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Glossary term · Security

128-NEA2

128-bit NR Encryption Algorithm 2

Security →

128-NEA2 is the AES-based 128-bit confidentiality algorithm for 5G NR, defined in 33.501 to encrypt RRC and user-plane data.

Introduced
Rel-15
Where
Security
Specifications
1 specs
128-NEA2 Description Purpose What changed Family Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

128-NEA2 is a standardized 5G New Radio encryption algorithm that provides confidentiality protection for radio-layer messages. It is specified in 3GPP TS 33.501 as one of the NR encryption algorithms, alongside null encryption and other cipher families. In the NR security architecture, NEA2 is used when the network and the UE agree to protect RRC signalling and, where applicable, user-plane data. The algorithm is selected from the UE security capability list and is bound to keys derived from the 5G authentication and key agreement procedure. Because it is a confidentiality algorithm, NEA2 prevents passive eavesdropping on the radio link, but it does not by itself authenticate the source of messages or protect against tampering; those functions are provided by integrity algorithms such as 128-NIA2 or 128-NIA1. Cryptographically, 128-NEA2 is based on the Advanced Encryption Standard with a 128-bit key operating in counter mode. The input key is normally a 128-bit derived key, such as a key used for RRC encryption or user-plane encryption. The algorithm also takes security context parameters, including a 32-bit COUNT, a direction indicator, a bearer or radio bearer identifier, and a length field. These values are used to construct a unique initial counter block for each encryption operation. AES then encrypts successive counter blocks to generate a keystream. The keystream is XORed with the plaintext to produce ciphertext, and the same operation can be used for decryption because CTR mode is symmetric. This construction allows encryption of arbitrary message lengths without the block padding requirements of CBC mode. The operational role of 128-NEA2 is tied to key derivation and per-bearer freshness. In 5G, the UE and network derive a hierarchy of keys from the long-term or session key, including keys for access stratum confidentiality and integrity. When a bearer is established or a security mode command is executed, the network indicates the selected encryption algorithm. The COUNT value is maintained per direction and bearer to ensure that each packet or message is encrypted under a different keystream. If the same key were reused with the same counter values, the security of a stream-like construction would be compromised, so the standard carefully binds bearer, direction, and sequence information into the algorithm inputs. This makes NEA2 suitable for the high-throughput, low-latency traffic patterns expected in NR. From an implementation perspective, AES is attractive because mature hardware and software implementations are available across mobile chipsets, baseband processors, and security accelerators. AES-CTR can be pipelined and parallelized, which helps meet the performance demands of 5G data channels. The algorithm is also familiar to security engineers because AES is widely analyzed and standardized outside 3GPP. In NR deployments, NEA2 is often considered a strong default or recommended option where AES acceleration is present. However, support for NEA2 is negotiated through UE capabilities and network policy, and the standard also defines alternative algorithms so that operators can choose based on security, performance, regulatory, or interoperability requirements. The main limitation of 128-NEA2 is that it provides only confidentiality. It does not detect message modification, replay, or spoofing unless combined with an integrity mechanism. It also relies on correct key management, unique counter usage, and protection of the derived keys from disclosure. If a key is compromised, all traffic encrypted with that key can be decrypted; if counter reuse occurs, plaintexts may be related through XOR differences. Therefore, NEA2 is used as part of a broader security framework that includes authentication, key derivation, integrity protection, and replay protection. In summary, 128-NEA2 is the AES-based 128-bit NR encryption algorithm that secures the radio link against passive interception while leveraging the performance and trustworthiness of AES.

Purpose & Motivation

128-NEA2 exists because 5G New Radio requires a strong, efficient confidentiality algorithm for the exposed radio interface. Passive eavesdropping is a realistic threat in cellular networks, and the NR architecture demands high throughput, low latency, and support for diverse services. The algorithm was introduced in Rel-15 as part of the NR security suite to provide an AES-based option that can protect RRC and user-plane data using keys derived from the 5G authentication and key agreement procedure. Its purpose is to ensure that intercepted radio frames do not reveal signalling or user content without requiring the attacker to possess the correct session keys. Previous approaches, including LTE encryption algorithms and null encryption, did not fully meet the needs of the new radio architecture. Null encryption provides no confidentiality, and older algorithms may not align with the NR key hierarchy, bearer model, or performance expectations. AES was chosen because it is widely analyzed, widely deployed, and well supported by hardware accelerators. 128-NEA2 therefore solves the problem of securing NR radio traffic while offering a trusted cipher family, good performance, and interoperability across devices and networks. It also supports algorithm diversity, allowing operators to balance security, regulatory requirements, and implementation efficiency.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define 128-NEA2. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 33.501Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 TS 33.501 adds roaming and inter-PLMN indirect communication authorization, fast re-authentication for non-3GPP mobility, and AI/ML security clauses for positioning and federated learning. It also adds NPN security, NRF access token key retrieval, LTM security, and monitoring-of-signalling-traffic protection.

Full comparison in TS 33.501 →

Technology family

Ciphering and integrity algorithms · Security

  1. Phase 1 A5/1, A5/2, A8
  2. R97 GEA
  3. R98 B1, B2
  4. R99 A5/3, GEA3, KASUMI, UEA1, UIA1
  5. Rel-7 SNOW 3G, UEA2, UIA2
  6. Rel-8 128-EEA1, 128-EEA2, 128-EIA1, 128-EIA2, EEA0, EIA0
  7. Rel-9 A5/4, GEA4
  8. Rel-11 128-EEA3, 128-EIA3, ZUC
  9. Rel-13 GEA5, GIA4, GIA5
  10. Rel-15 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3, NEA0, NIA0
  • 128-NEA2 reuses 128-EEA2
    “128-NEA2 is based on 128-bit AES [15] in CTR mode [16].” TS 33.501

Members and relations were proposed independently by several models and kept only where at least two agree; quotes are verified verbatim against the specifications. Release = first approved version of the defining specification.

Detected Changes Across Releases

verified against 3GPP sources

Documented changes in 1 releases, each verified against the text of 3GPP specifications or approved change requests and shown with the exact wording. The release timeline above shows the same releases. A release without an entry has no documented change for this term.

Rel-15 introduced

128-NEA2 is specified for the first time in TS 33.501 as a 128-bit AES-CTR based NR ciphering algorithm, identical to 128-EEA2, for NAS, RRC and UP ciphering.

  • “128-NEA2 is based on 128-bit AES [15] in CTR mode [16].” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
  • “128-NEA2 is identical to 128-EEA2 as specified in Annex B of TS 33.401 [10].” TS 33.501 v15.20.0
  • “NEA0, 128-NEA1 and 128-NEA2 for NAS signalling ciphering, RRC signalling ciphering and UP ciphering;” TS 33.501 v15.20.0

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference 128-NEA2, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 33.501 vk30 5G Security Architecture Rel-20 read