Overview
The document defines an architecture and requirements for remote provisioning and management of eUICCs in IoT devices with network or user-interface constraints, based on the referenced eSIM architecture. It describes principles, roles, architecture elements, eUICC interfaces, and functional and security requirements. Procedures cover profile download, enabling, disabling and deletion, as well as eIM configuration; informative annexes discuss threats, configuration options and deployment scenarios. The framework is intended to support global interoperability among actors involved in IoT deployments.
- eUICC
- eSIM profiles
- eIM
- remote profile management
Overview generated automatically from the document's scope and outline. The document text is authoritative.
Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Overview
- 1.2 Scope
- 1.3 Intended Audience
- 1.4 Definition of Terms
- 1.5 Abbreviations
- 1.6 References
- 1.7 Conventions
- 2 Principles
- 2.1 Basic Principles
- 2.2 IoT Device principles
- 2.3 IoT Profile Principles
- 3 Roles
- 3.1 Mobile Service Provider, Operator
- 3.2 Subscriber, End User, eUICC Manufacturer, Device Manufacturer
- 4 Architecture
- 4.1 Architecture Diagram
- 4.1.2 IPA in the eUICC
- 4.2 Architecture Elements
- 4.2.1 eSIM IoT Remote Manager
- 4.2.2 IoT Profile Assistant
- 4.3 eUICC Architecture
- 4.3.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
- 4.4 Interfaces
- 4.4.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
- 4.4.2 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
- 4.4.3 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
- 4.4.4 SM-DP+ – IPA (ES9+)
- 4.4.5 SM-DP+ – eIM (ES9+’)
- 4.4.6 IPA – eUICC (ES10a)
- 4.4.7 IPA – eUICC (ES10b)
- 4.4.8 IPA – SM-DS (ES11)
- 4.4.9 eIM – SM-DS (ES11’)
- 4.4.10 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)
- 4.4.11 eIM – eUICC (ESpsmo)
- 4.4.12 eIM – IPA (ESipa)
- 5 Requirements
- 5.1 Functional Requirements
- 5.1.1 General Functional Requirements
- 5.1.2 eUICC Functional Requirements
- 5.1.3 eIM Functional Requirements
- 5.1.4 IPA Functional Requirements
- 5.2 Security Requirements
- 5.2.1 eUICC Security Requirements
- 5.2.2 eIM Security Requirements
- 5.2.3 General Security Requirements
- 6 Procedures
- 6.1 Profile Download Procedures
- 6.1.1 Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Code
- 6.1.2 eIM Initiated Direct Profile Download with SM-DS
- 6.1.3 eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Code
- 6.1.4 Profile Download with Default SM-DP+
- 6.1.5 eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with SM-DS
- 6.2 Profile Enabling
- 6.2.1 Profile Enabling via eIM
- 6.3 Profile Disabling
- 6.3.1 Profile Disabling via eIM
- 6.4 Profile Delete
- 6.4.1 Profile Delete via eIM
- 6.5 eIM Configuration
- 6.5.1 Add eIM Configuration Data via IPA
- 6.5.2 eIM Configuration via eIM
- 6.5.3 Complete Removal of eIM Configuration Data from the eUICC
- A Threats and Risks (Informative)
- A.1 Compromised IoT Device
- A.2 Compromised eIM
- A.3 Malicious eIM
- A.4 Privacy Leakage
- A.5 New Profile on New IoT Device
- A.6 Profile Disabling / Profile Deletion
- A.7 Profile Switch
- A.8 Profile Swap
- A.9 Cryptographic Related Risks
- A.10 Quality of Service
- A.11 Non-human or Unpredictable
- A.12 New Profile during Subscriber Journey
- A.13 Others
- B eIM Configuration Scenarios (Informative)
- B.1 eIM Configuration Performed by the EUM
- B.2 eIM Configuration Performed in the IoT Device Production
- B.3 eIM Configuration Performed in the Field by a Backend System
- B.4 eIM Configuration Performed by an eIM
- B.5 Removal of eIM Configuration
- C Profile Download Deployment Scenarios (Informative)
- C.1 Indirect Profile Download
- C.1.1 Indirect Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using AC
- C.1.2 Indirect Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using SM-DS
- C.2 Direct Profile Download
- C.2.1 Direct Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using Activation Code
- C.2.2 Direct Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using SM-DS
- C.2.3 Direct Profile Download Unassisted by eIM Using SM-DS
- C.2.4 Direct Profile Download Unassisted by eIM Using Default SM -DP+
- D Document Management
- D.1 Document History
- D.2 Other Information
Version 1.0 19 April 2022
This Industry Specification is a Non-Binding Permanent Reference Document of the GSMA
Security Classification: Non-confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other than those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association.
Copyright Notice Copyright © 2022 GSM Association
Disclaimer The GSM Association (“Association”) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document. The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.
Compliance Notice The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy.
This Permanent Reference Document is classified by GSMA as an Industry Specification, as such it has been developed and is maintained by GSMA in accordance with the provisions set out in GSMA AA.35 - Procedures for Industry Specifications.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
This document specifies an architecture and requirements for remote provisioning of eUICCs in Network Constrained and/or User Interface (UI) Constrained IoT Devices.
NOTE 1:The primary focus of this version of the document is to support IoT Devices that require the use of a remote Profile management entity. Permissive requirements are included to support energy and Network Constrained IoT Devices, and for IoT Devices that do not require the use of a remote Profile management entity. The document can be amended by additional requirements for these types of IoT Devices in future releases.
NOTE 2:A set of basic principles for support of eSIM in IoT Devices is also presented, though, as noted, these include items for which specific or complete requirements are not included in this version of the document.
1.2 Scope
This document defines requirements and architectures to enable the remote provisioning and management of the eUICC in IoT Devices which are Network Constrained and/or UI Constrained Devices based on the architecture described in SGP.21 [1]. This framework aims to provide the basis for global interoperability among actors in IoT deployment scenarios.
1.3 Intended Audience
Technical experts within Operators, eUICC solution providers, Subscription management providers, IoT Device vendors, standards organisations, solution providers, network infrastructure vendors, Mobile Service Providers and IoT service providers and other impacted industry bodies.
1.4 Definition of Terms
Term Description
Activation Code Information issued by an Operator to request the download and installation
of a Profile.
Associated eIM An eIM whose eIM Configuration Data is available within the eUICC and
used by the eUICC for verification of an eIM Configuration Operation or
PSMO.
Bound Profile As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Package
eIM Configuration The data to be used by the eUICC to authenticate the eIM commands.
Data
eIM Configuration An operation related to eIM Configuration Data (e.g. add eIM Configuration
Operation Data, remove eIM Configuration Data in the eUICC) through the IPA.
eUICC As defined in SGP.21 [1]
Event As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Event Record As defined in SGP.21 [1].
IoT As defined in TS.34[3].
IoT Device As defined in TS.34 [3].Term Description
Mobile Service The Mobile Service Provider provides Subscriptions to Subscribers either
Provider as part of an Operator or as a party with a wholesale agreement with an
Operator. The Mobile Service Provider could also be the Operator.
Network Constrained An IoT Device where communications resources are limited in bandwidth
Device (NCD) and/or available protocol alternatives. E.g., the bandwidth is typically
limited to relatively low data rates, and may allow asynchronous data
exchange with a platform, and device may not support TCP (or even IP)
protocols.
Notification A report about a Profile Download or PSMO processed by the eUICC.
NOTE: This also applies for implicit changes of a Profile status, e.g. as a
result of enabling another Profile.
Notification A list defined in the Profile containing SM-DP+s that are to receive
Receivers Notifications concerning that Profile.
Operator As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Profile As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Profile Package As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Profile State An operation related to the state update of a Profile in a dedicated ISD-P
Management on the eUICC (e.g: enable Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, list Profile
Operation (PSMO) information, and query Profile metadata, update Profile metadata).
NOTE: in SGP.21 [1], the corresponding term is Profile Management.
Roll-Back Mechanism of enabling the previously enabled Profile in case no
Mechanism communication between the eIM and IPA can be established using the
recently enabled Profile.
Root SM-DS As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Subscriber As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Subscription As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Subscription As defined in SGP.21 [1] with the difference that LPA is IPA in the context
Manager Data of this document.
Preparation + (SM-
DP+)
Subscription As defined in SGP.21 [1].
Manager Discovery
Server (SM-DS)
User Interface An IoT Device with limited, or without, a UI for RSP management functions.
Constrained Device
(UICD)1.5 Abbreviations
Term Description AC Activation Code CASD Controlling Authority Security Domain CoAP Constrained Application Protocol DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security ECASD eUICC Controlling Authority Security Domain
Term Description eDRX Extended Discontinuous Reception eIM eSIM IoT Remote Manager FFS For Further Study IoT Internet of Things IP Internet Protocol ISD-P Issuer Security Domain – Profile ISD-R Issuer Security Domain – Root IPA IoT Profile Assistant IPAe IoT Profile Assistant located in the eUICC IPAd IoT Profile Assistant located in the IoT Device LPWA Low-Power Wide Area MNO-SD Mobile Network Operator – Security Domain NAA Network Access Application NB-IoT Narrow Band Internet of Things NCD Network Constrained Device NIDD Non-IP Data Delivery PSM Power Saving Mode PSMO Profile State Management Operation RSP Remote SIM Provisioning SD Security Domain SM-DP+ Subscription Manager Data Preparation + SM-DS Subscription Manager Discovery Server SSD Supplementary Security Domain TCP Transmission Control Protocol UDP User Datagram Protocol UI User Interface UICD UI Constrained Device
1.6 References
Ref Doc Number Title
[1] SGP.21 V2.4 eSIM Architecture Specification
TCA eUICC Profile
eUICC Profile Package: Interoperable Format Technical
[2] Package v3.1 or
Specification
higher
[3] TS.34 V7.1 IoT Device Connection Efficiency Guidelines “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels”, S.
[4] RFC 2119 Bradner
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
[5] RFC 8174 Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key WordsRef Doc Number Title
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc81741.7 Conventions
“The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [4] and clarified by RFC 8174 ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia.¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia., when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.”
2 Principles
This specification will be based on the SGP.21 [1] architecture and define features related to the scope of the current document. The specification will refer to SGP.21 [1] where appropriate. This implies that to cover the whole range of eSIM provisioning for IoT Devices SGP.31 MUST be used together with SGP.21 [1].
2.1 Basic Principles
This section describes basic principles on what is expected from the architecture.
Principle no. Description
It should be possible to securely perform all supported Profile State
BP01
Management Operations remotely on a given IoT Device containing an eUICC.
It should be possible for a IoT Device containing an eUICC to establish a secure
connection with an entity performing Profile State Management Operations.
BP02 NOTE: a secure connection is a connection that provides confidentiality,
integrity and mutual authentication.
It should be possible to provision eUICCs in IoT Devices where SMS is not
BP03
available.
It should be possible to provision eUICCs in IoT Devices where connection-
BP04
oriented protocols (e.g: TCP/IP) are not upported.
It should be possible to use a lightweight protocol based on CoAP (e.g. LwM2M)
BP05 for transfer of Profile download and Profile State Management Operation related
messages (e.g. ES8+ messages) over LPWA networks in a secure way.
The architecture should support Profile download and Profile State
Management Operations in an asynchronous way with execution on a IoT
Device happening after an extended period of time (e.g. due to eDRX, PSM
BP06 cycles).
NOTE: It may be necessary to store the information about the request for a
longer period of time until the IoT Device is connected.
The principle BP06 should also be applicable for automated Profile download
BP07
and Profile State Management Operations on a large number of IoT Devices.
The architecture should allow push mechanism to the IoT Device to initiate a
BP08
Profile provisioning or management transaction. The architecture should allow polling by the IoT Device to check whether there
is a Profile provisioning or management transaction waiting, e.g. for when the
BP09
IoT Device can no longer communicate with the network due to rejection of
registration attempts. Such polling may use an alternative connectivity.
The architecture should avoid ongoing and frequent polling between the IoT
BP10
Device and the RSP system.
The Notification mechanism should take into account the possibly limited
BP11 availability of the IoT Device in the network as well as being adapted to the use
in constrained networks, such as LPWA networks.
It should be possible for an entity managing a IoT Device (e.g. Mobile Service
BP12 Provider, IoT Device owner/user, enterprise or IoT service provider) to remotely
enable, disable and delete a Profile in a secure way.
It should be possible for an entity managing a fleet of IoT Devices (e.g. IoT
Device owner/user, enterprise, Mobile Service Provider, or IoT service provider)
BP13
to automate Profile download triggering and Profile State Management
Operations for its IoT Devices.
It should be possible to leverage the IoT Device’s existing protocol stack for IoT
Device and data management (e.g. CoAP over DTLS) for secure transfer of
BP14
Profile downloads and Profile State Management Operation related messages
(e.g. ES8+ messages) to and from the IoT Device.
The secure download of Bound Profile Packages via a RSP mechanism for a
BP15 certain production batch of modules/IoT Devices with eUICC by a dedicated
production-line server/appliance should be possible.
The secure transfer of Bound Profile Packages from an SM-DP+ to a dedicated
BP16
server in a manufacturing environment should be possible.
The secure download of the Bound Profile Package from the (off-line)
BP17
production-line server to the IoT Device/eUICC should be possible.
The architecture should support a secure asynchronous mode for Profile
BP18
provisioning and management.
The asynchronous procedure of BP18 should only allow a Bound Profile
BP19
Package to be installed once on an eUICC.
The specification should provide a formula for the calculation of Profile Package
BP20
sizes.
It should be possible to provision eUICCs in IoT Devices using an IP transport
BP21
(e.g.: CoAP over UDP).
It should be possible to provision eUICCs in IoT Devices using a non-IP
BP22
transport (e.g.: CoAP over NIDD).
The architecture should enable installation of Profiles during eUICC or IoT
BP23 Device manufacture or distribution (online or offline) using end-to-end security
equivalent to that provided for in-service (field) Profile download and installation.
The architecture should support a single-round trip key management protocol
BP24
to establish the secure channel between the eUICC and the server.
BP25 The specifications should aim to describe protocols for the support and security
of Profile download or Profile State Management Operation to minimise the
number of transactions required over the lifetime of the IoT Device.BP26 The architecture should support Profile State Management Operation and
Profile download operations with minimal integration between different
components and/or different entities.
BP27 The architecture should optimize the traffic (e.g. avoid excessive polling)
between the network and the IoT Device to enable mass IoT deployment.
“TS34 – IoT Device Connection Efficiency Guidelines” of the GSMA [3] should
be followed.
The architecture should minimise the number of operations at IoT
BP28 Device/eUICC side to avoid IoT Devices having very long operational lifetime
wearing out sensitive memory.
The architecture should be able to cope with the IoT Device being unreachable
BP29
for prolonged periods of time.
The transmission of Notifications should be highly reliable when connectivity is
BP30 available and the IoT Device can process the task, taking into account limited
memory to store Notifications until they can be sent.
It should be possible to remotely trigger the IoT Device, in a secure way, to start
BP31
the download of a Profile.
It should be possible to perform remote operations described in BP31, BP15)
BP32
and BP16 without requiring local interaction with a given IoT Device.
Wherever practical, the installation process described in BP23 should utilize the
BP33 same protocols and encryption techniques as those used in field installation
(e.g: to minimise code requirements in the eUICC/IoT Device).
Computational complexity of processes should be consistent with process
BP34 transaction latency for IoT Devices having limited power and/or total lifetime
energy resources, without impacting the security level.NOTE 1:Requirements, or additional requirements, for some basic principles may be added in future versions of this document.
NOTE 2:The following basic principles have been highlighted as principles that require further study: BP09, BP10, BP13, BP15, BP16, BP17, BP18, BP19, BP20, BP23, BP24, BP25, BP27, BP29, BP33.
2.2 IoT Device principles
Principle no. Description
DEVP1 Impact of Profile constraints on IoT Device functionality is out of scope of this
specification.
DEVP2 Profile handling related code on the IoT Device SHOULD be kept to a minimum for
memory constrained IoT Devices.2.3 IoT Profile Principles
All Profile principles in SGP.21 [1] apply for this specification. The below are additional principles:
Principle no. Description PROF1 This document uses the term Profile as defined by SGP.21 [1].
PROF2 Profile description is defined by Trusted Connectivity Alliance (formerly SIMalliance)
eUICC Profile Package: Interoperable Format Technical Specification [2].
PROF3 Description of a Profile intended for use with IoT services and Subscriptions will be
done by the issuing Mobile Service Provider and is out of scope of this document.
PROF4 Profile package size SHOULD be kept to a minimum for Network Constrained Devices.3 Roles
3.1 Mobile Service Provider, Operator
This document adopts the definitions of SGP.21 [1] for the roles ‘Mobile Service Provider’ and ‘Operator’.
Subscriptions used by IoT Devices in the scope of solutions described by this document are defined through the Subscription products/contracts and eSIM Profiles supplied by the Mobile Service Provider and their description or usage are not in scope of this document.
NOTE:A Mobile Service Provider issues Subscription contracts for network access and has the commercial customer relationship. This document does not separate between service providers for specialised market segments. These are all considered as providers of Subscriptions for mobile network access.
3.2 Subscriber, End User, eUICC Manufacturer, Device Manufacturer
The roles eUICC Manufacturer, Device Manufacturer, Subscriber and End User are used as defined in SGP.21 [1].
4 Architecture
This section contains the functional description of the system architecture for the eSIM IoT. Architecture elements include eUICC, SM-DP+, eIM, IPA, SM-DS and Operator. The IPA is located either in the IoT Device (IPAd) or in the eUICC (IPAe).
NOTE:The interaction between a Subscriber and the Mobile Service Provider is not shown on this architecture but is expected to be similar to the interactions described in SGP.21 [1].
4.1 Architecture Diagram
The following architecture diagrams describe the roles and interfaces (Figure 1).
Figure 1: eSIM IoT Functional Architecture (IPA in the IoT Device)
4.1.2 IPA in the eUICC
The following architecture diagrams describe the architecture model (Figure 2) where the IPA is located in the eUICC.
Figure 2: eSIM IoT Functional Architecture (IPA in the eUICC)
4.2 Architecture Elements
4.2.1 eSIM IoT Remote Manager
The eSIM IoT Remote Manager is responsible for remote Profile State Management Operations on a single IoT Device or a fleet of IoT Devices.
The eIM can either be a stand-alone component or a component of a higher-level functional system (e.g. device management platform).
NOTE:Apart from the necessary functional and security requirements, this specification will not further describe the implementation of the eIM, neither is the interaction between a
Subscriber and the Mobile Service Provider which is expected to be similar to the interactions described in SGP.21 [1].
4.2.2 IoT Profile Assistant
The IoT Profile Assistant (IPA) provides functions that enable the eUICC in the IoT Device to be provisioned by the SM-DP+.
The IPA can either be a stand-alone component or a component of a higher-level functional software in the IoT Device (e.g. device management client).
The IPA provides multiple distinct functions, the Profile Download,the Discovery Service, the Notification Handling, Conveying PSMO and related results as described below.
Function name Description
Discovery Service When REQUIRED, this service is responsible for retrieving pending Event
Records from the SM-DS.
This plays a proxy role for the efficient download of a Bound Profile
Package in two stages: (i) the download of a Bound Profile Package from
Profile Download the SM-DP+ to the IPA in a single transaction, and (ii) the onward transfer
of the Bound Profile Package into the eUICC in segments.
This function will depend on network, IoT Device, and eUICC capabilities.
This is responsible for conveying PSMOs and related results between eIM
PSMO Conveying
and eUICC.
This is responsible for forwarding notifications to the eIM and/or the SM-
Notification Handling
DP+.Table 1 IPA Function Descriptions
4.3 eUICC Architecture
4.3.1 eUICC Architecture Overview
This section describes the internal high-level architecture of the eUICC. The eUICC architecture is similar to the one used in [1].
Figure 3: eUICC Architecture
4.4 Interfaces
In this section we define the interfaces used in this specification. Interfaces as defined in SGP.21 [1] will be referenced as appropriate.
4.4.1 Operator – SM-DP+ (ES2+)
The ES2+ interface is used by the Operator to order Profiles for specific eUICCs as well as other administrative functions as defined in SGP.21[1].
4.4.2 Operator – eUICC (ES6)
The ES6 interface is used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services. It’s used for Profile Content Management operations. This interface is defined in SGP.21[1].
4.4.3 SM-DP+ – eUICC (ES8+)
The ES8+ is a logical interface which provides a secure end-to-end channel between the SM- DP+ and the eUICC for the administration of the ISD-P and the associated Profile during download and installation. This interface is defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.4 SM-DP+ – IPA (ES9+)
The ES9+ interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the IPA. This interface is defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.5 SM-DP+ – eIM (ES9+’)
The ES9+’ interface is used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of the Bound Profile Package between the SM-DP+ and the eIM. The eIM is acting on behalf of the IPA. This interface is implements the same procedures as ES9+ defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.6 IPA – eUICC (ES10a)
The ES10a interface is used by the IPA in the IoT Device to get the configured addresses from the eUICC for Root SM-DS, and optionally the default SM-DP+. This interface is defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.7 IPA – eUICC (ES10b)
The ES10b interface is used by the IPA in the IoT Device and the IPA services in the eUICC to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC as defined in SGP.21[1]. The ES10b is also used by the IPA to transfer PSMO to the eUICC.
4.4.8 IPA – SM-DS (ES11)
The ES11 interface allows the IPA to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC. This interface is defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.9 eIM – SM-DS (ES11’)
The ES11’ interface allows the eIM to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC. The eIM is acting on behalf of the IPA. This interface is implements the same procedures as ES11 defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.10 SM-DP+ – SM-DS (ES12)
The ES12 interface allows any SM-DP+ to issue or remove Event Registrations on the SM- DS. This interface is defined in SGP.21 [1].
4.4.11 eIM – eUICC (ESpsmo)
The ESpsmo is a logical end-to-end interface between the eIM and the eUICC.
Req no. Description
ESPSMO1 The PSMO SHALL be integrity protected over ESpsmo.
NOTE: The solution shall not require associating at eUICC manufacturing the
eUICC with a specific eIM.
ESPSMO2 The PSMO SHALL be protected against replay attacks.
ESPSMO3 The PSMO SHALL be protected in terms of integrity and authenticity.Table 2: eIM – eUICC (ESpsmo) Interface Requirements
4.4.12 eIM – IPA (ESipa)
The ESipa is a logical interface between an eIM and an IPA. It could be used to trigger a Profile download at the IPA. It is also used to provide a secure transport for the delivery of
PSMO between an eIM and an IPA, unless the underlying transport provides necessary security.
NOTE : The underlying transport layer can provide transport for other functions (e.g. device management) and should allow multiplexing of these functions in parallel with the ESipa.
Req no. Description
ESipa1 ESipa SHALL support triggering of Profile download.
ESipa2 ESipa SHALL support delivery of PSMO between eIM and eUICC.
ESipa messages SHALL be protected in terms of confidentiality, integrity and
ESipa3
authenticity.
ESipa message protection as per ESipa3 MAY be provided by the underlying
ESipa4
transport.
ESipa5 An EID sent to the eIM via ESipa SHALL be privacy protected.Table 3: eIM – IPA (ESipa) Interface Requirements
5 Requirements
5.1 Functional Requirements
5.1.1 General Functional Requirements
Req no. Description
It is OPTIONAL for the IoT Device, eIM and the SM-DP+ to permit the use of
GENF01
an SM-DS.5.1.2 eUICC Functional Requirements
Req no. Description
EUICCF1 The eIM Configuration Data SHALL include credentials (e.g. eIM public key) to
allow the eUICC to authenticate the commands from the eIM.
EUICCF2 It SHALL be possible to transfer eIM Configuration Data to the eUICC at the stage
of eUICC production. NOTE: The mechanism and security applied are left to the implementation and may
be EUM specific.
EUICCF3 The eUICC SHALL provide an interface to the IPA to perform eIM Configuration
Operations.
NOTE: Whether IPA/device uses this interface is an implementation specific
decision.
When the eUICC is not associated to any eIM, the eUICC SHALL accept adding
any eIM Configuration Data provided through the interface defined in EUICCF3.
EUICCF4
NOTE: This interface cam be disabled by configuring any (even non-existing) eIM.
Once an eIM is associated with the eUICC, the eUICC SHALL only accept further
eIM Configuration Operations signed by the Associated eIM, except EUICCF6.
EUICCF5
The processing of this signed eIM Configuration Operations SHALL be handled as
a signed PSMO.EUICCF6 The eUICC MAY provide an interface to the IPA to allow the complete removal of all
eIM Configuration Data from the eUICC.
NOTE: The mechanism has to be protected against misuse and could be realised
by a kind of reset functionality.
EUICCF7 The eUICC SHALL support the Roll-Back Mechanism.
EUICCF8 If the eIM has requested use of the Roll-Back Mechanism (see EIMF8), and if the
IPA informs the eUICC that Roll-Back is required (see IPAF1), the eUICC SHALL
execute the Roll-Back Mechanism.
NOTE: In this version only the requesting eIM is notified about the result.EUICCF9 The eUICC SHALL provide a signed result of a requested PSMO or Profile
installation to the IPA.
NOTE: This signed result is included by the IPA within its responses to requests
from the eIM.
EUICCF10 The eUICC SHALL be able to provide Notifications to the IPA for IPA to send to
Notification Receivers. This mechanism SHALL be in accordance with SGP.21[1].
EUICCF11 The eUICC SHALL be able to accept SM-DS or default SM-DP+ triggered Profile
download and automatic activation without signed PSMO from any potentially
Associated eIM.
EUICCF12 The behavior in EUICCF11 SHALL be configurable in the eUICC.
EUICCF13 Changing the configuration in the eUICC (see EUICCF12) SHALL not require a
signed PSMO, if there is no eIM associated. If an eIM is associated, only the
Associated eIM can change the configuration in the eUICC.An EUM MAY lock the behavior in eUICC manufacturing.
5.1.3 eIM Functional Requirements
Req no. Description
EIMF1 The eIM SHALL be able to trigger the IPA to initiate a Profile Download from the
SM-DP+. Depending on the technical capabilities of the IoT Device (see IPAF12),
at least one of the following three Profile Download mechanisms SHALL be
supported:
• Profile Download from default SM-DP+
• Profile Download with Activation Code
• Profile Download via SM-DS
NOTE: Impact of this optionality on Profile Provisioning procedures is FFS.
EIMF2 The eIM SHALL be able to trigger a PSMO to be executed by the eUICC.
EIMF3 An eIM MAY support eIM Configuration Operations.
EIMF4 The eIM MAY support the transfer of the Bound Profile Package and related
communication between the SM-DP+ and IPA/eUICC.
EIMF5 An eIM which is designed for use with IoT Devices that do not require to support
the establishment of a direct ES9+ interface to the SM-DP+, SHALL be able to
support the transfer of the Bound Profile Package and related communication
between the SM-DP+ and the IPA.
EIMF6 The eIM MAY support the transfer of the Event Records and related communication
between the SM-DS and IPA/eUICC.
EIMF7 An eIM which is designed for use with IoT Devices that do not require to support
the establishment of a direct ES11 interface to the SM-DS, SHALL be able to
support the transfer of the Event Records and related communication between the
SM-DS and the IPA.EIMF8 The eIM SHALL be able to request of the eUICC the activation of the Roll-Back
Mechanism.EIMF9 The eIM MAY support the transfer of Notifications and related communication
between the SM-DP+ and IPA/eUICC.
EIMF10 An eIM which is designed for use with IoT Devices that do not require to support
the establishment of a direct ES9+ interface to the SM-DP+, SHALL be able to
support the transfer of Notifications between the SM-DP+ and the IPA.5.1.4 IPA Functional Requirements
Req no. Description
IPAF1 If the eIM has requested activation of the Roll-Back Mechanism, then following a
Profile Enabling request from an eIM and its execution by the eUICC, the IPA SHALL
(a) determine if communications with that eIM can be established; and (b) inform the
eUICC that Roll-Back is required if no communication with the eIM is possible.
IPAF2 If the eIM request contains a signed PSMO, or a signed eIM Configuration Operation,
or triggers a Profile installation that returns a signed result from the eUICC, the IPA
SHALL retrieve the signed result from the eUICC and SHALL include it in a response
to the eIM.
IPAF3 The IPA SHALL retrieve pending Notifications from the eUICC and SHALL send the
Notifications to the Notification Receivers.
IPAF4 An IPA which is designed for use with IoT Devices that do not require to support the
establishment of a direct ES9+ interface to the SM-DP+, SHALL be able to include
Notifications into responses between the IPA and the eIM.IPAF5 As per EIMF10, there SHALL be a means for the IPA to identify Notifications to be
transferred by a specific eIM to a designated SM-DP+.
IPAF6 The IPA SHALL send Notifications on a best-effort basis when connectivity is
available.
IPAF7 The IPA SHALL retain signed eUICC results until they can be sent in a response to
the eIM.
IPAF8 IPA MAY support direct Profile download via ES9+.
IPAF9 IPA MAY support indirect Profile download via ESipa.
IPAF10 The IPA MAY support eIM Configuration Operations.
IPAF11 As per EIMF1, the IPA SHALL be able to accept a Profile Download trigger from the
eIM.
IPAF12 The IPA SHALL support at least one of the following three mechanisms for Profile
Download:
• Profile Download from default SM-DP+
• Profile Download with Activation Code
• Profile Download via SM-DS
IPAF13 IPA MAY support Profile download and automatic activation through SM-DS or
default SM-DP+ without eIM involvement.5.2 Security Requirements
5.2.1 eUICC Security Requirements
Req no. Description
EUICCS1 The eUICC SHALL only accept PSMO triggered from an Associated eIM as per
EUICCF1.
EUICCS2 Prior to processing any PSMO in the eUICC, the eUICC SHALL verify that the
PSMO is signed by an Associated eIM.
With regards to EUICCF5, the eUICC SHALL verify that the eIM Configuration
EUICCS3
Operation is signed by an Associated eIM prior to its processing.
The eUICC SHALL support an asymmetric cryptographic scheme for verifying
EUICCS4
an eIM signature.
EUICCS5 The eUICC SHALL have means to verify that Profile download and automatic
activation through default SM-DP+ or SM-DS is authorised.5.2.2 eIM Security Requirements
Req no. Description
EIMS1 Any PSMO sent to the eUICC SHALL be signed by the eIM.
EIMS2 If supported by the eIM, the eIM SHALL sign eIM Configuration Operations.
The eIM SHALL support an asymmetric cryptographic scheme for signing
EIMS3
PSMO.5.2.3 General Security Requirements
Req no. Description
The mechanism to modify the eIM Configuration Data within the eUICC
SHALL be protected in terms of integrity and authenticity.
GS1
NOTE: The security and the mechanisms other than the signed eIM request is
left to the implementation.6 Procedures
This section contains the high level description of the procedures.
6.1 Profile Download Procedures
6.1.1 Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Code
The following procedure describes the direct Profile Download procedure between the SM- DP+ and the eUICC when it’s triggered by the eIM, using an Activation Code.
Start Conditions:
1. The ordering process related to this Profile has been completed.
2. Activation Code is generated by the Operator and made available to the eIM.
Procedure:
1. The eIM sends the AC, containing the SM-DP+ identifier, to the IPA.
2. The IPA parses the Activation Code parameters to identify the SM-DP+ address.
3. The IPA establishes a secure connection with the SM-DP+.4. Mutual Authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ is performed. Additional
information from eUICC is provided to the SM-DP+ to proceed with the Profile
preparation.
5. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the Profile preparation:
a. Performs the eligibility check based on the provided information by the eUICC.
b. Prepare the Bound Profile Package.
NOTE: The Operator owning the Profile SHALL be able to stop the Profile download at
this stage.
6. The Bound Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC through the IPA using the
secure connection with SM-DP+.
7. The Profile is installed by the eUICC.
8. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and the eIM and
the SM-DP+ are notified.
9. The Operator is notified by the SM-DP+ about the Profile InstallationEnd Conditions:
a) A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a
Disabled state.NOTE:the automatic enabling for an installed profile is FFS.
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant “<b>Operator” as OPE participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
EIM -> IPA: [1] Sends AC
rnote over IPA #FFFFFF [2] Identify SM-DP+ endrnote
rnote over IPA, DP #FFFFFF [3] Secure Connection establishment endrnote
rnote over E, DP #FFFFFF [4] Mutual Authentication Procedure Additional information for Profile Generation is provided endrnote
rnote over DP #FFFFFF [5] a. Eligibility check b. Profile generation and protection endrnote
DP -> E: [6] Profile Download
rnote over E #FFFFFF
[7] Profile Installation endrnote
E -> EIM: [8] Installation Report E -> DP: [8] Installation Report DP -> OPE: [9] Installation Report
@enduml
6.1.2 eIM Initiated Direct Profile Download with SM-DS
The following procedure describes two options for the direct Profile Download between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
Option a) with the IPA being triggered by the eIM in order to download the corresponding Event Record from the SM-DS and
Option b) with the eIM retrieving the corresponding Event Record from the SM-DS and forwarding it to the IPA for further processing.
Start Conditions:
1. The ordering process to this Profile has been completed and a respective Event Record for a Profile Download has been created via ES12. 2. Option a) IPA is configured with the SM-DS address. Option b) eIM is configured with the SM-DS address.
Procedure:
Option a)
1. A secure connection between IPA and eIM is established via ESipa. 2. The IPA is triggered to initiate a connection to the configured SM-DS for Event Record retrieval, requests and receives information from eUICC REQUIRED to perform mutual authentication with SM-DS.
3. The IPA establishes a secure connection to the SM-DS via ES11 4. Mutual Authentication between the SM-DS and the eUICC is performed. The mutual authentication is initiated and driven by the IPA and involves relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DS. 5. The IPA downloads the Event Record to process.
Option b)
1. A secure connection between IPA and eIM is established via ESipa. 2. The eIM requests the IPA to get information from the eUICC REQUIRED to perform mutual authentication between the eUICC and the SM-DS. 3. The eIM establishes a secure connection to the configured SM-DS via ES11’ 4. Mutual authentication between the SM-DS and the eUICC is performed. The mutual authentication is initiated and driven by the eIM on behalf of the IPA and involves relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DS including re- encoding of the messages for the two secure connections ESipa and ES11’. 5. The eIM downloads the Event Record via ES11’, connects to the IPA and forwards the Event Record to process to the IPA.
NOTE:Unrequested Profile download is to be prevented by the detailed version of this procedure.
For both Option a) and Option b) the procedure continues as follows:
6. The IPA identifies the address of the SM-DP+ where the Profile is stored.
7. The IPA establishes a secure connection with the SM-DP+.
8. Mutual Authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ is performed. Additional
information from eUICC is provided to the SM-DP+ to proceed with the Profile
preparation.
9. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the Profile preparation:
a. Perform the eligibility check based on the provided information by the eUICC.
b. Prepare the Bound Profile Package.NOTE:The Operator owning the Profile is able to stop the Profile download at this stage.
10. The Bound Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC through the IPA using the
secure connection with SM-DP+.
11. The Profile is installed by the eUICC.
12. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and both the eIM
and the Notification Receivers are informed.End Conditions:
a)A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a Disabled state.
NOTE:the automatic enabling for an installed profile is FFS. @startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant “<b>Operator” as OPE participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant "<b>SM-DS" as DS participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
Group Option a)
rnote over EIM, IPA #FFFFFF
[1] Secure Connection establishment via ESipa
endrnoteEIM -> IPA: [2] trigger connection establishment to DS IPA -> E: [2a] request information for mutual authentication E -> IPA: [2b] information for mutual authentication
rnote over IPA, DS #FFFFFF [3] Establish secure Connection via ES11 endrnote
rnote over DS, E #FFFFFF [4] Mutual Authentication endrnote
DS -> IPA: [5] Event Record end
Group Option b)
rnote over EIM, IPA #FFFFFF
[1] Secure Connection establishment via ESipa
endrnoteEIM -> IPA: [2] request information for mutual authentication IPA -> E: [2a] request information for mutual authentication E -> IPA: [2b] information for mutual authentication IPA -> EIM: [2c] information for mutual authentication
rnote over EIM, DS #FFFFFF [3] Establish secure Connection via ES11' endrnote
rnote over DS, E #FFFFFF [4] Mutual Authentication endrnote
DS -> EIM: [5] Download Event Record EIM -> IPA: [5] Event Record end
rnote over IPA #FFFFFF [6] Identify SM-DP endrnote
rnote over IPA, DP #FFFFFF [7] Secure Connection establishment endrnote
rnote over E, DP #FFFFFF
[8] Mutual Authentication Procedure
Additional information for Profile Generation is provided
endrnoternote over DP #FFFFFF [9] a. Eligibility check b. Bound Profile Package generation endrnote
DP -> E: [10] Profile Download
rnote over E #FFFFFF [11] Profile Installation endrnote
E -> EIM: [12] Installation Report E -> DP: [12] Installation Report @enduml
6.1.3 eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with Activation Code
The following procedure describes the indirect Profile Download procedure between the SM- DP+ and the eUICC where the eIM assists with the Profile download. The Profile download is triggered by the eIM using an Activation Code.
Start Conditions:
1. The ordering process related to this Profile has been completed. 2. The Activation Code is available at the eIM.
Procedure:
1. The secure connection between the IPA and the eIM is established via ESipa.
2. The eIM parses the Activation Code (AC) to identify the SM-DP+ address.
3. The eIM establishes a secure connection with the SM-DP+.
4. Mutual Authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ is performed. The mutual
authentication is initiated and driven by the eIM on behalf of the IPA and involves
relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DP+ including re-
encoding of the messages for the two different secure connections.NOTE:The Matching Id from the AC is provided by the eIM to IPA as part of the mutual authentication exchange.
5. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the Profile preparation:
a. Performs the eligibility check based on the provided eUICC and IoT Device
information.
b. Prepare the Bound Profile Package.
NOTE: The Operator owning the Profile SHALL be able to stop the Profile
download at this stage.
6. The eIM receives the Bound Profile Package from the SM-DP+ using the secure
connection with SM-DP+.
7. The Bound Profile Package is loaded to the eUICC:
a. The eIM sends a request to IPA to load the Bound Profile Package to the
eUICC. The request contains the Bound Profile Package and is sent using the
secure connection with the IoT Device/IPA.
b. IPA loads the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.
8. The Profile contained in the Bound Profile Package is installed by the eUICC.
9. Successful installation of the Profile is reported back to the eIM in the response to the
request from the eIM. The response contains a Profile installation result Notification
signed by the eUICC.
10. The eIM delivers the Notification to the SM-DP+ using the secure connection with
SM-DP+.
11. The Operator is notified by the SM-DP+ about the Profile InstallationEnd Conditions:
a)A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and the Profile contained in the Bound Profile Package is installed on the eUICC. The Profile is in Disabled state.
NOTE:the automatic enabling for an installed profile is FFS.
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center
skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "operator" as operator #white participant "SM-DP+" as smdp #white participant eIM as eim #white participant "device/IPA" as ipa #white participant eUICC as euicc #white
'title eIM Assisted Profile Download triggered by eIM with Activation Code
group Procedure
group device/IPA establishes a secure \n connection with eIM eim <-> ipa : <b>1. </b>Secure session between\n eIM and device/IPA note right #white Device / device management protocol dependent, e.g. (D)TLS end note end
note over eim #white: <b>2. </b>eIM parses the Activation Code \n to extract SM-DP+ address
group eIM establishes a secure \n connection with SM-DP+ eim <-> smdp : <b>3. </b>TLS session between eIM and SM-DP+ note right #white Check SMDPid eIM authenticates SM-DP+ end note end
'group Mutual authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ 'smdp <-> euicc : <b>4 </b>Mutual authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ note over smdp, euicc #white 4. Mutual authentication between SM-DP+ and eUICC end note 'end
group Bound Profile Package Download group opt note over smdp #white : <b>5.a </b>Eligibility check,\n inform Operator...\n (refer to SGP.21) end note over smdp #white : <b>5.b </b>Prepare bound profile package eim <- smdp : <b>6. </b>bound profile package\n (refer to SGP.21) eim -> ipa : <b>7.a </b>bound profile package ipa -> euicc : <b>7.b </b>bound profile package\n (refer to SGP.21) euicc -> euicc : <b>8. </b> eUICC verifies and\n installs bound profile package ipa <- euicc : <b>9. </b>response (result \nnotification signed by eUICC) eim <- ipa : <b>9. </b>response (notification) eim -> smdp : <b>10. </b>notification operator <- smdp : <b>11. </b>notification end end @enduml
6.1.4 Profile Download with Default SM-DP+
The following procedure describes the direct Profile Download procedure between the SM- DP+ and the eUICC using Default SM-DP+ address.
Start Conditions:
1. The ordering process related to this Profile has been completed. 2. At least one default SM-DP+ address is configured in the eUICC or IPA.
Procedure:
1. The IPA is triggered to initiate a Profile Download from the configured default SM-DP+
address.
2. The IPA establishes a secure connection to the SM-DP+.
3. Mutual Authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ is performed. Additional
information from eUICC is provided to the SM-DP+ to proceed with the Profile
preparation.
4. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the Profile preparation:
a. Performs the eligibility check based on the provided information by the eUICC.
b. Prepare the Bound Profile Package.NOTE:The Operator owning the Profile SHALL be able to stop the Profile download at this stage. 5. The Bound Profile Package is downloaded to the eUICC through the IPA using the secure connection with SM-DP+. 6. The Profile is installed by the eUICC. 7. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is acknowledged and the eIM and the SM-DP+ are notified. 8. The Operator is notified by the SM-DP+ about the Profile Installation NOTE: it is the responsibility of the Operator to notify the Mobile Service Provider.
End Conditions:
a)A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a Disabled state.
NOTE:the automatic enabling for an installed profile is FFS. @startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant “<b>Operator” as OPE participant "<b>Default SM-DP+" as DP participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
rnote over IPA #FFFFFF [0] Default SM-DP+ address is configured endrnote
IPA -> DP: [1] Profile Download Request
rnote over DP, IPA #FFFFFF [2] Secure connection establishment endrnote
rnote over DP, E #FFFFFF [3] Mutual authentication procedure Additional information for Profile generation is provided endrnote
rnote over DP #FFFFFF [4] a. Eligibility check b. Bound Profile Package generation endrnote
DP -> E: [5] Profile Download
rnote over E #FFFFFF [6] Profile Installation endrnote
E -> EIM: [7] Installation Report E -> DP: [7] Installation Report
DP -> OPE: [8] Installation Report
@enduml
6.1.5 eIM Assisted Profile Download Triggered by eIM with SM-DS
The following procedure describes the indirect Profile Download procedure between the SM- DP+ and the eUICC using the SM-DS where the eIM assists with both the retrieval of the Event Record and the Profile Download.
Start Conditions:
1. The ordering process to this Profile has been completed and a respective Event Record for a Profile Download has been created via ES12. 2. The SM-DS address is available at the eIM.
Procedure:
1. The secure connection between IPA and eIM is established via ESipa. 2. The eIM requests the IPA to get information from the eUICC REQUIRED to perform mutual authentication between the eUICC and the SM-DS. 3. The eIM establishes a secure connection to the configured SM-DS 4. Mutual authentication between the SM-DS and the eUICC is performed. The mutual authentication is initiated and driven by the eIM on behalf of the IPA and involves relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DS including re- encoding of the messages for the two secure connections ESipa and ES11’. 5. The eIM downloads the Event Record via ES11’.
6. The eIM identifies the address of the SM-DP+ where the Profile is stored.
7. The eIM establishes a secure connection with the SM-DP+ and establishes a secure
connection to the IPA.
8. Mutual authentication between eUICC and SM-DP+ is performed. The mutual
authentication is initiated and driven by the eIM on behalf of the IPA and involves
relaying authentication messages between the IoT Device and SM-DP+ including re-
encoding of the messages for the two secure connections ESipa and ES9+’. Additional
information from eUICC is provided to the SM-DP+ to proceed with the Profile
preparation.
9. The SM-DP+ proceeds with the Profile preparation:
a. Perform the eligibility check based on the provided information by the eUICC.
b. Prepare the Bound Profile Package.NOTE:The Operator owning the Profile is able to stop the Profile download at this stage.
10. The eIM receives the Bound Profile Package from the SM-DP+ via ES9+’
11. The Bound Profile Package is loaded to the eUICC:
a. The eIM sends a request to IPA to load the Bound Profile Package to the
eUICC. The request contains the Bound Profile Package and is sent using the
secure connection with the IoT Device/IPA.
b. IPA loads the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC.
12. The Profile contained in the Bound Profile Package is installed by the eUICC.
13. Successful installation of the Profile on the eUICC is reported back to the eIM in the
response to the request from the eIM. The response contains a Profile installation
result Notification signed by the eUICC.
14. The eIM delivers the Notification to the SM-DP+ using the secure connection with SM-
DP+.
15. The Operator is notified by the SM-DP+ about the Profile Installation.End Conditions:
a)A Bound Profile Package has been downloaded and installed on the eUICC in a Disabled state.
NOTE:the automatic enabling for an installed profile is FFS. @startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant “<b>Operator” as OPE participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant "<b>SM-DS" as DS participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
rnote over EIM, IPA #FFFFFF [1] Secure connection endrnote
EIM -> E: [2] Request eUICC information E -> EIM: [2] Provide eUICC information
rnote over EIM, DS #FFFFFF [3] Secure connection establishment endrnote
rnote over DS, E #FFFFFF [4] Mutual authentication procedure endrnote
DS -> EIM: [5] Download Event Record via ES11'
rnote over EIM #FFFFFF [6] Identify SM-DP+ endrnote
rnote over EIM, DP #FFFFFF [7] Secure connection establishment endrnote
rnote over E, DP #FFFFFF [8] Mutual authentication Procedure Additional information for Profile generation is provided endrnote
rnote over DP #FFFFFF [9] a. Eligibility check b. Bound Profile Package generation endrnote
DP -> EIM: [10] Profile Download
rnote over EIM, E #FFFFFF [11] Profile Installation via IPA [a] eIM requests IPA to load BPP into eUICC [b] IPA loads BPP into eUICC endrnote
rnote over E #FFFFFF [12] Profile installation endrnote
E -> EIM: [13] Profile Installation Report EIM -> DP: [14] Notification Delivery DP -> OPE: [15] Profile Installation Report @enduml
6.2 Profile Enabling
6.2.1 Profile Enabling via eIM
The following procedure describes the Profile Enabling procedure via the eIM.
Start Conditions:
1. The eIM and the eUICC are associated. 2. The target Profile has been selected by the eIM.
Procedure:
1. The eIM prepares and signs the Profile Enabling request for the target Profile and sends
it to the IPA.
2. The IPA sends the signed Profile Enabling request for the target Profile to the eUICC.
3. The eUICC verifies that the Profile Enabling request is signed by an eIM that is
configured in the eUICC as an Associated eIM.
4. If the verification fails, the eUICC aborts the procedure.
5. If the verification is successful, the eUICC disables the currently enabled Profile, if any,
and enables the target Profile.
a. If the Profile is already enabled, no error SHOULD be generated.
6. The IPA retrieves the signed result of the enabling of the target Profile from the eUICC.
7. The IPA includes the signed result from the eUICC into a response to the eIM to notify
about the result of the Profile Enabling execution. a. If the eIM cannot be notified and if the Roll-Back Mechanism has been
requested by the eIM, the IPA informs the eUICC to execute the Roll-Back
Mechanism. The eUICC informs the IPA, and the IPA informs the eIM of the
enabling of the previously enabled Profile. The procedure stops here.
8. The IPA retrieves the pending Notifications from the eUICC and sends the Notifications
to the Notification Receivers.End Conditions:
a)If the Roll-Back Mechanism has been executed, the previously enabled Profile is enabled. b) Otherwise, the target Profile is enabled and the previously enabled Profile, if any, is disabled.
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
EIM -> IPA: [1] Signed Profile Enable Request
IPA -> E: [2] Signed Profile Enable Request
rnote over E #FFFFFF [3] Verification of the associated eIM signature [4] If verification fails, abort procedure endrnote
rnote over E #FFFFFF [5] Disable currently Enabled Profile Enable target Profile a. If target profile is already enabled generates no error endrnote
E -> IPA: [6] Signed Profile Enabling result
alt Device is successfully connected IPA -> EIM: [7] Signed Profile Enabling result E -> IPA: [8] Profile Enabling Notification IPA -> DP: [8] Profile Enabling Notification else [7.a] Connectivity failure and Rollback configured IPA -> E: Roll-Back Mechanism rnote over E #FFFFFF Disable target Profile, Enable previously enabled Profile endrnote E -> IPA: Signed Profile Roll-Back information IPA -> EIM: Signed Profile Roll-Back information end
@enduml
6.3 Profile Disabling
6.3.1 Profile Disabling via eIM
The following procedure describes the Profile Disabling procedure via the eIM.
Start Conditions:
1. The eIM is configured in the eUICC as an Associated eIM. 2. The target Profile has been selected by the eIM.
Procedure:
1. The eIM prepares and signs a Profile Disabling request for the target Profile and sends it to the IPA 2. The IPA sends the signed Profile Disable request for the target Profile to the eUICC 3. The eUICC verifies that the Profile Disable request is signed by an eIM that is configured in the eUICC as an Associated eIM. 4. If the verification fails, the eUICC aborts the procedure. 5. If the verification is successful, the eUICC disables the target enabled Profile.
a. If the Profile is already disabled, no error SHOULD be generated. 6. The IPA retrieves the signed result IPA of the disabling of the target Profile from the eUICC 7. The IPA includes the signed result from the eUICC into a response to the eIM. 8. The IPA retrieves the pending Notifications from the eUICC and sends the Notifications to the Notification Receivers.
End Conditions:
a)The target Profile is disabled. b) Mobile connectivity not available
NOTE:the automatic enabling for an installed Profile and Profile Switch is FFS. @startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
EIM -> IPA: [1] Signed Profile Disable request
IPA -> E: [2] Signed Profile Disable Request
rnote over E #FFFFFF [3] Verification of the associated eIM signature [4] If verification fails, abort procedure endrnote
rnote over E #FFFFFF [5] Disable the target Profile a. If target profile is already disabled generates no error endrnote
E -> IPA: [6] Signed Profile Disabling result
IPA -> EIM: [7] Signed Profile Disabling result
E -> IPA: [8] Profile Disabling Notification IPA -> DP: [8] Profile Disabling Notification
@enduml
6.4 Profile Delete
6.4.1 Profile Delete via eIM
The following procedure describes the Profile Delete procedure via the eIM.
Start Conditions:
1. The target Profile is present in the eUICC in disable state 2. The eIM is configured in the eUICC as an Associated eIM. 3. The target Profile has been selected by the eIM.
Procedure:
1. The eIM prepares and signs a Profile Delete request for the target Profile and sends it
to the IPA.
2. The IPA sends and signs Profile Delete request for the target Profile to the eUICC.
3. The eUICC verifies that the Profile Delete operation is signed by an eIM that is
configured in the eUICC as an Associated eIM.
4. If the verification fails, the eUICC aborts the procedure.
5. The eUICC verifies that the target Profile is disabled.
6. If the verification fails, the eUICC aborts the procedure and informs the eIM.
NOTE: How the eIM is informed is left to the technical realisation.
7. If the verification is successful, the eUICC deletes the target Profile and all the data
associated to this Profile.
8. The IPA retrieves the signed result of the deletion of the target Profile from the eUICC.
9. The IPA includes the signed result from the eUICC into a response to the eIM.
10. The IPA retrieves the pending Notifications from the eUICC and sends the Notifications
to the Notification ReceiversEnd Conditions:
a)The target Profile is deleted. @startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
EIM -> IPA: [1] Signed Profile Delete request
IPA -> E: [2] Signed Profile Delete Request
rnote over E #FFFFFF [3] Verification of the associated eIM signature [4] If verification fails, abort procedure endrnote
rnote over E #FFFFFF [5] Verification of the target Profile is disabled endrnote
E –> IPA: [6] Error IPA –> EIM: [6] Error
rnote over E #FFFFFF [7] Profile Deletion endrnote
E -> IPA: [8] Signed Profile Delete result
IPA -> EIM: [9] Signed Profile Delete result
E -> IPA: [10] Profile Delete Notification IPA -> DP: [10] Profile Delete Notification
@enduml
6.5 eIM Configuration
6.5.1 Add eIM Configuration Data via IPA
The following procedure describes adding eIM Configuration Data to the eUICC when no eIM is associated within the eUICC.
Start Conditions:
1. No eIM is associated within the eUICC
Procedure:
1. The IPA sends the eIM Configuration Operation, including the eIM Configuration
Data to the eUICC.
2. The eUICC checks if an Associated eIM exists.
a. If no eIM is associated, the eUICC executes the eIM Configuration Operation,
else
b. the eUICC aborts the procedure.
3. The IPA retrieves the result of the eIM Configuration Operation from the eUICCEnd Conditions:
a) The eIM Configuration Data of the Associated eIM is stored in the eUICC.@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
IPA -> E: [1] eIM Configuration Operation rnote over E #FFFFFF [2] eIM is already associated to the eUICC ? [a]: no eIM associated -> execute eIM Configuration Operation [b]: eIM associated -> abort procedure endrnote
E -> IPA: [3] eIM Configuration Operation result @enduml
6.5.2 eIM Configuration via eIM
The following procedure describes the eIM Configuration Operation process when an eIM is associated within the eUICC.
Start Conditions: 1. An eIM is associated with an eUICC.
Procedure:
1. The eIM prepares and signs an eIM Configuration Operation and sends it to the IPA.
2. The IPA sends the signed eIM Configuration Operation to the eUICC.
3. The eUICC verifies that the eIM Configuration Operation is signed by an eIM that is
configured in the eUICC as an Associated eIM.
a. If the verification is successful, the eUICC processes the eIM Configuration
Operation else
b. the eUICC aborts the procedure.
4. The IPA retrieves the signed result from the eUICC.
5. The IPA includes the signed result from the eUICC into a response to the eIM.End Conditions: a) The requested eIM Configuration Data is stored in or removed from the eUICC.
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid participant “<b>eIM” as EIM participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
EIM -> IPA: [1] Signed eIM Configuration Operation IPA -> E: [2] Signed eIM Configuration Operation rnote over E #FFFFFF [3] Operation is signed by an Associated eIM ? [a]: Signature verification succesful -> execute eIM Configuration Operation [b]: Signature verification fails -> abort procedure Endrnote E -> IPA: [4] Signed eIM Configuration Operation result IPA -> EIM: [5] Signed eIM Configuration Operation result @enduml
6.5.3 Complete Removal of eIM Configuration Data from the eUICC
The following procedure describes how to completely remove all eIM Configuration Data from the eUICC.
Start Conditions:
1. An eIM is associated within the eUICC
Procedure:
1. The IPA sends the eIM Configuration Data removal operation to the eUICC.
2. The eUICC executes the operation and removes all available eIM Configuration Data
stored in it.
3. The IPA retrieves the result of the operation from the eUICC.End Conditions:
a)The eIM Configuration Data is completely removed from the eUICC. b) The eUICC is not associated with any eIM anymore.
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>IPA" as IPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E
IPA -> E: [1] eIM Configuration Data removal operation rnote over E #FFFFFF [2] eUICC removes all eIM Configuration Data stored in it endrnote
E -> IPA: [3] eIM Configuration Data removal operation result @enduml
A Threats and Risks (Informative)
This section lists and describes different types of risks that are considered by the architecture as described within this specification.
A.1 Compromised IoT Device
Risk no. Risk description
DEV1 Malicious IoT Device SW/FW and /or malicious IPA is able to perform illegitimate PSMO
on the eUICC.
DEV2 Malicious IoT Device SW/FW and/or malicious IPA is able to block all PSMO to eUICC.
Malicious IoT Device SW/FW and/or malicious IPA is able to associate illegitimate eIM
DEV3
to eUICC.
Malicious IoT Device SW/FW and/or malicious IPA is able to improperly deleting eIM
DEV4
associations on the eUICC.
Table 4: Compromised IoT Device RisksA.2 Compromised eIM
An authorized and legitimate eIM is manipulated and compromised.
Risk no. Risk description
CeIM1 Attacker is able to perform illegitimate PSMO on a number of eUICCs.
Attacker is able to perform illegitimate eIM Configuration Operations on a number
CeIM2
of eUICCs.Table 5: Compromised eIM Risks
A.3 Malicious eIM
A malicious eIM is both not authorized and illegitimate, e.g. malicious eIM acts as man-in-the- middle.
Risk no. Risk description
MeIM1 Attacker is able to perform unauthorized, illegitimate PSMO on a number of IoT Devices
/ eUICCs.
Attacker is able to perform unauthorized, illegitimate eIM Configuration Operations on
MeIM2
a number of eUICCs.Table 6: Malicious eIM Risks
A.4 Privacy Leakage
Leakage of privacy relevant data on the interface between the eIM and the IoT Device.
Risk no. Risk description
Attacker gets hold of privacy related information of the eUICC (e.g. EID) that may be
PRI1
used to track the location of the IoT Device.
eUICC management commands leading to the creation of unexpected and
PRI2 unpredicted « remote paging » or « remote control » commands used by 3rd parties to
spy or compromise IoT Devices or the Subscriber themselves.Table 7: Loss of Privacy Risks
A.5 New Profile on New IoT Device
Risk no. Risk description
INI1 Incomplete or corrupted Profile being pushed to the IoT Device.
Malicious eUICC party using privileged position in order to push unsolicited Profiles
INI2
to IoT Devices.Table 8: New Profile on New IoT Device Risks
A.6 Profile Disabling / Profile Deletion
Risk no. Risk description
Long term gathering of key materials due to a long term storage of delivered Profiles
IND1
after their disabling.
IND2 Loss of sensitive data from discarded media supports (hard drives…)
Malware / malicious entity launching coordinated or isolated disabling or deletion of
IND3
one or several Profiles leading to a loss of connectivity to an IoT Device.
Malicious or compromised eIM launching coordinated or isolated disabling or deletion
IND4
of one or several Profiles leading to a loss of connectivity to an IoT Device.
Accidental Profile disabling or deletion leading to a loss of connectivity to an IoT
IND5
Device.
Malicious or compromised eIM repeatedly deleting Profiles and asking for them to be
IND6
reloaded leading to surcharge of provisioning servers.
IND7 Malicious execution of PSMO leading to wrong enabled/disabled/deleted Profile.
Malicious execution of PSMO from an internal party leading to wrong Profile status
IND8
reported to the eIM.Table 9:Profile Disabling or Deletion Risks
A.7 Profile Switch
Risk no. Risk description
INP1 Malicious Profile switching originating from an internal party.
INP2 Malicious Profile switching originating from a malicious or compromised eIM.
INP3 Switching of alternate Profiles leading to a loss of connectivity.
Malware / malicious entity launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or
INP4
several Profiles leading to a loss of connectivity.
Malware / malicious entity launching coordinated or isolated switching of one or
INP5
several Profiles leading to major fraud scenarios.Table 10: Profile Switching Risks
A.8 Profile Swap
Risk no. Risk description INS1 Race condition leading to the deactivation of all Profiles and a loss of connectivity.
Table 11: Profile Swapping Risks
A.9 Cryptographic Related Risks
Risk no. Risk description
Loss or theft of private keys in one or several Profile Management components
INO1
leading to the loss of confidentiality on the whole chain.
Inability to revoke compromised Certificates leading to the loss of trust on the whole
INO2
Certificate chain.
INO3 Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful disclosure of key materials.
Local law enforcement requests leading to the forceful compromise of key
INO4
components.
Malicious or accidental revocation of Certificates leading to the denial of service on
INO5
the whole provisioning Certificate chain.
Use of temporary symmetric cryptographic or “generic” key material during the Profile
INO6 creation, temporary storage, transport, or long-term storage leading to single point of
failure and attack being created.Table 12: Cryptographic Related Risks
A.10 Quality of Service
Risk no. Risk description
Profile creation burst leading to the inability for the eUICC platforms to deliver
QoS1
expected service level.
Denial of service on delivery platforms leading to the inability to deliver expected
QoS2
service level.
Inability to recover from management communication failures leading to a temporary
QoS3
or permanent inability to deliver a Profile.Table 13: Quality of Service Risks
A.11 Non-human or Unpredictable
Risk no. Risk description
Catastrophic event such as floods, earthquakes, etc. leading to the destruction of a
EXC1
datacentre.
EXC2 Geopolitical/Human events leading to the destruction of a datacentre.
Change of regulation leading to partial or total loss of trust for an actor of the
EXC3
provisioning delivery chain (Operator, OEM, EUM…).Table 14: Non-human or Unpredictable Risks
A.12 New Profile during Subscriber Journey
Risk no. Risk description
EXN1 Malicious pairing of new IoT Device using unattended IoT Device.
Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the loss of confidentiality during
EXN2
the provisioning of Profile operations.
Use of public Wi-Fi for internet connectivity leading to the tampering of registration
EXN3
information during provisioning of Profile operations.
Man-in-the-middle or eavesdropping during Profile provisioning leading to the loss of
EXN5
confidentiality.
“Implicit authentication” (e.g. HTTP MSISDN enrichment) leading to the loss of
EXN6
authentication or Profile material.Table 15: New Profile during Subscriber Journey Risks
A.13 Others
Risk no. Risk description
Compromising of exchanges between Profile Management actors leading to the
EXO1
critical loss of private keys.
EXO2 Profile cloning due to unpredicted implementation routines for specific scenarios.Table 16: Other Risks
B eIM Configuration Scenarios (Informative)
This section describes different types of eIM configuration scenarios that are considered by the architecture described in this specification. This section contains some examples and is not limited to them.
B.1 eIM Configuration Performed by the EUM
The EUM performs the loading of the eIM Configuration Data into the eUICC the during eUICC manufacturing process. The mechanisms are EUM specific and not described in this specification. The security of EUM production scenarios is covered by SAS UP.
Figure 4: eIM Configuration performed by the EUM
B.2 eIM Configuration Performed in the IoT Device Production
A production tool communicates with the IoT Device and establishes a secure link to the IPA to trigger eIM Configuration and to provide the eIM Configuration Data. The IPA transfers the eIM Configuration Operations and corresponding results to/from the eUICC.
NOTE:The mechanism and security applied between the production tool and the IPA are left to the implementation. Secure link between production tool and IPA can be provided by the underlying transport between production tool and IoT Device.
NOTE:IoT Device Production can be understood in a broader sense (e.g. module production, device production, warehouse, logistic partner, field technician etc.).
Figure 5: eIM Configuration performed in IoT Device production
B.3 eIM Configuration Performed in the Field by a Backend System
A backend system (e.g. smart meter management platform or mobile application) has already a communication in place with the IoT Device. The backend system establishes a secure link to the IPA to trigger eIM Configuration and provides the eIM Configuration Data. The IPA transfers the eIM Configuration Operations and corresponding results to/from the eUICC. NOTE: The mechanism and security applied between the backend system and the IPA are left to the implementation. Secure link between backend system and IPA can be provided by the underlying transport between backend system and IoT Device.
NOTE:General clarification and illustrated in Figure 6, the eIM can, but does not have to be part of the backend system.
Figure 6: eIM Configuration performed in the field by a backend system
B.4 eIM Configuration Performed by an eIM
A backend system (e.g. smart meter management platform or mobile application) has already a communication in place with the IoT Device. In this example, the eIM_A is considered as part of this backend system and is already associated to the eUICC. To associate a new eIM_B to the eUICC, the eIM_A prepares an eIM Configuration Operation including the public key of eIM_B and signs the Operation with its private eIM_A key. The eIM_A sends the signed eIM Configuration Operation to the IPA and the IPA forwards the operation to the eUICC, which proves the signature before executing the operation. After succeful execution eIM_B is associated to the eUICC.
Figure 7: eIM Configuration performed by an eIM
B.5 Removal of eIM Configuration
A backend system (e.g. smart meter management platform or mobile application) has already a communication in place with the IoT Device. The backend system establishes a secure link to the IPA to trigger the removal of the eIM Configuration.The IPA transfers the operations and corresponding results to/from the eUICC. NOTE: The removal of the eIM association(s) might be realised by a kind of reset functionality by the IoT Device, protected against misuse. NOTE: The mechanism and security applied between the backend system and the IPA are left to the implementation. Secure link between backend system and IPA can be provided by the underlying transport between backend system and IoT Device.
NOTE:General clarification and illustrated in Figure 8, the eIM can, but does not have to be part of the backend system.
Figure 8: Removal of eIM Configuration
C Profile Download Deployment Scenarios (Informative)
This Annex gives some examples of deployment scenarios for the Profile download operations.
C.1 Indirect Profile Download
In Indirect Profile download scenarios, the eIM is always involved in the Profile download operation. It is acting as a support between the SM-DP+ and the IPA. Hence, ES9+’ and ESipa are used for Profile Download.
The transfer of the Profile from the SM-DP+ to the eIM is done using ES9+’. The transfer of the Profile from the eIM to the IPA is done using ESipa. ES8+ is always used between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
C.1.1 Indirect Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using AC
In this example (see Figure 9), the Profile download is triggered using the Activation Code.
Figure 9: Indirect Profile download assisted by eIM using AC
C.1.2 Indirect Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using SM-DS
In the example shown in Figure 10, the Profile download is triggered using SM-DS. The Profile download Event Record is retrieved by the eIM using ES11’.
Figure 10: Indirect Profile download assisted by eIM using SM-DS
C.2 Direct Profile Download
In direct Profile download scenarios, ES9+’ and ESipa are not used for Profile download. This means that the eIM doesn’t use an ES9+’ interface with the SM-DP+ for the Profile download.
The transfer of the Profile from the SM-DP+ to the IPA is always done via ES9+. The eIM may be involved to differing degrees (e.g. send the Activation Code,…).
C.2.1 Direct Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using Activation Code
In this example (see Figure 11), the eIM instructs the IPA using an Activation Code.
Figure 11: Direct Profile Download assisted by eIM using AC
C.2.2 Direct Profile Download Assisted by eIM Using SM-DS
In this example (see Figure 12), the Profile download Event Record is retrieved by the eIM using ES11’. This Event is sent to the IPA using ESipa.
Figure 12: Direct Profile Download assisted by eIM using SM-DS
C.2.3 Direct Profile Download Unassisted by eIM Using SM-DS
In this example (Figure 13), the IPA retrieves the Profile download Event Record from the SM-DS using ES11.
Figure 13: Direct Profile download unassisted by eIM using SM-DS
C.2.4 Direct Profile Download Unassisted by eIM Using Default SM -DP+
The Profile download is done using ES9+ between the IPA and the default SM-DP+.
Figure 14: Direct Profile download unassisted by eIM using Default SM-DP+
D Document Management
D.1 Document History
Version Date Additions
V1.0 19/04/2022 CR001R02 - Overview proposal
CR002R01 - Intended audience proposal
CR003R03 - Scope definition
CR005R01 - Definition of network constrained device
CR006R01 - Definition of User Interface constrained device
CR008R01 - Draft Roles section
CR009R03 - Draft Profile and Device principles
CR011R05 - Basic Principles from IoT Working documentCR004R03 – Basic Principles CR0016R02 - Additional Basic Principles from IoT Working document CR0017R00 - Abbreviations and References addition CR0027R02 - eSIM for Iot Architecture - episode 1 CR0028R02 - eSIM IoT baseline architecture CR0034R01 - Baseline Architecture CR CR0029R04 - eSIM for Iot Architecture - episode 2 CR0035R01 - IPA functions descriptions CR0036R01 - IoT Device definition CR0037R00 - Major Threats CR0024R04 - eSIM IoT Security Risks CR0040R02 - Functional requirements for eSIM IoT Remote Manager CR0026R06 - eSIM IoT Architecture CR0038R01 - Missing definitions and abbreviations CR0039R01 - Missing interfaces CR0042R03 - eIM provisioning requirements CR0043R03 - eIM-eUICC Interface Introduction CR0041R05 - Security Requirements CR0045R02 - Introduction of ESipa interface CR0046R00 - Resolution of editors note in EUICCS1 CR0031R05 - eSIM for Iot Architecture - episode 4 CR0051R02 - Add option for SM-DS to/from Device via eIM CR0052R01 - Update of Arch diagram with SM-DP+ to Device via eIM CR0053R01 - Update of Arch diagram with SM-DS to Device via eIM CR49R02 - Profile Download and Installation triggered by EIM CR0055R02 - ES10b description update CR0056R02 - Make the IPA simple CR0058R05 - Profile Enabling Triggered by eIM CR0023R03 - Architecture Procedure CR0059R05 – Profile Delete Triggered by eIM CR0060R04 - Profile Disabling Triggered by eIM CR0054R07 - SIM profile switch Roll-Back mechanism CR0064R02 - IPA requirements on Roll-Back CR0065R00 - Editorial Change ES_PSM and PSMO CR0066R05 - Editorial Changes to Rollback Mechanism CR0075R01 - Changes to requirements IPAF1 / EUICCF5 / Roll-Back Definition CR0067R01 - Changes to Enable Profile Procedure CR0071R00 - Editorial changes to draft 18 CR0073R00 - Editorial changes to draft 18 - Mobile Service Provider CR0070R04 – Notifications CR0079R02 – Profile Donwload Procedure using default SM-DP+
CR0081R01 – Editorial Mobile Service Provider definition CR0076R04 – eIM assisted (indirect) Profile Download CR0069R05 - Enabling_ Disabling_ Delete diagrams CR0077R03 - Add indirect Profile Download with SM-DS procedure CR0082R00 - Editorial adding definitions for Operator, Subscriber and Subscriptions CR0083R00 - CR to remove redundant editor’s notes CR0084R01 - Notifications via eIM CR0086R00 - CR to remove editor’s notes agreed by deelgates CR0072R02 - Adding optional encryption of PSMO messages CR0087R02 - Editorial clarification for NCD and UICD CR0088R01 - Editorial – Consistent Use of eIM in Section 4.4 (Interfaces) CR0078R04 - Add diagram and ES11’ based procedure to 6.1.2 CR0089R02 - SM-DS optionality for IoT Devices CR0090R01 - Detailing the eUICC architecture on the architecture diagram CR0091R01 - Detailing the eUICC architecture on the architecture diagram CR0093R04 - eIM Configuration Requirements CR0096R01 - Profile Download options CR0098R02 - eIM Configuration Procedures CR0105R02 - Deployment scenarios for profile download CR0094R02 - Update References CR0095R02 - Clarification of the term PSMO message CR0097R02 - Add asymmetric PSMO signing option CR0108R02 - Comprensive device and profile management CR0113R01 - Support for SM-DS and default SM-DP+ triggered profile download and activation CR0116R01 – Resolve editor’s note in 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 CR0018R00 - PR12 edit CR0092R04 - Introduction of IPA in the eUICC (“IPAe”) CR0100R00 - Removing editor's notes in 4.4.5 and 4.4.9 CR0101R00 - Change Editor's note in EUICCF5 CR0102R00 - Removing editor's notes in EIMF8 and EIMF10 CR0103R00 - Removing editor's note in IPAF4 CR0109R00 - Removal of Editor’s Notes related to automatic enabling CR0111R00 - Removal of Editor’s Notes within requirements CR0112R00 - Add eUICC abbreviations CR0114R00 – Remove MEP editor’s note in 6.2.1 CR0115R00 – Diagram for profile download via Def. DP+ CR0014R03 – Definitions CR0104R01 – editor’s notes in 6.1.1- Telenor CR0119R01 – Resolution of comments
CR0110R01 – CR Removal of Editor’s Notes CR121R01 - Update Reference of SGP.21 (2.2 to 2.4) CR0122R01 – Final Editorial Corrections CR0123R01 – Scope of SGP.31 V1.0 and notes on principles CR0124R00 – Ultimate Editorials Telenor CR0125R01 – clarifying start conditions of Profile Donwload procedure with AC CR0126R01 – Additional Editorial Corrections
D.2 Other Information
Type Description Document Owner eSIM Editor / Company Gloria Trujillo, GSMA
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