Overview
The document defines architecture and requirements for remote provisioning and management of eUICCs in IoT devices constrained by network connectivity, user interface, or both, based on the architecture described in SGP.21. It sets out principles, roles, architecture elements, interfaces, functional and security requirements, and procedures for downloading, enabling, disabling, and deleting profiles and configuring an eIM. Its framework is intended to support global interoperability in IoT deployments. The primary focus is devices that use a remote profile management entity, with permissive principles also addressing other device types.
- eUICC
- eSIM
- IoT
- SGP.21
- eIM
- Profile management
Overview generated automatically from the document's scope and outline. The document text is authoritative.
Changes since v1.2
65 clauses modified, 5 clauses added
Compared automatically clause by clause from the extracted text of both versions; differences only in layout, spacing or table cells are ignored. The documents are authoritative.
1.4 Definition of Termsmodified
| Term | Description | Activation Code | Information issued by an Operator to request the download and installation of a Profile. |Application Developer As defined in SGP.21 [1]. Associated eIM | An eIM whose eIM Configuration Data is available within the eUICC and used by the eUICC for verification of an eIM Configuration Operation or PSMO. | Bound Profile Package | As defined in SGP.21 [1]. | Connectivity Parameters | A set of data required by the eUICC to open a communication channel (for example HTTPS) on a dedicated network. | eIM Configuration Data | The data to be used by the eUICC to authenticate the eIM commands. | eIM Configuration Operation (eCO) | An operation related to eIM Configuration Data (e.g.(e.g., add eIM Operation (eCO) Configuration Data, read/remove eIM Configuration Data in the eUICC) through the IPA. | Eligibility Check Information | As defined in SGP.21 [1]. |Information Emergency Profile | An Operational Profile with an attribute indicating that this Profile is to be enabled for Emergency Calls. |Term Description An Emergency Profile complies with regulatory requirements and only provides the capability to make Emergency Calls and receive calls from an Emergency centre (e.g.(e.g., Public Safety Answering Point). | It only applies for voice capable IoT Devices. | Emergency Mechanism | eUICC-based mechanism, triggered by the IPA, which enables and disables the Emergency Profile. | eUICC | As defined in SGP.21 [1] |eUICC OS Update As defined in SGP.21 [1]. eUICC Package | A signed package prepared by the eIM that contains either PSMO(s) or eCO(s). The package is verified and executed by the eUICC. | Event | As defined in SGP.21 [1]. | Event Record | As defined in SGP.21 [1]. | Event Registration | As defined in SGP.21 [1]. | Event Retrieval | A process for the IPA or eIM to retrieve Event Records for an eUICC from an SM-DS. | Fallback Attribute | This is an attribute of a Profile which, when set, identifies the Profile to be enabled by the Fallback Mechanism. | Fallback Mechanism | eUICC-based mechanism, triggered by the IPA, which enables the Profile with Fallback Attribute set when the Enabled Profile loses network connectivity. | Fallback Profile | An Operational Profile having the Fallback Attribute set. |Interoperable IoTApplication |As defined in SGP.21 [1]. IoT As defined in TS.34[3]. | IoT Device | As defined in TS.34 [3]. | IPA Capabilities | List of functionalities supported by the IPA. | Mobile Service Provider | The Mobile Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement with an Operator. The Mobile Service Provider could also be the Operator. | Network Constrained Device (NCD) | An IoT Device where communications resources are limited in Device (NCD) bandwidth and/or available protocol alternatives. E.g., the bandwidth is typically limited to relatively low data rates, and may allow asynchronous data exchange with a platform, and device may not support TCP (or even IP) protocols. | Notification | A report about a Profile Download or PSMO processed by the eUICC. | NOTE: This also applies for implicit changes of a Profile status, e.g.e.g., as a result of enabling another Profile. | Notification Receivers | A list defined in the Profile containing SM-DP+s that are to receive Notifications concerning that Profile. | Operator | As defined in SGP.21 [1]. | Profile | As defined in SGP.21 [1]. | Profile Package | As defined in SGP.21 [1]. | Profile State Management Operation (PSMO) | An operation related to the state update of a Profile in a dedicated Operation (PSMO) ISD-P on the eUICC (e.g:(e.g., enable Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, list Profile information,information). and query Profile metadata, update Profile metadata). | NOTE: in SGP.21 [1], the corresponding term is Profile Management. | Rollback Mechanism | Mechanism of enabling the previously enabled Profile in case no communication between the eIM and IPA can be established using the recently enabled Profile. | Root SM-DS | As defined in SGP.21 [1]. | Subscriber | As defined in SGP.21 [1]. | Subscription | As defined in SGP.21 [1]. |Term Description Subscription Manager Data Preparation + (SM-DP+) | As defined in SGP.21 [1] with the difference that LPA is IPA in the Preparation + (SM-DP+) context of this document. | Subscription Manager Discovery Server (SM-DS) | As defined in SGP.21 [1]. |Discovery Server (SM-DS) User Interface Constrained Device (UICD) | An IoT Device with limited, or without, a UI for RSP management Device (UICD) functions. |Table 1.4.1: Definition of Terms
1.5 Abbreviationsmodified
… Management Operation RSP Remote SIM Provisioning SD Security Domain SM-DP+ Subscription Manager Data Preparation + SM-DS Subscription Manager Discovery Server … Term Description SSD Supplementary Security Domain TCP Transmission Control Protocol UDP User Datagram Protocol UI User Interface UICD UI Constrained Device Table 1.5.1: Abbreviations
1.6 Referencesmodified
| Ref | Doc Number | Title |[1] 1. | SGP.21 V2.5V2.7 |RSP eSIM Architecture Specification[2] | 2. | TCA eUICC Profile Package | eUICC Profile Package: Interoperable Format Technical Package Specification |[3] 3. | TS.34 | IoT Device Connection Efficiency Guidelines |[4] 4. | RFC 2119 | “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, S. Bradner |[5] 5. | RFC 8174 | Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words |[6] 6. | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Information security management systems — Requirements |[7] 7. | SGP.24 | eSIM Compliance Process |[8] 8. | SGP.33-1 | eSIM IoT eUICC Test Specification |Table 1.6.1: References
1.7 Conventionsmodified
…OT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [4] and clarified by RFC 8174 … Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not found.,[5], when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.”
1.8 References to SGP.21modified
The present document contains several references to SGP.21 [1]. The following list maps the terms used by SGP.21 [1] to the terms used in the present document: - LPA (Local Profile Assistant) refers to IPA.
2 Principlesmodified
…r to SGP.21 [1] where appropriate. This implies that to cover the whole range of eSIM provisioning for IoT Devices SGP.31 MUST be used together with SGP.21 [1]. … However, the following feature defined in SGP.21 [1] is not applicable in the scope of this specification: − Activation Code Retrieval.
2.1 Basic Principlesmodified
This section describes basic principles on what is expected from the architecture. They are used to create the adequate normative requirements in this document. | Principle no. | Description | BP01 | It should be possible to securely perform all supported Profile State Management Operations remotely on a given IoT Device containing an eUICC. | BP02 | It should be possible for a IoT Device containing an eUICC to establish a secure connection with an entity performing Profile State Management Operations. | NOTE: a secure connection is a connection that provides at least confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. | BP03 | It should be possible to provision eUICCs in IoT Devices where SMS is not available. | BP04 | It should be possible to provision eUICCs in IoT Devices where connection-oriented protocols (e.g: TCP/IP) are not supported. | BP05 | It should be possible to use a lightweight protocol based on CoAP (e.g.(e.g., LwM2M) for transfer of Profile download and Profile State Management Operation related messages (e.g.(e.g., ES8+ messages) over LPWA networks in a secure way. | BP06 | The architecture should support Profile download and Profile State Management Operations in an asynchronous way with execution on a IoT Device happening after an extended period of time (e.g.(e.g., due to eDRX, PSM cycles). | NOTE: It may be necessary to store the information about the request for a longer period of time until the IoT Device is connected. | BP07 | The principle BP06 should also be applicable for automated Profile download and Profile State Management Operations on a large number of IoT Devices. | BP08 | The architecture should allow push mechanism to the IoT Device to initiate a Profile provisioning or management transaction. | BP09 | The architecture should allow polling by the IoT Device to check whether there is a Profile provisioning or management transaction waiting. | BP10 | The architecture should avoid ongoing and frequent polling between the IoT Device and the RSP system. | BP11 | The Notification mechanism should take into account the possibly limited availability of the IoT Device in the network as well as being adapted to the use in constrained networks, such as LPWA networks. | BP12 | It should be possible for an entity managing a IoT Device (e.g.(e.g., Mobile Service Provider, IoT Device owner/user, enterprise or IoT service provider) to remotely enable, disable and delete a Profile in a secure way. | BP13 | It should be possible for an entity managing a fleet of IoT Devices (e.g.(e.g., IoT Device owner/user, enterprise, Mobile Service Provider, or IoT service provider) to automate Profile download triggering and Profile State Management Operations for its IoT Devices. | BP14 | It should be possible to leverage the IoT Device’s existing protocol stack for IoT Device and data management (e.g.(e.g., CoAP over DTLS) for secure transfer of Profile downloads and Profile State Management Operation related messages (e.g.(e.g., ES8+ messages) to and from the IoT Device. | BP15 | Void | BP16 | Void | BP17 | Void | BP18 | Void | BP19 | Void | BP20 |Void The specification should provide a formula for the calculation of Profile Package sizes. | BP21 | It should be possible to provision eUICCs in IoT Devices using an IP transport (e.g.:(e.g., CoAP over UDP). | BP22 | It should be possible to provision eUICCs in IoT Devices using a non-IP transport (e.g.:(e.g., CoAP over NIDD). | BP23 | Void | BP24 | The architecture should support a single-round trip key management protocol to establish the secure channel between the eUICC and the server. | BP25 | The specifications should aim to describe protocols for the support and security of Profile download or Profile State Management Operation to minimise the number of transactions required over the lifetime of the IoT Device. | BP26 | The architecture should support Profile State Management Operation and Profile download operations with minimal integration between different components and/or different entities. | BP27 | The architecture should optimize the traffic (e.g.(e.g., avoid excessive polling) between the network and the IoT Device to enable mass IoT deployment. “TS.34 – IoT Device Connection Efficiency Guidelines” of the GSMA [3] should be followed. | BP28 | The architecture should minimise the number of operations at IoT Device/eUICC side to avoid IoT Devices having very long operational lifetime wearing out sensitive memory. | BP29 | The architecture should be able to cope with the IoT Device being unreachable for prolonged periods of time. | BP30 | The transmission of Notifications should be highly reliable when connectivity is available and the IoT Device can process the task, taking into account limited memory to store Notifications until they can be sent. | BP31 | It should be possible to remotely trigger the IoT Device, in a secure way, to start the download of a Profile. | BP32 | It should be possible to perform remote operations described in BP31,BP31 BP15 and BP16 without requiring local interaction with a given IoT Device. | BP33 | Void | BP34 | Computational complexity of processes should be consistent with process transaction latency for IoT Devices having limited power and/or total lifetime energy resources, without impacting the security level. | NOTE: The following basic principles have been highlighted as principles that require further study in the future: BP09, BP10, BP13, BP20, BP23, BP24, BP25, BP27, BP29.
2.2 IoT Device principlesmodified
…ity is out of scope of this specification. DEVP2 Profile handling related code on the IoT Device SHOULD be kept to a minimum for memory constrained IoT Devices. … Table 2.2.1: Basic principles
2.3 IoT Profile Principlesmodified
…he issuing Mobile Service Provider and is out of scope of this document. PROF4 Profile package size SHOULD be kept to a minimum for Network Constrained Devices. … Table 2.3.1: IoT Device principles
3.2 Subscriber, End User, eUICC Manufacturer, Device Manufacturer, Application Developermodified was Subscriber, End User, eUICC Manufacturer, Device Manufacturer
The roles eUICC Manufacturer, Device Manufacturer, SubscriberSubscriber, and End User and Application Developer are used as defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.1 Architecture Diagrammodified
The following architecture diagrams describe the roles and interfaces (Figure 1). [] Figure 1 eSIM IoT Functional Architecture (IPA in the IoT Device)4.1.1.1).
4.1.1 IPA in the IoT Deviceadded
ES12 SM-DP SM-DP+ ES2+ Operator ES9+’ ES9+ SM-DS ES8+ ES8+ ES11’ eSIM IoT remote Manager ESipa ES6 ES8+ ES8+ ES11 ESep IPA ES10a ES10b ISD-R ISD-P MNO-SD eUICC IoT Device Figure 4.1.1.1: eSIM IoT Functional Architecture (IPA in the IoT Device)
4.1.2 IPA in the eUICCmodified
The following architecture diagrams describe the architecture model (Figure 2)4.1.2.1) where the IPA is located in the eUICC. []ES12 SM-DP SM-DP+ ES2+ Operator ES9+’ SM-DS ES8+ ES9+ ES11’ ES8+ eSIM IoT remote Manager ESipa ESep ES6 ES8+ ES8+ ES8+ IPA ES11 ES8+ ISD-R ISD-P MNO-SD eUICC IoT Device Figure 24.1.2.1: eSIM IoT Functional Architecture (IPA in the eUICC)
4.2.1 eSIM IoT Remote Managermodified
…tions (eCO) on the eUICC when it is associated with the eUICC. The Eim can either be a stand-alone component or a component of a higher-level functional system … (e.g.(e.g., device management platform). NOTE: Apart from the necessary functional and security requirements, this specification will not further describe the implementati… …
4.2.2 IoT Profile Assistantmodified
…oT Device to be provisioned by the SM-DP+. The IPA can either be a stand-alone component or a component of a higher-level functional software in the IoT Device … (e.g.(e.g., device management client). The IPA provides multiple distinct functions, the Profile Download,the Discovery Service, the Notification Handling, Conveying PSMO, eCO and related results as described below. | Function name | Description | Discovery Service | When REQUIRED, this service is responsible for retrieving pending Event Records from the SM-DS. | Profile Download | This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound Profile Package in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile Package from the SM-DP+ to the IPA in a single transaction, and (ii) the onward transfer of the Bound Profile Package into the eUICC in segments. | This function will depend on network, IoT Device, and eUICC capabilities. | PSMO / eCO Conveying | This is responsible for conveying PSMOs, eCO and related results between eIM and eUICC. | Notification Handling | This is responsible for forwarding notifications to the eIM and/or the SM-DP+.SM- |DP+. 1.Table 4.2.2.1: IPA Function Descriptions
4.3.1 eUICC Architecture Overviewmodified
This section describes the internal high-level architecture of the eUICC. The eUICC architecture is similar to the one used in [1]. []The IoT Device To Operator To SM-DS To SM-DP+ To SM-DP+ To eIM To eIM To IPA in ES10a,b ESipa ESep ES9+ ES11 ES6 ES8+ eUICC Telecom Operating Framework System ISD-P ISD-P IPA in the eUICC MNO-SD MNO-SD Profile IPA Package Services Interpreter File System File System Applets Applets ISD-R CASD CASD NAAs NAAs SSD SSD ECASD Operator Disabled Profile Operator Enabled Profile Figure 34.3.1.1: eUICC Architecture (IPA in eUICC)
4.4.11 eIM – eUICC (ESep)modified
The ESep is a logical end-to-end interface between the eIM and the eUICC used for eUICC Package (PSMO and eCO). | Req no. | Description | ESEP1 | The PSMO and eCO SHALL be integrity protected over ESep. | NOTE: The solution shall not require associating at eUICC manufacturing the eUICC with a specific eIM. | ESEP2 | The PSMO and eCO SHALL be protected against replay attacks. | ESEP3 | The PSMO and eCO SHALL be protected in terms of integrity and authenticity. |Table 2.4.4.11.1: eIM – eUICC (ESep) Interface Requirements
4.4.12 eIM – IPA (ESipa)modified
…sed to provide a secure transport for the delivery of PSMO and eCO between an eIM and an IPA, unless the underlying transport provides necessary security. NOTE … ::The The underlying transport layer can provide transport for other functions (e.g.(e.g., device management) and should allow multiplexing of these functions in parallel with the ESipa. Req no. Description ESipa1 ESipa SHALL support triggering of Pr … ipa SHALL be privacy protected. ESipa6 ESipa message SHALL be protected against replay attacks. ESipa7 ESipa MAY support delivery of eCO between eIM and eUICC. … 3.Table 4.4.12.1: eIM – IPA (ESipa) Interface Requirements
5.1.1 General Functional Requirementsmodified
Req no. Description GENF01 It is OPTIONAL for the IoT Device, eIM and the SM-DP+ to permit the use of GENF01 an SM-DS. 4.Table 5.1.1.1: General Functional Requirements
5.1.2 eUICC Functional Requirementsmodified
All eUICC functional requirements specified in SGP.21 [1] SHALL apply to this specification, unless specified otherwise. This includes sectionthe following sections of SGP.21 [1]: 4.3 “eUICC Requirements”Requirements”, and 4.4 “ eUICC eligibility Check”Check”, of4.15 SGP.21“eUICC [1].OS Update”. The following requirements from SGP.21 [1] are not applicable within the scope of this specification: EUICC36, EUICC46, EUICC47, EUICC53, EUICC57. The below are additional requirements: | Req no. | Description | EUICCF1 | The eIM Configuration Data SHALL include credentials (e.g.(e.g., eIM public key) to allow the eUICC to authenticate the commands from the eIM. | EUICCF2 | It SHALL be possible to transfer eIM Configuration Data to the eUICC at the stage of eUICC production. | NOTE: The mechanism and security applied are left to the implementation and may be EUM specific. | EUICCF3 | The eUICC SHALL provide an interface to the IPA to perform eCOs. | NOTE: Whether IPA/device uses this interface is an implementation specific decision. | EUICCF4 | When the eUICC is not associated to any eIM, the eUICC SHALL accept adding any eIM Configuration Data provided through the interface defined in EUICCF3. | NOTE: This interface can be disabled by configuring any (even non-existing) eIM. | EUICCF5 | Once an eIM is associated with the eUICC, the eUICC SHALL only accept further eCOs signed by the Associated eIM, except EUICCF6 and EUICCF16. | The processing of this signed eIM Configuration Operations SHALL be handled as a signed PSMO. |NOTE: EUICCF6The |addition of other eIM(s) is under the responsibility of the currently Associated eIM(s). EUICCF6 The eUICC MAY provide an interface to the IPA to allow the complete removal of all eIM Configuration Data from the eUICC. | NOTE: The mechanism has to be protected against misuse and could be realised by a kind of reset functionality. | EUICCF7 | The eUICC SHALL support the Rollback Mechanism. | EUICCF8 | If the eIM has requested use of the Rollback Mechanism (see EIMF8), and if the IPA informs the eUICC that Rollback is required (see IPAF1), the eUICC SHALL execute the Rollback Mechanism. | NOTE: In this version only the requesting eIM is notified about the result. | EUICCF9 | The eUICC SHALL provide a signed result of a requested PSMO, eCO or Profile installation to the IPA. | NOTE: This signed result is included by the IPA within its responses to requests from the eIM. | EUICCF10 | The eUICC SHALL be able to provide Notifications to the IPA for IPA to send to Notification Receivers. This mechanism SHALL be in accordance with SGP.21[1]. | EUICCF11 | The eUICC SHALL be able to accept default SM-DP+ triggered Profile download and immediate enabling without signed PSMO from any potentially Associated eIM. | EUICCF12 | The behavior in EUICCF11 SHALL be configurable in the eUICC. | EUICCF13 | Changing the configuration in the eUICC (see EUICCF12 and EUICC15) SHALL not require a signed PSMO, if there is no eIM associated. If an eIM is associated, only the Associated eIM can change the configuration in the eUICC. | An EUM MAY configure the behavior in eUICC manufacturing. | EUICCF14 | The eUICC MAY be able to accept SM-DS triggered Profile download and immediate enabling without signed PSMO from any potentially Associated eIM. | NOTE: technical implementation of this requirement is FFS. | EUICCF15 | The behavior in EUICCF11 and EUICCF14 (if supported) SHALL be configurable in the eUICC. | NOTE: technical implementation of this requirement for EUICCF14 is FFS. | EUICCF16 | The eUICC MAY provide an interface to the IPA to read the eIM Configuration Data (e.g:(e.g., eIM ID) stored in the eUICC. | EUICCF17 | An eUICC SHALL indicate in the Eligibility Check Information if it is an eUICC as defined in this specification. | EUICCF18 | The eUICC MAY support the Emergency Mechanism. | EUICCF19 | If the Emergency Mechanism is supported, the eUICC SHALL provide an interface to the IPA to Enable and Disable the Emergency Profile. | EUICCF20 | If the Emergency Mechanism is supported, the eUICC MAY contain the Emergency Profile. | EUICCF21 | If the Emergency Mechanism is supported, the eUICC SHALL enable the previously enabled Profile when the Emergency Profile is disabled by the IPA. | EUICCF22 | If Fallback Mechanism is supported, the eUICC SHALL provide an interface to the IPA to Enable and Disable the Fallback Profile. | EUICCF23 | If Fallback Mechanism is supported, the eUICC SHALL contain at most one Profile with the Fallback Attribute set. | EUICCF24 | When the IPA sends the request to disable the Fallback Profile, the eUICC SHALL enable the previously enabled Profile. | EUICCF25 | The eUICC MAY provide an interface to set and unset the Fallback Attribute for a given Profile. | EUICCF26 | If Fallback Mechanism is supported, the eUICC SHALL reject to set the Fallback Attribute for a Profile if Fallback for this Profile is not authorised by the Profile Owner. | EUICCF27 | An Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to execute the test cases defined in SGP.33-1 [8]. | EUICCF28 | The eUICC SHALL support a set of standard functions and services including, but not limited to USIM Toolkit functions and GlobalPlatform features. The list of supported functions and services SHALL be explicitly referenced within the technical specification. | EUICCF29 | The eUICC SHALL support at least the following USIM Toolkit commands: | - PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION including the following fields: Location Information, IMEI, Network Measurement Results, Date & Time & Time zone, Access Technology | - TERMINAL PROFILE | - ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD) | - SEND SHORT MESSAGE | REFRESH including the “UICC Reset” and “eUICC Profile Change” modes | EUICCF30 | The eUICC SHALL support an IPAd (i.e.;(i.e., ES10 interface). |EUICCF31 5.The eUICC SHALL be able to download a Profile without changing Associated eIM. EUICCF32 It SHALL be possible to associate eUICC with zero, only one, or multiple eIMs. Table 5.1.2.1: eUICC Functional Requirements
5.1.3 eIM Functional Requirementsmodified
| Req no. | Description | EIMF1 | The eIM SHALL be able to trigger the IPA to initiate a Profile Download from the SM-DP+.SM- DP+. Depending on the technical capabilities of the IoT Device (see IPAF12), at least one of the following three Profile Download mechanisms SHALL be supported: | - Profile Download from default SM-DP+ | - Profile Download with Activation Code | - Profile Download via SM-DS | NOTE: Impact of this optionality on Profile Provisioning procedures is FFS. | EIMF2 | The eIM SHALL be able to trigger a PSMO to be executed by the eUICC. | EIMF3 | An eIM MAY be able to trigger an eCO to be executed by the eUICC. | EIMF4 | The eIM MAY support the transfer of the Bound Profile Package and related communication between the SM-DP+ and IPA/eUICC. | EIMF5 | An eIM which is designed for use with IoT Devices that do not require to support the establishment of a direct ES9+ interface to the SM-DP+, SHALL be able to support the transfer of the Bound Profile Package and related communication between the SM-DP+ and the IPA. | EIMF6 | The eIM MAY support the transfer of the Event Records and related communication between the SM-DS and IPA/eUICC. | EIMF7 | An eIM which is designed for use with IoT Devices that do not require to support the establishment of a direct ES11 interface to the SM-DS, SHALL be able to support the transfer of the Event Records and related communication between the SM-DS and the IPA. | EIMF8 | The eIM SHALL be able to request of the eUICC the activation of the Rollback Mechanism. | EIMF9 | The eIM SHALL support the transfer of Notifications and related communication between the SM-DP+ and IPA/eUICC. | EIMF10 | An eIM which is designed for use with IoT Devices that do not require to support the establishment of a direct ES9+ interface to the SM-DP+, SHALL be able to support the transfer of Notifications between the SM-DP+ and the IPA. | EIMF11 | If Fallback Mechanism is supported by the eUICC, an Associated eIM SHOULD be able to request the eUICC to set and unset the Fallback Attribute. |EIMF12 6.There SHALL be a compliance process for the eIM specified in GSMA SGP.24 [7]. EIMF13 An eIM MAY be declared compliant according to GSMA SGP.24 [7]. Table 5.1.3.1: eIM Functional Requirements
5.1.4 IPA Functional Requirementsmodified
| Req no. | Description | IPAF1 | If the eIM has requested activation of the Rollback Mechanism, then following a Profile Enabling request from an eIM and its execution by the eUICC, the IPA SHALL (a) determine if communications with that eIM can be established; and (b) inform the eUICC that Rollback is required if no communication with the eIM is possible. | IPAF2 | If the eIM request contains a signed PSMO, or a signed eCO, or triggers a Profile installation that returns a signed result from the eUICC, the IPA SHALL retrieve the signed result from the eUICC and SHALL include it in a response to the eIM. | IPAF3 | The IPA SHALL retrieve pending Notifications from the eUICC and SHALL send the Notifications to the Notification Receivers. | IPAF4 | An IPA which is designed for use with IoT Devices that do not require to support the establishment of a direct ES9+ interface to the SM-DP+, SHALL be able to include Notifications into responses between the IPA and the eIM. | IPAF5 | As per EIMF10, there SHALL be a means for the IPA to identify Notifications to be transferred by a specific eIM to a designated SM-DP+. | IPAF6 | The IPA SHALL send Notifications on a best-effort basis when connectivity is available. | IPAF7 | The IPA SHALL retain signed eUICC results until they can be sent in a response to the eIM. | IPAF8 | IPA MAY support direct Profile download via ES9+. | IPAF9 | IPA MAY support indirect Profile download via ESipa. | IPAF10 | The IPA MAY support eCOs. | IPAF11 | As per EIMF1, the IPA SHALL be able to accept a Profile Download trigger from the eIM. | IPAF12 | The IPA SHALL support at least one of the following three mechanisms for Profile Download: | - Profile Download from default SM-DP+ | - Profile Download with Activation Code | - Profile Download via SM-DS | IPAF13 | IPA MAY support Profile download and immediate enabling through default SM-DP+ without eIM involvement. | IPAF14 | There SHALL be at most one active IPA, either the IPAd or the IPAe, per eUICC at a given time (either IPAe or IPAd is active). | IPAF15 | If more than one IPA is present, the IoT Device MAY have a means to set which IPA is active. |NOTE: Note: it is IoT Device implementation-specific to configure which IPA is active by default. | IPAF16 | There SHALL be a mechanism for the IPA to provide its IPA Capabilities (e.g: verify Profile Metadata) to the eIM. | IPAF17 | IPA MAY support Profile download and immediate enabling through SM-DS without eIM involvement. | NOTE: technical implementation of this requirement is FFS. | IPAF18 | The IPA MAY request to the eUICC to Enable or Disable the Emergency Profile. | IPAF19 | If Fallback Mechanism is supported, the IPA SHOULD indicate to the eUICC the loss of connectivity in order to execute the Fallback Mechanism. | NOTE: It’s IoT Device implementation specific to detect the connectivity loss. | IPAF20 | If the IPA indicated to the eUICC the enabling of Fallback Profile, the IPA SHALL (a) determine if communications with that eIM can be established using Fallback Profile; and (b) inform the eUICC to enable the previously enabled Profile if no communication with the eIM is possible. | NOTE: It’s IoT Device implementation specific to retry. |IPAF21 7.There SHALL be a compliance process for the IPA (IPAd and IPAe) specified in GSMA SGP.24 [7]. Table 5.1.4.1: IPA Functional Requirements
5.1.5 SM-DP+ Functional Requirementsmodified
All SM-DP+ requirements specified in SGP.21 [1] section 4.10.2 apply for this specification, unless otherwise specified. The below are additional requirements: NOTE: An SM-DP+ can implement the Activation Code Retrieval (for Consumer Devices), according to SGP.21 [1] in requirements SMDP41, SMDP42, SMDP43, SMDP44, SMDP45, and SMDP46. Req no. Description SMDPF1 An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to identify an eUICC, as defined in this specification, through eUICC Eligibility Check Information. 8.Table 5.1.5.1: SM-DP+ Functional Requirements
5.1.6 Profile Functional Requirementsmodified
…ack Profile. PRF2 The Profile MAY contain Connectivity Parameters. PRF3 If a Profile contains Connectivity Parameters, these parameters MAY be managed via ES6. … 9.Table 5.1.6.1: Profile Functional Requirements
5.1.7 Requirements for Interoperable Applicationsadded
All requirements for Interoperable Applications specified in SGP.21 [1] section 4.16 SHALL apply to this specification, unless specified otherwise.
5.2.1 eUICC Security Requirementsmodified
All eUICC security requirements specified in SGP.21 [1] SHALL apply to this specification, unless specified otherwise. This includesincludes: The section 4.14.1 “eUICC Certification” of SGP.21 [1].[1], The requirements CERTPK1, CERTPK7, CERTPK9, CERTPK9a, and CERTPK10 of 4.14.6 “Public Key Certificates Management Requirements”, Additionally, if the eUICC supports an IPAe, the requirements CERTPK2, CERTPK3, CERTPK4, CERTPK5 and CERTPK10a. The following requirement from SGP.21 [1] isn’t applicable within the scope of this specification : CERTEU2. The below are additional requirements: | Req no. | Description | EUICCS1 | The eUICC SHALL only accept PSMO triggered from an Associated eIM as per EUICCF1. | EUICCS2 | Prior to processing any PSMO in the eUICC, the eUICC SHALL verify that the PSMO is signed by an Associated eIM. | EUICCS3 | With regards to EUICCF5, the eUICC SHALL verify that the eCO is signed by an EUICCS3 Associated eIM prior to its processing. | EUICCS4 | The eUICC SHALL support an asymmetric cryptographic scheme for verifying an EUICCS4 eIM signature. | EUICCS5 | The eUICC SHALL have means to verify that Profile download and immediateenablingimmediate enabling through default SM-DP+ is authorised. | EUICCS6 | The eUICC MAY have means to verify that Profile download and immediateenablingimmediate enabling through SM-DS is authorised. | NOTE: technical implementation of this requirement is FFS. |Table 10.5.2.1.1: eUICC Security Requirements
5.2.2 eIM Security Requirementsmodified
Req no. Description EIMS1 Any PSMO sent to the eUICC SHALL be signed by the eIM. EIMS2 An eIM that supports eIM configuration, SHALL sign eCO. EIMS3 The eIM SHALL support an asymmetric cryptographic scheme for signing PSMO and EIMS3 eCO. EIMS4 An eIM SHALL be implemented and operated with security measures to protect against threats listed in Annex A.2, A.3 and A.6. With regard to EIMS4, evidence SHALL be provided for an eIM when it is declared EIMS5 compliant according to GSMA SGP.24 [7]. With regard to EIMS4,EIMS5, evidence MAYSHALL be provided by a thirdthird-party party security EIMS6 evaluation (e.g., SAS accreditation,accreditation number, IEC/ISO 27001:2022 [6], or similar). 11.The eIM TLS/DTLS Certificates MAY be self-signed or chaining to e.g. GSMA CI, EIMS7 public trusted CA, private CA between eIM and IPA. Table 5.2.2.1: eIM Security Requirements
5.2.3 General Security Requirementsmodified
| Req no. | Description | GS1 | The mechanism to modify the eIM Configuration Data within the eUICC SHALL be protected in terms of integrity authenticity and anti-replay. It SHOULD also be protected in terms of confidentiality when necessary. | NOTE: The security and the mechanisms other than the signed eIM request is left to the implementation. |Table 12.5.2.3.1: General Security Requirements
5.2.4 EUM Functional Requirementsmodified
…responsible for the implementation of any IPA elements that reside in the eUICC and the compliance of these IPA elements according to IPA requirements in 5.1.4 … 13.Table 5.2.4.1: EUM Security Requirements
5.2.5 SM-DP+ Security Requirementsadded
All SM-DP+ security requirements specified in SGP.21 [1] SHALL apply for this specification, unless otherwise specified. This includes: • The section 4.14.3 “SM-DP+ Certification Requirements” of SGP.21 [1], • The requirements CERTPK6, CERTPK10, CERTPK10a and CERTPK11 of 4.14.6 “Public Key Certificates Management Requirements”.
5.2.6 SM-DS Security Requirementsadded
All SM-DS security requirements specified in SGP.21 [1] SHALL apply for this specification, unless otherwise specified. This includes: • The section 4.14.4 “SM-DS Certification Requirements” of SGP.21 [1], • The requirements CERTPK10, CERTPK10a and CERTPK11 of 4.14.6 “Public Key Certificates Management Requirements”.
6.1.1 Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Codemodified
The following procedure describes the direct Profile Download procedure between the SM-DP+SM- DP+ and the eUICC when it’s triggered by the eIM, using an Activation Code. Start Conditions: 1. The ordering process related to this Profile has been completed. 2. … over E #FFFFFF [7] Profile Installation endrnote E -> EIM: [8] Installation Report E -> DP: [8] Installation Report DP -> OPE: [9] Installation Report @enduml … [Generated by PlantUML] Figure 46.1.1.1: Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Code
6.1.2 eIM Initiated Direct Profile Download with SM-DSmodified
…authentication is initiated and driven by the eIM on behalf of the IPA and involves relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DS including … re-encodingre- encoding of the messages for the two secure connections ESipa and ES11’. 5. The eIM downloads the Event Record via ES11’, connects to the IPA and forwards the Event Reco … > E: [10] Profile Download rnote over E #FFFFFF [11] Profile Installation endrnote E -> EIM: [12] Installation Report E -> DP: [12] Installation Report @enduml … [] Figure 56.1.2.1: eIM Initiated Direct Profile Download with SM-DS
6.1.3 eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Codemodified
The following procedure describes the indirect Profile Download procedure between the SM-DP+SM- DP+ and the eUICC where the eIM assists with the Profile download. The Profile download is triggered by the eIM using an Activation Code. Start Conditions: 1. The o … uthentication is initiated and driven by the eIM on behalf of the IPA and involves relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DP+ including … re-encodingre- encoding of the messages for the two different secure connections. NOTE: The Matching Id from the AC is provided by the eIM to IPA as part of the mutual authentication e … e contains a Profile installation result Notification signed by the eUICC. 10. The eIM delivers the Notification to the SM-DP+ using the secure connection with … SM-DP+.SM- DP+. 11. The Operator is notified by the SM-DP+ about the Profile Installation End Conditions: a) A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and the Profile contain … ure \n connection with eIM eim <-> ipa : <b>1. </b>Secure session between\n eIM and device/IPA note right #white Device / device management protocol dependent, … e.g.e.g., (D)TLS end note end note over eim #white: <b>2. </b>eIM parses the Activation Code \n to extract SM-DP+ address group eIM establishes a secure \n connection wi … igned by eUICC) eim <- ipa : <b>9. </b>response (notification) eim -> smdp : <b>10. </b>notification operator <- smdp : <b>11. </b>notification end end @enduml … [Diagram Description automatically generated] Figure 66.1.3.1: eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Code
6.1.4 Profile Download with Default SM-DP+modified
The following procedure describes the direct Profile Download procedure between the SM-DP+SM- DP+ and the eUICC using Default SM-DP+ address. Start Conditions: 1. The ordering process related to this Profile has been completed. 2. At least one default SM-DP+ … #FFFFFF [10] Profile Enabling endrnote E --> EIM: [11] Enabling Notification E -> DP: [11] Enabling Notification DP -> OPE: [12] Enabling Notification @enduml … [PlantUML diagram] Figure 76.1.4.1: Profile Download with Default SM-DP+
6.1.5 eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with SM-DSmodified
The following procedure describes the indirect Profile Download procedure between the SM-DP+SM- DP+ and the eUICC using the SM-DS where the eIM assists with both the retrieval of the Event Record and the Profile Download. Start Conditions: 1. The ordering proc … authentication is initiated and driven by the eIM on behalf of the IPA and involves relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DS including … re-encodingre- encoding of the messages for the two secure connections ESipa and ES11’. 5. The eIM downloads the Event Record via ES11’. 6. The eIM identifies the address of the SM-DP+ … uthentication is initiated and driven by the eIM on behalf of the IPA and involves relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DP+ including … re-encodingre- encoding of the messages for the two secure connections ESipa and ES9+’. Additional information from eUICC is provided to the SM-DP+ to proceed with the Profile preparat … e contains a Profile installation result Notification signed by the eUICC. 14. The eIM delivers the Notification to the SM-DP+ using the secure connection with … SM-DP+.SM- DP+. 15. The Operator is notified by the SM-DP+ about the Profile Installation. End Conditions: a) A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the e … file installation endrnote E -> EIM: [13] Profile Installation Report EIM -> DP: [14] Notification Delivery DP -> OPE: [15] Profile Installation Report @enduml … [] Figure 86.1.5.1: eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with SM-DS
6.2.1 Profile Enabling via eIMmodified
…t Profile, Enable previously enabled Profile endrnote E -> IPA: Signed Profile Rollback information IPA -> EIM: Signed Profile Rollback information end @enduml … [Generated by PlantUML] Figure 96.2.1.1: Profile Enabling via eIM
6.3.1 Profile Disabling via eIMmodified
…bling result IPA -> EIM: [7] Signed Profile Disabling result E -> IPA: [8] Profile Disabling Notification IPA -> DP: [8] Profile Disabling Notification @enduml … [Generated by PlantUML] Figure 106.3.1.1: Profile Disabling via eIM
6.4.1 Profile Delete via eIMmodified
…ofile Delete result IPA -> EIM: [9] Signed Profile Delete result E -> IPA: [10] Profile Delete Notification IPA -> DP: [10] Profile Delete Notification @enduml … [Generated by PlantUML] Figure 116.4.1.1: Profile Delete via eIM
6.5.1 Add eIM Configuration Data via IPAmodified
…eIM is already associated to the eUICC ? [a]: no eIM associated -> execute eCO [b]: eIM associated -> abort procedure endrnote E -> IPA: [3] eCO result @enduml … [Diagram Description automatically generated] Figure 126.5.1.1: Add eIM Configuration Data via IPA
6.5.2 eIM Configuration via eIMmodified
…uccesful -> execute eCO [b]: Signature verification fails -> abort procedure Endrnote E -> IPA: [4] Signed eCO result IPA -> EIM: [5] Signed eCO result @enduml … [Diagram Description automatically generated] Figure 136.5.2.1: eIM Configuration via eIM
6.5.3 Complete Removal of eIM Configuration Data from the eUICCmodified
…n rnote over E #FFFFFF [2] eUICC removes all eIM Configuration Data stored in it endrnote E -> IPA: [3] eIM Configuration Data removal operation result @enduml … [] Figure 146.5.3.1: Complete Removal of eIM Configuration Data from the eUICC
A.1 Compromised IoT Devicemodified
…able to associate illegitimate eIM to eUICC. DEV4 Malicious IoT Device SW/FW and/or malicious IPA is able to improperly deleting eIM associations on the eUICC. … 14.Table A.1.1: Compromised IoT Device Risks
A.2 Compromised eIMmodified
…escription CeIM1 Attacker is able to perform illegitimate PSMO on a number of eUICCs. CeIM2 Attacker is able to perform illegitimate eCO on a number of eUICCs. … 15.Table A.2.1: Compromised eIM Risks
A.3 Malicious eIMmodified
A malicious eIM is both not authorized and illegitimate, e.g.e.g., malicious eIM acts as man-in-the-middle.man-in-the- middle. Risk no. Risk description MeIM1 Attacker is able to perform unauthorized, illegitimate PSMO on a number of IoT Devices / eUICCs. MeIM2 Attacker is able to perform unauthorized, illegitimate eCO on a number of eUICCs. MeIM3 Malicious eIM is able to tamper with ES9+’ communications. 16.Table A.3.1: Malicious eIM Risks
A.4 Privacy Leakagemodified
Leakage of privacy relevant data on the interface between the eIM and the IoT Device. Risk no. Risk description PRI1 Attacker gets hold of privacy related information of the eUICC (e.g.(e.g., EID) that may be used to track the location of the IoT Device. PRI2 eUICC management commands leading to the creation of unexpected and unpredicted « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties to spy or compromise IoT Devices or the Subscriber themselves. 17.Table A.4.1: Loss of Privacy Risks
A.5 New Profile on New IoT Devicemodified
…or corrupted Profile being pushed to the IoT Device. INI2 Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles to IoT Devices. … 18.Table A.5.1: New Profile on New IoT Device Risks
A.6 Profile Disabling / Profile Deletionmodified
…leading to wrong enabled/disabled/deleted Profile. IND8 Malicious execution of PSMO from an internal party leading to wrong Profile status reported to the eIM. … 19.Table A.6.1: Profile Disabling or Deletion Risks
A.7 Profile Switchmodified
… loss of connectivity. INP5 Malware / malicious entity launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several Profiles leading to major fraud scenarios. … 20.Table A.7.1: Profile Switching Risks
A.8 Profile Swapmodified
Risk no. Risk description INS1 Race condition leading to the disabling of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity. 21.Table A.8.1: Profile Swapping Risks
A.9 Cryptographic Related Risksmodified
…eric” key material during the Profile creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single point of failure and attack being created. … 22.Table A.9.1 Cryptographic Related Risks
A.10 Quality of Servicemodified
…er expected service level. QoS3 Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a temporary or permanent inability to deliver a Profile. … 23.Table A.10.1: Quality of Service Risks
A.11 Non-human or Unpredictablemodified
…ion of a datacentre. EXC3 Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, EUM…). … 24.Table A.11.1: Non-human or Unpredictable Risks
A.12 New Profile during Subscriber Journeymodified
… Profile operations. EXN5 Man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping during Profile provisioning leading to the loss of confidentiality. EXN6 “Implicit authentication” … (e.g.(e.g., HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of authentication or Profile material. 25.Table A.12.1: New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks
A.13 Othersmodified
…Profile Management actors leading to the critical loss of private keys. EXO2 Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios. … 26.Table A.13.1: Other Risks
B.1 eIM Configuration Performed by the EUMmodified
… manufacturing process. The mechanisms are EUM specific and not described in this specification. The security of EUM production scenarios is covered by SAS UP. … [] Figure 15B.1.1: eIM Configuration performed by the EUM
B.2 eIM Configuration Performed in the IoT Device Productionmodified
…ol and IPA can be provided by the underlying transport between production tool and IoT Device. NOTE: IoT Device Production can be understood in a broader sense … (e.g.(e.g., module production, device production, warehouse, logistic partner, field technician etc.). [] Figure 16B.2.1: eIM Configuration performed in IoT Device production
B.3 eIM Configuration Performed in the Field by a Backend Systemmodified
A backend system (e.g.(e.g., smart meter management platform or mobile application) has already a communication in place with the IoT Device. The backend system establishes a secure link t … backend system and IPA can be provided by the underlying transport between backend system and IoT Device. NOTE: General clarification and illustrated in Figure … 17,B.3.1, the eIM can, but does not have to be part of the backend system. [] Figure 17B.3.1: eIM Configuration performed in the field by a backend system
B.4 eIM Configuration Performed by an eIMmodified
A backend system (e.g.(e.g., smart meter management platform or mobile application) has already a communication in place with the IoT Device. In this example, the eIM_A is considered as pa … IPA and the IPA forwards the eCO to the eUICC, which proves the signature before executing the eCO. After succeful execution eIM_B is associated to the eUICC. … [] Figure 18B.4.1: eIM Configuration performed by an eIM
B.5 Removal of eIM Configurationmodified
A backend system (e.g.(e.g., smart meter management platform or mobile application) has already a communication in place with the IoT Device. The backend system establishes a secure link t … backend system and IPA can be provided by the underlying transport between backend system and IoT Device. NOTE: General clarification and illustrated in Figure … 19,B.5.1, the eIM can, but does not have to be part of the backend system. [] Figure 19B.5.1: Removal of eIM Configuration
C.1.1 Indirect Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using ACmodified
In this example (see Figure 20),C.1.1.1), the Profile download is triggered using the Activation Code. [Diagram Description automatically generated] Figure 20C.1.1.1: Indirect Profile download assisted by eIM using AC
C.1.2 Indirect Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using SM-DSmodified
In the example shown in Figure 21,C.1.2.1, the Profile download is triggered using SM-DS. The Profile download Event Record is retrieved by the eIM using ES11’. [Diagram Description automatically generated] Figure 21C.1.2.1: Indirect Profile download assisted by eIM using SM-DS
C.2 Direct Profile Downloadmodified
…e SM-DP+ for the Profile download. The transfer of the Profile from the SM-DP+ to the IPA is always done via ES9+. The eIM may be involved to differing degrees … (e.g.(e.g., send the Activation Code,…).
C.2.1 Direct Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using Activation Codemodified
In this example (see Figure 22),C.2.1.1), the eIM instructs the IPA using an Activation Code. [Diagram Description automatically generated] Figure 22C.2.1.1 Direct Profile Download assisted by eIM using AC
C.2.2 Direct Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using SM-DSmodified
In this example (see Figure 23),C.2.2.1), the Profile download Event Record is retrieved by the eIM using ES11’. This Event is sent to the IPA using ESipa. [Diagram Description automatically generated] Figure 23C.2.2.1 Direct Profile Download assisted by eIM using SM-DS
C.2.3 Direct Profile Download Unassisted by eIM Using SM-DSmodified
In this example (Figure 24),C.2.3.1), the IPA retrieves the Profile download Event Record from the SM-DS using ES11. [Diagram Description automatically generated] Figure 24C.2.3.1 Direct Profile download unassisted by eIM using SM-DS
C.2.4 Direct Profile Download Unassisted by eIM Using Default SM -DP+modified
The Profile download is done using ES9+ between the IPA and the default SM-DP+. [Diagram Description automatically generated] Figure 25C.2.4.1 Direct Profile download unassisted by eIM using Default SM-DP+
D.1 Document Historymodified
| Version | Date |Brief AdditionsDescription | V1.0 | 15/04/2022 | CR001R02 - Overview proposal | CR002R01 - Intended audience proposal | CR003R03 - Scope definition | CR005R01 - Definition of network constrained device | CR006R01 - Definition of User Interface constrained device | CR008R01 - Draft Roles section | CR009R03 - Draft Profile and Device principles | CR011R05 - Basic Principles from IoT Working document | CR004R03 – Basic Principles | CR0016R02 - Additional Basic Principles from IoT Working document | CR0017R00 - Abbreviations and References addition | CR0027R02 - eSIM for Iot Architecture - episode 1 | CR0028R02 - eSIM IoT baseline architecture | CR0034R01 - Baseline Architecture CR | CR0029R04 - eSIM for Iot Architecture - episode 2 | CR0035R01 - IPA functions descriptions | CR0036R01 - IoT Device definition | CR0037R00 - Major Threats | CR0024R04 - eSIM IoT Security Risks | CR0040R02 - Functional requirements for eSIM IoT Remote Manager | CR0026R06 - eSIM IoT Architecture | CR0038R01 - Missing definitions and abbreviations | CR0039R01 - Missing interfaces | CR0042R03 - eIM provisioning requirements | CR0043R03 - eIM-eUICC Interface Introduction | CR0041R05 - Security Requirements | CR0045R02 - Introduction of ESipa interface | CR0046R00 - Resolution of editors note in EUICCS1 | CR0031R05 - eSIM for Iot Architecture - episode 4 | CR0051R02 - Add option for SM-DS to/from Device via eIM | CR0052R01 - Update of Arch diagram with SM-DP+ to Device via eIM | CR0053R01 - Update of Arch diagram with SM-DS to Device via eIM | CR49R02 - Profile Download and Installation triggered by EIM | CR0055R02 - ES10b description update | CR0056R02 - Make the IPA simple | CR0058R05 - Profile Enabling Triggered by eIM | CR0023R03 - Architecture Procedure | CR0059R05 – Profile Delete Triggered by eIM | CR0060R04 - Profile Disabling Triggered by eIM | CR0054R07 - SIM profile switch Roll-Back mechanism | CR0064R02 - IPA requirements on Roll-Back | CR0065R00 - Editorial Change ES_PSMApproval andEditor PSMO | CR0066R05 - Editorial Changes to Rollback Mechanism | CR0075R01 - Changes to requirements IPAF1 / EUICCF5Company /Authority Roll-Back Definition | CR0067R01 - Changes to Enable Profile Procedure | CR0071R00 - Editorial changes to draft 18 | CR0073R00 - Editorial changes to draft 18 - Mobile Service Provider | CR0070R04 – Notifications | CR0079R02 – Profile Donwload Procedure using default SM-DP+ | CR0081R01 – Editorial Mobile Service Provider definition | CR0076R04 – eIM assisted (indirect) Profile Download | CR0069R05 - Enabling_ Disabling_ Delete diagrams | CR0077R03 - Add indirect Profile Download with SM-DS procedure | CR0082R00 - Editorial adding definitions for Operator, Subscriber and Subscriptions | CR0083R00 - CR to remove redundant editor’s notes | CR0084R01 - Notifications via eIM | CR0086R00 - CR to remove editor’s notes agreed by deelgates | CR0072R02 - Adding optional encryption of PSMO messages | CR0087R02 - Editorial clarification for NCD and UICD | CR0088R01 - Editorial – Consistent Use of eIM in Section 4.4 (Interfaces) | CR0078R04 - Add diagram and ES11’ based procedure to 6.1.2 | CR0089R02 - SM-DS optionality for IoT Devices | CR0090R01 - Detailing the eUICC architecture on the architecture diagram | CR0091R01 - Detailing the eUICC architecture on the architecture diagram | CR0093R04 - eIM Configuration Requirements | CR0096R01 - Profile Download options | CR0098R02 - eIM Configuration Procedures | CR0105R02 - Deployment scenarios for profile download | CR0094R02 - Update References | CR0095R02 - Clarification of the term PSMO message | CR0097R02 - Add asymmetric PSMO signing option | CR0108R02 - Comprensive device and profile management | CR0113R01 - Support for SM-DS and default SM-DP+ triggered profile download and activation | CR0116R01 – Resolve editor’s note in 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 | CR0018R00 - PR12 edit | CR0092R04 - Introduction of IPA in the eUICC (“IPAe”) | CR0100R00 - Removing editor's notes in 4.4.5 and 4.4.9 | CR0101R00 - Change Editor's note in EUICCF5 | CR0102R00 - Removing editor's notes in EIMF8 and EIMF10 | CR0103R00 - Removing editor's note in IPAF4 | CR0109R00 - Removal of Editor’s Notes related to automatic enabling | CR0111R00 - Removal of Editor’s Notes within requirements | CR0112R00 - Add eUICC abbreviations | CR0114R00 – Remove MEP editor’s note in 6.2.1 | CR0115R00 – Diagram for profile download via Def. DP+ | CR0014R03 – Definitions | CR0104R01 – editor’s notes in 6.1.1- Telenor | CR0119R01 – Resolution of comments | CR0110R01 – CR Removal of Editor’s Notes | CR121R01 - Update Reference of SGP.21 (2.2 to 2.4) | CR0122R01 – Final Editorial Corrections | CR0123R01 – Scope of SGP.31 V1.0 and15/04/2022 notesFirst onRelease principlesISAG |Gloria CR0124R00Trujillo, –GSMA Ultimate Editorials Telenor | CR0125R01 – clarifying start conditions of Profile Donwload procedure with AC | CR0126R01 – Additional Editorial Corrections | V1.1 |26/05/2023 26Clarifications May 2023 | CR0127R00 – Definition of event registration | CR0128R00 – Capitalisation of term ‘associated’ | CR0129R03 - IPAe_IPAd Requirements | CR0131R00 Editorials | CR0132R01 - Add IPA Capabilities in support of Indirect Profile Downlaod | CR0133R00 - Editorials – Add some missed alphabets and symbolsadditions |ISAG CR0134R01Gloria -Trujillo, EditorialsGSMA -DeleteV1.2 some26/04/2024 extraAddition symbols and words | CR0135R00 - Comment about General Security Requirements | CR0136R00 – Added ESipa messages protection requirement | CR0137R01 - Clarification of eIM Security Requirement | CR0141R00 - Add Event Retrieval definition | CR0138R02 - IPA to retireve eIM Configuration Data | CR0140R03 - Clarification of automatic enable option using default DP+ | CR0139R07 - Security protection of the Eim | CR0142R00 - Editorial modification changing Roll-Back to Rollback | CR0143R00 - Changes to section Basic Principles | CR0144R02 - Clarification eCO over ESpsmo | CR0145R01 - IoT eSIM eligibility check | CR0146R03 eIM as RSP server attacker risk | CR0148R01 Voiding requirements onfor: automaticISAG enablingGloria withTrujillo, SM-DS− -Emergency Alt to CR0147 | CR0149R00 Mandatory support of eUICC to return eIM Configuration Data | CR0150R00 - Update of References | V1.2 | 26 April 2024 | CR0151R02 - Add requirement to enable switching to an emergency call profileprofile, |GSMA CR0153R05− -Connectivity Introduce connectivity parameters for constrained devicesdevices, |− CR0154R01Field - Introduce connectivity parameters for constrained devices | CR0152R03 - Clarify IPA Requirement IPAF14 | CR155R00 - Rename automatic profile enabling to immediate profile enabling | CR156R01 - Add field test eUICCeUICC. |V1.3 CR0157R0022/05/2026 -Maintenance UpdateISAG ofStéphane ReferencesBandin, (Editorial)Orange |Table CR0158R02D.1.1: -Document Clarification of which SGP.21 requirements apply to SGP.31 | CR0160R00 - Removal of Editors Note | CR0161R03 – IPAd Support clarification | CR0162R00 – Adding requirements adapted to IoT from SGP.21 EUICC45 and EUICC46 | CR0163R00 – Clarify optionality of emergency profile support | CR0164R00 - eIM Notification Delivery support | CR0166R01 - Editorial clean-up |History
D.2 Detailed Document History for V1.3modified was Other Information
TypeVersion DescriptionDate DocumentAdditions OwnerDraft eSIM01 Editor10/12/2024 /CR13001R00 CompanyAlignment Gloriaof Trujillo,the GSMAdefinition Itof isPSMO ourCR13002R01 intentionClarification related to providethe aeIM qualitysecurity productcompliance declaration CR13003R01 Add requirements for yourthe use.functional Ifcompliance youof findeIM anyand errorsIPA orDraft omissions,02 please21/01/2025 contact- usRenumbering withof yourTables comments.and YouFigures mayCR13008R01 notifyClarify usthat ateIM [email protected]compliance Yourdeclaration commentsis oroptional suggestionsDraft &03 questions27/03/2025 areCR13004R01 alwaysCorrecting welcome.Basic Principles removing references to voided principles CR13005R02 Removing unsatisfied Basic Principle Draft 04 17/09/2025 CR13010R03 Upgrade SGP.21 reference to v2.6 Draft 05 11/02/2026 CR13012R03 Alignment to SGP.21 v2.7 CR13013R01 eIM certificate clarification CR13014R02 Clarification on security requirements CR13015R00 ESep Interface Naming Confusion Draft 06 13/03/2026 CR13017R03 Clarify Single eIM Option for RSP Operations Table D.2.1: Detailed Document History for V1.3
D.3 Other Informationadded
Type Description Document Owner eSIMG Editor / Company Stéphane Bandin, Orange Table D.3.1: Other information It is our intention to provide a quality product for your use. If you find any errors or omissions, please contact us with your comments. You may notify us at [email protected] Your comments or suggestions & questions are always welcome.
Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Overview
- 1.2 Scope
- 1.3 Intended Audience
- 1.4 Definition of Terms
- 1.5 Abbreviations
- 1.6 References
- 1.7 Conventions
- 1.8 References to SGP.21
- 2 Principles
- 2.1 Basic Principles
- 2.2 IoT Device principles
- 2.3 IoT Profile Principles
- 3 Roles
- 3.1 Mobile Service Provider, Operator
- 3.2 Subscriber, End User, eUICC Manufacturer, Device Manufacturer, Application Developer
- 4 Architecture
- 4.1 Architecture Diagram
- 4.1.1 IPA in the IoT Device
- 4.1.2 IPA in the eUICC
- 4.2 Architecture Elements
- 4.2.1 eSIM IoT Remote Manager
- 4.2.2 IoT Profile Assistant
- 4.3 eUICC Architecture
- 4.3.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
- 4.4 Interfaces
- 4.4.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
- 4.4.2 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
- 4.4.3 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
- 4.4.4 SM-DP+ – IPA (ES9+)
- 4.4.5 SM-DP+ – eIM (ES9+’)
- 4.4.6 IPA – eUICC (ES10a)
- 4.4.7 IPA – eUICC (ES10b)
- 4.4.8 IPA – SM-DS (ES11)
- 4.4.9 eIM – SM-DS (ES11’)
- 4.4.10 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)
- 4.4.11 eIM – eUICC (ESep)
- 4.4.12 eIM – IPA (ESipa)
- 5 Requirements
- 5.1 Functional Requirements
- 5.1.1 General Functional Requirements
- 5.1.2 eUICC Functional Requirements
- 5.1.3 eIM Functional Requirements
- 5.1.4 IPA Functional Requirements
- 5.1.5 SM-DP+ Functional Requirements
- 5.1.6 Profile Functional Requirements
- 5.1.7 Requirements for Interoperable Applications
- 5.2 Security Requirements
- 5.2.1 eUICC Security Requirements
- 5.2.2 eIM Security Requirements
- 5.2.3 General Security Requirements
- 5.2.4 EUM Functional Requirements
- 5.2.5 SM-DP+ Security Requirements
- 5.2.6 SM-DS Security Requirements
- 6 Procedures
- 6.1 Profile Download Procedures
- 6.1.1 Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Code
- 6.1.2 eIM Initiated Direct Profile Download with SM-DS
- 6.1.3 eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Code
- 6.1.4 Profile Download with Default SM-DP+
- 6.1.5 eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with SM-DS
- 6.2 Profile Enabling
- 6.2.1 Profile Enabling via eIM
- 6.3 Profile Disabling
- 6.3.1 Profile Disabling via eIM
- 6.4 Profile Delete
- 6.4.1 Profile Delete via eIM
- 6.5 eIM Configuration
- 6.5.1 Add eIM Configuration Data via IPA
- 6.5.2 eIM Configuration via eIM
- 6.5.3 Complete Removal of eIM Configuration Data from the eUICC
- A Threats and Risks (Informative)
- A.1 Compromised IoT Device
- A.2 Compromised eIM
- A.3 Malicious eIM
- A.4 Privacy Leakage
- A.5 New Profile on New IoT Device
- A.6 Profile Disabling / Profile Deletion
- A.7 Profile Switch
- A.8 Profile Swap
- A.9 Cryptographic Related Risks
- A.10 Quality of Service
- A.11 Non-human or Unpredictable
- A.12 New Profile during Subscriber Journey
- A.13 Others
- B eIM Configuration Scenarios (Informative)
- B.1 eIM Configuration Performed by the EUM
- B.2 eIM Configuration Performed in the IoT Device Production
- B.3 eIM Configuration Performed in the Field by a Backend System
- B.4 eIM Configuration Performed by an eIM
- B.5 Removal of eIM Configuration
- C Profile Download Deployment Scenarios (Informative)
- C.1 Indirect Profile Download
- C.1.1 Indirect Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using AC
- C.1.2 Indirect Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using SM-DS
- C.2 Direct Profile Download
- C.2.1 Direct Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using Activation Code
- C.2.2 Direct Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using SM-DS
- C.2.3 Direct Profile Download Unassisted by eIM Using SM-DS
- C.2.4 Direct Profile Download Unassisted by eIM Using Default SM -DP+
- D Document Management
- D.1 Document History
- D.2 Detailed Document History for V1.3
- D.3 Other Information
eSIM IoT Architecture and Requirements
Version 1.3
22nd May 2026Security Classification: Non-Confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other than those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association.
Copyright Notice Copyright © 2026 GSM Association
Disclaimer The GSMA makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any respon sibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this do cument. The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.
Compliance Notice The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSMA Antitrust Compliance Policy.
This Permanent Reference Document is classified by GSMA as an Industry Specification, as such it has been developed and is ma intained by GSMA in accordance with the provisions set out GSMA AA.35 - Procedures for Industry Specifications.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
This document specifies an architecture and requirements for remote provisioning of eUICCs in Network Constrained and/or User Interface (UI) Constrained IoT Devices.
NOTE 1:The primary focus of this version of the document is to support IoT Devices that require the use of a remote Profile management entity. Permissive requirements are included to support energy and Network Constrained IoT Devices, and for IoT Devices that do not require the use of a remote Profile management entity. The document can be amended by additional requirements for these types of IoT Devices in future releases.
NOTE 2:A set of basic principles for support of eSIM in IoT Devices is also presented, though, as noted, these include items for which specific or complete requirements are not included in this version of the document.
1.2 Scope
This document defines requirements and architectures to enable the remote provisioning and management of the eUICC in IoT Devices which are Network Constrained and/or UI Constrained Devices based on the architecture described in SGP.21 [1]. This framework aims to provide the basis for global interoperability among actors in IoT deployment scenarios.
1.3 Intended Audience
Technical experts within Operators, eUICC solution providers, Subscription management providers, IoT Device vendors, standards organisations, solution providers, network infrastructure vendors, Mobile Service Providers and IoT service providers and other impacted industry bodies.
1.4 Definition of Terms
Term Description
Activation Code Information issued by an Operator to request the download and
installation of a Profile.
Application Developer As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Associated eIM An eIM whose eIM Configuration Data is available within the eUICC
and used by the eUICC for verification of an eIM Configuration
Operation or PSMO.
Bound Profile Package As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Connectivity Parameters A set of data required by the eUICC to open a communication
channel (for example HTTPS) on a dedicated network.
eIM Configuration Data The data to be used by the eUICC to authenticate the eIM
commands.
eIM Configuration An operation related to eIM Configuration Data (e.g., add eIM
Operation (eCO) Configuration Data, read/remove eIM Configuration Data in the
eUICC) through the IPA.
Eligibility Check As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Information
Emergency Profile An Operational Profile with an attribute indicating that this Profile is
to be enabled for Emergency Calls.Term Description
An Emergency Profile complies with regulatory requirements and
only provides the capability to make Emergency Calls and receive
calls from an Emergency centre (e.g., Public Safety Answering
Point).
It only applies for voice capable IoT Devices.
Emergency Mechanism eUICC-based mechanism, triggered by the IPA, which enables and
disables the Emergency Profile.
eUICC As defined in SGP.21 [1]
eUICC OS Update As defined in SGP.21 [1].
eUICC Package A signed package prepared by the eIM that contains either PSMO(s)
or eCO(s). The package is verified and executed by the eUICC.
Event As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Event Record As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Event Registration As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Event Retrieval A process for the IPA or eIM to retrieve Event Records for an eUICC
from an SM-DS.
Fallback Attribute This is an attribute of a Profile which, when set, identifies the Profile
to be enabled by the Fallback Mechanism.
Fallback Mechanism eUICC-based mechanism, triggered by the IPA, which enables the
Profile with Fallback Attribute set when the Enabled Profile loses
network connectivity.
Fallback Profile An Operational Profile having the Fallback Attribute set.
Interoperable Application As defined in SGP.21 [1].
IoT As defined in TS.34[3].
IoT Device As defined in TS.34 [3].
IPA Capabilities List of functionalities supported by the IPA.
Mobile Service Provider The Mobile Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers
either as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale
agreement with an Operator. The Mobile Service Provider could also
be the Operator.
Network Constrained An IoT Device where communications resources are limited in
Device (NCD) bandwidth and/or available protocol alternatives. E.g., the bandwidth
is typically limited to relatively low data rates, and may allow
asynchronous data exchange with a platform, and device may not
support TCP (or even IP) protocols.
Notification A report about a Profile Download or PSMO processed by the
eUICC.
NOTE: This also applies for implicit changes of a Profile status, e.g.,
as a result of enabling another Profile.
Notification Receivers A list defined in the Profile containing SM-DP+s that are to receive
Notifications concerning that Profile.
Operator As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Profile As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Profile Package As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Profile State Management An operation related to the state update of a Profile in a dedicated
Operation (PSMO) ISD-P on the eUICC (e.g., enable Profile, disable Profile, delete
Profile, list Profile information).
NOTE: in SGP.21 [1], the corresponding term is Profile
Management.
Rollback Mechanism Mechanism of enabling the previously enabled Profile in case no
communication between the eIM and IPA can be established using
the recently enabled Profile.
Root SM-DS As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Subscriber As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Subscription As defined in SGP.21 [1].Term Description Subscription Manager Data As defined in SGP.21 [1] with the difference that LPA is IPA in the Preparation + (SM-DP+) context of this document. Subscription Manager As defined in SGP.21 [1]. Discovery Server (SM-DS) User Interface Constrained An IoT Device with limited, or without, a UI for RSP management Device (UICD) functions.
Table 1.4.1: Definition of Terms
1.5 Abbreviations
Term Description AC Activation Code CASD Controlling Authority Security Domain CoAP Constrained Application Protocol DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security ECASD eUICC Controlling Authority Security Domain eCO eIM Configuration Operation eDRX Extended Discontinuous Reception eIM eSIM IoT Remote Manager FFS For Further Study IoT Internet of Things IP Internet Protocol ISD-P Issuer Security Domain – Profile ISD-R Issuer Security Domain – Root IPA IoT Profile Assistant IPAe IoT Profile Assistant located in the eUICC IPAd IoT Profile Assistant located in the IoT Device LPWA Low-Power Wide Area MNO-SD Mobile Network Operator – Security Domain NAA Network Access Application NB-IoT Narrow Band Internet of Things NCD Network Constrained Device NIDD Non-IP Data Delivery PSM Power Saving Mode PSMO Profile State Management Operation RSP Remote SIM Provisioning SD Security Domain SM-DP+ Subscription Manager Data Preparation + SM-DS Subscription Manager Discovery Server
Term Description SSD Supplementary Security Domain TCP Transmission Control Protocol UDP User Datagram Protocol UI User Interface UICD UI Constrained Device
Table 1.5.1: Abbreviations
1.6 References
Ref Doc Number Title
[1] SGP.21 V2.7 RSP Architecture
[2] TCA eUICC Profile eUICC Profile Package: Interoperable Format Technical
Package Specification[3] TS.34 IoT Device Connection Efficiency Guidelines
[4] RFC 2119 “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, S.
Bradner
[5] RFC 8174 Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words
[6] ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection —
Information security management systems — Requirements
[7] SGP.24 eSIM Compliance Process
[8] SGP.33-1 eSIM IoT eUICC Test SpecificationTable 1.6.1: References
1.7 Conventions
“The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [4] and clarified by RFC 8174 [5], when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.”
1.8 References to SGP.21
The present document contains several references to SGP.21 [1].
The following list maps the terms used by SGP.21 [1] to the terms used in the present
document:
• LPA (Local Profile Assistant) refers to IPA.2 Principles
This specification will be based on the SGP.21 [1] architecture and define features related to the scope of the current document. The specification will refer to SGP.21 [1] where
appropriate. This implies that to cover the whole range of eSIM provisioning for IoT Devices SGP.31 MUST be used together with SGP.21 [1].
However, the following feature defined in SGP.21 [1] is not applicable in the scope of this specification:
− Activation Code Retrieval.
2.1 Basic Principles
This section describes basic principles on what is expected from the architecture. They are used to create the adequate normative requirements in this document.
Principle no. Description
BP01 It should be possible to securely perform all supported Profile State Management
Operations remotely on a given IoT Device containing an eUICC.
BP02 It should be possible for a IoT Device containing an eUICC to establish a secure
connection with an entity performing Profile State Management Operations.
NOTE: a secure connection is a connection that provides at least confidentiality,
integrity and authenticity.
BP03 It should be possible to provision eUICCs in IoT Devices where SMS is not available.
BP04 It should be possible to provision eUICCs in IoT Devices where connection-oriented
protocols (e.g: TCP/IP) are not supported.
BP05 It should be possible to use a lightweight protocol based on CoAP (e.g., LwM2M) for
transfer of Profile download and Profile State Management Operation related
messages (e.g., ES8+ messages) over LPWA networks in a secure way.
BP06 The architecture should support Profile download and Profile State Management
Operations in an asynchronous way with execution on a IoT Device happening after
an extended period of time (e.g., due to eDRX, PSM cycles).
NOTE: It may be necessary to store the information about the request for a longer
period of time until the IoT Device is connected.
BP07 The principle BP06 should also be applicable for automated Profile download and
Profile State Management Operations on a large number of IoT Devices.
BP08 The architecture should allow push mechanism to the IoT Device to initiate a Profile
provisioning or management transaction.
BP09 The architecture should allow polling by the IoT Device to check whether there is a
Profile provisioning or management transaction waiting.
BP10 The architecture should avoid ongoing and frequent polling between the IoT Device
and the RSP system.
BP11 The Notification mechanism should take into account the possibly limited availability
of the IoT Device in the network as well as being adapted to the use in constrained
networks, such as LPWA networks.
BP12 It should be possible for an entity managing a IoT Device (e.g., Mobile Service
Provider, IoT Device owner/user, enterprise or IoT service provider) to remotely
enable, disable and delete a Profile in a secure way.BP13 It should be possible for an entity managing a fleet of IoT Devices (e.g., IoT Device
owner/user, enterprise, Mobile Service Provider, or IoT service provider) to automate
Profile download triggering and Profile State Management Operations for its IoT
Devices.
BP14 It should be possible to leverage the IoT Device’s existing protocol stack for IoT Device
and data management (e.g., CoAP over DTLS) for secure transfer of Profile downloads
and Profile State Management Operation related messages (e.g., ES8+ messages) to
and from the IoT Device.
BP15 Void
BP16 Void
BP17 Void
BP18 Void
BP19 Void
BP20 VoidBP21 It should be possible to provision eUICCs in IoT Devices using an IP transport (e.g.,
CoAP over UDP).
BP22 It should be possible to provision eUICCs in IoT Devices using a non-IP transport (e.g.,
CoAP over NIDD).
BP23 Void
BP24 The architecture should support a single-round trip key management protocol to
establish the secure channel between the eUICC and the server.
BP25 The specifications should aim to describe protocols for the support and security of
Profile download or Profile State Management Operation to minimise the number of
transactions required over the lifetime of the IoT Device.
BP26 The architecture should support Profile State Management Operation and Profile
download operations with minimal integration between different components and/or
different entities.
BP27 The architecture should optimize the traffic (e.g., avoid excessive polling) between the
network and the IoT Device to enable mass IoT deployment.
“TS.34 – IoT Device Connection Efficiency Guidelines” of the GSMA [3] should be
followed.
BP28 The architecture should minimise the number of operations at IoT Device/eUICC side
to avoid IoT Devices having very long operational lifetime wearing out sensitive
memory.
BP29 The architecture should be able to cope with the IoT Device being unreachable for
prolonged periods of time.
BP30 The transmission of Notifications should be highly reliable when connectivity is
available and the IoT Device can process the task, taking into account limited memory
to store Notifications until they can be sent.
BP31 It should be possible to remotely trigger the IoT Device, in a secure way, to start the
download of a Profile.
BP32 It should be possible to perform remote operations described in BP31 without requiring
local interaction with a given IoT Device.BP33 Void
BP34 Computational complexity of processes should be consistent with process transaction
latency for IoT Devices having limited power and/or total lifetime energy resources,
without impacting the security level.NOTE:The following basic principles have been highlighted as principles that require further study in the future: BP09, BP10, BP13, BP24, BP25, BP27, BP29.
2.2 IoT Device principles
Principle no. Description
DEVP1 Impact of Profile constraints on IoT Device functionality is out of scope of this
specification.
DEVP2 Profile handling related code on the IoT Device SHOULD be kept to a minimum for
memory constrained IoT Devices.Table 2.2.1: Basic principles
2.3 IoT Profile Principles
All Profile principles in SGP.21 [1] apply for this specification. The below are additional principles:
Principle no. Description
PROF1 This document uses the term Profile as defined by SGP.21 [1].
PROF2 Profile description is defined by Trusted Connectivity Alliance (formerly SIMalliance)
eUICC Profile Package: Interoperable Format Technical Specification [2].
PROF3 Description of a Profile intended for use with IoT services and Subscriptions will be
done by the issuing Mobile Service Provider and is out of scope of this document.
PROF4 Profile package size SHOULD be kept to a minimum
for Network Constrained Devices.Table 2.3.1: IoT Device principles
3 Roles
3.1 Mobile Service Provider, Operator
This document adopts the definitions of SGP.21 [1] for the roles ‘Mobile Service Provider’ and ‘Operator’.
Subscriptions used by IoT Devices in the scope of solutions described by this document are defined through the Subscription products/contracts and eSIM Profiles supplied by the Mobile Service Provider and their description or usage are not in scope of this document.
NOTE:A Mobile Service Provider issues Subscription contracts for network access and has the commercial customer relationship. This document does not separate between service providers for specialised market segments. These are all considered as providers of Subscriptions for mobile network access.
3.2 Subscriber, End User, eUICC Manufacturer, Device Manufacturer, Application Developer
The roles eUICC Manufacturer, Device Manufacturer, Subscriber, End User and Application Developer are used as defined in SGP.21 [1].
4 Architecture
This section contains the functional description of the system architecture for the eSIM IoT. Architecture elements include eUICC, SM-DP+, eIM, IPA, SM-DS and Operator. The IPA is located either in the IoT Device (IPAd) or in the eUICC (IPAe).
NOTE:The interaction between a Subscriber and the Mobile Service Provider is not shown on this architecture but is expected to be similar to the interactions described in SGP.21 [1].
4.1 Architecture Diagram
The following architecture diagrams describe the roles and interfaces (Figure 4.1.1.1).
4.1.1 IPA in the IoT Device
ES12 SM-DP
SM-DP+ ES2+ Operator ES9+’
ES9+
SM-DS ES8+
ES8+
ES11’ eSIM IoT remote ManagerESipa
ES6
ES8+ ES8+
ES11
ESep IPAES10a ES10b
ISD-R
ISD-P
MNO-SD
eUICCIoT Device
Figure 4.1.1.1: eSIM IoT Functional Architecture (IPA in the IoT Device)
4.1.2 IPA in the eUICC
The following architecture diagrams describe the architecture model (Figure 4.1.2.1) where the IPA is located in the eUICC.
ES12
SM-DP
SM-DP+ ES2+ OperatorES9+’ SM-DS ES8+ ES9+
ES11’ ES8+
eSIM IoT remote ManagerESipa
ESep ES6
ES8+ ES8+
ES8+ IPA ES11 ES8+
ISD-R
ISD-P
MNO-SD
eUICCIoT Device
Figure 4.1.2.1: eSIM IoT Functional Architecture (IPA in the eUICC)
4.2 Architecture Elements
4.2.1 eSIM IoT Remote Manager
The eSIM IoT Remote Manager is responsible for remote Profile State Management Operations (PSMO) on a single IoT Device or a fleet of IoT Devices. . If supported by the eIM, the eIM can also be used to perform eIM Configuration Operations (eCO) on the eUICC when it is associated with the eUICC.
The Eim can either be a stand-alone component or a component of a higher-level functional system (e.g., device management platform).
NOTE:Apart from the necessary functional and security requirements, this specification will not further describe the implementation of the Eim, neither is the interaction between a Subscriber and the Mobile Service Provider which is expected to be similar to the interactions described in SGP.21 [1].
4.2.2 IoT Profile Assistant
The IoT Profile Assistant (IPA) provides functions that enable the Euicc in the IoT Device to be provisioned by the SM-DP+.
The IPA can either be a stand-alone component or a component of a higher-level functional software in the IoT Device (e.g., device management client).
The IPA provides multiple distinct functions, the Profile Download,the Discovery Service, the Notification Handling, Conveying PSMO, eCO and related results as described below.
Function name Description
Discovery Service When REQUIRED, this service is responsible for retrieving pending Event
Records from the SM-DS.
Profile Download This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound Profile
Package in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile Package from
the SM-DP+ to the IPA in a single transaction, and (ii) the onward transfer
of the Bound Profile Package into the eUICC in segments.
This function will depend on network, IoT Device, and eUICC capabilities.
PSMO / eCO Conveying This is responsible for conveying PSMOs, eCO and related results between
eIM and eUICC.
Notification Handling This is responsible for forwarding notifications to the eIM and/or the SM-
DP+.Table 4.2.2.1: IPA Function Descriptions
4.3 eUICC Architecture
4.3.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
This section describes the internal high-level architecture of the eUICC. The eUICC architecture is similar to the one used in [1].
The IoT Device To Operator
To SM-DS To SM-DP+
To SM-DP+ To eIM
To eIM
To IPA in
ES10a,b
ESipa
ESepES9+ ES11
ES6 ES8+
eUICC
Telecom
Operating
Framework
System ISD-P ISD-P IPA in the
eUICC
MNO-SD MNO-SD Profile
IPA Package
Services Interpreter
File SystemFile System Applets
Applets
ISD-R CASD
CASD NAAs
NAAs SSD
SSD
ECASD
Operator Disabled Profile Operator Enabled Profile
Figure 4.3.1.1: eUICC Architecture (IPA in eUICC)
4.4 Interfaces
In this section we define the interfaces used in this specification. Interfaces as defined in SGP.21 [1] will be referenced as appropriate.
4.4.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
The ES2+ interface is used by the Operator to order Profiles for specific eUICCs as well as other administrative functions as defined in SGP.21[1].
4.4.2 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
The ES6 interface is used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services. It’s used for Profile Content Management operations. This interface is defined in SGP.21[1].
4.4.3 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
The ES8+ is a logical interface which provides a secure end-to-end channel between the SM- DP+ and the eUICC for the administration of the ISD-P and the associated Profile during download and installation. This interface is defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.4 SM-DP+ – IPA (ES9+)
The ES9+ interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the IPA. This interface is defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.5 SM-DP+ – eIM (ES9+’)
The ES9+’ interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the eIM. The eIM is acting on behalf of the IPA. This interface is implements the same procedures as ES9+ defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.6 IPA – eUICC (ES10a)
The ES10a interface is used by the IPA in the IoT Device to get the configured addresses from the eUICC for Root SM-DS, and optionally the default SM-DP+. This interface is defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.7 IPA – eUICC (ES10b)
The ES10b interface is used by the IPA in the IoT Device and the IPA services in the eUICC to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC as defined in SGP.21[1]. The ES10b is also used by the IPA to transfer PSMO and eCO to the eUICC.
4.4.8 IPA – SM-DS (ES11)
The ES11 interface allows the IPA to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC. This interface is defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.9 eIM – SM-DS (ES11’)
The ES11’ interface allows the eIM to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC. The eIM is acting on behalf of the IPA. This interface is implements the same procedures as ES11 defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.10 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)
The ES12 interface allows any SM-DP+ to issue or remove Event Registrations on the SM- DS. This interface is defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.11 eIM – eUICC (ESep)
The ESep is a logical end-to-end interface between the eIM and the eUICC used for eUICC Package (PSMO and eCO).
Req no. Description ESEP1 The PSMO and eCO SHALL be integrity protected over ESep.
NOTE: The solution shall not require associating at eUICC manufacturing the
eUICC with a specific eIM.
ESEP2 The PSMO and eCO SHALL be protected against replay attacks.
ESEP3 The PSMO and eCO SHALL be protected in terms of integrity and authenticity.Table 4.4.11.1: eIM – eUICC (ESep) Interface Requirements
4.4.12 eIM – IPA (ESipa)
The ESipa is a logical interface between an eIM and an IPA. It could be used to trigger a Profile download at the IPA. It is also used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of PSMO and eCO between an eIM and an IPA, unless the underlying transport provides necessary security.
NOTE :The underlying transport layer can provide transport for other functions (e.g., device
management) and should allow multiplexing of these functions in parallel with the
ESipa.Req no. Description
ESipa1 ESipa SHALL support triggering of Profile download.
ESipa2 ESipa SHALL support delivery of PSMO between eIM and eUICC.
ESipa3 ESipa messages SHALL be protected in terms of confidentiality, integrity and
authenticity.
ESipa4 ESipa message protection as per ESipa3 MAY be provided by the underlying
transport.
ESipa5 An EID sent to the eIM via ESipa SHALL be privacy protected.
ESipa6 ESipa message SHALL be protected against replay attacks.
ESipa7 ESipa MAY support delivery of eCO between eIM and eUICC.Table 4.4.12.1: eIM – IPA (ESipa) Interface Requirements
5 Requirements
5.1 Functional Requirements
5.1.1 General Functional Requirements
Req no. Description
It is OPTIONAL for the IoT Device, eIM and the SM-DP+ to permit the use of
GENF01
an SM-DS.Table 5.1.1.1: General Functional Requirements
5.1.2 eUICC Functional Requirements
All eUICC functional requirements specified in SGP.21 [1] SHALL apply to this specification, unless specified otherwise. This includes the following sections of SGP.21 [1]:
• 4.3 “eUICC Requirements”, • 4.4 “ eUICC eligibility Check”, • 4.15 “eUICC OS Update”.
The following requirements from SGP.21 [1] are not applicable within the scope of this specification: EUICC36, EUICC46, EUICC47, EUICC53, EUICC57. The below are additional requirements:
Req no. Description
EUICCF1 The eIM Configuration Data SHALL include credentials (e.g., eIM public key) to allow
the eUICC to authenticate the commands from the eIM.
EUICCF2 It SHALL be possible to transfer eIM Configuration Data to the eUICC at the stage
of eUICC production. NOTE: The mechanism and security applied are left to the implementation and may
be EUM specific.
EUICCF3 The eUICC SHALL provide an interface to the IPA to perform eCOs. NOTE: Whether IPA/device uses this interface is an implementation specific
decision.
EUICCF4 When the eUICC is not associated to any eIM, the eUICC SHALL accept adding any
eIM Configuration Data provided through the interface defined in EUICCF3. NOTE: This interface can be disabled by configuring any (even non-existing) eIM.
EUICCF5 Once an eIM is associated with the eUICC, the eUICC SHALL only accept further
eCOs signed by the Associated eIM, except EUICCF6 and EUICCF16.The processing of this signed eIM Configuration Operations SHALL be handled as a signed PSMO.
NOTE: The addition of other eIM(s) is under the responsibility of the currently
Associated eIM(s).
EUICCF6 The eUICC MAY provide an interface to the IPA to allow the complete removal of all
eIM Configuration Data from the eUICC. NOTE: The mechanism has to be protected against misuse and could be realised by
a kind of reset functionality.
EUICCF7 The eUICC SHALL support the Rollback Mechanism.
EUICCF8 If the eIM has requested use of the Rollback Mechanism (see EIMF8), and if the IPA
informs the eUICC that Rollback is required (see IPAF1), the eUICC SHALL execute
the Rollback Mechanism. NOTE: In this version only the requesting eIM is notified about the result.
EUICCF9 The eUICC SHALL provide a signed result of a requested PSMO, eCO or Profile
installation to the IPA. NOTE: This signed result is included by the IPA within its responses to requests from
the eIM.
EUICCF10 The eUICC SHALL be able to provide Notifications to the IPA for IPA to send to
Notification Receivers. This mechanism SHALL be in accordance with SGP.21[1].EUICCF11 The eUICC SHALL be able to accept default SM-DP+ triggered Profile download and
immediate enabling without signed PSMO from any potentially Associated eIM.
EUICCF12 The behavior in EUICCF11 SHALL be configurable in the eUICC.
EUICCF13 Changing the configuration in the eUICC (see EUICCF12 and EUICC15) SHALL not
require a signed PSMO, if there is no eIM associated. If an eIM is associated, only
the Associated eIM can change the configuration in the eUICC. An EUM MAY configure the behavior in eUICC manufacturing.
EUICCF14 The eUICC MAY be able to accept SM-DS triggered Profile download and immediate
enabling without signed PSMO from any potentially Associated eIM. NOTE: technical implementation of this requirement is FFS.
EUICCF15 The behavior in EUICCF11 and EUICCF14 (if supported) SHALL be configurable in
the eUICC. NOTE: technical implementation of this requirement for EUICCF14 is FFS.
EUICCF16 The eUICC MAY provide an interface to the IPA to read the eIM Configuration Data
(e.g., eIM ID) stored in the eUICC.
EUICCF17 An eUICC SHALL indicate in the Eligibility Check Information if it is an eUICC as
defined in this specification.
EUICCF18 The eUICC MAY support the Emergency Mechanism.
EUICCF19 If the Emergency Mechanism is supported, the eUICC SHALL provide an interface
to the IPA to Enable and Disable the Emergency Profile.
EUICCF20 If the Emergency Mechanism is supported, the eUICC MAY contain the Emergency
Profile.
EUICCF21 If the Emergency Mechanism is supported, the eUICC SHALL enable the previously
enabled Profile when the Emergency Profile is disabled by the IPA.
EUICCF22 If Fallback Mechanism is supported, the eUICC SHALL provide an interface to the
IPA to Enable and Disable the Fallback Profile.
EUICCF23 If Fallback Mechanism is supported, the eUICC SHALL contain at most one Profile
with the Fallback Attribute set.
EUICCF24 When the IPA sends the request to disable the Fallback Profile, the eUICC SHALL
enable the previously enabled Profile.
EUICCF25 The eUICC MAY provide an interface to set and unset the Fallback Attribute for a
given Profile.
EUICCF26 If Fallback Mechanism is supported, the eUICC SHALL reject to set the Fallback
Attribute for a Profile if Fallback for this Profile is not authorised by the Profile Owner.
EUICCF27 An Integrated eUICC SHALL be able to execute the test cases defined in SGP.33-1
[8].
EUICCF28 The eUICC SHALL support a set of standard functions and services including, but
not limited to USIM Toolkit functions and GlobalPlatform features. The list of
supported functions and services SHALL be explicitly referenced within the technical
specification.EUICCF29 The eUICC SHALL support at least the following USIM Toolkit commands:
• PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION including the following fields: Location
Information, IMEI, Network Measurement Results, Date & Time & Time zone,
Access Technology
• TERMINAL PROFILE
• ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD)
• SEND SHORT MESSAGE
• REFRESH including the “UICC Reset” and “eUICC Profile Change” modes
EUICCF30 The eUICC SHALL support an IPAd (i.e., ES10 interface).
EUICCF31 The eUICC SHALL be able to download a Profile without changing Associated eIM.
EUICCF32 It SHALL be possible to associate eUICC with zero, only one, or multiple eIMs.Table 5.1.2.1: eUICC Functional Requirements
5.1.3 eIM Functional Requirements
Req no. Description
EIMF1 The eIM SHALL be able to trigger the IPA to initiate a Profile Download from the SM-
DP+. Depending on the technical capabilities of the IoT Device (see IPAF12), at least
one of the following three Profile Download mechanisms SHALL be supported:
• Profile Download from default SM-DP+
• Profile Download with Activation Code
• Profile Download via SM-DS NOTE: Impact of this optionality on Profile Provisioning procedures is FFS.
EIMF2 The eIM SHALL be able to trigger a PSMO to be executed by the eUICC.
EIMF3 An eIM MAY be able to trigger an eCO to be executed by the eUICC.
EIMF4 The eIM MAY support the transfer of the Bound Profile Package and related
communication between the SM-DP+ and IPA/eUICC.EIMF5 An eIM which is designed for use with IoT Devices that do not require to support the
establishment of a direct ES9+ interface to the SM-DP+, SHALL be able to support
the transfer of the Bound Profile Package and related communication between the
SM-DP+ and the IPA.
EIMF6 The eIM MAY support the transfer of the Event Records and related communication
between the SM-DS and IPA/eUICC.
EIMF7 An eIM which is designed for use with IoT Devices that do not require to support the
establishment of a direct ES11 interface to the SM-DS, SHALL be able to support
the transfer of the Event Records and related communication between the SM-DS
and the IPA.
EIMF8 The eIM SHALL be able to request of the eUICC the activation of the Rollback
Mechanism.
EIMF9 The eIM SHALL support the transfer of Notifications and related communication
between the SM-DP+ and IPA/eUICC.
EIMF10 An eIM which is designed for use with IoT Devices that do not require to support the
establishment of a direct ES9+ interface to the SM-DP+, SHALL be able to support
the transfer of Notifications between the SM-DP+ and the IPA.EIMF11 If Fallback Mechanism is supported by the eUICC, an Associated eIM SHOULD be
able to request the eUICC to set and unset the Fallback Attribute.
EIMF12 There SHALL be a compliance process for the eIM specified in GSMA SGP.24 [7].
EIMF13 An eIM MAY be declared compliant according to GSMA SGP.24 [7].Table 5.1.3.1: eIM Functional Requirements
5.1.4 IPA Functional Requirements
Req no. Description
IPAF1 If the eIM has requested activation of the Rollback Mechanism, then following a
Profile Enabling request from an eIM and its execution by the eUICC, the IPA SHALL
(a) determine if communications with that eIM can be established; and (b) inform the
eUICC that Rollback is required if no communication with the eIM is possible.
IPAF2 If the eIM request contains a signed PSMO, or a signed eCO, or triggers a Profile
installation that returns a signed result from the eUICC, the IPA SHALL retrieve the
signed result from the eUICC and SHALL include it in a response to the eIM.
IPAF3 The IPA SHALL retrieve pending Notifications from the eUICC and SHALL send the
Notifications to the Notification Receivers.
IPAF4 An IPA which is designed for use with IoT Devices that do not require to support the
establishment of a direct ES9+ interface to the SM-DP+, SHALL be able to include
Notifications into responses between the IPA and the eIM.
IPAF5 As per EIMF10, there SHALL be a means for the IPA to identify Notifications to be
transferred by a specific eIM to a designated SM-DP+.
IPAF6 The IPA SHALL send Notifications on a best-effort basis when connectivity is
available.
IPAF7 The IPA SHALL retain signed eUICC results until they can be sent in a response to
the eIM.
IPAF8 IPA MAY support direct Profile download via ES9+.
IPAF9 IPA MAY support indirect Profile download via ESipa.
IPAF10 The IPA MAY support eCOs.
IPAF11 As per EIMF1, the IPA SHALL be able to accept a Profile Download trigger from the
eIM.
IPAF12 The IPA SHALL support at least one of the following three mechanisms for Profile
Download:
• Profile Download from default SM-DP+
• Profile Download with Activation Code
• Profile Download via SM-DS
IPAF13 IPA MAY support Profile download and immediate enabling through default SM-DP+
without eIM involvement.
IPAF14 There SHALL be at most one active IPA, either the IPAd or the IPAe, per eUICC at
a given time (either IPAe or IPAd is active).
IPAF15 If more than one IPA is present, the IoT Device MAY have a means to set which IPA
is active. NOTE: it is IoT Device implementation-specific to configure which IPA is active by
default.
IPAF16 There SHALL be a mechanism for the IPA to provide its IPA Capabilities (e.g: verify
Profile Metadata) to the eIM.IPAF17 IPA MAY support Profile download and immediate enabling through SM-DS without
eIM involvement. NOTE: technical implementation of this requirement is FFS.
IPAF18 The IPA MAY request to the eUICC to Enable or Disable the Emergency Profile.
IPAF19 If Fallback Mechanism is supported, the IPA SHOULD indicate to the eUICC the loss
of connectivity in order to execute the Fallback Mechanism. NOTE: It’s IoT Device implementation specific to detect the connectivity loss.
IPAF20 If the IPA indicated to the eUICC the enabling of Fallback Profile, the IPA SHALL (a)
determine if communications with that eIM can be established using Fallback Profile;
and (b) inform the eUICC to enable the previously enabled Profile if no
communication with the eIM is possible. NOTE: It’s IoT Device implementation specific to retry.
IPAF21 There SHALL be a compliance process for the IPA (IPAd and IPAe) specified in
GSMA SGP.24 [7].Table 5.1.4.1: IPA Functional Requirements
5.1.5 SM-DP+ Functional Requirements
All SM-DP+ requirements specified in SGP.21 [1] section 4.10.2 apply for this specification,
unless otherwise specified. The below are additional requirements:
NOTE: An SM-DP+ can implement the Activation Code Retrieval (for Consumer Devices),
according to SGP.21 [1] in requirements SMDP41, SMDP42, SMDP43, SMDP44,
SMDP45, and SMDP46.Req no. Description
SMDPF1 An SM-DP+ SHALL be able to identify an eUICC, as defined in this specification,
through eUICC Eligibility Check Information.Table 5.1.5.1: SM-DP+ Functional Requirements
5.1.6 Profile Functional Requirements
All Profile requirements specified in SGP.21 [1] section 4.7 SHALL apply to this specification, unless otherwise specified. The following requirements from SGP.21 [1] are not applicable within the scope of this specification: PPRO2, PPRO3, PPRO4, PPRO5. The below are additional requirements:
Req no. Description
PRF1 It SHALL be possible for the Profile Owner to indicate, as part of Profile Metadata,
whether a Profile is allowed as a Fallback Profile.
PRF2 The Profile MAY contain Connectivity Parameters.
PRF3 If a Profile contains Connectivity Parameters, these parameters MAY be managed
via ES6.Table 5.1.6.1: Profile Functional Requirements
5.1.7 Requirements for Interoperable Applications
All requirements for Interoperable Applications specified in SGP.21 [1] section 4.16 SHALL apply to this specification, unless specified otherwise.
5.2 Security Requirements
5.2.1 eUICC Security Requirements
All eUICC security requirements specified in SGP.21 [1] SHALL apply to this specification,
unless specified otherwise. This includes:
• The section 4.14.1 “eUICC Certification” of SGP.21 [1],
• The requirements CERTPK1, CERTPK7, CERTPK9, CERTPK9a, and CERTPK10 of
4.14.6 “Public Key Certificates Management Requirements”,
• Additionally, if the eUICC supports an IPAe, the requirements CERTPK2, CERTPK3,
CERTPK4, CERTPK5 and CERTPK10a.The following requirement from SGP.21 [1] isn’t applicable within the scope of this specification : CERTEU2. The below are additional requirements:
Req no. Description
EUICCS1 The eUICC SHALL only accept PSMO triggered from an Associated eIM as per
EUICCF1.
EUICCS2 Prior to processing any PSMO in the eUICC, the eUICC SHALL verify that the PSMO
is signed by an Associated eIM.
With regards to EUICCF5, the eUICC SHALL verify that the eCO is signed by an
EUICCS3
Associated eIM prior to its processing.
The eUICC SHALL support an asymmetric cryptographic scheme for verifying an
EUICCS4
eIM signature.
EUICCS5 The eUICC SHALL have means to verify that Profile download and immediate
enabling through default SM-DP+ is authorised.
EUICCS6 The eUICC MAY have means to verify that Profile download and immediate enabling
through SM-DS is authorised.NOTE:technical implementation of this requirement is FFS.
Table 5.2.1.1: eUICC Security Requirements
5.2.2 eIM Security Requirements
Req no. Description
EIMS1 Any PSMO sent to the eUICC SHALL be signed by the eIM.
EIMS2 An eIM that supports eIM configuration, SHALL sign eCO.
The eIM SHALL support an asymmetric cryptographic scheme for signing PSMO and
EIMS3
eCO.
EIMS4 An eIM SHALL be implemented and operated with security measures to protect
against threats listed in Annex A.2, A.3 and A.6. With regard to EIMS4, evidence SHALL be provided for an eIM when it is declared
EIMS5
compliant according to GSMA SGP.24 [7].
With regard to EIMS5, evidence SHALL be provided by a third-party security
EIMS6
evaluation (e.g., SAS accreditation number, IEC/ISO 27001:2022 [6], or similar).
The eIM TLS/DTLS Certificates MAY be self-signed or chaining to e.g. GSMA CI,
EIMS7
public trusted CA, private CA between eIM and IPA.Table 5.2.2.1: eIM Security Requirements
5.2.3 General Security Requirements
Req no. Description
GS1 The mechanism to modify the eIM Configuration Data within the eUICC SHALL be
protected in terms of integrity authenticity and anti-replay. It SHOULD also be
protected in terms of confidentiality when necessary.NOTE:The security and the mechanisms other than the signed eIM request is left to the implementation.
Table 5.2.3.1: General Security Requirements
5.2.4 EUM Functional Requirements
All EUM requirements specified in SGP.21 [1] section 3.1 SHALL apply to this specification, unless specified otherwise.
The following requirement from SGP.21 [1] isn’t applicable within the scope of this specification : EUM5. The below are additional requirements:
Req no. Description
EUMF1 The EUM SHALL declare eUICC product compliance according to
GSMA SGP.24 [7].
EUMF2 The EUM SHALL be responsible for the implementation of any IPA elements
that reside in the eUICC and the compliance of these IPA elements according
to IPA requirements in 5.1.4Table 5.2.4.1: EUM Security Requirements
5.2.5 SM-DP+ Security Requirements
All SM-DP+ security requirements specified in SGP.21 [1] SHALL apply for this specification, unless otherwise specified. This includes:
• The section 4.14.3 “SM-DP+ Certification Requirements” of SGP.21 [1],
• The requirements CERTPK6, CERTPK10, CERTPK10a and CERTPK11 of 4.14.6
“Public Key Certificates Management Requirements”.5.2.6 SM-DS Security Requirements
All SM-DS security requirements specified in SGP.21 [1] SHALL apply for this specification, unless otherwise specified. This includes:
•The section 4.14.4 “SM-DS Certification Requirements” of SGP.21 [1],
•The requirements CERTPK10, CERTPK10a and CERTPK11 of 4.14.6 “Public Key Certificates Management Requirements”.
6 Procedures
This section contains the high level description of the procedures.
6.1 Profile Download Procedures
6.1.1 Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Code
The following procedure describes the direct Profile Download procedure between the SM- DP+ and the eUICC when it’s triggered by the eIM, using an Activation Code.
Start Conditions:
1. The ordering process related to this Profile has been completed.
2. Activation Code is generated by the Operator and made available to the eIM.
Procedure:
1. The eIM sends the AC, containing the SM-DP+ identifier, to the IPA.
2. The IPA parses the Activation Code parameters to identify the SM-DP+ address.
3. The IPA establishes a secure connection with the SM-DP+.
4. Mutual Authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ is performed. Additional
information from eUICC is provided to the SM-DP+ to proceed with the Profile
preparation.
5. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the Profile preparation:
a. Performs the eligibility check based on the provided information by the eUICC.
b. Prepare the Bound Profile Package.
NOTE: The Operator owning the Profile SHALL be able to stop the Profile download at
this stage.
6. The Bound Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC through the IPA using the
secure connection with SM-DP+.
7. The Profile is installed by the eUICC.
8. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and the eIM and
the SM-DP+ are notified.
9. The Operator is notified by the SM-DP+ about the Profile InstallationEnd Conditions:
a) A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a
Disabled state.NOTE:the immediate enabling for an installed profile is FFS.
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant “<b>Operator” as OPE participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
EIM -> IPA: [1] Sends AC
rnote over IPA #FFFFFF [2] Identify SM-DP+ endrnote
rnote over IPA, DP #FFFFFF [3] Secure Connection establishment endrnote
rnote over E, DP #FFFFFF [4] Mutual Authentication Procedure Additional information for Profile Generation is provided endrnote
rnote over DP #FFFFFF [5] a. Eligibility check b. Profile generation and protection endrnote
DP -> E: [6] Profile Download
rnote over E #FFFFFF [7] Profile Installation endrnote
E -> EIM: [8] Installation Report E -> DP: [8] Installation Report DP -> OPE: [9] Installation Report
@enduml
Figure 6.1.1.1: Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Code
6.1.2 eIM Initiated Direct Profile Download with SM-DS
The following procedure describes two options for the direct Profile Download between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
Option a) with the IPA being triggered by the eIM in order to download the corresponding Event Record from the SM-DS and
Option b) with the eIM retrieving the corresponding Event Record from the SM-DS and forwarding it to the IPA for further processing.
Start Conditions:
1. The ordering process to this Profile has been completed and a respective Event Record for a Profile Download has been created via ES12. 2. Option a) IPA is configured with the SM-DS address. Option b) eIM is configured with the SM-DS address.
Procedure:
Option a)
1. A secure connection between IPA and eIM is established via ESipa. 2. The IPA is triggered to initiate a connection to the configured SM-DS for Event Record retrieval, requests and receives information from eUICC REQUIRED to perform mutual authentication with SM-DS.
3. The IPA establishes a secure connection to the SM-DS via ES11 4. Mutual Authentication between the SM-DS and the eUICC is performed. The mutual authentication is initiated and driven by the IPA and involves relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DS. 5. The IPA downloads the Event Record to process.
Option b)
1. A secure connection between IPA and eIM is established via ESipa. 2. The eIM requests the IPA to get information from the eUICC REQUIRED to perform mutual authentication between the eUICC and the SM-DS. 3. The eIM establishes a secure connection to the configured SM-DS via ES11’ 4. Mutual authentication between the SM-DS and the eUICC is performed. The mutual authentication is initiated and driven by the eIM on behalf of the IPA and involves relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DS including re- encoding of the messages for the two secure connections ESipa and ES11’. 5. The eIM downloads the Event Record via ES11’, connects to the IPA and forwards the Event Record to process to the IPA.
NOTE:Unrequested Profile download is to be prevented by the detailed version of this procedure.
For both Option a) and Option b) the procedure continues as follows:
6. The IPA identifies the address of the SM-DP+ where the Profile is stored.
7. The IPA establishes a secure connection with the SM-DP+.
8. Mutual Authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ is performed. Additional
information from eUICC is provided to the SM-DP+ to proceed with the Profile
preparation.
9. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the Profile preparation:
a. Perform the eligibility check based on the provided information by the eUICC.
b. Prepare the Bound Profile Package.NOTE:The Operator owning the Profile is able to stop the Profile download at this stage.
10. The Bound Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC through the IPA using the
secure connection with SM-DP+.
11. The Profile is installed by the eUICC.
12. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and both the eIM
and the Notification Receivers are informed.End Conditions:
a)A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a Disabled state.
NOTE:the immediate enabling for an installed profile is FFS. @startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true
skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant “<b>Operator” as OPE participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant "<b>SM-DS" as DS participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
Group Option a)
rnote over EIM, IPA #FFFFFF
[1] Secure Connection establishment via ESipa
endrnoteEIM -> IPA: [2] trigger connection establishment to DS IPA -> E: [2a] request information for mutual authentication E -> IPA: [2b] information for mutual authentication
rnote over IPA, DS #FFFFFF [3] Establish secure Connection via ES11 endrnote
rnote over DS, E #FFFFFF [4] Mutual Authentication endrnote
DS -> IPA: [5] Event Record end
Group Option b)
rnote over EIM, IPA #FFFFFF
[1] Secure Connection establishment via ESipa
endrnoteEIM -> IPA: [2] request information for mutual authentication IPA -> E: [2a] request information for mutual authentication E -> IPA: [2b] information for mutual authentication IPA -> EIM: [2c] information for mutual authentication
rnote over EIM, DS #FFFFFF [3] Establish secure Connection via ES11' endrnote
rnote over DS, E #FFFFFF [4] Mutual Authentication endrnote
DS -> EIM: [5] Download Event Record EIM -> IPA: [5] Event Record end
rnote over IPA #FFFFFF [6] Identify SM-DP endrnote
rnote over IPA, DP #FFFFFF [7] Secure Connection establishment endrnote
rnote over E, DP #FFFFFF
[8] Mutual Authentication Procedure
Additional information for Profile Generation is provided
endrnoternote over DP #FFFFFF [9] a. Eligibility check b. Bound Profile Package
generation endrnote
DP -> E: [10] Profile Download
rnote over E #FFFFFF [11] Profile Installation endrnote
E -> EIM: [12] Installation Report E -> DP: [12] Installation Report @enduml
Figure 6.1.2.1: eIM Initiated Direct Profile Download with SM-DS
6.1.3 eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Code
The following procedure describes the indirect Profile Download procedure between the SM- DP+ and the eUICC where the eIM assists with the Profile download. The Profile download is triggered by the eIM using an Activation Code.
Start Conditions:
1. The ordering process related to this Profile has been completed. 2. The Activation Code is available at the eIM.
Procedure:
1. The secure connection between the IPA and the eIM is established via ESipa.
2. The eIM parses the Activation Code (AC) to identify the SM-DP+ address.
3. The eIM establishes a secure connection with the SM-DP+.
4. Mutual Authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ is performed. The mutual
authentication is initiated and driven by the eIM on behalf of the IPA and involves
relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DP+ including re-
encoding of the messages for the two different secure connections.NOTE:The Matching Id from the AC is provided by the eIM to IPA as part of the mutual authentication exchange.
5. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the Profile preparation:
a. Performs the eligibility check based on the provided eUICC and IoT Device
information.
b. Prepare the Bound Profile Package.
NOTE: The Operator owning the Profile SHALL be able to stop the Profile
download at this stage.
6. The eIM receives the Bound Profile Package from the SM-DP+ using the secure
connection with SM-DP+.
7. The Bound Profile Package is loaded to the eUICC:
a. The eIM sends a request to IPA to load the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.
The request contains the Bound Profile Package and is sent using the secure
connection with the IoT Device/IPA.
b. IPA loads the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.
8. The Profile contained in the Bound Profile Package is installed by the eUICC.
9. Successful installation of the Profile is reported back to the eIM in the response to the
request from the eIM. The response contains a Profile installation result Notification
signed by the eUICC.
10. The eIM delivers the Notification to the SM-DP+ using the secure connection with SM-
DP+.
11. The Operator is notified by the SM-DP+ about the Profile InstallationEnd Conditions:
a)A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and the Profile contained in the Bound Profile Package is installed on the eUICC. The Profile is in Disabled state.
NOTE:the immediate enabling for an installed profile is FFS. @startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "operator" as operator #white participant "SM-DP+" as smdp #white participant eIM as eim #white participant "IPA" as ipa #white participant eUICC as euicc #white
'title eIM Assisted Profile Download triggered by eIM with Activation Code
group Procedure
group device/IPA establishes a secure \n connection with eIM eim <-> ipa : <b>1. </b>Secure session between\n eIM and device/IPA
note right #white Device / device management protocol dependent, e.g., (D)TLS end note end
note over eim #white: <b>2. </b>eIM parses the Activation Code \n to extract SM-DP+ address
group eIM establishes a secure \n connection with SM-DP+ eim <-> smdp : <b>3. </b>TLS session between eIM and SM-DP+ note right #white Check SMDPid eIM authenticates SM-DP+ end note end
'group Mutual authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ 'smdp <-> euicc : <b>4 </b>Mutual authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ note over smdp, euicc #white 4. Mutual authentication between SM-DP+ and eUICC end note 'end
group Bound Profile Package Download group opt note over smdp #white : <b>5.a </b>Eligibility check,\n inform Operator...\n (refer to SGP.21) end note over smdp #white : <b>5.b </b>Prepare Bound Profile Package eim <- smdp : <b>6. </b>Bound Profile Package\n (refer to SGP.21) eim -> ipa : <b>7.a </b>Bound Profile Package ipa -> euicc : <b>7.b </b>Bound Profile Package\n (refer to SGP.21) euicc -> euicc : <b>8. </b> eUICC verifies and\n installs Bound Profile Package ipa <- euicc : <b>9. </b>response (result \nnotification signed by eUICC) eim <- ipa : <b>9. </b>response (notification) eim -> smdp : <b>10. </b>notification operator <- smdp : <b>11. </b>notification end end @enduml
Figure 6.1.3.1: eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Code
6.1.4 Profile Download with Default SM-DP+
The following procedure describes the direct Profile Download procedure between the SM- DP+ and the eUICC using Default SM-DP+ address.
Start Conditions:
1. The ordering process related to this Profile has been completed. 2. At least one default SM-DP+ address is configured in the eUICC or IPA.
Procedure:
1. The IPA is triggered to initiate a Profile Download from the configured default SM-DP+
address.
2. The IPA establishes a secure connection to the SM-DP+.
3. Mutual Authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ is performed. Additional
information from eUICC is provided to the SM-DP+ to proceed with the Profile
preparation.
4. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the Profile preparation:
a. Performs the eligibility check based on the provided information by the eUICC.
b. Prepare the Bound Profile Package.
NOTE: The Operator owning the Profile SHALL be able to stop the Profile download at
this stage.
5. The Bound Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC through the IPA using the
secure connection with SM-DP+.6. The Profile is installed by the eUICC.
7. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and the eIM (if
any) and the SM-DP+ are notified.
8. The Operator is notified by the SM-DP+ about the Profile Installation
9. The IPA can request the eUICC to enable the Profile and continue with step 10.
Otherwise, the procedure stops.
10. If the eUICC is configured to support immediate enabling using default SM-DP+, the
eUICC enables the installed Profile. Otherwise, the procedure stops.
11. The SM-DP+ and the eIM (if any) are notified about the Profile enabling result.
12. The Operator is notified by the SM-DP+ about the Profile enabling result.NOTE:it is the responsibility of the Operator to notify the Mobile Service Provider.
NOTE:steps 8 and 12 could be executed in parallel by the SM-DP+.
End Conditions:
a)A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a Disabled state. @startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant “<b>Operator” as OPE participant "<b>Default SM-DP+" as DP participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
rnote over IPA #FFFFFF [0] Default SM-DP+ address is configured endrnote
IPA -> DP: [1] Profile Download Request
rnote over DP, IPA #FFFFFF [2] Secure connection establishment endrnote
rnote over DP, E #FFFFFF [3] Mutual authentication procedure Additional information for Profile generation is provided endrnote
rnote over DP #FFFFFF [4] a. Eligibility check b. Bound Profile Package generation endrnote
DP -> E: [5] Profile Download
rnote over E #FFFFFF [6] Profile Installation endrnote
E -> EIM: [7] Installation Report E -> DP: [7] Installation Report
DP -> OPE: [8] Installation Report
IPA -> E: [9] Enable using default SM-DP+
rnote over E #FFFFFF [10] Profile Enabling endrnote
E --> EIM: [11] Enabling Notification E -> DP: [11] Enabling Notification
DP -> OPE: [12] Enabling Notification
@enduml
Figure 6.1.4.1: Profile Download with Default SM-DP+
6.1.5 eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with SM-DS
The following procedure describes the indirect Profile Download procedure between the SM- DP+ and the eUICC using the SM-DS where the eIM assists with both the retrieval of the Event Record and the Profile Download.
Start Conditions:
1. The ordering process to this Profile has been completed and a respective Event Record for a Profile Download has been created via ES12. 2. The SM-DS address is available at the eIM.
Procedure:
1. The secure connection between IPA and eIM is established via ESipa.
2. The eIM requests the IPA to get information from the eUICC REQUIRED to perform
mutual authentication between the eUICC and the SM-DS.
3. The eIM establishes a secure connection to the configured SM-DS
4. Mutual authentication between the SM-DS and the eUICC is performed. The mutual
authentication is initiated and driven by the eIM on behalf of the IPA and involves
relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DS including re-
encoding of the messages for the two secure connections ESipa and ES11’.
5. The eIM downloads the Event Record via ES11’.
6. The eIM identifies the address of the SM-DP+ where the Profile is stored.
7. The eIM establishes a secure connection with the SM-DP+ and establishes a secure
connection to the IPA.
8. Mutual authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ is performed. The mutual
authentication is initiated and driven by the eIM on behalf of the IPA and involves
relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DP+ including re-
encoding of the messages for the two secure connections ESipa and ES9+’. Additional
information from eUICC is provided to the SM-DP+ to proceed with the Profile
preparation.
9. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the Profile preparation:
a. Perform the eligibility check based on the provided information by the eUICC.
b. Prepare the Bound Profile Package.NOTE:The Operator owning the Profile is able to stop the Profile download at this stage.
10. The eIM receives the Bound Profile Package from the SM-DP+ via ES9+’
11. The Bound Profile Package is loaded to the eUICC:
a. The eIM sends a request to IPA to load the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.
The request contains the Bound Profile Package and is sent using the secure
connection with the IoT Device/IPA.
b. IPA loads the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.
12. The Profile contained in the Bound Profile Package is installed by the eUICC.
13. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is reported back to the eIM in the
response to the request from the eIM. The response contains a Profile installation
result Notification signed by the eUICC.
14. The eIM delivers the Notification to the SM-DP+ using the secure connection with SM-
DP+.
15. The Operator is notified by the SM-DP+ about the Profile Installation.End Conditions:
a)A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a Disabled state.
NOTE:the immediate enabling for an installed profile is FFS. @startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11
skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant “<b>Operator” as OPE participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant "<b>SM-DS" as DS participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
rnote over EIM, IPA #FFFFFF [1] Secure connection endrnote
EIM -> E: [2] Request eUICC information E -> EIM: [2] Provide eUICC information
rnote over EIM, DS #FFFFFF [3] Secure connection establishment endrnote
rnote over DS, E #FFFFFF [4] Mutual authentication procedure endrnote
DS -> EIM: [5] Download Event Record via ES11'
rnote over EIM #FFFFFF [6] Identify SM-DP+ endrnote
rnote over EIM, DP #FFFFFF [7] Secure connection establishment endrnote
rnote over E, DP #FFFFFF [8] Mutual authentication Procedure Additional information for Profile generation is provided endrnote
rnote over DP #FFFFFF [9] a. Eligibility check b. Bound Profile Package generation endrnote
DP -> EIM: [10] Profile Download
rnote over EIM, E #FFFFFF [11] Profile Installation via IPA [a] eIM requests IPA to load BPP into eUICC [b] IPA loads BPP into eUICC endrnote
rnote over E #FFFFFF [12] Profile installation endrnote
E -> EIM: [13] Profile Installation Report EIM -> DP: [14] Notification Delivery DP -> OPE: [15] Profile Installation Report @enduml
Figure 6.1.5.1: eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with SM-DS
6.2 Profile Enabling
6.2.1 Profile Enabling via eIM
The following procedure describes the Profile Enabling procedure via the eIM.
Start Conditions:
1. The eIM and the eUICC are associated. 2. The target Profile has been selected by the eIM.
Procedure:
1. The eIM prepares and signs the Profile Enabling request for the target Profile and sends
it to the IPA.
2. The IPA sends the signed Profile Enabling request for the target Profile to the eUICC.
3. The eUICC verifies that the Profile Enabling request is signed by an eIM that is
configured in the eUICC as an Associated eIM.
4. If the verification fails, the eUICC aborts the procedure.
5. If the verification is successful, the eUICC disables the currently enabled Profile, if any,
and enables the target Profile.
a. If the Profile is already enabled, no error SHOULD be generated.
6. The IPA retrieves the signed result of the enabling of the target Profile from the eUICC.
7. The IPA includes the signed result from the eUICC into a response to the eIM to notify
about the result of the Profile Enabling execution. a. If the eIM cannot be notified and if the Rollback Mechanism has been requested
by the eIM, the IPA informs the eUICC to execute the Rollback Mechanism. The
eUICC informs the IPA, and the IPA informs the eIM of the enabling of the
previously enabled Profile. The procedure stops here.
8. The IPA retrieves the pending Notifications from the eUICC and sends the Notifications
to the Notification Receivers.End Conditions:
a)If the Rollback Mechanism has been executed, the previously enabled Profile is enabled. b) Otherwise, the target Profile is enabled and the previously enabled Profile, if any, is disabled. @startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
EIM -> IPA: [1] Signed Profile Enable Request
IPA -> E: [2] Signed Profile Enable Request
rnote over E #FFFFFF [3] Verification of the Associated eIM signature [4] If verification fails, abort procedure endrnote
rnote over E #FFFFFF [5] Disable currently Enabled Profile Enable target Profile a. If target profile is already enabled generates no error endrnote
E -> IPA: [6] Signed Profile Enabling result
alt Device is successfully connected IPA -> EIM: [7] Signed Profile Enabling result E -> IPA: [8] Profile Enabling Notification IPA -> DP: [8] Profile Enabling Notification else [7.a] Connectivity failure and Rollback configured IPA -> E: Rollback Mechanism rnote over E #FFFFFF Disable target Profile, Enable previously enabled Profile endrnote E -> IPA: Signed Profile Rollback information IPA -> EIM: Signed Profile Rollback information end
@enduml
Figure 6.2.1.1: Profile Enabling via eIM
6.3 Profile Disabling
6.3.1 Profile Disabling via eIM
The following procedure describes the Profile Disabling procedure via the eIM.
Start Conditions:
1. The eIM is configured in the eUICC as an Associated eIM. 2. The target Profile has been selected by the eIM.
Procedure:
1. The eIM prepares and signs a Profile Disabling request for the target Profile and sends it to the IPA 2. The IPA sends the signed Profile Disable request for the target Profile to the eUICC 3. The eUICC verifies that the Profile Disable request is signed by an eIM that is configured in the eUICC as an Associated eIM. 4. If the verification fails, the eUICC aborts the procedure. 5. If the verification is successful, the eUICC disables the target enabled Profile. a. If the Profile is already disabled, no error SHOULD be generated.
6. The IPA retrieves the signed result IPA of the disabling of the target Profile from the eUICC 7. The IPA includes the signed result from the eUICC into a response to the eIM. 8. The IPA retrieves the pending Notifications from the eUICC and sends the Notifications to the Notification Receivers.
End Conditions:
a)The target Profile is disabled. b) Mobile connectivity not available
NOTE:the immediate enabling for an installed Profile and Profile Switch is FFS. @startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
EIM -> IPA: [1] Signed Profile Disable request
IPA -> E: [2] Signed Profile Disable Request
rnote over E #FFFFFF [3] Verification of the Associated eIM signature [4] If verification fails, abort procedure endrnote
rnote over E #FFFFFF [5] Disable the target Profile a. If target profile is already disabled generates no error endrnote
E -> IPA: [6] Signed Profile Disabling result
IPA -> EIM: [7] Signed Profile Disabling result
E -> IPA: [8] Profile Disabling Notification IPA -> DP: [8] Profile Disabling Notification
@enduml
Figure 6.3.1.1: Profile Disabling via eIM
6.4 Profile Delete
6.4.1 Profile Delete via eIM
The following procedure describes the Profile Delete procedure via the eIM.
Start Conditions:
1. The target Profile is present in the eUICC in disable state 2. The eIM is configured in the eUICC as an Associated eIM. 3. The target Profile has been selected by the eIM.
Procedure:
1. The eIM prepares and signs a Profile Delete request for the target Profile and sends it
to the IPA.
2. The IPA sends and signs Profile Delete request for the target Profile to the eUICC.
3. The eUICC verifies that the Profile Delete operation is signed by an eIM that is
configured in the eUICC as an Associated eIM.
4. If the verification fails, the eUICC aborts the procedure.
5. The eUICC verifies that the target Profile is disabled.
6. If the verification fails, the eUICC aborts the procedure and informs the eIM.
NOTE: How the eIM is informed is left to the technical realisation.
7. If the verification is successful, the eUICC deletes the target Profile and all the data
associated to this Profile.
8. The IPA retrieves the signed result of the deletion of the target Profile from the eUICC.
9. The IPA includes the signed result from the eUICC into a response to the eIM.
10. The IPA retrieves the pending Notifications from the eUICC and sends the Notifications
to the Notification ReceiversEnd Conditions:
a)The target Profile is deleted. @startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
EIM -> IPA: [1] Signed Profile Delete request
IPA -> E: [2] Signed Profile Delete Request
rnote over E #FFFFFF [3] Verification of the Associated eIM signature [4] If verification fails, abort procedure endrnote
rnote over E #FFFFFF [5] Verification of the target Profile is disabled endrnote
E –> IPA: [6] Error IPA –> EIM: [6] Error
rnote over E #FFFFFF [7] Profile Deletion endrnote
E -> IPA: [8] Signed Profile Delete result
IPA -> EIM: [9] Signed Profile Delete result
E -> IPA: [10] Profile Delete Notification IPA -> DP: [10] Profile Delete Notification
@enduml
Figure 6.4.1.1: Profile Delete via eIM
6.5 eIM Configuration
6.5.1 Add eIM Configuration Data via IPA
The following procedure describes adding eIM Configuration Data to the eUICC when no eIM is associated within the eUICC.
Start Conditions:
1. No eIM is associated within the eUICC
Procedure:
1. The IPA sends the eCO, including the eIM Configuration Data to the eUICC.
2. The eUICC checks if an Associated eIM exists.
a. If no eIM is associated, the eUICC executes the eCO, else
b. the eUICC aborts the procedure.
3. The IPA retrieves the result of the eCO from the eUICCEnd Conditions:
a) The eIM Configuration Data of the Associated eIM is stored in the eUICC.@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11
skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
IPA -> E: [1] eCO rnote over E #FFFFFF [2] eIM is already associated to the eUICC ? [a]: no eIM associated -> execute eCO [b]: eIM associated -> abort procedure endrnote
E -> IPA: [3] eCO result @enduml
Figure 6.5.1.1: Add eIM Configuration Data via IPA
6.5.2 eIM Configuration via eIM
The following procedure describes adding eIM Configuration Data to the eUICC when an eIM is associated within the eUICC.
Start Conditions: 1. An eIM is associated with an eUICC.
Procedure:
1. The eIM prepares and signs an eCO and sends it to the IPA.
2. The IPA sends the signed eCO to the eUICC.
3. The eUICC verifies that the eCO is signed by an eIM that is configured in the eUICC
as an Associated eIM.
a. If the verification is successful, the eUICC processes the eCO else
b. the eUICC aborts the procedure.
4. The IPA retrieves the signed result from the eUICC.
5. The IPA includes the signed result from the eUICC into a response to the eIM.End Conditions: a) The requested eIM Configuration Data is stored in or removed from the eUICC.
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center
skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
EIM -> IPA: [1] Signed eCO IPA -> E: [2] Signed eCO rnote over E #FFFFFF [3] Operation is signed by an Associated eIM ? [a]: Signature verification succesful -> execute eCO [b]: Signature verification fails -> abort procedure Endrnote E -> IPA: [4] Signed eCO result IPA -> EIM: [5] Signed eCO result @enduml
Figure 6.5.2.1: eIM Configuration via eIM
6.5.3 Complete Removal of eIM Configuration Data from the eUICC
The following procedure describes how to completely remove all eIM Configuration Data from the eUICC.
Start Conditions:
1. An eIM is associated within the eUICC
Procedure:
1. The IPA sends the eIM Configuration Data removal operation to the eUICC.
2. The eUICC executes the operation and removes all available eIM Configuration Data
stored in it.
3. The IPA retrieves the result of the operation from the eUICC.End Conditions: a) The eIM Configuration Data is completely removed from the eUICC. b) The eUICC is not associated with any eIM anymore.
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center
skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
IPA -> E: [1] eIM Configuration Data removal operation rnote over E #FFFFFF [2] eUICC removes all eIM Configuration Data stored in it endrnote
E -> IPA: [3] eIM Configuration Data removal operation result @enduml
Figure 6.5.3.1: Complete Removal of eIM Configuration Data from the eUICC
A Threats and Risks (Informative)
This section lists and describes different types of risks that are considered by the architecture as described within this specification.
A.1 Compromised IoT Device
Risk no. Risk description
DEV1 Malicious IoT Device SW/FW and /or malicious IPA is able to perform illegitimate
PSMO on the eUICC.
DEV2 Malicious IoT Device SW/FW and/or malicious IPA is able to block all PSMO to eUICC.
DEV3 Malicious IoT Device SW/FW and/or malicious IPA is able to associate illegitimate eIM
to eUICC.
DEV4 Malicious IoT Device SW/FW and/or malicious IPA is able to improperly deleting eIM
associations on the eUICC.Table A.1.1: Compromised IoT Device Risks
A.2 Compromised eIM
An authorized and legitimate eIM is manipulated and compromised.
Risk no. Risk description CeIM1 Attacker is able to perform illegitimate PSMO on a number of eUICCs. CeIM2 Attacker is able to perform illegitimate eCO on a number of eUICCs.
Table A.2.1: Compromised eIM Risks
A.3 Malicious eIM
A malicious eIM is both not authorized and illegitimate, e.g., malicious eIM acts as man-in-the- middle.
Risk no. Risk description
MeIM1 Attacker is able to perform unauthorized, illegitimate PSMO on a number of IoT Devices
/ eUICCs.
MeIM2 Attacker is able to perform unauthorized, illegitimate eCO on a number of eUICCs.
MeIM3 Malicious eIM is able to tamper with ES9+’ communications.Table A.3.1: Malicious eIM Risks
A.4 Privacy Leakage
Leakage of privacy relevant data on the interface between the eIM and the IoT Device.
Risk no. Risk description
PRI1 Attacker gets hold of privacy related information of the eUICC (e.g., EID) that may be
used to track the location of the IoT Device.
PRI2 eUICC management commands leading to the creation of unexpected and
unpredicted « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties
to spy or compromise IoT Devices or the Subscriber themselves.Table A.4.1: Loss of Privacy Risks
A.5 New Profile on New IoT Device
Risk no. Risk description
INI1 Incomplete or corrupted Profile being pushed to the IoT Device.
INI2 Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles to
IoT Devices.Table A.5.1: New Profile on New IoT Device Risks
A.6 Profile Disabling / Profile Deletion
Risk no. Risk description
IND1 Long term gathering of key materials due to a long term storage of delivered Profiles
after their disabling.
IND2 Loss of sensitive data from discarded media supports (hard drives…)
IND3 Malware / malicious entity launching coordinated or isolated disabling or deletion of one
or several Profiles leading to a loss of connectivity to an IoT Device.
IND4 Malicious or compromised eIM launching coordinated or isolated disabling or deletion
of one or several Profiles leading to a loss of connectivity to an IoT Device.
IND5 Accidental Profile disabling or deletion leading to a loss of connectivity to an IoT Device.
IND6 Malicious or compromised eIM repeatedly deleting Profiles and asking for them to be
reloaded leading to surcharge of provisioning servers.
IND7 Malicious execution of PSMO leading to wrong enabled/disabled/deleted Profile.
IND8 Malicious execution of PSMO from an internal party leading to wrong Profile status
reported to the eIM.Table A.6.1: Profile Disabling or Deletion Risks
A.7 Profile Switch
Risk no. Risk description
INP1 Malicious Profile switching originating from an internal party.
INP2 Malicious Profile switching originating from a malicious or compromised eIM.
INP3 Switching of alternate Profiles leading to a loss of connectivity.
INP4 Malware / malicious entity launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several
Profiles leading to a loss of connectivity.
INP5 Malware / malicious entity launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or several
Profiles leading to major fraud scenarios.Table A.7.1: Profile Switching Risks
A.8 Profile Swap
Risk no. Risk description INS1 Race condition leading to the disabling of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity.
Table A.8.1: Profile Swapping Risks
A.9 Cryptographic Related Risks
Risk no. Risk description
INO1 Loss or theft of private keys in one or several Profile Management components leading
to the loss of confidentiality on the whole chain.
INO2 Inability to revoke compromised Certificates leading to the loss of trust on the whole
Certificate chain.
INO3 Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful disclosure of key materials.
INO4 Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful compromise of key components.
INO5 Malicious or accidental revocation of Certificates leading to the denial of service on the
whole provisioning Certificate chain.
INO6 Use of temporary symmetric cryptographic or “generic” key material during the Profile
creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single point of
failure and attack being created.Table A.9.1 Cryptographic Related Risks
A.10 Quality of Service
Risk no. Risk description
QoS1 Profile creation burst leading to the inability for the eUICC platforms to deliver expected
service level.
QoS2 Denial of service on delivery platforms leading to the inability to deliver expected
service level.
QoS3 Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a temporary or
permanent inability to deliver a Profile.Table A.10.1: Quality of Service Risks
A.11 Non-human or Unpredictable
Risk no. Risk description
EXC1 Catastrophic event such as floods, earthquakes, etc. leading to the destruction of a
datacentre.
EXC2 Geopolitical/Human events leading to the destruction of a datacentre.
EXC3 Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the
provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, EUM…).Table A.11.1: Non-human or Unpredictable Risks
A.12 New Profile during Subscriber Journey
Risk no. Risk description
EXN1 Malicious pairing of new IoT Device using unattended IoT Device.
EXN2 Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the loss of confidentiality during
the provisioning of Profile operations.
EXN3 Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the tampering of registration
information during provisioning of Profile operations.
EXN5 Man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping during Profile provisioning leading to the loss of
confidentiality.EXN6 “Implicit authentication” (e.g., HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of
authentication or Profile material.Table A.12.1: New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks
A.13 Others
Risk no. Risk description
EXO1 Compromising of exchanges between Profile Management actors leading to the critical
loss of private keys.
EXO2 Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios.Table A.13.1: Other Risks
B eIM Configuration Scenarios (Informative)
This section describes different types of eIM configuration scenarios that are considered by the architecture described in this specification.
This section contains some examples and is not limited to them.
B.1 eIM Configuration Performed by the EUM
The EUM performs the loading of the eIM Configuration Data into the eUICC the during eUICC manufacturing process. The mechanisms are EUM specific and not described in this specification. The security of EUM production scenarios is covered by SAS UP.
Figure B.1.1: eIM Configuration performed by the EUM
B.2 eIM Configuration Performed in the IoT Device Production
A production tool communicates with the IoT Device and establishes a secure link to the IPA
to trigger eIM Configuration and to provide the eIM Configuration Data. The IPA transfers the
eCO and corresponding results to/from the eUICC.
NOTE: The mechanism and security applied between the production tool and the IPA are left
to the implementation. Secure link between production tool and IPA can be provided
by the underlying transport between production tool and IoT Device.
NOTE: IoT Device Production can be understood in a broader sense (e.g., module production,
device production, warehouse, logistic partner, field technician etc.).Figure B.2.1: eIM Configuration performed in IoT Device production
B.3 eIM Configuration Performed in the Field by a Backend System
A backend system (e.g., smart meter management platform or mobile application) has already
a communication in place with the IoT Device. The backend system establishes a secure link
to the IPA to trigger eCO. The IPA transfers the eCOs and corresponding results to/from the
eUICC.
NOTE: The mechanism and security applied between the backend system and the IPA are
left to the implementation. Secure link between backend system and IPA can be
provided by the underlying transport between backend system and IoT Device.
NOTE: General clarification and illustrated in Figure B.3.1, the eIM can, but does not have to
be part of the backend system.Figure B.3.1: eIM Configuration performed in the field by a backend system
B.4 eIM Configuration Performed by an eIM
A backend system (e.g., smart meter management platform or mobile application) has already a communication in place with the IoT Device. In this example, the eIM_A is considered as part of this backend system and is already associated to the eUICC. To associate a new eIM_B to the eUICC, the eIM_A prepares eCO including the public key information of eIM_B and signs the eCO with its private eIM_A key. The eIM_A sends the signed eCO to the IPA and the IPA forwards the eCO to the eUICC, which proves the signature before executing the eCO. After succeful execution eIM_B is associated to the eUICC.
Figure B.4.1: eIM Configuration performed by an eIM
B.5 Removal of eIM Configuration
A backend system (e.g., smart meter management platform or mobile application) has already
a communication in place with the IoT Device. The backend system establishes a secure link
to the IPA to trigger the removal of the eIM Configuration Data.The IPA transfers the
operations and corresponding results to/from the eUICC.
NOTE: The removal of the eIM association(s) might be realised by a kind of reset functionality
by the IoT Device, protected against misuse.
NOTE: The mechanism and security applied between the backend system and the IPA are
left to the implementation. Secure link between backend system and IPA can be
provided by the underlying transport between backend system and IoT Device.
NOTE: General clarification and illustrated in Figure B.5.1, the eIM can, but does not have to
be part of the backend system.Figure B.5.1: Removal of eIM Configuration
C Profile Download Deployment Scenarios (Informative)
This Annex gives some examples of deployment scenarios for the Profile download operations.
C.1 Indirect Profile Download
In Indirect Profile download scenarios, the eIM is always involved in the Profile download operation. It is acting as a support between the SM-DP+ and the IPA. Hence, ES9+’ and ESipa are used for Profile Download.
The transfer of the Profile from the SM-DP+ to the eIM is done using ES9+’. The transfer of the Profile from the eIM to the IPA is done using ESipa. ES8+ is always used between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
C.1.1 Indirect Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using AC
In this example (see Figure C.1.1.1), the Profile download is triggered using the Activation Code.
Figure C.1.1.1: Indirect Profile download assisted by eIM using AC
C.1.2 Indirect Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using SM-DS
In the example shown in Figure C.1.2.1, the Profile download is triggered using SM-DS. The Profile download Event Record is retrieved by the eIM using ES11’.
Figure C.1.2.1: Indirect Profile download assisted by eIM using SM-DS
C.2 Direct Profile Download
In direct Profile download scenarios, ES9+’ and ESipa are not used for Profile download. This means that the eIM doesn’t use an ES9+’ interface with the SM-DP+ for the Profile download.
The transfer of the Profile from the SM-DP+ to the IPA is always done via ES9+. The eIM may be involved to differing degrees (e.g., send the Activation Code,…).
C.2.1 Direct Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using Activation Code
In this example (see Figure C.2.1.1), the eIM instructs the IPA using an Activation Code.
Figure C.2.1.1 Direct Profile Download assisted by eIM using AC
C.2.2 Direct Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using SM-DS
In this example (see Figure C.2.2.1), the Profile download Event Record is retrieved by the eIM using ES11’. This Event is sent to the IPA using ESipa.
Figure C.2.2.1 Direct Profile Download assisted by eIM using SM-DS
C.2.3 Direct Profile Download Unassisted by eIM Using SM-DS
In this example (Figure C.2.3.1), the IPA retrieves the Profile download Event Record from the SM-DS using ES11.
Figure C.2.3.1 Direct Profile download unassisted by eIM using SM-DS
C.2.4 Direct Profile Download Unassisted by eIM Using Default SM -DP+
The Profile download is done using ES9+ between the IPA and the default SM-DP+.
Figure C.2.4.1 Direct Profile download unassisted by eIM using Default SM-DP+
D Document Management
D.1 Document History
Version Date Brief Description of Change Approval Editor / Company
Authority
V1.0 15/04/2022 First Release ISAG Gloria Trujillo,
GSMA
V1.1 26/05/2023 Clarifications and additions ISAG Gloria Trujillo,
GSMA
V1.2 26/04/2024 Addition of requirements for: ISAG Gloria Trujillo,
− Emergency call profile, GSMA
− Connectivity parameters for
constrained devices,
− Field test eUICC.
V1.3 22/05/2026 Maintenance ISAG Stéphane Bandin,
OrangeTable D.1.1: Document History
D.2 Detailed Document History for V1.3
Version Date Additions
Draft 01 10/12/2024 CR13001R00 Alignment of the definition of PSMO
CR13002R01 Clarification related to the eIM security compliance
declaration
CR13003R01 Add requirements for the functional compliance of eIM
and IPA
Draft 02 21/01/2025 - Renumbering of Tables and Figures
CR13008R01 Clarify that eIM compliance declaration is optional
Draft 03 27/03/2025 CR13004R01 Correcting Basic Principles removing references to
voided principles
CR13005R02 Removing unsatisfied Basic Principle
Draft 04 17/09/2025 CR13010R03 Upgrade SGP.21 reference to v2.6
Draft 05 11/02/2026 CR13012R03 Alignment to SGP.21 v2.7
CR13013R01 eIM certificate clarification
CR13014R02 Clarification on security requirements
CR13015R00 ESep Interface Naming Confusion
Draft 06 13/03/2026 CR13017R03 Clarify Single eIM Option for RSP OperationsTable D.2.1: Detailed Document History for V1.3
D.3 Other Information
Type Description Document Owner eSIMG Editor / Company Stéphane Bandin, Orange
Table D.3.1: Other information
It is our intention to provide a quality product for your use. If you find any errors or omissions, please contact us with your comments. You may notify us at [email protected]
Your comments or suggestions & questions are always welcome.
© GSM Association. Converted automatically from the published PDF; layout, figures and tables may differ from the original. The authoritative version is the original: https://www.gsma.com/solutions-and-impact/technologies/esim/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/SGP.31-v1.3.pdf.