authorisation of the SM-DP (Auth 2). 7. The ISD-P of the target Profile verifies the authorisation, thus verifying the master del… …

3.5.6 Profile Enablingmodified

A switch between two Profiles can be achieved by the following dedicated procedure. In this case the request is issued directly by the MNOOperator to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC. Figure 8: Profile Enabling Start Conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. Another Profile is enabled. b. The Subscription associated with the target Profile is active in the MNO’sOperator’s network. c. The EID of the target eUICC, the SRID associated with the target Profile and the ICCID of the target Profile are known by the MNO.Operator. Procedure: 1. The MNOOperator sends a Profile Enabling request to the SM-SR. The request includes the target EID and at least the ICCID (or other unique identifier) of the target Profile. 2. The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of both the currently Enabled Profile andpermits the target Profile permit the Profile switch to take place. 3. If there is a conflict with POL2, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the concerned MNO(s)Operator accordingly. 4. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if not already authenticated. 5. If there is no conflict with … e SM-SR records in the EIS that the target Profile is enabled and the previous Profile is disabled. 11. The SM-SR reports the Profile switch result back to the … MNO(s).Operator(s). These messages will include the EID and the ICCID (orof othertheir uniquerespective identifier)Profiles. 12. The SM-SR SHALL report the Profile switch result back to the M2M SP if requested by the Operator during PLMA registrations (see 3.5.155) . These messages will include the EID and the ICCID of theirthe respectivetargeted Profiles. End Condition: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. The previously Enabled Profile is disabled. The EIS is up to date.

3.5.7 Profile Enabling via SM-DPmodified

A switch between two Profiles can be achieved by the following dedicated procedure. In this case, the request is issued by the MNOOperator to the SM-DP which forwards it to the SM-SRSM- SR associated with the target eUICC. This way, the MNOOperator does not have to be linked to the SM-SM-SR SR and relies on the SM-DP to make the connection. Figure 9: Profile Enabling via SM-DP Start Conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. Another Profile is enabled. b. The Subscription associated with the target Profile is active in the MNO’sOperator’s network. c. The EID of the target eUICC, the SRID and the ICCID of the target Profile are known by the MNO.Operator. Procedure: 1. The MNOOperator sends a Profile Enabling request to the SM-DP. The request includes the target EID and at least the ICCID (or other unique identifier) of the target Profile. 2. The SM-DP identifies the related SM-SR. 3. The SM-SR and the SM-DP authenticate each other if not already authenticated. 4. The SM-DP forwards the Profile Enabling request to the SM-SR. 5. The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of both the currently Enabled Profile andpermits the target Profile permit the Profile switch to take place. 6. If there is a conflict with POL2, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the requesting SM-DPSM-DP. and the SM-DP or MNO of the disabled Profile. 7. If there is a conflict with POL2, the error message is forwarded by the SM-DP to the requesting MNO.Operator. 8. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if not already authenticated. 9. If there is no conflict with POL2, the SM- … e target Profile is enabled and the previous Profile is disabled. 15. The SM-SR reports the Profile switch result back to the requesting SM-DP and the SM-DP or … MNOOperator of the disabled Profile. These messages will include the EID and the ICCID (or other unique identifier) of their respective Profiles. 16. The Profile switch result is forwarded to the requesting MNO.Operator. 17. The SM-SR SHALL report the Profile switch result back to the M2M SP if requested by the Operator during PLMA registration (see 3.5.15). These messages will include the EID and the ICCID of the targeted Profiles. End Condition: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. The previously Enabled Profile is disabled. The EIS is up to date.

3.5.8 Profile Disablingmodified

Profile disabling can be achieved by the following procedure. The request is issued directly by the MNOOperator to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC. Figure 10: Profile Disabling Start Condition: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. Procedure: 1. The MNOOperator sends a Profile Disabling request to the SM-SR. The request includes the target EID and at least the ICCID of the target Profile. 2. If the target Profile for disabling is the Profile with Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set then the Profile disabling shallSHALL notNOT be executed. 3. The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of the Enabled Profile permits the Profile to be disabled 4. If there is a POL2 conflict, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and send error message to MNO(s).Operator. 5. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if not already authenticated. 6. If there is no POL2 conflict, the SM-SR issues a Profile enabling request to the ISD-ISD-R R on the eUICC for the Profile with Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set. 7. The eUICC performs an internal POL1 check for the currently Enabled Profile.Profile, and verifies that the currently Enabled Profile does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set. If permitted, the Enabled Profile is disabled and the ISD-R enables the Profile with Fall-backFall- Back Attribute set. 8. The ISD-R sends reports the Profile disabling result to the SM-SR. 9. If the disabling is successful the SM-SR records in the EIS that the target Profile is disabled. 10. The SM-SR reports the Profile disabling result to the MNO(s).Operator(s). This message includes the EID and the ICCID of the Profile(s). 11. The SM-SR SHALL report the Profile disabling result back to the M2M SP if requested by the Operator during PLMA registration (see 3.5.155). These messages will include the EID and the ICCID of the targeted Profiles. End Condition: The target Profile is now disabled on the eUICC, and the Profile with Fall- backBack Attribute set is enabled.

3.5.9 ISD-P Deletionmodified

A Profile can be deleted by its MNO.Operator. Figure 11: ISD-P Deletion Start Condition: The MNOOperator decides to permanently delete a Profile on a eUICC. Procedure: 1. The MNOOperator sends an ISD-P Deletion request to the SM-SR. The request includes the target EID and the ICCID (or other unique identifier) of the target Profile. 2. The SM-SR checks the POL2 of the target Profile.Profile, and verifies that the target Profile does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set. 3. If there is a conflict with POL2,POL2 or with the Fall-Back Attribute, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the MNO(s)Operator(s) accordingly 4. If the target Profile is enabled, the SM-SR starts the Profile Disabling procedure. 5. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, … 6. The SM-SR sends the ISD-P Deletion request to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile. 7. The eUICC performs a POL1 … check and a Fall-Back Attribute check. 8. If there is a conflict with POL1,POL1 or with the Fall-Back Attribute, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM-SM-SR. SR. 9. If there is no conflict, the ISD-R then erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P. 10. The ISD-R reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the SM-SR. 11. The SM-SR updates the EIS appropriately. 12. The SM-SR reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the requesting MNO.Operator. 13. The SM-SR SHALL report ISD-P deletion result back to the M2M SP if requested by the Operator during PLMA registration (see 3.5.15). These messages will include the EID and the ICCID of the targeted Profiles. End Condition: The target Profile is deleted from the eUICC. The EIS in the SM-SR is up to date.

3.5.10 ISD-P Deletion via SM-DPmodified

A Profile can be deleted by its MNO.Operator. ISD-P deletion would be requested via the SM-DP. In this case, the MNOOperator does not have to be linked to all SM-SRs and relies on the SM-DP to make the connection. Figure 12: Operational Profile Deletion via SM-DP Start Condition: The MNOOperator decides to permanently delete a Profile on a eUICC. Procedure: 1. The MNOOperator sends an ISD-P Deletion request to the SM-DP. The request includes the target EID and the ICCID (or other unique identifier) of the target Profile. The MNOOperator mayMAY also provide the SRID. 2. The SM-SR and the SM-DP authenticate each other if not already authenticated. 3. If the SRID was not provided by the MNOOperator the SM-DP identifies the related SM-SR.SM- SR. The request is passed on to the dedicated SM-SR. 4. The SM-SR checks the POL2 and the Fall-Back Attribute of the target Profile. 5. If there is a conflict with POL2,POL2 or with the Fall-Back Attribute, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the MNO(s)Operator(s) accordingly 6. If the target Profile is enabled, the SM-SR starts the Profile Disabling procedure. 7. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, … 8. The SM-SR sends an ISD-P Deletion request to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile. 9. The eUICC performs a POL1 … check and a Fall-Back Attribute check. 10. If there is a conflict with POL1,POL1 or with the Fall-Back Attribute, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM-SM-SR. SR. 11. If there is no conflict, the ISD-R then erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P. 12. The ISD-R reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the SM-SR. 13. The SM-SR updates the EIS appropriately. 14. The SM-SR reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the requesting SM-DP. 15. The SM-DP reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the requesting MNO.Operator. 16. The SM-SR SHALL report ISD-P deletion result back to the M2M SP if requested by the Operator during PLMA registration (see 3.5.15). This message will include the EID and the ICCID of the targeted Profile. End Condition: The target Profile is deleted from the eUICC. The EIS in the SM-SR is up to date.

3.5.11 SM-SR Changemodified

This procedure assumes that, prior to the procedure being executed, the MNOsOperators with installed Profiles on the concerned eUICC might request to be informed of the change by the current SM-SR (SM-SR1) and be allowed to take action as it relates to the desired disposition of their Profile (e.g. do nothing, update Policy rules, deletiondelete of the Profile). In the case where the SM-SR has to be changed, the credentials of the individual eUICCs must remain confidential. 9. Notification of the result of the EIS deletion 10. Notification of SM-SR Figure 13: SM-SR Change Start Conditions: a. The EID of the eUICC is known b. The SRIDs of SM-SR1 and SM-SR2 are known. c. The ISD-R is personalised with the ke … w SM-SR2 can address the ISD-R directly, and SM-SR2 requests the eUICC to delete the key set related to SM-SR1. 7. SM-SR2 sends a confirmation of the change to … both SM-SR1 and the initiator.SM-SR1. 8. SM-SR1 deletes the EIS dataset related to the eUICC. 9. SM-SR1 sends a notificationresponse to SM-SR2the onInitiator, indicating the deletionsuccess result of the EISoverall datasetSM-SR relatedchange tooperation. the eUICC. 10. SM-SR2 sends a notificationreport to the MNOOperator owner(s) of the Profile(s) on the eUICC, either directly or via the SM-DP, of the change of SM-SR. 11. If applicable, SM-SR2 sends a report to the M2M SP managing the eUICC. End Conditions: a. The ISD-R is personalised with the keys of the target SM-SR (SM-SR2). b. The eUICC is registered within the target SM-SR (SM-SR2). c. The EIS and EID reside within the target SM-SR (SM-SR2). d. SM-SR1 is no longer related to the eUICC. e. The MNOOperator(s) owner of the Profile(s) is/are aware of the change. f. The M2M SP managing the eUICC is aware of the change. NOTE1: This procedure MAY not support the transfer of the PLMA. If such transfer is supported, this is out of scope of this specification. In all cases, the Operator MAY set the same or different PLMA on SM-SR2, as described in procedure 3.5.15.1. NOTE2: In this procedure, the Initiator SHOULD be the Operator1 as it is the one requesting the transfer from SM-SR1 to SM-SR2.

3.5.13 Fall-Back Mechanismmodified

In the event of loss of network connectivity, as detected by the machine to machine Device, there is a need to change to the Profile with Fall-backFall-Back attribute set. In this case the eUICC disables the currently Enabled Profile (Profile A) and enables the Profile with Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set (Profile B). If Profile A has POL1 rule “disable not allowed” set then the eUICC will overrule this setting. If Profile A has POL1 rule “Profile deletion is mandatory when it is disabled” set, the eUICC SHALL NOT automatically delete this Profile. For security reasons if Profile A has the POL1 rule “disabled not allowed” or “Profile deletion is mandatory when it is disabled” set then the eUICC can only switch back to Profile A untilexcept suchif time that the POL1 of Profile A ishas changedbeen or Profile A is deleted by use of the Master Delete function. Profile A cannot be deleted with a normal delete command in this situation. Start Conditions: a. The machine to machine Device reports network loss to the eUICC. b. The eUICC is configured to perform the Fall-backFall-Back mechanism if certain network connectivity issues are reported by the machine to machine Device. c. The Profile with Fall-backFall-Back attribute set is not the presently Enabled Profile. Procedure: 1. The eUICC disables the currently Enabled Profile (overruling POL1 if necessary) and enables the Profile with Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set. 2. The eUICC reports the change of Enabled Profile to the SM-SR. The SM-SR updates the EIS. 3. The SM-SR reports the change to the owner(s)respective owners of the Profile(s).targeted Profiles. and to the M2M SP, if requested by the Operator during PLMA registration (see 3.5.15). End Condition: The eUICC has enabled the Profile with Fall-backFall-Back Attribute set and the EIS of the SM-SR is up-to-date.

3.5.14 eUICC Certificate Verificationmodified

This procedure defines how an MNOSM-DP on behalf of the Operator can verify if an eUICC is certified, in particular if the eUICC is designed according to the present specification. Procedure: 1. The MNO,OperatorSM-DP, orSHALL SM-DP on behalf of the MNO, shall be able to retrieve the eUICC certificate from: a. The EIS stored within the SM-SR in which the eUICC is registered OR b. The EUM (Note:NOTE: this interface is out of scope of this document). 2. The MNOSM-DP extracts the EUM information from the eUICC certificate (for example: certificates, SASSAS-UP accreditation[23 etc.).UP (Note:[23] At present the SAS accreditation schemeetc.). for eUICCs is for future study). 3. With the information retrieved at step 2, the MNOSM-DP requests the EUM certificate from the SM-SR, the EUM or the GSMA. (Note:NOTE: The interface to the EUM and GSMA are out of the scope of this document). 4. The MNOSM-DP verifies the validity and signature of the EUM certificate. 5. The MNOSM-DP verifies the EUM signature of the eUICC certificate. End Condition: The eUICC certificate and EUM certificate have been checked by the MNO.SM- DP.

3.5.15 Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Registration at SM- SRadded

In some circumstances, on one hand, an M2M SP MAY have to manage the lifecycle of Operator Profiles by its own, and to be notified of any change in Operator Profiles lifecycle on the eUICCs they are responsible for. On the other hand, it is important for an Operator to be able to control which M2M SP is allowed to perform Profile Lifecycle Management on Operator’s Profile(s). The Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation (PLMA) mechanisms described in this chapter will allow Operators to provide Profile Lifecycle Management functionality to an M2M SP while keeping the control of allowed commands and reports. Furthermore, an Operator might be willing to receive or not reports when an authorised M2M SP is changing the lifecycle of its own Profile(s). All PLMA requests defined below will require a prior mutual authentication between the Operator and the SM-SR. In case an Operator does not have a dedicated interface with an SM-SR, it SHALL be possible to manage PLMA via its SM-DP interface. The SM-DP SHALL forward PLMA management commands to the SM-SR without any further processing and SHALL NOT host any PLMA. NOTE: It SHOULD be considered that the role of an M2M SP can also be played by a partner Operator or affiliate from the Operator.

3.5.15.1 Set Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisationadded

This procedure sets the PLMAs on the SM-SR and includes which Platform Management commands are allowed to be executed by an M2M SP and which reports SHALL be sent to M2M SP and Operator. Figure 14: Set Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Start Condition: The Operator opened a dedicated interface with the SM-SR, either directly or through its SM- DP, for PLMA management. Procedure: 1. The Operator whose Profile is resident on a set of eUICCs sends a PLMA request to the SM-SR managing those eUICCs, either directly (1.a) or through its SM-DP (1.b, 1.c), to set PLMA. 2. The SM-SR creates the corresponding PLMA for a specific set of eUICCs and/or Profiles based on dedicated identifier provided to the SM-SR. 3. The SM-SR confirms the successful creation of the PLMA by notifying the requesting Operator, either directly (3.a) or through its SM-DP (3.b, 3.c), as well as the correspondent M2M SP (3.d). NOTE: The definition of needed identifier to set the PLMA on eUICC and /or Profiles is out of scope of this specification. End Condition: The SM-SR has set the Profile Lifecycle Management functionality for the addressed M2M SP. The M2M SP is able to manage the lifecycle of the targeted Profile on a set of eUICCs and to receive reports related to those Profiles. In case of change done on the referenced Profile by the referenced M2M SP, the Operator is receiving relevant reports. The Operator is able to send the set PLMA requests only for its own Profiles. Any changes to the PLMA (e.g. removal of reports to be sent to M2M SP) must be done by this procedure. Depending on the Operator choice, the PLMA will allow: a. The referenced M2M SP to:  Request to enable the referenced Profile.  Request to disable the referenced Profile.  Request to delete the referenced Profile.  Request to set the Fall-Back Attribute on the referenced Profile.  Un-Set the Fall-Back Attribute on the referenced Profile as a result of setting it on another Profile.  Request to set the Emergency Profile Attribute on the referenced Profile.  Un-Set the Emergency Profile Attribute on the referenced Profile as a result of setting it on another Profile. b. The referenced M2M SP to receive reports on:  Referenced Profile enabling.  Referenced Profile disabling.  Referenced Profile deletion.  Referenced Profile Fall-Back Attribute setting/un-setting.  Referenced Profile Emergency Profile Attribute setting/un-setting. c. Optionally (if supported by the SM-SR), the Operator to not receive reports on:  Referenced Profile enabling.  Referenced Profile disabling.  Referenced Profile deletion.  Referenced Profile Fall-Back Attribute setting/un-setting.  Referenced Profile Emergency Profile Attribute setting/un-setting. NOTE: When no PLMA is provided to the M2M SP but the M2M SP has the need to get status changes on Profiles being resident on eUICCs it is responsible for, it is up to the Operator, owning the Profiles on the eUICC, to forward reports about Profile status changes to the correspondent M2M SP. This is outside of this specification.

3.5.15.2 Retrieve Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation– by Operatoradded

With this procedure the Operator retrieves the PLMA set on the SM-SR. Figure 15: Retrieve Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation by Operator Start Condition: a. The Operator opened a dedicated interface with the SM-SR, either directly or through its SM-DP, for PLMA management. b. PLMA MAY exist in the SM-SR. Procedure: 1. The Operator whose Profile resides on a set of eUICCs sends a PLMA request to the SM-SR managing those eUICCs, either directly (1.a) or through its SM-DP (1.b, 1.c), to retrieve PLMA, applying to its Profile(s) for an M2M SP.  It SHALL be possible for the Operator to set in the request only the M2M SP ID and / or any identifier pointing to a set of eUICCs and/or Profiles. 2. The SM-SR retrieves the PLMA applying to the identifier sent in the request. 3. The SM-SR return the corresponding PLMA to the requesting Operator (3.a, 3.b, 3.c). NOTE: The definition of needed identifier to retrieve PLMA applying to a set of eUICCs and/or Profiles is out of scope of this specification. End Condition: The Operator has received the PLMA according to input parameters the Operator has provided in the request. An Operator is able to send the retrieve PLMA request for its own Profiles only.

3.5.15.3 Retrieve Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation– by M2M SPadded

With this procedure, the M2M SP retrieves the PLMA the Operator has set on the SM-SR. Figure 16: Retrieve Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation by M2M SPStart Condition: a. The M2M SP opened a dedicated interface with the SM-SR to be able to retrieve its own PLMA. b. PLMA MAY exist in the SM-SR. Procedure: 1. An M2M SP who wants to retrieve PLMA applying to a set of Operator owned Profiles, sends a PLMA request to the SM-SR, managing those eUICCs having the targeted Operator Profiles installed  It SHALL be possible for the M2M SP to set in the request the Operator ID only and / or any identifier pointing to a set of eUICCs and/or Profiles. 2. The SM-SR return the corresponding PLMA to the requesting M2M SP. NOTE: The definition of needed identifier to retrieve PLMA applying to a set of eUICCs and/or Profiles is out of scope of this specification. End Condition: The M2M SP has received the PLMA according to the input parameter the M2M SP has provided in the request. An M2M SP is able to retrieve PLMA only for Profiles it has authorisations for. An M2M SP is able to send the retrieve PLMA request only for its own eUICCs.

3.5.15.4 Delete Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisationadded

The delete PLMA requests comprises the following steps: Figure 17: Delete Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Start Condition: a. The Operator opened a dedicated interface with the SM-SR, either directly or through its SM-DP, for PLMA management. b. PLMA exists in the SM-SR. Procedure: 1. An Operator whose Profile is resident on a set of eUICCs sends a PLMA request to the SM-SR managing those eUICCs, either directly (1.a) or through its SM-DP (1.b, 1.c), to delete PLMA.  It SHALL be possible for the Operator to set in the request only the M2M SP ID and / or any identifier pointing to a set of eUICCs and/or Profiles. 2. The SM-SR deletes the PLMA applying to the identifier sent in the request. 3. The SM-SR confirms the successful deletion of the PLMA by notifying the requesting Operator, either directly (3.a) or through its SM-DP (3.b, 3.c), as well as the corresponding M2M SP (3.d). End Condition: The SM-SR has deleted the Profile Lifecycle Management functionality for the addressed M2M SP. The referenced M2M SP is no more able to manage the lifecycle of the Operator Profile(s) for the set of eUICCs as well as to receive reports related to those Profiles. An Operator is able to send the delete PLMA requests only for its own Profiles. NOTE: In case that the M2M SP has still the need to get status changes on Profiles being resident on eUICCs it is responsible for, it is up to the Operator, owning the Profiles on the eUICC, to forward reports about Profile status changes to the correspondent M2M SP. This is outside of this specification.

3.5.16 Profile Enabling via M2M SPadded

A switch between two Profiles can be achieved by the following dedicated procedure. In this case the request is issued directly by the M2M SP to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC. To be successful, the authorisation for the M2M SP SHALL be configured in the SM- SR (see Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Registration at SM-SR chapter 3.5.15 for details). Figure 18: Profile Enabling via M2M SP Start Conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. Another Profile is enabled. b. The Subscription associated with the target Profile is active in the Operator’s network. c. The EID of the target eUICC, the SRID associated with the target Profile and the ICCID of the target Profile are known by the M2M SP. Procedure: 1. The M2M SP sends a Profile Enabling from M2M SP request to the SM-SR. The request includes the target EID and the ICCID of the target Profile. 2. The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of both the currently Enabled Profile and the target Profile permit the Profile switch to take place. The SM-SR checks if the M2M SP has the authorisations to enable the targeted Profile. 3. If there is a conflict with POL2 or with the M2M SP authorisations, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and MAY inform the M2M SP. In addition the SM-SR MAY inform the corresponding Operator(s) accordingly. 4. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if not already authenticated. 5. If there is no conflict with POL2, the SM-SR issues a Profile Enabling request to the ISD-R on the eUICC including at least the ISD-P AID of the target Profile. 6. The eUICC performs a POL1 check. 7. If there is a conflict with POL1, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM- SR. 8. In addition the SM-SR MAY inform the concerned M2M SP and Operator(s) accordingly. 9. If there is no conflict with POL1, the ISD-R performs the Profile switch resulting in the target Profile being enabled and the previously Enabled Profile being disabled. 10. The ISD-R reports the Profile switch result to the SM-SR. 11. If the switch is successful the SM-SR records in the EIS that the target Profile is enabled and the previous Profile is disabled. 12. The SM-SR reports the Profile switch result back to the M2M SP. 13. The SM-SR SHALL report the Profile switch result back to the Operator(s) if requested by the Operator(s). These messages will include the M2M SP OID, the EID and the ICCID of their targeted Profiles. End Condition: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. The previously Enabled Profile is disabled. The EIS is up to date.

3.5.17 Profile Disabling via M2M SPadded

Profile disabling can be achieved by the following procedure. In this case the request is issued directly by the M2M SP to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC. To be successful, the authorisation for the M2M SP SHALL be configured in the SM-SR (see Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Registration at SM-SR chapter 3.5.15 for details). Figure 19: Profile Disabling via M2M SP Start Conditions: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. Procedure: 1. The M2M SP sends a Profile Disabling from M2M SP request to the SM-SR. The request includes the target EID and the ICCID of the target Profile. 2. If the target Profile for disabling is the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set then the Profile disabling SHALL NOT be executed. 3. The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of the Enabled Profile permits the Profile to be disabled. The SM-SR checks if the M2M SP has the authorisations to disable the targeted Profile 4. If there is a conflict with POL2 or with the M2M SP authorisations, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and MAY inform the M2M SP. In addition the SM-SR MAY inform the corresponding Operator accordingly. 5. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if not already authenticated. 6. If there is no POL2 conflict, the SM-SR issues a Profile enabling request to the ISD- R on the eUICC for the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set. 7. The eUICC performs an internal POL1 check for the currently Enabled Profile. 8. If there is a conflict with POL1, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM- SR. 9. In addition the SM-SR MAY inform the corresponding M2M SP and Operator accordingly. 10. If permitted, the Enabled Profile is disabled and the ISD-R enables the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set. 11. The ISD-R sends reports of the Profile disabling result to the SM-SR. 12. If the disabling is successful the SM-SR records in the EIS that the target Profile is disabled. 13. The SM-SR reports the Profile disabling result back to the M2M SP. 14. The SM-SR SHALL report the Profile disabling result back to the Operator(s) if requested by the Operator(s). These messages will include the M2M SP OID, the EID and the ICCID of their targeted Profiles. End Condition: The target Profile is now disabled on the eUICC, and the Profile with Fall- Back Attribute set is enabled.

3.5.18 ISD-P Deletion via M2M SPadded

A Profile can be deleted by the following procedure. In this case the request is issued directly by the M2M SP to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC. To be successful, the authorisation for the M2M SP SHALL be configured in the SM-SR (see Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Registration at SM-SR chapter 3.5.15 for details). Figure 20: ISD-P Deletion via M2M SP Start Conditions: The M2M SP decides to permanently delete a Profile on a eUICC. Procedure: 1. The M2M SP sends an ISD-P Deletion from M2M SP request to the SM-SR. The request includes the target EID and the ICCID of the targeted Profile. 2. The SM-SR checks the POL2 of the target Profile. The SM-SR checks if the M2M SP has the authorisations to delete the targeted Profile 3. If there is a conflict with POL2 or with the M2M SP authorisations, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and MAY inform the M2M SP. In addition the SM-SR MAY inform the corresponding Operator accordingly. 4. If the target Profile is enabled, the SM-SR starts the Profile Disabling procedure. 5. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if not already authenticated. 6. The SM-SR sends the ISD-P Deletion request to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The request includes the ISD-P AID of the targeted Profile. 7. The eUICC performs a POL1 check. 8. If there is a conflict with POL1, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM- SR. 9. In addition the SM-SR MAY inform the corresponding M2M SP and Operator accordingly. 10. If there is no conflict, the ISD-R then erases the targeted Profile and the related ISD- P. 11. The ISD-R sends reports of the ISD-P deletion result to the SM-SR. 12. If the ISD-P deletion is successful the SM-SR updates the EIS appropriately 13. The SM-SR reports the ISD-P deletion result back to the M2M SP. 14. The SM-SR SHALL report the ISD-P deletion result back to the Operator(s) if requested by the Operator(s). These messages will include the M2M SP OID, the EID and the ICCID of the deleted Profile. End Condition: The target Profile is deleted from the eUICC. The EIS in the SM-SR is up to date.

3.5.19 Fall-Back Attribute Managementadded

This procedure contains the steps needed to change the Fall-Back Attribute from one Profile to another. The Operator1 owning the Profile that currently has the Fall-Back Attribute set and the Operator2 that wants to set the Fall-Back Attribute on its own Profile need to have an agreement. This agreement is materialised by the Operator1 settings a PLMA where it MAY grant Operator2 the authorisation to unset the Fall-Back Attribute on its Operator1 Profile as a consequence of setting the Fall-Back Attribute on the Operator 2 Profile by Operator 2. NOTE: There is no operation that explicitly un-sets the Fall-Back Attribute on a Profile. The Fall-Back Attribute is only un-set as the consequence of setting the Fall- Back Attribute on another Profile. Figure 21: Fall-Back Attribute Management Start Conditions: a. Profile A with Fall-Back Attribute set. b. Profile B, targeted to have the Fall-Back Attribute set, present on the eUICC. c. Profile A owner Operator1 has configured a PLMA authorizing Operator2 to unset the Fall-Back Attribute on Profile A. Procedure: 1. The Operator2 owning Profile B requests setting of the Fall-Back Attribute on Profile B to the SM-SR, either directly (1.a) or through its SM-DP (1.b, 1.c). 2. The SM-SR checks if Operator1 has configured a PLMA authorizing Operator2 to unset the Fall-Back Attribute on Profile A. a. If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the Operator 2. 3. The SM-SR, by calling Set Fall-Back Attribute function, requests the eUICC to set the Fall-Back Attribute to the Profile B. 4. The eUICC performs the operation. This will remove the Fall-Back Attribute from Profile A. 5. The eUICC reports the status of the Set Fall-Back operation to the SM-SR 6. The SM-SR update the EIS accordingly. 7. The SM-SR reports to the Operator1 owning the Profile A that the Fall-Back Attribute has been unset on its Profile. 8. The SM-SR reports to Operator2 that Profile B now has the Fall-Back Attribute set. 9. The SM-SR SHALL report to the M2M SP that the Profile A has the Fall-Back Attribute unset, if requested by the Operator1 during PLMA registration (see 3.5.155). 10. The SM-SR SHALL report to the M2M SP that the Profile B has the Fall-Back Attribute set, if requested by the Operator2 during PLMA registration (see 3.5.155). End Conditions: The Profile B has the Fall-Back Attribute set. The Profile A has the Fall-Back Attribute unset.

3.5.20 Fall-Back Attribute Management via the M2M SPadded

Operators MAY also authorise an M2M SP to change the Fall-Back Attribute from one Profile to another. This procedure contains the steps needed to execute such an operation. The Operator1 owning the Profile that currently has the Fall-Back Attribute set and the Operator2 that agree to have the Fall-Back Attribute set on its own Profile need to have an agreement with the M2M SP. This agreement is materialised by the Operator2 and Operator1 settings PLMAs where they MAY grant the M2M SP the authorisation to set or unset the Fall- Back Attribute on their respective Profile. NOTE: There is no operation that explicitly un-sets the Fall-Back Attribute on a Profile. The Fall-Back Attribute is only unset as the consequence of setting the Fall- Back Attribute on another Profile. Figure 22: Fall-Back Attribute Management via M2M SP Start Conditions: a. Profile A with Fall-Back Attribute set. b. Profile B, targeted to have the Fall-Back Attribute set, present on the eUICC. c. Profile A owner Operator1 has configured a PLMA authorizing the M2M SP to unset the Fall-Back Attribute. d. Profile B owner Operator2 has configured a PLMA authorising the M2M SP to set the Fall-Back Attribute. Procedure: 1. The M2M SP requests setting of the Fall-Back Attribute on Profile B to the SM-SR. 2. The SM-SR checks if a PLMA from Operator2 authorises the M2M SP to set the Fall- Back Attribute on Profile B. a) If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the M2M SP. 3. The SM-SR checks if a PLMA from Operator1 authorises the M2M SP to unset the Fall-Back Attribute on Profile A. a) If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the M2M SP. 4. The SM-SR, by calling Set Fall-Back Attribute function, requests the eUICC to set the Fall-Back Attribute to the Profile B. 5. The eUICC Sets the Fall-Back Attribute on the Profile B. This will remove the Fall- Back Attribute from Profile A. 6. The eUICC sends a report of the operation to the SM-SR 7. The SM-SR update the EIS accordingly. 8. The SM-SR reports to the Operator1 that Profile A now has the Fall-Back Attribute unset. 9. The SM-SR reports to Operator2 that Profile B now has the Fall-Back Attribute set. 10. The SM-SR reports to the M2M SP that the Fall-Back Attribute is now set in Profile B. End Conditions: The Profile B has the Fall-Back Attribute set. The Profile A has the Fall-Back Attribute unset.

3.5.21 Emergency Profile Attribute Managementadded

Under certain circumstances, it MAY be necessary to set the Emergency Profile Attribute for a Profile when no other Profile has the Emergency Profile Attribute set (case 1), or, a change regarding the Profile that has the Emergency Profile Attribute set is needed (case 2). This procedure contains the steps needed to execute such operations. For case 2. the Operator1 owning the Profile that currently has the Emergency Profile Attribute set and the Operator2 that wants to set the Emergency Profile Attribute on its own Profile need to have an agreement. This agreement is materialised by the Operator1 settings a PLMA where it MAY grant Operator2 the authorisation to unset the Emergency Profile Attribute on this Operator1 Profile. NOTE: There is no operation that explicitly unsets the Emergency Profile Attribute on a Profile. The Emergency Profile Attribute is only unset as a consequence of setting the Emergency Profile Attribute on another Profile. For case 1 the procedure below applies: Figure 23: Emergency Profile Attribute Management (case 1) Start Conditions (case 1): a. No Profile with Emergency Profile Attribute set exists. b. Profile B, targeted to have the Emergency Profile Attribute set, present on the eUICC and disabled c. Profile B does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set. Procedure (case 1): 1. The Operator2 owning Profile B requests setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile B to the SM-SR, either directly (1.a) or through its SM-DP (1.b, 1.c). 2. The SM-SR, by calling Set Emergency Profile Attribute function, requests the eUICC to set the Emergency Profile Attribute to the Profile B. 3. The eUICC verifies that Profile B does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set (3a) and performs the operation (3b). a. If the conditions (3a) is not true, the eUICC aborts the procedure and reports an error to the SM-SR. 4. The eUICC reports the status of the Set Emergency Profile Attribute operation to the SM-SR 5. The SM-SR updates the EIS accordingly. 6. The SM-SR reports to all Operators, having a Profile on this eUICC, that a Profile now has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. This report MAY include the Profile ID. 7. The SM-SR SHALL report to the M2M SP that the Profile B has the Emergency Profile Attribute set, if requested by the Operator2 during PLMA registrations (see 3.5.155). End Conditions (case 1): The Profile B has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. For case 2 the procedure below applies Figure 24: Emergency Profile Attribute Management (case 2) Start Conditions (case 2): a. Profile A with Emergency Profile Attribute set. b. Profile B, targeted to have the Emergency Profile Attribute set, present on the eUICC. c. Profile A owner Operator1 has configured a PLMA authorizing Operator2 to unset the Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile A. Procedure (case 2): 1. The Operator2 owning Profile B requests setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile B to the SM-SR, either directly (1.a) or through its SM-DP (1.b, 1.c). 2. The SM-SR checks if Operator2 has PLMA configured to unset the Emergency Profile Attribute from the Operator1 owning the Profile that currently has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. a. If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the Operator 2. 3. The SM-SR, by calling Set Emergency Profile Attribute function, requests the eUICC to set the Emergency Profile Attribute to the Profile B. 4. The eUICC verifies that Profile B does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set (4a) and performs the operation (4b). This will remove the Emergency Profile Attribute from Profile A. a. If the conditions (4a) is not true, the eUICC aborts the procedure and reports an error to the SM-SR. 5. The eUICC reports the status of the Set Emergency Profile Attribute operation to the SM-SR 6. The SM-SR updates the EIS accordingly. 7. The SM-SR reports to all Operators, having a Profile on this eUICC, that another Profile now has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. This report MAY include the Profile ID. 8. The SM-SR SHALL report to the M2M SP that the Profile A has the Emergency Profile Attribute unset, if requested by the Operator1 during PLMA registrations (see 3.5.155). 9. The SM-SR SHALL report to the M2M SP that the Profile B has the Emergency Profile Attribute set, if requested by the Operator2 during PLMA registrations (see 3.5.155). End Conditions (case 2): The Profile A has the Emergency Profile Attribute unset. The Profile B has the Emergency Profile Attribute set.

3.5.22 Emergency Profile Attribute Management via the M2M SPadded

Operators MAY also authorise an M2M SP to change which Profile has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. Under certain circumstances, it MAY be necessary to set the Emergency Profile Attribute for a Profile when no other Profile has the Emergency Profile Attribute set (case 1), or, a change regarding the Profile that has the Emergency Profile Attribute set is needed (case 2). This procedure contains the steps needed to execute such operations. For case 1 the Operator2 that agrees to have the Emergency Profile Attribute set on its own Profile need to have an agreement with the M2M SP. This agreement is materialised by the Operator2 setting PLMAs where Operator2 MAY grant the M2M SP the authorisation to set the Emergency Profile Attribute on its respective Profile. For case 2. the Operator1 owning the Profile that currently has the Emergency Profile Attribute set and the Operator2 that agree to have the Emergency Profile Attribute set on its own Profile need to have an agreement with the M2M SP. This agreement is materialised by the Operator2 and Operator1 setting PLMAs where Operator2 MAY grant the M2M SP the authorisation to set the Emergency Profile Attribute on its respective Profile and where Operator1 MAY grant the M2M SP the authorisation to un-set the Emergency Profile Attribute on its respective Profile. NOTE: There is no operation that explicitly unsets the Emergency Profile Attribute on a Profile. The Emergency Profile Attribute is only unset as a consequence of setting the Emergency Profile Attribute on another Profile. For case 1 the procedure below applies: Figure 25: Emergency Profile Attribute Management via M2M SP (case 1) Start Conditions: a. Profile B, targeted to have the Emergency Profile Attribute set, present on the eUICC. b. Profile B owner Operator2 has configured a PLMA authorizing the M2M SP to set the Emergency Profile Attribute. Procedure: 1. The M2M SP requests setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile B to the SM-SR. 2. The SM-SR checks if a PLMA from Operator2 that authorises the M2M SP to set the Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile B is configured a. If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the M2M SP. 3. The SM-SR, by calling Set Emergency Profile Attribute function, requests the eUICC to set the Emergency Profile Attribute to the Profile B. 4. The eUICC verifies that Profile B does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set (4a) and then sets the Emergency Profile Attribute to the Profile B (4b). a. If the conditions (4a) is not true, the eUICC aborts the procedure and reports an error to the SM-SR. 5. The eUICC sends a report of the operation to the SM-SR 6. The SM-SR updates the EIS accordingly. 7. The SM-SR reports to all Operators, having a Profile on this eUICC, that a Profile now has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. This report MAY include the Profile ID. 8. The SM-SR reports to the M2M SP that the Emergency Profile Attribute is now set for Profile B. End Conditions: The Profile B has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. For case 2 the procedure below applies: Figure 26: Emergency Profile Attribute Management via M2M SP (case 2) Start Conditions: a. Profile A with Emergency Profile Attribute set. b. Profile B, targeted to have the Emergency Profile Attribute set, present on the eUICC. c. Profile A owner Operator1 has configured a PLMA authorizing the M2M-SP to unset the Emergency Profile Attribute. d. Profile B owner Operator2 has configured a PLMA authorizing the M2M-SP to set the Emergency Profile Attribute. Procedure: 1. The M2M SP requests setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile B to the SM-SR. 2. The SM-SR checks if a PLMA from Operator2 that authorises the M2M SP to set the Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile B is configured. a. If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the M2M SP. 3. The SM-SR checks if a PLMA from Operator1 that authorises the M2M SP to unset the Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile A is configured. a. If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the M2M SP. 4. The SM-SR, by calling Set Emergency Profile Attribute function, requests the eUICC to set the Emergency Profile Attribute to the Profile B. 5. The eUICC verifies that Profile B does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set (5a) and then sets the Emergency Profile Attribute to the Profile B (5b). This will remove the Emergency Profile Attribute from Profile A. a. If the conditions (5a) is not true, the eUICC aborts the procedure and reports an error to the SM-SR. 6. The eUICC sends a report of the operation to the SM-SR 7. The SM-SR updates the EIS accordingly. 8. The SM-SR reports to all Operators, having a Profile on this eUICC, that another Profile now has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. This report MAY include the Profile ID. 9. The SM-SR reports to the M2M SP that the Emergency Profile Attribute is now set for Profile B. End Conditions: The Profile A has the Emergency Profile Attribute unset. The Profile B has the Emergency Profile Attribute set.

3.5.23 Local Enable of the Test Profileadded

A switch from Operational Profile to the Test Profile can be achieved by the following dedicated procedure. The request is issued directly from the Device to the eUICC. Start Conditions: An Operational Profile is enabled. Procedure: 1. The Device sends a Local Enable request to the eUICC. 2. The eUICC performs a verification that the Profile to be enabled is a Test Profile. 3. If the Profile to be enabled is not a Test Profile, the eUICC SHALL abort the procedure and informs the Device. 4. The eUICC performs the Profile switch, without enforcing POL1, resulting in the Test Profile being enabled and the previously Enabled Profile being disabled. 5. The eUICC stores the ISD-P AID of the previously enabled Operational Profile. 6. The eUICC reports the Profile switch to the Device. End Condition: The Test Profile is enabled on the eUICC. The previously enabled Operational Profile is disabled.

3.5.24 Local Disable of the Test Profileadded

Local Disable can be achieved by the following procedure. The request is issued directly by the Device to the eUICC. Start Condition: The Test Profile is enabled on the eUICC. Procedure: 1. The Device sends a Local Disable request to the eUICC. 2. If the Profile to be disabled is not a Test Profile then the Local Disable SHALL NOT be executed. 3. The eUICC enables the previously enabled Operational Profile. 4. If the network attach fails, the eUICC SHALL activate the Fall-Back Mechanism. 5. The eUICC reports the Profile switch to the Device. 6. The eUICC MAY report the successful Local Disable result to the SM-SR. End Condition: The Test Profile is disabled on the eUICC, and the previously Enabled Profile or the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set is enabled.

3.6.1 Overview Diagram of Rule Management Systemmodified

The figure below represents the Policy Rule management system: Figure 14:27: Policy Rule Management System

3.6.2 Policy Rules Managementmodified

Policy control, as it relates to a Profile, is required by the MNOOperator and is achieved through the use of rules set by the MNO.Operator. This Policy control is under the control (or jurisdiction) of a single MNOOperator Policy. This Policy mayMAY be comprised of sub-policies whose enforcement lies with different entities. There are two types of rules:  POL1 – these rules resides within a Profile and would be enforced by the eUICC.  POL2 – these rules would be stored at and enforced by the SM-SR. The MNOOperator sends POL2 directly to the SM-SR or through the SM-DP for attaching as metadata to a Profile. POL1 and POL2 are representations of a common MNOOperator Policy enforced in different locations/entities. The combination of POL1 and POL2 represent the contract between an MNOOperator and a CustomerSubscriber as applied to the Profile. In this section all commands are considered as being updates; in the first instance when a rule is first established is considered a special case of update.

3.6.2.1 SM-SR Policy Rule Management Enginemodified

The SM-SR has a Policy Rule management engine identified as “Task 1” in the diagram. Task 1 accepts the following commands: 1) Update POL2 as per MNOOperator request 2) Update POL2 as per MNOOperator request via SM-DP Task 1 sets the POL2 as per the metadata supplied with a Profile from SM-DP. Task 1 enforces POL2 rules right after installation of the relat… …

3.6.2.2 SM-DP Policy Rule Management Enginemodified

The SM-DP has a Policy Rule management engine identified as “Task 2” and “Task 4” in the diagram. Task 2 accepts the following commands: 1) Set POL1 as per MNOOperator request and embed it in the Profile. Task 4 accepts the following commands 1) “Update POL2” from the MNO,Operator, and passes it to the SM-SR for updating the EIS. 2) Set POL2 from the MNOOperator and attach it to a Profile as metadata for transmission to the SM-SR.

3.6.2.3 eUICC Policy Rule Management Enginemodified

…e installation of the related Profile (see role of Platform Service Manager in Section 3.2.2). Task 3 accepts the following command: 1) Read/Update POL1 as per … MNOOperator request (commands are sent by the MNO’sOperator’s respective OTA system).

3.6.2.4 OTA Policy Rule Update Mechanismmodified

For Task 5 the MNOOperator OTA Platform is used. In this case it is accepting POL1 update commands from the MNOOperator Rule Maker and issues POL1 updates to the eUICC.

3.6.3 Policy Control Mechanismmodified

The Policy Control Mechanism within the eUICC is a combination of:  The Policy Rules stored within the ISD-P under MNOOperator authority;  The Policy Rules Enforcer, which is the process delivering the Policy Enforcement Function and resides within the Platform Service Manager. See the diagram in Section 3.2.2

3.6.3.1 Policy Rulesmodified

Policy Rules are checked at different state changes of Profiles. They mayMAY impact both the state of the Profile that is associated with the rule and the state of other Profiles. Depending on the nature of the rule, Policy enforcement can happen at the eUICC and/or at the SM-SR level. Only the MNOOperator which is the owner of the Profile is able to modify the Policy Rules. At the eUICC level, the rules are part of the Profile package and are enforced by the eUICC operating system through the interaction with the Platform Service Manager. The MNOOperator can update the Policy Rules within hisits Profile using hisits own OTA Platform(s). Updating can only be done when the Profile is in enabled state. The policy enforcement mechanisms defined in this document to enforce the … ipating Operators can enforce policy rules provided such actions comply with applicable competition and regulatory law. The following Policy Rules are defined: … Note:NOTE: This assumes the SM-SR to be GSMA certified and trusted by the MNO.Operator. Policy Rules Enforcement when the Enforced at Profile is 1 Disabling of this Profile not Enabled eUICC via POL1 allowed SM-SR via POL2 2 Deletion of this Profile not Enabled or Disabled eUICC via POL1 allowed SM-SR via POL2 3 Profile deletion is N/A eUICC via POL1 mandatory when it is SM-SR via POL2 disabled. POL1 and POL2 settings mayMAY or mayMAY not be the same. POL1 and POL2 are enforced by different entities (eUICC for POL1; SM-SR for POL2) and will be enforced independently. The explicit setting of POL1 and POL2 rules is the choice of the MNOOperator (e.g. to set POL1 rules to be empty).

4.1 Security Challengesmodified

…t UICC and its management systems. Considering the new delivery of Profiles in the eUICC compared to the existing model, the following main security challenges … shallSHALL be considered and fixed in the security analysis: a) Different Actors mayMAY be involved in Profile creation, load, install and enabling and be involved in managing the eUICC during its lifecycle. b) A Profile can be replaced in the eUICC. c) Several Profiles mayMAY be hosted at a given time in the eUICC. d) Authentication algorithms mayMAY be shared between operators. e) Profile and Platform Management are controlled through rules and/or commands which need to be considered in the assets to be protected. f) Remote installation/Provisioning of a Profile. g) Remote management of the Profile. Note:NOTE: The support of proprietary authentication algorithms and the upgradability of authentication algorithms are for further study. Therefore, the challenge is to d… …

4.3 Aim of the Security Realm Approachmodified

…t between different administrative entities, is considered to be an independent Security Realm. Negotiated and shared logical secured interface Realm 1 Realm 2 … MNOOperator SMDP SMSR eUICC Realm 3 Realm 4 Realm 5 MNOOperator SMDP SMSR eUICC Realm 6 Realm 7 Realm 8 Realm 9 9 MNOOperator SMDP SMSR eUICC Realm 10 Realm 11 Realm12 MNOOperator SMDP SMSR eUICC Realm 13 Realm 14 Realm15 SMDP MNO SMSR eUICC Realm 16 M2M SP Realm 17 Realm18 Operator SMSR eUICC Realm 19 Realm20 M2M SP SMSR eUICC Figure 15:28: Examples of security realms organisation in the security model

4.4 Security Requirementsmodified

This section lists security requirements. In the security model we consider the Customer,Subscriber, MNO,Operator, M2M SP, SM-DP, SM-SR, eUICC and eUICCEUM. Manufacturer. We consider the MNO,Operator, M2M SP, SM-DP, SM-SR, eUICC and eUICCEUM Manufacturer as elements that can belong to a Security Realm. The requirements section is organised in three layered parts:  General requirements, to be applied to the whol … the security realm;  Security requirements attached to a particular role; a section is dedicated to each of the following Roles: o eUICC; o SM-SR; o SM-DP; o … Machine to Machine Device. Role 1 Role 2 Role 3 Role 4 Device requirement requirement requirement requirement requirements s s Securitysrealm 2 Securitysrealm 3 Security realm 1 requirements requirements requirements General Requirements Figure 16:29: Example of security requirements organisation

4.4.1 General Security Requirementsmodified

# Requirement Cryptographic solutions used within the eUICC ecosystem shallSHALL offer strength at SG1 least conform to NIST cryptographic recommendations in NIST SP800-57 [NIST].[20]. Past or future communications associated with Profile download and installation, between the SM-DP and the eUICC, whenever trappable by third party shallSHALL notNOT be SG2 be recoverable based upon the compromise of a single long-term key used for message encryption. A similar requirement for Platform Management is for further study. SG3 The certificate chains shallSHALL be highly secure, highly reliable and verifiableverifiable. [if used]. SG4 All cryptographic keys shallSHALL be kept in secure environment (e.g. HSM, eUICC). SG5 The keys used by the EUM for eUICC Certificate generation shallSHALL be stored in a secure environment (i.e. in a Hardware Security Module). SG6 The solution shallSHALL notNOT prevent a further release allowing the capability to upgrade the network authentication algorithms used within the ecosystem. The architecture shallSHALL provide a flexible solution including on the base of its security SG7 principles, meaning the security applied to a subsystem of the global ecosystem shallSHALL notNOT challenge the security of the overall ecosystem once interconnected. The architecture shallSHALL provide an interoperable solution including on the base of its SG8 security principles, meaning the security applied to a subsystem of the global ecosystem shallSHALL notNOT challenge the security of the overall ecosystem once interconnected. Multiple Roles and functions mayMAY be played by a single Actor as long as: 1. It respects local lawful obligations; SG9 2. It does not lower the overall security level of the system; 3. It does not conflict with own MNOOperator security policies (e.g. force an operator to share its secrets with a third party). SG10 The MNOOperator shalland the M2M SP SHALL be able to reject to use a non-trusted system for the Embedded UICC management.

4.4.2 Security Realms Requirementsmodified

# Requirement SR1 Security realms shallSHALL be identifiable and mutually authenticated for the purpose of any communication. Communication between the SM-SR and the eUICC shallSHALL be protected against SR2 replay attacks. An entity within a security realm mayMAY need authorisation before communication SR3 exchange. Any end to end data communication between two security realms of the eUICC ecosystem shallSHALL be origin authenticated, integrity and confidentiality protected, SR4 protected against replay attacks and non-repudiable.non-reputable. Non-repudiation mayMAY not apply to communication with the eUICC. Network communication links used inside a security realm shallSHALL be dedicated – i.e. neither public network, neither mutualised. E.g. solutions such as MPLS or GRE are SR5 not considered as dedicated links; a solution such as an authenticated and secured VPN is considered as dedicated. When two security realms are exchanging data, they shallSHALL at first engage a security SR6 negotiation (e.g. EAP, IPSEC, TLS handshake…) resulting in the application of an agreed security level between them. SR7 Security realms shallSHALL enforce filtering rules so that only authorised entities are granted access to allowed services. When negotiating a communication, at least the lowest acceptable common SR8 cryptographic suite shallSHALL apply.

4.4.3 eUICC Requirementsmodified

# Requirement eUICC shallSHALL be certified according to the Protection Profile defined in GSMA FastEmbedded SE1UICC Track Project. Note: Need to refer to the GSMA Protection Profile documentSE1 once[27] available.. TheVoid eUICC Protection Profile should at least include the following elements: Platform Service Manager, ISD-R, Profile storage and isolation of Profiles. SE2 Note:Void Related Actors, Roles and environmental conditions will be defined in the eUICC Protection Profile The eUICC protection Profile shall be compatible with existing accepted Protection SE3 Profile. SE4 The eUICC platform shallSHALL be in line with Common Criteria EAL4+ - EAL4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2. SE5 Upon Profile deletion, the eUICC shallSHALL ensure of the complete wipe of the Profile. eUICC shallSHALL only accept Platform and Profile Management commands sent from an SE6 an authorised SM-SR or SM-DP. SE7 The integrity of the Profile shallSHALL be ensured before its installation in the eUICC. eUICC shallSHALL reject any Platform and Profile Management commands that are in SE8 conflict with the Policy Rules of any Profile on the eUICC the only exception being for the master delete command. SE9 eUICC shallSHALL be resistant to tamper attacks (physical and logical). SE10 Profile keys and algorithm parameters shallSHALL notNOT be extractable from the eUICC. SE11 A Profile shallSHALL notNOT be exported from the eUICC. According to 3GPP TS21.133 [21133],[17], eUICC shallSHALL be able to play a role in deterring SE12 terminal theft; e.g. this could be achieved by the definition of a particular SE12 configuration for the eUICC preventing normal use of the machine to machine Device but allowing emergency services. SE13 The eUICC shallSHALL provide a secure way for the SM-DP and SM-SR to check its identity and status in such a way that the entity has a proof of identity and origin. This capability is offered through the verification of the eUICC certificate during the Eligibility Verification function. SE14 All cryptographic functions shallSHALL be implemented in a robust tamper-proof way and resistant to side-channel attacks. SE15 The Operator Credentials shallSHALL notNOT be extractable from a Profile on the eUICC. SE16 The eUICC SHOULD support a secure mechanism to allow the eUICC OS Update. In case it supports such mechanism, it SHALL be declared in the EIS. SE17 If the mechanism in SE16 is supported, the eUICC SHALL implement a mechanism to report the updated OS version identifier to the SM-SR.

4.4.4 SM-SR and SM-DP Requirementsmodified

# Requirement SM1 SM-DP shallSHALL be certified according to a GSMA agreedSAS-SM certificationscheme scheme.[22]. (SM-DP) SM2 SM-SR shallSHALL be certified according to a GSMA agreedSAS-SM certificationscheme scheme.[22]. (SM-SR) SM3 SM-SR shallSHALL implement an access control mechanism on the request for execution of the SMSRSM-SR functions only to authorised security realms. (SM-SR) SM4 SM-DP shallSHALL implement an access control mechanism on the request for execution of the SMDPSM-DP functions only to authorised security realms. (SM-DP) SM5 Security realm of SM-SR and SM-DP, and eUICC interfaces shallSHALL have proper counter measures against denial of services attacks. (SM-SR) SM6 The donor SM-SR shallSHALL notNOT be able to access the eUICC once the SM-SR switch procedure has been completed. (SM-SR) SM7 The SM-DP shallSHALL be able to establish Profile InstallerManagement Credentials on the eUICC for the secure end-to-end communication used for the Profile loading in a (SM-DP) reliable and (SM-DP) confidential way. SM8 The SM-SR shallSHALL be able to establish Platform Management Credentials on the eUICC for the secure end-to-end communication used for the Platform Management (SM-SR) in a reliable and confidential way. The MNOOperator shallSHALL be able to update the OTA Keys in its Profile on the eUICC in a SM9 secure and confidential way reusing existing OTA Platform mechanisms. SM9 Note: Need to study the possibility for the MNO by itself to update the Network Access Credentials. There shallSHALL be a secure end to end communication channel between the Security SM10 Realms which host the SM-DP function and the eUICC during the Profile installation.

4.4.5 Machine to Machine Device Requirementsmodified

# Requirement SD1 The security of the system shallSHALL notNOT be dependent upon the security mechanisms within the machine to machine Device. SD2 The machine to machine Device shallSHALL notNOT be able to access nor modify sensitive Profile data, i.e. credentials, management commands, Policy Rules, authentication algorithm parameters.

4.4.6 Policy Control Functionmodified

…ected against modification by unauthorised entities when they are stored within, and transported between, the SM-SR, SM-DP and eUICC. SP2 Policy Rule transport … shallSHALL be treated as per SR2.

4.5.1 Secure Download and Installation of a Profilemodified

This section describes the security details related to the procedure stated in section 3.5.4. Download and installation of a Profile shallSHALL be done in a secure way, as follows: MNO SM-DP SM-SR eUICC (1.a) Profile Download Request (1.b) SMSR (SRID, EID, identification (1.c) Get eUICC info (1.d) Send SM-DP set (EIS) of EID info set (1.e) Send eUICC info set (EIS) of EID (1.f) EIS check (1.g) If EIS conflict, notify (2.a) ISD-P creation (2.b) ISD-P creation (2.c) Creation response (2.d) Creation response (2.e) If failure : notify (3) Secure channel establishment: session keyset (cf. section 4.5.1.2) (4) Encrypt and sign the Profile using the session keyset (5) Send the Profile encrypted and signed with session keyset (6-7) Verify, decrypt and install Profile using the session keyset (8.a) Profile Download Confirmation (EID…) (8.b) EIS update (8.d) Profile Download (8.c) Profile Download Confirmation (EID…) Confirmation (EID…) Figure 17:30: Secure Download and Installation of a Profile The process between the MNOOperator and the eUICC shallSHALL be as follows: Start Conditions: A. MNOOperator and SM-DP share the Network Access Credentials associated to the Profile. Procedure: 1. (a) The MNOOperator requests a Profile download and installation to the SM-DP 1. (a) If not already done in earlier transactions, the SM-DP and the SM-SR authenticate each other a … 7. The Profile is installed on the eUICC. 8. (a to d) The eUICC notifies the status of the download and installation process to the SM-SR, to the SM-DP and the … MNO.Operator. The SM-SR updates the EIS information of the corresponding eUICC in its database. End Conditions: A. The Profile is installed on the eUICC.

4.5.1.1 Establishment of the Keysetmodified

… in step 3 in the Secure Download and Installation process. The keyset is calculated by both the SM-DP and the eUICC on the base of a shared secret called ShS. … WeThe distinguish two options for the ShS generation: 1. Key agreement: the ShS is generated locally by both entities SM-DP and eUICC using a Key Agreement Algorithm. 2. Key distribution: the ShS is generated by one entity and sent to the other. We distinguish two models: a. Push model: generated by the SM-DP and sent to the eUICC b. Pull model: generated by the eUICC and sent to the SM-DP

4.5.1.2 Key Agreementmodified

…ntication of the eUICC to the SM-DP is mandatory. The mutual authentication of the SM-DP and the eUICC is mandatory. The following figure details the step 3 of … figureFigure 17.30. MNO SM-DP SM-SR eUICC ISD-P (3.a) initiate key agreement (3.b) Calculate ShS, Derive keyset (3.c) response key agreement (3.d) Calculate ShS, Derive keyset Figure 18:31: Key Set Establishment: Key Agreement Protocol (overview)

4.5.2 Mutual Authenticationmodified

This section details the mutual authentication mechanism between two entities in the architecture. The entities concerned within this section to authenticate each other are SM-SM-DP DP to SM-SR and SM-SR to SM-SR. Authentication between other entities in the system mayMAY use other solutions for authentication and is not in the scope for this section. To secure the messages being sent between the entities from an authentication point of view, at least one of the following two mechanisms shallSHALL be used: 1. Security within a message allowing it to be authenticated, e.g. Web Service Security (WS-Security); 2. Mutual authenticated transport level security, e.g. SSL.TLS.

5 Compliance requirementsadded

5.1 SM-SR and SM-DP Compliance Requirementsadded

# Requirement SMC1 Site Security of SM-DP and SM-SR SHALL be certified according to GSMA SAS-SM scheme [22]. SMC2 Functional compliance of SM-DP and SM-SR SHALL be verified through vendor or third party test suite according to the GSMA test plan.

5.2 eUICC Compliance requirementsadded

# Requirement EUC1 eUICC SHALL be certified according to the GSMA Embedded UICC Protection Profile [27]. EUC2 Functional compliance of eUICC SHALL be verified through an independent GSMA industry-approved certification scheme.

5.3 EUM Compliance requirementsadded

# Requirement EMC1 The EUM production site SHALL be GSMA SAS-UP [23] certified.

A.1 EUM – SM-SR interfacemodified was eUICC Manufacturer – SM-SR interface

A.2 Operator – SM-DP Interfacemodified was MNO – SM-DP Interface

…nabling via SM-DP as defined in section 3.5.7 and the ISD-P deletion via SM-DP as defined in section 3.5.10. The following information is exchanged between the … MNOOperator and the SM-DP:  The description of the Subscriptions e.g.: o The IMSI range or list of IMSIs, the ICCID range or list of ICCIDs o The Applications and files as defined in the relevant specifications (in particular 3GPP TS 31.102 [31102],[18], 3GPP TS 31.103 [31103][19] and ETSI TS 102 221 [102221].)[3].) o The algorithm parameters associated with its corresponding Network Access Application (for instance with Milenage: the OPc, ri, ci values)  Other data or ap … encrypted by the SM-DP are to be delivered directly (via SM-SR) to the specified eUICC. The SM-DP provides:  The relevant information for the Profiles to the … MNOOperator so that the MNOOperator can provision the information relevant to the Subscription in its mobile network.

A.3 SM-DP – SM-SR Interfacemodified

…ation, the Profile enabling via SM-DP, Profile disabling via-SM-DP, Profile deletion via SM-DP procedures. The entity taking the role of SM-DP and/or the SM-SR … mayMAY retain certain information related to the Profile according to the commercial agreement, MNOOperator Policy Rules and regulatory data retention obligations.

A.4 Operator – SM-SR interfacemodified was MNO – SM-SR interface

This interface is used during the Profile enabling, Profile disabling, and Profile deletion procedures. The SM-SR takes as input: - Platform management requests from the MNO;Operator; - Policy Rule (POL2) update from the MNO;Operator; - The EID of the targeted eUICCs. The MNOOperator takes as input: - The relevant parts of the EIS of the targeted eUICCs; - Receipts/responses to MNOOperator Platform management requests; - Receipts/responses to MNOOperator Policy Rule updates; - Platform management-related events. This interface is also used when managing the PLMA, allowing M2M SP to manage a Profile owned by an Operator on its behalf, and under PLMAs. The related procedure is described in section 3.5.15.

A.7 Operator – eUICC interfacemodified was MNO – eUICC interface

This corresponds to the interface between the MNOOperator and the eUICC. Confidential

A.8 M2M SP – SM-SR interfaceadded

This interface is used during the Profile enabling, Profile disabling, and Profile deletion via M2M SP procedures as defined in 3.5.16, 3.5.17 and 3.5.18.

A.9 Device – eUICC interfaceadded

This interface provides the possibility for a Device supporting Local Enable / Local Disable functionality to enable or disable the Test Profile or the Emergency Profile. Local Enable and Local Disable functions are only possible for the Test Profile or the Emergency Profile. A Device supporting Emergency Calls, requiring a dedicated Emergency Profile, can use this interface to enable the Emergency Profile in situations requiring to set up an Emergency Call to specific Emergency Call number(s). The Device can use this interface to disable the Emergency Profile when the emergency situation has ended. NOTE: An emergency situation MAY not end immediately after an Emergency Call, as it MAY be necessary to receive a call back from the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP).

B Risk Matrix (Informative)modified

…tificates    private keys chain trust in the entire process chain. Authentication algorithm Weakening of authentication algorithms due to malevolence, human … error  eUICC V02   breach error or other means.  authentication algorithm A breakthrough in cryptographic research might lead to the weakening or  All assets using V03 Cryptographic breakthrough   or total loss of authentication and ciphering schemes. cryptographic primitives V04 EID tampering Installation of Profile on a wrong eUICC  Profile  Provisioning & Delivery Risks Denial of service on public Denial of service using vulnerabilities in public interfaces or basic resource  Profiles Denial of service on public V05 resource exhaustion techniques might lead to the impossibility of Provisioning and  network facing components  connectivity chain to eUICC Provisioning and management of eUICC, and cause loss of services. Critical component Lax policies in network access or interconnection might lead to the V06  eUICC  communicat … ecurity domain leading to loss of integrity or confidentiality of  All    SM-SR or SM-DP) critical information such as the Profile or a management command. … Confidential Confidentiality loss of Interception of transport key might lead to unsolicited connection to the  data protection key and its V09 transport keys used to deliver eUICC or network component in order to perform denial of service, theft  certificate the Profile up to the eUICC of service or impersonation. Confidentiality or integrity loss  Profiles Communication of Profiles over non protected networks might lead to the Profiles V10 loss of Profile during Provisioning   the interception or tampering of transiting Profiles  eUICC Provisioning or delivery Poor isolation of Profiles on Insufficient isolation of Profiles on the eUICC might lead to the reuse or  eUICC Poor isolation of Profiles on V11 leaking of critical part of the Profile such as the ISD-P or keys such as the   the eUICC  Profiles the K. Human error, malevolence or action from a malicious 3rd party might lead  management function key Rogue Profile and Platform V12 lead to unsolicited Profile or Platform Management commands resulting in loss   Management commands  eUICC in loss of service, impersonation or fraud.  PCF files Human error, malevolence or compromising of the PCF might enable V13 PCF breach  Profiles    scenarios where … mpering  eUICC    attacks that might allow leaking or modifying of installed Profiles. It might be possible for an attacker to install a valid Profile on a … non-non-trusted Installation of Profile within a trustedV15 eUICC (being soft or hardware) thus allowing for the extraction or V15  eUICC    non-certified eUICC replication of the Profile. This might lead to fraud or impersonation attacks  eUICC Failure to prevent Profile extraction or … te V16 eUICC cloning   eUICC and embedding them in soft or rogue eUICC in order to perpetuate fraud or impersonation.  OTA Keys  Profile keys Dependability … Confidential Failure to recover from a Delivery of a malformed Profile might result in a loss of communication  eUICC V17  damaged Profile abilities and ultimately to machine to machine Device loss. Inability for a eUICC to verify the integrity of a delivered Profile, might lead  eUICC V18 Enabling of degraded V18Profiles lead to the installation of a malformed or forged Profile leading to loss of   Profiles service, OTA ping-pong storm, fraud or impersonation scenarios. Inability to remove old Profiles from an eUICC might lead to the dead  eUICC V19 Inability to w … e  eUICC V20   call impossible for a user to make emergency calls.  Baseband Device Unauthorised ability to wipe If Profiles are erasable directly from the … machineDevice towithout machineauthorisation Deviceby V21 Profile for reselling of stolen without authorisation by using a software or hardware switch, it might V21enable malicious 3rd parties  eUICC   machineDevice to machine enable malicious 3rd parties to resell a stolen machine to machine Device Device.

C List of Sensitive Assets (Informative)modified

…anagement of such assets is the most critical when they are available in clear and impacts the components accessing these assets (see 2nd column). However they … mayMAY be transferred between entities as long as their security properties (integrity, confidentiality, authentication…) are not compromised. The fourth column of th … the potential cost impact on the Actor(s) in case of security failure. The following criticalities are considered:  Criticality 4: the Embedded UICC ecosystem … mayMAY be at risk with severe business risks for several or all Actors.  Criticality 3: one part of the Embedded UICC ecosystem is affected; the affected Actor(s) mayMAY suffer strong effects which mayMAY endanger their whole business.  Criticality 2: the service is temporarily interrupted; the affected Actor(s) have a major business impact.  Criticality 1: the service is temporarily interrupted; the affected Actor(s) have a minor business impact. Sensitive Asset Asset Asset Handled In Clear By: Criticality Asset Originator Owner Authentication MNOOperator MNO,Operator, eUICC 3 to 4 Algorithm Authentication MNOOperator MNO,Operator, eUICC, SM-DP 2 (one eUICC Algorithm Key affected) to 4 (a set of eUICCs affected) Authentication MNOOperator MNO,Operator, eUICC, SM-DP 2 (one eUICC Algorithm affected) to 4 (a set of Parameters eUICCs affected) (e.g. Opc, Ri-Ci etc.) IMSI MNOOperator MNO,Operator, eUICC, SM-DP 1 (one IMSI affected) to 2 (a set of IMSIs affected) MSISDN MNOOperator MNO,Operator, SM-DP, SM-SR 1 (one MSISDN affected) to 2 (a set of MSISDNs affected) RootGSMA CertificateCI Root CA owner Root CA owner 4 Certificate EUM Certificate Root CA owner EUM 3 eUICC EUM EUM, eUICC 2 to 3 Certificate EID eUICCEUM SM-SR, eUICC, SM-DP, MNO,Operator, , 1 (one EID affected) to ManufacturerEUM eUICC Manufacturer 2 (a set of EIDs affected) Profile MNOOperator MNO,Operator, eUICC, SM-DP 3 to 4 MNOSensitive OTAAsset KeysAsset MNOHandled MNO,In eUICC,Clear SMDPBy: 3Criticality toAsset 4Originator SensitiveOwner AssetOperator AssetOTA AssetOperator HandledOperator, IneUICC, ClearSMDP By:3 Criticalityto Originator4 OwnerKeys PCF rules MNOOperator eUICC, MNO,Operator, SM-SR, SM-DP 3 to 4 Profile Asset Asset Handled In Clear By: Criticality Management Originator Sensitive Data Owner Platform SM-SR SM-SR, eUICC 2 to 4 manageme… …

D Additional Information Related to Section 4.5 (Informative)modified

…r encryption Km The key from the keyset used for message authentication and integrity protection. Ku The key from the keyset used for protection of key values. … PKeUICCPKeuicc This Public key is part of the eUICC Certificate. In GlobalPlatform, it corresponds to the public key of the ECASD. For ElGamal Elliptic Curves key agreement t … ature verification by external entities this key is PK.CASD.AUT [GP Am. A] For confidentially (encryption by external entity) this key is PK.CASD.CT [GP Am. A] … SKeUICCSKeuicc Private key of the eUICC. In GlobalPlatform, it corresponds to the private key of the ECASD. For ElGamal Elliptic Curves key agreement this key is SK.CASD.ECKA [GP Am. E] For signature by eUICC this key is SK.CASD.AUT[GP Am. A] For decryption by eUICC this key is SK.CASD.CT [GP Am. A] PKSM-DP Public Key of the SM-DP SKSM-DP Private Key of the SM-DP PKeph Ephemeral Public Key generated by the SM-DP SKeph Ephemeral Private Key generated by the SM-DP

D.1 Voidmodified was Additional Key Establishment Mechanisms

In addition to the key agreement protocol outlined above, two key distribution models are considered: 1 – The Push Model, in which the ShS is generated by SM-DP. 2 – The Pull Model, in which the ShS is generated by the eUICC.Void

D.1.1 Push Model (ShS generated by SM-DP)removed

The following steps shall be executed: 1. The SM-DP asks the SM-SR for the public key of eUICC (PKeUICC). This message is part of step 1.a in Figure 17 in section 4. 2. The SM-SR sends to SM-DP the public key of eUICC (PKeUICC). This message is part of step 1.b in Figure 17 in section 4Error! Reference source not found. 3. The SM-DP verifies that PKeUICC (Public Key of eUICC) is signed by the EUM Certificate. 4. SM-DP generates the Shared Secret (ShS) and sends it to the eUICC (ISD-P) encrypted with the public key of eUICC (PKeUICC). It may send its signed public key to the eUICC if it is not done by the SM-SR (if step 1.c is not executed). 5. The eUICC decrypts and verifies the integrity of the ShS. 6. The eUICC sends a confirmation receipt signed with its private key (SKeUICC) back to the SM-DP. 7. The SM-DP and eUICC generate the keyset. The following figure details step 1 of figure 17 in section 4. MNO SM-DP SM-SR eUICC (1.a) Get eUICC info (1.c) Send SM-DP info (PKSM-DP,….) (1.b) Send eUICC info (PKeUICC,…) (2.a) Generate ShS, encrypt it using PKeUICC (message enriched by anti-replay mechanism, nonce, timestamp, random, or signature using SKSM-DM, etc…) (2.b) Verify and decrypt. Derive keyset from ShS (2.c) response and confirmation signed with SKeUICC (2.d) Verify response, derive keyset Figure 19: Session key set establishment: key distribution, push model In step (2.a) SM-DP can also generate the keyset and sends it to eUICC. In this case, the eUICC has to retrieve the keyset directly from the received message. In a GP based model, the SM-DP addresses the ISD-P. The ISD-P has to ask the ECASD to decrypt the received message using SKeUICC =SK.CASD.CT [AmdA]. The SM-DP uses PK.CASD.CT to encrypt the message. PK.CASD.CT is part of CERT.CASD.CT which is signed by the EUM. The eUICC signs the receipt using SK.CASD.AUT and the SM-DP verifies the receipt using PK.CASD.AUT

D.1.2 Pull model (ShS generated by the eUICC)removed

It is similar to the push model, except that the eUICC generates ShS. The following steps shall be executed: 1. The SM-DP asks the SM-SR for the public key of eUICC (PKeUICC). This message is part of step 1.a in Figure 17. 2. The SM-SR sends to SM-DP the public key of eUICC (PKeUICC). This message is part of step 1.b in Figure 17. 3. The SM-DP verifies that PKeUICC (Public Key of eUICC) is signed by the EUM Certificate. 4. The SM-SR sends to the eUICC the public key of SM-DP (PKSM-DP). This message is part of step 1.c in Figure 17Error! Reference source not found. 5. The eUICC generates the Shared Secret (ShS), and sends it to the SM-DP signed with the private key (SKeUICC) and encrypted with the public key of SM-DP (PKSM-DP). It may send its signed public key to the SM-DP if it is not done by the SM-SR. 6. The SM-DP sends a confirmation receipt signed with its private key (SKSM-DP) back to the eUICC. 7. The SM-DP and eUICC generate the keyset In a GP based model, the eUICC uses SK.CASD.AUT to sign the message and SM-DP uses PK.CASD.AUT to verify the signature [AmdA]. PK.CASD.AUT is part of CERT.CASD.AUT which is signed by the EUM.

D.2 Details on the ElGamal Key Agreementmodified

SM-DP or SM-SR2 SM-SR(1) eUICC 1. Verifiy CASD certificate 2. Generate ephemeral EC key pair SKe+PKe 3. Send public key PKe 4. Request key set generation in ISD-P or ISD-R (PKe) 5. ISD-P/R provides PKe to CASD; CASD calculates shared secret ShS from own SK and PKe and generates ISD-P/R key set and receipt from ShS. 6. Send confirmation 7. Send confirmation 8. Calculate ShS from own SKe and PK of CASD; derive ISD-P/R key set from ShS and verifiy receipt Figure 2032 : ElGamal Key Agreement Start Condition: The SM-SR has connectivity with the eUICC. 1. The SM-DP verifies the eUICC Certificate, which carries a signature from the EUM. This is part of step 1.e of Figure 17.30. 2.2.1 and 2.2 The SM-DP sends its certificate to the eUICC through the SM-SR 3.1 The SM-DP generates an ephemeral EC (elliptic curve) key pair, named SKeSKeph and PKe.PKeph 3.and sends PKeph to the SM-SR. 3.2 and 3.3 The SM-DP sends a key set generation request to the SM-SR, including the ephemeral public key PKe.PKeph. The SM-SR passes the request for key set generation to the ISD-P on the eUICC, providing the PKe.PKeph. 5a.3-4. The eUICC now performs the following actions: The ISD-P provides the ECASD with the PKe.PKeph. 5b. The ECASD generates a Shared Secret ShS from its own secret key and received ephemeral PKePKeph and returns it to the ISD-P. 5c. The ISD-P uses ShS to generate its own key pair as well as a receipt from the operation. 6.3-5. The ISD-P passes a confirmation (with receipt) of the generation back to the SM- SR.. 7.3-6. The SM-SR passes the confirmation back to the SM-DP. 8a.4. The SM-DP generates ShS from the ephemeral secret key SKeSKeph and the eUICCs public key. 8b. The SM-DP uses this calculated ShS to derive the same key set as generated by the ISD-P. 8c. The SM-DP verifies the receipt it received from the eUICC to verify the validity of the entire operation. Together with the eUICC Certificate verified in step 1, this also confirms the authenticity of the eUICC.eUICC, and confirms the correct keyset derivation on both the eUICC and the SM-DP server. End Condition: A secret key set, whose contents are only known within the ISD-P and by the SM-DP has been generated and the eUICC is authenticated to the SM-DP. In a GP based model, for key agreement the PKeUICCPKeuicc corresponds to PK.CASD.ECKA which is part of CERT.CASD.ECKA signed by the EUM.

D.3 Calculation of the keyset (Ke, Km, Ku)modified

The keyset is constituted of 3 keys, derived from the ShS, calculated both by eUICC and SM-DPSM- DP entities as follow:  Ke: encryption key used to encrypt the Profile;  Km: integrity key used for MAC;  Ku: optional key from the keyset used for protection of key values. To be calculated, these keys shallSHALL use a Key Derivation Function (KDF). The KDF could be a PRF (Pseudo Random Function) which is a combination of one way hash functions. Several PRFs can be used in the Key Derivation Function. The KDF could take as parameters information related to the eUICC, the Profile owner (MNO),(Operator), the Profile itself, the SM-DP or the card issuer. These different keys are calculated as follow: Ke=KDF(ShS, additional_information, diversified_parameter1); K … n, diversified_parameter3); With, additional_information is a common diversification input to generate the three keys; it could include information relating to … MNO,Operator, SM-DP, eUICC, Profile and a nonce. Diversified_parameters are diversification parameters to generate different keys. The Profile can be sent from the SM-DP to … …

D.5.1 Authenticationmodified

To secure the messages being sent between the entities, at least one of the following two mechanisms couldSHALL be used: 1. WS-Security standard.standard 2.for Mutualclient authenticatedauthentication and transport level security (SSL).(TLS) Bothfor mechanismsserver requireauthentication. the2. useMutual ofauthenticated digitaltransport signedlevel certificates.security For(TLS). WS-SecurityIn mutualboth cases the authentication at leastTLS X.509level certificaterequires needsthe touse beof supported.digital Bothsigned partiescertificates. areA requiredplatform tothat haveneeds X.509to certificatesprove (andits public-privateidentity keyat pairs)TLS whichlevel is usedrequired to authenticatehave eachX.509 othercertificates using(and theirpublic-private certificates.key pairs). The specifics of who is trusted to issue X.509 certificates depend on the organisation’s PKI setup. For authentication, the subject of the X.509 certificate id… …

E Voidadded

E Flowcharts for basic remote Provisioning events (Informative)removed

This annex suggests macroscopic flows for remote Subscription management. These flows are designed to enable an MNO using remote Subscription management services to manage eUICCs according to Customer demands. This also illustrates how the various procedures link together and how processes external to the Subscription management architecture (such as Subscription activation) need to interact with these procedures. An important issue is to avoid situations of dead-lock or unmanageable Profiles as unintended consequences of a particular management practise. These situations may be avoided by ensuring the proper process flow when managing Subscriptions and their associated Profiles. The following codes of conduct should be observed by any MNO: 1. When a Customer terminates a contract with an MNO, this MNO should clean up its part of the eUICC(s) and associated Subscription Manager(s) of this Customer (SIM- card analogy: cards for which Subscriptions no longer exist are destroyed) 2. When an MNO terminates a contract with a Customer, this MNO should clean up its part of the eUICC(s) and associated Subscription Manager(s) of this Customer (SIM- card analogy: SIM-cards become useless (and are destroyed) 3. The contents of a Profile including policy settings should at all times reflect the contract between MNO and the Customer (i.e. if there is no valid exclusivity clause in the contract, the Profile should reflect this.) The flows illustrated below are to be used for situations of management for:  a single Subscription for a single machine-to-machine Device a single Subscription for multiple machine-to-machine Devices multiple Subscriptions for a single machine- to-machine Device  multiple Subscriptions for multiple machine-to-machine Devices It is advised that these flows are used as guidelines in the general case. The flowcharts are built around the procedures of the architecture. To keep complexity low two macros have been created, “Provisioning” and “De-Provisioning”. Those are the first two charts illustrated after the legend below. Following this are use-cases which are described in the GSMA’s Ecosystem document [2]. In addition the use of the “Master Delete” and “Fall- back” mechanisms is illustrated. Note that “Fall-back” is a mechanism which is triggered within the eUICC and not by an entity in the Subscription Management architecture directly.

E.1 Legendremoved

Start or end condition SM predefined procedure Macro Procedure: Group of procedures or events Other SM procedure or event Other, SM external, procedure or event Logical AND Logical OR Decision n Connector Figure 21: Legend – following conventional flowchart notation

E.2 Macro procedure: «Provisioning of a Machine to Machine Device»removed

1 Change Yes Proc.10: SM-SR? Change of SM-SR No MNO: Requires profile download No Enabling Yes Proc. 3: required Profile Download & ? Installation Proc. 3: ISD-P created in eUICC for MNO, Profile Download & containing profile in disabled state, SM- Installation SR updated EIS. Proc..5: Profile Enabling Target profile is enabled on ISD-P created in eUICC for MNO, eUICC. Previously enabled containing profile in disabled state, SM- profile is disabled. EIS is SR updated EIS. updated. 2b 2a Figure 22- Macro: “Provisioning of Device” – showing the flow following a Customer demand to provision a machine to machine Device. E3. Macro Procedure: “De-Provisioning of Machine to Machine Device” 3 MNO: Requires profile Deletion No Profile Deletion Yes via SM- DP Proc. 9: Proc. 8: ISD-P deletion via ISD-P deletion SM-DP The profile and its container is removed from the eUICC. EIS is up to date in SM- SR. Only Provisioning profile is enabled. 4 Figure 23- Macro: “De-Provisioning of machine to machine Device” – showing the flow resulting from a Customer demand to delete a Profile or as part of the termination of a Subscription.

E.4 A. From eUICC registration to operative machine to machine Device –removed

Customer enters Subscription with MNO (Ecosystem Lifecycle worked example 3.1.1) eUICCs produced; provisioning profile Profiles defined, tested, agreed between loaded; tested ready for shipment; MNO and SM-DP; MNO demands n>=1 has a corresponding EIS. eUICC profiles Proc..1: Proc. 2: eUICC Registration Profile Ordering at SM-SR (propr.) eUICC registered at SM-SR; can be Ordered quantity ready for profile shipped to the device manufacturer. download. Credentials available to MNO. EID of eUICC and SRID known by MNO Device manufacturer: Customer: eUICC integrated in Enters subscription with device MNO MNO: initiates provisioning of device MNO: Activates subscription 1 Provisioning of device 2a Device is operative Figure 24: The flow describing the way from registration of the eUICC/Device with the SM-SR to the Provisioning of the machine to machine Device on demand from the first Customer E.5 B. End of contract with MNO A. Re-Provisioning with MNO B (Ecosystem: 3.1.2 worked example – Re-Provisioning, case 2) Customer: Enters subscription with MNO B EID of eUICC and SRID known by MNO B MNO B: initiates provisioning of device 1 Provisioning of device MNO B: Activates subscription 2a MNO A: Device is operative with De-provisioning of MNO B device MNO A’s profile is cleared from device Figure 25: End of contract between Customer and MNO A. Customer Re-Provisioning with MNO B. MNO A performs a De-Provisioning, thus clearing his Profiles from the Customer’s machine to machine Device.

E.6 C. Termination of a Subscription (Ecosystem: 3.1.2 worked example - end ofremoved

contract) The customer’s subscription with the MNO is terminated For all EIDs associated with the subscription, perform the sequence below The target profile is enabled on the eUICC. EID of eUICC and SRID known by MNO MNO: initiates de- provisioning - and clean-up of device 3 De-Provisioning of device MNO: 4 Deactivates Customer subscription Customer subscription deactivated. Device no longer operative with this MNO Figure 26: Customer terminates his Subscription with MNO and MNO de-provisions the machine to machine Device, removing Profiles.

E.7 D: Customer Changes Machine to Machine Device but not MNO. (Ecosystemremoved

3.1.3 worked example) Customer has operative Customer decides to device with MNO change device MNO: initiates de- provisioning of device 3 De-Provisioning of device 4 New eUICC registered at MNO: initiates SM-SR and integrated in provisioning of new device device MNO: activates subscription 1 Provisioning of device 2a New device operative with MNO Figure 27 Ecosystem 3.1.3 worked example: the Customer replaces one machine to machine Device for another without changing MNO.

E.8 E. Switch of Enabled Profile from MNO A to MNO B. (Both Subscriptions areremoved

active) Device is operative with Subscription activated by MNO A.. Profile for MNO B MNO B disabled on eUICC MNO B: initiates a Customer: Decides to switch of enabled enable subscription B profiles Proc..5: Profile Enabling Device is operative with MNO B Figure 28 Switching of Enabled Profile from MNO A to MNO B. Both Subscriptions with MNO A and B are active.

E.9 F. Use of Master Delete Mechanismremoved

There is a profile with unmanageable policy rules on an eUICC Is the No target Yes profile enabled Owner of the target profile deactivates the subscription Proc.: Fall-Back Mechanism Proc.: Master delete Mechanism The target profile is deleted. The profile with the Fall-Back attribute is enabled Figure 29: Using the Master Delete mechanism to remove a Profile with unmanageable policy rule(s).

E.10 G. Use of Fall-back Mechanismremoved

Connectivity to the device with the enabled profile is permanently lost Proc.: Fall-Back Mechanism The profile with the fall- back attribute set is enabled, the previously enabled profile is disabled. Figure 30: Use of the (on-card) Fall-back Mechanism.

F Profile Creation, Ordering and Personalisation (Informative)modified

The following diagram shows an example of how the functions defined in section 3.3.1.1 mayMAY be performed. Figure 31:33: Profile Creation, Ordering and Personalisation

Contents
  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 1.1 Overview
  3. 1.2 Void
  4. 1.3 Scope
  5. 1.4 Intended Audience
  6. 1.5 Definition of Terms
  7. 1.6 Abbreviations
  8. 1.7 References
  9. 1.8 Conventions
  10. 2 Basic Principles and Assumptions
  11. 2.1 Basic Principles
  12. 2.2 General Assumptions
  13. 2.2.1 Use of Existing Standards
  14. 2.2.2 Machine to Machine Device Impact
  15. 2.2.3 Security
  16. 2.2.4 Regulatory
  17. 2.3 The eUICC Ecosystem
  18. 2.3.1 Roles and Entities
  19. 2.4 The eUICC
  20. 2.4.1 Profiles
  21. 2.4.2 Policies & Policy Control
  22. 2.5 Profile Attributes
  23. 3 Architecture
  24. 3.1 Architecture Diagram
  25. 3.2 Card Architecture
  26. 3.2.1 Security Domains
  27. 3.2.2 Card Architecture
  28. 3.2.3 State Diagram for an ISD-P
  29. 3.3 Relevant Roles and Functions
  30. 3.3.1 Functions Definition
  31. 3.3.2 Void
  32. 3.4 Profile Description
  33. 3.4.1 General Content of a Profile Installed on an eUICC
  34. 3.4.2 Access to the Content of a Profile
  35. 3.5 Procedures
  36. 3.5.1 eUICC Registration at SM-SR
  37. 3.5.2 Un-personalised Profile Verification (Proprietary)
  38. 3.5.3 Profile Ordering (Proprietary)
  39. 3.5.4 Profile Download and Installation
  40. 3.5.5 Master Delete
  41. 3.5.6 Profile Enabling
  42. 3.5.7 Profile Enabling via SM-DP
  43. 3.5.8 Profile Disabling
  44. 3.5.9 ISD-P Deletion
  45. 3.5.10 ISD-P Deletion via SM-DP
  46. 3.5.11 SM-SR Change
  47. 3.5.12 ISD-P Key Establishment Procedure
  48. 3.5.13 Fall-Back Mechanism
  49. 3.5.14 eUICC Certificate Verification
  50. 3.5.15 Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Registration at SM- SR
  51. 3.5.16 Profile Enabling via M2M SP
  52. 3.5.17 Profile Disabling via M2M SP
  53. 3.5.18 ISD-P Deletion via M2M SP
  54. 3.5.19 Fall-Back Attribute Management
  55. 3.5.20 Fall-Back Attribute Management via the M2M SP
  56. 3.5.21 Emergency Profile Attribute Management
  57. 3.5.22 Emergency Profile Attribute Management via the M2M SP
  58. 3.5.23 Local Enable of the Test Profile
  59. 3.5.24 Local Disable of the Test Profile
  60. 3.6 Policy Control
  61. 3.6.1 Overview Diagram of Rule Management System
  62. 3.6.2 Policy Rules Management
  63. 3.6.3 Policy Control Mechanism
  64. 4 Security Model: Threats Analysis & Risk Assessment Model
  65. 4.1 Security Challenges
  66. 4.2 Security Analysis Methodology
  67. 4.3 Aim of the Security Realm Approach
  68. 4.4 Security Requirements
  69. 4.4.1 General Security Requirements
  70. 4.4.2 Security Realms Requirements
  71. 4.4.3 eUICC Requirements
  72. 4.4.4 SM-SR and SM-DP Requirements
  73. 4.4.5 Machine to Machine Device Requirements
  74. 4.4.6 Policy Control Function
  75. 4.5 Security Architecture
  76. 4.5.1 Secure Download and Installation of a Profile
  77. 4.5.2 Mutual Authentication
  78. 5 Compliance requirements
  79. 5.1 SM-SR and SM-DP Compliance Requirements
  80. 5.2 eUICC Compliance requirements
  81. 5.3 EUM Compliance requirements
  82. A Interfaces
  83. A.1 EUM – SM-SR interface
  84. A.2 Operator – SM-DP Interface
  85. A.3 SM-DP – SM-SR Interface
  86. A.4 Operator – SM-SR interface
  87. A.5 SM-SR – eUICC interface
  88. A.6 SM-SR – SM-SR Interface
  89. A.7 Operator – eUICC interface
  90. A.8 M2M SP – SM-SR interface
  91. A.9 Device – eUICC interface
  92. B Risk Matrix (Informative)
  93. C List of Sensitive Assets (Informative)
  94. D Additional Information Related to Section 4.5 (Informative)
  95. D.1 Void
  96. D.2 Details on the ElGamal Key Agreement
  97. D.3 Calculation of the keyset (Ke, Km, Ku)
  98. D.4 Role of the EUM in the Certificate Chain
  99. D.5 Mutual Authentication Binding to a SOA Environment
  100. D.5.1 Authentication
  101. E Void
  102. F Profile Creation, Ordering and Personalisation (Informative)
Embedded SIM Remote Provisioning Architecture
                                                                                                  Version 4.0
                                                                                   25 February 2019

This is a Non-binding Permanent Reference Document of the GSMA

Security Classification: Non-confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is confidential to the Association and is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other than those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association.

Copyright Notice Copyright © 2019 GSM Association

Disclaimer The GSM Association (“Association”) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document. The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.

Antitrust Notice The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy.

V 4.0                                                                                                                           Page 1 of 103

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

Many Machine to Machine (M2M) Devices will not be easily reachable for the purpose of Provisioning a Subscription. This document provides an architecture approach as a proposed solution for the remote Provisioning and Subscription management of Devices, while at the same time maintaining at least the same level of security both for network operators and Subscribers as present solutions. Additionally this document describes a solution to be able to locally switch to specific optionally supported Profiles, i.e. for testing/certification or for emergency cases.

1.2 Void

1.3 Scope

The aim of this document is to define a common architecture framework to enable the remote Provisioning and management of the Embedded UICC (eUICC) in Devices which are not easily reachable, and additionally a way to locally switch to specific Profiles for testing/certification or emergency cases. The adoption of this architecture framework will aim to provide a basis for ensuring global interoperability for Remote Provisioning between Operators in different deployment scenarios.

1.4 Intended Audience

Technical experts working within Operators, SIM solution providers, machine to machine
Device    vendors,   standards    organisations,    network    infrastructure  vendors,
Telecommunication Service Providers and other industry bodies.

1.5 Definition of Terms

Term                                   Description
                                       Physical entity (person, company or organisation) that
                                       can assume a role in the functional architecture. It is
Actor
                                       possible for an actor to assume multiple Roles in the
                                       same functional architecture.
                                       A paying party, legally responsible juridical person or
Customer
                                       entity.
                                       Equipment into which an Embedded UICC and a
Device                                 communication module are inserted during assembly.
                                       Examples include: Utility meter, car and camera.
                                       A UICC which is not easily accessible or replaceable, is
Embedded UICC                          not intended to be removed or replaced in the Device,
                                       and enables the secure changing of Subscriptions.
Term                                       Description
                                           An Operational Profile with a Profile Attribute allocated,
                                           indicating that this Profile is an Emergency Profile.
                                           An Emergency Profile complies with regulatory
Emergency Profile
                                           requirements and only provides the capability to make
                                           Emergency Calls and receive calls from an Emergency
                                           centre (e.g. Public Safety Answering Point)
                                           This is an attribute allocated to a Profile which, when set,
Emergency Profile Attribute
                                           identifies the Emergency Profile.
                                           The state of a Profile when its files and/or applications
Enabled Profile                            (e.g., NAA) are selectable over the UICC-Terminal
                                           interface.
                                           A certificate issued by the EUM for a specific, individual,
eUICC Certificate                          eUICC.
                                           This certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate.
                                           Supplier of the eUICCs and resident software (for
eUICC Manufacturer
                                           example firmware and operating system)
                                           Mechanism to correct existing features on an eUICC by
eUICC OS Update                            the original OS Manufacturer when the eUICC is in the
                                           field.
                                           A certificate issued to a GSMA accredited EUM which
                                           can be used to verify eUICC Certificates.
EUM Certificate
                                           This certificate can be verified using the GSMA CI
                                           Certificate.
                                           This is an attribute allocated to a Profile which, when set,
                                           identifies the Profile to be enabled by the Fall-Back
Fall-Back Attribute                        Mechanism or by the execution of the Disable Profile
                                           function on another Profile. Only one Profile on the
                                           eUICC can have the Fall-Back attribute set at a time.
                                           eUICC based mechanism which enables the Profile with
Fall-Back Mechanism                        Fall-Back Attribute set when the Enabled Profile loses
                                           network connectivity.
                                           Manifestation of UICC. Specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [3]
Form Factor
                                           and ETSI TS 102 671 [8].
                                           Profile generated by the SM-DP following the Operator’s
Generic Profile                            specifications, but without the Operator’s credentials and
                                           any specific data linked to the future targeted eUICC.
                                           Self-signed certificate of the CI, used to authenticate
GSMA CI Certificate
                                           certificates issued to other entities.
                                           Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC. The
Integrated Circuit Card ID                 ICCID is coded as defined by ITU-T E.118 [24].
                                           Unique identifier owned and issued by Operators as
International Mobile Subscriber Identity
                                           defined in 3GPP TS 23.003 [25].
Term                                  Description
                                      A function of the interface between a Device and an
                                      eUICC that provides the capability for a Device to locally
Local Disable
                                      disable the Emergency Profile on the eUICC without
                                      involvement of an SM-SR and/or SM-DP.
                                      A function of the interface between a Device and an
                                      eUICC that provides the capability for a Device to locally
Local Enable
                                      enable the Emergency Profile on the eUICC without
                                      involvement of an SM-SR and/or SM-DP.
                                      A Service Provider relying on an Operator providing the
M2M Service Provider (M2M SP)
                                      Profiles on the eUICC.
                                      An application residing on a UICC which provides
Network Access Application            authorisation to access a network for example a USIM
                                      application.
                                      Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [16]
Network Access Credentials            network. This MAY include data such as Ki/K and IMSI
                                      stored within a NAA.
                                      A Profile containing one or more Network Access
                                      Applications and associated Network Access Credentials
Operational Profile
                                      and Operator’s (e.g. STK) applications and 3rd party
                                      applications.
                                      A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network
Operator                              Operator; a company providing wireless cellular network
                                      services.
                                      Set of credentials owned by an Operator, including
                                      Network Access Credentials, OTA Keys for remote
Operator Credentials
                                      Profile management and authentication algorithm
                                      parameters.
                                      A Profile whose Policy Rules have become
Orphaned Profile                      unmanageable, for example due to the termination of the
                                      Subscriber’s contract with the Operator.
                                      The credentials included in the Profile, used in
OTA Keys
                                      conjunction with OTA Platforms.
                                      An Operator platform used for remote management of
OTA Platform
                                      UICCs of Enabled Operator Profiles on eUICCs.
                                      Un-personalised Profile with the addition of the
Personalised Profile                  Personalisation Data for the eUICC targeted by the
                                      Operator.
                                      Set of data derived from the input data provided by the
                                      Operator and generated by the SM-DP (e.g. NAC, Keys,
Personalisation Data
                                      etc.) and dedicated to the personalisation of a unique
                                      Personalised Profile.
Term                                  Description
                                      A set of functions related to the, enabling, disabling and
                                      deletion of a Profile and the transport of Profile
                                      Management functions to an eUICC. Platform
Platform Management                   Management actions are protected by Platform
                                      Management Credentials shared between the SM-SR
                                      and the ISD-R. Platform Management does not affect
                                      the contents of a Profile.
                                      Data required within an eUICC so that a secured
                                      communication can be set up between an external entity
Platform Management Credentials       and the eUICC in order to, enable, disable and delete
                                      Profiles on the eUICC and to transport Profile
                                      Management functions.
                                      Principles reflected in a set of rules that governs the
Policy                                behaviour of eUICC and/or entities involved in the
                                      remote management of the eUICC.
                                      A function that defines, updates or removes Policy Rules
Policy Control Function
                                      to implement a Policy.
                                      A function that executes Policy Rules to implement a
Policy Enforcement Function
                                      Policy.
                                      Defines the atomic action of a Policy and the conditions
Policy Rule
                                      under which it is executed.
                                      Combination of a file structure, data and applications to
                                      be provisioned onto, or present on, an eUICC and which
Profile
                                      allows, when enabled, the access to a specific mobile
                                      network infrastructure.
                                      Description of a Profile in a format specific to the
Profile Description                   Operator; Example formats include Excel table, xml
                                      format and plain text.
                                      Execution of certain Platform Management commands
Profile Lifecycle Management          by the M2M SP on a Profile, based on prior PLMA from
                                      the Operator owning the Profile.
                                      Authorisation given by an Operator to an M2M SP to
Profile Lifecycle Management
                                      permit Profile Lifecycle Management. Such
Authorisation (PLMA)
                                      authorisations are managed by the SM-SR.
                                      A set of functions related to the downloading, installation
                                      and content update of a Profile in a dedicated ISD-P on
Profile Management                    the eUICC. Download and installation are protected by
                                      Profile Management Credentials shared between the
                                      SM-DP and the ISD-P.
                                      Data required within an eUICC so that a Profile
Profile Management Credentials        downloaded from an external entity can be decrypted
                                      and installed on the eUICC
                                      The downloading and installation of a Profile into an
Provisioning
                                      eUICC.
Term                                  Description
                                      A Profile containing one or more Network Access
                                      Applications, and associated Network Access
                                      Credentials which, when installed on an eUICC, enables
Provisioning Profile
                                      access to communication network(s), only to provide
                                      transport capability for eUICC management and Profile
                                      management between the eUICC and an SM-SR.
                                      A special purpose contract, with its associated
                                      Provisioning Profile, that enables a machine to machine
Provisioning Subscription
                                      Device to access a mobile network only for the purpose
                                      of management of Operational Profiles on the eUICC.
Roles                                 Roles are representing a logical grouping of functions.
                                      An element or set of elements within the ecosystem
                                      sharing a common level of trust and securely managed
Security Realm
                                      by a single administrative authority. No specific level of
                                      trust is to be assumed.
                                      An entity (associated with one or more users) that is
                                      engaged in a Subscription with a Telecommunication
                                      Service Provider. The subscriber is allowed to subscribe
Subscriber                            and unsubscribe to services, to register a user or a list of
                                      users authorised to enjoy those services, and also to set
                                      the limits relative to the use that associated users make
                                      of these services
                                      Describes the commercial relationship between the
Subscription                          Subscriber and the Telecommunication Service
                                      Provider.
                                      Role that prepares the Profiles to be securely
Subscription Manager Data             provisioned on the eUICC and manages the secure
Preparation                           download and installation of these Profile onto the
                                      eUICC
                                      Role that securely performs functions of Platform
Subscription Manager Secure Routing   Management commands and the transport of Profile
                                      Management commands.
                                      Entity that provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either
                                      as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale
Telecommunication Service Provider    agreement with an Operator. The Telecommunication
                                      Service Provider could also be the Operator.
                                      A combination of data and applications to be provisioned
                                      on an eUICC to provide connectivity to test equipment
Test Profile                          for the purpose of testing the Device and the eUICC. A
                                      Test Profile does not allow access to an ITU-E.212 [16]
                                      network.
                                      Representation of the Profile (e.g. script) without any
Un-personalised Profile               personalised data in a machine readable format. This
                                      format can be processed by a targeted eUICC type.

1.6 Abbreviations

Abbreviation                           Description
AID                                    Application Identifier
CASD                                   Controlling Authority Security Domain
CI                                     Certificate Issuer
DAP                                    Data Authentication Pattern
DPID                                   ID of the relevant SM-DP
ECASD                                  eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain
ECKA                                   Elliptic Curve Key Agreement algorithm
EID                                    eUICC-ID
EIS                                    eUICC Information Set
EncP                                   Encrypted and integrity protected Personalised Profile
EPS                                    Evolved Packet System
ETSI                                   European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EUM                                    eUICC Manufacturer
eUICC                                  Embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card
GP                                     GlobalPlatform
GPCS                                   GlobalPlatform Card Specification
GSMA                                   GSM Association
ICCID                                  Integrated Circuit Card ID
IMS                                    IP Multimedia Subsystem
IMSI                                   International Mobile Subscriber Identity
ISD                                    Issuer Security Domain
ISD-P                                  Issuer Security Domain Profile
ISD-R                                  Issuer Security Domain Root
ISO                                    International Standards Organisation
ITU                                    International Telecoms Union
KDF                                    Key Derivation Function
LTE                                    Long Term Evolution
M2M                                    Machine to Machine
M2M SP                                 Machine to Machine Service Provider
MNO-SD                                 Mobile Network Operator Security Domain
NAA                                    Network Access Application
OTA                                    Over The Air
PLMA                                   Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation
POL1                                   Policy Rules within the Profile
                                       Policy Rules associated to a Profile and stored in the
POL2
                                       relevant EIS at the SM-SR
PRF                                    Pseudo Random Function
Abbreviation                           Description
SAS                                    Security Accreditation Scheme
SCP                                    Secure Channel Protocol
SD                                     Security Domain
ShS                                    Shared Secret
SIM                                    Subscriber Identity Module
SM                                     Subscription Manager
SM-DP                                  Subscription Manager Data Preparation
SM-SR                                  Subscription Manager Secure Routing
SRID                                   ID of the relevant SM-SR
SSD                                    Supplementary Security Domain
STK                                    SIM Tool Kit
TLS                                    Transport Layer Security
UMTS                                   Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service
USIM                                   Universal Subscriber Identity Module
XML                                    Extensible Markup Language
W3C                                    World Wide Web Consortium

1.7 References

               Document
Ref            Number                Title
[1]            Void                  Void
[2]            Void                  Void
                                     UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical
[3]            ETSI TS 102 221
                                     characteristics
                                     Administrative commands for telecommunications
[4]            ETSI TS 102 222
                                     applications
[5]            ETSI TS 102 223       Smart Cards; Card Application Toolkit (CAT)
[6]            ETSI TS 102 225       Secured packet structure for UICC based applications
[7]            ETSI TS 102 226       Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications
                                     Smart cards; Machine to Machine UICC; Physical and
[8]            ETSI TS 102 671
                                     logical characteristics
[9]            ETSI TS 103 383       Embedded UICC; Requirements Specification
[10]                                 GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2.1
                                     GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2.1 UICC
[11]
                                     Configuration v1.0.1
                                     GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment A:
[12]
                                     Confidential Card Content Management, v1.0.1
                                     GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment B:
[13]
                                      v1.0.1
               Document
Ref            Number                Title
                                     GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment D:
[14]
                                     Secure Channel Protocol 03, v1.1
                                     GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment E:
[15]
                                     Security Upgrade for Card Content Management v1.0
                                     The international identification plan for public networks
[16]           ITU E.212
                                     and Subscriptions
[17]           3GPP TS 21.133        3G Security, Security Threats and Requirements
                                     Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity
[18]           3GPP TS 31.102
                                     Module (USIM) application
                                     Characteristics of the IP Multimedia Services Identity
[19]           3GPP TS 31.103
                                     Module (ISIM) application
               NIST SP 800-57 Part   NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for
[20]
               1                     Key Management – Part 1: General (Revision 3)
                                     Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
[21]           RFC 2119              Levels, S. Bradner
                                     http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
                                     FS.08 – Security Accreditaion Scheme for Subscription
[22]           FS.08
                                     Manager - Standard v3
                                     FS.04 - Security Accreditation Scheme for UICC
[23]           FS.04
                                     Production – Standard v8
[24]           ITU-T E.118           The international telecommunication charge card
                                     Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+);
[25]           3GPP TS 23.003        Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS);
                                     Numbering, addressing and identification
[26]           SGP.14                GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy Version 1.1
[27]           SGP.05                Embedded UICC Protection Profile Version 1.1
                                     Common test environments for User Equipment (UE);
[28]           3GPP TS 34.108
                                     Conformance testing

1.8 Conventions

The key words "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY" in this document SHALL be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [2119].

2 Basic Principles and Assumptions

This section contains the principles and assumptions related to the GSMA remote Provisioning system for Embedded UICC.

2.1 Basic Principles

BPR1        The solution SHALL reflect the most important UICC-related use cases and
            adequately support them in a context where the eUICC hardware is not easily
            accessible or removable from the machine to machine Device. It is possible, due to
            the different nature of the eUICC, that not all current use cases can be covered.
BPR2        The solution SHALL be designed to enable new business opportunities, e.g. in M2M
            segments, while keeping the proven benefits of the current UICC.
BPR3        The security of the eUICC and its overall management processes must at all times
            and under all circumstances be at least as good as with the current removable UICC
            and its Provisioning processes.
BPR4        Any function, feature or service which is possible on a current UICC SHALL be
            possible on the eUICC.
BPR5        The access to functions, features or services on the eUICC SHALL be identical to
            the current UICC, i.e. transparent for the terminal and the user.
BPR6        The remote management of functions, features or services on the eUICC SHALL
            have minimal impact on the operator’s existing systems and infrastructure. This
            SHALL be achieved by using existing standards and specifications as far as
            possible.
BPR7        Keep it simple. Complexity is understood as a risk factor. A reasonably limited
            functional approach will support the time-to-market expectations and MAY evolve
            with future requirements and improvements.
BPR8        3rd-party applications which are outside of an Operational Profile are out of the scope
            of this document.
BPR9        Each entity SHALL be responsible for its operations.
BPR10       The applications and file system within a disabled Operational Profile are neither
            locally or remotely selectable.

2.2 General Assumptions

2.2.1 Use of Existing Standards

STD1       The definition of the eUICC and the related Provisioning systems SHALL be as
           efficient as possible, in terms of efforts and costs for all involved parties. This SHALL
           be achieved by using existing standards and specifications where possible.
STD2       GlobalPlatform specifications will be considered as a framework of choice for the
           implementation of the eUICC.

2.2.2 Machine to Machine Device Impact

DEV1       The implementation of the eUICC ecosystem will have minimal impact on the Device.
DEV2       No security certification requirement will be placed on the Device.
DEV3       No new certification requirement will be placed on the Device.
DEV4       Any Device approval impact SHALL be covered under existing Device type approval
           or certification schemes and be independent of the certification of the eUICC.
DEV5       The communication module within the Device SHALL conform to the terminal
           requirements within ETSI TS 102 221 [13] for all standardised ETSI Form Factors.
DEV6       The Device manufacturer SHALL ensure that there is a method for the owner of the
           Device or Telecommunication Service Provider to access the eUICC identification
           (EID).
DEV7       The Device manufacturer SHOULD print the eUICC identification (EID) on the Device
           so that it is human readable.

2.2.3 Security

SEC1       The overall security of the eUICC in combination with the related management
           processes must at all time and under all circumstances be at least equivalent to the
           current removable UICC and its Provisioning processes.
SEC2       The architecture of the eUICC and its remote Provisioning system complies with the
           requirements of 3GPP TS 21.133 [17] “3G Security, Security Threats and
           Requirements”.
SEC3       The architecture must support a level of security with respect to protection of Operator
           Credentials which is at least equal to present levels of security. This applies in
           particular to:
                    The confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters.
                    The integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI).
SEC4       Certification SHALL be mandatory for the eUICC.
SEC5       The remote Provisioning architecture must avoid compromising the security of
           Subscriber data.
SEC6       A trusted system is a system that is relied upon to a specified extent to enforce a
           specified security Policy. A trust model is defined as part of the security related project
           deliverables.
SEC7       For remote Platform and Profile management, all entities involved in the management
           have to be mutually authenticated.

2.2.4 Regulatory

REG1       Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of the Embedded SIMworking
           group. Regulatory issues will be referred to the GSMA regulatory team.

2.3 The eUICC Ecosystem

ECO1        Remote subscription management functions are provided by two Roles – the SM-DP
            and the SM-SR.
ECO2        1. Profile management is governed by Policy Rules that are contained in the
                   Operator’s Profile and in the SM-SR.
            2. Policy Rules are enforced by the eUICC and the SM-SR on behalf of the Operator.
            3. Control of Policy Rules lies with the Operators.

2.3.1 Roles and Entities

2.3.1.1 eUICC Manufacturer

MAN1      1. The eUICC Manufacturer (EUM) provides eUICCs containing a Provisioning Profile
             and/or one or more Operational Profiles.
          2. The eUICCs are delivered to the machine to machine Device manufacturer.
          3. Related Platform Management Credentials are sent to the SM-SR to be associated
             with each eUICC.
          4. The EUM is responsible for the initial cryptographic configuration and security
             architecture of the eUICC.
          5. The EUM production site SHALL be SAS-UP [23] certified.
          6. The eUICC manufacturer MAY also provide eUICCs containing an Emergency
             Profile.
          7. The eUICC Manufacturer MAY provide eUICCs also containing a Test Profile.
              EUM.
MAN2      The EUM SHALL issue the eUICC Certificate to allow:
                 the eUICC authentication and certification to other entities;
                 the authenticated keyset establishment between an SM-DP and an eUICC;
                 the authenticated keyset establishment between an SM-SR and an eUICC.
MAN3      The EUM Certificate and GSMA CI Certificate SHALL be delivered to other entities
          using reliable storage and communication channels.
MAN4      The EUM SHALL provide services, tools, scripts or documentation to the SM-DP
          enabling it to create an Un-personalised Profile for a eUICC produced by the EUM. It is
          not the role of the EUM to create the Un-Personalised Profile on behalf of the SM-DP.
MAN5      In case the eUICC OS Update mechanism is used, the EUM SHALL ensure the eUICC
          affected by such mechanism maintains the same level of security and functional
          compliance.

2.3.1.2 Device Manufacturer

DMA1      1. The Device manufacturer builds machine to machine Devices which comprise a
             communication module and an eUICC containing at least a Provisioning Profile or
             Operational Profile that is enabled.
          2. A Provisioning Profile or Operational Profile SHALL be enabled.
              NOTE: Any Enabled Profile requires the agreement of the respective Operator.

2.3.1.3 Operator

MNO1      1. The Operator provides mobile network connectivity.
          2. The Operator selects at least one SM-DP.
          3. The Operator SHALL have a direct interface to the SM-SR.
          4. In the event that a Subscriber has selected an Operator, that Operator initiates the
             download of a particular Profile to an identified target eUICC subject to current
             Policy Rules.
          5. The Operator specifies the Profile characteristics and any features and
             applications, analogous to current UICCs. The Operator owns the Profile.
          6. Profiles can be generated at the time the download is ordered.
          7. To achieve a transparent fit with existing UICC processes and interfaces, Profiles
             can also be ordered in bulk, then securely stored at the SM-DP until ordered for
             download. SAS-SM [22] requirements SHALL apply.
          8. The Operator defines the Policy Rules that control the Profile management when
             this Profile is enabled.
          9. After the download is ordered the Operator SHALL be able to check and validate
             the certification and capabilities (manufacturer, memory size, algorithms etc.) of the
             target eUICC before the download of the Profile is started.
          10. The Operator SHALL receive confirmation of the successfully completed download
              and installation of the Profile.
          11. The enabled Operator SHALL be able to use an OTA Platform in order to manage
              the content of its enabled Profile in the eUICC.
MNO2      Upon request from a Subscriber the Operator SHALL be able to declare to the relevant
          entities a machine to machine Device as stolen so that appropriate measures can be
          taken.
MNO3      An Operator SHOULD provide only limited service to a Device using a Provisioning
          Profile; the mechanism the Operator uses to enforce this limited service is out of scope
          of this architecture.
MNO4      An Operator SHALL be able to send Platform Management commands and Profile
          Management commands to manage its own Profiles
                 either to an SM-DP to be transmitted to an SM-SR
                 either directly to an SM-SR
          These commands SHALL be executed only if the targeted Profile is owned by the
          Operator.
MNO5      The Operator SHALL be able to receive reports of a Profile status changes of its own
          Profiles, irrespective of the cause of the Profile status change.
MNO6      An Operator SHALL be able to define PLMAs for its own Profiles. No other entity than
          the Operator SHALL be able to define PLMA.
MNO7      The Operator SHALL be able to set and unset PLMAs whereby the M2M SP SHALL be
          able to receive a report about this change of authorisation.
MNO8      An Operator SHALL be able to grant PLMA to an M2M SP for:
                 Commands to enable, disable, delete a Profile.
                 Management (set or unset) of the Fall-Back Attribute of a Profile.
                 Management (set or unset) of the Emergency Profile Attribute of a Profile.
                 The reception of reports related to enabling, disabling, deleting, and
                  management of the Fall-Back Attribute of a Profile.
                 The reception of reports related to management of the Emergency Profile
                  Attribute of a Profile.
MNO9      MNO4 SHALL be independent of any given PLMA to an M2M SP.
MNO10     An Operator SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR,
                 the setting of the Fall-Back Attribute on its Profile,
                 the setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute on its Profile if another Profile has
                  the Emergency Profile Attribute set,
          if and only if the appropriate PLMA have been set by the Operator owning the Profile
          with the Fall-Back Attribute or the Profile with the Emergency Profile Attribute to be
          unset.
MNO11     An Operator SHALL be able to send Profile Lifecycle Management commands to
          enable, disable and delete Profiles, targeting its own Profiles, issued by an M2M SP on
          an M2M SP/Operator interface.
          The Operator SHALL be able to send these commands
                 either to an SM-DP to be transmitted to an SM-SR
                 either directly to an SM-SR.
          These commands SHALL be executed only if the targeted Profile is owned by the
          Operator and PLMA has been set by the Operator owning the Profile , for the M2M SP.
MNO12     The Operator SHALL be able to route Profile change status reports to the M2M SP that
          is authorised on this Profile when M2M SP is using an Operator/M2M SP interface as
          specified in MNO11.
MNO13     The Operator SHALL be able to receive a report of setting the Emergency Profile
          Attribute of any Profile on the eUICC.

NOTE:The Operator MAY provide an interface to the M2M SP in order to allow the M2M SP to trigger Profile installation or perform Profile Lifecycle Management related to the Operator’s Profiles. This interface is out of scope of this specification.

2.3.1.4 Operator Subscriber

CUS1      1. The Operator Subscriber is the actual contract partner of the Operator for the
             Subscription. It MAY not be identical to the end user.
          2. The Operator Subscriber uses a Device equipped with a eUICC from the Device
             manufacturer and a Profile (Subscription) from a selected Operator.
          3. Prior to the download of a Profile the Operator Subscriber must provide his/her
             implicit or explicit acceptance.
          4. The Operator Subscriber SHALL have means to directly or indirectly obtain the
             machine to machine Device identifier. The identification of the machine to machine
             Device SHALL implicitly or explicitly identify the eUICC.

2.3.1.5 End User

END1      1. The end user uses the machine to machine Device and the services related to the
             Enabled Profile.
          2. The end user MAY be identical to the Operator Subscriber.
          3. The eUICC is transparent to the end user.
          4. The end user’s relationship is with an Operator Subscriber or the Operator directly.

2.3.1.6 Subscription Manager – Data Preparation (SM-DP)

SMDP1      1. The SM-DP acts on behalf of the Operator.
           2. The SM-DP receives a Profile Description from the Operator and creates Un-
              personalised Profile accordingly. The SM-DP MAY have to utilise tools provided
              by the EUM to create the Un-personalised Profile. The information exchanged
              between the SM-DP and EUM is not standardised and MAY differ between
              different entities.
           3. The SM-DP generates Personalisation Data for the targeted eUICC (e.g. Network
              Access Credentials and other data) based upon input data from the Operator.
           4. The SM-DP builds Personalised Profiles for the targeted eUICC.
           5. The SM-DP SHALL secure the Profile package with the Profile Management
              Credentials of the targeted eUICC.
           6. The SM-DP installs the Personalised Profile on the eUICC through the SM-SR.
SMDP2      On request by the Operator the SM-DP also initiates Profile enabling, Profile disabling,
           Profile deletion and Fall-Back/Emergency Profile Attribute management requests to
           the eUICC via the SM-SR.
SMDP3      The SM-DP establishes a secure and authenticated channel to the eUICC to download
           and install Profiles on to the eUICC.
SMDP4      The interface between the SM-DP and the SM-SR SHALL have proper security level
           defined in order to support secure delivery of Profiles through the SM-SR.
SMDP5      The SM-DP must always receive a request from an Operator to send a Profile via an
           SM-SR to an eUICC.
SMDP6      The SM-DP SHALL be GSMA SAS-SM [22] certified.
SMDP7      Given any eUICC, the SM-DP SHALL be able to generate a Personalised Profile for
           this eUICC.
SMDP8      The SM-DP and Operator are the only entities allowed to establish a secure and
           authenticated channel to the eUICC to manage a Profile.
SMDP9      The Operator SHALL be able to interface to an SM-DP of the Operator’s choosing to
           serve any Operator approved eUICC.
SMDP10     The SM-DP SHALL be able to generate a Personalised Profile that can be downloaded
           and installed on the eUICC targeted by the Operator.
SMDP11     The SM-DP SHALL support the Profile ordering procedure described in section 3.5.3
           of this document.
SMDP12     The SM-DP SHALL be able to forward to the corresponding Operator any status
           change, including Attribute changes, of a Profile reported by the SM-SR to the SM-DP
           independently of the cause of the Profile change.
SMDP13     The SM-DP certificate SHALL be issued by a GSMA CI.
SMDP14     The SM-DP SHALL authenticate the Operator before executing Profile Management
           or forwarding Platform Management commands from this Operator to the SM-SR.
SMDP15     On request by the Operator the SM-DP SHALL be able to set, delete or retrieve PLMA
           in an SM-SR managing the Operator PLMA, as described in section 3.5.15.
SMDP16     The SM-DP SHALL be able to forward to the corresponding Operator the setting of the
           Emergency Profile Attribute for any Profile on the eUICC reported by the SM-SR.

2.3.1.7 Subscription Manager – Secure Routing (SM-SR)

SMSR1     The SM-SR is the only entity allowed to establish a secure and authenticated transport
          channel to the eUICC to manage the eUICC platform.
SMSR2     The SM-SR loads, enables, disables and deletes Profiles on the eUICC in accordance
          with the Operator’s Policy Rules and PLMAs.
SMSR3     The SM-SR obtains the Platform Management Credentials of the eUICC from the EUM
          or establishes them through the previous SM-SR.
SMSR4     Only one SM-SR can be associated with an eUICC at any point in time, but it can be
          changed during the lifetime of the eUICC.
SMSR5     The interface between the SM-SR and the eUICC SHALL have proper security level
          defined in order to support the secure delivery to, and management of, Profiles in the
          eUICC.
SMSR6     1. The SM-SR SHALL NOT handle Operator Credentials in clear text.
          2. The SM-SR has secure communications channels to the SM-DP, eUICC, Operator
             and M2M SP.
          3. The SM-SR SHALL be GSMA SAS-SM [22]- certified.
          The SM-SR SHALL be able to determine whether an eUICC is available for remote
SMSR7
          management.
SMSR8     The SM-SR SHALL be non-discriminatory with regards to other entities within the
          ecosystem.
SMSR9     The SM-SR certificate SHALL be issued by a GSMA CI.
SMSR10    The SM-SR SHALL support Profile Lifecycle Management. through an interface with an
          M2M SP.
SMSR11    The SM-SR SHALL support the PLMA function through an interface with an Operator
          as described in section 3.5.15.
SMSR12    The SM-SR SHALL authenticate the Operator and check that the Operator is the owner
          of the Profile before executing Platform Management commands.
SMSR13     The SM-SR SHALL authenticate the M2M SP and check that the M2M SP is authorised
           by the Operator through PLMA before executing Profile Lifecycle Management on the
           Profile owned by the Operator who has given the PLMA.
           If no PLMA is given, only the Operator is able to execute Platform Management on its
           Profiles.
SMSR14     The SM-SR SHALL be able to report any status change of a Profile, to
                  1. a corresponding Operator owning the affected Profile and interfacing with the
                     SM-SR
           or
                  2. an M2M SP having PLMA set for the affected Profile and interfacing with the
                     SM-SR
           or
                  3. a corresponding SM-DP being in charge of the affected Profile and interfacing
                     with the SM-SR
This SHALL be independent of the cause of the Profile change and SHALL also cover
the case where the Operator acts on behalf of the M2M SP as described in MNO11.
SMSR15     In case of SM-SR change, no PLMA SHALL be transferred to the new SM-SR.
SMSR16     The SM-SR SHALL ensure no PLMAs are granted for:
                     The setting of POL2
                     The setting of other PLMAs

2.3.1.8 Certificate Issuer

           The Certificate Issuer role issues certificates for Embedded UICC remote provisioning
CIS1
           system entities and acts as a trusted third party for the purpose of authentication of
           the entities of the system.
           The Certificate Issuer provides certificates for the EUM, SM-SR and SM-DP.
CIS2
CIS3       The Certificate Issuer communicates with the SM-SR, SM-DP and EUM through
           interfaces that are defined in SGP.14 [26].

2.3.1.9 Initiator

           The Initiator is a virtual role that can be assumed by various entities. The Initiator is in
INT1
           charge of initiating specific procedures.
           For the purpose of the procedures defined within this document the Initiator MAY be
INT2
           assumed to be an Operator or an M2M SP, having PLMAs set for the affected
           Operator Profiles.
INT3       At any time, only one entity MAY assume the Initiator role.
INT4       The interface between the Initiator and the SM-SR is based on the interfaces defined in
           this document.
INT5       The Initiator SHALL be authorised and authenticated by the SM-SR.
2.3.1.10M2M Service Provider
               An M2M SP MAY have a direct interface to the SM-SR to perform Profile
  M2MSP1
               Lifecycle Management for which PLMAs have been set by the Operator.
               An M2M SP SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR the enabling of a Profile
  M2MSP2
               for which PLMAs have been set by the Operator.
               An M2M SP SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR the disabling of a Profile
  M2MSP3
               for which PLMAs have been set by the Operator.
               An M2M SP SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR the deletion of a Profile
  M2MSP4
               for which PLMAs have been set by the Operator.
               An M2M SP SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR the setting of the Fall-
  M2MSP4-B
               Back Attribute on a Profile, if and only if the appropriate PLMA has been set
               by both the Operator whose Profile has the Fall-Back Attribute currently set,
               and the Operator whose Profile will have the Fall-Back Attribute set by the
               request.
               A M2M SP SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR the setting of the
  M2MSP4-C
               Emergency Profile Attribute on a Profile, if and only if the appropriate PLMA
               has been set by the Operator whose Profile will have the Emergency Profile
               Attribute set by the request.
               In case a Profile exists that already has the Emergency Profile Attribute set,
               an M2M SP SHALL be able to request to an SM-SR the setting of the
               Emergency Profile Attribute on a Profile, if and only if the appropriate PLMAs
               have been set by both, the Operator whose Profile has the Emergency Profile
               Attribute currently set, and the Operator whose Profile will have the
               Emergency Profile Attribute set by the request.
M2MSP5       The M2M SP SHALL be able to receive reports of a Profile enabling, disabling,
             or deletion and Fall-Back or Emergency Profile Attribute change, based on a
             Platform Management command executed by an SM-SR, irrespective of the
             cause of the changes to the Profile.
M2MSP6       The M2M SP SHALL be able to receive reports whenever its PLMAs have been
             changed.
M2MSP7       The reception of reports in M2MSP5 SHALL be configured via PLMAs.

2.4 The eUICC

EUICC1     The eUICC is a discrete hardware component in a standardised ETSI Form Factor.
EUICC2     In general, the eUICC is non-removable.
EUICC3     From a machine to machine Device perspective, the behaviour of the eUICC is
           generally identical to the UICC.
EUICC4     1. The eUICC can contain one or more Profiles.
           2. Only one Profile SHALL be enabled at any point in time.
           3. Void.
           4. Void.
           5. Void.
           6. All relevant UICC specifications SHALL apply.
EUICC4-    The eUICC SHALL contain a Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set.
B
           The eUICC SHALL NOT contain more than one Profile with the Fall-Back Attribute set.
           The Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set SHALL NOT be deleted.
           The setting of the Fall-Back Attribute SHALL be managed by the SM-SR.
EUICC4-    The eUICC MAY contain a Profile with Emergency Profile Attribute set.
C
           The eUICC SHALL NOT contain more than one Profile with the Emergency Profile
           Attribute set.
           A Profile SHALL NOT have the Emergency Profile attribute and the Fall-Back attribute
           set at the same time.
           The setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute SHALL be managed by the SM-SR.
EUICC4-    The eUICC MAY contain a Test Profile.
D
           The eUICC SHALL NOT contain more than one Test Profile.
           The eUICC SHALL ensure that the Test Profile does not have the Fall-Back Attribute
           set or the Emergency Profile Attribute set.
EUICC4-    The eUICC SHALL ensure that the Profile Attribute requirements described in 2.5 are
E          fulfilled.
EUICC5     The behaviour of a (U)SIM or ISIM within a Profile on an eUICC is expected to be
           identical to a present (U)SIM or ISIM. No changes to existing 3GPP (U)SIM and ISIM
           specifications are expected.
EUICC6     The eUICC SHALL implement the Milenage network authentication algorithm.
EUICC7     The eUICC SHOULD implement the TUAK algorithm in addition to Milenage when
           TUAK is included within 3GPP specifications.
EUICC8     The ownership of the physical eUICC MAY change throughout its lifetime.
EUICC9     The eUICC SHALL contain the address of its associated SM-SR and have a means to
           authenticate it.
EUICC10    eUICCs delivered by the EUM SHALL always be registered to an SM-SR.
EUICC11    If any command, such as Profile enabling, Profile disabling and Profile download and
           installation does not complete successfully, the eUICC SHALL maintain the state it was
           in before it received the request.
EUICC12    The eUICC MAY support Local Enable and Local Disable functions of an Emergency
           Profile without interaction with the SM-SR.
EUICC12-   The eUICC MAY support Local Enable and Local Disable functions of a Test Profile
B          without interaction with the SM-SR.
EUICC13    The eUICC SHALL NOT send a report to the SM-SR when an Emergency Profile has
           been enabled using the Local Enable function.
EUICC14    The eUICC SHALL enable the previously enabled Profile when the Emergency Profile
           has been disabled using the Local Disable function.
EUICC15    When an Emergency Profile has been disabled using the Local Disable function the
           eUICC MAY send a report to the SM-SR.
EUICC16    The eUICC supporting Local Enable and Local Disable SHALL allow these functions
           only for the Emergency Profile.
EUICC17    In case the execution of the Local Disable fails (e.g. previously enabled Profile deleted,
           previously enabled Profile not providing network connectivity), the eUICC SHALL trigger
           the Fall-Back Mechanism.
EUICC18    The eUICC MAY support Local Enable and Local Disable functions for a Test Profile
           without interaction with the SM-SR.
EUICC19    The eUICC SHALL NOT send a report to the SM-SR when the Test Profile has been
           enabled using the Local Enable function.
EUICC20    The eUICC SHALL enable the previously enabled Profile when the Test Profile has
           been disabled using the Local Disable function.
EUICC21    When a Test Profile has been disabled using the Local Disable function the eUICC MAY
           send a report to the SM-SR.
EUICC22    In case the execution of the Local Disable fails (e.g. previously enabled Profile deleted,
           previously enabled Profile not providing network connectivity), the eUICC SHALL trigger
           the Fall-Back Mechanism.
EUICC23    The eUICC SHALL perform the necessary action to ensure that the values of the Test
           Profile are in accordance with 3GPP TS 34.108 [28] and to ensure that the Test Profile
           does not allow access to an ITU-E.212 [16] network.
EUICC24    In case the execution of the Local Disable fails, the eUICC triggering the Fall-Back
           Mechanism SHALL ensure that the previously enabled Profile is the Profile that was
           enabled before the Local Enable.

2.4.1 Profiles

PRO1        Profiles are the property of the issuing Operator.
PRO2        Profiles SHALL be uniquely identified.
PRO3        1. Only one Profile SHALL be enabled at any point in time.
            2. Other Profiles MAY exist on the Embedded UICC, but the Enabling/Disabling of
               Profiles, except an Emergency Profile and a Test Profile, always remains an
               action that is executed only by the SM-SR acting on behalf of the Operator, except
               under specific circumstances described by PRO11 or by an M2M SP based on
               PLMAs set by the Operator.
            3. Enable/Disable/Delete actions SHALL be undertaken according to Policy Rules.
PRO4        1. A Profile is under the control of the issuing Operator. The Operator MAY delegate
               part of the Profile Lifecycle Management via PLMAs.
            2. A Profile in combination with a eUICC carries all logical characteristics of a UICC.
               All relevant UICC specifications SHALL apply with the exceptions defined by the
               eUICC specifications.
PRO5        Each Profile SHALL be isolated within its own dedicated secure container. The
            GlobalPlatform’s Security Domain framework SHALL be considered.
PRO6        Profiles MAY be used either for Provisioning (Provisioning Profile), for operation
            (Operational Profile) or for testing (Test Profile). They are clearly distinguished.
            1. An Operational Profile MAY be used as a Provisioning Profile.
            2. A Provisioning Profile SHALL NOT be used as an Operational Profile.
            3. A Test Profile SHALL NOT be used as a Provisioning or Operational Profile.
PRO7        There SHALL be zero or one Provisioning Profile.
PRO8        There MAY be several Operational Profiles.
PRO9        Installed Profiles SHALL have one of the following states:
                       enabled
                       disabled
PRO10       In all operational uses the eUICC SHALL enforce that one, and only one, Profile is
            enabled at any point in time.
PRO11       There SHALL be a capability for eUICC–initiated enabling of the Profile with Fall-Back
            Attribute set, in the case of loss of network connectivity. In case this mechanism is
            used, the POL1 “disabled not allowed” and “Profile deletion is mandatory when it is
            disabled” SHALL be ignored.
PRO11-B     In case a Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set is enabled by the eUICC as per PRO11,
            the eUICC SHALL inform its associated SM-SR. The Profile with Fall-Back Attribute
            set will consequently provide network connectivity to allow the SM-SR to remotely
            manage the eUICC.
PRO12       The local Profile management SHALL only be possible:
                        Under specific circumstances described by PRO11
                        For Emergency Profile
                        For Test Profile
PRO13       A Profile contains parameters for an authentication algorithm (e.g. OPc, ri, ci for the
            Milenage algorithm) but not the algorithm itself.
PRO14         The eUICC MAY support other network authentication algorithms; if such algorithms
              are supported, the eUICC SHALL implement a mechanism to configure its
              parameters.
              NOTE:               The accessibility of these other network authentication algorithms to
                                  Profiles is out of the scope of this document.
PRO15         A Profile contains a subset of Policy Rules to control external Profile management
              actions.
PRO16         A Profile MAY contain identifiers for entities in the ecosystem, keys, PINs, certificates,
              algorithm parameters, as well as first and second level applications. (Ref: ETSI TS
              102 221 [3]).
PRO17         Any function, feature or service which is possible on a current UICC SHALL be
              possible in an Operational Profile on an eUICC.
PRO18         The access to functions, features or services in a Profile on an eUICC SHALL be
              identical to the current UICC, i.e. transparent for the terminal and the user.
PRO19         The remote management of functions, features or services in a Profile on an eUICC
              SHALL have minimal impact on the operator’s existing systems and infrastructure.
PRO20         Profiles are stored only in the SM-DP and installed on the eUICC; they are not stored
              anywhere else and are encrypted in transit.
PRO21         It SHALL be possible to update a Test Profile with restriction defined by the EUICC23.
PRO22         The deletion of the Test Profile SHALL NOT be possible.
PRO23         It SHALL NOT be possible to remotely enable or disable the Test Profile.

2.4.2 Policies & Policy Control

PPC1        Each Profile has an associated Policy. A Policy contains rules which govern the change
            of operational states of the Profile. These state transitions are:
                     disabling
                     enabling
                     deletion
PPC2        Update-access to a Profile’s Policy is restricted to the issuing Operator.
PPC3        The Policy Rules of a disabled Profile can only apply to itself. The Policy Rules of a
            disabled Profile cannot affect any other Profile, except for the reasons listed by PPC4.
PPC4        If the previously Enabled Profile has the POL1 rule “disable not allowed” set, then the
            eUICC SHALL only switch back to this Profile: as long as POL1 rule “disable not
            allowed” is set, it SHALL only be possible to delete this Profile by the Master Delete
            function.

2.5 Profile Attributes

In this version of the specification the following Profile Attributes are defined:

-   Fall-Back Attribute
-   Emergency Profile Attribute
PRA1      A Profile Attribute MAY be set for a Profile.
PRA2      The support of the Emergency Profile Attribute is optional.
PRA3      If a specific Profile Attribute is supported, it SHALL be possible to set such Profile
          Attribute for a Profile.
PRA4      A Profile SHALL NOT have the Fall-Back Attribute and the Emergency Profile
          Attribute set at the same time.

3 Architecture

3.1 Architecture Diagram

This section defines the functional architecture required to support the remote Provisioning of eUICCs. The basic building blocks of the architecture consist of the functions to be performed, the Roles and the assigned Actors. The figure below represents the eUICC remote Provisioning system. Details of the Roles, the associated functions and interfaces are described in section 3.3 and Annex A.

CI                                 SM-DP                                Operator
EUM                                 SM-SR                                M2M SP
SM-SR                                eUICC                                 Device
Interfaces in Scope                                         CI interfaces
Out Of Scope (Partially defined)                            Out of Scope

Figure 1: eUICC Remote Provisioning System

3.2 Card Architecture

3.2.1 Security Domains

GlobalPlatform provides the notion of Security Domains (SD). These are on-card representatives of off-card entities that provide:  Secure storage for cryptographic keys;  Access for off card entities using (GP) secure channel protocols;  A mechanism for loading applications;  Security services for applications.

The properties of SDs are configured via GP privileges (e.g. Delegated or Authorised
Management, DAP Verification, Token Management, Global Delete), by the Provisioning of
keys (e.g. for SCP03 or SCP80/81) and by associating an SD to another SD with other rights,
by associating an SD to itself (and thus removing all management rights of a superior SD) or
by assigning memory quotas for the SD and all its contents.
In earlier versions, the ISD (Issuer Security Domain) had several unique privileges. However,
in the latest GlobalPlatform Card Specification [10], it is also configured via privileges, and
except for being there in the beginning, no major specific feature remains. This SHOULD
allow Operators to have the same benefits as they do today with the current ISD in a UICC.
The way forward is:
    To build the eUICC on a structure of SDs, and
    To define additional properties (e.g. via privileges) so that the different SDs can
      represent the Actors for the various Roles in remote Provisioning of Profiles.

3.2.2 Card Architecture

This section describes how Profiles SHOULD be designed, for example, using an extended version of the concepts and information models from GlobalPlatform Card Specification [10]. Profiles are contained within security domains (SD) on the eUICC, thus making the security mechanisms of SDs available. Further information can be found in [10]. The following figure outlines a schematic representation of the eUICC.

Figure 2:Schematic Representation of the eUICC

The operating system (OS) contains the basic platform features, e.g. support of the features defined in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [10]. The ECASD (eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain):  Is created within an eUICC at time of manufacturing;  Cannot be deleted or disabled after delivery;

   Is based on the concept of CASD from Global Platform (see [10], [12] and [15]);
   Is configured by the EUM at pre-issuance;
   Contains a non-modifiable eUICC private key, the associated Certificate, the CI’s
    root public keys and the EUM keyset for key/certificate renewal;
   Is associated to the ISD-R, which provides the underlying secure OTA channel;
   Is required for, and is not limited to, the establishment of new keysets in the ISD-P(s)
    and ISD-R;
   Does not support the Mandated DAP verification feature.
ISD-R and ISD-P are security domains with special features.
The ISD-R (ISD-Root) is the on-card representative of the SM-SR that executes the Platform
Management commands (see the functions for Platform Management in section 3.3.1.3).
An ISD-R SHALL:
      a) Be created within an eUICC at time of manufacturing;
      b) Be associated to an SM-SR;
      c) Not be deleted or disabled;
      d) Provides a secure OTA channel using Platform Management Credentials
          (SCP80 or SCP81 as defined in [10]) to the SM-SR;
      e) Implement a key establishment protocol for the support of the change of SM-SR;
      f) Offers wrapping and unwrapping service of the transport part during Profile
          download;
      g) Be able to create new ISD-Ps with the required cumulative granted memory
          (CGM)
          NOTE:     memory management at SM-SR level is for further study;
      h) Not be able to create any SD except an ISD-P;
      i) Executes Platform Management functions in accordance to the Policy Rules;
      j) Not be able to perform any operation inside an ISD-P.
The ISD-P (ISD-Profile) is the on-card representative of the Operator, or SM-DP if delegated
by the Operator.
An ISD-P SHALL:
      a) Be a separate and independent entity on the eUICC;
      b) Contain a Profile including MNO-SD, Connectivity Parameters, file system, NAAs
          and Policy Rules;
      c) Contain a state machine related to creating, enabling and disabling the Profile;
      d) Contain keys for Profile management for the loading and installation phase;
      e) Implement a key establishment protocol to generate a keyset for the
          personalisation of the ISD-P;
      f) Be able to receive and decrypt, load and install the Profile created by the SM-
          DP;
      g) Be able to set its own state to disabled once the Profile is installed;
      h) Provide SCP03 capabilities to secure its communication with the SM-DP;
      i) Be able to contain a CASD. This CASD is optional within the Profile and provides
          services only to security domains of the Profile and only when the Profile is in
          Enabled state.
The MNO-SD is the on-card representative of the Operator.
An MNO-SD SHALL:

a)Be associated to itself; b) Contain the Operator OTA Keys; c) Provide a secure OTA channel (SCP80 or SCP81 as defined in [6] and [7]); d) Have the capability to host Supplementary Security Domains. Once the Profile is installed in its ISD-P on the eUICC, the Profile and ISD-P SHALL be considered to be in union and thereafter it is the state of the ISD-P that is managed. The SM-DP performs the Profile Management functions (see section 3.3.1.2) on the ISD-P during the load and install phase. The MNO-SD is managed by an Operator OTA Platform once the Profile is enabled. The MNO-SD is managed in an equivalent way to the ISD of a current UICC. The Platform Service Manager is an OS service that offers Platform management functions and Policy Rules enforcement mechanism (Policy Rules Enforcer). Called by the ISD-R or ISD-P it executes the functions according to the Policy Rules (see section 3.6). In addition it can retrieve ISD-P generic information (i.e. Profile ID, Profile State) that can be shared with authorised entities on request. The Telecom Framework is an OS service that provides standardised network authentication algorithms to the NAAs hosted in the ISD-Ps. Furthermore it provides the capabilities to configure the algorithm with the needed parameters. Contained in the ISD-P are the well-known card structure with applications, SDs for other entities, the file system (MF tree, ADFs, etc.) (as per ETSI TS 102 221 [3] and 3GPP TS 31 102 [18]) and the Policy Rules.

3.2.3 State Diagram for an ISD-P

The states and state transitions for an ISD-P are as follows: After an ISD-P is created and keys are set up, the SM-DP, on behalf of the Operator, can create a Profile containing SDs, applications, NAAs, and the file system. When the Profile is installed, the SM-DP sets the state of the ISD-P to disabled, effectively handing it over to the SM-SR for Platform Management.

by SM-SR

               created                     disabled                      deleted
by SM-SR                     by SM -DP                       by SM -SR

by SM -SR

enabled

Download and
installation Phase        Operational Phase

Figure 3: ISD-P State Diagram

In the created state shown in the diagram above, the Profile is downloaded and installed in the ISD-P. In the created, disabled or deleted state, the Profile is not visible to the machine to machine Device.

3.3 Relevant Roles and Functions

This section introduces and defines the relevant Roles and functions needed to support the remote Provisioning of Embedded UICCs. The functions describe what actions are either performed internally by the role, or what actions are performed when communicating with another role or entity of the architecture. The role is agnostic to the business Actor to which this role is assigned.

3.3.1 Functions Definition

3.3.1.1 Functions for Data Preparation

               Un-personalised Profile Creation
Un-personalised Profile Creation covers the building of the Un-personalised Profile based on
the Operator’s Profile Description and the type of eUICC targeted.
The SM-DP generates the Un-personalised Profile using the documentation provided by the
Operator.
It is assumed the SM-DP tests the Un-personalised Profile with a sample of the target eUICC.
The Operator validates the Un-personalised Profile by testing a sample of the target eUICC
personalised with a test Personalised Profile created from the Un-personalised Profile
developed by the SM-DP. The downloadable Profile SHALL be provided in a standardised
format.
               Profile Ordering
Profile ordering covers the processes for the preparation and generation of the Personalised
Profiles by the SM-DP based on the input data provided by the Operator to the SM-DP. The
input data includes (but is not limited to):
    The quantity of the Profiles to be generated;
    IMSI value(s) or range;
    ICCID value(s) or range;
    Un-personalised Profile type(s);
    Information about the target eUICC(s), such as the EID.

How and when the input data is provided by the Operator to the SM-DP is out of scope.

               Generation of Personalisation Data
This function creates the credential and key values (e.g. NAC, PINs, OTA Keys) in a secure
environment based on the input data provided by the Operator (e.g. IMSI, ICCID).
                 Profile Personalisation
SM-DP inserts the Personalisation Data into the Un-personalised Profile with respect to the
order placed by the Operator. This function addresses the procedures which ensure a created
Personalised Profile can only be installed on a specific eUICC.
             EUM Services, Scripts, Tools or Documentation
To allow any SM-DP to undertake the above functions on any eUICC or the documentation
supplied by the EUM must support at least the following eUICC attributes which MAY be
delivered by the Operator. Some attributes are related to the function of Un-personalised
Profile Creation and some to Profile Personalisation and in some cases the function to which
they apply MAY be dependent on the particular eUICC.
The attributes are:
    Applications (and assignment of the applications) to be used or loaded, including
       USIM, ISIM, CAT and third party application SSDs;
     Algorithm selection, algorithm parameter assignment, and algorithm parameter
      loading within the eUICC platform;
     Application Key and PIN assignment and loading;
     Optional and variable data fields in the USIM application file structure;
     Additional data fields and file structures to support other applications – both SIM-
      based and device-based applications.

The information exchanged between the SM-DP and EUM is not standardised and MAY differ between different entities.

3.3.1.2 Functions for Profile Management

                  eUICC Eligibility Verification Function
The eUICC Eligibility Verification function covers the following aspects:
    Verification of the targeted eUICC for installing the Profile in preparation.
    Verification of the eUICC certification.
                  Profile Download and Installation Function
This function allows the download and installation of a Personalised Profile into the targeted
eUICC.
                 Profile Content Update Function
This is handled by an Operator OTA Platform.
                 Policy Rules Update Function
This function updates the Policy Rules.
The Policy Rules to be updated MAY be the ones in the SM-SR, or the ones within a Profile
already installed in the ISD-P on the eUICC.
               Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Function
This covers the setting, unsetting and status enquiry of the PLMA in the SM-SR, initiated by
the Operator.

3.3.1.3 Functions for Platform Management

               ISD-P Creation Function
This function creates an ISD-P within the eUICC in preparation for Profile content to be
loaded.
               ISD-P Deletion Function
This function allows the deletion of an ISD-P. ISD-P deletion is the permanent removal of an
ISD-P along with its content previously loaded and installed on the eUICC.
An ISD-P can be deleted only when it is in disabled state (see state diagram in section 3.2.3).
               Master Delete Function
The Master Delete Function allows the deletion of an Orphaned Profile without the Fall-Back
Attribute set regardless of the Profile’s policy rules.
This function will delete the Profile and its ISD-P. The deletion of a Profile can only happen
when the Profile is in disabled state and its Fall-Back Attribute is not set.
               Profile Enabling Function
This function is used to Enable a Profile in Disable state.
This will make the applications and files within the Profile visible to and selectable by the M2M
Device subject to relevant access control.
               Profile Disabling Function
This function is used to Disable a Profile in Enable state.
This will make all applications and files within the Profile invisible to and not selectable by the
Device.
               Set Fall-Back Attribute
This function sets the Fall-Back Attribute of a Profile on the eUICC
               Transport Function
Transport function refers to the establishing of the communication channel between the SM-
SR and the ISD-R on the eUICC.
Security of transport channel between the SM-SR and eUICC is also addressed by this
function.
NOTE:          The eUICC within a Device MAY be contacted over different type of network
               systems (such as GSM, GPRS, UMTS, or EPS) by the SM-SR. Furthermore,
the SM-SR will need to interface with the concerned network system
accordingly. For instance the SM-SR would need to use SMPP to be able to
communicate with SMS, or it MAY need to connect to an IMS gateway in order
to establish an IP-based communication with the eUICC. These
communications are being provided by the active Subscription.
               Policy Enforcement Function
This deals with the enforcement of the policy rules on the eUICC and at the SM-SR.

3.3.1.4 Functions for eUICC Management

               eUICC Registration Function
This function is called to register an eUICC in an SM-SR.
               SM-SR Change Function
This function is called to initiate the change the change of an SM-SR for an eUICC. SM-SR
change is the transfer of the EIS for an eUICC from one SM-SR to another SM-SR and the
establishment of new key set, in the ISD-R, between the new SM-SR and the eUICC.

3.3.1.5 eUICC Functions

Fall-Back Function

This function activates the Fall-Back Mechanism that disables the currently Enabled Profile and enables the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set. For example, in the case of permanent loss of network connectivity for the Enabled Profile.

3.3.1.6 Device Functions

             Local Enable of the Emergency Profile
This function enables the Device to enable the Emergency Profile.
             Local Disable of the Emergency Profile
This function enables the Device to disable the Emergency Profile.
             Local Enable of the Test Profile
This function enables the Device to enable the Test Profile.
             Local Disable of the Emergency Profile
This function enables the Device to disable the Test Profile.

3.3.2 Void

3.4 Profile Description

3.4.1 General Content of a Profile Installed on an eUICC

The following data is part of a Profile:
     The Applications and files as defined in the relevant specifications (in particular
       3GPP TS 31.102 [18], 3GPP TS 31.103 [19] and ETSI TS 102 221 [3]).
In addition to the above, the following data which is not included in the above standards:
     The algorithm parameters associated with its corresponding Network Access
       Application (for instance with Milenage: the OPc, ri, ci values);
     Policy Rules attached to the Profile (POL1).

3.4.2 Access to the Content of a Profile

For the Device the Enabled Profile is equivalent to an UICC. For an Operator OTA Platform, the Enabled Profile is equivalent to an UICC as per ETSI TS 102 225 [6], TS 102 226 [7] and TS 102 223 [5]. The Policy Rules POL1 attached to the Profile are managed through the Operator OTA Platform, as per the rest of the content of the Profile. An applet in the Enabled Profile will work the same manner as an applet in an UICC as per relevant ETSI and 3GPP standards.

3.5 Procedures

The procedures described in this section involve both interactions between the Roles of the business environment (e.g. between a Subscriber and a Telecommunication Service Provider) and between entities of the remote Provisioning architecture (e.g. between eUICC and SM-SR). For each procedure the main steps as well as the related “Start conditions” and “End conditions” are described. “Start conditions” describe a set of prerequisites which must hold before the procedure can be performed. “End conditions” describe a set of results which will hold after the procedure has been performed. The following main procedures for the Provisioning and lifecycle management of eUICCs and related Profiles are identified:

No                      Name                                     Purpose
 1      eUICC Registration at SM-SR         To register a newly manufactured eUICC at a given
                                            SM-SR as a prerequisite for subsequent remote
                                            management
 2      Profile Ordering                    For the Operator to order at the SM-DP a quantity of
                                            Profiles ready for download
 3      Profile Download and Installation   To download a Profile to a given eUICC
 4      Master Delete                       To delete an Orphaned Profile in a given eUICC
 5      Profile Enabling                    To enable a Profile in a given eUICC via SM-SR
 6      Profile Enabling via SM-DP          To enable a Profile in a given eUICC via SM-DP
 7     Profile Disabling                       To disable the Enabled Profile and enable the Profile
                                               with Fall-Back Attribute set.
 8     ISD-P Deletion                          To delete a Profile and its ISD-P from a given eUICC
                                               via SM-SR.
 9     ISD-P Deletion via SM-DP                To delete a Profile and its ISD-P from a given eUICC
                                               via SM-DP.
10     SM-SR Change                            To change the SM-SR of a given eUICC
11     ISD-P Key Establishment                 Key establishment procedure between the SM-DP
                                               and the ISD-P.
                                               NOTE:            This procedure is part of the Profile
                                                                Download and Installation
                                                                procedure.
12     Fall-Back Mechanism                     To enable the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set in
                                               a given eUICC
13     eUICC Certificate Check                 To verify whether the targeted eUICC is certified.
14     ProfileLifecycle       Management       To set, to delete or to enquire the status of PLMA in
       Authorisation Function                  the SM-SR
15     Profile Enabling via M2M SP             To enable a Profile in a given eUICC via M2M SP.
16     Profile Disabling via M2M SP            To disable the enabled Profile and to enable the
                                               Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set via M2M SP.
17     ISD-P Deletion via M2M SP               To delete a Profile and its ISD-P from a given eUICC
                                               via M2M SP.

3.5.1 eUICC Registration at SM-SR

eUICCs are manufactured, according to given standards, generally independent from Device
makers, mobile operators or Telecommunication Service Providers. The Device
manufacturers can select any certified eUICC that fits their purpose and order it in the
necessary quantity directly from the EUM. In order to allow subscription management
procedures, the EUM registers the eUICC at a selected SM-SR. This means that related
information which is relevant throughout its further lifetime, in particular the Platform
Management Credentials, Provisioning MSISDN, are stored in the SM-SR database. Without
this step, remote access to the eUICC for the purpose of subscription management will be
impossible.
NOTE:           It is assumed that at this stage the eUICC does contain a Provisioning Profile
                and is linked to an active Provisioning Subscription. How the Provisioning
                operator is selected and the nature of the related commercial and technical
                agreements between the EUM and the Provisioning Operator are out of scope
                of this document.

The following represents a functional representation of the eUICC Information Set:

EIS = { EID,
                Type, Version, Production Date,
                Platform Management Credentials, Certificate,
                Available Memory, Total Memory,
                SRID,
                { Profile 0: Profile Type, ISD-P AID, ICCID, MSISDN, State, DPID, Allocated Memory, POL2
                  Profile 1: Profile Type, ISD-P AID, ICCID, MSISDN, State, DPID, Allocated Memory, POL2
                  …
                  Profile n: …
      }
}

The eUICC registration comprises the following steps:

Figure 4: eUICC Registration at SM-SR

Start Condition: eUICCs are produced and a Provisioning Profile is loaded and active in the
Provisioning operator’s network. They are tested and ready for shipment. Each eUICC has a
corresponding EIS.
Procedure:
   1. The EUM sends a eUICC registration request to the selected SM-SR, containing the
      EIS.
   2. The SM-SR stores the EIS in its database, with EID as the key parameter.
   3. The SM-SR confirms the successful registration towards the EUM.
End Condition: The eUICC is registered at the SM-SR and ready for Platform and Profile
Management operations.
Each eUICC MAY only be registered at one SM-SR. The communication link between the
EUM and the SM-SR SHALL be secure.

3.5.2 Un-personalised Profile Verification (Proprietary)

Within the eUICC, the current functional scope of the UICC is represented by a Profile.
Similar to the verification of classic UICCs, Profiles SHALL be verified by the entity that
creates the Profile, the SM-DP. For the verification of a Profile by the SM-DP, a similar
procedure as for a classic UICC SHALL be used. One of the differences is that physical test
eUICCs are only personalised by the SM-DP.
NOTE:         The Profile verification processes and interfaces are not standardised and
              MAY differ between Operators and SM-DPs (Profile validation strategy, which
              tests MAY be performed by the Operator, which MAY be done by the SM-DP,
              what MAY be exchanged between the Operator and SM-DP, how this interface
              is secured, etc.).
For example, the Profile verification procedure MAY comprise the following steps:
Start Condition:
   a. The Profile Description has been provided by the Operator to the SM-DP and the Un-
       personalised Profile has been generated by the SM-DP in a separate process.
   b. The SM-DP has sample eUICCs of a specific type.

Procedure:

1. The Operator provides a test subscription to the selected SM-DP, as well as data such
   as applets, POL1 and Profile type. Other data, e.g. keys or ICCID, MAY be generated
   by the SM-DP.
2. The SM-DP creates a test Personalised Profile (Un-personalised Profile personalised
   with test data, including the data received from the Operator), then downloads and
   installs it onto an eUICC sample.
3. The SM-DP performs the necessary validation procedure to verify the combination of
   the eUICC sample and the test Personalised Profile.

End Condition: The Un-personalised Profile is valid and is now ready for the Profile ordering procedure for an eUICC type.

3.5.3 Profile Ordering (Proprietary)

Within the eUICC, the current functional scope of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Just
as with current UICCs, Profiles are ordered under the responsibility of the Operator.
The same procedures SHALL apply with the only difference being that the UICCs are not
produced in physical form but are kept at the SM-DP as Profiles.
NOTE:         Profile ordering processes and interfaces are not standardised and MAY differ
              between Operators.
For example, the Profile ordering MAY comprise the following steps:

Figure 5: Profile Ordering

Start Conditions:
   a. An Un-personalised Profile has been created by the SM-DP based on the Profile
       Description provided by the Operator.
   b. The Operator has a demand for a quantity of eUICC Profiles.
   c. The Un-personalised Profile has been validated on the target eUICC type using the
       Un-personalised Profile verification procedure in section 3.5.2

Procedure: 1. The Operator provides an order to a selected SM-DP. The order contains production data such as the quantity and a Start-IMSI, an IMSI range or a list of IMSIs and a reference to the Un-personalised Profile type. The POL1 and POL2 definitions for the Policy Rules to

be applied later by respectively the eUICC and SM-SR can also be delivered in this context.

2. The SM-DP then starts production, i.e. personalisation of Profiles using the data received from the Operator. Other data, e.g. keys or ICCID, MAY be generated by the SM-DP during the personalisation process. The Profiles are stored within the SM-DP. 3. Order completion is confirmed to the Operator, including all data necessary to register the Profiles in the Operator’s backend systems. Each Profile is uniquely identified at least by its ICCID. 4. The Operator installs the Profiles in the related systems, e.g. HLR, AuC, CRM. These procedures are no different from current UICC registration processes at the Operator.

End Condition: The ordered quantity of Profiles is now ready for the Profile download procedure. Related Operator Credentials are available to the Operator.

3.5.4 Profile Download and Installation

In order for the Device to be used for communication services, the eUICC must be loaded with at least one Operational Profile. In general, this will be done over-the-air, using the Subscription represented by the currently Enabled Profile. If no other Operational Profile is enabled the Provisioning Profile is used. The Profile download and installation procedure follows the following steps:

Figure 6: Profile Download

Start Conditions: a. A Subscriber has subscribed to a selected Operator. b. The EID of the target eUICC and the SRID are known by the Operator. c. A Profile ordering procedure has been completed with a selected SM-DP. d. The target eUICC is integrated into a Device and is associated to an SM-SR. e. The Operator MAY activate the related Subscription in the network by the ICCID.

Procedure:
  1.   The Operator sends a Profile Download request to the SM-DP. The request must
       include the relevant information to allow the identification of the SM-SR, the target EID
       and ICCID.
       The Operator MAY also ask the SM-DP to enable the Profile once it is downloaded
       and installed.
2.   Based on the information provided by the Operator, the SM-DP identifies the SM-SR,
     where the eUICC is currently registered.
3.   The SM-SR and the SM-DP authenticate each other if not already authenticated.
4.   The SM-DP requests from the SM-SR the EIS for that particular eUICC, identified by
     its EID.
5.   Based on the EID, the SM-SR retrieves the EIS.
6.   The SM-SR sends the relevant information from the EIS to the requesting SM-DP.
     NOTE:          The rationale for saying “relevant information from the EIS” is that the
                    SM-SR will not provide information to the SM-DP that is not appropriate
                    for the particular SM-DP.
7.   The SM-DP checks the eligibility of the eUICC (e.g. type, certificate and memory)
     based upon the received information from the EIS.
8.   If a problem is detected with the eligibility of the eUICC, the SM-DP aborts the
     procedure and returns an error message to the requesting Operator.
9.   If no problem is detected with the eligibility of the eUICC, the SM-DP issues an
     installation request for the ISD-P to the SM-SR.
10. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if
    not already authenticated.
11. The SM-SR contacts the ISD-R on the eUICC for ISD-P installation and an empty ISD-
    P is created in the eUICC. This is confirmed back to the SM-DP.
12. The SM-DP and the eUICC authenticate each other and a shared key set is
    established between the ISD-P and the SM-DP through the SM-SR. The Key
    Establishment Procedure is described in Security Section 4.5.
13. Now the SM-DP selects the Personalised Profile (e.g. based on the ICCID or Profile
    type) and protects it using the new ISD-P key set, producing the encrypted and
    integrity protected Profile EncP.
14. The SM-DP asks the SM-SR to establish a secure transport channel between the ISD-
    R on the eUICC and the SM-SR. This secure transport channel is for protection of
    Profile management commands not the Profile itself.
15. The SM-DP initiates the Profile Download and Installation by sending the EncP to the
    eUICC using a secure channel between the SM-DP and the newly created ISD-P on
    the eUICC, and within the established secure transport channel between the SM-SR
    and the ISD-R on the eUICC.
16. The eUICC sends the result of the installation of the Profile to the SM-DP.
     The Operator owner of the Profile decides whether, at the end of Profile installation,
     the SCP03 key set in the ISD-P SHALL be removed by the SM-DP, retained by the
     SM-DP or be handed over to the Operator.
     NOTE:          If the Operator decides that the key set is retained by the SM-DP the
                    Operator can instruct the SM-DP to handover or delete the key set at
                    a later point in time.
17. SM-DP sends the result of the installation of the Profile to the SM-SR. This message
    includes the relevant EIS elements for this Profile.
18. The SM-SR updates its database. If the download and installation was successful, the
    SM-SR inserts a new Profile record into the EIS, with the status “disabled”.
  19. The SM-SR confirms the status of the Profile download and installation back to the
      SM-DP.
  20. If the Operator asked the SM-DP to enable the Profile once it is downloaded and
      installed, the SM-DP executes the Profile Enabling via SM-DP procedure (see 3.5.7).
  21. The SM-DP confirms the status of the download and installation back to the Operator.
      This message includes the information to identify the Profile.
End Condition: An ISD-P has been created in the eUICC for the Operator, containing a
Profile in disabled or enabled state. The SM-SR has updated the EIS for this eUICC
accordingly.

3.5.5 Master Delete

This procedure deletes an Orphaned Profile without the Fall-Back Attribute set regardless of
the Profile’s Policy rules.
The successful execution of this procedure requires the authorisation of both the Initiator and
the SM-DP.
NOTE:          The actor who assumes the role of the initiator needs to be determined. In the
               example below we can assume the initiator will be the new Operator with the
               authorisation of the Subscriber.

Figure 7: Master Delete

Start Conditions:
   a. There is an Orphaned Profile on a eUICC which is, for example, blocking the loading
       of another Profile.
   b. The Orphaned Profile cannot be deleted using the normal ISD-P deletion procedure.
   c. The Initiator decides to delete the Orphaned Profile on the eUICC.
   d. The Orphaned Profile is disabled.
Procedure:
  1.    The Initiator sends a master delete request to the SM-SR. The request includes the
        target EID and the ICCID of the target Profile. The request includes the Initiator’s
        authorisation (Auth 1) for the master delete.
  2.    The SM-SR sends the authorisation request together with the initiator authorisation
        (Auth 1) to the SM-DP associated with the target Profile. The SM-DP verifies the
        authorisation (Auth 1).
  3.    The SM-DP also requests authorisation from the Operator owner of the target Profile.
        NOTE:         The definition of this interface is out of the scope of this document.
  4.    If the Operator authorises the deletion or if there is no response from the Operator,
        the SM-DP sends a response to the SM-SR containing the SM-DP’s authorisation
        (Auth 2) for the master delete. If the SM-DP does not give its authorisation for the
        master delete the SM-SR informs the Initiator.
  5.    The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if
        not already authenticated.
  6.    The SM-SR sends the master delete request to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The request
        includes the ICCID of the target Profile and the authorisation of the SM-DP (Auth 2).
  7.    The ISD-P of the target Profile verifies the authorisation, thus verifying the master
        delete command.
  8.    The ISD-R deletes the target Profile and the related ISD-P without Policy Rule
        enforcement.
  9.    The ISD-R reports the status of the master delete to the SM-SR.
  10. The SM-SR updates the EIS accordingly.
  11. The SM-SR reports the status of the master delete to the Initiator.
End Condition: The target Profile is deleted from the eUICC. The EIS in the SM-SR is up to
date.

3.5.6 Profile Enabling

A switch between two Profiles can be achieved by the following dedicated procedure. In this case the request is issued directly by the Operator to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC.

Figure 8: Profile Enabling

Start Conditions:
   a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. Another Profile is enabled.
   b. The Subscription associated with the target Profile is active in the Operator’s
       network.
   c. The EID of the target eUICC, the SRID associated with the target Profile and the
       ICCID of the target Profile are known by the Operator.
Procedure:
  1.   The Operator sends a Profile Enabling request to the SM-SR. The request includes
       the target EID and at least the ICCID of the target Profile.
  2.   The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of the currently Enabled Profile permits the Profile
       switch to take place.
  3.   If there is a conflict with POL2, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the
       concerned Operator accordingly.
  4.   The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if
       not already authenticated.
  5.   If there is no conflict with POL2, the SM-SR issues a Profile Enabling request to the
       ISD-R on the eUICC including at least the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
  6.   The eUICC performs a POL1 check.
  7.   If there is a conflict with POL1, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM-
       SR.
  8.   If there is no conflict with POL1, the ISD-R performs the Profile switch resulting in the
       target Profile being enabled and the previously Enabled Profile being disabled.
  9.   The ISD-R reports the Profile switch result to the SM-SR.
10. If the switch is successful the SM-SR records in the EIS that the target Profile is
    enabled and the previous Profile is disabled.
11. The SM-SR reports the Profile switch result back to the Operator(s). These messages
    will include the EID and the ICCID of their respective Profiles.
12. The SM-SR SHALL report the Profile switch result back to the M2M SP if requested
    by the Operator during PLMA registrations (see 3.5.155) . These messages will
    include the EID and the ICCID of the targeted Profiles.

End Condition: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. The previously Enabled Profile is disabled. The EIS is up to date.

3.5.7 Profile Enabling via SM-DP

A switch between two Profiles can be achieved by the following dedicated procedure. In this case, the request is issued by the Operator to the SM-DP which forwards it to the SM- SR associated with the target eUICC. This way, the Operator does not have to be linked to the SM-SR and relies on the SM-DP to make the connection.

Figure 9: Profile Enabling via SM-DP

Start Conditions:
   a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. Another Profile is enabled.
   b. The Subscription associated with the target Profile is active in the Operator’s
       network.
   c. The EID of the target eUICC, the SRID and the ICCID of the target Profile are known
       by the Operator.
Procedure:
  1.   The Operator sends a Profile Enabling request to the SM-DP. The request includes
       the target EID and at least the ICCID of the target Profile.
  2.   The SM-DP identifies the related SM-SR.
  3.   The SM-SR and the SM-DP authenticate each other if not already authenticated.
  4.   The SM-DP forwards the Profile Enabling request to the SM-SR.
  5.   The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of the currently Enabled Profile permits the Profile
       switch to take place.
6.    If there is a conflict with POL2, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the
      requesting SM-DP.
7.    If there is a conflict with POL2, the error message is forwarded by the SM-DP to the
      requesting Operator.
8.    The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if
      not already authenticated.
9.    If there is no conflict with POL2, the SM-SR issues a Profile Enabling request to the
      ISD-R on the eUICC including at least the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
10. The eUICC performs a POL1 check.
11. If there is a conflict with POL1, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM-
    SR.
12. If there is no conflict with POL1, the ISD-R performs the Profile switch resulting in the
    target Profile being enabled and the previously enable Profile being disabled.
13. The ISD-R reports the Profile switch result to the SM-SR.
14. If the switch is successful the SM-SR records in the EIS that the target Profile is
    enabled and the previous Profile is disabled.
15. The SM-SR reports the Profile switch result back to the requesting SM-DP and the
    SM-DP or Operator of the disabled Profile. These messages will include the EID and
    the ICCID of their respective Profiles.
16. The Profile switch result is forwarded to the requesting Operator.
17. The SM-SR SHALL report the Profile switch result back to the M2M SP if requested
    by the Operator during PLMA registration (see 3.5.15). These messages will include
    the EID and the ICCID of the targeted Profiles.

End Condition: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. The previously Enabled Profile is disabled. The EIS is up to date.

3.5.8 Profile Disabling

Profile disabling can be achieved by the following procedure. The request is issued directly by the Operator to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC.

Figure 10: Profile Disabling

Start Condition: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC.
Procedure:
  1.   The Operator sends a Profile Disabling request to the SM-SR. The request includes
       the target EID and at least the ICCID of the target Profile.
  2.   If the target Profile for disabling is the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set then the
       Profile disabling SHALL NOT be executed.
  3.   The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of the Enabled Profile permits the Profile to be disabled
  4.   If there is a POL2 conflict, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and send error message
       to Operator.
  5.   The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if
       not already authenticated.
  6.   If there is no POL2 conflict, the SM-SR issues a Profile enabling request to the ISD-R
       on the eUICC for the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set.
  7.   The eUICC performs an internal POL1 check for the currently Enabled Profile, and
       verifies that the currently Enabled Profile does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set. If
       permitted, the Enabled Profile is disabled and the ISD-R enables the Profile with Fall-
       Back Attribute set.
  8.   The ISD-R sends reports the Profile disabling result to the SM-SR.
9.    If the disabling is successful the SM-SR records in the EIS that the target Profile is
      disabled.
10. The SM-SR reports the Profile disabling result to the Operator(s). This message
    includes the EID and the ICCID of the Profile(s).
11. The SM-SR SHALL report the Profile disabling result back to the M2M SP if requested
    by the Operator during PLMA registration (see 3.5.155). These messages will include
    the EID and the ICCID of the targeted Profiles.

End Condition: The target Profile is now disabled on the eUICC, and the Profile with Fall- Back Attribute set is enabled.

3.5.9 ISD-P Deletion

A Profile can be deleted by its Operator.

Figure 11: ISD-P Deletion

Start Condition: The Operator decides to permanently delete a Profile on a eUICC.
Procedure:
  1.   The Operator sends an ISD-P Deletion request to the SM-SR. The request includes
       the target EID and the ICCID of the target Profile.
  2.   The SM-SR checks the POL2 of the target Profile, and verifies that the target Profile
       does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set.
  3.   If there is a conflict with POL2 or with the Fall-Back Attribute, the SM-SR aborts the
       procedure and informs the Operator(s) accordingly
  4.   If the target Profile is enabled, the SM-SR starts the Profile Disabling procedure.
  5.   The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if
       not already authenticated.
  6.   The SM-SR sends the ISD-P Deletion request to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The request
       includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
  7.   The eUICC performs a POL1 check and a Fall-Back Attribute check.
  8.   If there is a conflict with POL1 or with the Fall-Back Attribute, the ISD-R aborts the
       procedure and informs the SM-SR.
  9.   If there is no conflict, the ISD-R then erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P.
  10. The ISD-R reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the SM-SR.
  11. The SM-SR updates the EIS appropriately.
  12. The SM-SR reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the requesting Operator.
  13. The SM-SR SHALL report ISD-P deletion result back to the M2M SP if requested by
      the Operator during PLMA registration (see 3.5.15). These messages will include the
      EID and the ICCID of the targeted Profiles.
End Condition: The target Profile is deleted from the eUICC. The EIS in the SM-SR is up to
date.

3.5.10 ISD-P Deletion via SM-DP

A Profile can be deleted by its Operator. ISD-P deletion would be requested via the SM-DP. In this case, the Operator does not have to be linked to all SM-SRs and relies on the SM-DP to make the connection.

Figure 12: Operational Profile Deletion via SM-DP

Start Condition: The Operator decides to permanently delete a Profile on a eUICC.
Procedure:
  1.   The Operator sends an ISD-P Deletion request to the SM-DP. The request includes
       the target EID and the ICCID of the target Profile. The Operator MAY also provide the
       SRID.
  2.   The SM-SR and the SM-DP authenticate each other if not already authenticated.
  3.   If the SRID was not provided by the Operator the SM-DP identifies the related SM-
       SR. The request is passed on to the dedicated SM-SR.
  4.   The SM-SR checks the POL2 and the Fall-Back Attribute of the target Profile.
  5.   If there is a conflict with POL2 or with the Fall-Back Attribute, the SM-SR aborts the
       procedure and informs the Operator(s) accordingly
  6.   If the target Profile is enabled, the SM-SR starts the Profile Disabling procedure.
  7.   The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if
       not already authenticated.
8.   The SM-SR sends an ISD-P Deletion request to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The request
     includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
9.   The eUICC performs a POL1 check and a Fall-Back Attribute check.
10. If there is a conflict with POL1 or with the Fall-Back Attribute, the ISD-R aborts the
    procedure and informs the SM-SR.
11. If there is no conflict, the ISD-R then erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P.
12. The ISD-R reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the SM-SR.
13. The SM-SR updates the EIS appropriately.
14. The SM-SR reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the requesting SM-DP.
15. The SM-DP reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the requesting Operator.
16. The SM-SR SHALL report ISD-P deletion result back to the M2M SP if requested by
    the Operator during PLMA registration (see 3.5.15). This message will include the EID
    and the ICCID of the targeted Profile.

End Condition: The target Profile is deleted from the eUICC. The EIS in the SM-SR is up to date.

3.5.11 SM-SR Change

This procedure assumes that, prior to the procedure being executed, the Operators with installed Profiles on the concerned eUICC might request to be informed of the change by the current SM-SR (SM-SR1) and be allowed to take action as it relates to the desired disposition of their Profile (e.g. do nothing, update Policy rules, delete the Profile). In the case where the SM-SR has to be changed, the credentials of the individual eUICCs must remain confidential.

Figure 13: SM-SR Change

Start Conditions:
   a. The EID of the eUICC is known
   b. The SRIDs of SM-SR1 and SM-SR2 are known.
   c. The ISD-R is personalised with the keys of SM-SR1.
   d. The change of SM-SR is allowed.
Procedure:
  1.   The initiator sends a request to SM-SR2 for a change of SM-SR.
  2.   SM-SR2 confirms that it can take over this role.
  3.   The initiator, or SM-SR2 acting for the initiator, requests the change from SM-SR1.
  4.   SM-SR1 sends the EIS dataset of the specified EID to SM-SR2.
  5.   A new shared key set is established between SM-SR2 and the ISD-R via the secure
       channel provided by SM-SR1. The Key Establishment Procedure is described in the
       Annex D.2.
  6.   Now SM-SR2 can address the ISD-R directly, and SM-SR2 requests the eUICC to
       delete the key set related to SM-SR1.
  7.   SM-SR2 sends a confirmation of the change to the SM-SR1.
  8.   SM-SR1 deletes the EIS dataset related to the eUICC.
  9.   SM-SR1 sends a response to the Initiator, indicating the success of the overall SM-SR
       change operation.
  10. SM-SR2 sends a report to the Operator owner(s) of the Profile(s) on the eUICC, either
      directly or via the SM-DP, of the change of SM-SR.
  11. If applicable, SM-SR2 sends a report to the M2M SP managing the eUICC.

End Conditions:

a. The ISD-R is personalised with the keys of the target SM-SR (SM-SR2). b. The eUICC is registered within the target SM-SR (SM-SR2). c. The EIS and EID reside within the target SM-SR (SM-SR2). d. SM-SR1 is no longer related to the eUICC. e. The Operator(s) owner of the Profile(s) is/are aware of the change. f. The M2M SP managing the eUICC is aware of the change.

NOTE1:         This procedure MAY not support the transfer of the PLMA. If such transfer is
               supported, this is out of scope of this specification. In all cases, the Operator
               MAY set the same or different PLMA on SM-SR2, as described in procedure
               3.5.15.1.
NOTE2:         In this procedure, the Initiator SHOULD be the Operator1 as it is the one
               requesting the transfer from SM-SR1 to SM-SR2.

3.5.12 ISD-P Key Establishment Procedure

This procedure is defined within section 4.5 of this document.

3.5.13 Fall-Back Mechanism

In the event of loss of network connectivity, as detected by the Device, there is a need to change to the Profile with Fall-Back attribute set. In this case the eUICC disables the currently Enabled Profile (Profile A) and enables the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set (Profile B). If Profile A has POL1 rule “disable not allowed” set then the eUICC will overrule this setting. If Profile A has POL1 rule “Profile deletion is mandatory when it is disabled” set, the eUICC SHALL NOT automatically delete this Profile. For security reasons if Profile A has the POL1 rule “disabled not allowed” or “Profile deletion is mandatory when it is disabled” set then the eUICC can only switch back to Profile A except if Profile A has been deleted by use of the Master Delete function. Profile A cannot be deleted with a normal delete command in this situation.

Start Conditions:
   a. The Device reports network loss to the eUICC.
   b. The eUICC is configured to perform the Fall-Back mechanism if certain network
       connectivity issues are reported by the Device.
   c. The Profile with Fall-Back attribute set is not the presently Enabled Profile.
Procedure:
   1.   The eUICC disables the currently Enabled Profile (overruling POL1 if necessary) and
        enables the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set.
   2.   The eUICC reports the change of Enabled Profile to the SM-SR. The SM-SR updates
        the EIS.
   3.   The SM-SR reports the change to the respective owners of the targeted Profiles. and
        to the M2M SP, if requested by the Operator during PLMA registration (see 3.5.15).

End Condition: The eUICC has enabled the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set and the EIS of the SM-SR is up-to-date.

3.5.14 eUICC Certificate Verification

This procedure defines how an SM-DP on behalf of the Operator can verify if an eUICC is
certified, in particular if the eUICC is designed according to the present specification.
Procedure:
   1.    The OperatorSM-DP, SHALL be able to retrieve the eUICC certificate from:
        a.   The EIS stored within the SM-SR in which the eUICC is registered
        OR
        b.   The EUM
             NOTE:      this interface is out of scope of this document).
   2.    The SM-DP extracts the EUM information from the eUICC certificate (for example:
         certificates, SAS-UP [23 UP [23] accreditation etc.).
   3.    With the information retrieved at step 2, the SM-DP requests the EUM certificate from
         the SM-SR, the EUM or the GSMA.
         NOTE:          The interface to the EUM and GSMA are out of the scope of this
                        document).
   4.    The SM-DP verifies the validity and signature of the EUM certificate.
   5.    The SM-DP verifies the EUM signature of the eUICC certificate.
End Condition: The eUICC certificate and EUM certificate have been checked by the SM-
DP.

3.5.15 Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Registration at SM- SR

In some circumstances, on one hand, an M2M SP MAY have to manage the lifecycle of Operator Profiles by its own, and to be notified of any change in Operator Profiles lifecycle on the eUICCs they are responsible for. On the other hand, it is important for an Operator to be able to control which M2M SP is allowed to perform Profile Lifecycle Management on Operator’s Profile(s). The Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation (PLMA) mechanisms described in this chapter will allow Operators to provide Profile Lifecycle Management functionality to an M2M SP while keeping the control of allowed commands and reports. Furthermore, an Operator might be willing to receive or not reports when an authorised M2M SP is changing the lifecycle of its own Profile(s). All PLMA requests defined below will require a prior mutual authentication between the Operator and the SM-SR. In case an Operator does not have a dedicated interface with an SM-SR, it SHALL be possible to manage PLMA via its SM-DP interface. The SM-DP SHALL forward PLMA management commands to the SM-SR without any further processing and SHALL NOT host any PLMA.

NOTE:It SHOULD be considered that the role of an M2M SP can also be played by a partner Operator or affiliate from the Operator.

3.5.15.1 Set Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation

This procedure sets the PLMAs on the SM-SR and includes which Platform Management commands are allowed to be executed by an M2M SP and which reports SHALL be sent to M2M SP and Operator.

Figure 14: Set Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation

Start Condition:
The Operator opened a dedicated interface with the SM-SR, either directly or through its SM-
DP, for PLMA management.
Procedure:
      1. The Operator whose Profile is resident on a set of eUICCs sends a PLMA request
         to the SM-SR managing those eUICCs, either directly (1.a) or through its SM-DP
         (1.b, 1.c), to set PLMA.
      2. The SM-SR creates the corresponding PLMA for a specific set of eUICCs and/or
         Profiles based on dedicated identifier provided to the SM-SR.
      3. The SM-SR confirms the successful creation of the PLMA by notifying the
         requesting Operator, either directly (3.a) or through its SM-DP (3.b, 3.c), as well
         as the correspondent M2M SP (3.d).

NOTE:The definition of needed identifier to set the PLMA on eUICC and /or Profiles is out of scope of this specification.

End Condition: The SM-SR has set the Profile Lifecycle Management functionality for the addressed M2M SP. The M2M SP is able to manage the lifecycle of the targeted Profile on a set of eUICCs and to receive reports related to those Profiles. In case of change done on the referenced Profile by the referenced M2M SP, the Operator is receiving relevant reports. The Operator is able to send the set PLMA requests only for its own Profiles. Any changes to the PLMA (e.g. removal of reports to be sent to M2M SP) must be done by this procedure. Depending on the Operator choice, the PLMA will allow:

a. The referenced M2M SP to:
         Request to enable the referenced Profile.
         Request to disable the referenced Profile.
         Request to delete the referenced Profile.
         Request to set the Fall-Back Attribute on the referenced Profile.
         Un-Set the Fall-Back Attribute on the referenced Profile as a result
          of setting it on another Profile.
         Request to set the Emergency Profile Attribute on the referenced
          Profile.
         Un-Set the Emergency Profile Attribute on the referenced Profile as
          a result of setting it on another Profile.
b. The referenced M2M SP to receive reports on:
         Referenced Profile enabling.
         Referenced Profile disabling.
         Referenced Profile deletion.
         Referenced Profile Fall-Back Attribute setting/un-setting.
         Referenced Profile Emergency Profile Attribute setting/un-setting.
c. Optionally (if supported by the SM-SR), the Operator to not receive reports
   on:
         Referenced Profile enabling.
         Referenced Profile disabling.
         Referenced Profile deletion.
         Referenced Profile Fall-Back Attribute setting/un-setting.
         Referenced Profile Emergency Profile Attribute setting/un-setting.

NOTE:When no PLMA is provided to the M2M SP but the M2M SP has the need to get status changes on Profiles being resident on eUICCs it is responsible for, it is up to the Operator, owning the Profiles on the eUICC, to forward reports about Profile status changes to the correspondent M2M SP. This is outside of this specification.

3.5.15.2 Retrieve Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation– by Operator

With this procedure the Operator retrieves the PLMA set on the SM-SR.

Figure 15: Retrieve Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation by Operator

Start Condition:
   a. The Operator opened a dedicated interface with the SM-SR, either directly or
       through its SM-DP, for PLMA management.

b. PLMA MAY exist in the SM-SR.

Procedure:
      1. The Operator whose Profile resides on a set of eUICCs sends a PLMA request to
         the SM-SR managing those eUICCs, either directly (1.a) or through its SM-DP
         (1.b, 1.c), to retrieve PLMA, applying to its Profile(s) for an M2M SP.
              It SHALL be possible for the Operator to set in the request only the M2M
                 SP ID and / or any identifier pointing to a set of eUICCs and/or Profiles.
      2. The SM-SR retrieves the PLMA applying to the identifier sent in the request.
      3. The SM-SR return the corresponding PLMA to the requesting Operator (3.a, 3.b,
         3.c).

NOTE:The definition of needed identifier to retrieve PLMA applying to a set of eUICCs and/or Profiles is out of scope of this specification.

End Condition: The Operator has received the PLMA according to input parameters the Operator has provided in the request. An Operator is able to send the retrieve PLMA request for its own Profiles only.

3.5.15.3 Retrieve Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation– by M2M SP

With this procedure, the M2M SP retrieves the PLMA the Operator has set on the SM-SR.

Figure 16: Retrieve Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation by M2M SPStart

                                      Condition:
a. The M2M SP opened a dedicated interface with the SM-SR to be able to retrieve its
   own PLMA.

b. PLMA MAY exist in the SM-SR.

Procedure:
      1. An M2M SP who wants to retrieve PLMA applying to a set of Operator owned
         Profiles, sends a PLMA request to the SM-SR, managing those eUICCs having
         the targeted Operator Profiles installed
              It SHALL be possible for the M2M SP to set in the request the Operator ID
                 only and / or any identifier pointing to a set of eUICCs and/or Profiles.
      2. The SM-SR return the corresponding PLMA to the requesting M2M SP.

NOTE:The definition of needed identifier to retrieve PLMA applying to a set of eUICCs and/or Profiles is out of scope of this specification.

End Condition: The M2M SP has received the PLMA according to the input parameter the M2M SP has provided in the request.

An M2M SP is able to retrieve PLMA only for Profiles it has authorisations for. An M2M SP is able to send the retrieve PLMA request only for its own eUICCs.

3.5.15.4 Delete Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation

The delete PLMA requests comprises the following steps:

Figure 17: Delete Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation

Start Condition:
   a. The Operator opened a dedicated interface with the SM-SR, either directly or
       through its SM-DP, for PLMA management.
   b. PLMA exists in the SM-SR.
Procedure:
      1. An Operator whose Profile is resident on a set of eUICCs sends a PLMA request
         to the SM-SR managing those eUICCs, either directly (1.a) or through its SM-DP
         (1.b, 1.c), to delete PLMA.
              It SHALL be possible for the Operator to set in the request only the M2M
                 SP ID and / or any identifier pointing to a set of eUICCs and/or Profiles.
      2. The SM-SR deletes the PLMA applying to the identifier sent in the request.
      3. The SM-SR confirms the successful deletion of the PLMA by notifying the
         requesting Operator, either directly (3.a) or through its SM-DP (3.b, 3.c), as well
         as the corresponding M2M SP (3.d).
End Condition: The SM-SR has deleted the Profile Lifecycle Management functionality for
the addressed M2M SP. The referenced M2M SP is no more able to manage the lifecycle of
the Operator Profile(s) for the set of eUICCs as well as to receive reports related to those
Profiles.
An Operator is able to send the delete PLMA requests only for its own Profiles.
NOTE:         In case that the M2M SP has still the need to get status changes on Profiles
              being resident on eUICCs it is responsible for, it is up to the Operator, owning
              the Profiles on the eUICC, to forward reports about Profile status changes to
              the correspondent M2M SP. This is outside of this specification.

3.5.16 Profile Enabling via M2M SP

A switch between two Profiles can be achieved by the following dedicated procedure. In this case the request is issued directly by the M2M SP to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC. To be successful, the authorisation for the M2M SP SHALL be configured in the SM-

SR (see Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Registration at SM-SR chapter 3.5.15 for details).

Figure 18: Profile Enabling via M2M SP

Start Conditions:
   a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. Another Profile is enabled.
   b. The Subscription associated with the target Profile is active in the Operator’s
       network.
   c. The EID of the target eUICC, the SRID associated with the target Profile and the
       ICCID of the target Profile are known by the M2M SP.
Procedure:
  1.   The M2M SP sends a Profile Enabling from M2M SP request to the SM-SR. The
       request includes the target EID and the ICCID of the target Profile.
  2.   The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of both the currently Enabled Profile and the target
       Profile permit the Profile switch to take place. The SM-SR checks if the M2M SP has
       the authorisations to enable the targeted Profile.
  3.   If there is a conflict with POL2 or with the M2M SP authorisations, the SM-SR aborts
       the procedure and MAY inform the M2M SP. In addition the SM-SR MAY inform the
       corresponding Operator(s) accordingly.
  4.   The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other if
       not already authenticated.
  5.   If there is no conflict with POL2, the SM-SR issues a Profile Enabling request to the
       ISD-R on the eUICC including at least the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
  6.   The eUICC performs a POL1 check.
  7.   If there is a conflict with POL1, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM-
       SR.
  8.   In addition the SM-SR MAY inform the concerned M2M SP and Operator(s)
       accordingly.
  9.   If there is no conflict with POL1, the ISD-R performs the Profile switch resulting in the
       target Profile being enabled and the previously Enabled Profile being disabled.
  10. The ISD-R reports the Profile switch result to the SM-SR.
  11. If the switch is successful the SM-SR records in the EIS that the target Profile is
      enabled and the previous Profile is disabled.
  12. The SM-SR reports the Profile switch result back to the M2M SP.
  13. The SM-SR SHALL report the Profile switch result back to the Operator(s) if requested
      by the Operator(s). These messages will include the M2M SP OID, the EID and the
      ICCID of their targeted Profiles.
End Condition: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. The previously Enabled Profile
is disabled. The EIS is up to date.

3.5.17 Profile Disabling via M2M SP

Profile disabling can be achieved by the following procedure. In this case the request is issued directly by the M2M SP to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC. To be successful, the authorisation for the M2M SP SHALL be configured in the SM-SR (see Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Registration at SM-SR chapter 3.5.15 for details).

Figure 19: Profile Disabling via M2M SP

Start Conditions: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC.

Procedure:
       1. The M2M SP sends a Profile Disabling from M2M SP request to the SM-SR. The
          request includes the target EID and the ICCID of the target Profile.
       2. If the target Profile for disabling is the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set then the
          Profile disabling SHALL NOT be executed.
       3. The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of the Enabled Profile permits the Profile to be
          disabled. The SM-SR checks if the M2M SP has the authorisations to disable the
          targeted Profile
4. If there is a conflict with POL2 or with the M2M SP authorisations, the SM-SR aborts
   the procedure and MAY inform the M2M SP. In addition the SM-SR MAY inform the
   corresponding Operator accordingly.
5. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other
   if not already authenticated.
6. If there is no POL2 conflict, the SM-SR issues a Profile enabling request to the ISD-
   R on the eUICC for the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set.
7. The eUICC performs an internal POL1 check for the currently Enabled Profile.
8. If there is a conflict with POL1, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM-
   SR.
9. In addition the SM-SR MAY inform the corresponding M2M SP and Operator
   accordingly.
10. If permitted, the Enabled Profile is disabled and the ISD-R enables the Profile with
    Fall-Back Attribute set.
11. The ISD-R sends reports of the Profile disabling result to the SM-SR.
12. If the disabling is successful the SM-SR records in the EIS that the target Profile is
    disabled.
13. The SM-SR reports the Profile disabling result back to the M2M SP.
14. The SM-SR SHALL report the Profile disabling result back to the Operator(s) if
    requested by the Operator(s). These messages will include the M2M SP OID, the
    EID and the ICCID of their targeted Profiles.

End Condition: The target Profile is now disabled on the eUICC, and the Profile with Fall- Back Attribute set is enabled.

3.5.18 ISD-P Deletion via M2M SP

A Profile can be deleted by the following procedure. In this case the request is issued directly by the M2M SP to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC. To be successful, the authorisation for the M2M SP SHALL be configured in the SM-SR (see Profile Lifecycle Management Authorisation Registration at SM-SR chapter 3.5.15 for details).

Figure 20: ISD-P Deletion via M2M SP

Start Conditions: The M2M SP decides to permanently delete a Profile on a eUICC.

Procedure:
       1. The M2M SP sends an ISD-P Deletion from M2M SP request to the SM-SR. The
          request includes the target EID and the ICCID of the targeted Profile.
       2. The SM-SR checks the POL2 of the target Profile. The SM-SR checks if the M2M
          SP has the authorisations to delete the targeted Profile
       3. If there is a conflict with POL2 or with the M2M SP authorisations, the SM-SR aborts
          the procedure and MAY inform the M2M SP. In addition the SM-SR MAY inform the
          corresponding Operator accordingly.
       4. If the target Profile is enabled, the SM-SR starts the Profile Disabling procedure.
       5. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other
          if not already authenticated.
       6. The SM-SR sends the ISD-P Deletion request to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The
          request includes the ISD-P AID of the targeted Profile.
       7. The eUICC performs a POL1 check.
       8. If there is a conflict with POL1, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM-
          SR.
       9. In addition the SM-SR MAY inform the corresponding M2M SP and Operator
          accordingly.
       10. If there is no conflict, the ISD-R then erases the targeted Profile and the related ISD-
           P.
       11. The ISD-R sends reports of the ISD-P deletion result to the SM-SR.
       12. If the ISD-P deletion is successful the SM-SR updates the EIS appropriately
       13. The SM-SR reports the ISD-P deletion result back to the M2M SP.
       14. The SM-SR SHALL report the ISD-P deletion result back to the Operator(s) if
           requested by the Operator(s). These messages will include the M2M SP OID, the
           EID and the ICCID of the deleted Profile.
End Condition: The target Profile is deleted from the eUICC. The EIS in the SM-SR is up to
date.

3.5.19 Fall-Back Attribute Management

This procedure contains the steps needed to change the Fall-Back Attribute from one Profile
to another.
The Operator1 owning the Profile that currently has the Fall-Back Attribute set and the
Operator2 that wants to set the Fall-Back Attribute on its own Profile need to have an
agreement. This agreement is materialised by the Operator1 settings a PLMA where it MAY
grant Operator2 the authorisation to unset the Fall-Back Attribute on its Operator1 Profile as
a consequence of setting the Fall-Back Attribute on the Operator 2 Profile by Operator 2.
NOTE:           There is no operation that explicitly un-sets the Fall-Back Attribute on a Profile.
                The Fall-Back Attribute is only un-set as the consequence of setting the Fall-
                Back Attribute on another Profile.

Figure 21: Fall-Back Attribute Management

Start Conditions:
   a. Profile A with Fall-Back Attribute set.
   b. Profile B, targeted to have the Fall-Back Attribute set, present on the eUICC.
   c. Profile A owner Operator1 has configured a PLMA authorizing Operator2 to unset the
       Fall-Back Attribute on Profile A.
Procedure:
   1. The Operator2 owning Profile B requests setting of the Fall-Back Attribute on Profile
       B to the SM-SR, either directly (1.a) or through its SM-DP (1.b, 1.c).
   2. The SM-SR checks if Operator1 has configured a PLMA authorizing Operator2 to
       unset the Fall-Back Attribute on Profile A.
           a. If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure
                and informs the Operator 2.
   3. The SM-SR, by calling Set Fall-Back Attribute function, requests the eUICC to set the
       Fall-Back Attribute to the Profile B.
   4. The eUICC performs the operation. This will remove the Fall-Back Attribute from
       Profile A.
   5. The eUICC reports the status of the Set Fall-Back operation to the SM-SR
   6. The SM-SR update the EIS accordingly.
   7. The SM-SR reports to the Operator1 owning the Profile A that the Fall-Back Attribute
       has been unset on its Profile.
   8. The SM-SR reports to Operator2 that Profile B now has the Fall-Back Attribute set.
   9. The SM-SR SHALL report to the M2M SP that the Profile A has the Fall-Back Attribute
       unset, if requested by the Operator1 during PLMA registration (see 3.5.155).
   10. The SM-SR SHALL report to the M2M SP that the Profile B has the Fall-Back Attribute
       set, if requested by the Operator2 during PLMA registration (see 3.5.155).
End Conditions:

The Profile B has the Fall-Back Attribute set. The Profile A has the Fall-Back Attribute unset.

3.5.20 Fall-Back Attribute Management via the M2M SP

Operators MAY also authorise an M2M SP to change the Fall-Back Attribute from one Profile
to another. This procedure contains the steps needed to execute such an operation.
The Operator1 owning the Profile that currently has the Fall-Back Attribute set and the
Operator2 that agree to have the Fall-Back Attribute set on its own Profile need to have an
agreement with the M2M SP. This agreement is materialised by the Operator2 and Operator1
settings PLMAs where they MAY grant the M2M SP the authorisation to set or unset the Fall-
Back Attribute on their respective Profile.
NOTE:          There is no operation that explicitly un-sets the Fall-Back Attribute on a Profile.
               The Fall-Back Attribute is only unset as the consequence of setting the Fall-
               Back Attribute on another Profile.

Figure 22: Fall-Back Attribute Management via M2M SP

Start Conditions:
   a. Profile A with Fall-Back Attribute set.
   b. Profile B, targeted to have the Fall-Back Attribute set, present on the eUICC.
   c. Profile A owner Operator1 has configured a PLMA authorizing the M2M SP to unset
       the Fall-Back Attribute.
   d. Profile B owner Operator2 has configured a PLMA authorising the M2M SP to set the
       Fall-Back Attribute.
Procedure:
   1. The M2M SP requests setting of the Fall-Back Attribute on Profile B to the SM-SR.
   2. The SM-SR checks if a PLMA from Operator2 authorises the M2M SP to set the Fall-
      Back Attribute on Profile B.
        a) If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure
            and informs the M2M SP.
3. The SM-SR checks if a PLMA from Operator1 authorises the M2M SP to unset the
   Fall-Back Attribute on Profile A.
      a) If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure
          and informs the M2M SP.
   4. The SM-SR, by calling Set Fall-Back Attribute function, requests the eUICC to set the
       Fall-Back Attribute to the Profile B.
   5. The eUICC Sets the Fall-Back Attribute on the Profile B. This will remove the Fall-
       Back Attribute from Profile A.
   6. The eUICC sends a report of the operation to the SM-SR
   7. The SM-SR update the EIS accordingly.
   8. The SM-SR reports to the Operator1 that Profile A now has the Fall-Back Attribute
       unset.
   9. The SM-SR reports to Operator2 that Profile B now has the Fall-Back Attribute set.
   10. The SM-SR reports to the M2M SP that the Fall-Back Attribute is now set in Profile B.
End Conditions:
The Profile B has the Fall-Back Attribute set. The Profile A has the Fall-Back Attribute unset.

3.5.21 Emergency Profile Attribute Management

Under certain circumstances, it MAY be necessary to set the Emergency Profile Attribute for
a Profile when no other Profile has the Emergency Profile Attribute set (case 1), or, a change
regarding the Profile that has the Emergency Profile Attribute set is needed (case 2). This
procedure contains the steps needed to execute such operations. For case 2. the Operator1
owning the Profile that currently has the Emergency Profile Attribute set and the Operator2
that wants to set the Emergency Profile Attribute on its own Profile need to have an
agreement. This agreement is materialised by the Operator1 settings a PLMA where it MAY
grant Operator2 the authorisation to unset the Emergency Profile Attribute on this Operator1
Profile.
NOTE:          There is no operation that explicitly unsets the Emergency Profile Attribute on
               a Profile. The Emergency Profile Attribute is only unset as a consequence of
               setting the Emergency Profile Attribute on another Profile.

For case 1 the procedure below applies:

Figure 23: Emergency Profile Attribute Management (case 1)

Start Conditions (case 1):
   a. No Profile with Emergency Profile Attribute set exists.
   b. Profile B, targeted to have the Emergency Profile Attribute set, present on the eUICC
       and disabled
   c. Profile B does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set.
Procedure (case 1):
   1. The Operator2 owning Profile B requests setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute on
      Profile B to the SM-SR, either directly (1.a) or through its SM-DP (1.b, 1.c).
   2. The SM-SR, by calling Set Emergency Profile Attribute function, requests the eUICC
      to set the Emergency Profile Attribute to the Profile B.
   3. The eUICC verifies that Profile B does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set (3a) and
      performs the operation (3b).
          a. If the conditions (3a) is not true, the eUICC aborts the procedure and reports
              an error to the SM-SR.
   4. The eUICC reports the status of the Set Emergency Profile Attribute operation to the
      SM-SR
   5. The SM-SR updates the EIS accordingly.
   6. The SM-SR reports to all Operators, having a Profile on this eUICC, that a Profile now
      has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. This report MAY include the Profile ID.
   7. The SM-SR SHALL report to the M2M SP that the Profile B has the Emergency Profile
      Attribute set, if requested by the Operator2 during PLMA registrations (see 3.5.155).
End Conditions (case 1):
The Profile B has the Emergency Profile Attribute set.

For case 2 the procedure below applies

Figure 24: Emergency Profile Attribute Management (case 2)

Start Conditions (case 2):
   a. Profile A with Emergency Profile Attribute set.
   b. Profile B, targeted to have the Emergency Profile Attribute set, present on the eUICC.
   c. Profile A owner Operator1 has configured a PLMA authorizing Operator2 to unset the
       Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile A.
Procedure (case 2):
   1. The Operator2 owning Profile B requests setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute on
      Profile B to the SM-SR, either directly (1.a) or through its SM-DP (1.b, 1.c).
   2. The SM-SR checks if Operator2 has PLMA configured to unset the Emergency Profile
      Attribute from the Operator1 owning the Profile that currently has the Emergency
      Profile Attribute set.
          a. If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure
              and informs the Operator 2.
   3. The SM-SR, by calling Set Emergency Profile Attribute function, requests the eUICC
      to set the Emergency Profile Attribute to the Profile B.
   4. The eUICC verifies that Profile B does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set (4a) and
      performs the operation (4b). This will remove the Emergency Profile Attribute from
      Profile A.
            a. If the conditions (4a) is not true, the eUICC aborts the procedure and reports
                 an error to the SM-SR.
   5.   The eUICC reports the status of the Set Emergency Profile Attribute operation to the
        SM-SR
   6.   The SM-SR updates the EIS accordingly.
   7.   The SM-SR reports to all Operators, having a Profile on this eUICC, that another
        Profile now has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. This report MAY include the
        Profile ID.
   8.   The SM-SR SHALL report to the M2M SP that the Profile A has the Emergency Profile
        Attribute unset, if requested by the Operator1 during PLMA registrations (see 3.5.155).
   9. The SM-SR SHALL report to the M2M SP that the Profile B has the Emergency Profile
      Attribute set, if requested by the Operator2 during PLMA registrations (see 3.5.155).
End Conditions (case 2):
The Profile A has the Emergency Profile Attribute unset. The Profile B has the Emergency
Profile Attribute set.

3.5.22 Emergency Profile Attribute Management via the M2M SP

Operators MAY also authorise an M2M SP to change which Profile has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. Under certain circumstances, it MAY be necessary to set the Emergency Profile Attribute for a Profile when no other Profile has the Emergency Profile Attribute set (case 1), or, a change regarding the Profile that has the Emergency Profile Attribute set is needed (case 2). This procedure contains the steps needed to execute such operations. For case 1 the Operator2 that agrees to have the Emergency Profile Attribute set on its own Profile need to have an agreement with the M2M SP. This agreement is materialised by the Operator2 setting PLMAs where Operator2 MAY grant the M2M SP the authorisation to set the Emergency Profile Attribute on its respective Profile. For case 2. the Operator1 owning the Profile that currently has the Emergency Profile Attribute set and the Operator2 that agree to have the Emergency Profile Attribute set on its own Profile need to have an agreement with the M2M SP. This agreement is materialised by the Operator2 and Operator1 setting PLMAs where Operator2 MAY grant the M2M SP the authorisation to set the Emergency Profile Attribute on its respective Profile and where Operator1 MAY grant the M2M SP the authorisation to un-set the Emergency Profile Attribute on its respective Profile.

NOTE:There is no operation that explicitly unsets the Emergency Profile Attribute on a Profile. The Emergency Profile Attribute is only unset as a consequence of setting the Emergency Profile Attribute on another Profile.

For case 1 the procedure below applies:

Figure 25: Emergency Profile Attribute Management via M2M SP (case 1)

Start Conditions:
   a. Profile B, targeted to have the Emergency Profile Attribute set, present on the eUICC.
   b. Profile B owner Operator2 has configured a PLMA authorizing the M2M SP to set the
      Emergency Profile Attribute.
Procedure:
   1. The M2M SP requests setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile B to the
      SM-SR.
   2. The SM-SR checks if a PLMA from Operator2 that authorises the M2M SP to set the
      Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile B is configured
          a. If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure
              and informs the M2M SP.
   3. The SM-SR, by calling Set Emergency Profile Attribute function, requests the eUICC
      to set the Emergency Profile Attribute to the Profile B.
   4. The eUICC verifies that Profile B does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set (4a) and
      then sets the Emergency Profile Attribute to the Profile B (4b).
          a. If the conditions (4a) is not true, the eUICC aborts the procedure and reports
              an error to the SM-SR.
   5. The eUICC sends a report of the operation to the SM-SR
   6. The SM-SR updates the EIS accordingly.
   7. The SM-SR reports to all Operators, having a Profile on this eUICC, that a Profile now
      has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. This report MAY include the Profile ID.
   8. The SM-SR reports to the M2M SP that the Emergency Profile Attribute is now set for
      Profile B.
End Conditions:
The Profile B has the Emergency Profile Attribute set.

For case 2 the procedure below applies:

Figure 26: Emergency Profile Attribute Management via M2M SP (case 2)

Start Conditions: a. Profile A with Emergency Profile Attribute set. b. Profile B, targeted to have the Emergency Profile Attribute set, present on the eUICC.

   c. Profile A owner Operator1 has configured a PLMA authorizing the M2M-SP to unset
      the Emergency Profile Attribute.
   d. Profile B owner Operator2 has configured a PLMA authorizing the M2M-SP to set the
      Emergency Profile Attribute.
Procedure:
   1. The M2M SP requests setting of the Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile B to the
      SM-SR.
   2. The SM-SR checks if a PLMA from Operator2 that authorises the M2M SP to set the
      Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile B is configured.
          a. If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure
               and informs the M2M SP.
   3. The SM-SR checks if a PLMA from Operator1 that authorises the M2M SP to unset
      the Emergency Profile Attribute on Profile A is configured.
          a. If there is a conflict with the authorisation, the SM-SR aborts the procedure
               and informs the M2M SP.
   4. The SM-SR, by calling Set Emergency Profile Attribute function, requests the eUICC
      to set the Emergency Profile Attribute to the Profile B.
   5. The eUICC verifies that Profile B does not have the Fall-Back Attribute set (5a) and
      then sets the Emergency Profile Attribute to the Profile B (5b). This will remove the
      Emergency Profile Attribute from Profile A.
          a. If the conditions (5a) is not true, the eUICC aborts the procedure and reports
               an error to the SM-SR.
   6. The eUICC sends a report of the operation to the SM-SR
   7. The SM-SR updates the EIS accordingly.
   8. The SM-SR reports to all Operators, having a Profile on this eUICC, that another
      Profile now has the Emergency Profile Attribute set. This report MAY include the
      Profile ID.
   9. The SM-SR reports to the M2M SP that the Emergency Profile Attribute is now set for
      Profile B.

End Conditions: The Profile A has the Emergency Profile Attribute unset. The Profile B has the Emergency Profile Attribute set.

3.5.23 Local Enable of the Test Profile

A switch from Operational Profile to the Test Profile can be achieved by the following dedicated procedure. The request is issued directly from the Device to the eUICC.

Start Conditions: An Operational Profile is enabled.

Procedure:
  1.   The Device sends a Local Enable request to the eUICC.
  2.   The eUICC performs a verification that the Profile to be enabled is a Test Profile.
  3.   If the Profile to be enabled is not a Test Profile, the eUICC SHALL abort the procedure
       and informs the Device.
  4.   The eUICC performs the Profile switch, without enforcing POL1, resulting in the Test
       Profile being enabled and the previously Enabled Profile being disabled.
5.     The eUICC stores the ISD-P AID of the previously enabled Operational Profile.
6.     The eUICC reports the Profile switch to the Device.

End Condition: The Test Profile is enabled on the eUICC. The previously enabled Operational Profile is disabled.

3.5.24 Local Disable of the Test Profile

Local Disable can be achieved by the following procedure. The request is issued directly by the Device to the eUICC.

Start Condition:
The Test Profile is enabled on the eUICC.
Procedure:
  1.     The Device sends a Local Disable request to the eUICC.
  2.     If the Profile to be disabled is not a Test Profile then the Local Disable SHALL NOT
         be executed.
  3.     The eUICC enables the previously enabled Operational Profile.
  4.     If the network attach fails, the eUICC SHALL activate the Fall-Back Mechanism.
  5.     The eUICC reports the Profile switch to the Device.
  6.     The eUICC MAY report the successful Local Disable result to the SM-SR.

End Condition: The Test Profile is disabled on the eUICC, and the previously Enabled Profile or the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set is enabled.

3.6 Policy Control

3.6.1 Overview Diagram of Rule Management System

The figure below represents the Policy Rule management system:

Figure 27: Policy Rule Management System

3.6.2 Policy Rules Management

Policy control, as it relates to a Profile, is required by the Operator and is achieved through
the use of rules set by the Operator.
This Policy control is under the control (or jurisdiction) of a single Operator Policy. This Policy
MAY be comprised of sub-policies whose enforcement lies with different entities.
 There are two types of rules:
    POL1 – these rules resides within a Profile and would be enforced by the eUICC.
    POL2 – these rules would be stored at and enforced by the SM-SR. The Operator
       sends POL2 directly to the SM-SR or through the SM-DP for attaching as metadata
       to a Profile.
POL1 and POL2 are representations of a common Operator Policy enforced in different
locations/entities. The combination of POL1 and POL2 represent the contract between an
Operator and a Subscriber as applied to the Profile.

In this section all commands are considered as being updates; in the first instance when a rule is first established is considered a special case of update.

3.6.2.1 SM-SR Policy Rule Management Engine

The SM-SR has a Policy Rule management engine identified as “Task 1” in the diagram. Task 1 accepts the following commands: 1) Update POL2 as per Operator request

2)Update POL2 as per Operator request via SM-DP

Task 1 sets the POL2 as per the metadata supplied with a Profile from SM-DP. Task 1 enforces POL2 rules right after installation of the related Profile. Furthermore Task 1 updates the relevant EIS accordingly. The SM-SR is responsible for enforcing the POL2 rules when managing an eUICC.

3.6.2.2 SM-DP Policy Rule Management Engine

The SM-DP has a Policy Rule management engine identified as “Task 2” and “Task 4” in
the diagram.
Task 2 accepts the following commands:
    1) Set POL1 as per Operator request and embed it in the Profile.
Task 4 accepts the following commands
    1) “Update POL2” from the Operator, and passes it to the SM-SR for updating the EIS.
    2) Set POL2 from the Operator and attach it to a Profile as metadata for transmission
       to the SM-SR.

3.6.2.3 eUICC Policy Rule Management Engine

The eUICC has a Policy Rule management engine identified as “Task 3” in the diagram.

Task 3 can read the POL1 rules that reside within the installed Profiles. Furthermore it
enforces the POL1 rules right after the installation of the related Profile (see role of Platform
Service Manager in Section 3.2.2).
Task 3 accepts the following command:
    1) Read/Update POL1 as per Operator request (commands are sent by the Operator’s
        respective OTA system).

3.6.2.4 OTA Policy Rule Update Mechanism

For Task 5 the Operator OTA Platform is used. In this case it is accepting POL1 update commands from the Operator Rule Maker and issues POL1 updates to the eUICC.

3.6.3 Policy Control Mechanism

The Policy Control Mechanism within the eUICC is a combination of:
       The Policy Rules stored within the ISD-P under Operator authority;
       The Policy Rules Enforcer, which is the process delivering the Policy Enforcement
        Function and resides within the Platform Service Manager.
See the diagram in Section 3.2.2

3.6.3.1 Policy Rules

Policy Rules are checked at different state changes of Profiles. They MAY impact both the state of the Profile that is associated with the rule and the state of other Profiles. Depending on the nature of the rule, Policy enforcement can happen at the eUICC and/or at the SM-SR level. Only the Operator which is the owner of the Profile is able to modify the Policy Rules. At the eUICC level, the rules are part of the Profile package and are enforced by the eUICC operating system through the interaction with the Platform Service Manager.

The Operator can update the Policy Rules within its Profile using its own OTA Platform(s). Updating can only be done when the Profile is in enabled state. The policy enforcement mechanisms defined in this document to enforce the contractual provisions governing the remote Provisioning of an Embedded SIM are subject to applicable competition and regulatory law. The following principles apply to the enforcement of contractual provisions:

       Participating Operators must not abuse policy enforcement mechanisms to block or
        impede in any way the legitimate installation, enabling, disabling and deletion of a
        Profile on an Embedded SIM.
       Participating Operators can enforce policy rules provided such actions comply with
        applicable competition and regulatory law.
The following Policy Rules are defined:
NOTE:             This assumes the SM-SR to be GSMA certified and trusted by the Operator.
       Policy Rules                    Enforcement when the         Enforced at
                                       Profile is
1      Disabling of this Profile not   Enabled                      eUICC via POL1
       allowed                                                      SM-SR via POL2
2      Deletion of this Profile not    Enabled or Disabled          eUICC via POL1
       allowed                                                      SM-SR via POL2
3      Profile deletion is             N/A                          eUICC via POL1
       mandatory when it is                                         SM-SR via POL2
       disabled.

POL1 and POL2 settings MAY or MAY not be the same. POL1 and POL2 are enforced by different entities (eUICC for POL1; SM-SR for POL2) and will be enforced independently. The explicit setting of POL1 and POL2 rules is the choice of the Operator (e.g. to set POL1 rules to be empty).

3.6.3.2 eUICC Policy Rules Enforcer Function

The Policy Rules Enforcer is able to read and enforce all the POL1 present on the eUICC. The only case where the eUICC can overrule POL1 is the Fall-Back Mechanism.

3.6.3.3 SM-SR Policy Rules Enforcer Function

The SM-SR Policy Rules Enforcer is able to read and enforce the Policy Rules contained in the EIS of the targeted eUICC.

4 Security Model: Threats Analysis & Risk Assessment Model

4.1 Security Challenges

As mentioned in the basic assumptions section, one of the major expectations of this
architecture is to provide a solution offering a security level at least equivalent to the security
reached by the current UICC and its management systems.
Considering the new delivery of Profiles in the eUICC compared to the existing model, the
following main security challenges SHALL be considered and fixed in the security analysis:
      a) Different Actors MAY be involved in Profile creation, load, install and enabling and be
         involved in managing the eUICC during its lifecycle.
      b) A Profile can be replaced in the eUICC.
      c) Several Profiles MAY be hosted at a given time in the eUICC.
      d) Authentication algorithms MAY be shared between operators.
      e) Profile and Platform Management are controlled through rules and/or commands
         which need to be considered in the assets to be protected.
      f)    Remote installation/Provisioning of a Profile.
      g) Remote management of the Profile.
      NOTE:        The support of proprietary authentication algorithms and the upgradability of
                   authentication algorithms are for further study.
Therefore, the challenge is to deliver a solution offering a sufficient security level, but with
enough flexibility to permit interconnection of various subsystems provided by different
sources, delivering a part of, or an entire, solution.

4.2 Security Analysis Methodology

Because the design of the solution for eUICC and its remote Provisioning system must be
driven by security concerns, it is of primary importance to identify the key risks on the whole
architecture in order to derive security recommendations and principles that will shape the
final design.
The proposed methodology is based on a 4 step process:
      1. Identification of assets (see Annex C);
      2. Identification of functions;
      3. Identification of threats & risks (see Annex B);
      4. Description of security requirements.

4.3 Aim of the Security Realm Approach

A Security Realm is defined as the clustering of Roles and Actors connected through a single protected private network and operated by a sole entity. This entity, in charge of day to day operations of a Security Realm is defined as an “administrative entity” and might be comprised of one or several actors bound by a unique commercial or legal agreement. The segmentation in realms allows for the application of adequate protection levels related to a specific context applying to an administrative entity and its realm. This might be due to local specificities such as regulations, lawful enforcement, corporate policies or geographic context. The requirements pertaining to Security Realms also ensure for a common level of security when addressing communications between Security Realms. The security requirements applied to the Profile, Platform Management commands and Profile transport security are not addressed by Security Realms. The eUICC, being a shared asset between different administrative entities, is considered to be an independent Security Realm.

Negotiated and shared
logical secured interface
Realm 1                                                       Realm 2
Operator    SMDP       SMSR                                       eUICC
Realm 3                                Realm 4
                                                              Realm 5
Operator   SMDP                         SMSR
                                                                 eUICC
Realm 6               Realm 7             Realm 8             Realm 9
                                                              9
  Operator             SMDP                     SMSR               eUICC
Realm 10                 Realm 11                             Realm12
Operator                SMDP          SMSR                       eUICC
Realm 13                 Realm 14                             Realm15
SMDP                     MNO          SMSR                       eUICC

Realm 16

M2M SP

Realm 17                             Realm18
Operator      SMSR                       eUICC
Realm 19                                 Realm20
M2M SP       SMSR                         eUICC

Figure 28: Examples of security realms organisation in the security model

4.4 Security Requirements

This section lists security requirements.

In the security model we consider the Subscriber, Operator, M2M SP, SM-DP, SM-SR, eUICC
and EUM.
We consider the Operator, M2M SP, SM-DP, SM-SR, eUICC and EUM as elements that can
belong to a Security Realm.
The requirements section is organised in three layered parts:
    General requirements, to be applied to the whole architecture, including any security
      realm and its Actor(s) and role(s);
    Security requirements attached to a security realm, i.e. including to all of the role(s)
      attached to the security realm;
    Security requirements attached to a particular role; a section is dedicated to each of
      the following Roles:
           o eUICC;
              o     SM-SR;
              o     SM-DP;
              o      Device.
    Role 1         Role 2                     Role 3                  Role 4                   Device
 requirement requirement                   requirement             requirement              requirements
       s              s                  Securitysrealm 2        Securitysrealm 3
Security realm 1 requirements             requirements            requirements

General Requirements

Figure 29: Example of security requirements organisation

4.4.1 General Security Requirements

#         Requirement
               Cryptographic solutions used within the eUICC ecosystem SHALL offer strength at
SG1
               least conform to NIST cryptographic recommendations in NIST SP800-57 [20].
               Past or future communications associated with Profile download and installation,
               between the SM-DP and the eUICC, whenever trappable by third party SHALL NOT
SG2            be recoverable based upon the compromise of a single long-term key used for
               message encryption. A similar requirement for Platform Management is for further
               study.
SG3            The certificate chains SHALL be highly secure, highly reliable and verifiable.
SG4            All cryptographic keys SHALL be kept in secure environment (e.g. HSM, eUICC).
SG5            The keys used by the EUM for eUICC Certificate generation SHALL be stored in a
               secure environment (i.e. in a Hardware Security Module).
SG6         The solution SHALL NOT prevent a further release allowing the capability to upgrade
            the network authentication algorithms used within the ecosystem.
            The architecture SHALL provide a flexible solution including on the base of its security
SG7         principles, meaning the security applied to a subsystem of the global ecosystem
            SHALL NOT challenge the security of the overall ecosystem once interconnected.
            The architecture SHALL provide an interoperable solution including on the base of its
SG8         security principles, meaning the security applied to a subsystem of the global
            ecosystem SHALL NOT challenge the security of the overall ecosystem once
            interconnected.
            Multiple Roles and functions MAY be played by a single Actor as long as:
                1. It respects local lawful obligations;
SG9
                2. It does not lower the overall security level of the system;
                3. It does not conflict with own Operator security policies (e.g. force an operator
                   to share its secrets with a third party).
SG10        The Operator and the M2M SP SHALL be able to reject to use a non-trusted system
            for the Embedded UICC management.

4.4.2 Security Realms Requirements

#      Requirement
SR1         Security realms SHALL be identifiable and mutually authenticated for the purpose of
            any communication.
            Communication between the SM-SR and the eUICC SHALL be protected against
SR2
            replay attacks.
            An entity within a security realm MAY need authorisation before communication
SR3         exchange.
            Any end to end data communication between two security realms of the eUICC
            ecosystem SHALL be origin authenticated, integrity and confidentiality protected,
SR4
            protected against replay attacks and non-reputable. Non-repudiation MAY not apply
            to communication with the eUICC.
            Network communication links used inside a security realm SHALL be dedicated – i.e.
            neither public network, neither mutualised. E.g. solutions such as MPLS or GRE are
SR5
            not considered as dedicated links; a solution such as an authenticated and secured
            VPN is considered as dedicated.
            When two security realms are exchanging data, they SHALL at first engage a security
SR6         negotiation (e.g. EAP, IPSEC, TLS handshake…) resulting in the application of an
            agreed security level between them.
SR7         Security realms SHALL enforce filtering rules so that only authorised entities
            are granted access to allowed services.
            When negotiating a communication, at least the lowest acceptable common
SR8
            cryptographic suite SHALL apply.

4.4.3 eUICC Requirements

#      Requirement
            eUICC SHALL be certified according to the GSMA Embedded UICC Protection Profile
SE1         [27] .
            Void
SE2
            Void
SE3
SE4         The eUICC platform SHALL be in line with Common Criteria EAL4+ - EAL4
            augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
SE5         Upon Profile deletion, the eUICC SHALL ensure of the complete wipe of the Profile.
            eUICC SHALL only accept Platform and Profile Management commands sent from
SE6
            an authorised SM-SR or SM-DP.
SE7         The integrity of the Profile SHALL be ensured before its installation in the eUICC.
            eUICC SHALL reject any Platform and Profile Management commands that are in
SE8         conflict with the Policy Rules of any Profile on the eUICC the only exception being for
            the master delete command.
SE9         eUICC SHALL be resistant to tamper attacks (physical and logical).
SE10        Profile keys and algorithm parameters SHALL NOT be extractable from the eUICC.
SE11        A Profile SHALL NOT be exported from the eUICC.
            According to 3GPP TS21.133 [17], eUICC SHALL be able to play a role in deterring
SE12        terminal theft; e.g. this could be achieved by the definition of a particular configuration
            for the eUICC preventing normal use of the Device but allowing emergency services.
SE13        The eUICC SHALL provide a secure way for the SM-DP and SM-SR to check its
            identity and status in such a way that the entity has a proof of identity and origin. This
            capability is offered through the verification of the eUICC certificate during the
            Eligibility Verification function.
SE14        All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a robust tamper-proof way and
            resistant to side-channel attacks.
SE15        The Operator Credentials SHALL NOT be extractable from a Profile on the eUICC.
SE16        The eUICC SHOULD support a secure mechanism to allow the eUICC OS Update.
            In case it supports such mechanism, it SHALL be declared in the EIS.
SE17        If the mechanism in SE16 is supported, the eUICC SHALL implement a mechanism
            to report the updated OS version identifier to the SM-SR.

4.4.4 SM-SR and SM-DP Requirements

#       Requirement
  SM1          SM-DP SHALL be certified according to a GSMA SAS-SM scheme [22].
(SM-DP)
  SM2          SM-SR SHALL be certified according to a GSMA SAS-SM scheme [22].
(SM-SR)
  SM3          SM-SR SHALL implement an access control mechanism on the request for execution
               of the SM-SR functions only to authorised security realms.
(SM-SR)
  SM4          SM-DP SHALL implement an access control mechanism on the request for execution
               of the SM-DP functions only to authorised security realms.
(SM-DP)
  SM5          Security realm of SM-SR and SM-DP, and eUICC interfaces SHALL have proper
               counter measures against denial of services attacks.
(SM-SR)
  SM6          The donor SM-SR SHALL NOT be able to access the eUICC once the SM-SR switch
               procedure has been completed.
(SM-SR)
  SM7          The SM-DP SHALL be able to establish Profile Management Credentials on the
               eUICC for the secure end-to-end communication used for the Profile loading in a
(SM-DP)        reliable and confidential way.
  SM8          The SM-SR SHALL be able to establish Platform Management Credentials on the
               eUICC for the secure end-to-end communication used for the Platform Management
(SM-SR)        in a reliable and confidential way.
             The Operator SHALL be able to update the OTA Keys in its Profile on the eUICC in a
SM9          secure and confidential way reusing existing OTA Platform mechanisms.
             There SHALL be a secure end to end communication channel between the Security
SM10
             Realms which host the SM-DP function and the eUICC during the Profile installation.

4.4.5 Machine to Machine Device Requirements

#       Requirement
SD1          The security of the system SHALL NOT be dependent upon the security mechanisms
             within the Device.
SD2          The Device SHALL NOT be able to access nor modify sensitive Profile data, i.e.
             credentials, management commands, Policy Rules, authentication algorithm
             parameters.

4.4.6 Policy Control Function

#       Requirement
SP1       Policy Rules are to be protected against modification by unauthorised entities when
          they are stored within, and transported between, the SM-SR, SM-DP and eUICC.
SP2       Policy Rule transport SHALL be treated as per SR2.

4.5 Security Architecture

4.5.1 Secure Download and Installation of a Profile

This section describes the security details related to the procedure stated in section 3.5.4. Download and installation of a Profile SHALL be done in a secure way, as follows:

Figure 30: Secure Download and Installation of a Profile

The process between the Operator and the eUICC SHALL be as follows:
        Start Conditions:
        A. Operator and SM-DP share the Network Access Credentials associated to the
            Profile.

Procedure:

1. (a) The Operator requests a Profile download and installation to the SM-DP

1. (a) If not already done in earlier transactions, the SM-DP and the SM-SR
   authenticate each other and will use secure communication for all further data
   exchanges.
1. (b-f) The SM-DP requests the SM-SR for the relevant part of the eUICC
   information set (EIS).
2.   (a-e) The SM-DP requests that the SM-SR creates an ISD-P on the eUICC.
3.   The SM-DP establishes a keyset between itself and this new ISD-P within the
     eUICC (See section 4.5.1.1 regarding Establishment of the Keyset)
4.   The SM-DP encrypts and signs the Profile using the keyset established in step 3
     according to the secure channel protocol.
5.   The SM-DP sends the encrypted and signed Profile to the ISD-P for download
     and installation in the eUICC using the secure channel protocol based on the
     keyset established in step 3
6.   The eUICC decrypts and verifies the integrity of the Profile using the keyset
     established in step 3.
7.   The Profile is installed on the eUICC.
8. (a to d) The eUICC notifies the status of the download and installation process to
   the SM-SR, to the SM-DP and the Operator. The SM-SR updates the EIS
   information of the corresponding eUICC in its database.
End Conditions:
A. The Profile is installed on the eUICC.

4.5.1.1 Establishment of the Keyset

This chapter details the establishment of the keyset in step 3 in the Secure Download and Installation process. The keyset is calculated by both the SM-DP and the eUICC on the base of a shared secret called ShS. The ShS is generated locally by both entities SM-DP and eUICC using a Key Agreement Algorithm.

4.5.1.2 Key Agreement

A key agreement protocol is executed between the SM-DP and the eUICC to generate the Shared Secret ShS. The ShS is generated by both SM-DP and the eUICC using a key agreement protocol (e.g. Elliptic Curve Key Agreement based on Diffie-Hellman or ElGamal – ECKA-DH, ECKA-EG).

The result of the key agreement protocol must provide authentication which will help protect against man-in-the-middle attacks Authentication of the eUICC to the SM-DP is mandatory. The mutual authentication of the SM-DP and the eUICC is mandatory. The following figure details the step 3 of Figure 30.

Figure 31: Key Set Establishment: Key Agreement Protocol (overview)

4.5.2 Mutual Authentication

This section details the mutual authentication mechanism between two entities in the
architecture. The entities concerned within this section to authenticate each other are SM-DP
to SM-SR and SM-SR to SM-SR. Authentication between other entities in the system MAY
use other solutions for authentication and is not in the scope for this section.
To secure the messages being sent between the entities from an authentication point of view,
at least one of the following two mechanisms SHALL be used:
      1. Security within a message allowing it to be authenticated, e.g. Web Service Security
         (WS-Security);
Mutual authenticated transport level security, e.g. TLS.

5 Compliance requirements

5.1 SM-SR and SM-DP Compliance Requirements

#                     Requirement
SMC1                  Site Security of SM-DP and SM-SR SHALL be certified
                      according to GSMA SAS-SM scheme [22].
SMC2                  Functional compliance of SM-DP and SM-SR SHALL be verified
                      through vendor or third party test suite according to the GSMA
                      test plan.

5.2 eUICC Compliance requirements

#                   Requirement
EUC1                eUICC SHALL be certified according to the GSMA Embedded
                    UICC Protection Profile [27].
EUC2                Functional compliance of eUICC SHALL be verified through an
                    independent GSMA industry-approved certification scheme.

5.3 EUM Compliance requirements

#                   Requirement
EMC1                The EUM production site SHALL be GSMA SAS-UP [23]
                    certified.

A Interfaces

The purpose of this section is to provide additional information about the various interfaces required between the different elements of the architecture, and the functions to be supported over these interfaces.

A.1 EUM – SM-SR interface

The procedure “eUICC Registration at SM-SR” in section 3.5.1 mainly addresses this interface. The main purpose is to enable the registration of the eUICC platform at the SM-SR.

A.2 Operator – SM-DP Interface

This interface covers the Profile ordering aspects and the procedure as defined in section
3.5.3. This interface is also used during the Profile Download and Installation procedure as
defined in section 3.5.4, the Profile enabling via SM-DP as defined in section 3.5.7 and the
ISD-P deletion via SM-DP as defined in section 3.5.10.
The following information is exchanged between the Operator and the SM-DP:
    The description of the Subscriptions e.g.:
         o The IMSI range or list of IMSIs, the ICCID range or list of ICCIDs
         o The Applications and files as defined in the relevant specifications (in particular
            3GPP TS 31.102 [18], 3GPP TS 31.103 [19] and ETSI TS 102 221 [3].)
         o The algorithm parameters associated with its corresponding Network Access
            Application (for instance with Milenage: the OPc, ri, ci values)
    Other data or applications which are part of the Profiles.
    All relevant information needed to configure the future ISD-P, the Remote File
        Management and Remote Application Management applications.
    The Policy Rules.
    All relevant known information on the target eUICC and its SM-SR e.g.:
         o The geographical location of the SM-SR.
         o The type of communication supported by the SM-SR.
         o the security level to be supported by the SM-SR (in particular, the security
            association methods that can be used between the SM-DP and the SM-SR (see
            security section for proper recommendations))
         o The methods to be supported by the SM-SR to communicate with the eUICC (e.g.
            support of SMS and/or RAM over HTTP(s) over LTE/EPS)
         o The conditions under which the Profiles prepared and encrypted by the SM-DP
            are to be delivered directly (via SM-SR) to the specified eUICC.
The SM-DP provides:
    The relevant information for the Profiles to the Operator so that the Operator can
      provision the information relevant to the Subscription in its mobile network.

A.3 SM-DP – SM-SR Interface

This interface is used during the Profile download and installation, the Profile enabling via SM-DP, Profile disabling via-SM-DP, Profile deletion via SM-DP procedures. The entity taking the role of SM-DP and/or the SM-SR MAY retain certain information related to the Profile according to the commercial agreement, Operator Policy Rules and regulatory data retention obligations.

A.4 Operator – SM-SR interface

This interface is used during the Profile enabling, Profile disabling, and Profile deletion procedures. The SM-SR takes as input: - Platform management requests from the Operator; - Policy Rule (POL2) update from the Operator; - The EID of the targeted eUICCs. The Operator takes as input: - The relevant parts of the EIS of the targeted eUICCs; - Receipts/responses to Operator Platform management requests; - Receipts/responses to Operator Policy Rule updates; - Platform management-related events. This interface is also used when managing the PLMA, allowing M2M SP to manage a Profile owned by an Operator on its behalf, and under PLMAs. The related procedure is described in section 3.5.15.

A.5 SM-SR – eUICC interface

This interface is used during the Profile download and installation, the Profile enabling, the Profile enabling via SM-DP, Profile disabling, Profile disabling via-SM-DP, Profile deletion, Profile deletion via SM-DP procedures.

A.6 SM-SR – SM-SR Interface

This interface is used during the SM-SR Change procedure as defined in 3.5.11.

A.7 Operator – eUICC interface

This corresponds to the interface between the Operator and the eUICC.

A.8 M2M SP – SM-SR interface

This interface is used during the Profile enabling, Profile disabling, and Profile deletion via M2M SP procedures as defined in 3.5.16, 3.5.17 and 3.5.18.

A.9 Device – eUICC interface

This interface provides the possibility for a Device supporting Local Enable / Local Disable
functionality to enable or disable the Test Profile or the Emergency Profile. Local Enable and
Local Disable functions are only possible for the Test Profile or the Emergency Profile.
A Device supporting Emergency Calls, requiring a dedicated Emergency Profile, can use this
interface to enable the Emergency Profile in situations requiring to set up an Emergency Call
to specific Emergency Call number(s). The Device can use this interface to disable the
Emergency Profile when the emergency situation has ended.
NOTE:          An emergency situation MAY not end immediately after an Emergency Call,
               as it MAY be necessary to receive a call back from the Public Safety Answering
               Point (PSAP).

B Risk Matrix (Informative)

This section lists risks, related impacted sensitive assets and impacted properties (C=Confidentiality, I=Integrity, A=Availability).

                                                                                                                                                               Impacts
  #                  Risks                                                   Definition                                                   Assets
                                                                                                                                                               C   I     A
Generic Risks
                                            Penetration on a server managing master keys or private keys, loss of
        Failure in certificates       or
 V01                                        confidentiality due to human error or malevolence might lead to loss of           all certificates                      
        private keys chain
                                            trust in the entire process chain.
        Authentication        algorithm     Weakening of authentication algorithms due to malevolence, human error            eUICC
 V02                                                                                                                                                              
        breach                              or other means.                                                                   authentication algorithm
                                            A breakthrough in cryptographic research might lead to the weakening or           All      assets         using
 V03    Cryptographic breakthrough                                                                                                                                
                                            total loss of authentication and ciphering schemes.                                cryptographic primitives
 V04    EID tampering                       Installation of Profile on a wrong eUICC                                          Profile                             
Provisioning & Delivery Risks
       Denial of service on public
                                           Denial of service using vulnerabilities in public interfaces or basic resource    Profiles
V05                                        exhaustion techniques might lead to the impossibility of Provisioning and                                                    
       network facing components                                                                                             connectivity chain to eUICC
                                           management of eUICC, and cause loss of services.
       Critical         component          Lax policies in network access or interconnection might lead to the
V06                                                                                                                          eUICC                           
       communication interception          interception and loss of confidentiality in critical assets such as Profiles.
       Penetration        of    the
                                           Lax policies in network access or interconnection might lead to the
V07    Subscription      Management                                                                                          network components              
                                           interception, alteration or deletion of critical assets such as Profiles.
       network
       Rogue component insertion           A malicious or compromised partner might introduce a rogue component
V08    within trusted network (e.g.        within a security domain leading to loss of integrity or confidentiality of       All                                     
       SM-SR or SM-DP)                     critical information such as the Profile or a management command.
       Confidentiality     loss    of      Interception of transport key might lead to unsolicited connection to the
                                                                                                                             data protection key and its
V09    transport keys used to deliver      eUICC or network component in order to perform denial of service, theft                                            
                                                                                                                              certificate
       the Profile up to the eUICC         of service or impersonation.
       Confidentiality or integrity loss                                                                                     Profiles
                                           Communication of Profiles over non protected networks might lead to the
V10    of Profile during Provisioning                                                                                                                            
                                           interception or tampering of transiting Profiles                                  eUICC
       or delivery
                                           Insufficient isolation of Profiles on the eUICC might lead to the reuse or          eUICC
        Poor isolation of Profiles on
 V11                                       leaking of critical part of the Profile such as the ISD-P or keys such as the                                         
        the eUICC                                                                                                              Profiles
                                           K.
                                           Human error, malevolence or action from a malicious 3rd party might lead            management function key
        Rogue Profile and Platform
 V12                                       to unsolicited Profile or Platform Management commands resulting in loss                                                  
        Management commands                                                                                                    eUICC
                                           of service, impersonation or fraud.
                                                                                                                               PCF files
                                           Human error, malevolence or compromising of the PCF might enable
 V13    PCF breach                                                                                                             Profiles                            
                                           scenarios where a Profile is able to bypass operators Profile policies
                                                                                                                               eUICC
eUICC Risks
                                           Failure in providing a secure eUICC might lead to physical or logical
 V14    eUICC tampering                                                                                                        eUICC                               
                                           attacks that might allow leaking or modifying of installed Profiles.
                                           It might be possible for an attacker to install a valid Profile on a non-trusted
        Installation of Profile within a
 V15                                       eUICC (being soft or hardware) thus allowing for the extraction or                  eUICC                               
        non-certified eUICC
                                           replication of the Profile. This might lead to fraud or impersonation attacks
                                                                                                                               eUICC
                                           Failure to prevent Profile extraction or loss of confidentiality in the Profile     data protection key and its
                                           creation database might lead to the leak of data enabling the cloning of             certificate
 V16    eUICC cloning                                                                                                                                            
                                           eUICC and embedding them in soft or rogue eUICC in order to perpetuate
                                           fraud or impersonation.                                                             OTA Keys
                                                                                                                               Profile keys
Dependability
       Failure to recover from a          Delivery of a malformed Profile might result in a loss of communication             eUICC
V17                                                                                                                                                                  
       damaged Profile                    abilities and ultimately to Device loss.
                                          Inability for a eUICC to verify the integrity of a delivered Profile, might lead    eUICC
V18    Enabling of degraded Profiles      to the installation of a malformed or forged Profile leading to loss of                                                   
                                          service, OTA ping-pong storm, fraud or impersonation scenarios.
                                          Inability to remove old Profiles from an eUICC might lead to the dead               eUICC
V19    Inability to wipe Profile          occupancy of a Profile slot, rendering Profile switching or Provisioning                                               
                                          impossible.
         Failure to make emergency         In case of forged, malformed or absence of a valid Profile, it might be       eUICC
 V20                                                                                                                                    
         call                              impossible for a user to make emergency calls.                                Baseband
Device
         Unauthorised ability to wipe      If Profiles are erasable directly from the Device without authorisation by
 V21     Profile for reselling of stolen   using a software or hardware switch, it might enable malicious 3rd parties    eUICC         
         Device                            to resell a stolen Device.

C List of Sensitive Assets (Informative)

This section lists the sensitive assets to be protected. The management of such assets is the
most critical when they are available in clear and impacts the components accessing these
assets (see 2nd column). However they MAY be transferred between entities as long as their
security properties (integrity, confidentiality, authentication…) are not compromised. The
fourth column of the following table corresponds to the criticality of the asset for the Embedded
UICC ecosystem. The criticality illustrates a security impact on the architecture and the
potential cost impact on the Actor(s) in case of security failure.
The following criticalities are considered:
    Criticality 4: the Embedded UICC ecosystem MAY be at risk with severe business
       risks for several or all Actors.
       Criticality 3: one part of the Embedded UICC ecosystem is affected; the affected
        Actor(s) MAY suffer strong effects which MAY endanger their whole business.
       Criticality 2: the service is temporarily interrupted; the affected Actor(s) have a major
        business impact.
       Criticality 1: the service is temporarily interrupted; the affected Actor(s) have a minor
        business impact.
Sensitive                 Asset        Asset Handled In Clear By:                    Criticality
Asset                   Originator
                         Owner
Authentication           Operator      Operator, eUICC                                 3 to 4
Algorithm
Authentication           Operator      Operator, eUICC, SM-DP                      2 (one eUICC
Algorithm Key                                                                  affected) to 4 (a set of
                                                                                  eUICCs affected)
Authentication           Operator      Operator, eUICC, SM-DP                      2 (one eUICC
Algorithm                                                                      affected) to 4 (a set of
Parameters                                                                        eUICCs affected)
(e.g. Opc, Ri-Ci
etc.)
IMSI                     Operator      Operator, eUICC, SM-DP                   1 (one IMSI affected)
                                                                                 to 2 (a set of IMSIs
                                                                                       affected)
MSISDN                   Operator      Operator, SM-DP, SM-SR                     1 (one MSISDN
                                                                               affected) to 2 (a set of
                                                                                MSISDNs affected)
GSMA             CI   Root CA owner    Root CA owner                                      4
Certificate
EUM Certificate       Root CA owner    EUM                                                3
eUICC                     EUM          EUM, eUICC                                      2 to 3
Certificate
EID                       EUM          SM-SR, eUICC, SM-DP, Operator, ,        1 (one EID affected) to
                                       EUM                                         2 (a set of EIDs
                                                                                       affected)
Profile                  Operator      Operator, eUICC, SM-DP                          3 to 4
Sensitive            Asset       Asset Handled In Clear By:                Criticality
Asset              Originator
                    Owner
Operator    OTA     Operator     Operator, eUICC, SMDP                       3 to 4
Keys
PCF rules           Operator     eUICC, Operator, SM-SR, SM-DP               3 to 4
Profile              Asset       Asset Handled In Clear By:                Criticality
Management         Originator
Sensitive Data      Owner
Platform             SM-SR       SM-SR, eUICC                                2 to 4
management
keyset
Profile              SM-DP       SM-DP, eUICC                                  4
Management
keyset

D Additional Information Related to Section 4.5 (Informative)

Nomenclature used in this annex:
 Acronym             Definition
 EC                  Elliptic Curves
 Ke                  The key from the keyset used for encryption
 Km                  The key from the keyset used for message authentication and integrity
                     protection.
 Ku                  The key from the keyset used for protection of key values.
 PKeuicc             This Public key is part of the eUICC Certificate. In GlobalPlatform, it
                     corresponds to the public key of the ECASD.
                     For ElGamal Elliptic Curves key agreement this key is PK.CASD.ECKA [GP
                     Am. E]
                     For signature verification by external entities this key is PK.CASD.AUT [GP
                     Am. A]
                     For confidentially (encryption by external entity) this key is PK.CASD.CT [GP
                     Am. A]
 SKeuicc             Private key of the eUICC. In GlobalPlatform, it corresponds to the private key
                     of the ECASD.
                     For ElGamal Elliptic Curves key agreement this key is SK.CASD.ECKA [GP
                     Am. E]
                     For signature by eUICC this key is SK.CASD.AUT[GP Am. A]
                     For decryption by eUICC this key is SK.CASD.CT [GP Am. A]
 PKSM-DP             Public Key of the SM-DP
 SKSM-DP             Private Key of the SM-DP
 PKeph               Ephemeral Public Key generated by the SM-DP
 SKeph               Ephemeral Private Key generated by the SM-DP

D.1 Void

Void

D.2 Details on the ElGamal Key Agreement

Figure 32 : ElGamal Key Agreement

Start Condition: The SM-SR has connectivity with the eUICC.
1.    The SM-DP verifies the eUICC Certificate, which carries a signature from the EUM.
      This is part of step 1.e of Figure 30.
2.1 and 2.2     The SM-DP sends its certificate to the eUICC through the SM-SR
3.1   The SM-DP generates an ephemeral EC (elliptic curve) key pair, named SKeph
      and PKeph and sends PKeph to the SM-SR.
3.2 and 3.3    The SM-DP sends a key set generation request to the SM-SR, including
     the ephemeral public key PKeph. The SM-SR passes the request for key set
     generation to the ISD-P on the eUICC, providing the PKeph.
3-4. The eUICC now performs the following actions: The ISD-P provides the ECASD
     with the PKeph.
The ECASD generates a Shared Secret ShS from its own secret key and received
    ephemeral PKeph and returns it to the ISD-P.
      The ISD-P uses ShS to generate its own key pair as well as a receipt from the
      operation.
3-5. The ISD-P passes a confirmation (with receipt) of the generation back to the SM-
     SR..
3-6. The SM-SR passes the confirmation back to the SM-DP.
4.    The SM-DP generates ShS from the ephemeral secret key SKeph and the eUICCs
      public key.
The SM-DP uses this calculated ShS to derive the same key set as generated by the
     ISD-P.
     The SM-DP verifies the receipt it received from the eUICC to verify the validity of
     the entire operation. Together with the eUICC Certificate verified in step 1, this also
     confirms the authenticity of the eUICC, and confirms the correct keyset derivation
     on both the eUICC and the SM-DP server.
End Condition: A secret key set, whose contents are only known within the ISD-P and
by the SM-DP has been generated and the eUICC is authenticated to the SM-DP.

In a GP based model, for key agreement the PKeuicc corresponds to PK.CASD.ECKA which is part of CERT.CASD.ECKA signed by the EUM.

D.3 Calculation of the keyset (Ke, Km, Ku)

The keyset is constituted of 3 keys, derived from the ShS, calculated both by eUICC and SM- DP entities as follow:  Ke: encryption key used to encrypt the Profile;  Km: integrity key used for MAC;  Ku: key from the keyset used for protection of key values. To be calculated, these keys SHALL use a Key Derivation Function (KDF).

The KDF could be a PRF (Pseudo Random Function) which is a combination of one way hash functions. Several PRFs can be used in the Key Derivation Function. The KDF could take as parameters information related to the eUICC, the Profile owner (Operator), the Profile itself, the SM-DP or the card issuer.

These different keys are calculated as follow:
         Ke=KDF(ShS, additional_information, diversified_parameter1);
         Km=KDF(ShS, additional_information, diversified_parameter2);
         Ku=KDF(ShS, additional_information, diversified_parameter3);
With,
         additional_information is a common diversification input to generate the three keys; it
         could include information relating to Operator, SM-DP, eUICC, Profile and a nonce.
         Diversified_parameters are diversification parameters to generate different keys.
The Profile can be sent from the SM-DP to the eUICC on the base of a secure channel protocol
using this keyset.

D.4 Role of the EUM in the Certificate Chain

The EUM is required in the different key establishment scenarios to sign the eUICC Certificate which contains the public key of the asymmetric key pair of the eUICC (stored in the ECASD in the GlobalPlatform scenario). By verifying this signature and by checking the response produced by the eUICC in the key establishment procedure, the SM-DP can authenticate the eUICC independently of the SM-SR.

D.5 Mutual Authentication Binding to a SOA Environment

This section provides information when deploying eUICC remote management system in SOA environment using Web Services technology, following the OASIS and W3C WS-* standard. This standard provides interoperability and loose coupling between parties named as “message requester” and “message receiver”.

The architecture does not prevent from using another type of technology if the security requirements detailed in this document are met. It implies that both message requester and message receiver uses the same technology.

D.5.1 Authentication

To secure the messages being sent between the entities, at least one of the following two
mechanisms SHALL be used:
   1. WS-Security standard for client authentication and transport level security (TLS) for
      server authentication.
   2. Mutual authenticated transport level security (TLS).
In both cases the authentication at TLS level requires the use of digital signed certificates.
A platform that needs to prove its identity at TLS level is required to have X.509 certificates
(and public-private key pairs).
The specifics of who is trusted to issue X.509 certificates depend on the organisation’s PKI
setup. For authentication, the subject of the X.509 certificate identifies the Actor. We also
assume that the issuer of the X.509 certificates is a general Certificate Authority not directly
involved in any authorisation of the web service transactions, but is relied on for the validity of
the X.509 certificate in a manner out of scope of the scenarios covered.

E Void

F Profile Creation, Ordering and Personalisation (Informative)

The following diagram shows an example of how the functions defined in section 3.3.1.1 MAY be performed.

Figure 33: Profile Creation, Ordering and Personalisation

Document Management Document History

Version       Date          Brief Description of              Approval           Editor /
                            Change                            Authority          Company
                                                              GSMA Embedded
                            1st Release of Document,
                                                              SIM Leadership     Ian Smith,
V1.0          01/7/2013     submitted to DAG#108 and
                                                              Team and PSMC      GSMA
                            PSMC#116 for approval
V1.1          06/12/2013    2nd Release of Document,          GSMA Embedded
                            submitted to DAG#108 and          SIM Leadership     Ian Smith,
                            PSMC#116 for approval             Team and PSMC      GSMA
 V4.0          25/02/2019    Version 4 is released (skipping   GSMA Embedded
                                                                                  Yolanda Sanz,
                             v2.0 and v3.0) to align with      SIM Leadership
                                                                                  GSMA
                             SGP.02 version V4.0. .            Team and TG
Other Information
 Type                              Description
 Document Owner                    Embedded SIM
 Editor / Company                  Alejandro Pulido, VALID

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© GSM Association. Converted automatically from the published PDF; layout, figures and tables may differ from the original. The authoritative version is the original: https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/wp-content/uploads//SGP.01-v4.0.pdf.