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GSMA · Specification

SGP.01v1.1

Embedded SIM Remote Provisioning Architecture

Defines a common architecture for remotely provisioning and managing embedded UICCs in hard-to-reach machine-to-machine devices, for operators and industry implementers.

Version
v1.1
  1. v4.32022-11-18
  2. v4.22020-07-07
  3. v4.12020-06-05
  4. v4.02019-02-25
  5. v1.12014-01-30
Issued
2014-01-30
Source
Original PDF

A formatted version of this document is not available yet; the text below is extracted clause by clause, so tables and figures may be incomplete.

Partial extraction: some headings could not be matched to the table of contents; text outside numbered clauses is shown where it occurs.

Overview

The document defines a common global architecture for remote provisioning and subscription management of embedded UICCs in machine-to-machine devices that are not easily reachable. It describes ecosystem roles, the eUICC and card architecture, profiles, procedures, policy control, and interfaces among operators, service providers, eUICC manufacturers, and subscription-management functions. It also sets out a security model, including threats, risk analysis, security requirements, and architecture, with informative material on key establishment and provisioning flows. The framework is intended to support interoperability while protecting network-access credentials and customer identities.

  • eUICC
  • M2M
  • SM-DP
  • SM-SR
  • ElGamal key agreement
  • IMSI

Overview generated automatically from the document's scope and outline. The document text is authoritative.

Contents
  1. 1 Introduction
  2. 1.1 Overview
  3. 1.2 Scoping the Problem
  4. 1.3 Document Purpose
  5. 1.4 Intended Audience
  6. 1.5 Definition of Terms
  7. 1.6 Abbreviations
  8. 1.7 References
  9. 2 Basic Principles and Assumptions
  10. 2.1 Basic Principles
  11. 2.2 General Assumptions
  12. 2.2.1 Use of Existing Standards
  13. 2.2.2 Machine to Machine Device Impact
  14. 2.2.3 Security
  15. 2.2.4 Regulatory
  16. 2.3 The eUICC Ecosystem
  17. 2.3.1 Roles and Entities
  18. 2.4 The eUICC
  19. 2.4.1 Profiles
  20. 2.4.2 Policies & Policy Control
  21. 3 Architecture
  22. 3.1 Architecture Diagram
  23. 3.2 Card Architecture
  24. 3.2.1 Security Domains
  25. 3.2.2 Card Architecture
  26. 3.2.3 State Diagram for an ISD-P
  27. 3.3 Relevant Roles and Functions
  28. 3.3.1 Functions Definition
  29. 3.3.2 Assignment of Functions to Relevant Actors and Roles
  30. 3.4 Profile Description
  31. 3.4.1 General Content of a Profile Installed on an eUICC
  32. 3.4.2 Access to the Content of a Profile
  33. 3.5 Procedures
  34. 3.5.1 eUICC Registration at SM-SR
  35. 3.5.2 Un-personalised Profile Verification (Proprietary)
  36. 3.5.3 Profile Ordering (Proprietary)
  37. 3.5.4 Profile Download and Installation
  38. 3.5.5 Master Delete
  39. 3.5.6 Profile Enabling
  40. 3.5.7 Profile Enabling via SM-DP
  41. 3.5.8 Profile Disabling
  42. 3.5.9 ISD-P Deletion
  43. 3.5.10 ISD-P Deletion via SM-DP
  44. 3.5.11 SM-SR Change
  45. 3.5.12 ISD-P Key Establishment Procedure
  46. 3.5.13 Fall-Back Mechanism
  47. 3.5.14 eUICC Certificate Verification
  48. 3.6 Policy Control
  49. 3.6.1 Overview Diagram of Rule Management System
  50. 3.6.2 Policy Rules Management
  51. 3.6.3 Policy Control Mechanism
  52. 4 Security Model: Threats Analysis & Risk Assessment Model
  53. 4.1 Security Challenges
  54. 4.2 Security Analysis Methodology
  55. 4.3 Aim of the Security Realm Approach
  56. 4.4 Security Requirements
  57. 4.4.1 General Security Requirements
  58. 4.4.2 Security Realms Requirements
  59. 4.4.3 eUICC Requirements
  60. 4.4.4 SM-SR and SM-DP Requirements
  61. 4.4.5 Machine to Machine Device Requirements
  62. 4.4.6 Policy Control Function
  63. 4.5 Security Architecture
  64. 4.5.1 Secure Download and Installation of a Profile
  65. 4.5.2 Mutual Authentication
  66. A Interfaces
  67. A.1 eUICC Manufacturer – SM-SR interface
  68. A.2 MNO – SM-DP Interface
  69. A.3 SM-DP – SM-SR Interface
  70. A.4 MNO – SM-SR interface
  71. A.5 SM-SR – eUICC interface
  72. A.6 SM-SR – SM-SR Interface
  73. A.7 MNO – eUICC interface
  74. B Risk Matrix (Informative)
  75. C List of Sensitive Assets (Informative)
  76. D Additional Information Related to Section 4.5 (Informative)
  77. D.1 Additional Key Establishment Mechanisms
  78. D.1.1 Push Model (ShS generated by SM-DP)
  79. D.1.2 Pull model (ShS generated by the eUICC)
  80. D.2 Details on the ElGamal Key Agreement
  81. D.3 Calculation of the keyset (Ke, Km, Ku)
  82. D.4 Role of the EUM in the Certificate Chain
  83. D.5 Mutual Authentication Binding to a SOA Environment
  84. D.5.1 Authentication
  85. E Flowcharts for basic remote Provisioning events (Informative)
  86. E.1 Legend
  87. E.2 Macro procedure: «Provisioning of a Machine to Machine Device»
  88. E.4 A. From eUICC registration to operative machine to machine Device –
  89. E.6 C. Termination of a Subscription (Ecosystem: 3.1.2 worked example - end of
  90. E.7 D: Customer Changes Machine to Machine Device but not MNO. (Ecosystem
  91. E.8 E. Switch of Enabled Profile from MNO A to MNO B. (Both Subscriptions are
  92. E.9 F. Use of Master Delete Mechanism
  93. E.10 G. Use of Fall-back Mechanism
  94. F Profile Creation, Ordering and Personalisation (Informative)
Embedded SIM Remote Provisioning Architecture
                                                                                                  Version 1.1
                                                                                     30 January 2014

This is a Non-binding Permanent Reference Document of the GSMA

Security Classification: Non-confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is confidential to the Association and is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other than those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association.

Copyright Notice Copyright © 2015 GSM Association

Disclaimer The GSM Association (“Association”) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document. The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.

Antitrust Notice The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy.

1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

Many machine-to-machine Devices will not be easily reachable for the purpose of Provisioning a Subscription. This will require a new solution to accommodate this special situation. The requirement is to define a mechanism for ‘over the air’ remote Provisioning of machine- to-machine Devices with the necessary credentials to gain mobile network access, under the assumption that the same or similar authentication protocols as today will be used. The MNO will have to be able to respond to requests to change Subscription (contract) from one MNO A to a different MNO B, without having physical access to the Embedded UICC in the Device in question. This document describes an architecture which, when implemented, will enable remote Provisioning and Subscription management, while at the same time maintaining at least the same level of security both for network operators and Customers as present solutions. This includes the safe keeping of MNO Network Access Credentials, such as keys for cryptographic functions, and identifiers such as IMSI and other Customer identities used.

1.2 Scoping the Problem

This document addresses:
    The Machine-to-Machine use cases as described in GSMA ‘Embedded SIM Task
       Force Requirements and Use Cases’ Version 1.0 [1]. This solution is not intended to
       apply to traditional consumer telecommunication devices as they are not concerned
       with the problem statement above.
    Architecture of the remote Provisioning system for Embedded UICCs i.e. its
       components and the related interfaces. The GSMA’s Embedded UICC Ecosystem
       document [2], and the principles and assumptions stated in section 2 will support its
       definition.
    Security of the remote Provisioning system for Embedded UICCs.
    SM-SR and SM-DP integration options within network infrastructure.
    The necessary aspects of the Embedded UICC architecture and its external interface
       to ensure compatibility with the GSMA architecture prior to delivery of an ETSI
       standard.
    The standardisation of the Embedded UICC remote Provisioning architecture where
       appropriate.

1.3 Document Purpose

The aim of this document is to define a common global architecture framework to enable the remote Provisioning and management of the Embedded UICC (eUICC) in machine-to- machine Devices which are not easily reachable. The adoption of a common architecture framework will provide a basis for ensuring global interoperability between potentially different MNO deployment scenarios while utilising a standardised eUICC platform. This document identifies the individual Roles and the potential Actors as well as the interfaces between each of the Roles in the architecture.

1.4 Intended Audience

Technical experts working within MNOs, SIM solution providers, machine to machine Device vendors, standards organisations, network infrastructure vendors, Service Providers and other industry bodies.

1.5 Definition of Terms

Term                                   Description
                                       An actor is a physical entity (person, company or
                                       organisation) that can assume a role in the functional
Actor
                                       architecture. It is possible for an actor to assume multiple
                                       Roles in the same functional architecture.
                                       A paying party, legally responsible juridical person or
Customer
                                       entity.
                                       Equipment into which an Embedded UICC and a
Device                                 communication module are inserted during assembly.
                                       Examples include: Utility meter, car and camera.
                                       A UICC which is not easily accessible or replaceable, is
Embedded UICC                          not intended to be removed or replaced in the terminal,
                                       and enables the secure changing of Subscriptions.
                                       The state of a Profile when its files and/or applications
Enabled Profile                        (e.g., NAA) are selectable over the UICC-Terminal
                                       interface.
                                       A certificate issued by the EUM for a specific, individual,
eUICC Certificate                      eUICC.
                                       This certificate is certified by the EUM Certificate.
                                       Supplier of the eUICC modules and resident software
eUICC Manufacturer
                                       (such as firmware and operating system)
                                       A certificate issued to a GSMA accredited EUM to issue
EUM Certificate                        eUICC Certificates.
                                       This certificate is certified by the Root Certificate.
                                       eUICC based mechanism which enables the Profile with
Fall-back Mechanism
                                       Fall-back Attribute set.
                                       This is an attribute of a Profile which, when set, identifies
                                       the Profile to be enabled by the Fall-back Mechanism.
Fall-back Attribute
                                       Only one Profile on the eUICC can have the Fall-back
                                       attribute set at a time.
                                       Manifestation of UICC. Specified in ETSI TS 102 221
Form Factor
                                       [102221] and ETSI TS 102 671 [102671].
                                       Profile generated by the SM-DP following the MNO’s
Generic Profile                        specifications, but without the MNO’s credentials and any
                                       specific data linked to the future targeted eUICC.
Term                                       Description
                                           Unique number to identify the Provisioning or Operational
                                           Profile in a eUICC
Integrated Circuit Card ID
                                           Note: the ICCID throughout this document is used to
                                           identify the Profile (Provisioning and Operational Profile)
                                           Unique identifier administered by regional authorities and
                                           allocated to Mobile network Operators to provision within
International Mobile Subscriber Identity
                                           their Network Access Applications to enable Devices to
                                           attach to a network and use services.
                                           An entity providing access capability and communication
Mobile Network Operator                    services to its Customers through a mobile network
                                           infrastructure.
                                           An application residing on a UICC which provides
Network Access Application                 authorisation to access a network. E.g. a USIM
                                           application.
                                           Data required to authenticate to an ITU E.212 [E212]
Network Access Credentials                 network. This may include data such as Ki/K and IMSI
                                           stored within a NAA.
                                           A Profile containing one or more Network Access
                                           Applications and associated Network Access Credentials
Operational Profile
                                           and MNO’s (e.g. STK) applications and 3rd party
                                           applications.
                                           Set of credentials owned by Mobile Network Operator,
                                           including Network Access Credentials, OTA Keys for
Operator Credentials
                                           remote Profile management and authentication algorithm
                                           parameters.
                                           A Profile whose Policy Rules have become
Orphaned Profile                           unmanageable, e.g. due to the termination of the
                                           Customer’s contract with the MNO.
                                           The credentials included in the Profile, used in conjunction
OTA Keys
                                           with OTA Platforms.
                                           An MNO platform used for remote management of UICCs
OTA Platform
                                           and enabled MNO profiles on eUICCs.
                                           Un-personalised Profile with the addition of the
Personalised Profile
                                           Personalisation Data for the eUICC targeted by the MNO.
                                           Set of data derived from the input data provided by the
                                           MNO and generated by the SM-DP (e.g. NAC, Keys, etc.)
Personalisation Data
                                           and dedicated to the personalisation of a unique
                                           Personalised Profile.
                                           A set of functions related to the transport, enabling,
                                           disabling and deletion of a Profile on an eUICC. Platform
                                           Management actions are protected by Platform
Platform Management
                                           Management Credentials shared between the SM-SR and
                                           the ISD-R. Platform Management does not affect the
                                           contents of a Profile.
Term                                   Description
                                       Data required within an eUICC so that a secured
                                       communication can be set up between an external entity
Platform Management Credentials
                                       and the eUICC in order to transport, enable, disable and
                                       delete Profiles on the eUICC.
                                       Principles reflected in a set of rules that governs the
Policy                                 behaviour of eUICC and/or entities involved in the remote
                                       management of the eUICC.
                                       A function that defines, updates or removes Policy Rules
Policy Control Function
                                       to implement a Policy.
                                       A function that executes Policy Rules to implement a
Policy Enforcement Function
                                       Policy.
                                       Defines the atomic action of a Policy and the conditions
Policy Rule
                                       under which it is executed.
                                       Combination of a file structure, data and applications to be
Profile
                                       provisioned onto, or present on, an eUICC.
                                       Description of a Profile in a format specific to the MNO;
Profile Description                    Example formats include Excel table, xml format and plain
                                       text.
                                       A set of functions related to the transport, downloading,
                                       installation and content update of a Profile in a dedicated
Profile Management                     ISD-P on the eUICC. Download and installation are
                                       protected by Profile Installer Credentials shared between
                                       the SM-DP and the ISD-P.
                                       Data required within an eUICC so that a Profile
Profile Installer Credentials          downloaded from an external entity can be decrypted and
                                       installed on the eUICC
                                       The downloading and installation of a Profile into an
Provisioning
                                       eUICC.
                                       A Profile containing one or more Network Access
                                       Applications, and associated Network Access Credentials
                                       which, when installed on an eUICC, enables access to
Provisioning Profile
                                       communication network(s), only to provide transport
                                       capability for eUICC management and Profile
                                       management between the eUICC and an SM-SR.
                                       A special purpose contract, with its associated
                                       Provisioning Profile, that enables a machine to machine
Provisioning Subscription
                                       Device to access a mobile network only for the purpose of
                                       management of Operational Profiles on the eUICC.
Roles                                  Roles are representing a logical grouping of functions.
                                       A certificate used to authenticate and authorise the entity
Root Certificate
                                       that issues EUM Certificates.
                                       An element or set of elements within the ecosystem
                                       sharing a common level of trust and securely managed by
Security Realm
                                       a single administrative authority. No specific level of trust
                                       is to be assumed.
Term                                    Description
                                        An entity (associated with one or more users) that is
                                        engaged in a Subscription with a Service Provider. The
                                        subscriber is allowed to subscribe and unsubscribe to
Subscriber
                                        services, to register a user or a list of users authorised to
                                        enjoy these services, and also to set the limits relative to
                                        the use that associated users make of these services
                                        Describes the commercial relationship between the
Subscription
                                        Subscriber and the Service Provider.
                                        Role that prepares Operational and Provisioning Profiles
Subscription Manager Data Preparation   to be securely provisioned on the eUICC and manages
                                        the installation of the Profile on the eUICC
                                        Role that securely performs functions which allow secure
                                        transport of both Platform and Profile management
Subscription Manager Secure Routing
                                        commands in order to load, enable, disable and delete
                                        Profiles on the eUICC.
                                        Actor who provides services to its service Subscribers on
Service Provider                        a contractual basis and who is responsible for the services
                                        offered.
                                        Representation of the Profile (e.g. script) without any
Un-personalised Profile                 personalised data in a machine readable format. This
                                        format can be processed by a targeted eUICC type.

1.6 Abbreviations

Abbreviation                             Description
AID                                      Application Identifier
CASD                                     Controlling Authority Security Domain
CI                                       Certificate Issuer
ECASD                                    eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain
DAP                                      Data Authentication Pattern
DPID                                     ID of the relevant SM-DP
EUM                                      eUICC Manufacturer
EID                                      eUICC-ID
EIS                                      eUICC Information Set
EncP                                     Encrypted and integrity protected Personalised Profile
EPS                                      Evolved Packet System
ETSI                                     European Telecommunications Standards Institute
eUICC                                    Embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card
GP                                       GlobalPlatform
GPCS                                     GlobalPlatform Card Specification
GSMA                                     GSM Association
Abbreviation                            Description
ICCID                                   Integrated Circuit Card ID
IMS                                     IP Multimedia Subsystem
IMSI                                    International Mobile Subscriber Identity
ISD-P                                   Issuer Security Domain Profile
ISD-R                                   Issuer Security Domain Root
ISO                                     International Standards Organisation
ITU                                     International Telecoms Union
LTE                                     Long Term Evolution
M2M                                     Machine to Machine
MNO                                     Mobile Network Operator
MNO-SD                                  Mobile Network Operator Security Domain
NAA                                     Network Access Application
OTA                                     Over The Air
POL1                                    Policy Rules within the Profile
                                        Policy Rules associated to a Profile and stored in the
POL2
                                        relevant EIS at the SM-SR
SAS                                     Security Accreditation Scheme
SCP                                     Secure Channel Protocol
SD                                      Security Domain
SIM                                     Subscriber Identity Module
SM-DP                                   Subscription Manager Data Preparation
SM-SR                                   Subscription Manager Secure Routing
SRID                                    ID of the relevant SM-SR
SSD                                     Supplementary Security Domain
STK                                     SIM Tool Kit
UMTS                                    Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service
USIM                                    Universal Subscriber Identity Module

1.7 References

            Document
Ref         Number                 Title
                                   GSMA ‘Embedded SIM Task Force Requirements and Use
[1]         NA
                                   Cases’ Version 1.0
                                   Embedded SIM Fast Track Working Group – Eco-system,
[2]         12ESWG1_10r8
                                   Roles and Commercial Relationships
[102221]    ETSI TS 102 221        UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics
[102222]    ETSI TS 102 222        Administrative commands for telecommunications applications
[102223]    ETSI TS 102 223        Smart Cards; Card Application Toolkit (CAT)
              Document
Ref           Number                  Title
[102225]      ETSI TS 102 225         Secured packet structure for UICC based applications
[102226]      ETSI TS 102 226         Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications
                                      Smart cards; Machine to Machine UICC; Physical and logical
[102671]      ETSI TS 102 671
                                      characteristics
[103383]      ETSI TS 103 383         Embedded UICC; Requirements Specification
[GPCS]                                GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2.1
                                      GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2.1 UICC Configuration
[GPUICC]
                                      v1.0.1
                                      GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment A:
[AmdA]
                                      Confidential Card Content Management, v1.0.1
                                      GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment B:
[AmdB]
                                       v1.0.1
                                      GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment D:
[AmdD]
                                      Secure Channel Protocol 03, v1.1
                                      GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment E:
[AmdE]
                                      Security Upgrade for Card Content Management v1.0
                                      The international identification plan for public networks and
[E212]        ITU E.212
                                      Subscriptions
[21133]       3GPP TS 21.133          3G Security, Security Threats and Requirements
                                      Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity Module
[31102]       3GPP TS 31.102
                                      (USIM) application
                                      Characteristics of the IP Multimedia Services Identity Module
[31103]       3GPP TS 31.103
                                      (ISIM) application
              NIST SP 800-57 Part     NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
[NIST]
              1                       Management – Part 1: General (Revision 3)

2 Basic Principles and Assumptions

This section contains the principles and assumptions related to the GSMA remote Provisioning system for Embedded UICC.

2.1 Basic Principles

BPR1         The solution shall reflect the most important UICC-related use cases and adequately
             support them in a context where the eUICC hardware is not easily accessible or
             removable from the machine to machine Device. It is possible, due to the different
             nature of the eUICC, that not all current use cases can be covered.
BPR2         The solution shall be designed to enable new business opportunities, e.g. in M2M
             segments, while keeping the proven benefits of the current UICC.
BPR3         The security of the eUICC and its overall management processes must at all times
             and under all circumstances be at least as good as with the current removable UICC
             and its Provisioning processes.
BPR4        Any function, feature or service which is possible on a current UICC shall be possible
            on the eUICC.
BPR5        The access to functions, features or services on the eUICC shall be identical to the
            current UICC, i.e. transparent for the terminal and the user.
BPR6        The remote management of functions, features or services on the eUICC shall have
            minimal impact on the operator’s existing systems and infrastructure. This shall be
            achieved by using existing standards and specifications as far as possible.
BPR7        Keep it simple. Complexity is understood as a risk factor. A reasonably limited
            functional approach will support the time-to-market expectations and may evolve with
            future requirements and improvements.
BPR8        3rd-party applications which are outside of an Operational Profile are out of the scope
            of this document.
BPR9        Each entity shall be responsible for its operations.
BPR10       The applications and file system within a disabled Operational Profile are neither
            locally or remotely selectable.

2.2 General Assumptions

2.2.1 Use of Existing Standards

STD1       The definition of the eUICC and the related Provisioning systems shall be as efficient
           as possible, in terms of efforts and costs for all involved parties. This shall be achieved
           by using existing standards and specifications where possible.
STD2       Global Platform specifications will be considered as a framework of choice for the
           implementation of the eUICC.

2.2.2 Machine to Machine Device Impact

DEV1       The implementation of the eUICC ecosystem will have minimal impact on the Device.
DEV2       No security certification requirements will be placed on the Device.
DEV3       No new certification requirements will be placed on the Device.
DEV4       Any Device approval impact shall be covered under existing Device type approval or
           certification schemes and be independent of the certification of the eUICC.
DEV5       The communication module within the Device shall conform to the terminal
           requirements within ETSI TS 102 221 [102221] for all standardised ETSI Form
           Factors.
DEV6       The Device manufacturer shall ensure that there is a method for the owner of the
           Device or Service Provider to access the eUICC identification (EID).
DEV7       The Device manufacturer should print the eUICC identification (EID) on the Device so
           that it is human readable.

2.2.3 Security

SEC1       The overall security of the eUICC in combination with the related management
           processes must at all time and under all circumstances be at least equivalent to the
           current removable UICC and its Provisioning processes.
SEC2       The architecture of the eUICC and its remote Provisioning system complies with the
           requirements of 3GPP TS 21.133 [21133] “3G Security, Security Threats and
           Requirements”.
SEC3       The architecture must support a level of security with respect to protection of Operator
           Credentials which is at least equal to present levels of security. This applies in
           particular to:
                    The confidentiality of cryptographic keys and authentication parameters.
                    The integrity of Subscriber identities (e.g. IMSI).
SEC4       Certification will become mandatory for the eUICC because the entity which contains
           the Operator Credentials may be no longer under the design control of the MNO.
SEC5       The remote Provisioning architecture must avoid compromising the security of
           Customer data.
SEC6       A trusted system is a system that is relied upon to a specified extent to enforce a
           specified security Policy. A trust model is defined as part of the security related project
           deliverables.
SEC7       For Platform and Profile management, all entities involved in the management have to
           be mutually authenticated.

2.2.4 Regulatory

REG1       Regulatory issues are considered outside the scope of the Embedded SIM Fast Track
           working group. Regulatory issues will be referred to the GSMA regulatory team.

2.3 The eUICC Ecosystem

ECO1        Subscription management functions are provided by two Roles – the SM-DP and the
            SM-SR.
ECO2        1. Profile management is governed by Policy Rules that are contained in the MNO’s
                   Profile and in the SM-SR.
            2. Policy Rules are enforced by the eUICC and the SM-SR on behalf of the MNO.
            3. Control of Policy Rules lies with the MNOs.

2.3.1 Roles and Entities

2.3.1.1 eUICC Manufacturer

MAN1       1. The manufacturer of the eUICC provides eUICCs containing a Provisioning Profile
              and/or one or more Operational Profiles.
           2. The eUICCs are delivered to the machine to machine Device manufacturer.
           3. Related Platform Management Credentials are forwarded to the SM-SR to be
              associated with each eUICC.
           4. The eUICC Manufacturer is responsible for the initial cryptographic configuration
              and security architecture of the eUICC.
           5. The relevant parts of the eUICC Manufacturer’s products and processes are
              certified by a GSMA-approved certification process.
MAN2      The EUM shall issue the eUICC Certificate to allow:
                 the eUICC authentication and certification to other entities;
                 the authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-DP and an eUICC;
                 the authenticated keyset establishment between a SM-SR and an eUICC.
MAN3      The EUM Certificate and Root Certificate shall be delivered to other entities using
          reliable storage and communication channels.
MAN4      The EUM shall provide services, tools, scripts or documentation to the SM-DP
          enabling it to create an Un-personalised Profile for a eUICC produced by the EUM. It is
          not the role of the EUM to create the Un-Personalised profile on behalf of the SM-DP.

2.3.1.2 Machine to Machine Device Manufacturer

DMA1      1. The Device manufacturer builds machine to machine Devices which comprise a
             communication module and an eUICC.
          2. A Provisioning Profile and/or Operational Profile may be enabled by default. Note:
             Any Enabled Profile requires the agreement of the respective MNO.

2.3.1.3 Mobile Network Operator (MNO)

MNO1      1. The MNO provides mobile network connectivity.
          2. The MNO selects at least one SM-DP.
          3. The MNO shall have a direct interface to the SM-SR.
          4. In the event that a Customer has selected an MNO, that MNO initiates the
             download of a particular Profile to an identified target eUICC subject to current
             Policy Rules.
          5. The MNO specifies the Profile characteristics and any features and applications,
             analogous to current UICCs. The MNO owns the Profile.
          6. Profiles can be generated at the time the download is ordered.
          7. To achieve a transparent fit with existing UICC processes and interfaces, Profiles
             can also be ordered in bulk, then securely stored at the SM-DP until ordered for
             download. SAS requirements shall apply.
          8. The MNO defines the Policy Rules that control the Profile management when this
             Profile is enabled.
          9. After the download is ordered the MNO shall be able to check and validate the
             certification and capabilities (manufacturer, memory size, algorithms etc.) of the
             target eUICC before the download of the Profile is started.
          10. The MNO shall receive confirmation of the successfully completed download and
              installation of the Profile.
          11. The enabled MNO shall be able to use an OTA Platform in order to manage the
              content of its enabled Profile in the eUICC.
MNO2      Upon request from a Customer the MNO shall be able to declare to the relevant
          entities a machine to machine Device as stolen so that appropriate measures can be
          taken.
MNO3      An MNO should provide only limited service to a Device using a Provisioning Profile;
          the mechanism the MNO uses to enforce this limited service is out of scope of this
          architecture.

2.3.1.4 MNO Customer

CUS1      1. The MNO Customer is the actual contract partner of the MNO for the Subscription.
             He may not be identical to the end user.
          2. The MNO Customer uses a machine to machine Device equipped with a eUICC
             from the Device manufacturer and a Profile (Subscription) from a selected MNO.
          3. Prior to the download of a Profile the MNO Customer must provide his implicit or
             explicit acceptance.
          4. The MNO Customer directly or indirectly identifies the machine to machine Device.
             The identification of the machine to machine Device shall implicitly or explicitly
             identify the eUICC.

2.3.1.5 End User

END1      1. The end user uses the machine to machine Device and the services related to the
             Enabled Profile.
          2. The end user can be identical to the MNO Customer.
          3. The eUICC is transparent to the end user.
          4. The end user’s relationship is with an MNO Customer or the MNO directly.

2.3.1.6 Subscription Manager – Data Preparation (SM-DP)

SMDP1      1. The SM-DP acts on behalf of the MNO.
           2. The SM-DP receives a Profile Description from the MNO and creates Un-
              personalised Profile accordingly. The SM-DP may have to utilise tools provided
              by the EUM to create the Un-personalised Profile. The information exchanged
              between the SM-DP and EUM is not standardised and may differ between
              different entities.
           3. The SM-DP generates Personalisation Data for the targeted eUICC (e.g.
              Network Access Credentials and other data) based upon input data from the
              MNO.
           4. The SM-DP builds Personalised Profiles for the targeted eUICC.
           5. The SM-DP shall secure the Profile package with the Profile Installer Credentials
              of the targeted eUICC.
           6. The SM-DP installs the Personalised Profile on the eUICC through the SM-SR.
SMDP2      On request by the MNO the SM-DP also initiates Profile enabling, and Profile deletion
           requests to the eUICC via the SM-SR.
SMDP3      The SM-DP establishes a secure and authenticated channel to the eUICC to
           download and install Profiles on to the eUICC.
SMDP4      The interface between the SM-DP and the SM-SR shall have proper security level
           defined in order to support secure delivery of Profiles to the SM-SR.
SMDP5      The SM-DP must always receive a request from an MNO to send a Profile via an SM-
           SR to an eUICC.
SMDP6      The SM-DP shall at least be GSMA SAS certified.
SMDP7      Given any eUICC, the SM-DP shall be able to generate a Personalised Profile for this
           eUICC.
SMDP8      The SM-DP and MNO are the only entities allowed to establish a secure and
           authenticated channel to the eUICC to manage a Profile.
SMDP9      The MNO shall be able to interface to an SM-DP of the MNO’s choosing to serve any
           MNO approved eUICC.
SMDP10     The SM-DP shall be able to generate a Personalised Profile that can be downloaded
           and installed on the eUICC targeted by the MNO.
SMDP11     The SM-DP shall support the Profile ordering procedure described in section 3.5.3 of
           this document.

2.3.1.7 Subscription Manager – Secure Routing (SM-SR)

SMSR1     The SM-SR is the only entity allowed to establish a secure and authenticated transport
          channel to the eUICC to manage the eUICC platform.
SMSR2     The SM-SR loads, enables, disables and deletes Profiles on the eUICC in accordance
          with the MNO’s Policy Rules.
SMSR3     The SM-SR obtains the Platform Management Credentials of the eUICC from the
          eUICC Manufacturer or from the previous SM-SR.
SMSR4     Only one SM-SR can be associated with an eUICC at any point in time, but it can be
          changed during the lifetime of the eUICC.
SMSR5     The interface between the SM-SR and the eUICC shall have proper security level
          defined in order to support the secure delivery to, and management of, Profiles in the
          eUICC.
SMSR6     1. The SM-SR shall not handle Operator Credentials in clear text.
          2. The SM-SR has secure communications channels to the SM-DP, eUICC and
             MNO.
          3. The SM-SR shall at least be GSMA SAS-like certified.
          The SM-SR shall be able to determine whether an eUICC is available for remote
SMSR7
          management.
SMSR8     The SM-SR shall be non-discriminatory with regards to other entities within the
          ecosystem.

2.3.1.8 Certificate Issuer

           The Certificate Issuer role issues certificates for Embedded UICC remote provisioning
CIS1
           system entities and acts as a trusted third party for the purpose of authentication of the
           entities of the system.
           The Certificate Issuer provides certificates for the EUM, SM-SR, SM-DP and MNO.
CIS2
CIS3       The Certificate Issuer communicates with the MNO, SM-SR, SM-DP and EUM through
           interfaces that are out of scope of this specification.

2.3.1.9 Initiator

           The Initiator is a virtual role that can be assumed by various entities. The Initiator is in
INT1
           charge of initiating specific procedures.
           For the purpose of the procedures defined within this document the Initiator can
INT2
           assumed to be a MNO.
INT3       At any time, only one entity may assume the Initiator role.
INT4       The interface between the Initiator and the SM-SR is based on the interfaces defined
           in this document.
INT5       The Initiator shall be authorised and authenticated by the SM-SR.

2.4 The eUICC

EUICC1      The eUICC is a discrete hardware component in a standardised ETSI Form Factor.
EUICC2      In general, the eUICC is non-removable.
EUICC3      From a machine to machine Device perspective, the behaviour of the eUICC is
            generally identical to the UICC.
EUICC4      1. The eUICC can contain one or more Profiles.
            2. Only one Profile shall be enabled at any point in time.
            3. The eUICC shall contain a Profile with Fall-back Attribute set. Only one Profile can
               have the Fall-Back Attribute set.
            4. The Profile with Fall-back Attribute set cannot be deleted.
            5. The setting of the Fall-back Attribute is managed by the SM-SR.
            6. All relevant UICC specifications shall apply.
EUICC5      The behaviour of a (U)SIM or ISIM within a Profile on an eUICC is expected to be
            identical to a present (U)SIM or ISIM. No changes to existing 3GPP (U)SIM and ISIM
            specifications are expected.
EUICC6      The eUICC shall implement the Milenage network authentication algorithm.
EUICC7      The eUICC should implement the TUAK algorithm in addition to Milenage when TUAK
            is included within 3GPP specifications.
EUICC8      The ownership of the physical eUICC may change throughout its lifetime.
EUICC9      The eUICC shall contain the identity of its associated SM-SR and have a means to
            authenticate it.
EUICC10     eUICCs delivered by the eUICC Manufacturer shall always be registered to an SM-
            SR.
EUICC11     If any command, such as Profile enabling, Profile disabling and Profile download and
            installation does not complete successfully, the eUICC shall maintain the state it was
            in before it received the request.

2.4.1 Profiles

PRO1       Profiles are the property of the issuing MNO.
PRO 2      Profiles shall be uniquely identified.
PRO 3      1. Only one Profile shall be enabled at any point in time.
           2. Other Profiles may exist on the Embedded UICC, but the Enabling/Disabling of
              Profiles always remains an action that is executed only by the SM-SR acting on
              behalf of the Operator.
           3. Actions shall be undertaken according to Policy Rules.
PRO 4      1. A Profile is under the control of the issuing MNO.
           2. A Profile in combination with a eUICC carries all logical characteristics of a UICC.
              All relevant UICC specifications shall apply with the exceptions defined by the
              eUICC specifications.
PRO 5      Each Profile shall be isolated within its own dedicated secure container. The
           GlobalPlatform’s Security Domain framework shall be considered.
PRO 6      Profiles can be used either for Provisioning (Provisioning Profile) or for operation
           (Operational Profile). They are clearly distinguished.
           1. An Operational Profile may be used as a Provisioning Profile.
           2. A Provisioning Profile shall not be used as an Operational Profile.
PRO 7      There will always be one Provisioning Profile.
PRO 8      There may be several Operational Profiles.
PRO 9      Installed Profiles can have one of the following states:
                  enabled
                  disabled
PRO 10     In all operational uses the eUICC shall enforce that one, and only one, Profile is
           enabled at any point in time.
PRO 11    There will be a capability for eUICC–initiated enabling of the Profile with Fall-back
          Attribute set. The Profile with Fall-back Attribute set will consequently provide network
          connectivity to allow SM-SR to remotely manage the eUICC.
PRO 12    There will be no local Profile management by the machine to machine Device.
PRO 13    A Profile contains parameters for an authentication algorithm (e.g. OPc, ri, ci for the
          Milenage algorithm) but not the algorithm itself.
PRO 14    The eUICC may support other network authentication algorithms; if such algorithms
          are supported, the eUICC shall implement a mechanism to configure its parameters.
          Note: The accessibility of these other network authentication algorithms to Profiles is
          out of the scope of this document.
PRO 15    A Profile contains a subset of Policy Rules to control external Profile management
          actions.
PRO 16    A Profile may contain identifiers for entities in the ecosystem, keys, PINs, certificates,
          algorithm parameters, as well as first and second level applications. (Ref: ETSI TS 102
          221 [102221] )
PRO 17    Any function, feature or service which is possible on a current UICC shall be possible
          in an Operational Profile on an eUICC.
PRO 18    The access to functions, features or services in a Profile on an eUICC shall be identical
          to the current UICC, i.e. transparent for the terminal and the user.
PRO 19    The remote management of functions, features or services in a Profile on an eUICC
          shall have minimal impact on the operator’s existing systems and infrastructure.
PRO 20    Profiles are stored only in the SM-DP and installed on the eUICC; they are not stored
          anywhere else and are encrypted in transit.

2.4.2 Policies & Policy Control

PPC1      Each Profile has an associated Policy. A Policy contains rules which govern the
          change of operational states of the Profile. These state transitions are:
                  disabling
                  enabling
                  deletion
PPC2      Update-access to a Profile’s Policy is restricted to the issuing MNO.
PPC3      The Policy Rules of a disabled Profile can only apply to itself. The Policy Rules of a
          disabled Profile cannot affect any other Profile.

3 Architecture

3.1 Architecture Diagram

This section defines the functional architecture required to support the remote Provisioning of eUICCs. The basic building blocks of the architecture consist of the functions to be performed, the Roles and the assigned Actors. The figure below represents the eUICC remote Provisioning system. Details of the Roles, the associated functions and interfaces are described in section 3.3 and Annex A.

Figure 1: eUICC Remote Provisioning System

3.2 Card Architecture

3.2.1 Security Domains

GlobalPlatform provides the notion of Security Domains (SD). These are on-card representatives of off-card entities that provide:  Secure storage for cryptographic keys;  Access for off card entities using (GP) secure channel protocols;  A mechanism for loading applications;  Security services for applications. The properties of SDs are configured via GP privileges (e.g. Delegated or Authorised Management, DAP Verification, Token Management, Global Delete), by the Provisioning of keys (e.g. for SCP02/03 or SCP80/81) and by associating an SD to another SD with other

rights, by associating an SD to itself (and thus removing all management rights of a superior
SD) or by assigning memory quotas for the SD and all its contents.
In earlier versions, the ISD (Issuer Security Domain) had several unique privileges.
However, in the latest GlobalPlatform Card Specification [GPCS], it is also configured via
privileges, and except for being there in the beginning, no major specific feature remains.
This should allow MNOs to have the same benefits as they do today with the current ISD in
a UICC.
The way forward is:
    To build the eUICC on a structure of SDs, and
    To define additional properties (e.g. via privileges) so that the different SDs can
      represent the Actors for the various Roles in remote Provisioning of Profiles.

3.2.2 Card Architecture

This section describes how Profiles should be designed, for example, using an extended version of the concepts and information models from Global Platform Card Specification [GPCS]. Profiles are contained within security domains (SD) on the eUICC, thus making the security mechanisms of SDs available. Further information can be found in [GPCS]. The following figure outlines a schematic representation of the eUICC.

Figure 2:Schematic Representation of the eUICC

The operating system (OS) contains the basic platform features, e.g. support of the features defined in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [GPCS]. The ECASD (eUICC Certificate Authority Security Domain):  Is created within an eUICC at time of manufacture;  Cannot be deleted or disabled after delivery;

   Is based on the concept of CASD from Global Platform (see [GPCS], [AmdA] and
    [AmdE]);
   Is configured by the eUICC Manufacturer at pre-issuance;
   Contains a non-modifiable eUICC private key, the associated Certificate, the CI’s
    root public keys and the EUM keyset for key/certificate renewal;
   Is associated to the ISD-R, which provides the underlying secure OTA channel;
   Is required for, and is not limited to, the establishment of new keysets in the ISD-P(s)
    and ISD-R;
   Does not support the Mandated DAP verification feature.
ISD-R and ISD-P are security domains with special features.
The ISD-R (ISD-Root) is the on-card representative of the SM-SR that executes the
Platform Management commands (see the functions for Platform Management in section
3.3.1.3).
An ISD-R shall:
      a) Be created within an eUICC at time of manufacture;
      b) Be associated to an SM-SR;
      c) Not be deleted or disabled;
      d) Provides a secure OTA channel using Platform Management Credentials
          (SCP80 or SCP81 as defined in [GPCS]) to the SM-SR;
      e) Implement a key establishment protocol for the support of the change of SM-SR;
      f) Offers wrapping and unwrapping service of the transport part during Profile
          download;
      g) Be able to create new ISD-Ps with the required memory quota (Note: memory
          quota management is for further study);
      h) Not be able to create any SD except an ISD-P;
      i) Executes Platform Management functions in accordance to the Policy Rules;
      j) Not be able to perform any operation inside an ISD-P.
The ISD-P (ISD-Profile) is the on-card representative of the MNO, or SM-DP if delegated by
the MNO.
An ISD-P shall:
      a) Be a separate and independent entity on the eUICC
      b) Contain a Profile including file system, NAAs and Policy Rules;
      c) Contain a state machine related to creating, enabling and disabling the Profile;
      d) Contain keys for Profile management for the loading and installation phase;
      e) Implement a key establishment protocol to generate a keyset for the
          personalisation of the ISD-P;
      f) Be able to receive and decrypt, load and install the Profile created by the SM-
          DP;
      g) Be able to set its own state to disabled once the Profile is installed;
      h) Provide SCP03 capabilities to secure its communication with the SM-DP;
      i) Be able to contain a CASD. This CASD is optional within the profile and
          provides services only to security domains of the Profile and only when the
          Profile is in Enabled state.
The MNO-SD is the on-card representative of the MNO.
An MNO-SD shall:
       j) Be associated to itself;
       k) Contain the MNO OTA Keys;
       l) Provide a secure OTA channel (SCP80 or SCP81 as defined in [102225] and
           [102226]);
       m) Have the capability to host Supplementary Security Domains.
Once the Profile is installed in its ISD-P on the eUICC, the Profile and ISD-P shall be
considered to be in union and thereafter it is the state of the ISD-P that is managed.
The SM-DP performs the Profile Management functions (see section 3.3.1.2) on the ISD-P
during the load and install phase. The MNO-SD is managed by an MNO OTA Platform
once the Profile is enabled. The MNO-SD is managed in an equivalent way to the ISD of a
current UICC.
The Platform Service Manager is an OS service that offers Platform management functions
and Policy Rules enforcement mechanism (Policy Rules Enforcer). Called by the ISD-R or
ISD-P it executes the functions according to the Policy Rules (see section 3.6). In addition it
can retrieve ISD-P generic information (i.e. Profile ID, Profile State) that can be shared with
authorised entities on request.
The Telecom Framework is an OS service that provides standardised network
authentication algorithms to the NAAs hosted in the ISD-Ps. Furthermore it provides the
capabilities to configure the algorithm with the needed parameters.
Contained in the ISD-P are the well-known card structure with applications, SDs for other
entities, the file system (MF tree, ADFs, etc.) (as per ETSI TS 102 221 [102221] and 3GPP
TS 31 102 [31102]) and the Policy Rules.

3.2.3 State Diagram for an ISD-P

The states and state transitions for an ISD-P are as follows: After an ISD-P is created and keys set up, the SM-DP, on behalf of the MNO, can create SDs, applications, NAAs, and the file system. When the Profile is installed, the SM-DP sets the state of the ISD-P to disabled, effectively handing it over to the SM-SR for Platform Management.

by SM-SR

               created                     disabled                      deleted
by SM-SR                     by SM -DP                       by SM -SR

by SM -SR

enabled

Download and
installation Phase        Operational Phase

Figure 3: ISD-P State Diagram

In the created state shown in the diagram above, the profile is downloaded and installed in the ISD-P. In the created, disabled or deleted state, the Profile is not visible to the machine to machine Device

3.3 Relevant Roles and Functions

This section introduces and defines the relevant Roles and functions needed to support the remote Provisioning of Embedded UICCs. The functions describe what actions are either performed internally by the role, or what actions are performed when communicating with another role or entity of the architecture. The role is agnostic to the business Actor to which this role is assigned.

3.3.1 Functions Definition

3.3.1.1 Functions for Data Preparation

               Un-personalised Profile Creation
Un-personalised Profile Creation covers the building of the Un-personalised Profile based
on the MNO’s Profile Description and the type of eUICC targeted.
The SM-DP generates the Un-personalised Profile using the services, scripts, tools or
documentation provided by the EUM of the target eUICC(s). The information exchanged
between the SM-DP and EUM is not standardised and may differ between different entities.
It is assumed the SM-DP tests the Un-personalised Profile with a sample of the target
eUICC. The MNO validates the Un-personalised Profile by testing a sample of the target
eUICC personalised with a test Personalised Profile created from the Un-personalised
Profile developed by the SM-DP.
              Profile Ordering
Profile ordering covers the processes for the preparation and generation of the Personalised
Profiles by the SM-DP based on the input data provided by the MNO to the SM-DP. The
input data includes (but is not limited to):
    The quantity of the profiles to be generated;
    IMSI value(s) or range;
    ICCID value(s) or range;
    Un-personalised Profile type(s);
    Information about the target eUICC(s), such as the EID.

How and when the input data is provided by the MNO to the SM-DP is out of scope.

              Generation of Personalisation Data
This function creates the credential and key values (e.g. NAC, PINs, OTA Keys) in a secure
environment based on the input data provided by the MNO (e.g. IMSI, ICCID).
              Profile Personalisation
SM-DP inserts the Personalisation Data into the Un-personalised Profile with respect to the
order placed by the MNO. This function addresses the procedures which ensure a created
Personalised Profile can only be installed on a specific eUICC.
          EUM Services, Scripts, Tools or Documentation
To allow any SM-DP to undertake the above functions on any eUICC, the services, scripts,
tools or documentation supplied by the EUM must support at least the following eUICC
attributes which may be delivered by the MNO. Some attributes are related to the function
of Un-personalised Profile Creation and some to Profile Personalisation and in some cases
the function to which they apply may be dependent on the particular eUICC.
The attributes are:
    Applications (and assignment of the applications) to be loaded – including USIM,
       ISIM, CAT and third party application SSDs;
   Algorithm selection, algorithm parameter assignment, and algorithm parameter
    loading within the eUICC platform;
   Application Key and PIN assignment and loading;
   Optional and variable data fields in the USIM application file structure;
   Additional data fields and file structures to support other applications – both SIM-
    based and device-based applications.

The information exchanged between the SM-DP and EUM is not standardised and may differ between different entities.

3.3.1.2 Functions for Profile Management

                eUICC Eligibility Verification Function
The eUICC Eligibility Verification function covers the following aspects:
    Verification of the targeted eUICC for installing the Profile in preparation.
    Verification of the eUICC certification.
                Profile Download and Installation Function
This deals with the download and installation of a Personalised Profile into the targeted
eUICC.
               Profile Content Update Function
This is realised by an MNO OTA Platform.
               Policy Rules Update Function
This covers the update of the Policy Rules.
The Policy Rules to be updated may be the ones in the SM-SR, or the ones within a Profile
already installed in the ISD-P on the eUICC.

3.3.1.3 Functions for Platform Management

               ISD-P Creation Function
This deals with the creation of an ISD-P in the eUICC in preparation for Profile content to be
loaded.
               ISD-P Deletion Function
This deals with the deletion of an ISD-P. ISD-P deletion is the permanent removal of an
ISD-P along with its content previously loaded and installed on the eUICC.
The deletion of an ISD-P can only happen when it is in disabled state (see state diagram in
section 3.2.3).
               Master Delete Function
This deals with the deletion of an Orphaned Profile without the Fall-back Attribute set
regardless of the Profile’s policy rules.
This function will delete the Profile and its ISD-P. The deletion of a Profile can only happen
when the Profile is in disabled state.
               Profile Enabling Function
This deals with the enabling of a Profile.
This will make the applications and files within the Profile visible to and selectable by the
machine to machine Device subject to relevant access control.
               Profile Disabling Function
This deals with the disabling of a Profile.
This will make all applications and files within the Profile invisible to and not selectable by
the machine to machine Device.
               Set Fall-back Attribute
This deals with the setting of the Fall-back Attribute of the Profile(s) on the eUICC
               Transport Function
Transport function refers to the establishing of the communication channel between the SM-
SR and the ISD-R on the eUICC.
Security of transport channel between the SM-SR and eUICC is also addressed by this
function.
Note: The eUICC within a machine to machine Device may be contacted over different type
of network systems (such as GSM, GPRS, UMTS, or EPS) by the SM-SR. Furthermore, the
SM-SR will need to interface with the concerned network system accordingly. For instance
the SM-SR would need to use SMPP to be able to communicate with SMS, or it may need
to connect to an IMS gateway in order to establish an IP-based communication with the
eUICC. These communications are being provided by the active Subscription.
               Policy Enforcement Function
This deals with the enforcement of the policy rules on the eUICC and at the SM-SR..

3.3.1.4 Functions for eUICC Management

               eUICC Registration Function
This deals with the registration of an eUICC in a SM-SR.
               SM-SR Change Function
This deals with the change of a SM-SR for an eUICC. SM-SR change is the transfer of the
EIS for an eUICC from one SM-SR to another SM-SR and the establishment of new key set,
in the ISD-R, between the new SM-SR and the eUICC.

3.3.1.5 eUICC Functions

               Fall-back Function
This deals with the enabling of the Profile with Fall-back Attribute set.
This function automatically disables the currently Enabled Profile and enables the Profile
with Fall-back Attribute set. For example, in the case of permanent loss of network
connectivity for the Enabled Profile.

3.3.2 Assignment of Functions to Relevant Actors and Roles

Function             MNO   SM-DP   SM-SR   eUICC
Data Preparation:
Un-personalised Profile Creation            X
Profile Ordering                      X
Generation of Personalisation Data    X     X
Profile Personalisation                     X
Profile Management:
eUICC eligibility verification        X     X       X
Profile Download and Installation           X
Profile Content Update                X
Policy Rules Update                   X
Platform Management:
ISD-P Creation                                      X
ISD-P Deletion                                      X
Master Delete                                       X
Profile Enabling                                    X
Profile Disabling                                   X
Set Fall-back Attribute                             X
Transport                                           X
Policy Enforcement                                  X        X
eUICC Management:
eUICC Registration                                  X
SM-SR Change                                        X
eUICC Functions:
Fall-back Function                                           X

3.4 Profile Description

3.4.1 General Content of a Profile Installed on an eUICC

The following data is part of a Profile:
     The Applications and files as defined in the relevant specifications (in particular
       3GPP TS 31.102 [31102], 3GPP TS 31.103 [31103] and ETSI TS 102 221 [102221]).
In addition to the above, the following data which is not included in the above standards:
     The algorithm parameters associated with its corresponding Network Access
       Application (for instance with Milenage: the OPc, ri, ci values);
     Policy Rules attached to the Profile (POL1).

3.4.2 Access to the Content of a Profile

For the machine to machine Device the Enabled Profile is equivalent to an UICC.

For an MNO OTA Platform, the Enabled Profile is equivalent to an UICC as per ETSI TS 102 225 [102225], TS 102 226 [102226] and TS 102 223 [102223]. The Policy Rules POL1 attached to the Profile are managed through the MNO OTA Platform, as per the rest of the content of the Profile. An applet in the Enabled Profile will work the same manner as an applet in an UICC as per relevant ETSI and 3GPP standards.

3.5 Procedures

The procedures described in this section involve both interactions between the Roles of the business environment (e.g. between a Customer and a Service Provider) and between entities of the remote Provisioning architecture (e.g. between eUICC and SM-SR). For each procedure the main steps as well as the related “Start conditions” and “End conditions” are described. “Start conditions” describe a set of prerequisites which must hold before the procedure can be performed. “End conditions” describe a set of results which will hold after the procedure has been performed. The following main procedures for the Provisioning and lifecycle management of eUICCs and related Profiles are identified:

No                    Name                                      Purpose
 1    eUICC Registration at SM-SR         To register a newly manufactured eUICC at a given
                                          SM-SR as a prerequisite for subsequent remote
                                          management
 2    Profile Ordering                    For the MNO to order at the SM-DP a quantity of
                                          Profiles ready for download
 3    Profile Download and Installation   To download a Profile to a given eUICC
 4    Master Delete                       To delete an Orphaned Profile in a given eUICC
 5    Profile Enabling                    To enable a Profile in a given eUICC via SM-SR
 6    Profile Enabling via SM-DP          To enable a Profile in a given eUICC via SM-DP
 7    Profile Disabling                   To disable the Enabled Profile and enable the
                                          Profile with Fall-back Attribute set.
 8    ISD-P Deletion                      To delete a Profile and its ISD-P from a given
                                          eUICC via SM-SR.
 9    ISD-P Deletion via SM-DP            To delete a Profile and its ISD-P from a given
                                          eUICC via SM-DP.
10    SM-SR Change                        To change the SM-SR of a given eUICC
11    ISD-P Key Establishment             Key establishment procedure between the SM-DP
                                          and the ISD-P
12    Fall-back Mechanism                 To enable the Profile with Fall-Back Attribute set in
                                          a given eUICC
13    eUICC Certificate Check             To verify whether the targeted eUICC is certified.

3.5.1 eUICC Registration at SM-SR

eUICCs are manufactured, according to given standards, generally independent from machine to machine Device makers, mobile operators or Service Providers. The machine to machine Device manufacturers can select any certified eUICC that fits their purpose and order it in the necessary quantity directly from the EUM. As a mandatory step in the production process and prior to shipment, the EUM registers the eUICC at a selected SM- SR. This means that related information which is relevant throughout its further lifetime, in particular the Platform Management Credentials, Provisioning MSISDN, are stored in the SM-SR database. Without this step, remote access to the eUICC will be impossible. Note: It is assumed that at this stage the eUICC does contain a Provisioning Profile and is linked to an active Provisioning Subscription. How the Provisioning operator is selected and the nature of the related commercial and technical agreements between the EUM and the Provisioning MNO are out of scope of this document.

The following represents a functional representation of the eUICC Information Set:

EIS = { EID,
               Type, Version, Production Date,
               Platform Management Credentials, Certificate,
               Available Memory, Total Memory,
               SRID,
               { Profile 0: Profile Type, ISD-P AID, ICCID, MSISDN, State, DPID, Allocated Memory, POL2
                 Profile 1: Profile Type, ISD-P AID, ICCID, MSISDN, State, DPID, Allocated Memory, POL2
                 …
                 Profile n: …
               }
        }

The eUICC registration comprises the following steps:

EUM                               SM-SR
1. eUICC registration
request (EIS)

2. EIS registration in database

3. eUICC registration
confirmation (EID)

Figure 4: eUICC Registration at SM-SR

Start Condition: eUICCs are produced and a Provisioning Profile is loaded and active in
the Provisioning operator’s network. They are tested and ready for shipment. Each eUICC
has a corresponding EIS.
Procedure:
   1. The EUM sends a eUICC registration request to the selected SM-SR, containing the
      EIS.
   2. The SM-SR stores the EIS in its database, with EID as the key parameter.
   3. The SM-SR confirms the successful registration towards the EUM. The confirmation
      message includes the EID.
End Condition: The eUICC is registered at the SM-SR and ready for Profile download. It
can now be shipped to the machine to machine Device manufacturer.

Each eUICC may only be registered at one SM-SR. The communication link between the EUM and the SM-SR shall be secure. Following registration and shipment, the eUICCs are embedded into machine to machine Devices during the Device manufacturing process.

3.5.2 Un-personalised Profile Verification (Proprietary)

Within the eUICC, the current functional scope of the UICC is represented by a Profile.
Similar to the verification of classic UICCs, Profiles shall be verified by the entity that
creates the Profile, the SM-DP. For the verification of a Profile by the SM-DP, a similar
procedure as for a classic UICC shall be used. One of the differences is that physical test
eUICCs are only personalised by the SM-DP.
Note: The Profile verification processes and interfaces are not standardised and may differ
between MNOs and SM-DPs (Profile validation strategy, which tests may be performed by
the MNO, which may be done by the SM-DP, what may be exchanged between the MNO
and SM-DP, how this interface is secured, etc.).
For example, the Profile verification procedure may comprise the following steps:
Start Condition:
   a. The Profile Description has been provided by the MNO to the SM-DP and the Un-
       personalized Profile has been generated by the SM-DP in a separate process.
   b. The SM-DP has sample eUICCs of a specific type.
Procedure:
   1. The MNO provides a test subscription to the selected SM-DP, as well as data such
      as applets, POL1 and Profile type. Other data, e.g. keys or ICCID, may be generated
      by the SM-DP.
   2. The SM-DP creates a test Personalised Profile (Un-personalised Profile personalised
      with test data, including the data received from the MNO), then downloads and
      installs it onto an eUICC sample.
   3. The SM-DP performs the necessary validation procedure to verify the combination of
      the eUICC sample and the test Personalised Profile.

End Condition: The Un-personalised Profile is valid and is now ready for the Profile ordering procedure for an eUICC type.

3.5.3 Profile Ordering (Proprietary)

Within the eUICC, the current functional scope of the UICC is represented by a Profile. Just as with current UICCs, Profiles are ordered under the responsibility of the MNO. The same procedures shall apply with the only difference being that the UICCs are not produced in physical form but are kept at the SM-DP as Profiles. Note: Profile ordering processes and interfaces are not standardised and may differ between MNOs. For example, the Profile ordering may comprise the following steps:

Figure 5: Profile Ordering

Start Conditions:
   a. An Un-personalised Profile has been created by the SM-DP based on the Profile
       Description provided by the MNO.
   b. The MNO has a demand for a quantity of eUICC Profiles.
   c. The Un-personalised Profile has been validated on the target eUICC type using the
       Un-personalised Profile verification procedure in section 3.5.2

Procedure: 1. The MNO provides an order to a selected SM-DP. The order contains production data such as the quantity and a Start-IMSI, an IMSI range or a list of IMSIs and a reference to the Un-personalised Profile type. The POL1 and POL2 definitions for the Policy Rules to be applied later by respectively the eUICC and SM-SR can also be delivered in this context. 2. The SM-DP then starts production, i.e. personalisation of Profiles using the data received from the MNO. Other data, e.g. keys or ICCID, may be generated by the SM- DP during the personalisation process. The Profiles are stored within the SM-DP. 3. Order completion is confirmed to the MNO, including all data necessary to register the Profiles in the MNO’s backend systems. Each Profile is uniquely identified at least by its ICCID. 4. The MNO installs the Profiles in the related systems, e.g. HLR, AuC, CRM. These procedures are no different from current UICC registration processes at the MNO.

End Condition: The ordered quantity of Profiles is now ready for the Profile download procedure. Related Operator Credentials are available to the MNO.

3.5.4 Profile Download and Installation

In order for the machine to machine Device to be used for communication services, the eUICC must be loaded with at least one Operational Profile. In general, this will be done

over-the-air, using the Subscription represented by the currently Enabled Profile. If no other Operational Profile is enabled the Provisioning Profile is used. The Profile download and installation procedure follows the following steps:

Figure 6: Profile Download

Start Conditions:
   a. A Customer has subscribed to a selected MNO.
   b. The EID of the target eUICC and the SRID are known by the MNO.
   c. A Profile ordering procedure has been completed with a selected SM-DP.
   d. The target eUICC is integrated into a machine to machine Device and is associated
       to an SM-SR.
   e. The MNO may activate the related Subscription in the network by the ICCID.
Procedure:
  1.   The MNO sends a Profile Download request to the SM-DP. The request must
       include the relevant information to allow the identification of the SM-SR, the target
       EID and ICCID.
       The MNO may also ask the SM-DP to enable the Profile once it is downloaded and
       installed.
  2.   Based on the information provided by the MNO, the SM-DP identifies the SM-SR,
       where the eUICC is currently registered.
  3.   The SM-SR and the SM-DP authenticate each other if not already authenticated.
  4.   The SM-DP requests from the SM-SR the EIS for a particular eUICC, identified by its
       EID.
  5.   Based on the EID, the SM-SR retrieves the EIS.
  6.   The SM-SR sends the relevant information from the EIS to the requesting SM-DP.
       Note: The rationale for saying “relevant information from the EIS” is that the SM-SR
       will not provide information to the SM-DP that is not appropriate for the particular
       SM-DP.
  7.   The SM-DP checks the eligibility of the eUICC (e.g. type, certificate and memory)
       based upon the received information from the EIS.
  8.   If a problem is detected with the eligibility of the eUICC, the SM-DP aborts the
       procedure and returns an error message to the requesting MNO and the SM-SR.
  9.   If no problem is detected with the eligibility of the eUICC, the SM-DP issues an
       installation request for the ISD-P to the SM-SR.
  10. The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other
      if not already authenticated.
  11. The SM-SR contacts the ISD-R on the eUICC for ISD-P installation and an empty
      ISD-P is created in the eUICC. This is confirmed back to the SM-DP.
  12. The SM-DP authenticates the eUICC and a shared key set is established between
      the ISD-P and the SM-DP. The Key Establishment Procedure is described in
      Security Section 4.5.
  13. Now the SM-DP selects the Personalised Profile (e.g. based on the ICCID or Profile
      type) and protects it using the new ISD-P key set, yielding the encrypted and
      integrity protected Profile EncP.
  14. The SM-DP asks the SM-SR to establish a secure transport channel between the
      ISD-R on the eUICC and the SM-SR. This secure transport channel is for protection
      of Profile management commands not the Profile itself.
  15. The SM-DP initiates the Profile Download and Installation by sending the EncP to
      the eUICC using a secure channel between the SM-DP and the newly created ISD-P
      on the eUICC, and within the established secure transport channel between the SM-
      SR and the ISD-R on the eUICC.
  16. The eUICC sends the result of the installation and state of the ISD-P to the SM-DP.
        The MNO owner of the profile decides whether, at the end of profile installation, the
        SCP03 key set in the ISD-P shall be removed by the SM-DP, retained by the SM-DP
        or be handed over to the MNO.
        Note: If the MNO decides that the key set is retained by the SM-DP the MNO can
        instruct the SM-DP to handover or delete the key set at a later point in time.
  17. SM-DP sends the result of the installation and state of the ISD-P to the SM-SR. This
      message includes the relevant EIS elements for this Profile.
  18. The SM-SR updates its database. If the download and installation was successful,
      the SM-SR inserts a new Profile record into the EIS, with the status “disabled”.
  19. The SM-SR confirms the status of the Profile download and installation back to the
      SM-DP. This message includes the relevant parts of the EIS.
  20. If the MNO asked the SM-DP to enable the Profile once it is downloaded and
      installed, the SM-DP executes the Profile Enabling via SM-DP procedure (see 3.5.7).
  21. The SM-DP confirms the status of the download and installation back to the MNO.
      This message can include the EID and the information to identify the Profile.
End Condition: An ISD-P has been created in the eUICC for the MNO, containing a Profile
in disabled or enabled state. The SM-SR has updated the EIS for this eUICC accordingly.
The MNO may activate the related Subscription in the network.

3.5.5 Master Delete

This procedure deletes an Orphaned Profile without the Fall-back Attribute set regardless of the Profile’s policy rules. The successful execution of this procedure requires the authorisation of both the Initiator and the SM-DP. Note: The actor who assumes the role of the initiator needs to be determined. In the example below we can assume the initiator will be the new MNO with the authorisation of the Customer.

Figure 7: Master Delete

Start Conditions:
   a. There is an Orphaned Profile on a eUICC which is, for example, blocking the loading
       of another Profile.
   b. The Orphaned Profile cannot be deleted using the normal ISD-P deletion procedure.
   c. The Initiator decides to delete the Orphaned Profile on the eUICC.
   d. The Orphaned Profile is disabled.
Procedure:
  1.   The Initiator sends a master delete request to the SM-SR. The request includes the
       target EID and the ICCID (or other unique identifier) of the target Profile. The request
       includes the Initiator’s authorisation (Auth 1) for the master delete.
  2.   The SM-SR sends the authorisation request together with the initiator authorisation
       (Auth 1) to the SM-DP associated with the target Profile. The SM-DP verifies the
       authorisation (Auth 1).
  3.   The SM-DP also requests authorisation from the MNO owner of the target Profile.
       Note: The definition of this interface is out of the scope of this document.
  4.   If the MNO authorises the deletion or if there is no response from the MNO, the SM-
       DP sends a response to the SM-SR containing the SM-DP’s authorisation (Auth 2)
       for the master delete. If the SM-DP does not give its authorisation for the master
       delete the SM-SR informs the Initiator.
  5.    The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other
        if not already authenticated.
  6.    The SM-SR sends the master delete request to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The
        request includes the ICCID (or other unique identifier) of the target Profile and the
        authorisation of the SM-DP (Auth 2).
  7.    The ISD-P of the target Profile verifies the authorisation, thus verifying the master
        delete command.
  8.    The ISD-R deletes the target Profile and the related ISD-P without Policy Rule
        enforcement.
  9.    The ISD-R reports the status of the master delete to the SM-SR.
  10. The SM-SR updates the EIS accordingly.
  11. The SM-SR reports the status of the master delete to the Initiator.
End Condition: The target Profile is deleted from the eUICC. The EIS in the SM-SR is up
to date.

3.5.6 Profile Enabling

A switch between two Profiles can be achieved by the following dedicated procedure. In this case the request is issued directly by the MNO to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC.

Figure 8: Profile Enabling

Start Conditions:
   a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. Another Profile is enabled.
   b. The Subscription associated with the target Profile is active in the MNO’s network.
   c. The EID of the target eUICC, the SRID associated with the target Profile and the
       ICCID of the target Profile are known by the MNO.
Procedure:
  1.   The MNO sends a Profile Enabling request to the SM-SR. The request includes the
       target EID and at least the ICCID (or other unique identifier) of the target Profile.
  2.   The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of both the currently Enabled Profile and the target
       Profile permit the Profile switch to take place.
  3.   If there is a conflict with POL2, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the
       concerned MNO(s) accordingly.
  4.   The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other
       if not already authenticated.
  5.   If there is no conflict with POL2, the SM-SR issues a Profile Enabling request to the
       ISD-R on the eUICC including at least the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
  6.   The eUICC performs a POL1 check.
  7.    If there is a conflict with POL1, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM-
        SR.
  8.    If there is no conflict with POL1, the ISD-R performs the Profile switch resulting in
        the target Profile being enabled and the previously Enabled Profile being disabled.
  9.    The ISD-R reports the Profile switch result to the SM-SR.
  10. If the switch is successful the SM-SR records in the EIS that the target Profile is
      enabled and the previous Profile is disabled.
  11. The SM-SR reports the Profile switch result back to the MNO(s). These messages
      will include the EID and the ICCID (or other unique identifier) of their respective
      Profiles.
End Condition: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. The previously Enabled Profile
is disabled. The EIS is up to date.

3.5.7 Profile Enabling via SM-DP

A switch between two Profiles can be achieved by the following dedicated procedure. In this case, the request is issued by the MNO to the SM-DP which forwards it to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC. This way, the MNO does not have to be linked to the SM- SR and relies on the SM-DP to make the connection.

Figure 9: Profile Enabling via SM-DP

Start Conditions: a. The target Profile is disabled on the eUICC. Another Profile is enabled.

b. The Subscription associated with the target Profile is active in the MNO’s network.
c. The EID of the target eUICC, the SRID and the ICCID of the target Profile are known
   by the MNO.
Procedure:
  1.    The MNO sends a Profile Enabling request to the SM-DP. The request includes the
        target EID and at least the ICCID (or other unique identifier) of the target Profile.
  2.    The SM-DP identifies the related SM-SR.
  3.    The SM-SR and the SM-DP authenticate each other if not already authenticated.
  4.    The SM-DP forwards the Profile Enabling request to the SM-SR.
  5.    The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of both the currently Enabled Profile and the target
        Profile permit the Profile switch to take place.
  6.    If there is a conflict with POL2, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the
        requesting SM-DP and the SM-DP or MNO of the disabled Profile.
  7.    If there is a conflict with POL2, the error message is forwarded by the SM-DP to the
        requesting MNO.
  8.    The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other
        if not already authenticated.
  9.    If there is no conflict with POL2, the SM-SR issues a Profile Enabling request to the
        ISD-R on the eUICC including at least the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
  10. The eUICC performs a POL1 check.
  11. If there is a conflict with POL1, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM-
      SR.
  12. If there is no conflict with POL1, the ISD-R performs the Profile switch resulting in
      the target Profile being enabled and the previously enable Profile being disabled.
  13. The ISD-R reports the Profile switch result to the SM-SR.
  14. If the switch is successful the SM-SR records in the EIS that the target Profile is
      enabled and the previous Profile is disabled.
  15. The SM-SR reports the Profile switch result back to the requesting SM-DP and the
      SM-DP or MNO of the disabled Profile. These messages will include the EID and the
      ICCID (or other unique identifier) of their respective Profiles.
  16. The Profile switch result is forwarded to the requesting MNO.
End Condition: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC. The previously Enabled Profile
is disabled. The EIS is up to date.

3.5.8 Profile Disabling

Profile disabling can be achieved by the following procedure. The request is issued directly by the MNO to the SM-SR associated with the target eUICC.

Figure 10: Profile Disabling

Start Condition: The target Profile is enabled on the eUICC.
Procedure:
  1.   The MNO sends a Profile Disabling request to the SM-SR. The request includes the
       target EID and at least the ICCID of the target Profile.
  2.   If the target Profile for disabling is the Profile with Fall-back Attribute set then the
       Profile disabling shall not be executed.
  3.   The SM-SR checks if the POL2 of the Enabled Profile permits the Profile to be
       disabled
  4.   If there is a POL2 conflict, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and send error message
       to MNO(s).
  5.   The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other
       if not already authenticated.
  6.   If there is no POL2 conflict, the SM-SR issues a Profile enabling request to the ISD-
       R on the eUICC for the Profile with Fall-back Attribute set.
  7.   The eUICC performs an internal POL1 check for the currently Enabled Profile. If
       permitted, the Enabled Profile is disabled and the ISD-R enables the Profile with
       Fall-back Attribute set.
  8.   The ISD-R sends reports the Profile disabling result to the SM-SR.
  9.   If the disabling is successful the SM-SR records in the EIS that the target Profile is
       disabled.
  10. The SM-SR reports the Profile disabling result to the MNO(s). This message
      includes the EID and the ICCID of the Profile(s).
End Condition: The target Profile is now disabled on the eUICC, and the Profile with Fall-
back Attribute set is enabled.

3.5.9 ISD-P Deletion

A Profile can be deleted by its MNO.

Figure 11: ISD-P Deletion

Start Condition: The MNO decides to permanently delete a Profile on a eUICC.
Procedure:
  1.    The MNO sends an ISD-P Deletion request to the SM-SR. The request includes the
        target EID and the ICCID (or other unique identifier) of the target Profile.
  2.    The SM-SR checks the POL2 of the target Profile.
  3.    If there is a conflict with POL2, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the
        MNO(s) accordingly
  4.    If the target Profile is enabled, the SM-SR starts the Profile Disabling procedure.
  5.    The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other
        if not already authenticated.
  6.    The SM-SR sends the ISD-P Deletion request to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The
        request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
  7.   The eUICC performs a POL1 check.
  8.   If there is a conflict with POL1, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM-
       SR.
  9.   If there is no conflict, the ISD-R then erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P.
  10. The ISD-R reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the SM-SR.
  11. The SM-SR updates the EIS appropriately.
  12. The SM-SR reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the requesting MNO.
End Condition: The target Profile is deleted from the eUICC. The EIS in the SM-SR is up
to date.

3.5.10 ISD-P Deletion via SM-DP

A Profile can be deleted by its MNO. ISD-P deletion would be requested via the SM-DP. In this case, the MNO does not have to be linked to all SM-SRs and relies on the SM-DP to make the connection.

Figure 12: Operational Profile Deletion via SM-DP

Start Condition: The MNO decides to permanently delete a Profile on a eUICC. Procedure:

  1.   The MNO sends an ISD-P Deletion request to the SM-DP. The request includes the
       target EID and the ICCID (or other unique identifier) of the target Profile. The MNO
       may also provide the SRID.
  2.   The SM-SR and the SM-DP authenticate each other if not already authenticated.
  3.   If the SRID was not provided by the MNO the SM-DP identifies the related SM-SR.
       The request is passed on to the dedicated SM-SR.
  4.   The SM-SR checks the POL2 of the target Profile.
  5.   If there is a conflict with POL2, the SM-SR aborts the procedure and informs the
       MNO(s) accordingly
  6.   If the target Profile is enabled, the SM-SR starts the Profile Disabling procedure.
  7.   The SM-SR and the eUICC, using the key set in the ISD-R, authenticate each other
       if not already authenticated.
  8.   The SM-SR sends an ISD-P Deletion request to the ISD-R on the eUICC. The
       request includes the ISD-P AID of the target Profile.
  9.   The eUICC performs a POL1 check.
  10. If there is a conflict with POL1, the ISD-R aborts the procedure and informs the SM-
      SR.
  11. If there is no conflict, the ISD-R then erases the target Profile and the related ISD-P.
  12. The ISD-R reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the SM-SR.
  13. The SM-SR updates the EIS appropriately.
  14. The SM-SR reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the requesting SM-DP.
  15. The SM-DP reports the status of the ISD-P deletion to the requesting MNO.
End Condition: The target Profile is deleted from the eUICC. The EIS in the SM-SR is up
to date.

3.5.11 SM-SR Change

This procedure assumes that, prior to the procedure being executed, the MNOs with installed Profiles on the concerned eUICC might request to be informed of the change by the current SM-SR (SM-SR1) and be allowed to take action as it relates to the desired disposition of their Profile (e.g. do nothing, update Policy rules, deletion of the Profile). In the case where the SM-SR has to be changed, the credentials of the individual eUICCs must remain confidential.

9. Notification of the result of
the EIS deletion

10. Notification of SM-SR

Figure 13: SM-SR Change

Start Conditions: a. The EID of the eUICC is known b. The SRIDs of SM-SR1 and SM-SR2 are known. c. The ISD-R is personalised with the keys of SM-SR1. d. The change of SM-SR is allowed.

Procedure:
  1.   The initiator sends a request to SM-SR2 for a change of SM-SR.
  2.   SM-SR2 confirms that it can take over this role.
  3.   The initiator, or SM-SR2 acting for the initiator, requests the change from SM-SR1.
  4.   SM-SR1 sends the EIS dataset of the specified EID to SM-SR2.
  5.   A new shared key set is established between SM-SR2 and the ISD-R via the secure
       channel provided by SM-SR1. The Key Establishment Procedure is described in the
       Annex D.2.
  6.   Now SM-SR2 can address the ISD-R directly, and SM-SR2 requests the eUICC to
       delete the key set related to SM-SR1.
  7.   SM-SR2 sends a confirmation of the change to both SM-SR1 and the initiator.
  8.   SM-SR1 deletes the EIS dataset related to the eUICC.
  9.   SM-SR1 sends a notification to SM-SR2 on the deletion result of the EIS dataset
       related to the eUICC.
  10. SM-SR2 sends a notification to the MNO owner(s) of the Profile(s) on the eUICC,
      either directly or via the SM-DP, of the change of SM-SR.
End Conditions:

a. The ISD-R is personalised with the keys of the target SM-SR (SM-SR2). b. The eUICC is registered within the target SM-SR (SM-SR2). c. The EIS and EID reside within the target SM-SR (SM-SR2). d. SM-SR1 is no longer related to the eUICC. e. The MNO owner of the Profile(s) is aware of the change.

3.5.12 ISD-P Key Establishment Procedure

This procedure is defined within section 4.5 of this document.

3.5.13 Fall-Back Mechanism

In the event of loss of network connectivity, as detected by the machine to machine Device, there is a need to change to the Profile with Fall-back attribute set. In this case the eUICC disables the currently Enabled Profile (Profile A) and enables the Profile with Fall-back Attribute set (Profile B). For security reasons if Profile A has the POL1 rule “disabled not allowed” set then the eUICC can only switch back to Profile A until such time that the POL1 of Profile A is changed or Profile A is deleted by use of the Master Delete function. Profile A cannot be deleted with a normal delete command in this situation.

Start Conditions:
   a. The machine to machine Device reports network loss to the eUICC.
   b. The eUICC is configured to perform the Fall-back mechanism if certain network
       connectivity issues are reported by the machine to machine Device.
   c. The Profile with Fall-back attribute set is not the presently Enabled Profile.
Procedure:
  1.    The eUICC disables the currently Enabled Profile (overruling POL1 if necessary) and
        enables the Profile with Fall-back Attribute set.
  2.    The eUICC reports the change of Enabled Profile to the SM-SR. The SM-SR
        updates the EIS.
  3.    The SM-SR reports the change to the owner(s) of the Profile(s).

End Condition: The eUICC has enabled the Profile with Fall-back Attribute set and the EIS of the SM-SR is up-to-date.

3.5.14 eUICC Certificate Verification

This procedure defines how an MNO can verify if an eUICC is certified, in particular if the
eUICC is designed according to the present specification.
Procedure:
  1.    The MNO, or SM-DP on behalf of the MNO, shall be able to retrieve the eUICC
        certificate from:
       a.   The EIS stored within the SM-SR in which the eUICC is registered
       OR
       b.   The EUM (Note: this interface is out of scope of this document).
  2.    The MNO extracts the EUM information from the eUICC certificate (for example:
        certificates, SAS accreditation etc.). (Note: At present the SAS accreditation scheme
        for eUICCs is for future study).
  3.    With the information retrieved at step 2, the MNO requests the EUM certificate from
        the SM-SR, the EUM or the GSMA. (Note: The interface to the EUM and GSMA are
        out of the scope of this document).
  4.    The MNO verifies the validity and signature of the EUM certificate.
  5.    The MNO verifies the EUM signature of the eUICC certificate.
End Condition: The eUICC certificate and EUM certificate have been checked by the
MNO.

3.6 Policy Control

3.6.1 Overview Diagram of Rule Management System

The figure below represents the Policy Rule management system:

Figure 14: Policy Rule Management System

3.6.2 Policy Rules Management

Policy control, as it relates to a Profile, is required by the MNO and is achieved through the
use of rules set by the MNO.
This Policy control is under the control (or jurisdiction) of a single MNO Policy. This Policy
may be comprised of sub-policies whose enforcement lies with different entities.
 There are two types of rules:
    POL1 – these rules resides within a Profile and would be enforced by the eUICC.
    POL2 – these rules would be stored at and enforced by the SM-SR. The MNO sends
       POL2 directly to the SM-SR or through the SM-DP for attaching as metadata to a
       Profile.
POL1 and POL2 are representations of a common MNO Policy enforced in different
locations/entities. The combination of POL1 and POL2 represent the contract between an
MNO and a Customer as applied to the Profile.

In this section all commands are considered as being updates; in the first instance when a rule is first established is considered a special case of update.

3.6.2.1 SM-SR Policy Rule Management Engine

The SM-SR has a Policy Rule management engine identified as “Task 1” in the diagram. Task 1 accepts the following commands: 1) Update POL2 as per MNO request 2) Update POL2 as per MNO request via SM-DP

Task 1 sets the POL2 as per the metadata supplied with a Profile from SM-DP. Task 1 enforces POL2 rules right after installation of the related Profile. Furthermore Task 1 updates the relevant EIS accordingly. The SM-SR is responsible for enforcing the POL2 rules when managing an eUICC.

3.6.2.2 SM-DP Policy Rule Management Engine

The SM-DP has a Policy Rule management engine identified as “Task 2” and “Task 4” in
the diagram.
Task 2 accepts the following commands:
    1) Set POL1 as per MNO request and embed it in the Profile.
Task 4 accepts the following commands
    1) “Update POL2” from the MNO, and passes it to the SM-SR for updating the EIS.
    2) Set POL2 from the MNO and attach it to a Profile as metadata for transmission to
       the SM-SR.

3.6.2.3 eUICC Policy Rule Management Engine

The eUICC has a Policy Rule management engine identified as “Task 3” in the diagram.

Task 3 can read the POL1 rules that reside within the installed Profiles. Furthermore it
enforces the POL1 rules right after the installation of the related Profile (see role of Platform
Service Manager in Section 3.2.2).
Task 3 accepts the following command:
    1) Read/Update POL1 as per MNO request (commands are sent by the MNO’s
        respective OTA system).

3.6.2.4 OTA Policy Rule Update Mechanism

For Task 5 the MNO OTA Platform is used. In this case it is accepting POL1 update commands from the MNO Rule Maker and issues POL1 updates to the eUICC.

3.6.3 Policy Control Mechanism

The Policy Control Mechanism within the eUICC is a combination of:
       The Policy Rules stored within the ISD-P under MNO authority;
       The Policy Rules Enforcer, which is the process delivering the Policy Enforcement
        Function and resides within the Platform Service Manager.
See the diagram in Section 3.2.2

3.6.3.1 Policy Rules

Policy Rules are checked at different state changes of Profiles. They may impact both the state of the Profile that is associated with the rule and the state of other Profiles. Depending on the nature of the rule, Policy enforcement can happen at the eUICC and/or at the SM-SR level. Only the MNO which is the owner of the Profile is able to modify the Policy Rules. At the eUICC level, the rules are part of the Profile package and are enforced by the eUICC operating system through the interaction with the Platform Service Manager. The MNO can update the Policy Rules within his Profile using his own OTA Platform(s). Updating can only be done when the Profile is in enabled state. The policy enforcement mechanisms defined in this document to enforce the contractual provisions governing the remote Provisioning of an Embedded SIM are subject to applicable competition and regulatory law. The following principles apply to the enforcement of contractual provisions:

       Participating Operators must not abuse policy enforcement mechanisms to block or
        impede in any way the legitimate installation, enabling, disabling and deletion of a
        Profile on an Embedded SIM.
       Participating Operators can enforce policy rules provided such actions comply with
        applicable competition and regulatory law.

The following Policy Rules are defined: Note: This assumes the SM-SR to be GSMA certified and trusted by the MNO.

             Policy Rules                    Enforcement when the         Enforced at
                                             Profile is
       1     Disabling of this Profile not   Enabled                      eUICC via POL1
             allowed                                                      SM-SR via POL2
       2     Deletion of this Profile not    Enabled or Disabled          eUICC via POL1
             allowed                                                      SM-SR via POL2
       3     Profile deletion is             N/A                          eUICC via POL1
             mandatory when it is                                         SM-SR via POL2
             disabled.
POL1 and POL2 settings may or may not be the same. POL1 and POL2 are enforced by
different entities (eUICC for POL1; SM-SR for POL2) and will be enforced independently.
The explicit setting of POL1 and POL2 rules is the choice of the MNO (e.g. to set POL1
rules to be empty).

3.6.3.2 eUICC Policy Rules Enforcer Function

The Policy Rules Enforcer is able to read and enforce all the POL1 present on the eUICC. The only case where the eUICC can overrule POL1 is the Fall-Back Mechanism.

3.6.3.3 SM-SR Policy Rules Enforcer Function

The SM-SR Policy Rules Enforcer is able to read and enforce the Policy Rules contained in the EIS of the targeted eUICC.

4 Security Model: Threats Analysis & Risk Assessment Model

4.1 Security Challenges

As mentioned in the basic assumptions section, one of the major expectations of this
architecture is to provide a solution offering a security level at least equivalent to the
security reached by the current UICC and its management systems.
Considering the new delivery of Profiles in the eUICC compared to the existing model, the
following main security challenges shall be considered and fixed in the security analysis:
      a) Different Actors may be involved in Profile creation, load, install and enabling and be
         involved in managing the eUICC during its lifecycle.
      b) A Profile can be replaced in the eUICC.
      c) Several Profiles may be hosted at a given time in the eUICC.
      d) Authentication algorithms may be shared between operators.
      e) Profile and Platform Management are controlled through rules and/or commands
         which need to be considered in the assets to be protected.
      f)    Remote installation/Provisioning of a Profile.
      g) Remote management of the Profile.
      Note: The support of proprietary authentication algorithms and the upgradability of
      authentication algorithms are for further study.
Therefore, the challenge is to deliver a solution offering a sufficient security level, but with
enough flexibility to permit interconnection of various subsystems provided by different
sources, delivering a part of, or an entire, solution.

4.2 Security Analysis Methodology

Because the design of the solution for eUICC and its remote Provisioning system must be
driven by security concerns, it is of primary importance to identify the key risks on the whole
architecture in order to derive security recommendations and principles that will shape the
final design.
The proposed methodology is based on a 4 step process:
      1. Identification of assets (see Annex C);
      2. Identification of functions;
      3. Identification of threats & risks (see Annex B);
      4. Description of security requirements.

4.3 Aim of the Security Realm Approach

A Security Realm is defined as the clustering of Roles and Actors connected through a single protected private network and operated by a sole entity. This entity, in charge of day to day operations of a Security Realm is defined as an “administrative entity” and might be comprised of one or several actors bound by a unique commercial or legal agreement. The segmentation in realms allows for the application of adequate protection levels related to a specific context applying to an administrative entity and its realm. This might be due to local specificities such as regulations, lawful enforcement, corporate policies or geographic context. The requirements pertaining to Security Realms also ensure for a common level of security when addressing communications between Security Realms. The security requirements applied to the Profile, Platform Management commands and Profile transport security are not addressed by Security Realms. The eUICC, being a shared asset between different administrative entities, is considered to be an independent Security Realm.

Negotiated and shared
logical secured interface
Realm 1                                                        Realm 2
MNO      SMDP        SMSR                                      eUICC
Realm 3                               Realm 4
                                                               Realm 5
MNO      SMDP                         SMSR
                                                               eUICC
Realm 6               Realm 7            Realm 8               Realm 9
                                                               9
   MNO                 SMDP                   SMSR                eUICC
Realm 10                 Realm 11                              Realm12
MNO                    SMDP        SMSR                        eUICC
Realm 13                 Realm 14                              Realm15
SMDP                     MNO        SMSR                        eUICC

Figure 15: Examples of security realms organisation in the security model

4.4 Security Requirements

This section lists security requirements.
In the security model we consider the Customer, MNO, SM-DP, SM-SR, eUICC and eUICC
Manufacturer.
We consider the MNO, SM-DP, SM-SR, eUICC and eUICC Manufacturer as elements that
can belong to a Security Realm.
The requirements section is organised in three layered parts:
    General requirements, to be applied to the whole architecture, including any security
      realm and its Actor(s) and role(s);
    Security requirements attached to a security realm, i.e. including to all of the role(s)
      attached to the security realm;
    Security requirements attached to a particular role; a section is dedicated to each of
      the following Roles:
           o eUICC;
o   SM-SR;
o   SM-DP;
o   Machine to Machine Device.
    Role 1         Role 2                   Role 3                   Role 4                     Device
 requirement requirement                 requirement              requirement                requirements
       s              s                Securitysrealm 2         Securitysrealm 3
Security realm 1 requirements           requirements             requirements

General Requirements

Figure 16: Example of security requirements organisation

4.4.1 General Security Requirements

#        Requirement
           Cryptographic solutions used within the eUICC ecosystem shall offer strength at
SG1
           least conform to NIST cryptographic recommendations in NIST SP800-57 [NIST].
           Past or future communications associated with Profile download and installation,
           between the SM-DP and the eUICC, whenever trappable by third party shall not be
SG2        recoverable based upon the compromise of a single long-term key used for
           message encryption. A similar requirement for Platform Management is for further
           study.
SG3        The certificate chains shall be highly secure, highly reliable and verifiable [if used].
SG4        All cryptographic keys shall be kept in secure environment (e.g. HSM, eUICC).
SG5        The keys used by the EUM for eUICC Certificate generation shall be stored in a
           secure environment (i.e. in a Hardware Security Module).
SG6        The solution shall not prevent a further release allowing the capability to upgrade the
           network authentication algorithms used within the ecosystem.
           The architecture shall provide a flexible solution including on the base of its security
SG7        principles, meaning the security applied to a subsystem of the global ecosystem
           shall not challenge the security of the overall ecosystem once interconnected.
           The architecture shall provide an interoperable solution including on the base of its
SG8        security principles, meaning the security applied to a subsystem of the global
           ecosystem shall not challenge the security of the overall ecosystem once
           interconnected.
         Multiple Roles and functions may be played by a single Actor as long as:
             1. It respects local lawful obligations;
SG9
             2. It does not lower the overall security level of the system;
             3. It does not conflict with own MNO security policies (e.g. force an operator to
                share its secrets with a third party).
SG10      The MNO shall be able to reject to use a non-trusted system for the Embedded
          UICC management.

4.4.2 Security Realms Requirements

#      Requirement
SR1      Security realms shall be identifiable and mutually authenticated for the purpose of
         any communication.
         Communication between the SM-SR and the eUICC shall be protected against
SR2
         replay attacks.
         An entity within a security realm may need authorisation before communication
SR3      exchange.
         Any end to end data communication between two security realms of the eUICC
         ecosystem shall be origin authenticated, integrity and confidentiality protected,
SR4
         protected against replay attacks and non-repudiable. Non-repudiation may not apply
         to communication with the eUICC.
         Network communication links used inside a security realm shall be dedicated – i.e.
         neither public network, neither mutualised. E.g. solutions such as MPLS or GRE are
SR5
         not considered as dedicated links; a solution such as an authenticated and secured
         VPN is considered as dedicated.
         When two security realms are exchanging data, they shall at first engage a security
SR6      negotiation (e.g. EAP, IPSEC, TLS handshake…) resulting in the application of an
         agreed security level between them.
SR7      Security realms shall enforce filtering rules so that only authorised entities
         are granted access to allowed services.
         When negotiating a communication, at least the lowest acceptable common
SR8
         cryptographic suite shall apply.

4.4.3 eUICC Requirements

#      Requirement
         eUICC shall be certified according to the Protection Profile defined in GSMA Fast
SE1      Track Project.
         Note: Need to refer to the GSMA Protection Profile document once available.
         The eUICC Protection Profile should at least include the following elements:
         Platform Service Manager, ISD-R, Profile storage and isolation of Profiles.
SE2
         Note: Related Actors, Roles and environmental conditions will be defined in the
         eUICC Protection Profile
         The eUICC protection Profile shall be compatible with existing accepted Protection
SE3
         Profile.
SE4      The eUICC platform shall be in line with Common Criteria EAL4+ - EAL4 augmented
         by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
SE5      Upon Profile deletion, the eUICC shall ensure of the complete wipe of the Profile.
         eUICC shall only accept Platform and Profile Management commands sent from an
SE6
         authorised SM-SR or SM-DP.
SE7      The integrity of the Profile shall be ensured before its installation in the eUICC.
         eUICC shall reject any Platform and Profile Management commands that are in
SE8      conflict with the Policy Rules of any Profile on the eUICC the only exception being
         for the master delete command.
SE9      eUICC shall be resistant to tamper attacks (physical and logical).
SE10     Profile keys and algorithm parameters shall not be extractable from the eUICC.
SE11     A Profile shall not be exported from the eUICC.
         According to 3GPP TS21.133 [21133], eUICC shall be able to play a role in
         deterring terminal theft; e.g. this could be achieved by the definition of a particular
SE12
         configuration for the eUICC preventing normal use of the machine to machine
         Device but allowing emergency services.
SE13     The eUICC shall provide a secure way for the SM-DP and SM-SR to check its
         identity and status in such a way that the entity has a proof of identity and origin.
         This capability is offered through the Eligibility Verification function.
SE14     All cryptographic functions shall be implemented in a robust tamper-proof way and
         resistant to side-channel attacks.
SE15     The Operator Credentials shall not be extractable from a Profile on the eUICC.

4.4.4 SM-SR and SM-DP Requirements

#      Requirement
  SM1      SM-DP shall be certified according to a GSMA agreed certification scheme.
(SM-DP)
  SM2      SM-SR shall be certified according to a GSMA agreed certification scheme.
(SM-SR)
  SM3      SM-SR shall implement an access control mechanism on the request for execution
           of the SMSR functions only to authorised security realms.
(SM-SR)
  SM4      SM-DP shall implement an access control mechanism on the request for execution
           of the SMDP functions only to authorised security realms.
(SM-DP)
  SM5      Security realm of SM-SR and SM-DP, and eUICC interfaces shall have proper
           counter measures against denial of services attacks.
(SM-SR)
  SM6      The donor SM-SR shall not be able to access the eUICC once the SM-SR switch
           procedure has been completed.
(SM-SR)
  SM7      The SM-DP shall be able to establish Profile Installer Credentials on the eUICC for
           the secure end-to-end communication used for the Profile loading in a reliable and
(SM-DP)    confidential way.
  SM8      The SM-SR shall be able to establish Platform Management Credentials on the
           eUICC for the secure end-to-end communication used for the Platform Management
(SM-SR)    in a reliable and confidential way.
         The MNO shall be able to update the OTA Keys in its Profile on the eUICC in a
         secure and confidential way reusing existing OTA Platform mechanisms.
SM9
         Note: Need to study the possibility for the MNO by itself to update the Network
         Access Credentials.
          There shall be a secure end to end communication channel between the Security
SM10
          Realms which host the SM-DP function and the eUICC during the Profile installation.

4.4.5 Machine to Machine Device Requirements

#      Requirement
SD1      The security of the system shall not be dependent upon the security mechanisms
         within the machine to machine Device.
SD2      The machine to machine Device shall not be able to access nor modify sensitive
         Profile data, i.e. credentials, management commands, Policy Rules, authentication
         algorithm parameters.

4.4.6 Policy Control Function

#      Requirement
SP1     Policy Rules are to be protected against modification by unauthorised entities when
        they are stored within, and transported between, the SM-SR, SM-DP and eUICC.
SP2     Policy Rule transport shall be treated as per SR2.

4.5 Security Architecture

4.5.1 Secure Download and Installation of a Profile

This section describes the security details related to the procedure stated in section 3.5.4. Download and installation of a Profile shall be done in a secure way, as follows:

MNO                                       SM-DP                                 SM-SR                              eUICC
           (1.a) Profile
            Download
             Request                  (1.b) SMSR
           (SRID, EID,               identification
(1.c) Get eUICC info                (1.d) Send SM-DP
   set (EIS) of EID                       info set
(1.e) Send eUICC info
   set (EIS) of EID

(1.f) EIS check

(1.g) If EIS conflict, notify
                                               (2.a) ISD-P creation               (2.b) ISD-P creation
                                  (2.c) Creation response
(2.d) Creation response
(2.e) If failure : notify
                                                (3) Secure channel establishment: session
                                                        keyset (cf. section 4.5.1.2)
(4) Encrypt and sign the Profile using the
             session keyset
(5) Send the Profile encrypted and signed with
               session keyset
(6-7) Verify, decrypt and install
Profile using the session keyset
(8.a) Profile Download
 Confirmation (EID…)

(8.b) EIS update

(8.d) Profile Download                          (8.c) Profile Download
 Confirmation (EID…)                             Confirmation (EID…)

Figure 17: Secure Download and Installation of a Profile

The process between the MNO and the eUICC shall be as follows:
        Start Conditions:
        A. MNO and SM-DP share the Network Access Credentials associated to the Profile.

Procedure:

1. (a) The MNO requests a Profile download and installation to the SM-DP

1. (a) If not already done in earlier transactions, the SM-DP and the SM-SR
   authenticate each other and will use secure communication for all further data
   exchanges.
1. (b-f) The SM-DP requests the SM-SR for the relevant part of the eUICC
   information set (EIS).
2.   (a-e) The SM-DP requests that the SM-SR creates an ISD-P on the eUICC.
3.   The SM-DP establishes a keyset between itself and this new ISD-P within the
     eUICC (See section 4.5.1.1 regarding Establishment of the Keyset)
4.   The SM-DP encrypts and signs the Profile using the keyset established in step 3
     according to the secure channel protocol.
5.   The SM-DP sends the encrypted and signed Profile to the ISD-P for download
     and installation in the eUICC using the secure channel protocol based on the
     keyset established in step 3
6.   The eUICC decrypts and verifies the integrity of the Profile using the keyset
     established in step 3.
7.   The Profile is installed on the eUICC.
8. (a to d) The eUICC notifies the status of the download and installation process to
   the SM-SR, to the SM-DP and the MNO. The SM-SR updates the EIS information
   of the corresponding eUICC in its database.
End Conditions:
A. The Profile is installed on the eUICC.

4.5.1.1 Establishment of the Keyset

This chapter details the establishment of the keyset in step 3 in the Secure Download and
Installation process.
The keyset is calculated by both the SM-DP and the eUICC on the base of a shared secret
called ShS.
We distinguish two options for the ShS generation:
   1. Key agreement: the ShS is generated locally by both entities SM-DP and eUICC
      using a Key Agreement Algorithm.
   2. Key distribution: the ShS is generated by one entity and sent to the other. We
      distinguish two models:
            a. Push model: generated by the SM-DP and sent to the eUICC
            b. Pull model: generated by the eUICC and sent to the SM-DP

4.5.1.2 Key Agreement

A key agreement protocol is executed between the SM-DP and the eUICC to generate the Shared Secret ShS.

The ShS is generated by both SM-DP and the eUICC using a key agreement protocol (e.g. Elliptic Curve Key Agreement based on Diffie-Hellman or ElGamal – ECKA-DH, ECKA-EG).

The result of the key agreement protocol must provide authentication which will help protect against man-in-the-middle attacks Authentication of the eUICC to the SM-DP is mandatory. The mutual authentication of the SM-DP and the eUICC is mandatory. The following figure details the step 3 of figure 17.

MNO                          SM-DP                          SM-SR                   eUICC
                                                                                     ISD-P

(3.a) initiate key agreement

(3.b) Calculate ShS,
    Derive keyset

(3.c) response key agreement

(3.d) Calculate ShS,
    Derive keyset

Figure 18: Key Set Establishment: Key Agreement Protocol (overview)

4.5.2 Mutual Authentication

This section details the mutual authentication mechanism between two entities in the
architecture. The entities concerned within this section to authenticate each other are SM-
DP to SM-SR and SM-SR to SM-SR. Authentication between other entities in the system
may use other solutions for authentication and is not in the scope for this section.
To secure the messages being sent between the entities from an authentication point of
view, at least one of the following two mechanisms shall be used:
   1. Security within a message allowing it to be authenticated, e.g. Web Service Security
      (WS-Security);
   2. Mutual authenticated transport level security, e.g. SSL.

A Interfaces

The purpose of this section is to provide additional information about the various interfaces required between the different elements of the architecture, and the functions to be supported over these interfaces.

A.1 eUICC Manufacturer – SM-SR interface

The procedure “eUICC Registration at SM-SR” in section 3.5.1 mainly addresses this interface. The main purpose is to enable the registration of the eUICC platform at the SM-SR.

A.2 MNO – SM-DP Interface

This interface covers the Profile ordering aspects and the procedure as defined in section
3.5.3. This interface is also used during the Profile Download and Installation procedure as
defined in section 3.5.4, the Profile enabling via SM-DP as defined in section 3.5.7 and the
ISD-P deletion via SM-DP as defined in section 3.5.10.
The following information is exchanged between the MNO and the SM-DP:
    The description of the Subscriptions e.g.:
         o The IMSI range or list of IMSIs, the ICCID range or list of ICCIDs
         o The Applications and files as defined in the relevant specifications (in particular
            3GPP TS 31.102 [31102], 3GPP TS 31.103 [31103] and ETSI TS 102 221
            [102221].)
         o The algorithm parameters associated with its corresponding Network Access
            Application (for instance with Milenage: the OPc, ri, ci values)
    Other data or applications which are part of the Profiles.
    All relevant information needed to configure the future ISD-P, the Remote File
        Management and Remote Application Management applications.
    The Policy Rules.
    All relevant known information on the target eUICC and its SM-SR e.g.:
         o The geographical location of the SM-SR.
         o The type of communication supported by the SM-SR.
         o the security level to be supported by the SM-SR (in particular, the security
            association methods that can be used between the SM-DP and the SM-SR (see
            security section for proper recommendations))
         o The methods to be supported by the SM-SR to communicate with the eUICC
            (e.g. support of SMS and/or RAM over HTTP(s) over LTE/EPS)
         o The conditions under which the Profiles prepared and encrypted by the SM-DP
            are to be delivered directly (via SM-SR) to the specified eUICC.
The SM-DP provides:
    The relevant information for the Profiles to the MNO so that the MNO can provision
      the information relevant to the Subscription in its mobile network.

A.3 SM-DP – SM-SR Interface

This interface is used during the Profile download and installation, the Profile enabling via SM-DP, Profile disabling via-SM-DP, Profile deletion via SM-DP procedures.

The entity taking the role of SM-DP and/or the SM-SR may retain certain information related to the Profile according to the commercial agreement, MNO Policy Rules and regulatory data retention obligations.

A.4 MNO – SM-SR interface

This interface is used during the Profile enabling, Profile disabling, and Profile deletion procedures. The SM-SR takes as input: - Platform management requests from the MNO; - Policy Rule (POL2) update from the MNO; - The EID of the targeted eUICCs. The MNO takes as input: - The relevant parts of the EIS of the targeted eUICCs; - Receipts/responses to MNO Platform management requests; - Receipts/responses to MNO Policy Rule updates; - Platform management-related events.

A.5 SM-SR – eUICC interface

This interface is used during the Profile download and installation, the Profile enabling, the Profile enabling via SM-DP, Profile disabling, Profile disabling via-SM-DP, Profile deletion, Profile deletion via SM-DP procedures.

A.6 SM-SR – SM-SR Interface

This interface is used during the SM-SR Change procedure as defined in 3.5.11.

A.7 MNO – eUICC interface

This corresponds to the interface between the MNO and the eUICC.

Confidential

B Risk Matrix (Informative)

This section lists risks, related impacted sensitive assets and impacted properties (C=Confidentiality, I=Integrity, A=Availability).

                                                                                                                                                         Impacts
  #                Risks                                                Definition                                                  Assets
                                                                                                                                                         C   I     A
Generic Risks
                                       Penetration on a server managing master keys or private keys, loss of
        Failure in certificates   or
 V01                                   confidentiality due to human error or malevolence might lead to loss of          all certificates                      
        private keys chain
                                       trust in the entire process chain.
        Authentication     algorithm   Weakening of authentication algorithms due to malevolence,           human       eUICC
 V02                                                                                                                                                        
        breach                         error or other means.                                                            authentication algorithm
                                       A breakthrough in cryptographic research might lead to the weakening             All      assets         using
 V03    Cryptographic breakthrough                                                                                                                          
                                       or total loss of authentication and ciphering schemes.                            cryptographic primitives
 V04    EID tampering                  Installation of Profile on a wrong eUICC                                         Profile                             
Provisioning & Delivery Risks
                                       Denial of service using vulnerabilities in public interfaces or basic            Profiles
        Denial of service on public
 V05                                   resource exhaustion techniques might lead to the impossibility of                                                           
        network facing components                                                                                       connectivity chain to eUICC
                                       Provisioning and management of eUICC, and cause loss of services.
        Critical         component     Lax policies in network access or interconnection might lead to the
 V06                                                                                                                    eUICC                           
        communication interception     interception and loss of confidentiality in critical assets such as Profiles.
        Penetration       of    the
                                       Lax policies in network access or interconnection might lead to the
 V07    Subscription     Management                                                                                     network components              
                                       interception, alteration or deletion of critical assets such as Profiles.
        network
        Rogue component insertion      A malicious or compromised partner might introduce a rogue component
 V08    within trusted network (e.g.   within a security domain leading to loss of integrity or confidentiality of      All                                     
        SM-SR or SM-DP)                critical information such as the Profile or a management command.

Confidential

       Confidentiality     loss    of     Interception of transport key might lead to unsolicited connection to the
                                                                                                                             data protection key and its
V09    transport keys used to deliver     eUICC or network component in order to perform denial of service, theft                                           
                                                                                                                              certificate
       the Profile up to the eUICC        of service or impersonation.
       Confidentiality or integrity
                                          Communication of Profiles over non protected networks might lead to                Profiles
V10    loss    of    Profile   during                                                                                                                          
                                          the interception or tampering of transiting Profiles                               eUICC
       Provisioning or delivery
        Poor isolation of Profiles on
                                           Insufficient isolation of Profiles on the eUICC might lead to the reuse or         eUICC
 V11                                       leaking of critical part of the Profile such as the ISD-P or keys such as                                            
        the eUICC                                                                                                             Profiles
                                           the K.
                                           Human error, malevolence or action from a malicious 3rd party might                management function key
        Rogue Profile and Platform
 V12                                       lead to unsolicited Profile or Platform Management commands resulting                                                    
        Management commands                                                                                                   eUICC
                                           in loss of service, impersonation or fraud.
                                                                                                                              PCF files
                                           Human error, malevolence or compromising of the PCF might enable
 V13    PCF breach                                                                                                            Profiles                            
                                           scenarios where a Profile is able to bypass operators Profile policies
                                                                                                                              eUICC
eUICC Risks
                                           Failure in providing a secure eUICC might lead to physical or logical
 V14    eUICC tampering                                                                                                       eUICC                               
                                           attacks that might allow leaking or modifying of installed Profiles.
                                           It might be possible for an attacker to install a valid Profile on a non-
        Installation of Profile within a   trusted eUICC (being soft or hardware) thus allowing for the extraction or
 V15                                                                                                                          eUICC                               
        non-certified eUICC                replication of the Profile. This might lead to fraud or impersonation
                                           attacks
                                                                                                                              eUICC
                                           Failure to prevent Profile extraction or loss of confidentiality in the Profile    data protection key and its
                                           creation database might lead to the leak of data enabling the cloning of            certificate
 V16    eUICC cloning                                                                                                                                           
                                           eUICC and embedding them in soft or rogue eUICC in order to
                                           perpetuate fraud or impersonation.                                                 OTA Keys
                                                                                                                              Profile keys
Dependability

Confidential

        Failure to recover from a         Delivery of a malformed Profile might result in a loss of communication         eUICC
V17                                                                                                                                       
        damaged Profile                   abilities and ultimately to machine to machine Device loss.
                                          Inability for a eUICC to verify the integrity of a delivered Profile, might     eUICC
        Enabling      of      degraded
V18                                       lead to the installation of a malformed or forged Profile leading to loss of                   
        Profiles
                                          service, OTA ping-pong storm, fraud or impersonation scenarios.
                                          Inability to remove old Profiles from an eUICC might lead to the dead           eUICC
V19     Inability to wipe Profile         occupancy of a Profile slot, rendering Profile switching or Provisioning                    
                                          impossible.
         Failure to make emergency         In case of forged, malformed or absence of a valid Profile, it might be         eUICC
 V20                                                                                                                                      
         call                              impossible for a user to make emergency calls.                                  Baseband
Device
         Unauthorised ability to wipe      If Profiles are erasable directly from the machine to machine Device
         Profile for reselling of stolen   without authorisation by using a software or hardware switch, it might
 V21                                                                                                                       eUICC         
         machine        to     machine     enable malicious 3rd parties to resell a stolen machine to machine
         Device                            Device.

C List of Sensitive Assets (Informative)

This section lists the sensitive assets to be protected. The management of such assets is the
most critical when they are available in clear and impacts the components accessing these
assets (see 2nd column). However they may be transferred between entities as long as their
security properties (integrity, confidentiality, authentication…) are not compromised. The
fourth column of the following table corresponds to the criticality of the asset for the
Embedded UICC ecosystem. The criticality illustrates a security impact on the architecture
and the potential cost impact on the Actor(s) in case of security failure.
The following criticalities are considered:
    Criticality 4: the Embedded UICC ecosystem may be at risk with severe business
       risks for several or all Actors.
    Criticality 3: one part of the Embedded UICC ecosystem is affected; the affected
       Actor(s) may suffer strong effects which may endanger their whole business.
    Criticality 2: the service is temporarily interrupted; the affected Actor(s) have a major
       business impact.
    Criticality 1: the service is temporarily interrupted; the affected Actor(s) have a minor
       business impact.
Sensitive Asset       Asset        Asset Handled In Clear By:                    Criticality
                     Originator
                      Owner
Authentication         MNO         MNO, eUICC                                      3 to 4
Algorithm
Authentication         MNO         MNO, eUICC, SM-DP                           2 (one eUICC
Algorithm Key                                                              affected) to 4 (a set of
                                                                              eUICCs affected)
Authentication         MNO         MNO, eUICC, SM-DP                           2 (one eUICC
Algorithm                                                                  affected) to 4 (a set of
Parameters                                                                    eUICCs affected)
(e.g. Opc, Ri-Ci
etc.)
IMSI                   MNO         MNO, eUICC, SM-DP                       1 (one IMSI affected)
                                                                            to 2 (a set of IMSIs
                                                                                  affected)
MSISDN                 MNO         MNO, SM-DP, SM-SR                          1 (one MSISDN
                                                                           affected) to 2 (a set of
                                                                            MSISDNs affected)
Root Certificate   Root CA owner   Root CA owner                                      4
EUM Certificate    Root CA owner   EUM                                                3
eUICC                  EUM         EUM, eUICC                                      2 to 3
Certificate
EID                  eUICC         SM-SR, eUICC, SM-DP,         MNO,   ,   1 (one EID affected) to
                   Manufacturer    eUICC Manufacturer                          2 (a set of EIDs
                                                                                   affected)
Profile                MNO         MNO, eUICC, SM-DP                               3 to 4
MNO OTA Keys           MNO         MNO, eUICC, SMDP                                3 to 4
Sensitive Asset     Asset        Asset Handled In Clear By:                Criticality
                   Originator
                    Owner
PCF rules             MNO        eUICC, MNO, SM-SR, SM-DP                    3 to 4
Profile             Asset        Asset Handled In Clear By:                Criticality
Management         Originator
Sensitive Data      Owner
Platform             SM-SR       SM-SR, eUICC                                2 to 4
management
keyset
Profile              SM-DP       SM-DP, eUICC                                  4
Management
keyset

D Additional Information Related to Section 4.5 (Informative)

Nomenclature used in this annex:
Acronym              Definition
EC                   Elliptic Curves
Ke                   The key from the keyset used for encryption
Km                   The key from the keyset used for message authentication and integrity
                     protection.
Ku                   The key from the keyset used for protection of key values.
PKeUICC              This Public key is part of the eUICC Certificate. In GlobalPlatform, it
                     corresponds to the public key of the ECASD.
                     For ElGamal Elliptic Curves key agreement this key is PK.CASD.ECKA [GP
                     Am. E]
                     For signature verification by external entities this key is PK.CASD.AUT [GP
                     Am. A]
                     For confidentially (encryption by external entity) this key is PK.CASD.CT [GP
                     Am. A]
SKeUICC              Private key of the eUICC. In GlobalPlatform, it corresponds to the private key
                     of the ECASD.
                     For ElGamal Elliptic Curves key agreement this key is SK.CASD.ECKA [GP
                     Am. E]
                     For signature by eUICC this key is SK.CASD.AUT[GP Am. A]
                     For decryption by eUICC this key is SK.CASD.CT [GP Am. A]
PKSM-DP              Public Key of the SM-DP
SKSM-DP              Private Key of the SM-DP

D.1 Additional Key Establishment Mechanisms

In addition to the key agreement protocol outlined above, two key distribution models are considered: 1 – The Push Model, in which the ShS is generated by SM-DP. 2 – The Pull Model, in which the ShS is generated by the eUICC.

D.1.1 Push Model (ShS generated by SM-DP)

The following steps shall be executed:

1. The SM-DP asks the SM-SR for the public key of eUICC (PKeUICC). This message is
   part of step 1.a in Figure 17 in section 4.
2. The SM-SR sends to SM-DP the public key of eUICC (PKeUICC). This message is part
   of step 1.b in Figure 17 in section 4Error! Reference source not found.
3. The SM-DP verifies that PKeUICC (Public Key of eUICC) is signed by the EUM
   Certificate.
   4. SM-DP generates the Shared Secret (ShS) and sends it to the eUICC (ISD-P)
        encrypted with the public key of eUICC (PKeUICC). It may send its signed public key to
        the eUICC if it is not done by the SM-SR (if step 1.c is not executed).
   5. The eUICC decrypts and verifies the integrity of the ShS.
   6. The eUICC sends a confirmation receipt signed with its private key (SKeUICC) back to
        the SM-DP.
   7. The SM-DP and eUICC generate the keyset.
The following figure details step 1 of figure 17 in section 4.
MNO                        SM-DP                                    SM-SR                                 eUICC
(1.a) Get eUICC
       info                                    (1.c) Send SM-DP
                                                info (PKSM-DP,….)
(1.b) Send eUICC
 info (PKeUICC,…)
(2.a) Generate ShS, encrypt it using PKeUICC
  (message enriched by anti-replay mechanism, nonce,
 timestamp, random, or signature using SKSM-DM, etc…)
                                                            (2.b) Verify and
                                                         decrypt. Derive keyset
                                                               from ShS
(2.c) response and confirmation signed with
                 SKeUICC
   (2.d) Verify
response, derive
     keyset

Figure 19: Session key set establishment: key distribution, push model

In step (2.a) SM-DP can also generate the keyset and sends it to eUICC. In this case, the eUICC has to retrieve the keyset directly from the received message. In a GP based model, the SM-DP addresses the ISD-P. The ISD-P has to ask the ECASD to decrypt the received message using SKeUICC =SK.CASD.CT [AmdA]. The SM-DP uses PK.CASD.CT to encrypt the message. PK.CASD.CT is part of CERT.CASD.CT which is signed by the EUM. The eUICC signs the receipt using SK.CASD.AUT and the SM-DP verifies the receipt using PK.CASD.AUT

D.1.2 Pull model (ShS generated by the eUICC)

It is similar to the push model, except that the eUICC generates ShS. The following steps shall be executed:

1. The SM-DP asks the SM-SR for the public key of eUICC (PKeUICC). This message is
   part of step 1.a in Figure 17.
2. The SM-SR sends to SM-DP the public key of eUICC (PKeUICC). This message is part
   of step 1.b in Figure 17.
3. The SM-DP verifies that PKeUICC (Public Key of eUICC) is signed by the EUM
   Certificate.
4. The SM-SR sends to the eUICC the public key of SM-DP (PKSM-DP). This message is
   part of step 1.c in Figure 17Error! Reference source not found.
5. The eUICC generates the Shared Secret (ShS), and sends it to the SM-DP signed
   with the private key (SKeUICC) and encrypted with the public key of SM-DP (PKSM-DP).
   It may send its signed public key to the SM-DP if it is not done by the SM-SR.
6. The SM-DP sends a confirmation receipt signed with its private key (SKSM-DP) back to
   the eUICC.
7. The SM-DP and eUICC generate the keyset

In a GP based model, the eUICC uses SK.CASD.AUT to sign the message and SM-DP uses PK.CASD.AUT to verify the signature [AmdA]. PK.CASD.AUT is part of CERT.CASD.AUT which is signed by the EUM.

D.2 Details on the ElGamal Key Agreement

SM-DP or
SM-SR2                    SM-SR(1)                 eUICC

1. Verifiy CASD certificate

2. Generate ephemeral EC
key pair SKe+PKe
3. Send public key
PKe
                      4. Request key set
                      generation in ISD-P or
                      ISD-R (PKe)
5. ISD-P/R provides PKe to
CASD; CASD calculates
shared secret ShS from own
SK and PKe and generates
ISD-P/R key set and receipt
from ShS.
                       6. Send confirmation
7. Send confirmation
8. Calculate ShS from own
SKe and PK of CASD;
derive ISD-P/R key set
from ShS and verifiy
receipt

Figure 20 : ElGamal Key Agreement

Start Condition: The SM-SR has connectivity with the eUICC.
1.   The SM-DP verifies the eUICC Certificate, which carries a signature from the
     EUM. This is part of step 1.e of Figure 17.
2.    The SM-DP generates an ephemeral EC (elliptic curve) key pair, named SKe and
      PKe.
3.    The SM-DP sends a key set generation request to the SM-SR, including the
      ephemeral public key PKe. The SM-SR passes the request for key set generation
      to the ISD-P on the eUICC, providing the PKe.
5a.   The eUICC now performs the following actions: The ISD-P provides the ECASD
      with the PKe.
5b.   The ECASD generates a Shared Secret ShS from its own secret key and
      received ephemeral PKe and returns it to the ISD-P.
5c.   The ISD-P uses ShS to generate its own key pair as well as a receipt from the
      operation.
6.    The ISD-P passes a confirmation (with receipt) of the generation back to the SM-
      SR..
7.    The SM-SR passes the confirmation back to the SM-DP.
8a.   The SM-DP generates ShS from the ephemeral secret key SKe and the eUICCs
      public key.
8b.   The SM-DP uses this calculated ShS to derive the same key set as generated by
      the ISD-P.
8c.   The SM-DP verifies the receipt it received from the eUICC to verify the validity of
      the entire operation. Together with the eUICC Certificate verified in step 1, this
      also confirms the authenticity of the eUICC.
End Condition: A secret key set, whose contents are only known within the ISD-P
and by the SM-DP has been generated and the eUICC is authenticated to the SM-DP.

In a GP based model, for key agreement the PKeUICC corresponds to PK.CASD.ECKA which is part of CERT.CASD.ECKA signed by the EUM.

D.3 Calculation of the keyset (Ke, Km, Ku)

The keyset is constituted of 3 keys, derived from the ShS, calculated both by eUICC and SM-DP entities as follow:  Ke: encryption key used to encrypt the Profile;  Km: integrity key used for MAC;  Ku: optional key from the keyset used for protection of key values. To be calculated, these keys shall use a Key Derivation Function (KDF).

The KDF could be a PRF (Pseudo Random Function) which is a combination of one way hash functions. Several PRFs can be used in the Key Derivation Function. The KDF could take as parameters information related to the eUICC, the Profile owner (MNO), the Profile itself, the SM-DP or the card issuer.

These different keys are calculated as follow:
         Ke=KDF(ShS, additional_information, diversified_parameter1);
         Km=KDF(ShS, additional_information, diversified_parameter2);
         Ku=KDF(ShS, additional_information, diversified_parameter3);
With,
         additional_information is a common diversification input to generate the three keys; it
         could include information relating to MNO, SM-DP, eUICC, Profile and a nonce.
         Diversified_parameters are diversification parameters to generate different keys.
The Profile can be sent from the SM-DP to the eUICC on the base of a secure channel
protocol using this keyset.

D.4 Role of the EUM in the Certificate Chain

The EUM is required in the different key establishment scenarios to sign the eUICC Certificate which contains the public key of the asymmetric key pair of the eUICC (stored in the ECASD in the GlobalPlatform scenario). By verifying this signature and by checking the response produced by the eUICC in the key establishment procedure, the SM-DP can authenticate the eUICC independently of the SM-SR.

D.5 Mutual Authentication Binding to a SOA Environment

This section provides information when deploying eUICC remote management system in SOA environment using Web Services technology, following the OASIS and W3C WS-* standard. This standard provides interoperability and loose coupling between parties named as “message requester” and “message receiver”. The architecture does not prevent from using another type of technology if the security requirements detailed in this document are met. It implies that both message requester and message receiver uses the same technology.

D.5.1 Authentication

To secure the messages being sent between the entities, at least one of the following two
mechanisms could be used:
      1. WS-Security standard.
      2. Mutual authenticated transport level security (SSL).
Both mechanisms require the use of digital signed certificates. For WS-Security mutual
authentication at least X.509 certificate needs to be supported.
Both parties are required to have X.509 certificates (and public-private key pairs) which is
used to authenticate each other using their certificates.
The specifics of who is trusted to issue X.509 certificates depend on the organisation’s PKI
setup. For authentication, the subject of the X.509 certificate identifies the Actor. We also
assume that the issuer of the X.509 certificates is a general Certificate Authority not directly
involved in any authorisation of the web service transactions, but is relied on for the validity
of the X.509 certificate in a manner out of scope of the scenarios covered.

E Flowcharts for basic remote Provisioning events (Informative)

This annex suggests macroscopic flows for remote Subscription management. These flows
are designed to enable an MNO using remote Subscription management services to
manage eUICCs according to Customer demands.
This also illustrates how the various procedures link together and how processes external to
the Subscription management architecture (such as Subscription activation) need to interact
with these procedures.
An important issue is to avoid situations of dead-lock or unmanageable Profiles as
unintended consequences of a particular management practise. These situations may be
avoided by ensuring the proper process flow when managing Subscriptions and their
associated Profiles.
The following codes of conduct should be observed by any MNO:
   1. When a Customer terminates a contract with an MNO, this MNO should clean up its
        part of the eUICC(s) and associated Subscription Manager(s) of this Customer (SIM-
        card analogy: cards for which Subscriptions no longer exist are destroyed)
   2. When an MNO terminates a contract with a Customer, this MNO should clean up its
        part of the eUICC(s) and associated Subscription Manager(s) of this Customer (SIM-
        card analogy: SIM-cards become useless (and are destroyed)
   3. The contents of a Profile including policy settings should at all times reflect the
        contract between MNO and the Customer (i.e. if there is no valid exclusivity clause in
        the contract, the Profile should reflect this.)
The flows illustrated below are to be used for situations of management for:
      a single Subscription for a single machine-to-machine Device a single Subscription
        for multiple machine-to-machine Devices multiple Subscriptions for a single machine-
        to-machine Device
      multiple Subscriptions for multiple machine-to-machine Devices
It is advised that these flows are used as guidelines in the general case.
The flowcharts are built around the procedures of the architecture. To keep complexity low
two macros have been created, “Provisioning” and “De-Provisioning”. Those are the first two
charts illustrated after the legend below. Following this are use-cases which are described in
the GSMA’s Ecosystem document [2]. In addition the use of the “Master Delete” and “Fall-
back” mechanisms is illustrated. Note that “Fall-back” is a mechanism which is triggered
within the eUICC and not by an entity in the Subscription Management architecture directly.

E.1 Legend

Start or end condition

SM predefined procedure

Macro Procedure: Group of procedures or
events

Other SM procedure or event

Other, SM external, procedure or event

Logical AND

Logical OR

Decision

n                      Connector

Figure 21: Legend – following conventional flowchart notation

E.2 Macro procedure: «Provisioning of a Machine to Machine Device»

1

Change            Yes              Proc.10:
SM-SR?                         Change of SM-SR

No

MNO: Requires profile
     download
No           Enabling          Yes               Proc. 3:
             required                      Profile Download &
                ?                              Installation
      Proc. 3:                                            ISD-P created in eUICC for MNO,
Profile Download &                                     containing profile in disabled state, SM-
    Installation                                                   SR updated EIS.
    Proc..5:
Profile Enabling
                                                                       Target profile is enabled on
   ISD-P created in eUICC for MNO,
                                                                       eUICC. Previously enabled
containing profile in disabled state, SM-
                                                                        profile is disabled. EIS is
            SR updated EIS.
                                                                                  updated.
2b
                                                                2a

Figure 22- Macro: “Provisioning of Device” – showing the flow following a Customer

demand to provision a machine to machine Device.
E3.    Macro Procedure: “De-Provisioning of Machine to Machine Device”

3

MNO: Requires profile
     Deletion
No            Profile
             Deletion
                                Yes
             via SM-
                DP
                                             Proc. 9:
   Proc. 8:
                                         ISD-P deletion via
ISD-P deletion
                                              SM-DP
 The profile and its container is removed
from the eUICC. EIS is up to date in SM-
 SR. Only Provisioning profile is enabled.

4

Figure 23- Macro: “De-Provisioning of machine to machine Device” – showing the

flow resulting from a Customer demand to delete a Profile or as part of the
                       termination of a Subscription.

E.4 A. From eUICC registration to operative machine to machine Device –

Customer enters Subscription with MNO (Ecosystem Lifecycle worked example 3.1.1)

eUICCs produced; provisioning profile                         Profiles defined, tested, agreed between
 loaded; tested ready for shipment;                           MNO and SM-DP; MNO demands n>=1
     has a corresponding EIS.                                               eUICC profiles
     Proc..1:                                                        Proc. 2:
eUICC Registration                                               Profile Ordering
    at SM-SR                                                         (propr.)
eUICC registered at SM-SR; can be                               Ordered quantity ready for profile
shipped to the device manufacturer.                          download. Credentials available to MNO.
EID of eUICC and SRID known
           by MNO
Device manufacturer:
                                                                    Customer:
 eUICC integrated in
                                                              Enters subscription with
       device
                                                                       MNO
   MNO: initiates
provisioning of device                                            MNO: Activates
                                                                   subscription

1

Provisioning of
    device

2a

Device is operative

Figure 24: The flow describing the way from registration of the eUICC/Device with the

SM-SR to the Provisioning of the machine to machine Device on demand from the
                                  first Customer

E.5 B. End of contract with MNO A. Re-Provisioning with MNO B (Ecosystem: 3.1.2 worked example – Re-Provisioning, case 2)

      Customer:
Enters subscription with
        MNO B
EID of eUICC and SRID known
          by MNO B
   MNO B: initiates
provisioning of device

1

Provisioning of
    device
MNO B: Activates
  subscription
                            2a
                                                          MNO A:
Device is operative with
                                                      De-provisioning of
        MNO B
                                                           device
 MNO A’s profile is
cleared from device

Figure 25: End of contract between Customer and MNO A. Customer Re-Provisioning with MNO B. MNO A performs a De-Provisioning, thus clearing his Profiles from the Customer’s machine to machine Device.

E.6 C. Termination of a Subscription (Ecosystem: 3.1.2 worked example - end of

contract)

  The customer’s
subscription with the
 MNO is terminated
For all EIDs associated
 with the subscription,
perform the sequence
         below
                                                              The target profile is enabled on
                                                                       the eUICC.
EID of eUICC and SRID known
           by MNO
                              MNO: initiates de-
                              provisioning - and
                              clean-up of device
3
De-Provisioning of
     device
                                    MNO:
4                           Deactivates Customer
                                subscription
   Customer subscription
deactivated. Device no longer
  operative with this MNO

Figure 26: Customer terminates his Subscription with MNO and MNO de-provisions

the machine to machine Device, removing Profiles.

E.7 D: Customer Changes Machine to Machine Device but not MNO. (Ecosystem

3.1.3 worked example)

Customer has operative           Customer decides to
   device with MNO                 change device
MNO: initiates de-
 provisioning of
     device

3

De-Provisioning of
     device

4

New eUICC registered at                                         MNO: initiates
SM-SR and integrated in                                         provisioning of
     new device                                                     device
                        MNO: activates
                         subscription
1
Provisioning of
    device

2a

New device operative
     with MNO
Figure 27 Ecosystem 3.1.3 worked example: the Customer replaces one machine to
                machine Device for another without changing MNO.

E.8 E. Switch of Enabled Profile from MNO A to MNO B. (Both Subscriptions are

active)

 Device is operative with
                                         Subscription activated by
MNO A.. Profile for MNO B
                                                 MNO B
   disabled on eUICC
                                                             MNO B: initiates a
Customer: Decides to
                                                             switch of enabled
enable subscription B
                                                                  profiles
    Proc..5:
Profile Enabling
                                 Device is operative with
                                         MNO B
Figure 28 Switching of Enabled Profile from MNO A to MNO B. Both Subscriptions
                           with MNO A and B are active.

E.9 F. Use of Master Delete Mechanism

  There is a profile with
unmanageable policy rules
      on an eUICC
              Is the
No            target             Yes
              profile
             enabled
 Owner of the target
profile deactivates the
      subscription
  Proc.:
 Fall-Back
Mechanism
   Proc.:
Master delete
 Mechanism
  The target profile is
deleted. The profile with
the Fall-Back attribute is
         enabled

Figure 29: Using the Master Delete mechanism to remove a Profile with unmanageable

policy rule(s).

E.10 G. Use of Fall-back Mechanism

Connectivity to the device
with the enabled profile is
     permanently lost
  Proc.:
 Fall-Back
Mechanism
The profile with the fall-
 back attribute set is
enabled, the previously
  enabled profile is
      disabled.

Figure 30: Use of the (on-card) Fall-back Mechanism.

F Profile Creation, Ordering and Personalisation (Informative)

The following diagram shows an example of how the functions defined in section 3.3.1.1 may be performed.

Figure 31: Profile Creation, Ordering and Personalisation

Document Management Document History

Version    Date          Brief Description of Change         Approval              Editor /
                                                             Authority             Company
                                                             GSMA Embedded
                         1st Release of Document,
                                                             SIM Leadership        Ian Smith,
V1.0       01/7/2013     submitted to DAG#108 and
                                                             Team and PSMC         GSMA
                         PSMC#116 for approval
V1.1       06/12/2013    2nd Release of Document,            GSMA Embedded
                         submitted to DAG#108 and            SIM Leadership        Ian Smith,
                         PSMC#116 for approval               Team and PSMC         GSMA
Other Information
Type                              Description
Document Owner                    Embedded SIM
Editor / Company                  Ian Smith, GSMA

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