Menu
Latest
12 meetings · Prague, Jeju · 12–16 Oct
Reports
RAN1#126-bis · SA2#177

Glossary term · Security

128-NIA2

128-bit NR Integrity Algorithm 2

Security →

128-NIA2 is the AES-based 128-bit 5G NR integrity algorithm defined in 33.501 to protect RRC and NAS messages and optionally user-plane data with authentication, replay protection, and tamper detection.

Introduced
Rel-15
Where
Security
Specifications
1 specs
128-NIA2 Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

128-NIA2 is a standardized 5G New Radio integrity algorithm that provides message authentication and freshness protection for radio-layer signalling. It is specified in 3GPP TS 33.501 as one of the NR integrity algorithms. Integrity protection is central to NR because the radio interface is exposed and attackers may attempt to modify, replay, or forge messages. NIA2 is commonly used to protect RRC signalling and NAS transport messages, and it can also be applied to user-plane data when the network selects user-plane integrity. Unlike encryption, integrity protection does not conceal the message content; instead, it allows the receiver to verify that the message was generated by a party holding the correct key and that it has not been altered. Cryptographically, 128-NIA2 is based on AES-128 CMAC, a message authentication code constructed from the Advanced Encryption Standard. The algorithm takes a 128-bit integrity key, security context parameters such as COUNT, direction, bearer or radio bearer identifier, length, and the message to be protected. The message is processed through AES-CMAC, which pads and transforms the data into a fixed-length authentication tag. In NR, the resulting MAC is typically truncated to 32 bits and appended to the protected message as MAC-I. The receiver recomputes the MAC using the same key and inputs and compares the result. If the comparison succeeds, the receiver has assurance that the message is authentic and fresh, because the COUNT and direction inputs bind the MAC to a particular bearer and sequence position. The integrity key used by NIA2 is derived from the 5G security context in the same hierarchy as encryption keys. During registration, authentication, and security mode procedures, the UE and network agree on algorithms and keys. RRC integrity is mandatory in NR for control-plane protection, while user-plane integrity is optional and depends on deployment policy and UE capability. The COUNT parameter is essential for replay protection: an old message encrypted or integrity protected under a previous COUNT cannot produce a valid MAC under the current expected COUNT. Direction indicators prevent messages intended for one direction from being accepted in the opposite direction, and bearer identifiers prevent cross-bearer substitution. These bindings are what make the algorithm suitable for mobile networks with many simultaneous bearers and frequent security context changes. From an implementation standpoint, NIA2 benefits from the broad availability of AES hardware. AES-CMAC can be accelerated using the same AES core used for AES-CTR encryption, although the modes and key usage differ. This can reduce cost and power consumption in devices that already support NEA2. The algorithm is also attractive because AES-CMAC has been extensively analyzed and is used in many other standards. Nevertheless, integrity algorithms must be implemented carefully to avoid timing side channels, incorrect truncation handling, or replay counter management errors. The 32-bit tag length provides a practical balance between signalling overhead and forgery resistance, but it also means that repeated forgery attempts are possible; protocols therefore include failure handling and key refresh mechanisms. The main limitation of 128-NIA2 is that it does not provide confidentiality. A message protected only by NIA2 may still be readable by an eavesdropper if it is not encrypted. It also does not protect against all forms of denial of service or resource exhaustion, although it prevents undetected tampering and replay. In NR, NIA2 is therefore used together with encryption algorithms such as NEA2 or NEA1 to provide both confidentiality and integrity. In summary, 128-NIA2 is the AES-based 128-bit NR integrity algorithm that secures the authenticity and freshness of control-plane and optional user-plane messages, leveraging AES-CMAC to detect modification and replay.

Purpose & Motivation

128-NIA2 exists because NR control-plane security requires more than confidentiality. An attacker on the radio interface may attempt to modify, replay, or forge RRC or NAS messages, which could lead to downgrade attacks, bearer manipulation, or session hijacking. The algorithm was introduced in Rel-15 as the AES-based integrity algorithm in the NR security suite. It provides a standardized way to authenticate messages and bind them to a specific bearer, direction, and sequence number, so the receiver can detect tampering and stale messages. Previous approaches relied on encryption alone or on older LTE integrity mechanisms, which were not sufficient for the NR architecture. Encryption does not prove that a message came from the legitimate peer or that it was not altered. LTE already used AES-CMAC in EIA2, but NR required a new algorithm suite aligned with the 5G key hierarchy and stricter integrity expectations. 128-NIA2 addresses this by using a widely trusted AES construction, enabling hardware reuse with NEA2, and supporting mandatory integrity protection for signalling while allowing optional user-plane integrity. It solves the problem of active radio attacks and provides a practical balance between tag length, overhead, and security. The motivation also includes interoperability and confidence: AES-CMAC has been extensively analyzed, and using AES for both encryption and integrity simplifies security evaluation.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define 128-NIA2. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 33.501Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 TS 33.501 adds roaming and inter-PLMN indirect communication authorization, fast re-authentication for non-3GPP mobility, and AI/ML security clauses for positioning and federated learning. It also adds NPN security, NRF access token key retrieval, LTM security, and monitoring-of-signalling-traffic protection.

Full comparison in TS 33.501 →

Technology family

Ciphering and integrity algorithms · Security

  1. Phase 1 A5/1, A5/2, A8
  2. R97 GEA
  3. R98 B1, B2
  4. R99 A5/3, GEA3, KASUMI, UEA1, UIA1
  5. Rel-7 SNOW 3G, UEA2, UIA2
  6. Rel-8 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, EEA0, EIA0
  7. Rel-9 A5/4, GEA4
  8. Rel-11 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, ZUC
  9. Rel-13 GEA5, GIA4, GIA5
  10. Rel-15 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3, NEA0, NIA0
  • 128-NIA2 reuses 128-EIA2
    “128-NIA2 is based on 128-bit AES [15] in CMAC mode [17].” TS 33.501

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 1 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Rel-15 introduced

128-NIA2 is specified for the first time in TS 33.501 as a 128-bit AES-CMAC based NR integrity algorithm, identical to 128-EIA2, for NAS, RRC and UP integrity protection.

  • “128-NIA2 is based on 128-bit AES [15] in CMAC mode [17].” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
  • “128-NIA2 is identical to 128-EIA2 as specified in Annex B of TS 33.401 [10].” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
  • “128-NIA1 and 128-NIA2 for NAS signalling integrity protection, RRC signalling integrity protection and UP integrity protection.” TS 33.501 v15.20.0

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference 128-NIA2, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 33.501 vk30 5G Security Architecture Rel-20 read