Overview
This specification gives the technical solution for remote provisioning and management of eUICCs in consumer devices. It covers eUICC architecture, the roles and interfaces in the Remote SIM Provisioning architecture, and the security functions used to protect provisioning and management. It defines procedures, data elements and function bindings across interfaces, including HTTP-based bindings using JSON or ASN.1, and includes normative device requirements. The solution supports interoperability across operator deployment scenarios, eUICC platforms and related service providers.
- eUICC
- Remote SIM Provisioning
- SM-DP+
- SM-DS
- HTTP
- TLS
Overview generated automatically from the document's scope and outline. The document text is authoritative.
Changes since v2.4
204 clauses modified, 125 clauses added, 7 clauses removed, 3 clauses renumbered
Compared automatically clause by clause from the extracted text of both versions; differences only in layout, spacing or table cells are ignored. The documents are authoritative.
1.1 Overviewmodified
This document provides a technical description of the GSMA’s 'Remote SIM Provisioning (RSP) Architecture for consumer Devices'.Devices' [4] that applies for eSIM Products.
1.2 Scopemodified
This specification provides a technical description of: The eUICC Architecture; The interfaces used within the Remote SIM Provisioning Architecture; and The security functions used within the Remote SIM Provisioning Architecture.
1.3 Document Purposemodified
…on of this technical solution will provide the basis for global interoperability between different Operator deployment scenarios, for example network equipment … (e.g.(e.g., Subscription Manager Data Preparation (SM-DP+)) and various eUICC platforms.
1.5 Definition of Termsmodified
Before
Term Description Information issued by an Operator/Service Provider to an End Activation Code User. It is used by the End User to request the download and installation of a Profile. A part of the Activation Code information provided by the Activation Code Token Operator/Service Provider to refer to a Subscription. SM-DS used in cascade mode with a Root SM-DS to redirect Alternative SM-DS Event Registration from an SM-DP+ to the Root SM-DS or direct Event Registration from a SM-DP+ for an installed Profile. A Protected Profile Package that has been cryptographically Bound Profile Package linked to a particular eUICC. (Public Key) Certificate A certificate as defined in RFC 5280 [17]. Certificate Authority A Certificate Authority is an entity that issues digital certificates. An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM Provisioning and certified according to the GSMA compliance Certified eUICC programme defined in [64]. Note: Unless stated otherwise, the word eUICC in this specification refers to a Certified eUICC. Certificate Issuer An Entity that is Authorised to Issue digital certificates. A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for Companion Device the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. A code entered by an End User required by the SM-DP+ to Confirmation Code confirm the download of a Profile. Refers to the hierarchy of User Intent and Confirmation Request, where: Confirmation Level User Intent is the first and lowest level Simple Confirmation is the second level Strong Confirmation is the third and highest level A request confirming User Intent by using either Simple Confirmation Request Confirmation or Strong Confirmation. Confirmation Code Required A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is Flag required. User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect Device to a mobile network. E.g. a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset. A mode hidden from the End User that allows access to and use Device Test Mode of Test Profiles. A digital representation of a Letter of Approval, signed by a Digital Letter Of Approval DLOA Authority. The state of a Profile where all files and applications (e.g. NAA) Disabled (Profile) present in the Profile are not selectable. An eUICC implemented on discrete standalone hardware, Discrete eUICC including its own dedicated volatile and non-volatile memory. A Discrete eUICC can be removable or non-removable. In the context of this document, an entity that provides a DLOA Authority certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, or validation scheme that delivers Digital Letters of Approval. A role that stores DLOAs and provides an interface to enable DLOA Registrar Management System to retrieve them. The state of a Profile when its files and/or applications (e.g., Enabled (Profile) NAA) are selectable. A UICC which enables the remote and/or local management of eUICC Profiles in a secure way. NOTE: The term originates from "embedded UICC". A certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC. eUICC Certificate This Certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate. An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a eUICC Memory Reset factory state. An action that deletes all post-issuance Test Profiles on an eUICC Test Memory Reset eUICC. A certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited EUM EUM Certificate which can be used to verify eUICC Certificates. A Profile download which is set by an SM-DP+ on behalf of an Event Operator, to be processed by a specific eUICC. Unique identifier of an Event for a specific EID generated by the EventID SM-DP+ / SM-DS. The set of information stored on the SM-DS for a specific Event, via the Event Registration procedure. This information consists Event Record of either: the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DP+ address or the Event-ID, EID, and SM-DS address. A process notifying the SM-DS on the availability of information Event Registration on either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC. A pre-production eUICC whose functional or security Field-Test eUICC certifications are not yet completed by the EUM. GSMA Certificate Issuer A Certificate Authority accredited by GSMA. Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by Integrated Circuit Card ID ITU-T E.118 [21]. Integrated eUICC An eUICC implemented on an Integrated TRE. A TRE implemented inside a System-on-Chip (SoC), optionally Integrated TRE making use of remote volatile and/or non-volatile memory. International Mobile Unique identifier owned and issued by Mobile operators as Subscriber Identity defined in 3GPP TS 23.003 [35] section 2.2. The first 8 digits of the EID identifying the EUM issuing the Issuer Identifier Number eUICC. A Security Domain on the UICC as defined by GlobalPlatform Issuer Security Domain Card Specification [8]. A letter generated by a Process Certification Authority, Letter of Approval (LOA) identifying a platform that has completed a certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, or validation scheme. A functional element in the Device or in the eUICC that provides the Local Profile Download (LPD), Local Discovery Services (LDS) and Local User Interface (LUI) features. When the LPA is located in the Device, they are called LPAd, LPDd, LUId, LDSd. Local Profile Assistant (LPA) When the LPA is located in the eUICC, they are called LPAe, LPDe, LUIe, LDSe. Where LPA, LPD, LDS or LUI are used, they apply to the element independent of its location in the Device or in the eUICC. Local Profile Management are operations that are locally Local Profile Management initiated on the End User (ESeu) interface. Local Profile Management Operations include enable Profile, Local Profile Management disable Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Operation Memory Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, set/edit Nickname, add Profile and edit default SM-DP+ address. In the context of this document, any authorized system interested in verifying the level of certification, evaluation, Management System approval, qualification, or validation of an eUICC (e.g. an MNO backend system, an SM-DP+). Reference data for an RSP Server which could be an Activation MatchingID Code Token or the EventID. An entity providing access capability and communication Mobile Network Operator services to its End User through a mobile network infrastructure. Part of the Profile, owned by the Operator, providing the Mobile Network Operator Secured Channel to the Operator’s Over The Air (OTA) Security Domain (MNO-SD) Platform. It is used to manage the content of a Profile once the Profile is enabled. Application residing in a Profile providing authorisation to access Network Access Application a network. NFC Device A Device compliant with GSMA TS.26 [40]. A report about a Profile Installation or Local Profile Management Notification Operation processed by the eUICC. A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC for the purposes of providing services by the Operator. The Profile SHALL be in support of a Operational Profile Subscription with the relevant Operator and allow connectivity to a mobile network. Applications MAY be included to provide non- telecommunication services. A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; Operator a company providing wireless cellular network services. The credentials included in the Profile, used in conjunction with OTA Keys OTA Platforms. An Operator platform for remote management of UICCs and the OTA Platform content of Enabled Operator Profiles on eUICCs. Other Notification Any Notification other than a Profile Installation Result. Proprietary application Identifier extension, the value of which is PIX part of the Application Identifier (AID). A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a Primary Device Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. The authority that provides the certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, and validation scheme defined in SGP.24 Process Certification and that delivers Digital Letters of Approval accordingly. Authority In the context of this document, the Process Certification Authority is the GSMA. A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an Profile eUICC for the purpose of providing services. A Profile Component is an element of the Profile, when installed in the eUICC, and MAY be one of the following: An element of the file system like an MF, EF or DF; Profile Component An Application, including NAA and Security Domain; Profile Metadata, including Profile Policy Rules; An MNO-SD. Profile Installation Result A Notification that contains the result of a Profile installation. A combination of local and remote management operations Profile Management (e.g.: enable Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, and query Profile Metadata). Profile Management An operation related to the content and state update of a Profile Operation in a dedicated ISD-P on the eUICC. Information pertaining to a Profile used for the purpose of Local Profile Metadata Profile Management. Profile Nickname Alternative name of the Profile set by the End User. The entity that controls the operations that can be performed Profile Owner upon its Profile. With the exception of Test Profiles, this is always the Operator. A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format Profile Package that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile. Profile Policy Authorisation A set of data that governs the ability of a Profile Owner to make Rule use of a Profile Policy Rule in a Profile. The functional element within the Profile management system Profile Policy Enabler that interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules. A policy control system that allows the Service Provider to Profile Policy Management implement, manage and enforce its subscription terms and conditions associated with the installed Profile. Defines a qualification for or enforcement of an action to be Profile Policy Rule performed on a Profile when a certain condition occurs. Operator specific defined type of Profile. This is equivalent to the Profile Type "Profile Description ID" as described in Annex B of SGP.21 [4] A Profile Package which has been cryptographically protected Protected Profile Package for storage but not linked to a particular eUICC. A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC for the purposes of providing connectivity to a mobile network solely for the purpose of the Provisioning Profile provisioning of Profiles on the eUICC. NOTE: Use of Provisioning Profiles for other system services in version 3 of this specification may require modifications of this definition. A Certificate Authority, commonly used to issue certificates for Public CA public Internet purposes, which is not subject to the GSMA Policy Authority as defined in SGP.14 [45]. The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, and deleting of Remote SIM Provisioning a Profile on an eUICC. Roles Roles are representing a logical grouping of functions. A globally identified central access point for finding Events from Root SM-DS one or more SM-DP+(s). A set of Profile Policy Authorisation Rules that, together, Rules Authorisation Table determines the ability of a Profile Owner to make use of a set of Profile Policy Rules in a Profile. RSP Server Either an SM-DS or SM-DP+. The organization through which the End User obtains PLMN Service Provider telecommunication services. This is usually the network operator or possibly a separate body. A secure and non-interceptable mechanism by which the End Simple Confirmation User confirms their action, e.g. by selecting Yes/No, OK/Cancel, etc. A Certificate issued by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM- SM-DP+ Certificate DP+. SM-DS Certificate A Certificate used by a GSMA CI to a GSMA accredited SM-DS. Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included SM-DP+ OID as part of the SM-DP+ Certificate. Identifier of the SM-DS that is globally unique and is included as SM-DS OID part of the SM-DS Certificate. A secure and non-interceptable mechanism to guarantee a higher level of User Intent than Simple Confirmation by which Strong Confirmation the End User confirms their action, e.g., by inputting PIN or fingerprint, repeating Simple Confirmation, entering Confirmation Code, etc. Describes the commercial relationship between the End User Subscription and the Service Provider. This role prepares Profile Packages, secures them with a Profile Protection Key, stores Profile Protection Keys in a secure manner and the Protected Profile Packages in a Profile Package Subscription Manager Data repository, and allocates the Protected Profile Packages to Preparation+ (SM-DP+) specified EIDs. The SM-DP+ binds Protected Profile Packages to the respective EID and securely downloads these Bound Profile Packages to the LPA of the respective eUICC. Subscription Manager This is responsible for providing addresses of one or more Discovery Server (SM-DS) SM-DP+(s) to a LDS. A security module consisting of hardware and low-level software providing resistance against software and hardware attacks, Tamper Resistant Element capable of securely hosting operating systems together with applications and their confidential and cryptographic data. A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC to provide connectivity to test equipment for the purpose Test Profile of testing the Device and the eUICC. A test profile is not intended to store any Operator Credentials. Describes the direct, real time acquisition and validation of the manual End User instruction on the LUI to trigger locally a User Intent Profile download or Profile Management Operation. As defined in SGP.21 [4].
After
| Term | Description | Access Rules | Information stored on the eUICC that defines whether applications on the Device are denied or allowed access to applications on the eUICC as specified by GlobalPlatform Secure Element Access Control [56]. | Activation Code | Information issued by an Operator/Service Provider to an End User. It is used by the End User to request the download and installation of a Profile. | Activation Code Token | The part of the Activation Code information provided by the Operator/Service Provider that refers to a Subscription. | Alternative SM-DS | SM-DS used in cascade mode with a Root SM-DS to redirect Event Registration from an SM-DP+ to that Root SM-DS used directly to perform Event Registration from an SM-DP+ or for an installed Profile. | Application Protocol Data Unit | The communication unit between the Device and the eUICC, as defined by ISO/IEC 7816-4 [14]. | Bound Profile Package | A Protected Profile Package that has been cryptographically linked to a particular eUICC. | (Public Key) Certificate | A certificate as defined in RFC 5280 Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not found.[17]. | Certificate Authority | A Certificate Authority is an entity that issues (Public Key) Certificates. | Certificate Issuer | An Entity that is Authorised to Issue digital certificates. | Certified eUICC | An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM Provisioning and certified according to the GSMA compliance programme defined in [64]. | Note: Unless stated otherwise, the word eUICC in this specification refers to a Certified eUICC. | Command Port | eSIM Port on which a given ES10 command is sent. It may be identical to the Target Port. | Companion Device | A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. | Confirmation Code | A code entered by an End User required by the SM-DP+ to validate the request to download a Profile or proceed with the Device Change. | Confirmation Code Required Flag | A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is required. | Confirmation Level | Refers to the hierarchy of User Intent and Confirmation Request, where: | - User Intent is the first and lowest level | - Simple Confirmation is the second level | - Strong Confirmation is the third and highest level | Confirmation Request | A request confirming User Intent by using either Simple Confirmation or Strong Confirmation. | CRL Issuer | Designates an RSP entity that manages and publishes Certificate revocation status by means of CRL(s). | Default SM-DP+ | An SM-DP+ that is contacted by an LPA by means of a pre-provisioned address on the eUICC. | Device | User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a mobile network. E.g., a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset. | Device Application | An application installed in a Device. | Device Baseband | A Device component that manages the cellular radio functions. | Device Change | Given that one or more Profiles related to their respective Subscription are installed in an old Device, the process for installing one or more Profiles related to the same Subscription(s) onto a new Device. | Device Change Configuration | Set of rules that apply to a Profile to support Device Change. | Device Information Code | A set of Device-related information used for Remote SIM Provisioning operations (e.g., for Profile preparation between the SM-DP+ and the operator). | Delete Notification for Device Change | A report containing an information about the deletion of the Profile for Device Change on the old Device. | Device Reset | An action that returns the Device to a state equivalent to a factory state. | Device Test Mode | A mode hidden from the End User that allows access to and use of Test Profiles. | Digital Letter Of Approval | A digital representation of a Letter of Approval, signed by a DLOA Authority. | Disabled Profile | A Profile in a state where all files and applications (e.g., NAA) present in the Profile are not selectable. | Discrete eUICC | An eUICC implemented on discrete hardware. | DLOA Authority | In the context of this document, an entity that provides a certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, or validation scheme that delivers Digital Letters of Approval. | DLOA Management System | Any authorised system interested in verifying the level of certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, or validation of an eUICC (e.g., an MNO backend system, an SM-DP+). | NOTE: This was called 'Management System' in the prior versions of this document. | DLOA Registrar | A role that stores DLOAs and provides an interface to enable Management System to retrieve them. | Enabled Profile | A Profile in a state where all files and/or applications (e.g., NAA) are selectable. | End User | The person using the Device. | Enterprise | A business, organization or government entity that subscribes to mobile services to be utilised by its workforce in support of the business or activities of the Enterprise. The Enterprise as the Subscriber owns the relationship with the Service Provider(s). | Enterprise Capable Device | A Device that supports the installation and enforcement of Enterprise Rules. | Enterprise Profile | An Operational Profile for which the Subscriber is an Enterprise. This Profile may include restrictions on the End User of the Device. | Enterprise Rule | A rule stored in an Enterprise Profile that can be used by the Profile Owner to restrict End User controllability for enabling and installing Profiles on Enterprise Capable Devices. | eSIM CA | A GSMA Certificate Issuer or an Independent eSIM CA. | eSIM Port | A logical connection between an endpoint in the Device and an endpoint in the eUICC (i.e., the Enabled Profile and/or the ISD-R in the context of this specification). | eSIM Products | eUICCs, Devices, and RSP Servers implementing this specification. | eUICC | A removable or non-removable UICC which enables the remote and/or local management of Profiles in a secure way. | NOTE: The term originates from "embedded UICC". | eUICC Certificate | A certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC. | This certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate. | eUICC Manufacturer | Manufacturer of the eUICC. | eUICC Memory Reset | An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a factory state. | eUICC OS Update | A mechanism to correct existing features on the eUICC by the original OS manufacturer. | eUICC Test Memory Reset | An action that deletes all post-issuance Test Profiles on an eUICC. | EUM Certificate | A certificate issued by an eSIM CA to a GSMA accredited EUM which can be used to verify eUICC Certificates. | EUM Keyset | Keyset used by the EUM to update ECASD content. | EUM Public Key | Public key included in the EUM Certificate (called PK.EUM.SIG). | EUM Private Key | Private Key used by the EUM to sign eUICC Certificates (called SK.EUM.SIG). | Event | A request for a Profile download or an RPM Operation which is set by an SM-DP+ on behalf of an Operator, to be processed by a specific eUICC. | EventID | Unique identifier of an Event for a specific EID generated by the SM-DP+ / SM-DS. | Event Checking | A process for the LDS to query the SM-DS to determine the presence of Event Records registered for an eUICC. | EventCheckingID (ECID) | Unique identifier for a specific EID generated by the SM-DS for Event Checking. | Event Record | The set of information stored on the SM-DS for a specific Event, via the Event Registration procedure. | Event Registration | A process notifying an SM-DS of the availability of information on either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC. | Field-Test eUICC | A pre-production eUICC whose functional or security certifications are not yet completed by the EUM. | GSMA Certificate Issuer | A Certificate Authority accredited by GSMA. | HRI Server | Server providing High Resolution Icons | Independent eSIM CA | A non-GSMA CI that issues Certificates for a specific region, company or group of companies for eSIM purposes. | Integrated Circuit Card Identifier | Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU-T E.118 [21]. | Integrated eUICC | An eUICC implemented on a Tamper Resistant Element (TRE) that is integrated into a System-on-Chip (SoC), optionally making use of remote volatile/non-volatile memory | Integrated TRE | A TRE implemented inside a larger System-on-Chip (SoC) | International Mobile Subscriber Identity | Unique identifier owned and issued by Operators as defined in 3GPP TS 23.003 [35] section 2.2. | Issuer Identifier Number | The first 8 digits of the EID identifying the EUM issuing the eUICC. | Issuer Security Domain | A Security Domain on the UICC as defined by GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8]. | Letter of Approval (LOA) | A letter generated by a Process Certification Authority, identifying a platform that has completed a certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, or validation scheme. | Local Profile Assistant (LPA) | A functional element in the Device or in the eUICC that provides the Local Profile Download (LPD), Local Discovery Services (LDS) and Local User Interface (LUI) features. When the LPA is located in the Device, they are called LPAd, LPDd, LUId, LDSd. When the LPA is located in the eUICC, they are called LPAe, LPDe, LUIe, LDSe. Where LPA, LPD, LDS or LUI are used, they apply to the element independent of its location in the Device or in the eUICC. | Local Profile Management | Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated on the End User (ESeu) interface. | Local Profile Management Operation | Local Profile Management Operations include enable Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, set/edit Nickname, add Profile and edit Default SM-DP+ address. | Logical SE Interface | As defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [6]. | LPA Proxy | An LPA role that establishes a Profile Content Management session and optionally provides progress information about that session to a Device Application. | Managing SM-DP+ | An SM-DP+ that is authorised by the Profile Owner to perform RPM to the eUICC on which their Profile resides. | MatchingID | Reference data for an RSP Server which could be an Activation Code Token or the EventID. | MEP-Capable Device | A Device where more than one Enabled Profile can be used in parallel on the same eUICC. | MEP-Capable eUICC | An eUICC where more than one Profile can be in Enabled state at the same point in time. | Mobile Network Operator | An entity providing access capability and communication services to its End User through a mobile network infrastructure. | Mobile Network Operator Security Domain (MNO-SD) | Part of the Profile, owned by the Operator, providing the Secured Channel to the Operator’s Over The Air (OTA) Platform. It is used to manage the content of a Profile once the Profile is enabled. | Mobile Virtual Network Operator | An entity providing access capability and communication services to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure but which does not have an allocation of spectrum. | Network Access Application | Application residing in a Profile providing authorisation to access a network. | NFC Device | A Device compliant with GSMA TS.26 [40]. | NFC Profile | A Profile containing contactless applications. | Non-Enterprise Capable Device | A Device that does not support the enforcement of Enterprise Rules. | Notification | A report about a Profile download, Local/remote Profile Management Operation or Remote eUICC Management operation processed by the eUICC or about the progress of such an operation. | Operational Profile | A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC for the purposes of providing services by the Operator. The Profile SHALL be in support of a Subscription with the relevant Operator and allow connectivity to a mobile network. Applications MAY be included to provide non-telecommunication services. | Operator | A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a company providing wireless cellular network services. | NOTE: For historic reasons, this document uses the expression "Operator" for the entity in the architecture and as endpoint for the specified interfaces, even though the more generic expression "Service Provider" or "Operator/Service Provider" might be more applicable. However, the exact work split between a Mobile Network Operator, a Mobile Virtual Network Operator and any other Service Provider is irrelevant for this specification. Their overall activities are covered by the architecture entity "Operator". | Operator Credentials | A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network Access Credentials, OTA Keys for Remote File/Application management, and authentication algorithm parameters. | OTA Keys | The credentials included in the Profile, used in conjunction with OTA Platforms. | OTA Platform | An Operator platform for remote management of UICCs and the content of Enabled Operator Profiles on eUICCs. | Other Notification | Any Notification other than a Profile Installation Result and a Load RPM Package Result. | PIX | Proprietary application Identifier extension, the value of which is part of the Application Identifier (AID). | Polling Address | An address configured in a Profile indicating where the Device needs to connect to retrieve RPM Events for this Profile. | Primary Device | A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. | Process Certification Authority | The authority that provides the certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, and validation scheme defined in SGP.24 and that delivers Digital Letters of Approval accordingly. | In the context of this document, the Process Certification Authority is the GSMA. | Profile | A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC for the purpose of providing services. | Profile Component | A Profile Component is an element of the Profile, when installed in the eUICC, and MAY be one of the following: | An element of the file system like an MF, EF or DF; | An Application, including NAA and Security Domain; | Profile Metadata, including Profile Policy Rules; | An MNO-SD. | Profile Content Management | The update of an Enabled Profile by its Profile Owner, using an agent (the PCMAA) on the Device as an intermediary between the Profile and a remote server (the PCMP). | Profile Content Management Platform (PCMP) | Platform owned by the Profile Owner, used to manage the content of an enabled Profile. | As this specification defines a generic mechanism for the PCMAA to request the next data from a different management platform, the term PCMP is used for all of these platforms and the term Delegated PCMP (DPCMP) is not used in this specification. | Profile Installation Result | A Notification that contains the result of a Profile installation. | Profile Management | A combination of local and remote management operations (enable Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, list Profile information and query Profile Metadata). | Profile Management Operation | An operation related to the content and state update of a Profile in a dedicated ISD-P on the eUICC. | Profile Metadata | Information pertaining to a Profile used for the purpose of Local Profile Management and Remote Profile Management. | Profile Nickname | Alternative name of the Profile set by the End User. | Profile Owner | The entity that controls the operations that can be performed upon its Profile. With the exception of Test Profiles, this is always the Operator. | Profile Package | A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile. | Profile Policy Authorisation Rule | A set of data that governs the ability of a Profile Owner to make use of a Profile Policy Rule in a Profile. | Profile Policy Enabler | The functional element within eUICC that interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules. | Profile Policy Management | A policy control system that allows the Service Provider to implement, manage and enforce its subscription terms and conditions associated with the installed Profile. | Profile Policy Rule | Defines a qualification for or enforcement of an action to be performed on a Profile when a certain condition occurs. | Profile Recovery | The process for re-installing a Profile related to the Subscription onto the old Device under condition that the Profile Installation onto the new Device for Device Change is failed due to a permanent error. | Profile Type | Operator specific defined type of Profile. This is equivalent to the "Profile Description ID" as described in Annex B of SGP.21 [4] | Protected Profile Package | A Profile Package which has been cryptographically protected for storage but not linked to a particular eUICC. | Provisioning Profile | A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC for the purposes of providing connectivity to a mobile network solely for the purpose of the provisioning of Profiles on the eUICC. | NOTE: Use of Provisioning Profiles for other system services in version 3 of this specification may require modifications of this definition. | Public CA | A Certificate Authority, commonly used to issue certificates for public Internet purposes, which is not subject to the GSMA Policy Authority as defined in SGP.14 [45]. | Push Service | A service provided by a combination of a push server and a push client on the Device, able to send a push notification from an SM-DS to an LDS. | Push Token | An identifier that is generated when an LDS registered a Push Service to a push server. | Reference Enterprise Rule | The Enterprise Rule that is currently being enforced by the eUICC. | Remote Profile Management | Profile Management operations performed by a Managing SM-DP+ at the request of the Profile Owner. | Remote SIM Provisioning | The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, and deleting of a Profile on an eUICC. | Roles | Roles are representing a logical grouping of functions. | Root SM-DS | A central access point for finding Events from one or more SM-DP+(s). | Rules Authorisation Table | A set of Profile Policy Authorisation Rules that, together, determines the ability of a Profile Owner to make use of a set of Profile Policy Rules in a Profile. | RSP Server | Either an SM-DS or SM-DP+. | RSP Session | Sequence of interlinked data exchanges between the eUICC, the LPA and an RSP Server, starting with the generation of a challenge on the eUICC and ending with a successful operation (Profile installation, RPM execution or Event List verification) on the eUICC or by explicit or implicit cancellation. | Service Provider | The organization through which the End User obtains PLMN telecommunication services. This is usually the network operator or possibly a separate body. | See also the definition for "Operator". | Simple Confirmation | A secure and non-interceptable mechanism by which the End User confirms their action, e.g., by selecting Yes/No, OK/Cancel. | SM-DP+ Certificate | A Certificate issued to a GSMA accredited SM-DP+, which chains to an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate. | SM-DS Certificate | A Certificate issued to a GSMA accredited SM-DS, which chains to an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate. | SM-DP+ OID | Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as part of the SM-DP+ Certificate. | SM-DS OID | Identifier of the SM-DS that is globally unique and is included as part of the SM-DS Certificate. | Strong Confirmation | A secure and non-interceptable mechanism to guarantee a higher level of User Intent than Simple Confirmation by which the End User confirms their action, e.g., by inputting PIN or fingerprint, repeating Simple Confirmation, entering Confirmation Code, etc. | SubC …
1.6 Abbreviations and Notationsmodified was Abbreviations
| Abbreviation | Description AID| ApplicationAES Identifier| ASN.1Advanced AbstractEncryption SyntaxStandard Notation| OneAID BPP| BoundApplication ProfileIdentifier Package| CAAPDU Certificate| AuthorityApplication CASDProtocol ControllingData AuthorityUnit Security| DomainAPI CAT| Card Application ToolkitProgramming CERT.CI.ECDSAInterface Certificate| ofASN.1 the| CIAbstract forSyntax itsNotation PublicOne ECDSA| KeyBPP Certificate| ofBound theProfile SM-DP+Package for| itsBSP Public| ECDSABPP keySecurity usedProtocol for| CERT.DPauth.ECDSACA SM-DP+| authentication Certificate ofAuthority the| SM-DP+CASD for| itsControlling PublicAuthority ECDSASecurity keyDomain used| forCAT CERT.DPpb.ECDSA| ProfileCard PackageApplication BindingToolkit | CI | Certificate ofIssuer the| SM-DSCMAC for| itsCipher-based PublicMAC ECDSA| keyCP used| forCommand CERT.DSauth.ECDSAPort SM-DS| authenticationCRL CERT.EUICC.ECDSA| Certificate ofRevocation theList eUICC| forCRT its| PublicControl ECDSAReference keyTemplate CERT.EUM.ECDSA| CertificateDH of| theDiffie-Hellman EUM| forDEV-IC its| PublicDevice ECDSAInformation keyCode CERT.DP.TLS| CertificateDLOA of| theDigital SM-DP+Letter forOf securingApproval TLS| CERT.DS.TLSDPI Certificate| ofDelegated thePlatform SM-DSIdentifier for| securingE4E TLS| CIE4 CertificateENVELOPE Issuer(ENVELOPE CMACcommand Cipher-basedwith MACtag CRL'E4') Certificate| RevocationECASD List| CRTeUICC ControlControlling ReferenceAuthority TemplateSecurity DHDomain Diffie-Hellman| DLOAECC Digital| LetterElliptic OfCurve ApprovalCryptography ECASD| eUICCECDHE Controlling| AuthorityElliptic SecurityCurve DomainDiffie-Hellman ECCusing EllipticEphemeral Curvekeys Cryptography| ECDSA | Elliptic Curve cryptography Digital Signature Algorithm | ECID | Event Checking Identifier | ECKA | Elliptic Curve cryptography Key Agreement algorithm | EID eUICC-ID| aseUICC definedidentifier in| SGP.02 [2] EIN | EUM Identification Number | ESIN | EUM Specific Identification Number | ETSI | European Telecommunications Standards Institute | EUM | eUICC Manufacturer | FCI | File Control Information | FFS | For Further Study | FQDN | Fully Qualified Domain Name | GID1 | Group Identifier 1, as defined in 3GPP TS 31.102 [54] | GID2 | Group Identifier 2, as defined in 3GPP TS 31.102 [54] | GP | GlobalPlatform | GSMA | GSM Association | GSMA CI | GSM Association Certificate Issuer | HLR | Home Location Register | HRI | High Resolution Icon | ICCID | Integrated Circuit Card ID | ICV | Initial Chaining Vector | IIN | Issuer Identifier Number | IMEI | International Mobile Equipment Identity | IMSI | International Mobile Subscriber Identity | ISD | Issuer Security Domain | ISD-P | Issuer Security Domain Profile | ISD-R | Issuer Security Domain Root | ISO | International Standards Organisation | ITU | International Telecommunications Union | KA | Key Agreement | LDS | Local Discovery Service | LDSd | Local Discovery Service when LPA is in the Device | LDSe | Local Discovery Service when LPA is in the eUICC | LOA | Letter Of Approval | LPA | Local Profile Assistant | LPAd | Local Profile Assistant when LPA is in the Device | LPAe | Local Profile Assistant when LPA is in the eUICC | LPD | Local Profile Download | LPDd | Local Profile Download when LPA is in the Device | LPDe | Local Profile Download when LPA is in the eUICC | LPM | Local Profile Management | LPRd | LPA Proxy when LPA is in the Device | LSI | Logical SE Interface | LTE | Long Term Evolution | LUI | Local User Interface | LUId | Local User Interface when LPA is in the Device | LUIe | Local User Interface when LPA is in the eUICC | M4M Mifare4MobileTM| Mifare4Mobile^(TM) | MAC | Message Authentication Code | MEP Message| ExchangeMultiple PatternEnabled Profiles | MNO | Mobile Network Operator MOC| Mandatory,MNO-SD Optional| orMobile ConditionalNetwork NAAOperator Network- AccessSecurity ApplicationDomain OTA| OverMOC The| AirMandatory, otPK.DP.ECKAOptional One-timeor PublicConditional Key| ofMXP the| SM-DP+Message foreXchange ECKAPattern otPK.EUICC.ECKA| One-timeNote: PublicIn Keyversion 2.X of thethis eUICCspecification, forthis ECKAwas otSK.DP.ECKAabbreviated One-timeas PrivateMEP. Key| ofNAA the| SM-DP+Network forAccess ECKAApplication otSK.EUICC.ECKA| One-timeOS Private| KeyOperating ofSystem the| eUICCOTA for| ECKAOver PEThe ProfileAir Element| PIXPCM Proprietary| applicationProfile IdentifierContent eXtensionManagement PKI| PublicPCMAA Key| InfrastructurePCM PK.CI.ECDSAAdmin PublicAgent Key| ofPCMP the| CI,Profile partContent ofManagement thePlatform CERT.CI.ECDSA| PK.DPauth.ECDSAPE Public| KeyProfile ofElement the| SM-DP+PIX part| ofProprietary theapplication CERT.DPauth.ECDSAIdentifier PK.DPpb.ECDSAeXtension Public| KeyPKI of| thePublic SM-DP+Key partInfrastructure of| thePOS CERT.DPpb.ECDSA| PK.DSauth.ECDSAPoint PublicOf KeySale of| thePPAR SM-DS| partProfile ofPolicy theAuthorisation CERT.DSauth.ECDSARule PK.EUICC.ECDSA| PublicPPE Key| ofProfile thePolicy eUICC,Enabler part| ofPPK the| CERT.EUICC.ECDSAProfile PK.EUM.ECDSAProtection Public Key of| thePPK-ENC EUM,| partOptional ofProfile theProtection CERT.EUM.ECDSAKey POSrandomly Pointgenerated Ofby Salethe PPARSM‑DP+ Profileand Policyused Authorisationfor Ruleencryption/decryption PPEof Profilea PolicyProtected EnablerProfile PPKPackage Profile| ProtectionPPK-MAC Key| PPK-ENCOptional Profile Protection Key forrandomly messagegenerated encryption/decryptionby PPK-MACthe ProfileSM‑DP+ Protectionand Keyused for message MAC generation/verification of a Protected Profile Package | PPP | Protected Profile Package | PPR | Profile Policy Rule | RAT | Rules Authorisation Table | RFU | Reserved for Future Use | RPM | Remote Profile Management | RSA | Rivest / Shamir / Adleman asymmetric algorithm | RSP | Remote SIM Provisioning | SAS | Security Accreditation Scheme | SBPP | Segmented Bound Profile Package | SCP | Secure Channel Protocol | SCWS | Smartcard Web Server | SD | Security Domain S-ENC| SessionSEAC key| forSecure messageElement encryption/decryptionAccess S-MACControl Session| KeySEP for| messageSingle MACEnabled generation/verificationProfile ShS| SharedSIM Secret| SK.CI.ECDSASubscriber PrivateIdentity keyModule of| theSVN CI| forSGP.22 signingSpecification certificatesVersion PrivateNumber Key(referred ofto theas of'eSVN' SM-DP+in forSGP.21 creating[4]). signatures| for SM-DP+ SK.DPauth.ECDSA| authenticationSubscription PrivateManager keyData ofPreparation the(Enhanced SM-DP+compared used to providethe signaturesSM-DP forin ProfileSGP.02 SK.DPpb.ECDSA[2]) binding| Private Key of the of SM-DS for| creatingSubscription signaturesManager forDiscovery SM-DSService SK.DSauth.ECDSA| authenticationS-ENC SK.EUICC.ECDSA| PrivateSession key ofresulting from the eUICCkey foragreement creatingbetween signaturesthe SK.EUM.ECDSASM-DP+ Privateand keythe ofeUICC theand EUMused for creatingencryption signaturesof SK.DP.TLSparts Private key of thea SM-DP+Bound forProfile securingPackage TLS| connectionS-MAC SK.DS.TLS| PrivateSession keyKey ofresulting from the SM-DSkey foragreement securingbetween TLSthe connection Subscription Manager Data Preparation (Enhanced compared to SM-DP+ and the SM-DPeUICC inand SGP.02used [2])for SGP.22MAC Specificationcomputation Versionof Numberparts (referredof toa asBound 'eSVN'Profile inPackage SVN| SGP.21 [4]). TAC | Type Allocation Code | TAR | Toolkit Application Reference | TLS | Transport Layer Security | TLV | Tag-Length-Value | TP | Target Port | TRE | Tamper Resistant Element | UI | User Interface | UIM | User Interface Module for LPAe | UPP | Unprotected Profile Package | URI | Uniform Resource Identifier | URL | Uniform Resource locator | USIM | Universal Subscriber Identity Module | W3C | World Wide Web Consortium |
1.7 Referencesmodified
Document Ref Title Number [1] Void GSMA Remote Provisioning of Embedded UICC Technical [2] SGP.02 specification V4.2 [3] void Void [4] SGP.21 RSP Architecture V2.4 Trusted Connectivity Alliance (formerly SIMalliance) eUICC eUICC Profile [5] Profile Package: Interoperable Format Technical Specification Package See section 5.7.8 for the applicable version(s). [6] ETSI TS 102 221 Smart Cards; UICC-Terminal interface OMA-TS- Smartcard_Web_ Open Mobile Alliance: Smartcard-Web-Server, Version 1.2.1 – 13 [7] Server-V1_2_1- Sep 2013 20130913-A [8] GPC_SPE_034 GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.3 GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.3 Amendment A: [9] GPC_SPE_007 Confidential Card Content Management v1.1 GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.3 Amendment C: [10] GPC_SPE_025 Contactless Services v1.2 GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment D: Secure [11] GPC_SPE_014 Channel Protocol '03' v1.1.1 GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment E: Security [12] GPC_SPE_042 Upgrade for Card Content Management v1.0 GlobalPlatform Card Specification v.2.2 Amendment F: Secure [13] GPC_SPE_093 Channel Protocol '11' ISO/IEC 7816- Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards - Part 4: [14] 4:2013 Organization, security and commands for interchange ISO/IEC Information technology -- Automatic identification and data [15] 18004:2015 capture techniques -- QR Code bar code symbology specification [16] RFC 5246 The TLS Protocol – Version 1.2 [17] RFC 5280 Internet X.509 PKI Certificate and CRL Profile Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves [18] RFC 5639 and Curve Generation Transmission Control Protocol, DARPA Internet Program, [19] RFC 793 Protocol specification, Sept 1981 Avis relatif aux paramètres de courbes elliptiques définis par l'Etat ANSSI ECC [20] français. JORF n°0241 du 16 octobre 2011 page 17533. texte n° FRP256V1 30. 2011 [21] ITU E.118 The international telecommunication charge card GSMA Security GSMA Doc Reference: Security Principles Related to Handset [22] Principles Related Theft 3.0.0 to Handset Theft EICTA CCIG Doc Reference: EICTA Doc: 04cc100 GSMA SAS Standard for Subscription Manager Roles [23] GSMA SAS-SM Version 3.0 - 31 Marc 2017 ITU-T X.520 Information technology – Open Systems [24] ITU-T X.520 Interconnection – The Directory: Selected attribute types RFC 5758 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: [25] RFC 5758 Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA RFC 5759 Suite B Certificate and Certificate Revocation List [26] RFC 5759 (CRL) Profile RFC 5480 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key [27] RFC 5480 Information [28] RFC 4519 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) NIST Special Publication SP 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair- [29] NIST SP 800-56A Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revision 2), May 2013 The international identification plan for public networks and [30] ITU E.212 Subscriptions [31] ETSI TS 102 223 Smart Cards; Card Application Toolkit (CAT) Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; [32] 3GPP TS 24.008 Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification; Core network protocols; Stage 3 Smart Cards; ETSI numbering system for telecommunication [33] ETSI TS 101 220 application providers [34] RFC 768 User Datagram Protocol, Aug 1980. Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); [35] 3GPP TS 23.003 Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Numbering, addressing and identification 3GPP2 S.R0048- [36] 3GPP2 - 3G Mobile Equipment Identifier (MEID) A ISO/IEC 7812- Identification cards -- Identification of issuers -- Part 1: Numbering [37] 1:2015 system Secured packet structure for UICC based applications; Release [38] ETSI TS 102 225 12 [39] ETSI TS 102 226 Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications; Release 9 [40] TS.26 GSMA NFC Handset Requirements V9.0 [41] BSI TR-03111 BSI Technical Guideline; Elliptic Curve Cryptography [42] N/A Not used [43] RFC 2986 PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure [44] RFC 6960 Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP [45] SGP.14 GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy V2.1 TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES [46] RFC 5289 Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [47] RFC 4279 Pre-Shared Key Cipher suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) [48] RFC 2616 Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1 ITU-T X.680 Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic [49] (11/2008) notation including Corrigendum 1 and 2 ASN.1 Encoding Rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules ITU-T X.690 [50] (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished (11/2008) Encoding Rules (DER) including Corrigendum 1 and 2 Specification of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1: Algorithm [51] 3GPP TS 35.231 Specification Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document 1: [52] 3GPP TS 35.205 General Smart cards; UICC Application Programming Interface (UICC [53] ETSI TS 102 241 API) for Java Card™ Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity Module [54] 3GPP TS 31.102 (USIM) application [55] SGP.03 GSMA NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1 GlobalPlatform Device Technology – Secure Element Access [56] GPD_SPE_013 Control - Version 1.1 [57] GPC_SPE_095 GlobalPlatform Card - Digital Letter of Approval - Version 1.0 [58] M4M MIFARE4Mobile Architecture – V 2.1.1 ISO/IEC [59] Information technology — Universal Coded Character Set (UCS) 10646:2014 [60] RFC 6066 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, S. [61] RFC 2119 Bradner http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt Common test environments for User Equipment (UE); [62] 3GPP TS 34.108 Conformance testing [63] 3GPP TS 29.002 Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification [64] SGP.24 RSP Compliance Process V1.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites [65] RFC 4492 for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Curves for Transport [66] RFC 7027 Layer Security (TLS) [67] RFC 2818 HTTP Over TLS IETF - The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange [68] RFC 7159 Format [69] GPD_SPE_075 GlobalPlatform Technology Open Mobile API Specification V3.3 [70] - N/A Not used [84] [85] TS.48 GSMA Generic eUICC Test Profile for Device Testing NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4, Recommendation [86] NIST SP 800-57 for Key Management [87] 3GPP TS 33.501 Security architecture and procedures for 5G System. [88] 3GPP TS 31.130 (U)SIM API for Java Card [89] SGP.29 GSMA EID Definition and Assignment Process V1.0
1.7.1 Normative Referencesadded
+------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Ref | Document | Title | | | Number | | +======+===================================================+=====================================================================================================================================================================================================================+ | [1] | Void | Void | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [2] | SGP.02 | GSMA "Remote Provisioning of Embedded UICC Technical specification" V3.1 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [3] | Void | Void | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [4] | SGP.21 | RSP Architecture V3.0 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [5] | eUICC Profile Package | Trusted Connectivity Alliance (TCA) eUICC Profile Package: Interoperable Format Technical Specification V3.2 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [6] | ETSI TS 102 221 | Smart Cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Release 17 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [7] | OMA-TS-Smartcard_Web_Server-V1_2_1-20130913-A | Open Mobile Alliance: Smartcard-Web-Server, Version 1.2.1 – 13 Sep 2013 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [8] | GPC_SPE_034 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.3 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [9] | GPC_SPE_007 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.3 Amendment A: Confidential Card Content Management v1.1 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [10] | GPC_SPE_025 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.3 Amendment C: Contactless Services v1.2 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [11] | GPC_SPE_014 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.2 Amendment D: Secure Channel Protocol '03' v1.1.1 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [12] | GPC_SPE_042 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.2 Amendment E: Security Upgrade for Card Content Management v1.0 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [13] | GPC_SPE_093 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.2 Amendment F: Secure Channel Protocol '11' v1.3 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [14] | ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 | Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards - Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [15] | ISO/IEC 18004:2015 | Information technology -- Automatic identification and data capture techniques -- QR Code bar code symbology specification | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [16] | RFC 5246 | The TLS Protocol – Version 1.2 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [17] | RFC 5280 | Internet X.509 PKI Certificate and CRL Profile | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [18] | RFC 5639 | Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [19] | RFC 793 | Transmission Control Protocol, DARPA Internet Program, Protocol specification, Sept 1981 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [20] | ANSSI ECC FRP256V1 | Avis relatif aux paramètres de courbes elliptiques définis par l'Etat français. JORF n°0241 du 16 octobre 2011 page 17533. texte n° 30. 2011 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [21] | ITU E.118 | The international telecommunication charge card | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [22] | GSMA Security Principles Related to Handset Theft | GSMA Doc Reference: Security Principles Related to Handset Theft 3.0.0 | | | | | | | | EICTA CCIG Doc Reference: EICTA Doc: 04cc100 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [23] | FS.08 | GSMA SAS Standard for Subscription Manager Roles | | | | | | | | Version 3.0 - 31 March 2017 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [24] | ITU-T X.520 | ITU-T X.520 Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Selected attribute types | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [25] | RFC 5758 | RFC 5758 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: | | | | | | | | Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [26] | RFC 5759 | RFC 5759 Suite B Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [27] | RFC 5480 | RFC 5480 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [28] | RFC 4519 | Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [29] | NIST SP 800-56A | NIST Special Publication SP 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revision 2), May 2013 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [30] | ITU E.212 | The international identification plan for public networks and Subscriptions | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [31] | ETSI TS 102 223 | Smart Cards; Card Application Toolkit (CAT); Release 17 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [32] | 3GPP TS 24.008 | Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); | | | | | | | | Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); | | | | | | | | LTE; | | | | | | | | Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification; | | | | | | | | Core network protocols; | | | | | | | | Stage 3 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [33] | ETSI TS 101 220 | Smart Cards; ETSI numbering system for telecommunication application providers | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [34] | RFC 768 | User Datagram Protocol, Aug 1980. | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [35] | 3GPP TS 23.003 | Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); | | | | | | | | Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); | | | | | | | | Numbering, addressing and identification | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [36] | 3GPP2 S.R0048-A | 3GPP2 - 3G Mobile Equipment Identifier (MEID) | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [37] | ISO/IEC 7812-1:2015 | Identification cards -- Identification of issuers -- Part 1: Numbering system | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [38] | ETSI TS 102 225 | Secured packet structure for UICC based applications; Release 12 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [39] | ETSI TS 102 226 | Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications; Release 9 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [40] | TS.26 | GSMA NFC Handset Requirements V9.0 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [41] | BSI TR-03111 | BSI Technical Guideline, TR-03111; Elliptic Curve Cryptography; Version 2.10 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [42] | TLS 1.3 | The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [43] | RFC 2986 | PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [44] | Void | Void | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [45] | SGP.14 | GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy V1.1 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [46] | RFC 5289 | TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [47] | RFC 4279 | Pre-Shared Key Cipher suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [48] | Void | Void | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [49] | ITU-T X.680 (11/2008) | Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation including Corrigendum 1 and 2 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [50] | ITU-T X.690 (11/2008) | ASN.1 Encoding Rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) including Corrigendum 1 and 2 | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [51] | 3GPP TS 35.231 | Specification of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1: Algorithm Specification | +------+---------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | [52] | 3GPP TS 35.205 | Specification of the MILENAG …
1.7.2 Informative Referencesadded
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ref Document Title Number ------- ------------------------------ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [i1] TS.43 GSMA VoWiFi and VoLTE Entitlement Configuration V4.0 [i2] OCF Easy Setup Specification OCF Easy Setup Specification v2.2.2: https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Easy_Setup_Specification_v2.2.2.pdf --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.9 Feature Supportadded
This specification indicates features and data elements that were added starting from v3.0.0 by acronyms encapsulated within hash symbols. This allows the sender of information to limit the content of its messages to what the receiver indicated to support. The following acronyms are used: #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0# These data elements were used in pre-3.0.0 versions of the specification and SHALL NOT be sent to a receiver indicating support for v3.0.0 or higher. #SupportedFromV2.X.Y# These data elements relate to a feature introduced in v2.X.Y. #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported# These data elements relate to the support of Device Information extensibility. These SHOULD only be sent to an eUICC indicating support for the extensibility (see section 4.3). #SupportedFromV3.0.0# These data elements relate to a feature introduced in v3.0.0. These SHALL NOT be sent to an eUICC indicating support for a version lower than v3.0.0. #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# These data elements relate to the support of the Remote Profile Management, a feature introduced in v3.0.0. These SHALL only be sent to an eUICC indicating support for this feature. #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# These data elements relate to the support of Enterprise Profiles, an optional feature introduced in v3.0.0. These SHALL only be sent to an eUICC indicating support for this feature. #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0# These data elements relate to the support of the LPA Proxy/Profile Content Management, an optional feature introduced in v3.0.0. These SHALL only be sent to an eUICC indicating support for this feature. #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# These data elements relate to the support of the Device Change, an optional feature introduced in v3.0.0. #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0# These data elements relate to the support of the Event Checking, an optional feature introduced in v3.0.0. #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0# These data elements relate to the support of the Push Service, an optional feature introduced in v3.0.0. #SupportedForMEPV3.0.0# These data elements relate to the support of the Multiple Enabled Profiles, an optional feature introduced in v3.0.0. #MandatoryFromV3.0.0# These data elements were optional or not defined in pre-3.0.0 versions and SHALL always be provided in v3.0.0 or higher. Backward compatibility with version 1 of this specification is not supported.
1.10 Editorial Guidelinesadded
This specification is built according to these editorial guidelines: ASN.1 code ASN.1 references used as character style JSON definitions Input Data, Output Data Status code "Subject - Reason" Names and phrases that are defined in section 1.5 or referenced in the definition of acronyms in section 1.6 are capitalised. Words or phrases used according to their commonly understood meanings are not capitalised. In addition, within section titles, table captions, and figure captions, the first word and every other word with length greater than three characters is capitalised. Octet values and octet string values are represented by uppercase hexadecimal digits between single quotation marks, optionally with spaces after each pair of digits. For example, 'BF12' or '12 34 56 78'. ASN.1 code is represented by lines containing no more than 80 characters. Where necessary to conform to this guideline, long definitions are represented by multiple consecutive lines. Comments within ASN.1 code use only the single-line format defined in section 12.6.3 of [49]. The following additional considerations apply: • Comments, which begin with a pair of hyphens (i.e., --), are always terminated by the end of the line (i.e., never by a second pair of hyphens). • Comments that would result in lines longer than 80 characters are represented by multiple consecutive single-line comments, each less than 80 characters in width.
2.1 General Architecture Diagrammodified
This section further specifies the Roles and interfaces associated with the Remote SIM Provisioning and Management of the eUICC for consumer Devices. ES2+[] OperatorFigure SM-DP+1: ES12Remote ES9+SIM ESopProvisioning SM-DSSystem, ES15LPA ES6in ES8+the ESci Device ES11Figure LPAd1 Endshows LDSdthe LPDdentities LUIdrequired ESeufor UserProfile CIDownload ES10aand ES10cRPM. ES10bFigure ESci1a EUMshows ESeumthe eUICCadditional DLOAentities ESdloarequired for Profile Content Management Registrarusing Systeman ProductionLPA interfacesProxy (out(LPRd) ofand scope)a EndPCM UserAdmin interfacesAgent. (outThe ofPCM scope)Admin InterfaceAgent tunneledMAY withinbe otherexternal interfacesto the LPAd. [] Figure 1:1a: RemoteEntities SIMfor ProvisioningProfile System,content management, LPA in the Device PCM enables the exchange of APDUs between the PCMP and the Enabled Profile. This includes using all kind of APDU based Secure Channel Protocols, e.g., SCP03 [11] and SCP11 [13] defined by GlobalPlatform. The LPRd triggers the PCM Admin Agent to start a PCM session and optionally relays progress information from the PCM Admin Agent to a Device Application. (See section 3.9.) A Device with an LPAd SHOULD support PCM. An eUICC that supports both the LPA Proxy and Remote Profile Management SHALL support the 'Contact PCMP' command. A Device compliant with this specification SHALL implement at least one of the following: The the LPAd, or The the requirements for one of the options for the LPAe (section 5.11). A Device that supports a non-removable eUICC without an LPAe SHALL provide an LPAd. An eUICC compliant with this specification SHALL satisfy the following: - The eUICC MAY implement the LPAe. - A removable eUICC SHALL implement the LPA ServicesServices. and- optionallyA non-removable eUICC in a Device containing an LPAd SHALL implement the LPAe.LPA Services. A Device supporting both the LPAd and the LPAe SHALL implement an appropriate mechanism that sets the LPA to be used. The above figure provides the complete des … (LPAd). The Remote SIM Provisioning and Management system also allows to have the LPA in the eUICC (LPAe). This architecture is shown in the following figure. … ES2+[] OperatorFigure SM-DP+2: ES12Remote ES9+SIM ESopProvisioning SM-DSSystem, ES15LPA ES6in ES8+the EScieUICC ES11NOTE: EndLPR Deviceis Usernot CIdefined ESeufor LPAeLPAe. ESciThis LDSemay LPDebe LUIeadded EUMin ESeuma eUICCfuture DLOAversion ESdloa Management Production interfaces (out of scope)this Registrar System End User interfaces (out of scope) Interface tunneled within other interfaces Figure 2: Remote SIM Provisioning System, LPA in the eUICCspecification.
2.2 Rolesmodified
Roles are defined within SGP.21 [4] Architecture Specification section 3. The DLOA Registrar is a role that stores DLOAs and provides an interface to enable authorised DLOA Management System to retrieve them. In the context of RSP, a well-known DLOA Registrar SHALL be defined (i.e.(i.e., a well-known URL SHALL be defined), containing all the valid (not expired and not revoked) DLOAs delivered by the DLOA.DLOA Authority. This DLOA Registrar MAY also contain additional DLOAs delivered by other authorities. DLOAs delivered by the DLOA Authority MAY be provided to othersother DLOA RegistrarsRegistrars. (see section 5.7.8). The DLOA Registrar is defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA [57]. InA theDLOA context of this document, a Management System is any authorised system (e.g.(e.g., a MNO backend system, an SM-DP+) interested in verifying the level of certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, or validation of a component (e.g.(e.g., eUICC platform).
2.3 Interfacesmodified
The following table provides information about the interfaces within the architecture. | Interface | Between | Description | ES2+ | Operator | SM-DP+ | Used by the Operator to order Profiles for specific eUICCs as well as other administrative functions. | ES6 | Operator | eUICC | Used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services. | ES8+ | SM-DP+ | eUICC | Provides a secure end-to-end channel between the SM-SM-DP+ DP+ and the eUICC for the administration of the ISD-P and the associated Profile during download and installation. It provides Perfect Forward Secrecy. | ES9+ | SM-DP+ | LPD | Used to provide a secure transport between the SM-DP+ and the LPA (LPD) for theProfile deliveryDownload, ofRPM, theetc. Bound| Profile Package. ES10a | LDSd | eUICC | Used between the LDSd and the LPA Services to handle a Profile discovery. | ES10b | LPDd | eUICC | Used between the LPDd and the LPA services to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC. This interface plays no role in the decryption of Profile Packages. | ES10c | LUId | eUICC | Used between the LUId and the LPA services for Local Profile Management by the End User. | ES11 | LDS | SM-DS | Used by the LDS to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC. | ES12 | SM-DP+ | SM-DS | Used by the SM-DP+ to issueregister or remove Event RegistrationsRecords onwith the SM-DS.SM-DS and to delete its Event Records. | ES15 | SM-DS | SM-DS | Used in the case of deployments of cascaded SM-DSs to connect those SM-DSs. | ES20 | PCMP | PCMAA | Used to send APDU scripts enhanced by additional information. | ES21 | Device Application | LPRd | Used to trigger the PCMAA and to send PCM notifications to the Device Application. | ES22 | Device Application | LPAd | Used by a Device Application to interwork with the LPA (out of scope of this specification). | ES25 | UIMe | LUIe | Used between the UIMe and the LUIe to transfer End User related interaction. | ESaa | PCMAA | enabled Profile | Used to select an application of the Enabled Profile and to exchange APDUs subsequently. Identical to the interface between the Admin Agent and the Secure Element defined in GP SERAM [74] and not further described in this specification. | ESapp | Operator | Device Application | Interface between the Operator and the Device Application (out of scope of this specification). | NOTE: an example of a protocol that can be used on ESapp can be found in [i1]. | EShri | LUI | HRI Server | Used to retrieve High Resolution Icons. | ESop | Operator | End User | Business interface between Operator and End user (out of scope forof SGP.22).this specification). | ESent | Operator | Enterprise | Interface between the Operator and the Enterprise (out of scope of this specification). | ESeu | End User | LUI | Interface to initiate local profile management functions (out of scope forof SGP.22).this specification). | ESeum | eUICC | EUM | Administrative interface between the eUICC vendor (EUM) and the eUICC (out of scope of SGP.22).this specification). | ESci | CI | SM-DP+ | This interface is used by the SM-DP+, SM-DS and EUM to SM-DS request a Certificatecertificate and retrieve Certificatecertificate revocation EUM status. Any other relying party MAY retrieve Certificatecertificate revocation status. | SM-DS | The interface for Certificate Signing Request is defined in SGP.14 [45] section 5.1. The interface for CRL retrieval is defined in the present document, section 4.5.2.1.34.5.2.1.2 "Extension CRL Distribution Points". | EUM | ESdloa | DLOA Registrar | Management System | This interface is defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA [57] Registrar System section 5. | ESdsps | SM-DS | push server | Interface between SM-DS and push server (out of scope of this specification). | ESps | push server | push client | Interface between push server and push client (out of scope of this specification). | ESpc | push client | LPAd | Interface between push client and LPAd (out of scope of this specification). | Table 1:Interfaces1: Interfaces
2.4.1 eUICC Overviewmodified
…tions or data of any other Profile stored on the eUICC. The same mechanism is currently in use within SIM cards to ensure payment applications are kept secure. … To SM-DP+ To Operator To SM-DP+ To SM-DS To LPAd ES6 ES8+ ESeu ES11 ES9+ ES10a,b,c eUICC Operating System ISD-P ISD-P LPAe MNO-SD MNO-SD LPA Profile Policy ISD-R Services Enabler File System File System Profile Applets Applets CASD CASD NAAs NAAs SSD SSD ECASD Package Interpreter Telecom Framework Operator disabled Profile Operator enabled Profile[] Figure 3: Schematic Representation of the eUICC
2.4.2 ECASDmodified
…ycle state PERSONALIZED as defined in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8] section 5.3. The AID of the ECASD SHALL follow SGP.02 [2]. The ECASD SHALL contain: … The eUICC’s Private Key(s) (SK.EUICC.ECDSA)(SK.EUICC.SIG) for creating ECDSAdigital signatures The eUICC’s Certificate(s) for eUICC authentication (CERT.EUICC.ECDSA)(CERT.EUICC.SIG) containing the eUICC’s public keykey(s) (PK.EUICC.ECDSA)(PK.EUICC.SIG) The GSMAeSIM Certificate Issuer’s (CI) RootCA Public Key(s) (PK.CI.ECDSA)(PK.CI.SIG) for verifying off-off-card card entities certificates (e.g.(e.g., SM-DP+) and Certificate Revocation List (CRL). ECASD MAY contain several public keys belonging to the same GSMAeSIM CICA or different GSMAeSIM CIs.CAs. Each PK.CI.ECDSAPK.CI.SIG SHALL be stored with information coming from the CERT.CI.ECDSACERT.CI.SIG the key is included in, at least: o CertificateeSIM serial number: required to manage GSMA CI revocation by CRL o GSMA Certificate Issuer identifier: GSMA CI OID o Subject Key Identifier: required to verify the CertificationCertificate chain of the off-off-card card entity The Certificate(s) of the EUM (CERT.EUM.ECDSA)(CERT.EUM.SIG), and, optionally, the Certificate(s) of the EUM SubCA (CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG) The ECASD SHOULD also contain: eUICC Manufacturer’s (EUMs) keyset for key/certificate renewal:renewal, which is used in one or more of the following functions: o Renew eUICC’s Private Key(s) and Certificate(s) o Renew EUM Certificate(s) and, optionally, EUM SubCA Certificate(s) o Renew CIeSIM CA RootCA public key(s) - Add new eUICC Private Key(s), eUICC Certificate(s), EUM Certificate(s) and, optionally, EUM SubCA Certificate(s) - Remove eUICC’s Certificate(s) - Remove EUM Certificate(s) and related eUICC’s Certificate(s) - Add new eSIM CA RootCA Public Key(s) - Remove eSIM CA RootCA Public Key(s) o Generate a new Public/Private Key pair to support a new curve The means by which the EUM SHOULD perform key/certificate renewalrenewal/generation/addition/removal is out of scope of this specification but, if provided, it SHALL be a GlobalPlatform [8] mechanism with a minimum security level corresponding to the security level of the key/Certificate on which the operation is performed (e.g., AES algorithm using a minimum key length of 128 bits.bits EUMfor MAYa alsorenewal doof GSMAECC CIkeys Certificateof revocation256 onbits). eUICCThe (e.g.EUM byMAY deletingalso therevoke relatedan publiceSIM key),CA inRootCA additionCertificate toon usingthe aeUICC CRL(e.g., loaded by deleting the LPArelated (sectionspublic 4.6key). and 5.7.12). The ECASD SHALL provide the following services to the ISD-R: eUICC signature creation on material provided by an ISD-R Verification of the off-card entities Certificatescertificates (e.g.(e.g., SM-DP+), provided by an ISD-R, with the CIeSIM CA RootCA public key (PK.CI.ECDSA)(PK.CI.SIG) Personalisation of the ECASD SHALL be done in a certified 'GSMA SAS-UP environment'.environment' NOTE:according Asto perthe NISTSAS SPUP 800-57specification Part 1 [86], ECC256 (128-bit security strength) is sufficient for current implementation beyond year 2031.[77].
2.4.4 ISD-Pmodified
…HALL have visibility or access to any Profile Component with the exception of the ISD-R, which SHALL have access to Profile Metadata. A Profile Component SHALL … notNOT have any visibility of, or access to, components outside its ISD-P. An ISD-P SHALL notNOT have any visibility of, or access to, any other ISD-P. Deletion of a Profile SHALL remove the containing ISD-P and all Profile Components of the Profile.
2.4.5 Profilemodified
A Profile consists of Profile Components: One MNO-SD Supplementary Security Domains (SSD) and a CASD Applets Applications, e.g.e.g., NFC applications NAAs Other elements of the File System Profile Metadata, including Profile Policy Rules The MNO-SD is the on-card representative of the Operator. It contains the Operator’s Over-Over-The-Air The-Air (OTA) keys and provides a secure OTA channel. All Security Domains of a Profile SHALL be located in the hierarchy of the MNO-SD or an SD extradited to itself. T … LL be equivalent to a UICC. This applies especially for the NAAs and applets contained in the Profile. When a Profile is Disabled, the eUICC SHALL ensure that: … Remote management of any Profile Component is not possible via the ES6 interface. The file system within the Profile cannot be selected by the Device or any application on the eUICC. The applications (including NAAs and Security Domains) within the Profile cannot be selected, triggered or individually deleted. For an eUICC compliant with M4M [58], no M4M Virtual Card inside that Profile is visible nor accessible through any interface.
2.4.5.2 Provisioning Profilemodified
…SHALL have the same format structure as any other Profile. Provisioning Profile Impact on LUI Provisioning Profiles and their associated Profile Metadata SHALL … notNOT be visible to the End User in the LUI. As a result, Provisioning Profiles SHALL notNOT be selectable by the End User nor deletable through any End User action, including eUICC Memory Reset. Provisioning Profile and Operational Profile Policies Pr… …
2.4.5.3 Test Profilemodified
…never use a key with so little entropy. Test Profiles and their associated Profile Metadata SHALL be visible in the LUI when the Device is in Device Test Mode. … The only indication the eUICC receives about the Device entering Test Mode is the initial enabling of a Test Profile. Other Test Profiles may be enabled subsequently. The explicit disabling of the current Test Profile or the enabling of a non-Test Profile indicates to the eUICC that Device Test Mode was left. If an Operational Profile was in Enabled state before the (first) Test Profile was enabled, the eUICC will ensure that this Operational Profile is re-enabled when the Test Profile is disabled. This ensures that the Profile Policy Rule "Disabling not allowed" is handled consistently. (See sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for details.) Even though Profile Policy Rules do not apply for MEP, the same re-enabling mechanism is specified for MEP. While a Test Profile is enabled on an eSIM Port, the LPAd SHALL not enable the temporarily disabled Operational Profile on a different eSIM Port. The behaviour of the eUICC for such attempts or for any other exceptional action by the LPAd is neither specified nor are such cases covered in the procedures in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. NOTE: While the LPAd can receive an implementation specific notification when the Device enters/leaves Test Mode, such a mechanism is not available for the LPAe. To avoid extra messages, the LPAe MAY implement a protected option in its user interface for activating Test Mode. Even if configured in its Metadata, the eUICC will never generate Notifications related to the Enabling or Disabling of a Test Profile. In addition, no Notifications will be generated for an Operational Profile when switching to or from a Test Profile. NOTE: The GSMA Generic Test Profile [85] is an example of a Test Profile that supports a wide range of development, certification, and repair/refurbishment testing activities.
2.4.7 Profile Package Interpretermodified
The Profile Package Interpreter is an eUICC Operating System service that translates the Profile Package data as defined in eUICC Profile Package specificationSpecification [5] into an installed Profile using the specific internal format of the target eUICC. NOTE: According to the eUICC Profile Package specificationSpecification [5], the eUICC also attempts to process Profile Packages indicating a different minor version.
2.4.9 LPA Servicesmodified
This role provides the necessary access to the services and data required by LPAd functions. These services include: Provide the addressaddress(es) of the Root SM-DSSM-DS(s) and (if configured) the Default SM-DP+SM-DP+, if configured Transfer Bound Profile Package from the LPAd to the ISD-P Provide list of installed Profiles and their Profile Metadata Retrieve EID Provide Local Profile Management Operations Provide Remote Profile Management Provide pendingauthentication Notificationsand LPAintegrity Servicesverification arefor mandatoryEvent evenRetrieval iffrom thean LPAeSM-DS isProvide providedpending inNotifications theThe eUICCconditions becauseunder thewhich eUICCLPA Services SHALL supportbe LPAdpresent evenare ifdescribed itin containssection LPAe.2.1.
2.4.10 Hardware Characteristics of the eUICCmodified
The following requirements apply: The eUICC SHALL be based on a Tamper Resistant Element. The eUICC SHALL be either a Discrete eUICC or an Integrated eUICC.AeUICC. A Discrete eUICC MAY either be removable or non-removable. A removable eUICC SHALL be packaged in a form factor specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [6].
2.4.11 Platform Characteristics of the eUICCmodified
In compliance with SGP.21, the following requirements apply: The eUICC SHALL support SHA-1. The eUICC SHALL support TUAK [51]. The eUICC SHALL support Milenage [52]. All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a tamper-resistant way and SHALL resist side-channel attacks.
2.4.11.1 Java Card packagesmodified
An eUICC supporting Java CardTMCard^(TM) SHALL support the Java Packages listed below. The implementation of each Package SHALL as a minimum be according to the given Package version and Specification version. | Package | Description | Package Version | Spec Version Version| java.* | java.io defines a subset of the java.io 1.0 Java CardTM (java.lang, java.io) package in the standard Java 3.0.4 programming language. | 1.0 | Java Card^(TM) 3.0.5 Classic Edition | (java.lang, java.io) | java.lang Provides classes that are 1.0 fundamental to the design of the Java Card technology subset of the Java programming language. | 1.0 | javacard.* | javacard.framework Provides a 1.5 Java CardTM (javacard.framework, framework of classes and interfaces for 3.0.4 javacard.security) building, communicating with and Classic working with Java CardCard^(TM) technology based applets. | 1.6 | Java Card^(TM) 3.0.5 Classic Edition | (javacard.framework, javacard.security) | javacard.security Provides classes 1.5 and interfaces that contain publicly available functionality for implementing a security and cryptography framework on the Java CardCard^(TM) platform | 1.6 | javacardx.* | javacardx.crypto Extension package 1.5 Java CardTM (javacardx.crypto) that contains functionality, which may 3.0.4 be subject to export controls, for Classic implementing a security and cryptography framework on the Java CardCard^(TM) platform. | 1.6 | Java Card^(TM) 3.0.5 Classic Edition | (javacardx.crypto) | uicc.* | uicc.access This package provides the 1.2 TS 102 241 (uicc.access, means to the applets for accessing the [53] Rel-9 uicc.system, UICC file system defined in the TS 102 uicc.toolkit) 221 [6] specification. | 1.2 | TS 102 241 [53] Rel-9 | (uicc.access, uicc.system, uicc.toolkit) | uicc.system This package provides the 1.0 means to the applets for accessing system wide services of the UICC platform. | 1.0 | uicc.toolkit This package provides the 1.6 means for the toolkit applets to register to the events of the common application toolkit (CAT) framework, to handle TLV information and to send proactive commands according to the ETSI TS 102 223 [31] specification. | 1.6 | uicc.usim.* | uicc.usim.access This package 1.0 3GPP TS provides the means for applets to get 31.130 [88] (uicc.usim.access, access to the files defined in the USIM, Rel-9 uicc.usim.toolkit) SIM and ISIM specification. | 1.0 | 3GPP TS 31.130 Rel-9 | (uicc.usim.access, uicc.usim.toolkit) | uicc.usim.toolkit This package 1.8 provides the means for the toolkit applets to register to the events defined in the USAT and STK specification to handle TLV information and to send proactive command according to the ETSI 3GPP TS 31.111 and 3GPP TS 51.014 specification. | 1.8 | org.globalplatform | Provides a framework of classes and 1.6 GP 2.3 [8] interfaces related to core services defined for smart cards based on GlobalPlatform specifications | 1.6 | GP 2.3 [8] | Table 2: Java Card Packages The following additional Java Card packages SHALL be supported by an eUICC supporting NFC: | Package | Description | Package Version | Spec Version Version| javacardx.* | javacardx.external Extension package 1.0 Java CardTM that provides mechanisms to access 3.0.4 Classic (javacardx.external, memory subsystems which are not javacardx.framework. directly addressable by the Java CardCard^(TM) tlv, runtime environment (Java CardCard^(TM) RE) on javacardx.framework. the Java CardCard^(TM) platform. util.intx)| 1.0 | Java Card^(TM) 3.0.5 Classic Edition | (javacardx.external, javacardx.framework.tlv, javacardx.framework.util.intx) | javacardx.framework.tlv Extension 1.0 package that contains functionality, for managing storage for BER TLV formatted data, based on the ASN.1 BER encoding rules of ISO/IEC 8825-8825-1:2002, 1:2002, as well as parsing and editing BER TLV formatted data in I/O buffers. javacardx.framework.util.intx| 1.0 | javacardx.framework.util.intx Extension package that contains common utility functions for using int components. | 1.0 | uicc.hci.* | uicc.hci.framework This package 1.1 TS 102 705 defines the basic interfaces for the HCI protocol. | 1.1 | TS 102 705 Rel-9 | (uicc.hci.framework, protocol.uicc.hci.services.cardemulation, uicc.hci.services.cardeuicc.hci.services.connectivity, mulation,uicc.hci.services.readermode) | uicc.hci.services.cardemulation This 1.0 uicc.hci.services.conn package defines the interfaces for the ectivity, card emulation mode of the HCI protocol. uicc.hci.services.read| ermode)1.0 | uicc.hci.services.connectivity This 1.0 package defines the interfaces for the functionality of the connectivity gate defined in the HCI protocol. | 1.0 | uicc.hci.services.readermode This 1.0 package defines the interfaces for the reader emulation mode of the HCI protocol. org.globalplatform.co| 1.0 | org.globalplatform.contactless | Provides a framework of classes and 1.3 Amd C 1.2 ntactless interfaces related to contactless services [10] defined for smart cards based on GlobalPlatform specifications | 1.3 | Amd C 1.2 [10] | Table 3: Java Card Packages
2.4.13 eUICC OS Updateadded
An eUICC SHOULD support a mechanism for eUICC OS Update. If such a mechanism is supported, it SHALL be secure. The eUICC OS Update capability allows the OS manufacturer to correct errors in existing features on the eUICC by updating the eUICC OS. The process and mechanisms used to perform an eUICC OS Update are Device manufacturer and EUM implementation-specific and therefore out of scope of this version of the specification. However, the eUICC OS Update mechanism SHALL fulfil the requirements defined in SGP.21 [4]. This operation MAY affect information contained within euiccInfo1 and euiccInfo2. Following any eUICC OS Update, the eUICC SHALL remain compliant according to the RSP Certification process as specified in SGP.24 [64].
2.4a ASN.1added
The description of some data objects in this specification is based on ASN.1 specified in ITU‑T X.680 [49] and encoded in TLV structures using DER (Distinguished Encoding Rule) encoding as specified in ITU-T X.690 [50]. This provides a flexible description of those data objects. The Remote SIM Provisioning format is defined in a single, self-contained, ASN.1 definition module called RSPDefinitions, with an ISO Object Identifier in the GSMA namespace. -- ASN1START RSPDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) gsma(146) rsp(1) spec-version(1) version-three(3)} DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS EXTENSIBILITY IMPLIED ::= BEGIN -- ASN1STOP Two encoding/decoding attributes are defined: • AUTOMATIC TAGS means that the tags are defined automatically using the encoding rules unless a tag notation is present in a data object format definition. • EXTENSIBILITY IMPLIED means that types MAY have elements that are not defined in this specification. This means that decoders SHALL be able to handle values with unspecified tags, either by processing them if they know their value content, or ignoring them silently (without reporting an error) if they do not know them. This is useful when processing data definitions from a newer specification and to handle proprietary tag values. As the eUICC cannot implement an off-the-shelf standard decoder, the requirement on extensibility SHALL NOT apply to the eUICC. In some cases the eUICC is even mandated to report undefined tags, see e.g., sections 3.1.5 and 5.7.6. The following general rules SHALL apply for the compliance of entities according to this specification: • A sender of data defined in this specification SHALL comply with the exact definition of the data structure. • A receiver is only mandated to check incoming data where such a check is explicitly required by this specification. Otherwise, a receiver is free to tolerate deviations (e.g., strings longer than the defined maximum) or reject them. If the receiver does not understand a field, the receiver SHALL silently ignore it without reporting an error (i.e., SHALL NOT parse or process the value content). If the receiver is requested to sign or verify the signature of a data object containing those unknown field(s), the receiver SHALL perform the request on the entire data object. NOTE: Unless otherwise specified in this specification, an optional field should be present only when the field has a value, i.e., it should not be present with empty content. This specification relies on X.509 data objects imported from libraries defined in RFC 5280 [17]: -- ASN1START IMPORTS Certificate, CertificateList, Time FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18)} SubjectKeyIdentifier FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19)} UICCCapability FROM PEDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) tca(143) euicc-profile(1) spec-version(1) version-three(3)}; -- The UICCCapability import module version is defined in section 4.3 -- ASN1STOP
2.6.7.1 Domain Parametersremoved
In order to facilitate interoperability, this specification is limited to the three following curves (similar as SGP.02 [2]):
NIST P-256, defined in Digital Signature Standard [29] (recommended by NIST) brainpoolP256r1, defined in RFC 5639 [18] (recommended by BSI) FRP256V1, defined in ANSSI ECC [20] (recommended by ANSSI)
An eUICC SHALL have at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters preloaded by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing, subject to support by the corresponding GSMA CI.
For each GSMA CI trust chain to which it belongs, an RSP Server SHALL support all sets of elliptic curve parameters that the corresponding GSMA CI supports.
The capabilities of each party are exchanged during the common mutual authentication procedure. The RSP Server SHALL select the most suitable GSMA CI certificates supported for signature verification and signature generation, respectively. This selection SHALL be based on the euiccCiPKIdListForVerification and the euiccCIPKIdListForSigning, which list the CI public keys the eUICC supports in descending priority. If an RSP server does not have any other priorities defined, it SHALL follow the priorities given by the eUICC. An SM- DP+ MAY follow the priorities defined by a Profile Owner. The curve parameters are identified by the selected certificates.
In the event that no common GSMA CI is supported by the RSP Server and the eUICC, the procedure SHALL be stopped.
2.6.7.2 ECDSAremoved
A signature based on ECDSA SHALL be computed as defined in GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment E [12] with one of the domain parameters defined above in section 2.6.7.1 and key length and HASH function recommended above in section 2.6.5.
When applied to an ASN.1 data object, the signature SHALL be computed for the data object after encoding (i.e. in its DER representation).
2.6.7.3 ECKAremoved
An Elliptic Curve Key Agreement Algorithm (ECKA) is used in RSP for the establishment of any session keys between the eUICC and the SM-DP+. The key agreement and key derivation process is detailed in Annex G.
2.4a.1 Common ASN.1 data typesrenumbered was 2.8.1
2.4a.1.0 Data type: Miscellaneousadded
The following constant, types and objects are used in this specification. -- ASN1START id-rsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) gsma(146) rsp(1)} -- Basic types, for size constraints Octet1 ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1)) Octet4 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(4)) Octet8 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) Octet16 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) OctetTo16 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..16)) Octet32 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)) VersionType ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(3)) -- major/minor/revision version are coded as binary value on byte 1/2/3, e.g., '02 00 0C' for v2.0.12. -- If revision is not used (e.g., v2.1), byte 3 SHALL be set to '00'. Iccid ::= [APPLICATION 26] OCTET STRING (SIZE(10)) -- ICCID as coded in EFiccid, corresponding tag is '5A' RemoteOpId ::= [2] INTEGER {installBoundProfilePackage(1)} TransactionId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..16)) -- Definition of OIDs id-rsp-cert-objects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rsp 2} -- value 0 in id-rsp-cert-objects was assigned in SGP.22 v2.x -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0# id-rspRole OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rsp-cert-objects 1} -- Definition of OIDs for role identification in certificates id-rspRole-ci OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 0} id-rspRole-ciSubCa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-ci 0} id-rspRole-eum OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-ciSubCa 0} id-rspRole-eumSubCa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-eum 0} id-rspRole-euicc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-eumSubCa 0} id-rspRole-dpSubCa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-ciSubCa 1} id-rspRole-dp-tls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dpSubCa 0} id-rspRole-dp-auth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dpSubCa 1} id-rspRole-dp-pb OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dpSubCa 2} id-rspRole-dsSubCa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-ciSubCa 2} id-rspRole-ds-tls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dsSubCa 0} id-rspRole-ds-auth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dsSubCa 1} -- The following OIDs are used in Variant O and OO Certificates id-rspRole-euicc-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 1} id-rspRole-eum-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 2} id-rspRole-dp-tls-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 3} id-rspRole-dp-auth-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 4} id-rspRole-dp-pb-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 5} id-rspRole-ds-tls-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 6} id-rspRole-ds-auth-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 7} -- Definition of OIDs for RSP-specific extensions in Certificates -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# id-rsp-extensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rsp-cert-objects 2} id-rsp-extension-permitted-eins OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-rsp-extensions 0} -- The extnValue field of the id-rsp-extension-permitted-eins extension SHALL be of type PermittedEins: PermittedEins ::= SEQUENCE OF PrintableString -- ASN1STOP
2.4a.1.1 Data type: PprIdsrenumbered was 2.8.1.1
The data type PprIds codes the identifiers for Profile Policy Rules defined in this document. -- ASN1START PprIds ::= BIT STRING {-- Definition of Profile Policy Rules identifiers pprUpdateControl(0), -- defines how to update PPRs via ES6 ppr1(1), -- Indicator for PPR1 'Disabling of this Profile is not allowed' ppr2(2) -- Indicator for PPR2 'Deletion of this Profile is not allowed' } -- ASN1STOP For pprX: a bit set to '1' indicates that the corresponding PPR is set. Further versions of this specification MAY introduce new Profile Policy Rule identifiers
2.4a.1.2 Data type: OperatorIdrenumbered was 2.8.1.2
The data type OperatorId contains the identification of an Operator. This type is used to identify a Profile Owner. -- ASN1START OperatorId ::= SEQUENCE { mccMnc OCTET STRING (SIZE(3)), -- MCC&MNC coded as 3GPP TS 24.008 gid1 OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- referring to content of EF GID1 (file identifier '6F3E') in 3GPP TS 31.102 [54] gid2 OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- referring to content of EF GID2 (file identifier '6F3F') in 3GPP TS 31.102 [54] } -- ASN1STOP Coding of mccMnc: contains MCC (3 digits) and MNC (2 or 3 digits) on 3 bytes coded as in 3GPP TS 24.008 [32]. For instance, an Operator identified by 246 for the MCC and 81 for the MNC will be coded as bytes 1 to 3: '42' 'F6' '18'. Coding of gid1 and gid2: both are optional. ContentIf provided, their content SHALL be coded as defined in 3GPP TS 31.102 [54]. In case the Profile contains multiple USIM applications, the OperatorId SHALL reflect the values of one of th… …
2.4a.1.3 Data type: RpmConfigurationadded
The data type RpmConfiguration defines the configuration on RPM support of a Profile. -- ASN1START RpmConfiguration ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# managingDpList [0] SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { managingDpOid [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- Managing SM-DP+ OID rpmType [1] RpmType OPTIONAL, tagList [APPLICATION 28] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }, pollingAddress [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- Tag '81' allowedCiPKId [2] SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- eSIM CA RootCA PKID that is allowed for managing SM-DP+s profileOwnerOid [3] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } RpmType ::= BIT STRING{ enable(0), disable(1), delete(2), listProfileInfo(3), contactPcmp(4) } -- ASN1STOP managingDpList contains a list of Managing SM-DP+s identified by their OIDs. Multiple bits can be set in rpmType, where a bit set to '1' indicates that the Managing SM-DP+ is allowed to perform the corresponding RPM Command, except for 'Update Metadata'. If a Managing SM-DP+ is allowed to perform 'Update Metadata', then the list of data objects that the Managing SM-DP+ can update SHALL be specified in the tagList (defined in section 5.7.15). pollingAddress contains the address of either SM-DP+ or SM-DS as an FQDN. allowedCiPKId specifies the only eSIM CA RootCA public key that is allowed for authentication of the Managing SM-DP+(s) specified by managingDpList. If allowedCiPKId is absent then any eSIM CA RootCA public key may be used. profileOwnerOid contains the OID of the Profile Owner.
2.4a.1.4 Data type: LocalisedTextMessageadded
The data type LocalisedTextMessage contains a text string and the language associated with it. -- ASN1START LocalisedTextMessage ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# languageTag UTF8String DEFAULT "en", -- language tag as defined by RFC 5646 message UTF8String } -- ASN1STOP
2.4a.1.5 Data type: LprConfigurationadded
The data type LprConfiguration defines the configuration for the LPRd. -- ASN1START LprConfiguration ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0# pcmpAddress [0] UTF8String, dpiEnable [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, triggerLprOnEnableProfile [2] NULL OPTIONAL } -- ASN1STOP pcmpAddress contains the FQDN of the PCMP server. dpiEnable contains the DPI which if present is appended to the pcmpAddress if the LPR is triggered upon local enabling. If triggerLprOnEnableProfile is present, then the LPA SHALL trigger the LPR session after local enabling the Profile.
2.4a.1.6 Data type: CertificateChainadded
The data type CertificateChain contains a chain of Certificates. -- ASN1START CertificateChain ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# -- ASN1STOP Each subsequent Certificate in the list SHALL certify the one preceding it. The eSIM CA RootCA Certificate SHALL be omitted.
2.4a.1.7 Data type: EnterpriseConfigurationadded
The data type EnterpriseConfiguration defines the configuration of an Enterprise Profile. -- ASN1START EnterpriseConfiguration ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# enterpriseOid [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, enterpriseName [1] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)), enterpriseRules [2] SEQUENCE { enterpriseRuleBits [0] BIT STRING { referenceEnterpriseRule (0), priorityEnterpriseProfile (1), onlyEnterpriseProfilesCanBeInstalled (2) }, numberOfNonEnterpriseProfiles [1] INTEGER -- that can be Enabled } OPTIONAL } -- ASN1STOP enterpriseOid contains the OID of the Enterprise. This field SHALL NOT be modifiable after the installation of an Enterprise Profile. enterpriseName contains the name of the Enterprise. enterpriseRules defines the Enterprise Rules of the Enterprise Profile as follows. • referenceEnterpriseRule indicates that the Enterprise Rule of this Enterprise Profile is the Reference Enterprise Rule. The next bits and numberOfNonEnterpriseProfiles described hereunder affect the Enterprise Capable Device only when this bit is set. The eUICC of an Enterprise Owned Device SHALL ensure that at most one Enterprise Profile has this bit set among the installed Enterprise Profiles. • priorityEnterpriseProfile indicates that the End User can enable only this Enterprise Profile or has to enable this Enterprise Profile before being able to enable any other Profile. • onlyEnterpriseProfilesCanBeInstalled indicates that the End User can install only Enterprise Profiles. • numberOfNonEnterpriseProfiles defines the maximum number of non-Enterprise Profiles that can be Enabled on an eUICC. NOTE: This parameter may even be higher than the supported number of Profiles being Enabled in parallel. Dependent on the latter and the parameter priorityEnterpriseProfile, the actual number of non-Enterprise Profiles that can be Enabled may be lower.
2.4a.1.8 Data type: VendorSpecificExtensionadded
The data type VendorSpecificExtension is used to send additional extensions that are not defined in this specification. -- ASN1START OPENTYPE ::= CLASS { &typeId OBJECT IDENTIFIER, &Type } VendorSpecificExtension ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0# vendorOid [0] OPENTYPE.&typeId, -- OID of the vendor who defined this specific extension vendorSpecificData [1] OPENTYPE.&Type } -- ASN1STOP
2.4a.1.9 Data type: DeviceChangeConfigurationadded
The data type DeviceChangeConfiguration defines the configurations for the LPAd to support the Device Change of the Profile. -- ASN1START DeviceChangeConfiguration ::= CHOICE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# requestToDp [0] SEQUENCE { smdpAddressForDc UTF8String, -- SM-DP+ address that processes the Device Change allowedCiPKId SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- PKID allowed for the SM-DP+ address that processes the Device Change eidRequired NULL OPTIONAL, -- the EID of the new Device is required tacRequired NULL OPTIONAL -- the TAC of the new Device is required }, usingStoredAc [1] SEQUENCE { activationCodeForDc UTF8String (SIZE(0..255)), -- Activation Code for Device Change of this Profile deleteOldProfile NULL OPTIONAL -- deletion of this Profile is required before providing the Activation code to the new Device } } -- ASN1STOP The requestToDp consists of the following data objects for the LPAd to support the Device Change of the Profile by requesting to the SM-DP+: - smdpAddressForDc contains the SM-DP+ address that SHALL process the Device Change of the Profile. - allowedCiPKId specifies the only eSIM CA RootCA public key that is allowed for authentication of the SM-DP+ in the smdpAddressForDc. If allowedCiPKId is absent, then any eSIM CA RootCA public key may be used. - eidRequired indicates that the EID of the new Device is required for the Device Change of the Profile. If eidRequired is present, then the LPA SHALL retrieve the EID from the new Device. - tacRequired indicates that the TAC of the new Device is required for the Device Change of the Profile. If tacRequired is present, then the LPA SHALL retrieve the TAC from the new Device. The usingStoredAc consists of the following data objects for the LPAd to support the Device Change of the Profile by using the Activation Code stored in the Profile Metadata: • activationCodeForDc contains the Activation Code to be provided to the new Device to download the Profile for the Device Change. • deleteOldProfile indicates that the Profile has to be deleted before the Activation Code is made available for the new Device.
2.4a.2 ASN.1 data type UTF8Stringadded
The size limits for UTF-8 strings apply to the number of UTF-8 characters, each coded on 1 to 4 bytes, see ISO/IEC 10646 [59]. Thus the length of the TLV object counted in bytes can be up to 4 times the number of characters. The eUICC is not mandated to analyse the character structure of UTF-8 strings provided in a command. The LPA and a Managing SM-DP+ SHOULD be able to receive a string with 4 times as many UTF-8 characters as the ASN.1 size limit if such a string was previously stored in the eUICC.
2.5.1 Profile Package Types Overviewmodified
From generation to download, the Profile Package will take different formats. This specification uses the following terms: Unprotected Profile Package (UPP): Raw eUICC Profile ElementPackage TLV sequence. Protected Profile Package (PPP): Segmented and protected in SCP03tBSP payload TLVs. Bound Profile Package (BPP): Prepended with session key agreement info, key replacement package, ISD-P creation and configuration info. Segmented Bound Profile Package (SBPP): BPP segmented into STORE DATA APDU script for loading into eUICC. This step is performed by the LPD when LPD is in the Device. SM-DP+:[] Profile Package Generation (Unprotected) Profile Package PE TLV1 PE TLV2 … PE TLVn SM-DP+: Protected Profile Package Data 1 MAC Data 2 MAC … Data n MAC Profile Package Protection Segmentation Segment1 Segment2 … Segment n SM-DP+: Profile Package Binding Bound Profile Package InitialiseSecureChannel CI SM PPK Segment1 Segment2 … Segment n LPA: Store Data Store Store Store Store Store Store Profile Package Delivery to Segmented Bound Profile Package 1…n Data Data Data Data Data … Data 1…n 1…n 1…n 1…n 1…n 1…n eUICC Clear data CI = Configure ISDP Encrypted data with Profile protection key (PPK-ENC) SM = Store Metadata Clear data MACed with Session key PPK = Protected Profile Protection Keys Encrypted data with Session key (S-ENC) Figure 4: Profile Package stage Description The above diagram describes the case where Profile Package is protected with keys different from the session keys established during the key agreement with the eUICC (S-ENC,(S‑ENC, S-MAC). It MAY also be possible to have a Profile Package protected with the session keys; in that case the 'Profile Protection Keys' block SHALL notNOT be present.
2.5.2 Unprotected Profile Packagemodified
…his specification. The Unprotected Profile Package consists of a sequence of Profile Element (PE) TLVs according to the eUICC Profile Package specification [5]. … NOTE: To achieve maximum interoperability with eUICC Profile Package specification version 2.0 the following two additional features "support USIM test algorithm" and "number of Keccak iterations" SHOULD be avoided.
2.5.3 Protected Profile Packagemodified
The Protected Profile Package (PPP) is generated by the SM-DP+, within the Profile Package Protection function. The PPP SHALL be protected withby SCP03t.the BSP. Command TLV encryption and MACing follows SGP.02 [2] section 4.1.3.3.2.6.4.4. During this step the internal UPP structure is not considered, and rather seen as a unique block of data. That block of data is split into segments of a maximum size of 1020 bytes (including the tag, length field and MAC). The eUICC SHALL support receiving data segments of at least up to this size. NOTE: When the BSP uses AES-CBC-128/AES-CMAC-128 or SM4-CBC/SM4-CMAC, the following applies: From the 1020 bytes of each data segment, only 1008 bytes are usable for payload (deducted the 1 byte tag, 3 bytes length field and 8 bytes MAC). Considering th … and necessary '80' byte padding), then each data segment can only contain 1007 bytes of the PPP data block. Profile protection SHALL be performed using either: … Session keys (S-ENC, S-MAC) resulting from the key agreement with eUICC. Or random keys per Profile (denoted PPK-ENC and PPK-MACPPK-MAC), ingenerated thisby documentthe andSM‑DP+. referredThe toSM-DP+ asSHALL S-ENCsupport the random key mode and S-MACSHOULD respectivelysupport inSession SGP.02keys. [2]),It generatedis bythe SM-DP+ choice (in line with the SM-DP+.agreement Ifwith the Operator) as to which mode is selected. The eUICC SHALL support both modes. The random key mode allows performing Profile Package Protection in advance without having any eUICC knowledge. It may help to provide a better SM-DP+ scalability. If this mode is selected by the SM-DP+, the initial MAC chaining value to be used for the first segment of the PPP is provided together with the random keykeys (section 5.5.4) and the encryptiondata block counter for ICV calculation is reset to its initial state (i.e.(i.e., the value on 16 bytes is '00…01'). OtherwiseOtherwise, the MAC chaining method defined in SGP.02section [2]2.6.4 SHALL be applied (i.e.(i.e., the MACoutput chaining value of the previous segment SHALL be used).used as MAC chaining value). S-ENC, S-MAC, PPK-ENC and PPK-MAC SHALL befollow 128the bitskey length.length defined in section 2.6.5. Each data segment of the PPP is identified by the tag '86''86'. as defined in SGP.02 [2]. It is the SM-DP+ choice (in line with the agreement with the Operator) as to whether to use this random keyset (PPK-ENC and PPK-MAC). This mode allows performing Profile Package Protection in advance without having any eUICC knowledge. It may help to provide a better SM-DP+ scalability. The eUICC SHALL be able to support both modes. In case the random key mode is used, the PPP is not bound to any particular eUICC or ISD- PISD-P AID value at this stage. Session keys and, if used, the random keys SHALL only be used in the Profile download process. They SHALL be deleted on the eUICC late… …
2.5.4 Bound Profile Packagemodified
…eement between the eUICC and the SM-DP+. See download and installation procedure (section 3.1.3). The BPP comprises a sequence of TLV commands (in this order): … TLV command for Key agreement in clear. Set of SCP03tBSP payload TLVs (tag '87') containing TLV commands for ConfigureISDP Set of SCP03tBSP payload TLVs (tag '88') containing TLV command for StoreMetadata Set of optional SCP03tBSP payload TLVs (tag '87') containing TLV command for 'Profile Protection Keys' Followed by the SCP03tBSP payload TLVs (tag '86') of the PPP The encryption counter for ICV calculation is incremented each time a TLV with tag '86', '87' or '88' is received. The data structure of the Bound Profile Package is as follows: -- ASN1START BoundProfilePackage ::= [54] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF36' initialiseSecureChannelRequest [35] InitialiseSecureChannelRequest, -- Tag 'BF23' firstSequenceOf87 [0] SE … secondSequenceOf87 [2] SEQUENCE OF [7] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- sequence of '87' TLVs sequenceOf86 [3] SEQUENCE OF [6] OCTET STRING -- sequence of '86' TLVs } … -- ASN1STOP The following table describes the various sequences of '86', '87' and '88' TLV | Tag | Length | Value Description | MOC | 'A0' | Var. | firstSequenceOf87 | M | '87' | Var. SCP03t| BSP segment containing ConfigureISDP, protected with session keys resulting from the key agreement (S-ENC, S-CMAC) (section 2.6.4) | M | Content: TLV for "ES8+.ConfigureISDP" function (section 5.5.2) | 'A1' | Var | sequenceOf88 | M | '88' | Var. SCP03t| BSP segment containing StoreMetadata, MAC protected with session keys resulting from the key agreement (S-CMAC) (See section 2.6.4) (i.e.(i.e., not encrypted). | M | Content: TLV for "ES8+.StoreMetadata" function (section 5.5.3) | '88' | Var. SCP03t| segmentAdditional BSP segment(s) containing the remainder of StoreMetadataStoreMetadata, only present if one '88' TLV is not able to C contain the whole data structure. | C | 'A2' | Var. | secondSequenceOf87 | C | SHALL be absent if no content | '87' | Var. SCP03t| BSP segment containing the Profile Protection Keys, protected with session keys resulting from the key agreement (S-ENC, S-S-CMAC) CMAC) (section 2.6.4). | O | Content: TLV for "ES8+.ReplaceSessionKeys" function (section 5.5.4) | 'A3' | Var. | sequenceOf86 | M | '86' | Var. SCP03t| BSP payload, segment b1 protected with Profile Protection Keys (PPK-ENC, PPK-MAC) M or with session keys resulting from the key agreement (S-ENC, S-CMAC) (section 2.6.4). | M | '86' | Var. | Subsequent SCP03tBSP payload, segment b2…bn | O | Table 4: Profile Installation sequences of TLV
2.5.4.1 Description of 'InitialiseSecureChannel' Blockmodified
…th eUICC, including key agreement. These TLVs, part of the function "ES8+.InitialiseSecureChannel", are listed and described in section 5.5.1. These TLVs SHALL … notNOT be encrypted. Integrity and authenticity are ensured by the signatures. The execution of this function by the eUICC will result in the generation of the SCP03tBSP session keys, denoted S-ENC, S-MAC and initial MAC chaining value, that will be used by the SM-DP+ to protect subsequent TLVs.
2.5.4.2 Description of 'ConfigureISDP' Blockmodified
This block comprises one TLV for ISD-P creation and configuration. The TLV, part of the function "ES8+.ConfigureISDP", is listed and described in section 5.5.2.5.5.2 . This TLV SHALL be encrypted and MACed with the SCP03tBSP session keys.
2.5.4.3 Description of 'StoreMetadata' Blockmodified
This block comprises one or twomore TLV(s) containing the Profile Metadata. The TLV(s), part of the function "ES8+.StoreMetadata", are listed and described in section 5.5.3. These TLV(s) SHALL be MACed only with the SCP03tBSP session keys.
2.5.4.4 Description of 'Profile Protection Keys' Blockmodified
… and S-MAC keys resulting from key agreement, by the keys used for protecting the Protected Profile Package, PPK-ENC and PPK_MAC. This function is protected by … SCP03tBSP with the S-ENC and S-MAC keys resulting from the key agreement. This block is optional depending on the mode selected by the SM-DP+ to protect the Profile Package (section 2.5.3).
2.5.5 Segmented Bound Profile Packagemodified
…the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC using the local interface ES10b. The segmentation SHALL be done according to the structure of the Bound Profile Package: … Tag and length fields of the BoundProfilePackage TLV plus the initialiseSecureChannelRequest TLV Tag and length fields of the first sequenceOf87 TLV plus the first '87' TLV Tag and length fields of the sequenceOf88 TLV Each of the '88' TLVs Tag and length fields of the sequenceOf87 TLV plus the first '87' TLV Tag and length fields of the sequenceOf86 TLV Each of the '86' TLVs Each segment of this list that is up to 255 bytes is transported in one APDU. Larger TLVs are sent in blocks of 255 bytes for the first b… …
2.5.6 Profile Installation Resultmodified
The Profile Installation Result SHALL be returned by the eUICC after the execution of the last TLVs of the BPP, or right after the first BPP’s TLV executed with error. It MAY also be returned when the installation is interrupted. The Profile Installation Result contains the following data: Notification Metadata: The Notification Metadata includes: o Sequence Number o Profile Management Operation o Recipient Address o ICCID (Not provided if the Notification reports an error that has happened before ICCID was known by the eUICC, otherwise it SHALL be present) Transaction ID: The Transaction Identifier given to the eUICC during the Profile "Download and Installation" procedure (section 3.1.3). Final Result: provides the final Profile installation status. SM-DP+ OID: The SM-DP+ OID as contained in CERT.DPpb.ECDSACERT.DPpb.SIG used during the profile download and installation procedure (section 3.1.3). eUICC signature: A signature created by the eUICC ensuring the authenticity and the integrity of the Profile Installation Result. The Profile Installation Result SHALL be created by the eUICC after the execution of the last TLVs of the BPP, or right after the first BPP’s TLV executed with error. The notificationAddress in the profileInstallationResultData SHALL be set to the serverAddress provided in "ES10b.AuthenticateServer". The Profile Installation Result is returned at the end of processing the BPP. Until the Profile Download and Installation process is completed,completed or terminated, no Result is available for the LPA. The Profile Installation Result SHALL be kept by the eUICC (which can hold one or several Profile Installation Results) unti … le Installation Result SHALL be encoded in the ASN.1 data object as shown below. It SHALL include an eUICC signature data object computed as defined in section … 2.6.7.2,2.6.9, using the eUICC private key SK.EUICC.ECDSASK.EUICC.SIG selected during the Profile Download and Installation procedure, across the data object ProfileInstallationResultData (tag 'BF 27'). -- ASN1START -- Definition of Profile Installation Result ProfileInstallationResult ::= [55] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF37' profileInstallationResultData [39] ProfileInstallationResultData, euiccSignPIR EuiccSignPIREuiccSign } ProfileInstallationResultData ::= [39] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF27' transactionId[0] TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SM-DP+ notificationMetadata[47] NotificationMetadata, smdpOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- SM-DP+ OID (same(value valuefrom asCERT.DPpb.SIG) in CERT.DPpb.ECDSA) finalResult [2] CHOICE { successResult SuccessResult, errorResult ErrorResult } } EuiccSignPIREuiccSign ::= [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- Tag '5F37', eUICC’s signature SuccessResult ::= SEQUENCE { aid [APPLICATION 15] OCTET STRING (SIZE (5..16)), -- AID of ISD-P simaResponseppiResponse OCTET STRING -- contains (multiple) 'EUICCResponse' of the Profile Package Interpreter as defined in [5] } ErrorResult ::= SEQUENCE { bppCommandId BppCommandId, errorReason ErrorReason, simaResponseppiResponse OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- contains (multiple) 'EUICCResponse' of the Profile Package Interpreter as defined in [5] } BppCommandId ::= INTEGER {initialiseSecureChannel(0),{ initialiseSecureChannel(0), configureISDP(1), storeMetadata(2), storeMetadata2(3), replaceSessionKeys(4), loadProfileElements(5)}loadProfileElements(5) } ErrorReason ::= INTEGER { incorrectInputValues(1), invalidSignature(2), invalidTransactionId(3), unsupportedCrtValues(4), unsupportedRemoteOperationType(5), unsupportedProfileClass(6), scp03tStructureError(7),bspStructureError(7), scp03tSecurityError(8),bspSecurityError(8), installFailedDueToIccidAlreadyExistsOnEuicc(9), installFailedDueToInsufficientMemoryForProfile(10), installFailedDueToInterruption(11), installFailedDueToPEProcessingError (12), installFailedDueToDataMismatch(13), testProfileInstallFailedDueToInvalidNaaKey(14), pprNotAllowed(15), enterpriseProfilesNotSupported(17), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# enterpriseRulesNotAllowed(18), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# enterpriseProfileNotAllowed(19), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# enterpriseOidMismatch(20), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# enterpriseRulesError(21), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# enterpriseProfilesOnly(22), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# lprNotSupported(23), -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0# unknownTlvInMetadata(26), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# installFailedDueToUnknownError(127) } -- ASN1STOP NOTE: Error reason values added since v3.0.0 are aligned with the cancel session reason values in section 5.7.14.
2.5.6.1 Profile Installation Result errorsmodified
… data object depends on the function that generated an error during processing of the BoundProfilePackage. The following table details authorised combinations: … ES8+ function ErrorReason in ErrorResult ES8+ function Initialise Configure Store Replace Load Secure ISDP Metadata Session Profile Channel Keys Elements incorrectInputValues(1) invalidSignature(2) invalidTransactionId(3) unsupportedCrtValues(4) unsupportedRemoteOperationType(5) unsupportedProfileClass(6) bspStructureError(7) scp03tStructureError(7)bspSecurityError(8) installFailedDueToIccidAlreadyExistsOnEuicc(9) installFailedDueToInsufficientMemoryForProfile(10) scp03tSecurityError(8) installFailedDueToIccidAlreadyExistsO nEuicc(9) installFailedDueToInsufficientMemoryF orProfile(10) installFailedDueToInterruption(11) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) installFailedDueToDataMismatch(13) testProfileInstallFailedDueToInvalidNaaKey(14) pprNotAllowed(15) enterpriseProfilesNotSupported(17) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(1enterpriseRulesNotAllowed(18) enterpriseProfileNotAllowed(19) 2)enterpriseOidMismatch(20) installFailedDueToDataMismatch(13)enterpriseRulesError(21) enterpriseProfilesOnly(22) testProfileInstallFailedDueToInvalidNlprNotSupported(23) unknownTlvInMetadata(26) aaKey(14) pprNotAllowed(15) installFailedDueToUnknownError(127) Table 4a: Authorised combinations of ES8+ Errors If an error is generated during the processing of a ProfileElement of the eUICC Profile Package, ppiResponse SHALL be set as provided by the Profile Package Interpreter, and a corresponding ErrorReason SHALL be set in the Profile Installation Result according to the following table: ErroreUICC Profile Package error status in PEStatus ErrorReason in ErrorResult pe-not-supported(1) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) memory-failure(2) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError( … essingError(12) feature-not-supported(10) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) unsupported-profile-version(31) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) Other … eUICC Profile Package status codes except (0) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) Table 4b: ErroreUICC statusProfile Package error mapping to ErrorReason For the following ErrorReason values, which indicate that Profile installation failed due to a requirement in this specification, any statuseUICC codeProfile inPackage PEStatusstatus code MAY be set: installFailedDueToDataMismatch(13) testProfileInstallFailedDueToInvalidNaaKey(14) The following ErrorReason values MAYSHALL be treated by the SM-DP+ as temporary errors, where the SM-DP+ SHALL allow retries of the Profile download as long as the download retry limit is not exceeded:… …
2.6.1 Certification of the Entitiesmodified
AccordingFunctional tocompliance SGP.21and [4]:security certification Therequirements eUICC SHALL be certified according to theSGP.24 GSMA[64] eUICCSHALL Protectionapply Profile for Consumer Devices NOTE: This document does not exist at the timeeUICC, of writing, reference to it will be added once the document will be available. The EUM, the SM-DP+ and the SM-DS SHALL be GSMA SAS certifiedSM-DS. The Device and the LPA SHALL comply with the security features defined in this specification and SGP.21 [4].
2.6.2 Remote Secure Communicationmodified
The RSP ecosystem relies on remote secure communication to achieve function execution requests and data exchanges. Any of the remote secure communication defined for RSP and not listed in the exceptions at the end of this section SHALL follow the hereunderrules rules.below. Mutual authentication: The Server (the entity providing the function, e.g.e.g., SM-DP+) SHALL be authenticated first by the Client (the entity requesting the function). Authentication SHALL include the verification of a valid Server Certificate signedchain byending aat GSMAan CIeSIM CA RootCA Certificate (section 4.5.2). The Client SHALL be authenticated by the Server in a second step. In case the Client is the eUICC, authentication SHALL include the verification of a valid eUICC andCertificate EUMchain Certificateending signedat byan aeSIM GSMACA CIRootCA Certificate (section 4.5.2). Client authentication does not apply to the LPA. Data privacy: The eUICC, as a Client, SHALL notNOT reveal any private data to an unauthenticated Server. The eUICC, as a Client, SHALL notNOT generate any signed material before having authenticated the Server. Communication protection: Once authenticated, the remote entities SHALL negotiate a common cryptographic suite for further communication. The communication SHALL be origin authenticated, as well as integrity and confidentiality protected. Session keys SHALL be generated using Perfect Forward Secrecy. Authorisation: On the basis of authentication, the Server SHALL always check that the requesting Client is authorised before delivering the requested function execution. The following exception from these security rules exists: Other Notifications are origin authenticated, integrity and replay protected, in addition to the protection provided by TLS as defined in section 2.6.6. For the communication between the LPA and the HRI Server, only the protection by TLS as defined in section 2.6.6 SHALL be used.
2.6.3 Public Key Infrastructuremodified
General security of the RSP ecosystem is based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Any Certificate defined in this specification has a validation chain whoseending rootat isan aeSIM GSMACA CIRootCA Certificate (section 4.5.2).4.5.2), except TLS Certificates that MAY instead chain to a Public CA. Certificates MAY be revoked; Revocation status are managed and made available by GSMAtheir CIissuer (section(see 4.6).section 2.7). Certificates are used for authentication of thetheir belongingowners entity via signaturesignatures created with the associated private key. This signature SHALL follow ECDSA as defined in section 2.6.7.2.keys.
2.6.4 BPP Security Protocolmodified was Protocol for Profile Protection and eUICC Binding
The Profile is protected by security mechanisms which are based on SCP11a as specified by the GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment F [13]. This section describesdefines the differences between SCP11a and the Protocol for Profile Protection. The SM-DP+ plays the role of the Off Card Entity (OCE) specified in GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment F [13]. The mutual authentication defined for SCP11a is modified: Whereas in SCP11a authentication is achieved by a sharedsecurity secretprotocol calculated from static key pairs being fed into the generation of the session keys, in the Protocol for Profile Protection signaturesand basedeUICC onBinding, ECDSAnamed ofBPP eachSecurity sideProtocol are(BSP). used to authenticate to the other side. ECKA certificates are not used for mutual authentication. NOTE: UsingThe ECDSAprotocol signaturewas keysinitially forderived thefrom authenticationGlobalPlatform's duringSCP11a the key establishment allows the same keys also to be used to sign other content, e.g. notifications. Only one certificate per entity is required in this case. Ephemeral keys are renamed to one-time keys in this specification, as theyspecified MAYby live longer and are stored in non-volatile memory. With respect to Perfect Forward Secrecy, they serve the sameGlobalPlatform purpose. The ISD-R SHALL not persistently store any SM-DP+ public key (GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment F [13] sections 4.1 and 4.2). Establishment of the session keys SHALL use only the shared secret generated from the one-time key pairs. The first TLV(s) following the data for key establishment are protected with the session keys generated in the key agreement. MACing and encryption is done as specified for SCP03t in SGP.02 [2] (NOTE below). The data contains the ISD-P configuration data. When this is processed by the eUICC, the ISD-P is created. Optionally, the session keys can be replaced by the Profile Protection Keys. The Profile Protection Keys are themselves secured by the session keys, Subsequent data is exchanged as TLVs as specified for SCP03t in SGP.02 [2] (NOTE below), protected by the Profile Protection Keys. NOTE: This specification only reuses parts of SCP03t as specified in SGP.02 [2]. No INITIALIZE UPDATE or EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command TLVs are required. Instead, this specification introduces new functions for key agreement and ISD-P creation in tag '87' and uses the MACed and encrypted data TLVs (tag '86') from SGP.02 [2].[13].
2.6.4.1 Key agreementadded
An Elliptic Curve Key Agreement Algorithm (ECKA) is used for the establishment of a shared secret value. It shall follow the definition for the Anonymous Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement in BSI TR-03111 [41]. The algorithm is executed • by the SM-DP+ using otPK.EUICC.KA and otSK.DP.KA, and • by the eUICC using otPK.DP.KA and otSK.EUICC.KA to calculate the shared secret value. NOTE 1: Ephemeral keys are renamed to one-time keys in this specification, as they MAY live longer and are stored in non-volatile memory. With respect to Perfect Forward Secrecy, they serve the same purpose. NOTE 2: The BSP itself does not provide authentication. Authentication is provided by signatures outside of the BSP.
2.6.4.2 Key derivationadded
Session keys and an initial MAC chaining value are derived from the shared secret value as follows: • Concatenate the following values as SharedInfo as input for the Key Derivation process (this data is the one given as input data in the function "ES8+.InitialiseSecureChannel"): - Key type (1 byte) - Key length (1 byte) - HostID-LV and EID-LV. HostID-LV comprises the length and the value field of the HostID given in the input data; EID-LV comprises the length and value field of the EID. • Initial MAC Chaining value, S-ENC and S-MAC are taken from KeyData derived from the shared secret value and the SharedInfo as defined in BSI TR-03111 [41] for the "X9.63 Key Derivation Function". SHA-256 SHALL be used for the key derivation to calculate KeyData of sufficient length. Data is assigned as defined in the following table: ----------------------------------------------------------------------- KeyData Key ---------------------------- ------------------------------------------ 1 to L Initial MAC chaining value L+1 to 2L S-ENC 2L+1 to 3L S-MAC ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Table 4c: Key Data The initial MAC chaining value is used for the computation of the MAC of the first data block as defined below.
2.6.4.3 Command TLV Protection Overviewadded
The next two section describe how data is protected by the BSP. NOTE: An earlier version of the protocol, named SCP03t, was derived from GlobalPlatform's SCP03 [11] and can be found in SGP.02 [2]. As the protocol in this document was further modified and not much is left of SCP03, a new name is used. BSP defines two options for protecting Command TLVs: - MAC and encryption - MAC only Command TLVs do not create response TLVs.
2.6.4.4 Command TLV MACing and Encryptionadded
BSP C-MAC and C-ENCRYPTION are done as follows: [] Figure 4a: TLV Command Data Field Encryption and C-MAC computation Procedure: 1. The data field is padded according to the encryption algorithm and mode used, as defined in table 4c. If this algorithm is AES-CBC-128 or SM4-CBC, padding SHALL be done as follows: - Append a byte with value '80' to the right of the data block; - Append 0 to 15 bytes with value '00' so that the length of the padded data block is a multiple of 16 bytes. 2. The result of step 1 is encrypted according to the encryption algorithm and mode used, as defined in table 4c. If this algorithm is AES-CBC-128 or SM4-CBC, the following applies: - The data blocks SHALL be numbered starting from 1 - The binary value of this number SHALL be left padded with zeroes to form a full block. - This block SHALL be encrypted with S-ENC to produce the ICV for command encryption. 3. The input data used for C-MAC computation comprises the MAC Chaining value, the tag, the final length and the result of step 2. - The initial MAC Chaining value is set as defined in 2.6.4.2 or 2.6.4.6. - Subsequent MAC chaining values are the full result of step 4 of the previous data block (which may also be a data block with C-MAC only). 4. The full MAC value is computed using the MACing algorithm as defined in table 4c. 5. The output data is computed by concatenating the following data: the tag, the final length, the result of step 2 and the C-MAC value. If the algorithm is AES-CBC-128 or SM4-CBC, the C-MAC value is the 8 most significant bytes of the result of step 4.
2.6.4.5 Command TLV MACingadded
BSP C-MAC only is done as follows: [] Figure 4b: TLV Command C-MAC computation Procedure: 1. Data used for C-MAC computation comprised MAC Chaining value, applicable tag (e.g., tag ‘88’ for Metadata data segment), length and data. In case algorithm is AES-CMAC-128 or SM4-CBC, the following applies: - MAC chaining values are the full result of the previous data block (which may also be a data block with C-ENCRYPTION and C-MAC). 2. C-MAC is computed according to symmetric algorithm used, as defined in table 4c. 3. The output data is computed by concatenating the following data: the tag, the final length, the data and the C-MAC value. If the algorithm is AES-CBC-128 or SM4-CBC, the C-MAC value is the 8 most significant bytes of the result of step 2. The data block counter for ICV calculation is incremented also for each segment with C-MAC only.
2.6.4.6 Key replacementadded
The session keys can be replaced by providing new keys and a new initial MAC chaining value within a protected Command TLV, see section 5.5.4. The data block counter used to calculate the ICV for encryption SHALL also be reset to its initial value after a key replacement.
2.6.5 Cryptographic Negotiation, Algorithms and Key Lengthmodified was Key Length and Hashing Functions
ExceptThis ifsection stateddescribes otherwise,the thismechanism specificationfor followscryptographic negotiation at application layer between the recommendationseUICC and the RSP Server used on top of TLS. TLS provides its own cryptographic negotiation (see section 2.6.6.1). The cryptographic negotiation at the application layer is independent of TLS. The application layer cryptographic negotiation proceeds between the eUICC and the RSP Server at the beginning of each RSP Session. All the cryptography is determined based on the RSP Server Certificate selected for the Common Mutual Authentication procedure. See section 3.0.1 for the detailed description of the procedure. Application layer cryptography is constrained to a limited number of algorithm sets listed in Tables 4c and 4d. Additional algorithm sets may be defined in SGP.02the [2]future. regardingThe keycryptographic length.negotiation Algorithmstarts Minimumwith the eUICC providing the list of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key LengthIdentifiers Symmetricthat (AES)it 128supports bits,for blocksignature sizeverification and signature generation within the ES9+.InitiateAuthentication function (see section 5.6.1). Then the SM-DP+ selects a Certificate (CERT.XXauth.SIG) whose chain ends at one of 128the bitseSIM EllipticCA curveRootCA 256Certificate(s) bitsthat the eUICC supports for signature verification (the selection process is further detailed in section 5.6.1). Each Public Key Identifier refers to an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate, which implicitly defines other cryptographic algorithms that the RSP Server and the eUICC SHALL use during the RSP session. This specification also mandates a simplification that all the Certificates in a chain SHALL have the same signature algorithm (i.e., 'AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm' and 'AlgorithmIdentifier.parameters' fields in the 'subjectPublicKeyInfo' have the same values in all Certificates of the chain). This simplification ensures that a receiving party is able to verify both the selected Certificate chain and the signature. Based on the signature algorithm mentioned in the CERT.XXauth.SIG, cryptographic algorithms to be used during the RSP Session SHALL be determined according to the table below: | Signature algorithm and parameters from CERT.XXauth.SIG | Key agreement algorithm and parameters | Symmetric algorithms for PPP | Hashing for DigitalSM-XX digital signatures and| hash-onlyECDSA⁽¹⁾, NIST P-256 | ECKA⁽²⁾, NIST P-256, SHA-256 applications| HashingAES-CBC-128 | As indicated in the CERT.XXauth.SIG⁽³⁾ | AES-CMAC-128 | ECDSA⁽¹⁾, BrainpoolP256r1 | ECKA⁽²⁾, BrainpoolP256r1, SHA-256 | AES-CBC-128 | As indicated in the CERT.XXauth.SIG⁽³⁾ | AES-CMAC-128 | ECDSA⁽¹⁾, FRP256V1 | ECKA⁽²⁾, FRP256V1, SHA-256 | AES-CBC-128 | As indicated in the CERT.XXauth.SIG⁽³⁾ | AES-CMAC-128 | SM2 Signature | ECKA⁽²⁾, SM2 Curve, SM3 | SM4-CBC | SM3 | SM4-CMAC | Note 1: ECDSA SHALL follow GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment E [12]. | Note 2: The ECKA algorithm is defined in section 2.6.4. | Note 3: Currently restricted to SHA-256. | Table 4c: Cryptographic algorithm sets based on CERT.XXauth.SIG NOTE: As per NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 [86], ECC256 (128-bit security strength) is sufficient for HMAC,implementations beyond year 2031. Algorithm references: - NIST P-256 is defined in Digital Signature Standard [29] (recommended by NIST). - BrainpoolP256r1 is defined in RFC 5639 [18] (recommended by BSI). - FRP256V1 is defined in ANSSI ECC [20] (recommended by ANSSI). - AES-CBC-128, AES in CBC mode with key length of 128 bits, is defined in NIST SP 800-38A [83]. - AES-CMAC-128, CMAC with AES in CBC mode with key length of 128 bits, is defined in NIST SP 800-38B [84]. - SM2 Curve is defined in RFC8998 [96] - SM2 is defined in SM2 algorithm [93] - SM3 is defined in SM3 algorithm [94] - SM4 is defined in SM4 algorithm [95] - SM4-CBC, SM4 in CBC mode, with CBC mode as defined in NIST SP 800-38A [83]. - SM4-CMAC, SM4 in CMAC mode, with CMAC mode as defined in NIST SP 800-38B [84]. An eUICC SHALL have at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters preloaded by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing, subject to support by the corresponding eSIM CA. For each eSIM CA trust chain to which it belongs, an RSP Server SHALL support all sets of elliptic curve parameters that the corresponding eSIM CA supports. The Key DerivationAgreement Functionsalgorithm is used in RSP for the establishment of the session keys between the eUICC and SHA-256the RandomSM-DP+. NumberThe Generationsymmetric TLSalgorithms isare used in RSP for the protection of the Profile Package (Protected Profile Package), see section 2.5. This specification allows the eUICC to provideuse different signature algorithms than the RSP server to generate its signatures, subject to their support by both parties. This is selected by the RSP Server and indicated in ES9+.InitiateAuthentication response (field euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed, see section 5.6.1). The eUICC SHALL use the signature algorithm selected by the RSP Server for all signatures generated by the eUICC during the RSP Session, including for the Profile Installation Result and the Load RPM Package Result. For all other signed Notifications related to a firstProfile, levelthe transporteUICC layer.SHALL use the digital signature algorithm selected during the Profile Download and Installation procedure. The selection SHALL be done according to the table below: | Digital signature algorithm and parameters from CERT.EUICC.SIG | Hashing for eUICC digital signatures | ECDSA⁽¹⁾, NIST P-256⁽²⁾ | As indicated in the CERT.EUICC.SIG⁽³⁾ | ECDSA⁽¹⁾, BrainpoolP256r1⁽²⁾ | As indicated in the CERT.EUICC.SIG⁽³⁾ | ECDSA⁽¹⁾, FRP256V1⁽²⁾ | As indicated in the CERT.EUICC.SIG⁽³⁾ | SM2 Signature | SM3 | Note 1: ECDSA SHALL follow GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment E [12]. | Note 2: The ECC domain parameters are defined above. | Note 3: Currently restricted to SHA-256 | Table 4d: Cryptographic algorithm sets for the eUICC Signature
2.6.6 TLS Requirementsmodified
RSP mandates use of TLS v1.2 as defined in RFC 5246 [16] as the minimal version for TLS connection. ToTLS fulfilwith themutual securityauthentication requirements of the previous section, the client SHALL offerbe sha256/ecdsaused inover theES12 "supported_signature_algorithms"and ofES15. TLS 1.2with [16] and the server authentication SHALL selectbe thisused hash/signatureover pair.ES9+, RSPES11, requiresES20 thatand RSPEShri. ServersTLS (e.g.with SM-DP+)mutual SHALLauthentication supportMAY atbe leastused theseover cipherES2+. suites:If (1)TLS TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256with (2)mutual TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256authentication Cipheris suitesnot (1)used andover (2)ES2+, areES2+ defined in RFC 5289 [46]. Clients SHALL supportbe atprotected leastwith onelevel of thesecurity cipherequivalent suitesto definedTLS. above.On ForES12 theand purposeES15, ofthe RSP,Root oneCertificate of thesea ciphercertificate suiteschain SHALLused befor used.mutual Clientsauthentication SHALL supportbe atan leasteSIM oneCA setor ofany ellipticCA curvethat parametersboth definedparties intrust. 2.6.7.1.On ForES9+, eachES11 GSMAand CIEShri, trustthe chainRoot toCertificate whichof ita belongs,certificate anchain RSPused Serverfor SHALLserver supportauthentication allSHALL setsbe ofan ellipticeSIM curveCA parametersor defineda inPublic 2.6.7.1CA. thatOn ES20, the correspondingRoot GSMACertificate CIof supports.a Thecertificate Clientchain andused thefor RSPserver Serverauthentication SHALL supportbe thea followingPublic NamedCurveCA. valuesOn duringES2+, theif TLS handshakeis toused, identify the ellipticRoot curvesCertificate definedof ina thiscertificate document:chain used secp256r1for (23)mutual forauthentication NISTcan P-256be asany definedCA inthat RFCboth 4492parties [65]trust. The Clientcertificates andused thefor RSP Server MAY support the following NamedCurve values during the TLS handshakeSHALL tofulfil identify the ellipticrequirements curvesdescribed defined in this document: brainpoolP256r1(26) as defined in RFC 7027 [66] value (0xFE00) for FRP256V1, from the rangenext for private use as defined in RFC 4492 [65].section.
2.6.6.1 Cipher suites and algorithmsadded
In this specification, a number of cryptographic algorithms and security properties applicable to TLS are specified to ensure a minimum security level and also to facilitate interoperability. NOTE: for TLS certificates, RSP Servers are allowed to use Public CAs in addition to eSIM CAs.
2.6.6.1.1 Elliptic curvesadded
For each eSIM CA that it supports, an RSP Server SHALL support the following elliptic curve(s) for signing and key-agreement: - NIST P-256 with the namedCurve secp256r1 (23) as defined in RFC 8422 [65]. In addition, for each eSIM CA that is supports, an RSP Server implementing TLS 1.3 [42] MAY support one or more additional elliptic curves for signing and key-agreement, including but not limited to: - brainpoolP256r1(26) as defined in RFC 7027 [66], - NIST P-384 with the namedCurve secp384r1 (24) as defined in RFC 8422 [65], - Ed25519 as defined in RFC 8410 [90], and x25519 with the namedCurve x25519 (29) as defined in RFC 8422 [65] For each eSIM CA that it supports, an RSP Client SHALL support the following elliptic curve(s) for signing and key-agreement: - NIST P-256 with the namedCurve secp256r1 (23) as defined in RFC 8422 [65]. In addition, for each eSIM CA that it supports, an RSP Client MAY support one or more additional elliptic curves for signing and key-agreement, including but not limited to: - brainpoolP256r1(26) as defined in RFC 7027 [66], - NIST P-384 with the namedCurve secp384r1 (24) as defined in RFC 8422 [65], - Ed25519 as defined in RFC 8410 [90], and x25519 with the namedCurve x25519 (29) as defined in RFC 8422 [65].
2.6.6.1.2 Digital signature algorithm for signingadded
The eSIM CA SHALL use the following digital signature algorithm for signing RSP Server TLS certificates: - ECDSA with NIST P-256 with SHA-256 NOTE: other digital signature algorithm for signing RSP Server TLS certificates might be used.
2.6.6.1.3 Cipher suitesadded
To fulfil the security requirements of the previous section, the client SHALL offer sha256/ecdsa in the "supported_signature_algorithms" of TLS 1.2 [16] and the server SHALL select this hash/signature pair. RSP Servers implementing TLS 1.2 [16] (e.g., SM-DP+) SHALL support at least the following cipher suites which provide(s) perfect forward secrecy: - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 [46] - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 [46] RSP Servers implementing TLS 1.3 [42] SHALL support at least the following cipher suite(s) which provide(s) perfect forward secrecy: - TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in TLS 1.3 [42] - TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in TLS 1.3 [42] RSP Servers implementing TLS 1.2 [16] MAY support one or more additional cipher suites which SHALL provide perfect forward secrecy, including but not limited to: - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 as defined in RFC 7905 [91] - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 [46] - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 [46] RSP Servers that need to support RSP V2 Clients as defined in SGP.22 V2 SHOULD support TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 [46]. However, the use of this cipher suite SHALL be limited to the case when it is the only cipher suite commonly supported by the RSP Server and the RSP V2 Client. RSP Servers implementing TLS 1.3 [42] MAY support one or more additional cipher suites which SHALL provide perfect forward secrecy, including but not limited to: - TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 as defined in TLS 1.3 [42] Clients implementing TLS 1.2 [16] SHALL support at least the following cipher suite(s) which provide(s) perfect forward secrecy: - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 [46] Clients implementing TLS 1.2 [16] SHALL NOT support the following cipher suite(s). - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 [46] NOTE: CBC encryption in MAC-then-Encrypt mode has repeatedly shown weaknesses in the past, for which only imperfect fixes exist. For this reason, such cipher suites should no longer be used. Clients implementing TLS 1.3 [42] SHALL support at least the following cipher suite(s) which provide(s) perfect forward secrecy: - TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in TLS 1.3 [42] Clients implementing TLS 1.2 [16] MAY support one or more additional cipher suites that provide perfect forward secrecy, including but not limited to: - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 as defined in RFC 7905 [91] - TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 [46] - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 [46] Clients implementing TLS 1.3 [142] MAY support one or more additional cipher suites that provide perfect forward secrecy, including but not limited to: - TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 as defined in TLS 1.3 [42] - TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in TLS 1.3 [42]
2.6.6.2 Use of Server Name indication extension for ES9+ and ES11added
Starting from version 3.0, the specification allows an RSP Server to use, over ES9+ and ES11, a TLS certificate which chains to a Public CA, whereas versions 2.x required it to chain to an eSIM CA. This flexibility, even if desirable, adds an additional burden on the RSP Server to select a TLS certificate chain that the LPA is able to verify. This section provides to the LPA and the RSP Server a mechanism to guide the RSP Server selection of an appropriate TLS certificate chain. The RSP Server and the LPA SHOULD support this mechanism. The Root SM-DS SHALL support this mechanism. An RSP Server and an LPA that support this mechanism SHALL comply with this section. General principle: In addition to its "base" FQDN, the RSP Server SHALL support a specific FQDN for v3 Devices. The v3-specific FQDN SHALL be the concatenation of the string "rsp3-" and the "base" UTF-8 encoded FQDN. Therefore the RSP Server SHALL take care that neither the resulting label nor the domain name in their final encoding violate the length limits of domain names. A v3 Device SHALL include the "server_name" extension defined in RFC 6066 [60] in the ClientHello with the v3-specific FQDN computed from the "base" FQDN known from the RSP Server. NOTE: This mechanism increases the probability that the LPA supports the TLS certificate chain selected by the RSP Server, but there is still a risk that it is not the case and the TLS handshake may fail. In that case the LPA MAY retry and the RSP Server MAY select a different certificate chain. LPA/Device side: The LPA SHALL compute the v3-specific FQDN computed from the "base" FQDN known from the RSP Server (e.g., an address retrieved from the eUICC, an address read from an Activation code). The LPA SHALL perform a DNS resolution using the v3-specific FQDN. In case of DNS lookup failure (e.g., this may happen if the RSP Server is a v2 server), the LPA SHALL revert to the "base" FQDN and proceed with the TLS handshake, which SHOULD include sending the "server_name" extension. If the DNS resolution using the v3-specific FQDN succeeds, the LPA SHALL include the "server_name" extension in the ClientHello message and containing the v3-specific FQDN. If the RSP Server replies with a fatal-level alert, the LPA SHALL retry the TLS handshake without sending the Server Name indication extension. RSP Server side: The RSP Server SHALL support the "server_name" extension to determine the TLS certificate to use. - If the received ClientHello message contains the "server_name" extension with the v3-specific FQDN, the RSP Server SHOULD use a TLS certificate that chains to a Public CA. - If the received ClientHello message contains the "server_name" extension with an unrecognized FQDN, the RSP Server SHALL take one of two actions: either abort the handshake by sending a fatal-level unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake with a TLS certificate that chains to a Public CA. - If the received ClientHello message doesn't contain the "server_name" extension, the RSP Server SHOULD use a TLS certificate that chains to an eSIM CA. NOTE: An RSP Server cannot rely upon receiving a "server_name" extension for "base" FQDNs (i.e., those without an "rsp3-" prefix). If the server can be reached through multiple "base" FQDNs that resolve to the same IP address, then it may be unable to select a TLS certificate containing the FQDN expected by the LPA.
2.6.7 Voidmodified was Elliptic Curves Algorithms
2.6.8 Random Number Generationadded
To protect against attacks, a high quality random number generator is required. Recommendations for appropriate random number generators are given by BSI [78] and NIST [79].
2.6.9 Digital Signature Computationadded
When applied to an ASN.1 data object, the digital signature (using the algorithm determined as described in section 2.6.5) SHALL be computed for the data object after encoding (i.e., in its DER representation).
2.7 Certificate Revocationmodified
See also section 4.5.2 that describes certificates’ chains of trust. The following Certificatescertificates MAY be revoked at any time: eSIM GSMACA CIRootCA Certificate (CERT.CI.ECDSA)(CERT.CI.SIG) eSIM CA SubCA Certificate (CERT.CISubCA.SIG) EUM Certificate (CERT.EUM.ECDSA)(CERT.EUM.SIG) and EUM SubCA Certificate (CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG) SM-DP+ CertificatesSubCA (CERT.DPauth.ECDSA,Certificate CERT.DPpb.ECDSA)(CERT.DPSubCA.SIG) SM-DP+ Certificates (CERT.DPauth.SIG, CERT.DPpb.SIG) SM-DP+ TLS Certificate (CERT.DP.TLS) SM-DS SubCA Certificate (CERT.DSauth.ECDSA)(CERT.DSSubCA.SIG) SM-DS Certificate (CERT.DSauth.SIG) SM-DS TLS Certificate (CERT.DS.TLS) The means by which an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate revocation status is made available is out of scope of this specification. However, as soon as such revocation status is known by an RSP entity, it SHALL no longer accept or perform any RSP operation using a certificate chain certified by this eSIM CA RootCA Certificate. Section 2.4.2 describes a means by which the eUICC can be updated to reflect that an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate has been revoked. Because of their potential number, EUICCeUICC Certificates (CERT.EUICC.ECDSA)(CERT.EUICC.SIG) are not revoked individually. Also, it is unlikely that an individual EUICCeUICC would be compromised. It is instead more probable that an eUICC model or an entire eUICC production batch would be declared as compromised. This approach is reflected by revoking the EUM Certificate or the EUM SubCA Certificate, if used by the EUM, attached to the production of the particular eUICC model or batch. As a consequence, it is up to the EUM to consider using distinct Certificatescertificates (CERT.EUM.SIG or CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG) for distinct eUICC models or production batches. This is out of the scope of this specification. EachThe GSMAfollowing CIRSP entities SHALL manage the revocation status forof the Certificates itthey hasissue: issued.- AAn revokedeSIM CertificateCA. SHALL- notAn beEUM, automaticallyfor renewed.CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG, Renewalwhen SHALLthe beadditional uponEUM theSubCA GSMAis Certificationused. authority- agreement.An RevocationSM-DP+ statusthat isuses madean availableadditional bySM-DP+ eachSubCA, GSMAfor CICERT.DPauth.SIG, byCERT.DPpb.SIG, theand meanCERT.DP.TLS, ofwhen these Certificates do not have a Certificateshort Revocationvalidity Listperiod. (CRL)- An SM-DS that SHALLuses bean madeadditional availableSM-DS toSubCA, anyfor RSPCERT.DSauth.SIG, entityand (sectionCERT.DS.TLS, 4.6).when GSMAthese CICertificates MAYdo providenot additionalhave meansa toshort makevalidity availableperiod. CertificateNOTE: revocationThe statusnotion (e.g.of OCSPthe asshort validity period is further defined in RFCSGP.14 6960[45]. [44]).A Therevoked Certificatecertificate revocationSHALL managementNOT isbe optionalautomatically forrenewed. theRenewal eUICC.SHALL Ifbe upon the capabilityeSIM isCertification notAuthority supportedagreement in(see theSGP.14 eUICC,[45] thesection LPA5.6). SHALLRSP notentities passthat themanage certificate revocation (further called a CRL toIssuer) SHALL publish the eUICC.revocation status by means of a CRL. An RSP Server SHALL support revocation status verification only by means of CRLs.
2.8 Voidmodified was ASN.1
The descriptioncontent of some data objects in this specificationsection ishas basedbeen onmoved ASN.1 specified in ITU-T X.680 [49] and encoded in TLV structures using DER (Distinguished Encoding Rule) encoding as specified in ITU-T X.690 [50]. This provides a flexible description of those data objects. The Remote SIM Provisioning format is defined in a single, self-contained, ASN.1 definition module called RSPDefinitions, with an ISO Object Identifier in the GSMA namespace. RSPDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) gsma(146) rsp(1) spec-version(1) version-two(2)} DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS EXTENSIBILITY IMPLIED ::= BEGIN Two encoding/decoding attributes are defined: AUTOMATIC TAGS means that the tags are defined automatically using the encoding rules unless a tag notation is present in a data object format definition. EXTENSIBILITY IMPLIED means that types MAY have elements that are not defined in this specification. This means that decoders SHALL be able to handlesection values with unspecified tags, either by processing them if they know their value content, or ignoring them silently (without reporting an error) if they do not know them. This is useful when processing data definitions from a newer specification and to handle proprietary tag values. As the eUICC cannot implement an off-the-shelf standard decoder, the requirement on extensibility SHALL not apply to the eUICC. In some cases the eUICC is even mandated to report undefined tags, see e.g. sections 3.1.5 and 5.7.6.2.4a.
2.8.2 ASN.1 data type UTF8Stringremoved
The size limits for UTF-8 strings apply to the number of UTF-8 characters, each coded on 1 to 4 bytes, see ISO/IEC 10646 [59]. Thus the length of the TLV object counted in bytes can be up to 4 times the number of characters.
The eUICC is not mandated to analyse the character structure of UTF-8 strings provided in a command. The LPA SHOULD take care that the eUICC may provide a string with a number of characters exceeding the ASN.1 size limit if such a string was previously stored.
2.9 Profile Policy Managementmodified
Profile Policy Management provides mechanisms by which Profile Owners can enforce the conditions of use under which services are provided. Profile Policy Management comprises three main elements: Profile Policy Rules (PPR) Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) Profile Policy Enabler (PPE) More details are provided in the next sub sections.
2.9.1 Profile Policy Rulesmodified
… eUICC, Profile Policy Rules SHALL be contained in the associated Profile. The following Profile Policy Rules are defined in this version of the specification: … (PPR1) 'Disabling of this Profile is not allowed' (PPR2) 'Deletion of this Profile is not allowed' The coding of PPRs is given in section 2.8.1.1.2.4a.1.1.
2.9.2 Rules Authorisation Table (RAT)modified
…n the eUICC. The RAT is initialised at eUICC manufacturing time or during the initial Device setup provided that there is no installed Operational Profile. The … OEMDevice manufacturer or EUM is responsible for setting the content of the RAT. The RAT SHALL notNOT be affected by the ES10b.eUICCMemoryResetES10c.eUICCMemoryReset function (section 5.7.19).
2.9.2.1 Profile Policy Authorisation Rules (PPAR)modified
The RAT contains a list of Profile Policy Authorisation Rules (PPAR). A PPAR is composed of the following information: | Data | Description | Profile Policy Rule Identifier | Identifies the Profile Policy Rules to which this PPAR applies. This Profile Policy Rule field SHALL contain one or several PPR(s) being set as defined in Identifier2.4a.1.1. 2.8.1.1.| Allowed Operators | List of Profile Owners, as defined in section 2.8.1.2,2.4a.1.2, allowed to use this PPR. Allowed| Operators Wildcards can be used to indicate that all, or a set of, Profile Owners are allowed. See below. | End User Consent Required | Indicates if the related PPR needs the End User Consent for the Required Profile to be installed (true/false). | Table 5: PPAR description The RAT MAY contain zero or more PPAR(s) related to a particular PPR. The order of the PPARs in the RAT is significant (see below). The RAT of an eUICC supporting MEP SHALL NOT contain any PPAR for PPR1. 'Allowed Operators' field The 'Allowed Operators' field contains the identifier(s) of the Profile Owner(s) (explicitly listed or matching a wild card) allowed t … alue (length zero). An omitted gid1 or gid2 value in the PPAR SHALL only match a profileOwner field where the corresponding gid1 or gid2 value is absent. NOTE: … aA PPR MAY be allowed for all Profile Owners by setting the 'Allowed Operators' field with a unique OperatorId having the mccMnc field value set to 'EEEEEE' and g … a PPR that is allowed for any Profile Owner; and if there is no PPAR for a particular PPR, then that PPR is forbidden. With this configuration, Operator OP-A: … can use PPR1 without the End User consent can use PPR2 with the End User consent With this configuration, Operator OP-B: can use PPR1 with the End User consent can use PPR2 without the End User consent With this configuration, any other Profile Owner: can use PPR1 and PPR2 with the End User consent
2.9.2.4 LPA verificationmodified
…ibes the process to determine if all PPRs of a Profile can be set by the Profile Owner, and if an End User consent is required, according to RAT configuration. … For[] each PPR in the Profile Does Profile yes Select next Is PPR no contains PPR in Profile known? PPRs? no yes Evaluate PPR PPR no authorisation (see next figure) allowed? yes End User no consent required? yes yes Other Note that End User PPR to consent is required evaluate? no PPR1 set End User no AND Other yes no consent Operational required? Profile already installed? yes Profile allowed Profile allowed Profile not allowed with End User consent Figure 5: Profile's PPRs verification by LPA The figure below describes the process to determine if a particular PPR can be set by the Profile Owner, and if an End User consent is required, according to its related PPAR(s) configuration. Look for PPAR(s) PPAR(s) no matching the PPR defined? yes Evaluate PPAR yes Operator allowed? no End User Other no yes consent PPAR To required? evaluate? yes no PPR PPR allowed with PPR NOT allowed End User consent allowed[] Figure 6: Particular PPR verification by the LPA
2.9.3 Profile Policy Enablermodified
The Profile Policy Enabler on the eUICC has two functions: Verification that a Profile containing PPRs is authorised by the RAT. Enforcement of the PPRs of a Profile.
2.9.3.1 PPRs Verification: Profile installation timemodified
…LPA. The PPE cannot enforce that the End User consent, if any is required, is captured by the LPA. As a consequence the 'End User Consent required' field SHALL … notNOT be considered during the PPRs verification by the PPE. The figure below describes the process that the PPE SHALL run to determine if a Profile containing PPRs can be installed on the eUICC, according to the RAT configuration. For[] each PPR in the Profile Does Profile yes Select next Is PPR no contains PPR in Profile known? PPRs? no yes Evaluate PPR PPR no authorisation (see next figure) allowed? yes Other yes PPR to evaluate? no PPR1 set no AND other yes Operational Profile already installed? Profile allowed Profile not allowed Figure 7: Profile's PPRs verification by PPE The figure below describes the process to determine if a PPR is allowed according to its related PPAR(s) configuration. Look for PPAR(s) PPAR(s) no matching the PPR defined? yes Evaluate PPAR yes Operator allowed? no Other yes PPAR To evaluate? no PPR PPR NOT allowed allowed[] Figure 8: Particular PPR verification by the PPE
2.9.3.2 PPR Verification: PPR update after Profile is installedmodified
A PPR in a Profile installed in the eUICC can be unset (using the "ES6.UpdateMetadata" Function by the Profile Owner).Owner or the RPM Command 'Update Metadata'). The setting of a PPR in the eUICC is for further study.
2.9.3.3 PPR Enforcementmodified
… Management Operation is requested upon this Profile. Each of the defined enforcement cases are described in the concerned procedures (see section 3.2 and 3.3). … Void Table 6: Void Enforcement involving Test Profile When a Test Profile is requested to be enabled whereas the currently Enabled Profile has a PPR1 set, PPE SHALL not enforce this PPR1 to allow the Test Profile to be enabled. Void
2.9.3.3.1 Voidadded
Table 6: Void
2.9.3.3.2 Enforcement involving Test Profileadded
When a Test Profile is requested to be enabled whereas the currently Enabled Profile has a PPR1 set, PPE SHALL NOT enforce this PPR1 to allow the Test Profile to be enabled.
2.9.3.3.3 Voidadded
2.10 Remote Profile Managementadded
This section describes the structure of RPM Package composed of one or more RPM Commands. This section also describes how an eUICC generates the execution result of an RPM Package.
2.10.1 RPM Packageadded
The SM-DP+ SHALL generate an RPM Package upon the request of Operator. The RPM Package SHALL be encoded in the ASN.1 data object as shown below. -- ASN1START RpmPackage ::= SEQUENCE OF RpmCommand -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# RpmCommand ::= SEQUENCE { continueOnFailure [0] NULL OPTIONAL, rpmCommandDetails CHOICE { enable [1] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid}, disable [2] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid}, delete [3] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid}, listProfileInfo [4] ListProfileInfo, updateMetadata [5] SEQUENCE { iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid, updateMetadataRequest UpdateMetadataRequest }, contactPcmp [6] SEQUENCE { iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid, dpiRpm UTF8String OPTIONAL } } } -- ASN1STOP The SM-DP+ SHALL limit the size of the value part of one RpmPackage to a maximum of 1057 bytes. The eUICC SHALL be able to handle at least this size. If the eUICC receives an RpmPackage too large to handle, it SHALL reject it with error code commandPackageTooLarge. NOTE 1: This allows transporting of one icon with maximum size (1024 bytes), together with the icon type and continueOnFailure being set. NOTE 2: If more RPM Commands need to be sent, an SM-DP+ MAY use rpmPending to chain multiple RSP sessions as defined in section 5.6.3. The rpmCommandDetails identifies the type of an RPM Command. The following limitations exist: In order to simplify handling of the REFRESH proactive command after processing of the RPM Package, the SM-DP+ SHALL restrict Enable and Disable commands in one RPM Package as follows: only one Enable command, or only one Disable command, or only one Disable command followed by only one Enable command. The eUICC MAY terminate processing of a subsequent Enable or Disable command in the RPM Package with error commandsWithRefreshExceeded. RPM Command 'Contact PCMP' SHALL NOT be followed by any other RPM Command in the same RPM Package. Any subsequent command SHALL be rejected with error commandAfterContactPcmp. An RPM Command requesting the enabling or disabling of a Test Profile via RPM SHALL be rejected by the eUICC. On the execution failure of an RPM Command: if continueOnFailure is present, then the eUICC SHALL continue to execute the next RPM Command in the RPM Package. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL stop processing the RPM. The iccid indicates the Target Profile. RPM Command 'List Profile Info' listProfileInfo SHALL be coded and processed as defined in section 5.7.15. RPM Command 'Update Metadata' updateMetadataRequest indicates the Profile Metadata to be updated. It SHALL be coded and processed as defined in section 5.4.1.
2.10.2 Load RPM Package Resultadded
The RPM Commands in the RPM Package are executed sequentially until the end is reached or an error is encountered for a command where continueOnFailure is not present. Each executed command produces an RPM Command Result. Atomic processing by the eUICC is required only for each RPM Command. In case of external interruptions (e.g., power loss), the eUICC MAY be unable to process remaining commands. This SHALL be indicated by placing interruption into the RPM Command Result. If an RPM Command in the sequence is unknown or unsupported, or the command data cannot be interpreted, the eUICC SHALL terminate processing of the command sequence and return unknownOrDamagedCommand as RPM Command Result. The eUICC SHALL be able to create a finalResult with a value size of at least 1072 Bytes. NOTE: This allows for the response to include one icon with maximum size (1024 bytes), together with the icon type and the ICCID. If the processing of an RPM command would result in exceeding the maximum size the eUICC can handle, independent of the presence of continueOnFailure, the eUICC SHALL NOT process this and all subsequent commands and place resultSizeOverflow into the RPM Command Result. The Load RPM Package Result SHALL be returned at the end of executing an RPM Package. A signed Load RPM Package Result SHALL be kept by the eUICC (which can hold one or several signed Load RPM Package Results) until explicitly deleted by the LPA, after successfully delivered to the SM-DP+. Before being deleted the signed Load RPM Package Result(s) MAY be retrieved at any time by the LPA. When the eUICC needs to store a new signed Load RPM Package Result and/or Profile Installation Result, if there is not enough room the eUICC SHALL delete one or more of the previously stored signed Load RPM Package Results or Profile Installation Results in order of their Sequence Number, beginning with the lowest. The Load RPM Package Result SHALL be encoded in the ASN.1 data object as shown below. -- ASN1START LoadRpmPackageResult ::= [68] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF44' #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# loadRpmPackageResultSigned LoadRpmPackageResultSigned, loadRpmPackageResultNotSigned LoadRpmPackageResultNotSigned } LoadRpmPackageResultSigned ::= SEQUENCE { loadRpmPackageResultDataSigned LoadRpmPackageResultDataSigned, euiccSignRPR EuiccSign } LoadRpmPackageResultDataSigned ::= SEQUENCE { transactionId [0] TransactionId, notificationMetadata[47] NotificationMetadata, smdpOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- SM-DP+ OID (value from CERT.DPauth.SIG) finalResult [2] CHOICE { rpmPackageExecutionResult SEQUENCE OF RpmCommandResult, loadRpmPackageErrorCodeSigned LoadRpmPackageErrorCodeSigned } } RpmCommandResult ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid OPTIONAL, -- SHALL be present, except for listProfileInfoResult and rpmProcessingTerminated rpmCommandResultData CHOICE { enableResult [49] EnableProfileResponse, -- ES10c.EnableProfile disableResult [50] DisableProfileResponse, -- ES10c.DisableProfile deleteResult [51] DeleteProfileResponse, -- ES10c.DeleteProfile listProfileInfoResult [45] ProfileInfoListResponse, -- ES10c.GetProfilesInfo updateMetadataResult [42] UpdateMetadataResponse, -- ES6.UpdateMetadata contactPcmpResult [0] ContactPcmpResponse, rpmProcessingTerminated INTEGER { resultSizeOverflow (1), unknownOrDamagedCommand (2), interruption (3), commandsWithRefreshExceeded (4), commandAfterContactPcmp (5), commandPackageTooLarge (6) } } } ContactPcmpResponse ::= CHOICE { contactPcmpResponseOk SEQUENCE { pcmpAddress UTF8String }, contactPcmpResponseError INTEGER { profileNotEnabled(2), commandError(7), noLprConfiguration(13), undefinedError(127)} } LoadRpmPackageResultNotSigned ::= SEQUENCE { transactionId [0] TransactionId, loadRpmPackageErrorCodeNotSigned LoadRpmPackageErrorCodeNotSigned } LoadRpmPackageErrorCodeSigned ::= INTEGER { invalidSignature(2), invalidTransactionId(5), undefinedError(127)} LoadRpmPackageErrorCodeNotSigned ::= INTEGER { noSession(4), undefinedError(127)} -- ASN1STOP euiccSignRPR SHALL be created using the SK.EUICC.SIG selected during the RPM Download procedure, and verified using the related PK.EUICC.SIG as described in section 2.6.9. euiccSignRPR SHALL apply on the concatenated data objects loadRpmPackageResultDataSigned and smdpSignature3. In case of the error invalidTransactionId, the transactionId in the LoadRpmPackageResultDataSigned SHALL be set to the value from the AuthenticateServerRequest. dpiRpm contains the DPI which if present in the command data is appended by the LPA to the pcmpAddress received in the response in order to trigger the LPR. NOTE: Error codes to RPM commands do not disclose any information about the existence of a Profile unless the SM-DP+ is authenticated and authorised.
2.11 Overview of version interoperabilityadded
Depending on the interfaces, interoperability between parties implementing different versions of this specification is enabled by SVN and/or RSP capability indication by one party and appropriate reaction by the other party. For (LPA and eUICC) to RSP Server communication related functions (ES8+, ES9+, ES10a, ES10b, ES11), this specification provides a built-in mechanism for capability indication. Each party compliant with version 3 or higher of this specification has to include its RSP capability. When the RSP capability is absent, it indicates a party implementing a version prior to version 3. This mechanism is described in section 3.0.1 Common Mutual Authentication Procedure and related functions. For RSP Server to RSP Server communication (ES2+, ES12, ES15), the RSP Server that acts as a client indicates its SVN using the HTTP header X-Admin-Protocol (see section 6.2). For information, the Device and the LPAd can determine the highestSvn of the eUICC by using the ES10b.GetEUICCInfo function as described in section 5.7.8. The LPAd uses the ES10 functions and associated parameters in line with the EuiccRspCapability for further communication with the eUICC. The eUICC doesn't need to know the lpaSvn of the LPAd and operates according to the LPAd requests. To communicate on ES6 with the eUICC, the Operator SHALL use the protocol and functions corresponding to the capabilities communicated by the eUICC in EUICCInfo2 during the Profile Download and Installation. There is no SVN negotiation on EShri. But the HRI Server can version its services using different URLs.
2.12 Multiple Enabled Profilesadded
This specification defines optional support of Multiple Enabled Profiles (MEP), where several Profiles can be in Enabled state. This enables a Device with more than one baseband to use more than one Profile at the same time for providing connectivity to different networks. The multiplexing of the APDU streams to those Profiles on a single physical interface is specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [6]. This specification uses the term "eSIM Port" for what ETSI TS 102 221 [6] calls a logical SE interface (LSI). eSIM Ports are identified by consecutive numbers starting from zero (and will be written as eSIM Port 0, eSIM Port 1, etc.). Each eSIM Port SHALL be assigned to at most one Enabled Profile at any point in time. Each Profile SHALL be assigned to at most one eSIM Port at any point in time. Profile Enabling assigns a Profile to an eSIM Port. Profile Disabling releases this assignment. A Disabled Profile is not assigned to any eSIM Port. Several options for different features are defined for MEP: - APDU multiplexing can use any of the mechanisms defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [6], e.g.: - eSIM Port selection via the APDU MANAGE LSI (select LSI) when the transmission protocol T=0 or T=1 is used. - eSIM Port selection via the NAD byte when the transmission protocol T=1 is used. - Three options are defined for the selection of the ISD-R and the assignments of eSIM Ports: - MEP-A1: The ISD-R is selected on eSIM Port 0 only and Profiles are selected on eSIM Ports 1 and higher, with the eSIM Port being assigned by the LPA. I.e., Command Port and Target Port will always be different. - MEP-A2: The ISD-R is selected on eSIM Port 0 only and Profiles are selected on eSIM Ports 1 and higher, with the eSIM Port being assigned by the eUICC. I.e., Command Port and Target Port will always be different. - MEP-B: Profiles are selected on eSIM Ports 0 and higher, with the ISD-R being selectable on any of these eSIM Ports. ES10c.EnableProfile and, if CAT is initialised on the Target Port, ES10c.DisableProfile are always sent on the Target Port (i.e., Command Port and Target Port are identical). If CAT is not initialised on the Target Port, ES10c.DisableProfile can be sent on any eSIM Port. Other ES10 commands can be sent on any eSIM Port where CAT is initialised. - As already defined in v2 of this specification, two options exist for processing a Profile switch: - Profile switching requires a REFRESH proactive command to be issued by the eUICC. - Profile switching is performed without such a proactive command. This specification treats these options independently and an eUICC MAY implement any combination. Limitations for the LPA are given in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. MEP is only defined for non-removable eUICCs, where the options to be used can be pre-agreed by the OEM and the EUM. Still, an optional setup mechanism is defined in section 3.4.1, which allows Devices and eUICCs to support several modes.
2.13 Overview of Push Serviceadded
A Push Service is a service that allows an application server to send push notifications to an application on a Device. This specification allows an SM-DS and LDS to leverage a Push Service so that the LDS is informed in a timely manner when a relevant Event Record is available on the SM-DS. Figure 8aa shows the entities required for Push Service. A Push Service is implemented by a combination of a push server and a push client on the Device. The interfaces between the push server and the push client, between the push client and the LPAd, and between the SM-DS and the push server, as well as the interactions between them, are out of scope of this specification. [] Figure 8aa: Entities for Push Service, LPA in the Device The SM-DS and a Device MAY support one or more Push Services. The LPAd and SM-DS perform the Push Service registration so that the SM-DS can subsequently send push notifications to the LPAd, following the general sequence that follows: The SM-DS indicates, during Common Mutual Authentication, one or more Push Service(s) that it supports. If the Device supports at least one of these Push Services, the LPAd requests the corresponding push client on the Device to allow the LPAd to use this Push Service. The push client and its related push server perform an operation to generate a Push Token dedicated to the LPAd. The LPAd then forwards its Push Token together with the EID of its associated eUICC to the SM-DS (see section 3.6.5). Later, to inform the LPAd that an Event Record is pending for this LPAd on the SM-DS, the SM-DS requests the push server to send a push notification for this Push Token. The push server routes this notification to the push client, which forwards it to the LPAd. The LPAd MAY then perform an Event Retrieval procedure. A Push Service MAY limit the validity of a Push Token depending on its implementation. Upon expiration of the validity, the LPAd SHOULD re-register a Push Token to the SM-DS to remain able to receive push notifications. The SM-DS MAY also clean its database of Push Tokens to avoid keeping obsolete Push Tokens. The LPAd and Push Service may not know about when this happens. An SM-DS that enacts such a clean-up policy SHOULD instruct the LPAd of a maximum Push Token retention time. It is the responsibility of the LPAd to register a Push Token, which was previously used or is newly generated, to the SM-DS when this retention time expires.
3.0 Common Proceduresadded
The list is shortened; compare the original documents for the remaining changes.
Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 Overview
- 1.2 Scope
- 1.3 Document Purpose
- 1.4 Intended Audience
- 1.5 Definition of Terms
- 1.6 Abbreviations and Notations
- 1.7 References
- 1.7.1 Normative References
- 1.7.2 Informative References
- 1.8 Conventions
- 1.9 Feature Support
- 1.10 Editorial Guidelines
- 2 General Architecture
- 2.1 General Architecture Diagram
- 2.2 Roles
- 2.3 Interfaces
- 2.4 eUICC Architecture
- 2.4.1 eUICC Overview
- 2.4.2 ECASD
- 2.4.3 ISD-R
- 2.4.4 ISD-P
- 2.4.5 Profile
- 2.4.6 Telecom Framework
- 2.4.7 Profile Package Interpreter
- 2.4.8 LPAe
- 2.4.9 LPA Services
- 2.4.10 Hardware Characteristics of the eUICC
- 2.4.11 Platform Characteristics of the eUICC
- 2.4.12 Profile Policy Enabler
- 2.4.13 eUICC OS Update
- 2.4a ASN.1
- 2.4a.1 Common ASN.1 data types
- 2.4a.2 ASN.1 data type UTF8String
- 2.5 Profile Protection and Delivery
- 2.5.1 Profile Package Types Overview
- 2.5.2 Unprotected Profile Package
- 2.5.3 Protected Profile Package
- 2.5.4 Bound Profile Package
- 2.5.5 Segmented Bound Profile Package
- 2.5.6 Profile Installation Result
- 2.6 Security Overview
- 2.6.1 Certification of the Entities
- 2.6.2 Remote Secure Communication
- 2.6.3 Public Key Infrastructure
- 2.6.4 BPP Security Protocol
- 2.6.5 Cryptographic Negotiation, Algorithms and Key Length
- 2.6.6 TLS Requirements
- 2.6.7 Void
- 2.6.8 Random Number Generation
- 2.6.9 Digital Signature Computation
- 2.7 Certificate Revocation
- 2.8 Void
- 2.9 Profile Policy Management
- 2.9.1 Profile Policy Rules
- 2.9.2 Rules Authorisation Table (RAT)
- 2.9.3 Profile Policy Enabler
- 2.10 Remote Profile Management
- 2.10.1 RPM Package
- 2.10.2 Load RPM Package Result
- 2.11 Overview of version interoperability
- 2.12 Multiple Enabled Profiles
- 2.13 Overview of Push Service
- 3 Procedures
- 3.0 Common Procedures
- 3.0.1 Common Mutual Authentication Procedure
- 3.0.2 Common Cancel Session Procedure
- 3.0.3 RSP Sessions and Error Handling
- 3.1 Remote Provisioning
- 3.1.1 Profile Download Initiation
- 3.1.2 Void
- 3.1.3 Profile Download and Installation
- 3.1.4 Limitation for Profile Installation
- 3.1.5 Error Handling Within the Profile Download and Installation Procedure
- 3.1.6 Profile Lifecycle at SM-DP+
- 3.2 Local Profile Management
- 3.2.1 Enable Profile
- 3.2.2 Disable Profile
- 3.2.3 Delete Profile
- 3.2.4 List Profiles
- 3.2.5 Add Profile
- 3.2.6 Set/Edit Nickname
- 3.2.7 Update Profile
- 3.2.8 Add/Update All
- 3.3 Local eUICC Management
- 3.3.1 Retrieve EID
- 3.3.2 eUICC Memory Reset
- 3.3.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset
- 3.3.4 Set/Edit Default SM-DP+ Address
- 3.3.5 Retrieve DEV-IC
- 3.4 Device and eUICC Initialisation
- 3.4.1 eUICC Initialisation
- 3.4.2 RSP Device Capabilities
- 3.4.3 eUICC File Structure
- 3.4.4 Device Setup and Power-on Profile Discovery
- 3.5 Notifications
- 3.6 SM-DS
- 3.6.0 Requirements
- 3.6.1 Event Registration
- 3.6.2 Event Retrieval
- 3.6.3 Event Deletion
- 3.6.4 Event Checking
- 3.6.5 Push Service Registration
- 3.7 Remote Profile Management
- 3.7.1 RPM Initiation
- 3.7.2 RPM Download
- 3.7.3 RPM Execution
- 3.8 Remote Management by the Operator
- 3.8.1 Metadata Update via ES6
- 3.8.2 Pending Operation Alerting
- 3.9 Profile Content Management
- 3.10 eUICC Root Public Key Update
- 3.11 Device Change and Profile Recovery
- 3.11.1 Device Change
- 3.11.2 Profile Recovery
- 4 Data Elements
- 4.1 Activation Code
- 4.1.1 Matching ID
- 4.1.2 eSIM CA RootCA Public Key indicator
- 4.1.3 Delete Notification for Device Change
- 4.2 Device Information
- 4.3 eUICC Information
- 4.3.1 eUICC identifier (EID)
- 4.4 Profile Metadata
- 4.4.1 Profile Class
- 4.4.2 Profile Policy Rules
- 4.4.3 High Resolution Icons
- 4.4.4 Enterprise Configuration
- 4.4.5 Service Description
- 4.5 Keys and Certificates
- 4.5.1 Keys and Certificates Naming Conventions
- 4.5.2 Certificates
- 4.6 Certificate Revocation List
- 4.6.1 CRL publication rules
- 4.6.2 Void
- 4.6.3 eUICC Considerations
- 4.6.4 Retrieving a CRL
- 4.7 Confirmation Code
- 4.8 Device Information Code
- 5 Functions
- 5.1 Overview of Functions per Interface
- 5.2 LPA to Server and Server to Server Function Commonalities
- 5.2.1 Common Data Types
- 5.2.2 Request-Response Function
- 5.2.3 Notification Handler Function
- 5.2.4 Functions Input Header
- 5.2.5 Functions Output Header
- 5.2.6 Status Code
- 5.3 ES2+ (Operator -- SM-DP+)
- 5.3.1 Function: DownloadOrder
- 5.3.2 Function: ConfirmOrder
- 5.3.3 Function: CancelOrder
- 5.3.4 Function: ReleaseProfile
- 5.3.5 Function: HandleNotification
- 5.3.6 Function: RpmOrder
- 5.3.7 Function: HandleDeviceChangeRequest
- 5.4 ES6 (Operator -- eUICC)
- 5.4.1 Function: UpdateMetadata
- 5.5 ES8+ (SM-DP+ -- eUICC)
- 5.5.1 Function: InitialiseSecureChannel
- 5.5.2 Function: ConfigureISDP
- 5.5.3 Function: StoreMetadata
- 5.5.4 Function: ReplaceSessionKeys
- 5.5.5 Function: LoadProfileElements
- 5.6 ES9+ (LPA -- SM-DP+)
- 5.6.1 Function: InitiateAuthentication
- 5.6.2 Function: GetBoundProfilePackage
- 5.6.3 Function: AuthenticateClient
- 5.6.4 Function: HandleNotification
- 5.6.5 Function: CancelSession
- 5.6.6 Function: ConfirmDeviceChange
- 5.7 ES10x (LPA -- eUICC)
- 5.7.1 ISD-R Selection and LPAe Activation
- 5.7.2 Transport Command
- 5.7.3 Function (ES10a): GetEuiccConfiguredData
- 5.7.4 Function (ES10a): SetDefaultDpAddress
- 5.7.5 Function (ES10b): PrepareDownload
- 5.7.6 Function (ES10b): LoadBoundProfilePackage
- 5.7.7 Function (ES10b): GetEUICCChallenge
- 5.7.8 Function (ES10b): GetEUICCInfo
- 5.7.9 Function: (ES10b): ListNotification
- 5.7.10 Function (ES10b): RetrieveNotificationsList
- 5.7.11 Function (ES10b): RemoveNotificationFromList
- 5.7.12 Function (ES10b): LoadCRL
- 5.7.13 Function (ES10b): AuthenticateServer
- 5.7.14 Function (ES10b): CancelSession
- 5.7.15 Function (ES10c): GetProfilesInfo
- 5.7.16 Function (ES10c): EnableProfile
- 5.7.17 Function (ES10c): DisableProfile
- 5.7.18 Function (ES10c): DeleteProfile
- 5.7.19 Function (ES10c): eUICCMemoryReset
- 5.7.20 Function (ES10c): GetEID
- 5.7.21 Function (ES10c): SetNickname
- 5.7.22 Function (ES10b): GetRAT
- 5.7.23 Function (ES10c): LPA alerting
- 5.7.24 Function (ES10a): VerifySmdsResponse
- 5.7.25 Function (ES10b): LoadRpmPackage
- 5.7.26 Function (ES10b): PrepareDeviceChange
- 5.7.27 Function (ES10b): VerifyDeviceChange
- 5.8 ES11 (LPA -- SM-DS)
- 5.8.1 Function: InitiateAuthentication
- 5.8.2 Function: AuthenticateClient
- 5.8.3 Function: CheckEvent
- 5.9 ES12 (SM-DP+ -- SM-DS)
- 5.9.1 Function: RegisterEvent
- 5.9.2 Function: DeleteEvent
- 5.10 ES15 (SM-DS -- SM-DS)
- 5.10.1 Function: RegisterEvent
- 5.10.2 Function: DeleteEvent
- 5.11 ES25 (UIMe -- LUIe)
- 5.11.1 LUIe using CAT
- 5.11.2 LUIe using SCWS
- 5.11.3 LUIe using E4E
- 5.12 Other functions
- 5.12.1 Function: RetrieveIcon
- 5.13 ES22 (Device Application -- LPDd)
- 5.14 ES21 (Device Application -- LPRd)
- 5.14.1 Function: InitiateProfileContentManagement
- 5.14.2 Notification: PcmProgressInformation
- 6 Interface binding over HTTP
- 6.1 TLS Security
- 6.1.1 Identification/Authentication/Authorisation
- 6.1.2 Integrity
- 6.1.3 Confidentiality
- 6.2 HTTP request and response
- 6.3 HTTP response status codes
- 6.4 Secure Channel Set-Up on ES2+
- 6.5 Function Binding in JSON
- 6.5.1 JSON message definition
- 6.5.2 List of functions
- 6.6 Function Binding in ASN.1
- 6.6.1 ASN.1 message definition
- 6.6.2 List of functions
- A Use of GlobalPlatform Privileges (Normative)
- B Data Definitions (Normative)
- C Device Requirements (Normative)
- C.1 Functional Device Requirements
- C.2 Requirements for Companion Device Scenarios
- C.3 General LPA Requirements
- C.4 Support for CAT Mechanisms
- C.5 APDU Access Interface
- D Coding of the AIDs for 'Remote SIM Provisioning' (Normative)
- E List of Identifiers (Informative)
- F Profile Eligibility Check (Informative)
- G Void
- H ASN.1 Definitions (Normative)
- I JSON Request Response Examples (Informative)
- J Tag allocation (Normative)
- K OID allocation (Informative)
- L DLOA document (Normative)
- M Configuration for RSP Server, LPA and EUICC (Normative)
- N Version Interoperability (Informative)
- O Device Change (Informative)
- P Use of VendorSpecificExtension (informative)
- Q Document Management (Informative)
- Q.1 Document History
- Q.2 Other Information
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
RSP Technical Specification
Version 3.0
19^(th) October 2022
This Industry Specification is a Non-binding Permanent Reference Document of the GSMA
Security Classification: Non-confidential
Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is confidential to the Association and is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other than those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association.
Copyright Notice
Copyright © 2022 GSM Association
Disclaimer
The GSM Association (“Association”) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document. The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice.
Compliance Notice
The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy.
This Permanent Reference Document is classified by GSMA as an Industry Specification, as such it has been developed and is maintained by GSMA in accordance with the provisions set out in GSMA AA.35 - Procedures for Industry Specifications.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
This document provides a technical description of the GSMA’s 'Remote SIM Provisioning (RSP) Architecture for consumer Devices' [4] that applies for eSIM Products.
1.2 Scope
This specification provides a technical description of:
•The eUICC Architecture;
•The interfaces used within the Remote SIM Provisioning Architecture; and
•The security functions used within the Remote SIM Provisioning Architecture.
1.3 Document Purpose
This document defines a technical solution for the remote provisioning and management of the eUICC in consumer Devices as defined in RSP Architecture [4]. The adoption of this technical solution will provide the basis for global interoperability between different Operator deployment scenarios, for example network equipment (e.g., Subscription Manager Data Preparation (SM-DP+)) and various eUICC platforms.
1.4 Intended Audience
Technical experts working for Operators, SIM solution providers, consumer Device vendors, standards organisations, network infrastructure vendors, Service Providers and other industry bodies, etc.
1.5 Definition of Terms
Term | Description |
|---|---|
Access Rules | Information stored on the eUICC that defines whether applications on the Device are denied or allowed access to applications on the eUICC as specified by GlobalPlatform Secure Element Access Control [56]. |
Activation Code | Information issued by an Operator/Service Provider to an End User. It is used by the End User to request the download and installation of a Profile. |
Activation Code Token | The part of the Activation Code information provided by the Operator/Service Provider that refers to a Subscription. |
Alternative SM-DS | SM-DS used in cascade mode with a Root SM-DS to redirect Event Registration from an SM-DP+ to that Root SM-DS used directly to perform Event Registration from an SM-DP+ or for an installed Profile. |
Application Protocol Data Unit | The communication unit between the Device and the eUICC, as defined by ISO/IEC 7816-4 [14]. |
Bound Profile Package | A Protected Profile Package that has been cryptographically linked to a particular eUICC. |
(Public Key) Certificate | A certificate as defined in RFC 5280 Error! Reference source not found.Error! Reference source not found.[17]. |
Certificate Authority | A Certificate Authority is an entity that issues (Public Key) Certificates. |
Certificate Issuer | An Entity that is Authorised to Issue digital certificates. |
Certified eUICC | An eUICC meeting the GSMA requirements for Remote SIM Provisioning and certified according to the GSMA compliance programme defined in [64]. Note: Unless stated otherwise, the word eUICC in this specification refers to a Certified eUICC. |
Command Port | eSIM Port on which a given ES10 command is sent. It may be identical to the Target Port. |
Companion Device | A Device that relies on the capabilities of a Primary Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. |
Confirmation Code | A code entered by an End User required by the SM-DP+ to validate the request to download a Profile or proceed with the Device Change. |
Confirmation Code Required Flag | A parameter to indicate whether the Confirmation Code is required. |
Confirmation Level | Refers to the hierarchy of User Intent and Confirmation Request, where: -User Intent is the first and lowest level -Simple Confirmation is the second level -Strong Confirmation is the third and highest level |
Confirmation Request | A request confirming User Intent by using either Simple Confirmation or Strong Confirmation. |
CRL Issuer | Designates an RSP entity that manages and publishes Certificate revocation status by means of CRL(s). |
Default SM-DP+ | An SM-DP+ that is contacted by an LPA by means of a pre-provisioned address on the eUICC. |
Device | User equipment used in conjunction with an eUICC to connect to a mobile network. E.g., a tablet, wearable, smartphone or handset. |
Device Application | An application installed in a Device. |
Device Baseband | A Device component that manages the cellular radio functions. |
Device Change | Given that one or more Profiles related to their respective Subscription are installed in an old Device, the process for installing one or more Profiles related to the same Subscription(s) onto a new Device. |
Device Change Configuration | Set of rules that apply to a Profile to support Device Change. |
Device Information Code | A set of Device-related information used for Remote SIM Provisioning operations (e.g., for Profile preparation between the SM-DP+ and the operator). |
Delete Notification for Device Change | A report containing an information about the deletion of the Profile for Device Change on the old Device. |
Device Reset | An action that returns the Device to a state equivalent to a factory state. |
Device Test Mode | A mode hidden from the End User that allows access to and use of Test Profiles. |
Digital Letter Of Approval | A digital representation of a Letter of Approval, signed by a DLOA Authority. |
Disabled Profile | A Profile in a state where all files and applications (e.g., NAA) present in the Profile are not selectable. |
Discrete eUICC | An eUICC implemented on discrete hardware. |
DLOA Authority | In the context of this document, an entity that provides a certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, or validation scheme that delivers Digital Letters of Approval. |
DLOA Management System | Any authorised system interested in verifying the level of certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, or validation of an eUICC (e.g., an MNO backend system, an SM-DP+). NOTE: This was called 'Management System' in the prior versions of this document. |
DLOA Registrar | A role that stores DLOAs and provides an interface to enable Management System to retrieve them. |
Enabled Profile | A Profile in a state where all files and/or applications (e.g., NAA) are selectable. |
End User | The person using the Device. |
Enterprise | A business, organization or government entity that subscribes to mobile services to be utilised by its workforce in support of the business or activities of the Enterprise. The Enterprise as the Subscriber owns the relationship with the Service Provider(s). |
Enterprise Capable Device | A Device that supports the installation and enforcement of Enterprise Rules. |
Enterprise Profile | An Operational Profile for which the Subscriber is an Enterprise. This Profile may include restrictions on the End User of the Device. |
Enterprise Rule | A rule stored in an Enterprise Profile that can be used by the Profile Owner to restrict End User controllability for enabling and installing Profiles on Enterprise Capable Devices. |
eSIM CA | A GSMA Certificate Issuer or an Independent eSIM CA. |
eSIM Port | A logical connection between an endpoint in the Device and an endpoint in the eUICC (i.e., the Enabled Profile and/or the ISD-R in the context of this specification). |
eSIM Products | eUICCs, Devices, and RSP Servers implementing this specification. |
eUICC | A removable or non-removable UICC which enables the remote and/or local management of Profiles in a secure way. NOTE: The term originates from "embedded UICC". |
eUICC Certificate | A certificate issued by the EUM for a specific eUICC. This certificate can be verified using the EUM Certificate. |
eUICC Manufacturer | Manufacturer of the eUICC. |
eUICC Memory Reset | An action that returns the eUICC to a state equivalent to a factory state. |
eUICC OS Update | A mechanism to correct existing features on the eUICC by the original OS manufacturer. |
eUICC Test Memory Reset | An action that deletes all post-issuance Test Profiles on an eUICC. |
EUM Certificate | A certificate issued by an eSIM CA to a GSMA accredited EUM which can be used to verify eUICC Certificates. |
EUM Keyset | Keyset used by the EUM to update ECASD content. |
EUM Public Key | Public key included in the EUM Certificate (called PK.EUM.SIG). |
EUM Private Key | Private Key used by the EUM to sign eUICC Certificates (called SK.EUM.SIG). |
Event | A request for a Profile download or an RPM Operation which is set by an SM-DP+ on behalf of an Operator, to be processed by a specific eUICC. |
EventID | Unique identifier of an Event for a specific EID generated by the SM-DP+ / SM-DS. |
Event Checking | A process for the LDS to query the SM-DS to determine the presence of Event Records registered for an eUICC. |
EventCheckingID (ECID) | Unique identifier for a specific EID generated by the SM-DS for Event Checking. |
Event Record | The set of information stored on the SM-DS for a specific Event, via the Event Registration procedure. |
Event Registration | A process notifying an SM-DS of the availability of information on either a specific SM-DP+ or a specific SM-DS for a specific eUICC. |
Field-Test eUICC | A pre-production eUICC whose functional or security certifications are not yet completed by the EUM. |
GSMA Certificate Issuer | A Certificate Authority accredited by GSMA. |
HRI Server | Server providing High Resolution Icons |
Independent eSIM CA | A non-GSMA CI that issues Certificates for a specific region, company or group of companies for eSIM purposes. |
Integrated Circuit Card Identifier | Unique number to identify a Profile in an eUICC as defined by ITU-T E.118 [21]. |
Integrated eUICC | An eUICC implemented on a Tamper Resistant Element (TRE) that is integrated into a System-on-Chip (SoC), optionally making use of remote volatile/non-volatile memory |
Integrated TRE | A TRE implemented inside a larger System-on-Chip (SoC) |
International Mobile Subscriber Identity | Unique identifier owned and issued by Operators as defined in 3GPP TS 23.003 [35] section 2.2. |
Issuer Identifier Number | The first 8 digits of the EID identifying the EUM issuing the eUICC. |
Issuer Security Domain | A Security Domain on the UICC as defined by GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8]. |
Letter of Approval (LOA) | A letter generated by a Process Certification Authority, identifying a platform that has completed a certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, or validation scheme. |
Local Profile Assistant (LPA) | A functional element in the Device or in the eUICC that provides the Local Profile Download (LPD), Local Discovery Services (LDS) and Local User Interface (LUI) features. When the LPA is located in the Device, they are called LPAd, LPDd, LUId, LDSd. When the LPA is located in the eUICC, they are called LPAe, LPDe, LUIe, LDSe. Where LPA, LPD, LDS or LUI are used, they apply to the element independent of its location in the Device or in the eUICC. |
Local Profile Management | Local Profile Management are operations that are locally initiated on the End User (ESeu) interface. |
Local Profile Management Operation | Local Profile Management Operations include enable Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, query Profile Metadata, eUICC Memory Reset, eUICC Test Memory Reset, set/edit Nickname, add Profile and edit Default SM-DP+ address. |
Logical SE Interface | As defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [6]. |
LPA Proxy | An LPA role that establishes a Profile Content Management session and optionally provides progress information about that session to a Device Application. |
Managing SM-DP+ | An SM-DP+ that is authorised by the Profile Owner to perform RPM to the eUICC on which their Profile resides. |
MatchingID | Reference data for an RSP Server which could be an Activation Code Token or the EventID. |
MEP-Capable Device | A Device where more than one Enabled Profile can be used in parallel on the same eUICC. |
MEP-Capable eUICC | An eUICC where more than one Profile can be in Enabled state at the same point in time. |
Mobile Network Operator | An entity providing access capability and communication services to its End User through a mobile network infrastructure. |
Mobile Network Operator Security Domain (MNO-SD) | Part of the Profile, owned by the Operator, providing the Secured Channel to the Operator’s Over The Air (OTA) Platform. It is used to manage the content of a Profile once the Profile is enabled. |
Mobile Virtual Network Operator | An entity providing access capability and communication services to its Subscribers through a mobile network infrastructure but which does not have an allocation of spectrum. |
Network Access Application | Application residing in a Profile providing authorisation to access a network. |
NFC Device | A Device compliant with GSMA TS.26 [40]. |
NFC Profile | A Profile containing contactless applications. |
Non-Enterprise Capable Device | A Device that does not support the enforcement of Enterprise Rules. |
Notification | A report about a Profile download, Local/remote Profile Management Operation or Remote eUICC Management operation processed by the eUICC or about the progress of such an operation. |
Operational Profile | A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC for the purposes of providing services by the Operator. The Profile SHALL be in support of a Subscription with the relevant Operator and allow connectivity to a mobile network. Applications MAY be included to provide non-telecommunication services. |
Operator | A Mobile Network Operator or Mobile Virtual Network Operator; a company providing wireless cellular network services. NOTE: For historic reasons, this document uses the expression "Operator" for the entity in the architecture and as endpoint for the specified interfaces, even though the more generic expression "Service Provider" or "Operator/Service Provider" might be more applicable. However, the exact work split between a Mobile Network Operator, a Mobile Virtual Network Operator and any other Service Provider is irrelevant for this specification. Their overall activities are covered by the architecture entity "Operator". |
Operator Credentials | A set of credentials owned by the Operator, including Network Access Credentials, OTA Keys for Remote File/Application management, and authentication algorithm parameters. |
OTA Keys | The credentials included in the Profile, used in conjunction with OTA Platforms. |
OTA Platform | An Operator platform for remote management of UICCs and the content of Enabled Operator Profiles on eUICCs. |
Other Notification | Any Notification other than a Profile Installation Result and a Load RPM Package Result. |
PIX | Proprietary application Identifier extension, the value of which is part of the Application Identifier (AID). |
Polling Address | An address configured in a Profile indicating where the Device needs to connect to retrieve RPM Events for this Profile. |
Primary Device | A Device that can be used to provide some capabilities to a Companion Device for the purpose of Remote SIM Provisioning. |
Process Certification Authority | The authority that provides the certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, and validation scheme defined in SGP.24 and that delivers Digital Letters of Approval accordingly. In the context of this document, the Process Certification Authority is the GSMA. |
Profile | A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC for the purpose of providing services. |
Profile Component | A Profile Component is an element of the Profile, when installed in the eUICC, and MAY be one of the following: •An element of the file system like an MF, EF or DF; •An Application, including NAA and Security Domain; •Profile Metadata, including Profile Policy Rules; •An MNO-SD. |
Profile Content Management | The update of an Enabled Profile by its Profile Owner, using an agent (the PCMAA) on the Device as an intermediary between the Profile and a remote server (the PCMP). |
Profile Content Management Platform (PCMP) | Platform owned by the Profile Owner, used to manage the content of an enabled Profile. As this specification defines a generic mechanism for the PCMAA to request the next data from a different management platform, the term PCMP is used for all of these platforms and the term Delegated PCMP (DPCMP) is not used in this specification. |
Profile Installation Result | A Notification that contains the result of a Profile installation. |
Profile Management | A combination of local and remote management operations (enable Profile, disable Profile, delete Profile, list Profile information and query Profile Metadata). |
Profile Management Operation | An operation related to the content and state update of a Profile in a dedicated ISD-P on the eUICC. |
Profile Metadata | Information pertaining to a Profile used for the purpose of Local Profile Management and Remote Profile Management. |
Profile Nickname | Alternative name of the Profile set by the End User. |
Profile Owner | The entity that controls the operations that can be performed upon its Profile. With the exception of Test Profiles, this is always the Operator. |
Profile Package | A personalised Profile using an interoperable description format that is transmitted to an eUICC to load and install a Profile. |
Profile Policy Authorisation Rule | A set of data that governs the ability of a Profile Owner to make use of a Profile Policy Rule in a Profile. |
Profile Policy Enabler | The functional element within eUICC that interprets and enforces Profile Policy Rules. |
Profile Policy Management | A policy control system that allows the Service Provider to implement, manage and enforce its subscription terms and conditions associated with the installed Profile. |
Profile Policy Rule | Defines a qualification for or enforcement of an action to be performed on a Profile when a certain condition occurs. |
Profile Recovery | The process for re-installing a Profile related to the Subscription onto the old Device under condition that the Profile Installation onto the new Device for Device Change is failed due to a permanent error. |
Profile Type | Operator specific defined type of Profile. This is equivalent to the "Profile Description ID" as described in Annex B of SGP.21 [4] |
Protected Profile Package | A Profile Package which has been cryptographically protected for storage but not linked to a particular eUICC. |
Provisioning Profile | A combination of Operator data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC for the purposes of providing connectivity to a mobile network solely for the purpose of the provisioning of Profiles on the eUICC. NOTE: Use of Provisioning Profiles for other system services in version 3 of this specification may require modifications of this definition. |
Public CA | A Certificate Authority, commonly used to issue certificates for public Internet purposes, which is not subject to the GSMA Policy Authority as defined in SGP.14 [45]. |
Push Service | A service provided by a combination of a push server and a push client on the Device, able to send a push notification from an SM-DS to an LDS. |
Push Token | An identifier that is generated when an LDS registered a Push Service to a push server. |
Reference Enterprise Rule | The Enterprise Rule that is currently being enforced by the eUICC. |
Remote Profile Management | Profile Management operations performed by a Managing SM-DP+ at the request of the Profile Owner. |
Remote SIM Provisioning | The downloading, installing, enabling, disabling, and deleting of a Profile on an eUICC. |
Roles | Roles are representing a logical grouping of functions. |
Root SM-DS | A central access point for finding Events from one or more SM-DP+(s). |
Rules Authorisation Table | A set of Profile Policy Authorisation Rules that, together, determines the ability of a Profile Owner to make use of a set of Profile Policy Rules in a Profile. |
RSP Server | Either an SM-DS or SM-DP+. |
RSP Session | Sequence of interlinked data exchanges between the eUICC, the LPA and an RSP Server, starting with the generation of a challenge on the eUICC and ending with a successful operation (Profile installation, RPM execution or Event List verification) on the eUICC or by explicit or implicit cancellation. |
Service Provider | The organization through which the End User obtains PLMN telecommunication services. This is usually the network operator or possibly a separate body. See also the definition for "Operator". |
Simple Confirmation | A secure and non-interceptable mechanism by which the End User confirms their action, e.g., by selecting Yes/No, OK/Cancel. |
SM-DP+ Certificate | A Certificate issued to a GSMA accredited SM-DP+, which chains to an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate. |
SM-DS Certificate | A Certificate issued to a GSMA accredited SM-DS, which chains to an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate. |
SM-DP+ OID | Identifier of the SM-DP+ that is globally unique and is included as part of the SM-DP+ Certificate. |
SM-DS OID | Identifier of the SM-DS that is globally unique and is included as part of the SM-DS Certificate. |
Strong Confirmation | A secure and non-interceptable mechanism to guarantee a higher level of User Intent than Simple Confirmation by which the End User confirms their action, e.g., by inputting PIN or fingerprint, repeating Simple Confirmation, entering Confirmation Code, etc. |
SubCA | A CA whose Certificate is signed by another CA. |
Subscriber | An entity (associated with one or more End Users) that is engaged in a Subscription with a Operator/Service Provider. |
Subscription | Describes the commercial relationship between the Subscriber and the Operator/Service Provider. |
Subscription Manager Data Preparation+ (SM-DP+) | Prepares Profile Packages, secures them with a Profile Protection Key, stores Profile Protection Keys in a secure manner and the Protected Profile Packages in a Profile Package repository, and allocates the Protected Profile Packages to specified EIDs. The SM-DP+ binds Protected Profile Packages to the respective EID and securely downloads these Bound Profile Packages to the LPA of the respective eUICC. The SM-DP+ also performs Remote Profile Management and Remote eUICC Management. |
Subscription Manager Discovery Service (SM-DS) | This is responsible for providing addresses of one or more SM‑DP+(s) to a LDS. |
Tamper Resistant Element | A security module consisting of hardware and low-level software providing resistance against software and hardware attacks, capable of securely hosting operating systems together with applications and their confidential and cryptographic data. |
Target Port | eSIM Port which is explicitly affected by an ES10c.EnableProfile or ES10c.DisableProfile command. |
Target Profile | Profile that is explicitly affected by an ES10 command. NOTE: An ES10c.EnableProfile command may implicitly affect another Profile by implicitly disabling it. |
Test Profile | A combination of data and applications to be provisioned on an eUICC to provide connectivity to test equipment for the purpose of testing the Device and the eUICC. A test profile is not intended to store any Operator Credentials. |
User Intent | Describes the direct, real time acquisition and validation of the manual End User input on the LUI to trigger locally a Profile download or Profile Management Operation. As defined in SGP.21 [4]. |
1.6 Abbreviations and Notations
Abbreviation | Description |
|---|---|
AES | Advanced Encryption Standard |
AID | Application Identifier |
APDU | Application Protocol Data Unit |
API | Application Programming Interface |
ASN.1 | Abstract Syntax Notation One |
BPP | Bound Profile Package |
BSP | BPP Security Protocol |
CA | Certificate Authority |
CASD | Controlling Authority Security Domain |
CAT | Card Application Toolkit |
CI | Certificate Issuer |
CMAC | Cipher-based MAC |
CP | Command Port |
CRL | Certificate Revocation List |
CRT | Control Reference Template |
DH | Diffie-Hellman |
DEV-IC | Device Information Code |
DLOA | Digital Letter Of Approval |
DPI | Delegated Platform Identifier |
E4E | E4 ENVELOPE (ENVELOPE command with tag 'E4') |
ECASD | eUICC Controlling Authority Security Domain |
ECC | Elliptic Curve Cryptography |
ECDHE | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman using Ephemeral keys |
ECDSA | Elliptic Curve cryptography Digital Signature Algorithm |
ECID | Event Checking Identifier |
ECKA | Elliptic Curve cryptography Key Agreement algorithm |
EID | eUICC identifier |
EIN | EUM Identification Number |
ESIN | EUM Specific Identification Number |
ETSI | European Telecommunications Standards Institute |
EUM | eUICC Manufacturer |
FCI | File Control Information |
FFS | For Further Study |
FQDN | Fully Qualified Domain Name |
GID1 | Group Identifier 1, as defined in 3GPP TS 31.102 [54] |
GID2 | Group Identifier 2, as defined in 3GPP TS 31.102 [54] |
GP | GlobalPlatform |
GSMA | GSM Association |
GSMA CI | GSM Association Certificate Issuer |
HLR | Home Location Register |
HRI | High Resolution Icon |
ICCID | Integrated Circuit Card ID |
ICV | Initial Chaining Vector |
IIN | Issuer Identifier Number |
IMEI | International Mobile Equipment Identity |
IMSI | International Mobile Subscriber Identity |
ISD | Issuer Security Domain |
ISD-P | Issuer Security Domain Profile |
ISD-R | Issuer Security Domain Root |
ISO | International Standards Organisation |
ITU | International Telecommunications Union |
KA | Key Agreement |
LDS | Local Discovery Service |
LDSd | Local Discovery Service when LPA is in the Device |
LDSe | Local Discovery Service when LPA is in the eUICC |
LOA | Letter Of Approval |
LPA | Local Profile Assistant |
LPAd | Local Profile Assistant when LPA is in the Device |
LPAe | Local Profile Assistant when LPA is in the eUICC |
LPD | Local Profile Download |
LPDd | Local Profile Download when LPA is in the Device |
LPDe | Local Profile Download when LPA is in the eUICC |
LPM | Local Profile Management |
LPRd | LPA Proxy when LPA is in the Device |
LSI | Logical SE Interface |
LTE | Long Term Evolution |
LUI | Local User Interface |
LUId | Local User Interface when LPA is in the Device |
LUIe | Local User Interface when LPA is in the eUICC |
M4M | Mifare4Mobile^(TM) |
MAC | Message Authentication Code |
MEP | Multiple Enabled Profiles |
MNO | Mobile Network Operator |
MNO-SD | Mobile Network Operator - Security Domain |
MOC | Mandatory, Optional or Conditional |
MXP | Message eXchange Pattern Note: In version 2.X of this specification, this was abbreviated as MEP. |
NAA | Network Access Application |
OS | Operating System |
OTA | Over The Air |
PCM | Profile Content Management |
PCMAA | PCM Admin Agent |
PCMP | Profile Content Management Platform |
PE | Profile Element |
PIX | Proprietary application Identifier eXtension |
PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
POS | Point Of Sale |
PPAR | Profile Policy Authorisation Rule |
PPE | Profile Policy Enabler |
PPK | Profile Protection Key |
PPK-ENC | Optional Profile Protection Key randomly generated by the SM‑DP+ and used for encryption/decryption of a Protected Profile Package |
PPK-MAC | Optional Profile Protection Key randomly generated by the SM‑DP+ and used for MAC generation/verification of a Protected Profile Package |
PPP | Protected Profile Package |
PPR | Profile Policy Rule |
RAT | Rules Authorisation Table |
RFU | Reserved for Future Use |
RPM | Remote Profile Management |
RSA | Rivest / Shamir / Adleman asymmetric algorithm |
RSP | Remote SIM Provisioning |
SAS | Security Accreditation Scheme |
SBPP | Segmented Bound Profile Package |
SCP | Secure Channel Protocol |
SCWS | Smartcard Web Server |
SD | Security Domain |
SEAC | Secure Element Access Control |
SEP | Single Enabled Profile |
SIM | Subscriber Identity Module |
SVN | SGP.22 Specification Version Number (referred to as 'eSVN' in SGP.21 [4]). |
SM-DP+ | Subscription Manager Data Preparation (Enhanced compared to the SM-DP in SGP.02 [2]) |
SM-DS | Subscription Manager Discovery Service |
S-ENC | Session key resulting from the key agreement between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC and used for encryption of parts of a Bound Profile Package |
S-MAC | Session Key resulting from the key agreement between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC and used for MAC computation of parts of a Bound Profile Package |
TAC | Type Allocation Code |
TAR | Toolkit Application Reference |
TLS | Transport Layer Security |
TLV | Tag-Length-Value |
TP | Target Port |
TRE | Tamper Resistant Element |
UI | User Interface |
UIM | User Interface Module for LPAe |
UPP | Unprotected Profile Package |
URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
URL | Uniform Resource locator |
USIM | Universal Subscriber Identity Module |
W3C | World Wide Web Consortium |
1.7 References
1.7.1 Normative References
Ref | Document | Title |
|---|---|---|
[1] | Void | Void |
[2] | SGP.02 | GSMA "Remote Provisioning of Embedded UICC Technical specification" V3.1 |
[3] | Void | Void |
[4] | SGP.21 | RSP Architecture V3.0 |
[5] | eUICC Profile Package | Trusted Connectivity Alliance (TCA) eUICC Profile Package: Interoperable Format Technical Specification V3.2 |
[6] | ETSI TS 102 221 | Smart Cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Release 17 |
[7] | OMA-TS-Smartcard_Web_Server-V1_2_1-20130913-A | Open Mobile Alliance: Smartcard-Web-Server, Version 1.2.1 – 13 Sep 2013 |
[8] | GPC_SPE_034 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.3 |
[9] | GPC_SPE_007 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.3 Amendment A: Confidential Card Content Management v1.1 |
[10] | GPC_SPE_025 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.3 Amendment C: Contactless Services v1.2 |
[11] | GPC_SPE_014 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.2 Amendment D: Secure Channel Protocol '03' v1.1.1 |
[12] | GPC_SPE_042 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.2 Amendment E: Security Upgrade for Card Content Management v1.0 |
[13] | GPC_SPE_093 | GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.2 Amendment F: Secure Channel Protocol '11' v1.3 |
[14] | ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 | Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards - Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange |
[15] | ISO/IEC 18004:2015 | Information technology -- Automatic identification and data capture techniques -- QR Code bar code symbology specification |
[16] | RFC 5246 | The TLS Protocol – Version 1.2 |
[17] | RFC 5280 | Internet X.509 PKI Certificate and CRL Profile |
[18] | RFC 5639 | Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation |
[19] | RFC 793 | Transmission Control Protocol, DARPA Internet Program, Protocol specification, Sept 1981 |
[20] | ANSSI ECC FRP256V1 | Avis relatif aux paramètres de courbes elliptiques définis par l'Etat français. JORF n°0241 du 16 octobre 2011 page 17533. texte n° 30. 2011 |
[21] | ITU E.118 | The international telecommunication charge card |
[22] | GSMA Security Principles Related to Handset Theft | GSMA Doc Reference: Security Principles Related to Handset Theft 3.0.0 EICTA CCIG Doc Reference: EICTA Doc: 04cc100 |
[23] | FS.08 | GSMA SAS Standard for Subscription Manager Roles Version 3.0 - 31 March 2017 |
[24] | ITU-T X.520 | ITU-T X.520 Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Selected attribute types |
[25] | RFC 5758 | RFC 5758 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA |
[26] | RFC 5759 | RFC 5759 Suite B Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile |
[27] | RFC 5480 | RFC 5480 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information |
[28] | RFC 4519 | Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) |
[29] | NIST SP 800-56A | NIST Special Publication SP 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revision 2), May 2013 |
[30] | ITU E.212 | The international identification plan for public networks and Subscriptions |
[31] | ETSI TS 102 223 | Smart Cards; Card Application Toolkit (CAT); Release 17 |
[32] | 3GPP TS 24.008 | Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Mobile radio interface Layer 3 specification; Core network protocols; Stage 3 |
[33] | ETSI TS 101 220 | Smart Cards; ETSI numbering system for telecommunication application providers |
[34] | RFC 768 | User Datagram Protocol, Aug 1980. |
[35] | 3GPP TS 23.003 | Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Numbering, addressing and identification |
[36] | 3GPP2 S.R0048-A | 3GPP2 - 3G Mobile Equipment Identifier (MEID) |
[37] | ISO/IEC 7812-1:2015 | Identification cards -- Identification of issuers -- Part 1: Numbering system |
[38] | ETSI TS 102 225 | Secured packet structure for UICC based applications; Release 12 |
[39] | ETSI TS 102 226 | Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications; Release 9 |
[40] | TS.26 | GSMA NFC Handset Requirements V9.0 |
[41] | BSI TR-03111 | BSI Technical Guideline, TR-03111; Elliptic Curve Cryptography; Version 2.10 |
[42] | TLS 1.3 | The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 |
[43] | RFC 2986 | PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification |
[44] | Void | Void |
[45] | SGP.14 | GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy V1.1 |
[46] | RFC 5289 | TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) |
[47] | RFC 4279 | Pre-Shared Key Cipher suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) |
[48] | Void | Void |
[49] | ITU-T X.680 (11/2008) | Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation including Corrigendum 1 and 2 |
[50] | ITU-T X.690 (11/2008) | ASN.1 Encoding Rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) including Corrigendum 1 and 2 |
[51] | 3GPP TS 35.231 | Specification of the TUAK Algorithm Set; Document 1: Algorithm Specification |
[52] | 3GPP TS 35.205 | Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set; Document 1: General |
[53] | ETSI TS 102 241 | Smart cards; UICC Application Programming Interface (UICC API) for Java Card™; Release 17 |
[54] | 3GPP TS 31.102 | Characteristics of the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) application |
[55] | SGP.03 | GSMA NFC UICC Requirements Specification V6.1 |
[56] | GPD_SPE_013 | GlobalPlatform Device Technology – Secure Element Access Control - Version 1.1 |
[57] | GPC_SPE_095 | GlobalPlatform Card - Digital Letter of Approval - Version 1.0 |
[58] | M4M | MIFARE4Mobile Architecture – V 2.1.1 |
[59] | ISO/IEC 10646:2014 | Information technology — Universal Coded Character Set (UCS) |
[60] | RFC 6066 | Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions |
[61] | RFC 2119 | Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, S. Bradner http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt |
[62] | 3GPP TS 34.108 | Common test environments for User Equipment (UE); Conformance testing |
[63] | 3GPP TS 29.002 | Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification |
[64] | SGP.24 | RSP Compliance Process |
[65] | RFC 8422 | Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier |
[66] | RFC 7027 | Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Curves for Transport Layer Security (TLS) |
[67] | RFC 2818 | HTTP Over TLS |
[68] | RFC 7159 | IETF - The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format |
[69] | GPD_SPE_075 | GlobalPlatform Technology Open Mobile API Specification V3.3 |
[70] | RFC 5646 | Tags for Identifying Languages |
[71] | RFC 4648 | The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings |
[72] | RFC 3986 | Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax |
[73] | WebIDL | WebIDL Level 1, W3C Recommendation, 15 December 2016 |
[74] | GPD_SPE_008 | GlobalPlatform Device Technology – Secure Element Remote Application Management NOTE: The current version 1.0.1 of this GlobalPlatform specification does not cover all requirements from SGP.21 v3.0 [4]. The version will be updated once the new specification is available from GlobalPlatform. |
[75] | RFC 1341 | MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions): Mechanisms for Specifying and Describing the Format of Internet Message Bodies |
[76] | 3GPP TS 31.111 | 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) Application Toolkit (USAT) |
[77] | FS.04 | GSMA SAS Standard for UICC Production Version 8.0 - 31 March 2017 |
[78] | BSI TR-02102-1, Version 2018-01 | BSI Technische Richtlinie TR-02102-1: Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen |
[79] | NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, June 2015 |
[80] | RFC 3490 | Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA) |
[81] | RFC 7230 | Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing |
[82] | RFC 7231 | Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content |
[83] | NIST SP 800-38A | Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques, 2001. |
[84] | NIST SP 800-38B | NIST, Special Publication 800-38B, "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication", May 2005. |
[85] | TS.48 | GSMA Generic eUICC Test Profile for Device Testing |
[86] | NIST SP 800-57 | NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4, Recommendation for Key Management |
[87] | 3GPP TS 33.501 | 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security architecture and procedures for 5G system |
[88] | 3GPP TS 31.130 | 3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; (U)SIM Application Programming Interface (API); (U)SIM API for Java™ Card; |
[89] | SGP.29 | GSMA EID Definition and Assignment Process V1.0 |
[90] | RFC 8410 | Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure |
[91] | RFC 7905 | ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) |
[92] | SGP.25 | GSMA Embedded UICC for Consumer Devices – Protection Profile |
[93] | SM2 algorithm | ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 IT Security techniques – Digital signatures with appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms |
[94] | SM3 algorithm | ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 IT Security techniques – Hash-functions – Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions |
[95] | SM4 algorithm | ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/AMD1:2021 Information technology – Security techniques – Encryption algorithms – Part 3: Block ciphers – Amendment 1: SM4 |
[96] | RFC8998 | RFC 8998 ShangMi (SM) Cipher Suites for TLS 1.3 |
1.7.2 Informative References
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ref Document Title
Number
------- ------------------------------ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[i1] TS.43 GSMA VoWiFi and VoLTE Entitlement Configuration V4.0
[i2] OCF Easy Setup Specification OCF Easy Setup Specification v2.2.2: https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Easy_Setup_Specification_v2.2.2.pdf
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1.8 Conventions
The key words "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY" in this document SHALL be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [61].
1.9 Feature Support
This specification indicates features and data elements that were added starting from v3.0.0 by acronyms encapsulated within hash symbols. This allows the sender of information to limit the content of its messages to what the receiver indicated to support.
The following acronyms are used:
#SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
These data elements were used in pre-3.0.0 versions of the specification and SHALL NOT be sent to a receiver indicating support for v3.0.0 or higher.
#SupportedFromV2.X.Y#
These data elements relate to a feature introduced in v2.X.Y.
#DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
These data elements relate to the support of Device Information extensibility. These SHOULD only be sent to an eUICC indicating support for the extensibility (see section 4.3).
#SupportedFromV3.0.0#
These data elements relate to a feature introduced in v3.0.0. These SHALL NOT be sent to an eUICC indicating support for a version lower than v3.0.0.
#SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
These data elements relate to the support of the Remote Profile Management, a feature introduced in v3.0.0. These SHALL only be sent to an eUICC indicating support for this feature.
#SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
These data elements relate to the support of Enterprise Profiles, an optional feature introduced in v3.0.0. These SHALL only be sent to an eUICC indicating support for this feature.
#SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0#
These data elements relate to the support of the LPA Proxy/Profile Content Management, an optional feature introduced in v3.0.0. These SHALL only be sent to an eUICC indicating support for this feature.
#SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
These data elements relate to the support of the Device Change, an optional feature introduced in v3.0.0.
#SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0#
These data elements relate to the support of the Event Checking, an optional feature introduced in v3.0.0.
#SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0#
These data elements relate to the support of the Push Service, an optional feature introduced in v3.0.0.
#SupportedForMEPV3.0.0#
These data elements relate to the support of the Multiple Enabled Profiles, an optional feature introduced in v3.0.0.
#MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
These data elements were optional or not defined in pre-3.0.0 versions and SHALL always be provided in v3.0.0 or higher.
Backward compatibility with version 1 of this specification is not supported.
1.10 Editorial Guidelines
This specification is built according to these editorial guidelines:
ASN.1 code
ASN.1 references used as character style
JSON definitions
Input Data, Output Data
Status code "Subject - Reason"
Names and phrases that are defined in section 1.5 or referenced in the definition of acronyms in section 1.6 are capitalised. Words or phrases used according to their commonly understood meanings are not capitalised.
In addition, within section titles, table captions, and figure captions, the first word and every other word with length greater than three characters is capitalised.
Octet values and octet string values are represented by uppercase hexadecimal digits between single quotation marks, optionally with spaces after each pair of digits. For example, 'BF12' or '12 34 56 78'.
ASN.1 code is represented by lines containing no more than 80 characters. Where necessary to conform to this guideline, long definitions are represented by multiple consecutive lines.
Comments within ASN.1 code use only the single-line format defined in section 12.6.3 of [49]. The following additional considerations apply:
•Comments, which begin with a pair of hyphens (i.e., --), are always terminated by the end of the line (i.e., never by a second pair of hyphens).
•Comments that would result in lines longer than 80 characters are represented by multiple consecutive single-line comments, each less than 80 characters in width.
2 General Architecture
This section contains a technical description and architecture of the Remote SIM Provisioning System for consumer Devices. The statements in this section define the basic characteristics that need to be taken into account when reviewing this specification.
2.1 General Architecture Diagram
This section further specifies the Roles and interfaces associated with the Remote SIM Provisioning and Management of the eUICC for consumer Devices.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 1: Remote SIM Provisioning System, LPA in the Device
Figure 1 shows the entities required for Profile Download and RPM. Figure 1a shows the additional entities required for Profile Content Management using an LPA Proxy (LPRd) and a PCM Admin Agent. The PCM Admin Agent MAY be external to the LPAd.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 1a: Entities for Profile content management, LPA in the Device
PCM enables the exchange of APDUs between the PCMP and the Enabled Profile. This includes using all kind of APDU based Secure Channel Protocols, e.g., SCP03 [11] and SCP11 [13] defined by GlobalPlatform.
The LPRd triggers the PCM Admin Agent to start a PCM session and optionally relays progress information from the PCM Admin Agent to a Device Application. (See section 3.9.)
A Device with an LPAd SHOULD support PCM.
An eUICC that supports both the LPA Proxy and Remote Profile Management SHALL support the 'Contact PCMP' command.
A Device compliant with this specification SHALL implement at least one of the following:
•The LPAd, or
•The requirements for one of the options for the LPAe (section 5.11).
A Device that supports a non-removable eUICC without an LPAe SHALL provide an LPAd.
An eUICC compliant with this specification SHALL satisfy the following:
-The eUICC MAY implement the LPAe.
-A removable eUICC SHALL implement the LPA Services.
-A non-removable eUICC in a Device containing an LPAd SHALL implement the LPA Services.
A Device supporting both the LPAd and the LPAe SHALL implement an appropriate mechanism that sets the LPA to be used.
The above figure provides the complete description of the consumer Remote SIM Provisioning and Management system, when LPA is in the Device (LPAd).
The Remote SIM Provisioning and Management system also allows to have the LPA in the eUICC (LPAe). This architecture is shown in the following figure.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 2: Remote SIM Provisioning System, LPA in the eUICC
NOTE: LPR is not defined for LPAe. This may be added in a future version of this specification.
2.2 Roles
Roles are defined within SGP.21 [4] Architecture Specification section 3.
The DLOA Registrar is a role that stores DLOAs and provides an interface to enable authorised DLOA Management System to retrieve them. In the context of RSP, a well-known DLOA Registrar SHALL be defined (i.e., a well-known URL SHALL be defined), containing all the valid (not expired and not revoked) DLOAs delivered by the DLOA Authority. This DLOA Registrar MAY also contain additional DLOAs delivered by other authorities. DLOAs delivered by the DLOA Authority MAY be provided to other DLOA Registrars. The DLOA Registrar is defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA [57].
A DLOA Management System is any authorised system (e.g., a MNO backend system, an SM-DP+) interested in verifying the level of certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, or validation of a component (e.g., eUICC platform).
2.3 Interfaces
The following table provides information about the interfaces within the architecture.
Interface | Between | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|
ES2+ | Operator | SM-DP+ | Used by the Operator to order Profiles for specific eUICCs as well as other administrative functions. |
ES6 | Operator | eUICC | Used by the Operator for the management of Operator services via OTA services. |
ES8+ | SM-DP+ | eUICC | Provides a secure end-to-end channel between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC for the administration of the ISD-P and the associated Profile during download and installation. It provides Perfect Forward Secrecy. |
ES9+ | SM-DP+ | LPD | Used to provide a secure transport between the SM-DP+ and the LPA (LPD) for Profile Download, RPM, etc. |
ES10a | LDSd | eUICC | Used between the LDSd and the LPA Services to handle a Profile discovery. |
ES10b | LPDd | eUICC | Used between the LPDd and the LPA services to transfer a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC. This interface plays no role in the decryption of Profile Packages. |
ES10c | LUId | eUICC | Used between the LUId and the LPA services for Local Profile Management by the End User. |
ES11 | LDS | SM-DS | Used by the LDS to retrieve Event Records for the respective eUICC. |
ES12 | SM-DP+ | SM-DS | Used by the SM-DP+ to register Event Records with the SM-DS and to delete its Event Records. |
ES15 | SM-DS | SM-DS | Used in the case of deployments of cascaded SM-DSs to connect those SM-DSs. |
ES20 | PCMP | PCMAA | Used to send APDU scripts enhanced by additional information. |
ES21 | Device Application | LPRd | Used to trigger the PCMAA and to send PCM notifications to the Device Application. |
ES22 | Device Application | LPAd | Used by a Device Application to interwork with the LPA (out of scope of this specification). |
ES25 | UIMe | LUIe | Used between the UIMe and the LUIe to transfer End User related interaction. |
ESaa | PCMAA | enabled Profile | Used to select an application of the Enabled Profile and to exchange APDUs subsequently. Identical to the interface between the Admin Agent and the Secure Element defined in GP SERAM [74] and not further described in this specification. |
ESapp | Operator | Device Application | Interface between the Operator and the Device Application (out of scope of this specification). NOTE: an example of a protocol that can be used on ESapp can be found in [i1]. |
EShri | LUI | HRI Server | Used to retrieve High Resolution Icons. |
ESop | Operator | End User | Business interface between Operator and End user (out of scope of this specification). |
ESent | Operator | Enterprise | Interface between the Operator and the Enterprise (out of scope of this specification). |
ESeu | End User | LUI | Interface to initiate local profile management functions (out of scope of this specification). |
ESeum | eUICC | EUM | Administrative interface between the eUICC vendor (EUM) and the eUICC (out of scope of this specification). |
ESci | CI | SM-DP+ SM-DS EUM | This interface is used by the SM-DP+, SM-DS and EUM to request a certificate and retrieve certificate revocation status. Any other relying party MAY retrieve certificate revocation status. The interface for Certificate Signing Request is defined in SGP.14 [45] section 5.1. The interface for CRL retrieval is defined in the present document, section 4.5.2.1.2 "Extension CRL Distribution Points". |
ESdloa | DLOA Registrar | Management System | This interface is defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA [57] section 5. |
ESdsps | SM-DS | push server | Interface between SM-DS and push server (out of scope of this specification). |
ESps | push server | push client | Interface between push server and push client (out of scope of this specification). |
ESpc | push client | LPAd | Interface between push client and LPAd (out of scope of this specification). |
Table 1: Interfaces
2.4 eUICC Architecture
2.4.1 eUICC Overview
This section describes the internal high-level architecture of the eUICC. It should be noted that the eUICC architecture is very similar to that used in the GSMA Remote SIM Provisioning of Embedded UICC Technical specification [2]. Operator Profiles are stored inside Security Domains within the eUICC and are implemented using GlobalPlatform standards. These ensure that it is impossible for any Profile to access the applications or data of any other Profile stored on the eUICC. The same mechanism is currently in use within SIM cards to ensure payment applications are kept secure.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 3: Schematic Representation of the eUICC
2.4.2 ECASD
The Embedded UICC Controlling Authority Security Domain (ECASD) is responsible for secure storage of credentials required to support the required Security Domains on the eUICC.
There SHALL be only one ECASD on an eUICC. The ECASD SHALL be installed and personalized by the EUM (eUICC Manufacturer) during the eUICC manufacturing. After eUICC manufacturing, the ECASD SHALL be in life-cycle state PERSONALIZED as defined in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8] section 5.3.
The AID of the ECASD SHALL follow SGP.02 [2].
The ECASD SHALL contain:
•The eUICC’s Private Key(s) (SK.EUICC.SIG) for creating digital signatures
•The eUICC’s Certificate(s) for eUICC authentication (CERT.EUICC.SIG) containing the eUICC’s public key(s) (PK.EUICC.SIG)
•The eSIM Certificate Issuer’s (CI) RootCA Public Key(s) (PK.CI.SIG) for verifying off-card entities certificates (e.g., SM-DP+) and Certificate Revocation List (CRL). ECASD MAY contain several public keys belonging to the same eSIM CA or different eSIM CAs. Each PK.CI.SIG SHALL be stored with information coming from the CERT.CI.SIG the key is included in, at least:
oeSIM Certificate Issuer OID
oSubject Key Identifier: required to verify the Certificate chain of the off-card entity
•The Certificate(s) of the EUM (CERT.EUM.SIG), and, optionally, the Certificate(s) of the EUM SubCA (CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG)
The ECASD SHOULD also contain:
•eUICC Manufacturer’s (EUMs) keyset for key/certificate renewal, which is used in one or more of the following functions:
oRenew eUICC’s Private Key(s) and Certificate(s)
oRenew EUM Certificate(s) and, optionally, EUM SubCA Certificate(s)
oRenew eSIM CA RootCA public key(s)
-Add new eUICC Private Key(s), eUICC Certificate(s), EUM Certificate(s) and, optionally, EUM SubCA Certificate(s)
-Remove eUICC’s Certificate(s)
-Remove EUM Certificate(s) and related eUICC’s Certificate(s)
-Add new eSIM CA RootCA Public Key(s)
-Remove eSIM CA RootCA Public Key(s)
oGenerate a new Public/Private Key pair to support a new curve
The means by which the EUM SHOULD perform key/certificate renewal/generation/addition/removal is out of scope of this specification but, if provided, it SHALL be a GlobalPlatform [8] mechanism with a minimum security level corresponding to the security level of the key/Certificate on which the operation is performed (e.g., AES algorithm using a minimum key length of 128 bits for a renewal of ECC keys of 256 bits). The EUM MAY also revoke an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate on the eUICC (e.g., by deleting the related public key).
The ECASD SHALL provide the following services to the ISD-R:
•eUICC signature creation on material provided by an ISD-R
•Verification of the off-card entities certificates (e.g., SM-DP+), provided by an ISD-R, with the eSIM CA RootCA public key (PK.CI.SIG)
Personalisation of the ECASD SHALL be done in a certified 'GSMA SAS-UP environment' according to the SAS UP specification [77].
2.4.3 ISD-R
The ISD-R is responsible for the creation of new ISD-Ps and lifecycle management of all ISD-Ps.
There SHALL be only one ISD-R on an eUICC.
The ISD-R SHALL be installed and personalized by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing. The ISD-R SHALL be associated with itself. The ISD-R privileges SHALL be granted according to Annex A.
The ISD-R cannot be deleted or disabled.
2.4.4 ISD-P
The ISD-P is the on-card representative of the SM-DP+ and is a secure container (Security Domain) for the hosting of a Profile. The ISD-P is used for the Profile download and installation in collaboration with the Profile Package Interpreter for the decoding/interpretation of the received Profile Package.
An ISD-P hosts a unique Profile.
No component outside the ISD-P SHALL have visibility or access to any Profile Component with the exception of the ISD-R, which SHALL have access to Profile Metadata.
A Profile Component SHALL NOT have any visibility of, or access to, components outside its ISD-P. An ISD-P SHALL NOT have any visibility of, or access to, any other ISD-P.
Deletion of a Profile SHALL remove the containing ISD-P and all Profile Components of the Profile.
2.4.5 Profile
A Profile consists of Profile Components:
•One MNO-SD
•Supplementary Security Domains (SSD) and a CASD
•Applets
•Applications, e.g., NFC applications
•NAAs
•Other elements of the File System
•Profile Metadata, including Profile Policy Rules
The MNO-SD is the on-card representative of the Operator. It contains the Operator’s Over-The-Air (OTA) keys and provides a secure OTA channel.
All Security Domains of a Profile SHALL be located in the hierarchy of the MNO-SD or an SD extradited to itself.
The behaviour of an eUICC with an Enabled Profile SHALL be equivalent to a UICC. This applies especially for the NAAs and applets contained in the Profile.
When a Profile is Disabled, the eUICC SHALL ensure that:
•Remote management of any Profile Component is not possible via the ES6 interface.
•The file system within the Profile cannot be selected by the Device or any application on the eUICC.
•The applications (including NAAs and Security Domains) within the Profile cannot be selected, triggered or individually deleted.
•For an eUICC compliant with M4M [58], no M4M Virtual Card inside that Profile is visible nor accessible through any interface.
2.4.5.1 Operational Profile
An Operational Profile SHALL have its Profile Class set to 'operational' in its Profile Metadata to indicate to the LPA and the eUICC that it SHALL be handled in the manner that is appropriate for an Operational Profile.
2.4.5.2 Provisioning Profile
A Provisioning Profile SHALL have its Profile Class set to 'provisioning' in its Profile Metadata to indicate to the LPA and the eUICC that it SHALL be handled in the manner that is appropriate for a Provisioning Profile. In every other respect, a Provisioning Profile SHALL have the same format structure as any other Profile.
Provisioning Profile Impact on LUI
Provisioning Profiles and their associated Profile Metadata SHALL NOT be visible to the End User in the LUI. As a result, Provisioning Profiles SHALL NOT be selectable by the End User nor deletable through any End User action, including eUICC Memory Reset.
Provisioning Profile and Operational Profile Policies
Provisioning Profiles SHALL still be usable, even if the currently enabled Operational Profile is subject to Profile Policy Rule 'ppr1'. In the case where a Provisioning Profile needs to be enabled, the LPA SHALL directly enable the Provisioning Profile, without first explicitly disabling the currently enabled Operational Profile; the eUICC SHALL allow this operation and implicitly disable the currently enabled Operational Profile regardless of the Profile Policy Rule.
2.4.5.3 Test Profile
An eUICC MAY support Test Profiles.
A Test Profile SHALL have its Profile Class set to 'test' in its Profile Metadata to indicate to the LPA and the eUICC that it SHALL be handled in the manner that is appropriate for a Test Profile. To ensure that a Test Profile is not used as an Operational Profile, the value of its key(s) for network authentication SHALL comply with one of the following:
1.All bits except the lowest 32 bits set to zero.
2.'00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F' (default K value of Test USIM as defined in Section 8.2 of 3GPP TS 34.108 [62]).
3.Any arbitrary value, if the network authentication algorithm is the Test Algorithm as defined in Section 8.1.2 of 3GPP TS 34.108 [62] or the IMSI value complies with the Test USIM IMSI defined in Section 8.3.2.2 of 3GPP TS 34.108 [62].
When a Test Profile is downloaded, the eUICC SHALL accept keys compliant with (1) and SHOULD accept keys compliant with (2) or (3).
Preloaded Test Profiles SHALL comply with one of these conditions.
In every other respect, a Test Profile SHALL have the same format structure as any other Profile.
NOTE: A live commercial network would never use a key with so little entropy.
Test Profiles and their associated Profile Metadata SHALL be visible in the LUI when the Device is in Device Test Mode.
The only indication the eUICC receives about the Device entering Test Mode is the initial enabling of a Test Profile. Other Test Profiles may be enabled subsequently. The explicit disabling of the current Test Profile or the enabling of a non-Test Profile indicates to the eUICC that Device Test Mode was left. If an Operational Profile was in Enabled state before the (first) Test Profile was enabled, the eUICC will ensure that this Operational Profile is re-enabled when the Test Profile is disabled. This ensures that the Profile Policy Rule "Disabling not allowed" is handled consistently. (See sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for details.)
Even though Profile Policy Rules do not apply for MEP, the same re-enabling mechanism is specified for MEP. While a Test Profile is enabled on an eSIM Port, the LPAd SHALL not enable the temporarily disabled Operational Profile on a different eSIM Port. The behaviour of the eUICC for such attempts or for any other exceptional action by the LPAd is neither specified nor are such cases covered in the procedures in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
NOTE: While the LPAd can receive an implementation specific notification when the Device enters/leaves Test Mode, such a mechanism is not available for the LPAe. To avoid extra messages, the LPAe MAY implement a protected option in its user interface for activating Test Mode.
Even if configured in its Metadata, the eUICC will never generate Notifications related to the Enabling or Disabling of a Test Profile. In addition, no Notifications will be generated for an Operational Profile when switching to or from a Test Profile.
NOTE: The GSMA Generic Test Profile [85] is an example of a Test Profile that supports a wide range of development, certification, and repair/refurbishment testing activities.
2.4.6 Telecom Framework
The Telecom Framework is an Operating System service that provides standardised network authentication algorithms to the NAAs hosted in the ISD-Ps. Furthermore, it provides the capabilities to configure the algorithm with the necessary parameters in the Enabled Profile.
2.4.7 Profile Package Interpreter
The Profile Package Interpreter is an eUICC Operating System service that translates the Profile Package data as defined in eUICC Profile Package Specification [5] into an installed Profile using the specific internal format of the target eUICC.
NOTE: According to the eUICC Profile Package Specification [5], the eUICC also attempts to process Profile Packages indicating a different minor version.
2.4.8 LPAe
The LPAe is a functional element that provides the LPDe, LDSe and LUIe features. These features are similar to the features of an LPAd.
LPAe is optional.
The technical implementation of LPAe is up to the EUM. For example, the LPAe MAY be a feature of the ISD-R.
2.4.9 LPA Services
This role provides the necessary access to the services and data required by LPAd functions. These services include:
•Provide the address(es) of the Root SM-DS(s) and the Default SM-DP+, if configured
•Transfer Bound Profile Package from the LPAd to the ISD-P
•Provide list of installed Profiles and their Profile Metadata
•Retrieve EID
•Provide Local Profile Management Operations
•Provide Remote Profile Management
•Provide authentication and integrity verification for Event Retrieval from an SM-DS
•Provide pending Notifications
The conditions under which LPA Services SHALL be present are described in section 2.1.
2.4.10 Hardware Characteristics of the eUICC
The following requirements apply:
•The eUICC SHALL be based on Tamper Resistant Element.
•The eUICC SHALL be either a Discrete eUICC or an Integrated eUICC.
•A Discrete eUICC MAY either be removable or non-removable. A removable eUICC SHALL be packaged in a form factor specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [6].
2.4.11 Platform Characteristics of the eUICC
In compliance with SGP.21, the following requirements apply:
•The eUICC SHALL support SHA-1.
•The eUICC SHALL support TUAK [51].
•The eUICC SHALL support Milenage [52].
•All cryptographic functions SHALL be implemented in a tamper-resistant way and SHALL resist side-channel attacks.
2.4.11.1 Java Card packages
An eUICC supporting Java Card^(TM) SHALL support the Java Packages listed below. The implementation of each Package SHALL as a minimum be according to the given Package version and Specification version.
Package | Description | Package Version | Spec Version |
|---|---|---|---|
java.* (java.lang, java.io) | java.io defines a subset of the java.io package in the standard Java programming language. | 1.0 | Java Card^(TM) 3.0.5 Classic Edition |
java.lang Provides classes that are fundamental to the design of the Java Card technology subset of the Java programming language. | 1.0 | ||
javacard.* (javacard.framework, javacard.security) | javacard.framework Provides a framework of classes and interfaces for building, communicating with and working with Java Card^(TM) technology based applets. | 1.6 | Java Card^(TM) 3.0.5 Classic Edition |
javacard.security Provides classes and interfaces that contain publicly available functionality for implementing a security and cryptography framework on the Java Card^(TM) platform | 1.6 | ||
javacardx.* (javacardx.crypto) | javacardx.crypto Extension package that contains functionality, which may be subject to export controls, for implementing a security and cryptography framework on the Java Card^(TM) platform. | 1.6 | Java Card^(TM) 3.0.5 Classic Edition |
uicc.* (uicc.access, uicc.system, uicc.toolkit) | uicc.access This package provides the means to the applets for accessing the UICC file system defined in the TS 102 221 [6] specification. | 1.2 | TS 102 241 [53] Rel-9 |
uicc.system This package provides the means to the applets for accessing system wide services of the UICC platform. | 1.0 | ||
uicc.toolkit This package provides the means for the toolkit applets to register to the events of the common application toolkit (CAT) framework, to handle TLV information and to send proactive commands according to the ETSI TS 102 223 [31] specification. | 1.6 | ||
uicc.usim.* (uicc.usim.access, uicc.usim.toolkit) | uicc.usim.access This package provides the means for applets to get access to the files defined in the USIM, SIM and ISIM specification. | 1.0 | 3GPP TS 31.130 Rel-9 |
uicc.usim.toolkit This package provides the means for the toolkit applets to register to the events defined in the USAT and STK specification to handle TLV information and to send proactive command according to the ETSI 3GPP TS 31.111 and 3GPP TS 51.014 specification. | 1.8 | ||
org.globalplatform | Provides a framework of classes and interfaces related to core services defined for smart cards based on GlobalPlatform specifications | 1.6 | GP 2.3 [8] |
Table 2: Java Card Packages
The following additional Java Card packages SHALL be supported by an eUICC supporting NFC:
Package | Description | Package Version | Spec Version |
|---|---|---|---|
javacardx.* (javacardx.external, javacardx.framework.tlv, javacardx.framework.util.intx) | javacardx.external Extension package that provides mechanisms to access memory subsystems which are not directly addressable by the Java Card^(TM) runtime environment (Java Card^(TM) RE) on the Java Card^(TM) platform. | 1.0 | Java Card^(TM) 3.0.5 Classic Edition |
javacardx.framework.tlv Extension package that contains functionality, for managing storage for BER TLV formatted data, based on the ASN.1 BER encoding rules of ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, as well as parsing and editing BER TLV formatted data in I/O buffers. | 1.0 | ||
javacardx.framework.util.intx Extension package that contains common utility functions for using int components. | 1.0 | ||
uicc.hci.* (uicc.hci.framework, uicc.hci.services.cardemulation, uicc.hci.services.connectivity, uicc.hci.services.readermode) | uicc.hci.framework This package defines the basic interfaces for the HCI protocol. | 1.1 | TS 102 705 Rel-9 |
uicc.hci.services.cardemulation This package defines the interfaces for the card emulation mode of the HCI protocol. | 1.0 | ||
uicc.hci.services.connectivity This package defines the interfaces for the functionality of the connectivity gate defined in the HCI protocol. | 1.0 | ||
uicc.hci.services.readermode This package defines the interfaces for the reader emulation mode of the HCI protocol. | 1.0 | ||
org.globalplatform.contactless | Provides a framework of classes and interfaces related to contactless services defined for smart cards based on GlobalPlatform specifications | 1.3 | Amd C 1.2 [10] |
Table 3: Java Card Packages
2.4.12 Profile Policy Enabler
The Profile Policy Enabler is described in detail in section 2.9.3.
2.4.13 eUICC OS Update
An eUICC SHOULD support a mechanism for eUICC OS Update. If such a mechanism is supported, it SHALL be secure. The eUICC OS Update capability allows the OS manufacturer to correct errors in existing features on the eUICC by updating the eUICC OS.
The process and mechanisms used to perform an eUICC OS Update are Device manufacturer and EUM implementation-specific and therefore out of scope of this version of the specification. However, the eUICC OS Update mechanism SHALL fulfil the requirements defined in SGP.21 [4].
This operation MAY affect information contained within euiccInfo1 and euiccInfo2.
Following any eUICC OS Update, the eUICC SHALL remain compliant according to the RSP Certification process as specified in SGP.24 [64].
2.4a ASN.1
The description of some data objects in this specification is based on ASN.1 specified in ITU‑T X.680 [49] and encoded in TLV structures using DER (Distinguished Encoding Rule) encoding as specified in ITU-T X.690 [50]. This provides a flexible description of those data objects.
The Remote SIM Provisioning format is defined in a single, self-contained, ASN.1 definition module called RSPDefinitions, with an ISO Object Identifier in the GSMA namespace.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
RSPDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) gsma(146) rsp(1) spec-version(1) version-three(3)}
DEFINITIONS
AUTOMATIC TAGS
EXTENSIBILITY IMPLIED ::=
BEGIN
-- ASN1STOPTwo encoding/decoding attributes are defined:
•AUTOMATIC TAGS means that the tags are defined automatically using the encoding rules unless a tag notation is present in a data object format definition.
•EXTENSIBILITY IMPLIED means that types MAY have elements that are not defined in this specification. This means that decoders SHALL be able to handle values with unspecified tags, either by processing them if they know their value content, or ignoring them silently (without reporting an error) if they do not know them. This is useful when processing data definitions from a newer specification and to handle proprietary tag values.
As the eUICC cannot implement an off-the-shelf standard decoder, the requirement on extensibility SHALL NOT apply to the eUICC. In some cases the eUICC is even mandated to report undefined tags, see e.g., sections 3.1.5 and 5.7.6.
The following general rules SHALL apply for the compliance of entities according to this specification:
•A sender of data defined in this specification SHALL comply with the exact definition of the data structure.
•A receiver is only mandated to check incoming data where such a check is explicitly required by this specification. Otherwise, a receiver is free to tolerate deviations (e.g., strings longer than the defined maximum) or reject them. If the receiver does not understand a field, the receiver SHALL silently ignore it without reporting an error (i.e., SHALL NOT parse or process the value content). If the receiver is requested to sign or verify the signature of a data object containing those unknown field(s), the receiver SHALL perform the request on the entire data object.
NOTE: Unless otherwise specified in this specification, an optional field should be present only when the field has a value, i.e., it should not be present with empty content.
This specification relies on X.509 data objects imported from libraries defined in RFC 5280 [17]:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
IMPORTS Certificate, CertificateList, Time FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18)}
SubjectKeyIdentifier FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19)}
UICCCapability FROM PEDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) tca(143) euicc-profile(1) spec-version(1) version-three(3)};
-- The UICCCapability import module version is defined in section 4.3
-- ASN1STOP2.4a.1 Common ASN.1 data types
NOTE: Other common data types may be added here in future versions.
2.4a.1.0 Data type: Miscellaneous
The following constant, types and objects are used in this specification.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
id-rsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) gsma(146) rsp(1)}
-- Basic types, for size constraints
Octet1 ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1))
Octet4 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(4))
Octet8 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))
Octet16 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
OctetTo16 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..16))
Octet32 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(32))
VersionType ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(3)) -- major/minor/revision version are coded as binary value on byte 1/2/3, e.g., '02 00 0C' for v2.0.12.
-- If revision is not used (e.g., v2.1), byte 3 SHALL be set to '00'.
Iccid ::= [APPLICATION 26] OCTET STRING (SIZE(10)) -- ICCID as coded in EFiccid, corresponding tag is '5A'
RemoteOpId ::= [2] INTEGER {installBoundProfilePackage(1)}
TransactionId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..16))
-- Definition of OIDs
id-rsp-cert-objects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rsp 2}
-- value 0 in id-rsp-cert-objects was assigned in SGP.22 v2.x
-- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
id-rspRole OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rsp-cert-objects 1}
-- Definition of OIDs for role identification in certificates
id-rspRole-ci OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 0}
id-rspRole-ciSubCa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-ci 0}
id-rspRole-eum OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-ciSubCa 0}
id-rspRole-eumSubCa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-eum 0}
id-rspRole-euicc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-eumSubCa 0}
id-rspRole-dpSubCa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-ciSubCa 1}
id-rspRole-dp-tls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dpSubCa 0}
id-rspRole-dp-auth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dpSubCa 1}
id-rspRole-dp-pb OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dpSubCa 2}
id-rspRole-dsSubCa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-ciSubCa 2}
id-rspRole-ds-tls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dsSubCa 0}
id-rspRole-ds-auth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dsSubCa 1}
-- The following OIDs are used in Variant O and OO Certificates
id-rspRole-euicc-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 1}
id-rspRole-eum-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 2}
id-rspRole-dp-tls-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 3}
id-rspRole-dp-auth-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 4}
id-rspRole-dp-pb-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 5}
id-rspRole-ds-tls-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 6}
id-rspRole-ds-auth-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 7}
-- Definition of OIDs for RSP-specific extensions in Certificates
-- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
id-rsp-extensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rsp-cert-objects 2}
id-rsp-extension-permitted-eins OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-rsp-extensions 0}
-- The extnValue field of the id-rsp-extension-permitted-eins extension SHALL be of type PermittedEins:
PermittedEins ::= SEQUENCE OF PrintableString
-- ASN1STOP2.4a.1.1 Data type: PprIds
The data type PprIds codes the identifiers for Profile Policy Rules defined in this document.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
PprIds ::= BIT STRING {-- Definition of Profile Policy Rules identifiers
pprUpdateControl(0), -- defines how to update PPRs via ES6
ppr1(1), -- Indicator for PPR1 'Disabling of this Profile is not allowed'
ppr2(2) -- Indicator for PPR2 'Deletion of this Profile is not allowed'
}
-- ASN1STOPFor pprX: a bit set to '1' indicates that the corresponding PPR is set.
Further versions of this specification MAY introduce new Profile Policy Rule identifiers
2.4a.1.2 Data type: OperatorId
The data type OperatorId contains the identification of an Operator. This type is used to identify a Profile Owner.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
OperatorId ::= SEQUENCE {
mccMnc OCTET STRING (SIZE(3)), -- MCC&MNC coded as 3GPP TS 24.008
gid1 OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- referring to content of EF GID1 (file identifier '6F3E') in 3GPP TS 31.102 [54]
gid2 OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- referring to content of EF GID2 (file identifier '6F3F') in 3GPP TS 31.102 [54]
}
-- ASN1STOPCoding of mccMnc: contains MCC (3 digits) and MNC (2 or 3 digits) on 3 bytes coded as in 3GPP TS 24.008 [32]. For instance, an Operator identified by 246 for the MCC and 81 for the MNC will be coded as bytes 1 to 3: '42' 'F6' '18'.
Coding of gid1 and gid2: both are optional. If provided, their content SHALL be coded as defined in 3GPP TS 31.102 [54].
In case the Profile contains multiple USIM applications, the OperatorId SHALL reflect the values of one of the USIM applications.
NOTE: Additional mechanism for identifying MVNO/Service Providers is for further study.
2.4a.1.3 Data type: RpmConfiguration
The data type RpmConfiguration defines the configuration on RPM support of a Profile.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
RpmConfiguration ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
managingDpList [0] SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
managingDpOid [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- Managing SM-DP+ OID
rpmType [1] RpmType OPTIONAL,
tagList [APPLICATION 28] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
},
pollingAddress [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- Tag '81'
allowedCiPKId [2] SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- eSIM CA RootCA PKID that is allowed for managing SM-DP+s
profileOwnerOid [3] OBJECT IDENTIFIER
}
RpmType ::= BIT STRING{
enable(0), disable(1), delete(2), listProfileInfo(3), contactPcmp(4)
}
-- ASN1STOPmanagingDpList contains a list of Managing SM-DP+s identified by their OIDs. Multiple bits can be set in rpmType, where a bit set to '1' indicates that the Managing SM-DP+ is allowed to perform the corresponding RPM Command, except for 'Update Metadata'. If a Managing SM-DP+ is allowed to perform 'Update Metadata', then the list of data objects that the Managing SM-DP+ can update SHALL be specified in the tagList (defined in section 5.7.15).
pollingAddress contains the address of either SM-DP+ or SM-DS as an FQDN.
allowedCiPKId specifies the only eSIM CA RootCA public key that is allowed for authentication of the Managing SM-DP+(s) specified by managingDpList. If allowedCiPKId is absent then any eSIM CA RootCA public key may be used.
profileOwnerOid contains the OID of the Profile Owner.
2.4a.1.4 Data type: LocalisedTextMessage
The data type LocalisedTextMessage contains a text string and the language associated with it.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
LocalisedTextMessage ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
languageTag UTF8String DEFAULT "en", -- language tag as defined by RFC 5646
message UTF8String
}
-- ASN1STOP2.4a.1.5 Data type: LprConfiguration
The data type LprConfiguration defines the configuration for the LPRd.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
LprConfiguration ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0#
pcmpAddress [0] UTF8String,
dpiEnable [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL,
triggerLprOnEnableProfile [2] NULL OPTIONAL
}
-- ASN1STOPpcmpAddress contains the FQDN of the PCMP server.
dpiEnable contains the DPI which if present is appended to the pcmpAddress if the LPR is triggered upon local enabling.
If triggerLprOnEnableProfile is present, then the LPA SHALL trigger the LPR session after local enabling the Profile.
2.4a.1.6 Data type: CertificateChain
The data type CertificateChain contains a chain of Certificates.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START CertificateChain ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# -- ASN1STOP
Each subsequent Certificate in the list SHALL certify the one preceding it. The eSIM CA RootCA Certificate SHALL be omitted.
2.4a.1.7 Data type: EnterpriseConfiguration
The data type EnterpriseConfiguration defines the configuration of an Enterprise Profile.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
EnterpriseConfiguration ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseOid [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
enterpriseName [1] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)),
enterpriseRules [2] SEQUENCE {
enterpriseRuleBits [0] BIT STRING {
referenceEnterpriseRule (0),
priorityEnterpriseProfile (1),
onlyEnterpriseProfilesCanBeInstalled (2)
},
numberOfNonEnterpriseProfiles [1] INTEGER -- that can be Enabled
} OPTIONAL
}
-- ASN1STOPenterpriseOid contains the OID of the Enterprise. This field SHALL NOT be modifiable after the installation of an Enterprise Profile.
enterpriseName contains the name of the Enterprise.
enterpriseRules defines the Enterprise Rules of the Enterprise Profile as follows.
•referenceEnterpriseRule indicates that the Enterprise Rule of this Enterprise Profile is the Reference Enterprise Rule. The next bits and numberOfNonEnterpriseProfiles described hereunder affect the Enterprise Capable Device only when this bit is set. The eUICC of an Enterprise Owned Device SHALL ensure that at most one Enterprise Profile has this bit set among the installed Enterprise Profiles.
•priorityEnterpriseProfile indicates that the End User can enable only this Enterprise Profile or has to enable this Enterprise Profile before being able to enable any other Profile.
•onlyEnterpriseProfilesCanBeInstalled indicates that the End User can install only Enterprise Profiles.
•numberOfNonEnterpriseProfiles defines the maximum number of non-Enterprise Profiles that can be Enabled on an eUICC.
NOTE: This parameter may even be higher than the supported number of Profiles being Enabled in parallel. Dependent on the latter and the parameter priorityEnterpriseProfile, the actual number of non-Enterprise Profiles that can be Enabled may be lower.
2.4a.1.8 Data type: VendorSpecificExtension
The data type VendorSpecificExtension is used to send additional extensions that are not defined in this specification.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
OPENTYPE ::= CLASS {
&typeId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
&Type
}
VendorSpecificExtension ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0#
vendorOid [0] OPENTYPE.&typeId, -- OID of the vendor who defined this specific extension
vendorSpecificData [1] OPENTYPE.&Type
}
-- ASN1STOP2.4a.1.9 Data type: DeviceChangeConfiguration
The data type DeviceChangeConfiguration defines the configurations for the LPAd to support the Device Change of the Profile.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
DeviceChangeConfiguration ::= CHOICE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
requestToDp [0] SEQUENCE {
smdpAddressForDc UTF8String, -- SM-DP+ address that processes the Device Change
allowedCiPKId SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- PKID allowed for the SM-DP+ address that processes the Device Change
eidRequired NULL OPTIONAL, -- the EID of the new Device is required
tacRequired NULL OPTIONAL -- the TAC of the new Device is required
},
usingStoredAc [1] SEQUENCE {
activationCodeForDc UTF8String (SIZE(0..255)), -- Activation Code for Device Change of this Profile
deleteOldProfile NULL OPTIONAL -- deletion of this Profile is required before providing the Activation code to the new Device
}
}
-- ASN1STOPThe requestToDp consists of the following data objects for the LPAd to support the Device Change of the Profile by requesting to the SM-DP+:
-smdpAddressForDc contains the SM-DP+ address that SHALL process the Device Change of the Profile.
-allowedCiPKId specifies the only eSIM CA RootCA public key that is allowed for authentication of the SM-DP+ in the smdpAddressForDc. If allowedCiPKId is absent, then any eSIM CA RootCA public key may be used.
-eidRequired indicates that the EID of the new Device is required for the Device Change of the Profile. If eidRequired is present, then the LPA SHALL retrieve the EID from the new Device.
-tacRequired indicates that the TAC of the new Device is required for the Device Change of the Profile. If tacRequired is present, then the LPA SHALL retrieve the TAC from the new Device.
The usingStoredAc consists of the following data objects for the LPAd to support the Device Change of the Profile by using the Activation Code stored in the Profile Metadata:
•activationCodeForDc contains the Activation Code to be provided to the new Device to download the Profile for the Device Change.
•deleteOldProfile indicates that the Profile has to be deleted before the Activation Code is made available for the new Device.
2.4a.2 ASN.1 data type UTF8String
The size limits for UTF-8 strings apply to the number of UTF-8 characters, each coded on 1 to 4 bytes, see ISO/IEC 10646 [59]. Thus the length of the TLV object counted in bytes can be up to 4 times the number of characters.
The eUICC is not mandated to analyse the character structure of UTF-8 strings provided in a command. The LPA and a Managing SM-DP+ SHOULD be able to receive a string with 4 times as many UTF-8 characters as the ASN.1 size limit if such a string was previously stored in the eUICC.
2.5 Profile Protection and Delivery
This section describes how an Operator’s Profile is protected within a Profile Package prior to being downloaded to the eUICC. This also applies when the Profile Package is protected during transmission between Roles within the system.
2.5.1 Profile Package Types Overview
From generation to download, the Profile Package will take different formats. This specification uses the following terms:
•Unprotected Profile Package (UPP): Raw eUICC Profile Package TLV sequence.
•Protected Profile Package (PPP): Segmented and protected in BSP payload TLVs.
•Bound Profile Package (BPP): Prepended with session key agreement info, key replacement package, ISD-P creation and configuration info.
•Segmented Bound Profile Package (SBPP): BPP segmented into STORE DATA APDU script for loading into eUICC. This step is performed by the LPD when LPD is in the Device.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 4: Profile Package stage Description
The above diagram describes the case where Profile Package is protected with keys different from the session keys established during the key agreement with the eUICC (S‑ENC, S-MAC). It MAY also be possible to have a Profile Package protected with the session keys; in that case the 'Profile Protection Keys' block SHALL NOT be present.
2.5.2 Unprotected Profile Package
The Unprotected Profile Package (UPP) is generated by the SM-DP+, within the Profile Package Generation function. The Profile Package Generation takes as input the profile specification established with the Operator and input data provided by the Operator. The processes of profile specification and input data acquisition are out of scope of this specification.
The Unprotected Profile Package consists of a sequence of Profile Element (PE) TLVs according to the eUICC Profile Package specification [5].
2.5.3 Protected Profile Package
The Protected Profile Package (PPP) is generated by the SM-DP+, within the Profile Package Protection function.
The PPP SHALL be protected by the BSP. Command TLV encryption and MACing follows section 2.6.4.4. During this step the internal UPP structure is not considered, and rather seen as a unique block of data. That block of data is split into segments of a maximum size of 1020 bytes (including the tag, length field and MAC). The eUICC SHALL support receiving data segments of at least up to this size.
NOTE: When the BSP uses AES-CBC-128/AES-CMAC-128 or SM4-CBC/SM4-CMAC, the following applies: From the 1020 bytes of each data segment, only 1008 bytes are usable for payload (deducted the 1 byte tag, 3 bytes length field and 8 bytes MAC). Considering the necessary padding during encryption (16 bytes length block encryption and necessary '80' byte padding), then each data segment can only contain 1007 bytes of the PPP data block.
Profile protection SHALL be performed using either:
•Session keys (S-ENC, S-MAC) resulting from the key agreement with eUICC.
•Or random keys per Profile (denoted PPK-ENC and PPK-MAC), generated by the SM‑DP+.
The SM-DP+ SHALL support the random key mode and SHOULD support Session keys. It is the SM-DP+ choice (in line with the agreement with the Operator) as to which mode is selected.
The eUICC SHALL support both modes.
The random key mode allows performing Profile Package Protection in advance without having any eUICC knowledge. It may help to provide a better SM-DP+ scalability. If this mode is selected by the SM-DP+, the initial MAC chaining value to be used for the first segment of the PPP is provided together with the random keys (section 5.5.4) and the data block counter for ICV calculation is reset to its initial state (i.e., the value on 16 bytes is '00…01'). Otherwise, the MAC chaining method defined in section 2.6.4 SHALL be applied (i.e., the output of the previous segment SHALL be used as MAC chaining value).
S-ENC, S-MAC, PPK-ENC and PPK-MAC SHALL follow the key length defined in section 2.6.5.
Each data segment of the PPP is identified by the tag '86'.
In case the random key mode is used, the PPP is not bound to any particular eUICC or ISD-P AID value at this stage.
Session keys and, if used, the random keys SHALL only be used in the Profile download process. They SHALL be deleted on the eUICC latest at the end of the process.
The process of Profile creation is out of scope of this specification; however, the Operator MAY request the SM-DP+ to create multiple Profiles in advance. In this case the SM-DP+ SHALL create the Profiles in bulk, protect them using the random key mode, and store the resulting PPPs for later use.
2.5.4 Bound Profile Package
The Bound Profile Package (BPP) is generated by the SM-DP+, within the Profile Package Binding function. The purpose of this operation is to link a Protected Profile Package to a particular eUICC. This is done within a key agreement between the eUICC and the SM-DP+. See download and installation procedure (section 3.1.3).
The BPP comprises a sequence of TLV commands (in this order):
•TLV command for Key agreement in clear.
•Set of BSP payload TLVs (tag '87') containing TLV commands for ConfigureISDP
•Set of BSP payload TLVs (tag '88') containing TLV command for StoreMetadata
•Set of optional BSP payload TLVs (tag '87') containing TLV command for 'Profile Protection Keys'
•Followed by the BSP payload TLVs (tag '86') of the PPP
The encryption counter for ICV calculation is incremented each time a TLV with tag '86', '87' or '88' is received.
The data structure of the Bound Profile Package is as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
BoundProfilePackage ::= [54] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF36'
initialiseSecureChannelRequest [35] InitialiseSecureChannelRequest, -- Tag 'BF23'
firstSequenceOf87 [0] SEQUENCE OF [7] OCTET STRING, -- sequence of '87' TLVs
sequenceOf88 [1] SEQUENCE OF [8] OCTET STRING, -- sequence of '88' TLVs
secondSequenceOf87 [2] SEQUENCE OF [7] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- sequence of '87' TLVs
sequenceOf86 [3] SEQUENCE OF [6] OCTET STRING -- sequence of '86' TLVs
}
-- ASN1STOPThe following table describes the various sequences of '86', '87' and '88' TLV
Tag | Length | Value Description | MOC | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
'A0' | Var. | firstSequenceOf87 | M | ||
'87' | Var. | BSP segment containing ConfigureISDP, protected with session keys resulting from the key agreement (S-ENC, S-CMAC) (section 2.6.4) Content: TLV for "ES8+.ConfigureISDP" function (section 5.5.2) | M | ||
'A1' | Var | sequenceOf88 | M | ||
'88' | Var. | BSP segment containing StoreMetadata, MAC protected with session keys resulting from the key agreement (S-CMAC) (See section 2.6.4) (i.e., not encrypted). Content: TLV for "ES8+.StoreMetadata" function (section 5.5.3) | M | ||
'88' | Var. | Additional BSP segment(s) containing the remainder of StoreMetadata, only present if one '88' TLV is not able to contain the whole data structure. | C | ||
'A2' | Var. | secondSequenceOf87 SHALL be absent if no content | C | ||
'87' | Var. | BSP segment containing the Profile Protection Keys, protected with session keys resulting from the key agreement (S-ENC, S-CMAC) (section 2.6.4). Content: TLV for "ES8+.ReplaceSessionKeys" function (section 5.5.4) | O | ||
'A3' | Var. | sequenceOf86 | M | ||
'86' | Var. | BSP payload, segment b1 protected with Profile Protection Keys (PPK-ENC, PPK-MAC) or with session keys resulting from the key agreement (S-ENC, S-CMAC) (section 2.6.4). | M | ||
'86' | Var. | Subsequent BSP payload, segment b2…bn | O |
Table 4: Profile Installation sequences of TLV
2.5.4.1 Description of 'InitialiseSecureChannel' Block
This block comprises the TLVs for opening a remote personalisation session with eUICC, including key agreement.
These TLVs, part of the function "ES8+.InitialiseSecureChannel", are listed and described in section 5.5.1. These TLVs SHALL NOT be encrypted. Integrity and authenticity are ensured by the signatures.
The execution of this function by the eUICC will result in the generation of the BSP session keys, denoted S-ENC, S-MAC and initial MAC chaining value, that will be used by the SM-DP+ to protect subsequent TLVs.
2.5.4.2 Description of 'ConfigureISDP' Block
This block comprises one TLV for ISD-P creation and configuration.
The TLV, part of the function "ES8+.ConfigureISDP", is listed and described in section 5.5.2 . This TLV SHALL be encrypted and MACed with the BSP session keys.
2.5.4.3 Description of 'StoreMetadata' Block
This block comprises one or more TLV(s) containing the Profile Metadata.
The TLV(s), part of the function "ES8+.StoreMetadata", are listed and described in section 5.5.3. These TLV(s) SHALL be MACed only with the BSP session keys.
2.5.4.4 Description of 'Profile Protection Keys' Block
The 'Profile Protection Keys' block contains the function "ES8+.ReplaceSessionKeys" to replace the session S-ENC and S-MAC keys resulting from key agreement, by the keys used for protecting the Protected Profile Package, PPK-ENC and PPK_MAC.
This function is protected by BSP with the S-ENC and S-MAC keys resulting from the key agreement.
This block is optional depending on the mode selected by the SM-DP+ to protect the Profile Package (section 2.5.3).
2.5.5 Segmented Bound Profile Package
The Segmented Bound Profile Package (SBPP) is generated by the LPAd, to transfer the Bound Profile Package to the eUICC using the local interface ES10b.
The segmentation SHALL be done according to the structure of the Bound Profile Package:
•Tag and length fields of the BoundProfilePackage TLV plus the initialiseSecureChannelRequest TLV
•Tag and length fields of the first sequenceOf87 TLV plus the first '87' TLV
•Tag and length fields of the sequenceOf88 TLV
•Each of the '88' TLVs
•Tag and length fields of the sequenceOf87 TLV plus the first '87' TLV
•Tag and length fields of the sequenceOf86 TLV
•Each of the '86' TLVs
Each segment of this list that is up to 255 bytes is transported in one APDU. Larger TLVs are sent in blocks of 255 bytes for the first blocks and a last block that MAY be shorter.
At the beginning of each segment the block number of the STORE DATA commands SHALL be reset.
2.5.6 Profile Installation Result
The Profile Installation Result SHALL be returned by the eUICC after the execution of the last TLVs of the BPP, or right after the first BPP’s TLV executed with error. It MAY also be returned when the installation is interrupted.
The Profile Installation Result contains the following data:
•Notification Metadata: The Notification Metadata includes:
oSequence Number
oProfile Management Operation
oRecipient Address
oICCID (Not provided if the Notification reports an error that has happened before ICCID was known by the eUICC, otherwise it SHALL be present)
•Transaction ID: The Transaction Identifier given to the eUICC during the Profile "Download and Installation" procedure (section 3.1.3).
•Final Result: provides the final Profile installation status.
•SM-DP+ OID: The SM-DP+ OID as contained in CERT.DPpb.SIG used during the profile download and installation procedure (section 3.1.3).
•eUICC signature: A signature created by the eUICC ensuring the authenticity and the integrity of the Profile Installation Result.
The notificationAddress in the profileInstallationResultData SHALL be set to the serverAddress provided in "ES10b.AuthenticateServer".
Until the Profile Download and Installation process is completed or terminated, no Result is available for the LPA.
The Profile Installation Result SHALL be kept by the eUICC (which can hold one or several Profile Installation Results) until explicitly deleted by the LPA, after successfully delivered to the SM-DP+. Before being deleted the Profile Installation Result(s) MAY be retrieved at any time by the LPA.
When the eUICC needs to store a new Profile Installation Result, if there is not enough room the eUICC SHALL delete one or more of the previously stored Profile Installation Results in order of their Sequence Number, beginning with the lowest.
The Profile Installation Result SHALL be encoded in the ASN.1 data object as shown below. It SHALL include an eUICC signature data object computed as defined in section 2.6.9, using the eUICC private key SK.EUICC.SIG selected during the Profile Download and Installation procedure, across the data object ProfileInstallationResultData (tag 'BF 27').
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
-- Definition of Profile Installation Result
ProfileInstallationResult ::= [55] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF37'
profileInstallationResultData [39] ProfileInstallationResultData,
euiccSignPIR EuiccSign
}
ProfileInstallationResultData ::= [39] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF27'
transactionId[0] TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SM-DP+
notificationMetadata[47] NotificationMetadata,
smdpOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- SM-DP+ OID (value from CERT.DPpb.SIG)
finalResult [2] CHOICE {
successResult SuccessResult,
errorResult ErrorResult
}
}
EuiccSign ::= [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- Tag '5F37', eUICC’s signature
SuccessResult ::= SEQUENCE {
aid [APPLICATION 15] OCTET STRING (SIZE (5..16)), -- AID of ISD-P
ppiResponse OCTET STRING -- contains (multiple) 'EUICCResponse' of the Profile Package Interpreter as defined in [5]
}
ErrorResult ::= SEQUENCE {
bppCommandId BppCommandId,
errorReason ErrorReason,
ppiResponse OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- contains (multiple) 'EUICCResponse' of the Profile Package Interpreter as defined in [5]
}
BppCommandId ::= INTEGER {
initialiseSecureChannel(0),
configureISDP(1),
storeMetadata(2),
storeMetadata2(3),
replaceSessionKeys(4),
loadProfileElements(5)
}
ErrorReason ::= INTEGER {
incorrectInputValues(1),
invalidSignature(2),
invalidTransactionId(3),
unsupportedCrtValues(4),
unsupportedRemoteOperationType(5),
unsupportedProfileClass(6),
bspStructureError(7),
bspSecurityError(8),
installFailedDueToIccidAlreadyExistsOnEuicc(9),
installFailedDueToInsufficientMemoryForProfile(10),
installFailedDueToInterruption(11),
installFailedDueToPEProcessingError (12),
installFailedDueToDataMismatch(13),
testProfileInstallFailedDueToInvalidNaaKey(14),
pprNotAllowed(15),
enterpriseProfilesNotSupported(17), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseRulesNotAllowed(18), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseProfileNotAllowed(19), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseOidMismatch(20), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseRulesError(21), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseProfilesOnly(22), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
lprNotSupported(23), -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0#
unknownTlvInMetadata(26), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
installFailedDueToUnknownError(127)
}
-- ASN1STOPNOTE: Error reason values added since v3.0.0 are aligned with the cancel session reason values in section 5.7.14.
2.5.6.1 Profile Installation Result errors
ErrorReason data object contained in ErrorResult data object depends on the function that generated an error during processing of the BoundProfilePackage. The following table details authorised combinations:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ErrorReason in ErrorResult ES8+ function
---------------------------------------------------- --------------- ----------- ---------- --------- ----------
Initialise Configure Store Replace Load
Secure ISDP Metadata Session Profile
Channel Keys Elements
incorrectInputValues(1)
invalidSignature(2)
invalidTransactionId(3)
unsupportedCrtValues(4)
unsupportedRemoteOperationType(5)
unsupportedProfileClass(6)
bspStructureError(7)
bspSecurityError(8)
installFailedDueToIccidAlreadyExistsOnEuicc(9)
installFailedDueToInsufficientMemoryForProfile(10)
installFailedDueToInterruption(11)
installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12)
installFailedDueToDataMismatch(13)
testProfileInstallFailedDueToInvalidNaaKey(14)
pprNotAllowed(15)
enterpriseProfilesNotSupported(17)
enterpriseRulesNotAllowed(18)
enterpriseProfileNotAllowed(19)
enterpriseOidMismatch(20)
enterpriseRulesError(21)
enterpriseProfilesOnly(22)
lprNotSupported(23)
unknownTlvInMetadata(26)
installFailedDueToUnknownError(127)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 4a: Authorised combinations of ES8+ Errors
If an error is generated during the processing of a ProfileElement of the eUICC Profile Package, ppiResponse SHALL be set as provided by the Profile Package Interpreter, and a corresponding ErrorReason SHALL be set in the Profile Installation Result according to the following table:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- eUICC Profile Package error status in PEStatus ErrorReason in ErrorResult ----------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------- pe-not-supported(1) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) memory-failure(2) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) bad-values(3) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) not-enough-memory(4) installFailedDueToInsufficientMemoryForProfile(10) invalid-request-format(5) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) invalid-parameter(6) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) runtime-not-supported(7) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) lib-not-supported(8) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) template-not-supported(9) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) feature-not-supported(10) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) unsupported-profile-version(31) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) Other eUICC Profile Package status codes except (0) installFailedDueToPEProcessingError(12) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4b: eUICC Profile Package error mapping to ErrorReason
For the following ErrorReason values, which indicate that Profile installation failed due to a requirement in this specification, any eUICC Profile Package status code MAY be set:
installFailedDueToDataMismatch(13)
testProfileInstallFailedDueToInvalidNaaKey(14)
The following ErrorReason values SHALL be treated by the SM-DP+ as temporary errors, where the SM-DP+ SHALL allow retries of the Profile download as long as the download retry limit is not exceeded:
installFailedDueToInsufficientMemoryForProfile(10)
installFailedDueToInterruption(11)
All other ErrorReason values SHALL be treated as permanent errors.
2.6 Security Overview
This section provides an overview of the overall ecosystem security features.
2.6.1 Certification of the Entities
Functional compliance and security certification requirements according to SGP.24 [64] SHALL apply for the eUICC, the EUM, the SM-DP+ and the SM-DS.
The Device and the LPA SHALL comply with the security features defined in this specification and SGP.21 [4].
2.6.2 Remote Secure Communication
The RSP ecosystem relies on remote secure communication to achieve function execution requests and data exchanges. Any of the remote secure communication defined for RSP and not listed in the exceptions at the end of this section SHALL follow the rules below.
Mutual authentication:
•The Server (the entity providing the function, e.g., SM-DP+) SHALL be authenticated first by the Client (the entity requesting the function). Authentication SHALL include the verification of a Server Certificate chain ending at an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate (section 4.5.2).
•The Client SHALL be authenticated by the Server in a second step. In case the Client is the eUICC, authentication SHALL include the verification of a eUICC Certificate chain ending at an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate (section 4.5.2). Client authentication does not apply to the LPA.
Data privacy:
•The eUICC, as a Client, SHALL NOT reveal any private data to an unauthenticated Server.
•The eUICC, as a Client, SHALL NOT generate any signed material before having authenticated the Server.
Communication protection:
•Once authenticated, the remote entities SHALL negotiate a common cryptographic suite for further communication.
•The communication SHALL be origin authenticated, as well as integrity and confidentiality protected.
•Session keys SHALL be generated using Perfect Forward Secrecy.
Authorisation:
•On the basis of authentication, the Server SHALL always check that the requesting Client is authorised before delivering the requested function execution.
The following exception from these security rules exists:
•Other Notifications are origin authenticated, integrity and replay protected, in addition to the protection provided by TLS as defined in section 2.6.6.
•For the communication between the LPA and the HRI Server, only the protection by TLS as defined in section 2.6.6 SHALL be used.
2.6.3 Public Key Infrastructure
General security of the RSP ecosystem is based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Any Certificate defined in this specification has a validation chain ending at an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate (section 4.5.2), except TLS Certificates that MAY instead chain to a Public CA.
Certificates MAY be revoked; Revocation status are managed and made available by their issuer (see section 2.7).
Certificates are used for authentication of their owners via signatures created with the associated private keys.
2.6.4 BPP Security Protocol
This section defines a security protocol for Profile Protection and eUICC Binding, named BPP Security Protocol (BSP).
NOTE: The protocol was initially derived from GlobalPlatform's SCP11a as specified by the GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment F [13].
2.6.4.1 Key agreement
An Elliptic Curve Key Agreement Algorithm (ECKA) is used for the establishment of a shared secret value. It shall follow the definition for the Anonymous Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement in BSI TR-03111 [41]. The algorithm is executed
•by the SM-DP+ using otPK.EUICC.KA and otSK.DP.KA, and
•by the eUICC using otPK.DP.KA and otSK.EUICC.KA
to calculate the shared secret value.
NOTE 1: Ephemeral keys are renamed to one-time keys in this specification, as they MAY live longer and are stored in non-volatile memory. With respect to Perfect Forward Secrecy, they serve the same purpose.
NOTE 2: The BSP itself does not provide authentication. Authentication is provided by signatures outside of the BSP.
2.6.4.2 Key derivation
Session keys and an initial MAC chaining value are derived from the shared secret value as follows:
•Concatenate the following values as SharedInfo as input for the Key Derivation process (this data is the one given as input data in the function "ES8+.InitialiseSecureChannel"):
-Key type (1 byte)
-Key length (1 byte)
-HostID-LV and EID-LV. HostID-LV comprises the length and the value field of the HostID given in the input data; EID-LV comprises the length and value field of the EID.
•Initial MAC Chaining value, S-ENC and S-MAC are taken from KeyData derived from the shared secret value and the SharedInfo as defined in BSI TR-03111 [41] for the "X9.63 Key Derivation Function". SHA-256 SHALL be used for the key derivation to calculate KeyData of sufficient length. Data is assigned as defined in the following table:
----------------------------------------------------------------------- KeyData Key ---------------------------- ------------------------------------------ 1 to L Initial MAC chaining value L+1 to 2L S-ENC 2L+1 to 3L S-MAC -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4c: Key Data
The initial MAC chaining value is used for the computation of the MAC of the first data block as defined below.
2.6.4.3 Command TLV Protection Overview
The next two section describe how data is protected by the BSP.
NOTE: An earlier version of the protocol, named SCP03t, was derived from GlobalPlatform's SCP03 [11] and can be found in SGP.02 [2]. As the protocol in this document was further modified and not much is left of SCP03, a new name is used.
BSP defines two options for protecting Command TLVs:
-MAC and encryption
-MAC only
Command TLVs do not create response TLVs.
2.6.4.4 Command TLV MACing and Encryption
BSP C-MAC and C-ENCRYPTION are done as follows:
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 4a: TLV Command Data Field Encryption and C-MAC computation
Procedure:
1.The data field is padded according to the encryption algorithm and mode used, as defined in table 4c.
If this algorithm is AES-CBC-128 or SM4-CBC, padding SHALL be done as follows:
-Append a byte with value '80' to the right of the data block;
-Append 0 to 15 bytes with value '00' so that the length of the padded data block is a multiple of 16 bytes.
2.The result of step 1 is encrypted according to the encryption algorithm and mode used, as defined in table 4c.
If this algorithm is AES-CBC-128 or SM4-CBC, the following applies:
-The data blocks SHALL be numbered starting from 1
-The binary value of this number SHALL be left padded with zeroes to form a full block.
-This block SHALL be encrypted with S-ENC to produce the ICV for command encryption.
3.The input data used for C-MAC computation comprises the MAC Chaining value, the tag, the final length and the result of step 2.
-The initial MAC Chaining value is set as defined in 2.6.4.2 or 2.6.4.6.
-Subsequent MAC chaining values are the full result of step 4 of the previous data block (which may also be a data block with C-MAC only).
4.The full MAC value is computed using the MACing algorithm as defined in table 4c.
5.The output data is computed by concatenating the following data: the tag, the final length, the result of step 2 and the C-MAC value.
If the algorithm is AES-CBC-128 or SM4-CBC, the C-MAC value is the 8 most significant bytes of the result of step 4.
2.6.4.5 Command TLV MACing
BSP C-MAC only is done as follows:
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 4b: TLV Command C-MAC computation
Procedure:
1.Data used for C-MAC computation comprised MAC Chaining value, applicable tag (e.g., tag ‘88’ for Metadata data segment), length and data.
In case algorithm is AES-CMAC-128 or SM4-CBC, the following applies:
-MAC chaining values are the full result of the previous data block (which may also be a data block with C-ENCRYPTION and C-MAC).
2.C-MAC is computed according to symmetric algorithm used, as defined in table 4c.
3.The output data is computed by concatenating the following data: the tag, the final length, the data and the C-MAC value.
If the algorithm is AES-CBC-128 or SM4-CBC, the C-MAC value is the 8 most significant bytes of the result of step 2.
The data block counter for ICV calculation is incremented also for each segment with C-MAC only.
2.6.4.6 Key replacement
The session keys can be replaced by providing new keys and a new initial MAC chaining value within a protected Command TLV, see section 5.5.4.
The data block counter used to calculate the ICV for encryption SHALL also be reset to its initial value after a key replacement.
2.6.5 Cryptographic Negotiation, Algorithms and Key Length
This section describes the mechanism for cryptographic negotiation at application layer between the eUICC and the RSP Server used on top of TLS. TLS provides its own cryptographic negotiation (see section 2.6.6.1). The cryptographic negotiation at the application layer is independent of TLS.
The application layer cryptographic negotiation proceeds between the eUICC and the RSP Server at the beginning of each RSP Session. All the cryptography is determined based on the RSP Server Certificate selected for the Common Mutual Authentication procedure. See section 3.0.1 for the detailed description of the procedure. Application layer cryptography is constrained to a limited number of algorithm sets listed in Tables 4c and 4d. Additional algorithm sets may be defined in the future.
The cryptographic negotiation starts with the eUICC providing the list of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers that it supports for signature verification and signature generation within the ES9+.InitiateAuthentication function (see section 5.6.1).
Then the SM-DP+ selects a Certificate (CERT.XXauth.SIG) whose chain ends at one of the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate(s) that the eUICC supports for signature verification (the selection process is further detailed in section 5.6.1).
Each Public Key Identifier refers to an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate, which implicitly defines other cryptographic algorithms that the RSP Server and the eUICC SHALL use during the RSP session. This specification also mandates a simplification that all the Certificates in a chain SHALL have the same signature algorithm (i.e., 'AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm' and 'AlgorithmIdentifier.parameters' fields in the 'subjectPublicKeyInfo' have the same values in all Certificates of the chain). This simplification ensures that a receiving party is able to verify both the selected Certificate chain and the signature.
Based on the signature algorithm mentioned in the CERT.XXauth.SIG, cryptographic algorithms to be used during the RSP Session SHALL be determined according to the table below:
Signature algorithm and parameters from CERT.XXauth.SIG | Key agreement algorithm and parameters | Symmetric algorithms for PPP | Hashing for SM-XX digital signatures |
ECDSA⁽¹⁾, NIST P-256 | ECKA⁽²⁾, NIST P-256, SHA-256 | AES-CBC-128 AES-CMAC-128 | As indicated in the CERT.XXauth.SIG⁽³⁾ |
ECDSA⁽¹⁾, BrainpoolP256r1 | ECKA⁽²⁾, BrainpoolP256r1, SHA-256 | AES-CBC-128 AES-CMAC-128 | As indicated in the CERT.XXauth.SIG⁽³⁾ |
ECDSA⁽¹⁾, FRP256V1 | ECKA⁽²⁾, FRP256V1, SHA-256 | AES-CBC-128 AES-CMAC-128 | As indicated in the CERT.XXauth.SIG⁽³⁾ |
SM2 Signature | ECKA⁽²⁾, SM2 Curve, SM3 | SM4-CBC SM4-CMAC | SM3 |
Note 1: ECDSA SHALL follow GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment E [12]. Note 2: The ECKA algorithm is defined in section 2.6.4. Note 3: Currently restricted to SHA-256. |
Table 4c: Cryptographic algorithm sets based on CERT.XXauth.SIG
NOTE: As per NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 [86], ECC256 (128-bit security strength) is sufficient for implementations beyond year 2031.
Algorithm references:
-NIST P-256 is defined in Digital Signature Standard [29] (recommended by NIST).
-BrainpoolP256r1 is defined in RFC 5639 [18] (recommended by BSI).
-FRP256V1 is defined in ANSSI ECC [20] (recommended by ANSSI).
-AES-CBC-128, AES in CBC mode with key length of 128 bits, is defined in NIST SP 800-38A [83].
-AES-CMAC-128, CMAC with AES in CBC mode with key length of 128 bits, is defined in NIST SP 800-38B [84].
-SM2 Curve is defined in RFC8998 [96]
-SM2 is defined in SM2 algorithm [93]
-SM3 is defined in SM3 algorithm [94]
-SM4 is defined in SM4 algorithm [95]
-SM4-CBC, SM4 in CBC mode, with CBC mode as defined in NIST SP 800-38A [83].
-SM4-CMAC, SM4 in CMAC mode, with CMAC mode as defined in NIST SP 800-38B [84].
An eUICC SHALL have at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters preloaded by the EUM during eUICC manufacturing, subject to support by the corresponding eSIM CA.
For each eSIM CA trust chain to which it belongs, an RSP Server SHALL support all sets of elliptic curve parameters that the corresponding eSIM CA supports.
The Key Agreement algorithm is used in RSP for the establishment of the session keys between the eUICC and the SM-DP+.
The symmetric algorithms are used in RSP for the protection of the Profile Package (Protected Profile Package), see section 2.5.
This specification allows the eUICC to use different signature algorithms than the RSP server to generate its signatures, subject to their support by both parties. This is selected by the RSP Server and indicated in ES9+.InitiateAuthentication response (field euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed, see section 5.6.1). The eUICC SHALL use the signature algorithm selected by the RSP Server for all signatures generated by the eUICC during the RSP Session, including for the Profile Installation Result and the Load RPM Package Result. For all other signed Notifications related to a Profile, the eUICC SHALL use the digital signature algorithm selected during the Profile Download and Installation procedure. The selection SHALL be done according to the table below:
Digital signature algorithm and parameters from CERT.EUICC.SIG | Hashing for eUICC digital signatures |
ECDSA⁽¹⁾, NIST P-256⁽²⁾ | As indicated in the CERT.EUICC.SIG⁽³⁾ |
ECDSA⁽¹⁾, BrainpoolP256r1⁽²⁾ | As indicated in the CERT.EUICC.SIG⁽³⁾ |
ECDSA⁽¹⁾, FRP256V1⁽²⁾ | As indicated in the CERT.EUICC.SIG⁽³⁾ |
SM2 Signature | SM3 |
Note 1: ECDSA SHALL follow GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment E [12]. Note 2: The ECC domain parameters are defined above. Note 3: Currently restricted to SHA-256 |
Table 4d: Cryptographic algorithm sets for the eUICC Signature
2.6.6 TLS Requirements
RSP mandates use of TLS v1.2 as defined in RFC 5246 [16] as the minimal version for TLS connection.
TLS with mutual authentication SHALL be used over ES12 and ES15.
TLS with server authentication SHALL be used over ES9+, ES11, ES20 and EShri.
TLS with mutual authentication MAY be used over ES2+. If TLS with mutual authentication is not used over ES2+, ES2+ SHALL be protected with level of security equivalent to TLS.
On ES12 and ES15, the Root Certificate of a certificate chain used for mutual authentication SHALL be an eSIM CA or any CA that both parties trust.
On ES9+, ES11 and EShri, the Root Certificate of a certificate chain used for server authentication SHALL be an eSIM CA or a Public CA.
On ES20, the Root Certificate of a certificate chain used for server authentication SHALL be a Public CA.
On ES2+, if TLS is used, the Root Certificate of a certificate chain used for mutual authentication can be any CA that both parties trust.
The certificates used for TLS SHALL fulfil the requirements described in the next section.
2.6.6.1 Cipher suites and algorithms
In this specification, a number of cryptographic algorithms and security properties applicable to TLS are specified to ensure a minimum security level and also to facilitate interoperability.
NOTE: for TLS certificates, RSP Servers are allowed to use Public CAs in addition to eSIM CAs.
2.6.6.1.1 Elliptic curves
For each eSIM CA that it supports, an RSP Server SHALL support the following elliptic curve(s) for signing and key-agreement:
-NIST P-256 with the namedCurve secp256r1 (23) as defined in RFC 8422 [65].
In addition, for each eSIM CA that is supports, an RSP Server implementing TLS 1.3 [42] MAY support one or more additional elliptic curves for signing and key-agreement, including but not limited to:
-brainpoolP256r1(26) as defined in RFC 7027 [66],
-NIST P-384 with the namedCurve secp384r1 (24) as defined in RFC 8422 [65],
-Ed25519 as defined in RFC 8410 [90], and x25519 with the namedCurve x25519 (29) as defined in RFC 8422 [65]
For each eSIM CA that it supports, an RSP Client SHALL support the following elliptic curve(s) for signing and key-agreement:
-NIST P-256 with the namedCurve secp256r1 (23) as defined in RFC 8422 [65].
In addition, for each eSIM CA that it supports, an RSP Client MAY support one or more additional elliptic curves for signing and key-agreement, including but not limited to:
-brainpoolP256r1(26) as defined in RFC 7027 [66],
-NIST P-384 with the namedCurve secp384r1 (24) as defined in RFC 8422 [65],
-Ed25519 as defined in RFC 8410 [90], and x25519 with the namedCurve x25519 (29) as defined in RFC 8422 [65].
2.6.6.1.2 Digital signature algorithm for signing
The eSIM CA SHALL use the following digital signature algorithm for signing RSP Server TLS certificates:
-ECDSA with NIST P-256 with SHA-256
NOTE: other digital signature algorithm for signing RSP Server TLS certificates might be used.
2.6.6.1.3 Cipher suites
To fulfil the security requirements of the previous section, the client SHALL offer sha256/ecdsa in the "supported_signature_algorithms" of TLS 1.2 [16] and the server SHALL select this hash/signature pair.
RSP Servers implementing TLS 1.2 [16] (e.g., SM-DP+) SHALL support at least the following cipher suites which provide(s) perfect forward secrecy:
-TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 [46]
-TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 [46]
RSP Servers implementing TLS 1.3 [42] SHALL support at least the following cipher suite(s) which provide(s) perfect forward secrecy:
-TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in TLS 1.3 [42]
-TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in TLS 1.3 [42]
RSP Servers implementing TLS 1.2 [16] MAY support one or more additional cipher suites which SHALL provide perfect forward secrecy, including but not limited to:
-TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 as defined in RFC 7905 [91]
-TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 [46]
-TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 [46]
RSP Servers that need to support RSP V2 Clients as defined in SGP.22 V2 SHOULD support TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 [46]. However, the use of this cipher suite SHALL be limited to the case when it is the only cipher suite commonly supported by the RSP Server and the RSP V2 Client.
RSP Servers implementing TLS 1.3 [42] MAY support one or more additional cipher suites which SHALL provide perfect forward secrecy, including but not limited to:
-TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 as defined in TLS 1.3 [42]
Clients implementing TLS 1.2 [16] SHALL support at least the following cipher suite(s) which provide(s) perfect forward secrecy:
-TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 [46]
Clients implementing TLS 1.2 [16] SHALL NOT support the following cipher suite(s).
-TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 [46]
NOTE: CBC encryption in MAC-then-Encrypt mode has repeatedly shown weaknesses in the past, for which only imperfect fixes exist. For this reason, such cipher suites should no longer be used.
Clients implementing TLS 1.3 [42] SHALL support at least the following cipher suite(s) which provide(s) perfect forward secrecy:
-TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in TLS 1.3 [42]
Clients implementing TLS 1.2 [16] MAY support one or more additional cipher suites that provide perfect forward secrecy, including but not limited to:
-TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 as defined in RFC 7905 [91]
-TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 [46]
-TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 [46]
Clients implementing TLS 1.3 [142] MAY support one or more additional cipher suites that provide perfect forward secrecy, including but not limited to:
-TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 as defined in TLS 1.3 [42]
-TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in TLS 1.3 [42]
2.6.6.2 Use of Server Name indication extension for ES9+ and ES11
Starting from version 3.0, the specification allows an RSP Server to use, over ES9+ and ES11, a TLS certificate which chains to a Public CA, whereas versions 2.x required it to chain to an eSIM CA. This flexibility, even if desirable, adds an additional burden on the RSP Server to select a TLS certificate chain that the LPA is able to verify.
This section provides to the LPA and the RSP Server a mechanism to guide the RSP Server selection of an appropriate TLS certificate chain.
The RSP Server and the LPA SHOULD support this mechanism. The Root SM-DS SHALL support this mechanism. An RSP Server and an LPA that support this mechanism SHALL comply with this section.
General principle:
In addition to its "base" FQDN, the RSP Server SHALL support a specific FQDN for v3 Devices. The v3-specific FQDN SHALL be the concatenation of the string "rsp3-" and the "base" UTF-8 encoded FQDN. Therefore the RSP Server SHALL take care that neither the resulting label nor the domain name in their final encoding violate the length limits of domain names.
A v3 Device SHALL include the "server_name" extension defined in RFC 6066 [60] in the ClientHello with the v3-specific FQDN computed from the "base" FQDN known from the RSP Server.
NOTE: This mechanism increases the probability that the LPA supports the TLS certificate chain selected by the RSP Server, but there is still a risk that it is not the case and the TLS handshake may fail. In that case the LPA MAY retry and the RSP Server MAY select a different certificate chain.
LPA/Device side:
The LPA SHALL compute the v3-specific FQDN computed from the "base" FQDN known from the RSP Server (e.g., an address retrieved from the eUICC, an address read from an Activation code).
The LPA SHALL perform a DNS resolution using the v3-specific FQDN. In case of DNS lookup failure (e.g., this may happen if the RSP Server is a v2 server), the LPA SHALL revert to the "base" FQDN and proceed with the TLS handshake, which SHOULD include sending the "server_name" extension.
If the DNS resolution using the v3-specific FQDN succeeds, the LPA SHALL include the "server_name" extension in the ClientHello message and containing the v3-specific FQDN. If the RSP Server replies with a fatal-level alert, the LPA SHALL retry the TLS handshake without sending the Server Name indication extension.
RSP Server side:
The RSP Server SHALL support the "server_name" extension to determine the TLS certificate to use.
-If the received ClientHello message contains the "server_name" extension with the v3-specific FQDN, the RSP Server SHOULD use a TLS certificate that chains to a Public CA.
-If the received ClientHello message contains the "server_name" extension with an unrecognized FQDN, the RSP Server SHALL take one of two actions: either abort the handshake by sending a fatal-level unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake with a TLS certificate that chains to a Public CA.
-If the received ClientHello message doesn't contain the "server_name" extension, the RSP Server SHOULD use a TLS certificate that chains to an eSIM CA.
NOTE: An RSP Server cannot rely upon receiving a "server_name" extension for "base" FQDNs (i.e., those without an "rsp3-" prefix). If the server can be reached through multiple "base" FQDNs that resolve to the same IP address, then it may be unable to select a TLS certificate containing the FQDN expected by the LPA.
2.6.7 Void
2.6.8 Random Number Generation
To protect against attacks, a high quality random number generator is required. Recommendations for appropriate random number generators are given by BSI [78] and NIST [79].
2.6.9 Digital Signature Computation
When applied to an ASN.1 data object, the digital signature (using the algorithm determined as described in section 2.6.5) SHALL be computed for the data object after encoding (i.e., in its DER representation).
2.7 Certificate Revocation
See also section 4.5.2 that describes certificates’ chains of trust.
The following certificates MAY be revoked at any time:
•eSIM CA RootCA Certificate (CERT.CI.SIG)
•eSIM CA SubCA Certificate (CERT.CISubCA.SIG)
•EUM Certificate (CERT.EUM.SIG) and EUM SubCA Certificate (CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG)
•SM-DP+ SubCA Certificate (CERT.DPSubCA.SIG)
•SM-DP+ Certificates (CERT.DPauth.SIG, CERT.DPpb.SIG)
•SM-DP+ TLS Certificate (CERT.DP.TLS)
•SM-DS SubCA Certificate (CERT.DSSubCA.SIG)
•SM-DS Certificate (CERT.DSauth.SIG)
•SM-DS TLS Certificate (CERT.DS.TLS)
The means by which an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate revocation status is made available is out of scope of this specification. However, as soon as such revocation status is known by an RSP entity, it SHALL no longer accept or perform any RSP operation using a certificate chain certified by this eSIM CA RootCA Certificate. Section 2.4.2 describes a means by which the eUICC can be updated to reflect that an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate has been revoked.
Because of their potential number, eUICC Certificates (CERT.EUICC.SIG) are not revoked individually. Also, it is unlikely that an individual eUICC would be compromised. It is instead more probable that an eUICC model or an entire eUICC production batch would be declared as compromised. This approach is reflected by revoking the EUM Certificate or the EUM SubCA Certificate, if used by the EUM, attached to the production of the particular eUICC model or batch.
As a consequence, it is up to the EUM to consider using distinct certificates (CERT.EUM.SIG or CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG) for distinct eUICC models or production batches. This is out of the scope of this specification.
The following RSP entities SHALL manage the revocation status of the Certificates they issue:
-An eSIM CA.
-An EUM, for CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG, when the additional EUM SubCA is used.
-An SM-DP+ that uses an additional SM-DP+ SubCA, for CERT.DPauth.SIG, CERT.DPpb.SIG, and CERT.DP.TLS, when these Certificates do not have a short validity period.
-An SM-DS that uses an additional SM-DS SubCA, for CERT.DSauth.SIG, and CERT.DS.TLS, when these Certificates do not have a short validity period.
NOTE: The notion of the short validity period is further defined in SGP.14 [45].
A revoked certificate SHALL NOT be automatically renewed. Renewal SHALL be upon the eSIM Certification Authority agreement (see SGP.14 [45] section 5.6).
RSP entities that manage certificate revocation (further called a CRL Issuer) SHALL publish the revocation status by means of a CRL.
An RSP Server SHALL support revocation status verification only by means of CRLs.
2.8 Void
The content of this section has been moved to section 2.4a.
2.9 Profile Policy Management
Profile Policy Management provides mechanisms by which Profile Owners can enforce the conditions of use under which services are provided.
Profile Policy Management comprises three main elements:
•Profile Policy Rules (PPR)
•Rules Authorisation Table (RAT)
•Profile Policy Enabler (PPE)
More details are provided in the next sub sections.
2.9.1 Profile Policy Rules
The Profile Policy Rules (PPRs) are defined by the Profile Owners and set by the SM-DP+ in the Profile Metadata. They are also accessible by the LPA for verification or display to the End User.
A Profile MAY have zero or more Profile Policy Rules.
A Test Profile SHOULD NOT contain any Profile Policy Rules.
When installed on the eUICC, Profile Policy Rules SHALL be contained in the associated Profile.
The following Profile Policy Rules are defined in this version of the specification:
•(PPR1) 'Disabling of this Profile is not allowed'
•(PPR2) 'Deletion of this Profile is not allowed'
The coding of PPRs is given in section 2.4a.1.1.
2.9.2 Rules Authorisation Table (RAT)
The Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) contains the description of the acceptable set of PPRs that can be set in a Profile. The RAT is defined at eUICC platform level and is used by the Profile Policy Enabler (PPE) and the LPA to determine whether or not a Profile that contains PPRs is authorised and can be installed on the eUICC.
The RAT is initialised at eUICC manufacturing time or during the initial Device setup provided that there is no installed Operational Profile. The Device manufacturer or EUM is responsible for setting the content of the RAT.
The RAT SHALL NOT be affected by the ES10c.eUICCMemoryReset function (section 5.7.19).
2.9.2.1 Profile Policy Authorisation Rules (PPAR)
The RAT contains a list of Profile Policy Authorisation Rules (PPAR).
A PPAR is composed of the following information:
Data | Description |
|---|---|
Profile Policy Rule Identifier | Identifies the Profile Policy Rules to which this PPAR applies. This field SHALL contain one or several PPR(s) being set as defined in 2.4a.1.1. |
Allowed Operators | List of Profile Owners, as defined in section 2.4a.1.2, allowed to use this PPR. Wildcards can be used to indicate that all, or a set of, Profile Owners are allowed. See below. |
End User Consent Required | Indicates if the related PPR needs the End User Consent for the Profile to be installed (true/false). |
Table 5: PPAR description
The RAT MAY contain zero or more PPAR(s) related to a particular PPR. The order of the PPARs in the RAT is significant (see below).
The RAT of an eUICC supporting MEP SHALL NOT contain any PPAR for PPR1.
'Allowed Operators' field
The 'Allowed Operators' field contains the identifier(s) of the Profile Owner(s) (explicitly listed or matching a wild card) allowed to use the related PPR. It SHALL be compared against the profileOwner field of the Metadata of the Profile.
Any of the digits of the mccMnc data object can be wildcard-ed by setting the appropriate nibble to 'E'.
If present in the PPAR, a non-empty gid1 or gid2 value SHALL exactly match the corresponding value in the profileOwner field.
The gid1 or gid2 data objects can be wildcard-ed by setting an empty value (length zero).
An omitted gid1 or gid2 value in the PPAR SHALL only match a profileOwner field where the corresponding gid1 or gid2 value is absent.
NOTE: A PPR MAY be allowed for all Profile Owners by setting the 'Allowed Operators' field with a unique OperatorId having the mccMnc field value set to 'EEEEEE' and gid1 and gid2 data objects set with an empty value (length zero).
A PPR MAY be 'forbidden' for all Profile Owners by not defining any related PPAR.
Case where multiple PPARs are defined for a PPR:
A PPR is allowed for a Profile Owner whose identifier appears in the 'Allowed Operators' field (explicitly listed or matching a wild card) in one of the related PPARs.
'End User Consent required' field
When set to 'true', it indicates that for all Profile Owners allowed by the 'Allowed Operators' field the LPA SHALL get the End User Consent for the related PPR to install the Profile.
When set to 'false', it indicates that this End User Consent is not mandatory.
Case where multiple PPARs are defined for a PPR:
When a Profile Owner is allowed in several PPARs (explicitly listed or matching a wild card), the 'End User Consent required' field value of the first of these PPARs SHALL be used.
Example of RAT configuration (for illustration only and not intended to represent a real case):
------------------------------------------------------------------------- PPRid Allowed Operators End User Consent Required --------------- ----------------------------- --------------------------- PPR1 OP-A false PPR2 OP-B false PPR1, PPR2 * true -------------------------------------------------------------------------
The '*' in the 'Allowed Operators' field denotes a PPR that is allowed for any Profile Owner; and if there is no PPAR for a particular PPR, then that PPR is forbidden.
With this configuration, Operator OP-A:
•can use PPR1 without the End User consent
•can use PPR2 with the End User consent
With this configuration, Operator OP-B:
•can use PPR1 with the End User consent
•can use PPR2 without the End User consent
With this configuration, any other Profile Owner:
•can use PPR1 and PPR2 with the End User consent
2.9.2.2 Notable RAT configurations
'All PPRs allowed for all Profile Owners, End User Consent required'
------------------------------------------------------------------------- PPRid Allowed Operators End User Consent Required --------------- ----------------------------- --------------------------- PPR1, PPR2 * true -------------------------------------------------------------------------
'All PPRs forbidden for all Profile Owners'
------------------------------------------------------------------------- PPRid Allowed Operators End User Consent Required --------------- ----------------------------- --------------------------- <no entry> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.9.2.3 Void
2.9.2.4 LPA verification
During the Profile Download and Installation procedure (see section 3.1.3), the LPA SHALL verify that the PPRs defined in the Profile to install can be set by the Profile Owner, and if an End User Consent is required.
The figure below describes the process to determine if all PPRs of a Profile can be set by the Profile Owner, and if an End User consent is required, according to RAT configuration.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 5: Profile's PPRs verification by LPA
The figure below describes the process to determine if a particular PPR can be set by the Profile Owner, and if an End User consent is required, according to its related PPAR(s) configuration.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 6: Particular PPR verification by the LPA
2.9.3 Profile Policy Enabler
The Profile Policy Enabler on the eUICC has two functions:
•Verification that a Profile containing PPRs is authorised by the RAT.
•Enforcement of the PPRs of a Profile.
2.9.3.1 PPRs Verification: Profile installation time
At Profile installation time the Profile Policy Enabler SHALL verify each of the PPRs as described below, to determine if it allows the Profile installation to continue. If the verification results in the Profile not being allowed, then the Profile installation SHALL be rejected and a Profile Installation Result SHALL be generated and returned to the LPA.
The PPE cannot enforce that the End User consent, if any is required, is captured by the LPA. As a consequence the 'End User Consent required' field SHALL NOT be considered during the PPRs verification by the PPE.
The figure below describes the process that the PPE SHALL run to determine if a Profile containing PPRs can be installed on the eUICC, according to the RAT configuration.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 7: Profile's PPRs verification by PPE
The figure below describes the process to determine if a PPR is allowed according to its related PPAR(s) configuration.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 8: Particular PPR verification by the PPE
2.9.3.2 PPR Verification: PPR update after Profile is installed
A PPR in a Profile installed in the eUICC can be unset (using the "ES6.UpdateMetadata" Function by the Profile Owner or the RPM Command 'Update Metadata'). The setting of a PPR in the eUICC is for further study.
2.9.3.3 PPR Enforcement
The Profile Policy Enabler SHALL enforce the PPRs of a Profile when a Local Profile Management Operation is requested upon this Profile. Each of the defined enforcement cases are described in the concerned procedures (see section 3.2 and 3.3).
2.9.3.3.1 Void
Table 6: Void
2.9.3.3.2 Enforcement involving Test Profile
When a Test Profile is requested to be enabled whereas the currently Enabled Profile has a PPR1 set, PPE SHALL NOT enforce this PPR1 to allow the Test Profile to be enabled.
2.9.3.3.3 Void
2.10 Remote Profile Management
This section describes the structure of RPM Package composed of one or more RPM Commands. This section also describes how an eUICC generates the execution result of an RPM Package.
2.10.1 RPM Package
The SM-DP+ SHALL generate an RPM Package upon the request of Operator. The RPM Package SHALL be encoded in the ASN.1 data object as shown below.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
RpmPackage ::= SEQUENCE OF RpmCommand -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
RpmCommand ::= SEQUENCE {
continueOnFailure [0] NULL OPTIONAL,
rpmCommandDetails CHOICE {
enable [1] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid},
disable [2] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid},
delete [3] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid},
listProfileInfo [4] ListProfileInfo,
updateMetadata [5] SEQUENCE {
iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid,
updateMetadataRequest UpdateMetadataRequest
},
contactPcmp [6] SEQUENCE {
iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid,
dpiRpm UTF8String OPTIONAL
}
}
}
-- ASN1STOPThe SM-DP+ SHALL limit the size of the value part of one RpmPackage to a maximum of 1057 bytes. The eUICC SHALL be able to handle at least this size. If the eUICC receives an RpmPackage too large to handle, it SHALL reject it with error code commandPackageTooLarge.
NOTE 1: This allows transporting of one icon with maximum size (1024 bytes), together with the icon type and continueOnFailure being set.
NOTE 2: If more RPM Commands need to be sent, an SM-DP+ MAY use rpmPending to chain multiple RSP sessions as defined in section 5.6.3.
The rpmCommandDetails identifies the type of an RPM Command. The following limitations exist:
In order to simplify handling of the REFRESH proactive command after processing of the RPM Package, the SM-DP+ SHALL restrict Enable and Disable commands in one RPM Package as follows:
only one Enable command, or
only one Disable command, or
only one Disable command followed by only one Enable command.
The eUICC MAY terminate processing of a subsequent Enable or Disable command in the RPM Package with error commandsWithRefreshExceeded.
RPM Command 'Contact PCMP' SHALL NOT be followed by any other RPM Command in the same RPM Package. Any subsequent command SHALL be rejected with error commandAfterContactPcmp.
An RPM Command requesting the enabling or disabling of a Test Profile via RPM SHALL be rejected by the eUICC.
On the execution failure of an RPM Command: if continueOnFailure is present, then the eUICC SHALL continue to execute the next RPM Command in the RPM Package. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL stop processing the RPM.
The iccid indicates the Target Profile.
RPM Command 'List Profile Info'
listProfileInfo SHALL be coded and processed as defined in section 5.7.15.
RPM Command 'Update Metadata'
updateMetadataRequest indicates the Profile Metadata to be updated. It SHALL be coded and processed as defined in section 5.4.1.
2.10.2 Load RPM Package Result
The RPM Commands in the RPM Package are executed sequentially until the end is reached or an error is encountered for a command where continueOnFailure is not present. Each executed command produces an RPM Command Result.
Atomic processing by the eUICC is required only for each RPM Command.
In case of external interruptions (e.g., power loss), the eUICC MAY be unable to process remaining commands. This SHALL be indicated by placing interruption into the RPM Command Result.
If an RPM Command in the sequence is unknown or unsupported, or the command data cannot be interpreted, the eUICC SHALL terminate processing of the command sequence and return unknownOrDamagedCommand as RPM Command Result.
The eUICC SHALL be able to create a finalResult with a value size of at least 1072 Bytes.
NOTE: This allows for the response to include one icon with maximum size (1024 bytes), together with the icon type and the ICCID.
If the processing of an RPM command would result in exceeding the maximum size the eUICC can handle, independent of the presence of continueOnFailure, the eUICC SHALL NOT process this and all subsequent commands and place resultSizeOverflow into the RPM Command Result.
The Load RPM Package Result SHALL be returned at the end of executing an RPM Package.
A signed Load RPM Package Result SHALL be kept by the eUICC (which can hold one or several signed Load RPM Package Results) until explicitly deleted by the LPA, after successfully delivered to the SM-DP+. Before being deleted the signed Load RPM Package Result(s) MAY be retrieved at any time by the LPA.
When the eUICC needs to store a new signed Load RPM Package Result and/or Profile Installation Result, if there is not enough room the eUICC SHALL delete one or more of the previously stored signed Load RPM Package Results or Profile Installation Results in order of their Sequence Number, beginning with the lowest.
The Load RPM Package Result SHALL be encoded in the ASN.1 data object as shown below.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
LoadRpmPackageResult ::= [68] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF44' #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
loadRpmPackageResultSigned LoadRpmPackageResultSigned,
loadRpmPackageResultNotSigned LoadRpmPackageResultNotSigned
}
LoadRpmPackageResultSigned ::= SEQUENCE {
loadRpmPackageResultDataSigned LoadRpmPackageResultDataSigned,
euiccSignRPR EuiccSign
}
LoadRpmPackageResultDataSigned ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
notificationMetadata[47] NotificationMetadata,
smdpOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- SM-DP+ OID (value from CERT.DPauth.SIG)
finalResult [2] CHOICE {
rpmPackageExecutionResult SEQUENCE OF RpmCommandResult,
loadRpmPackageErrorCodeSigned LoadRpmPackageErrorCodeSigned
}
}
RpmCommandResult ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid OPTIONAL, -- SHALL be present, except for listProfileInfoResult and rpmProcessingTerminated
rpmCommandResultData CHOICE {
enableResult [49] EnableProfileResponse, -- ES10c.EnableProfile
disableResult [50] DisableProfileResponse, -- ES10c.DisableProfile
deleteResult [51] DeleteProfileResponse, -- ES10c.DeleteProfile
listProfileInfoResult [45] ProfileInfoListResponse, -- ES10c.GetProfilesInfo
updateMetadataResult [42] UpdateMetadataResponse, -- ES6.UpdateMetadata
contactPcmpResult [0] ContactPcmpResponse,
rpmProcessingTerminated INTEGER {
resultSizeOverflow (1),
unknownOrDamagedCommand (2),
interruption (3),
commandsWithRefreshExceeded (4),
commandAfterContactPcmp (5),
commandPackageTooLarge (6)
}
}
}
ContactPcmpResponse ::= CHOICE {
contactPcmpResponseOk SEQUENCE {
pcmpAddress UTF8String
},
contactPcmpResponseError INTEGER {
profileNotEnabled(2),
commandError(7),
noLprConfiguration(13),
undefinedError(127)}
}
LoadRpmPackageResultNotSigned ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
loadRpmPackageErrorCodeNotSigned LoadRpmPackageErrorCodeNotSigned
}
LoadRpmPackageErrorCodeSigned ::= INTEGER { invalidSignature(2), invalidTransactionId(5), undefinedError(127)}
LoadRpmPackageErrorCodeNotSigned ::= INTEGER { noSession(4), undefinedError(127)}
-- ASN1STOPeuiccSignRPR SHALL be created using the SK.EUICC.SIG selected during the RPM Download procedure, and verified using the related PK.EUICC.SIG as described in section 2.6.9. euiccSignRPR SHALL apply on the concatenated data objects loadRpmPackageResultDataSigned and smdpSignature3.
In case of the error invalidTransactionId, the transactionId in the LoadRpmPackageResultDataSigned SHALL be set to the value from the AuthenticateServerRequest.
dpiRpm contains the DPI which if present in the command data is appended by the LPA to the pcmpAddress received in the response in order to trigger the LPR.
NOTE: Error codes to RPM commands do not disclose any information about the existence of a Profile unless the SM-DP+ is authenticated and authorised.
2.11 Overview of version interoperability
Depending on the interfaces, interoperability between parties implementing different versions of this specification is enabled by SVN and/or RSP capability indication by one party and appropriate reaction by the other party.
For (LPA and eUICC) to RSP Server communication related functions (ES8+, ES9+, ES10a, ES10b, ES11), this specification provides a built-in mechanism for capability indication. Each party compliant with version 3 or higher of this specification has to include its RSP capability. When the RSP capability is absent, it indicates a party implementing a version prior to version 3. This mechanism is described in section 3.0.1 Common Mutual Authentication Procedure and related functions.
For RSP Server to RSP Server communication (ES2+, ES12, ES15), the RSP Server that acts as a client indicates its SVN using the HTTP header X-Admin-Protocol (see section 6.2).
For information, the Device and the LPAd can determine the highestSvn of the eUICC by using the ES10b.GetEUICCInfo function as described in section 5.7.8. The LPAd uses the ES10 functions and associated parameters in line with the EuiccRspCapability for further communication with the eUICC. The eUICC doesn't need to know the lpaSvn of the LPAd and operates according to the LPAd requests.
To communicate on ES6 with the eUICC, the Operator SHALL use the protocol and functions corresponding to the capabilities communicated by the eUICC in EUICCInfo2 during the Profile Download and Installation.
There is no SVN negotiation on EShri. But the HRI Server can version its services using different URLs.
2.12 Multiple Enabled Profiles
This specification defines optional support of Multiple Enabled Profiles (MEP), where several Profiles can be in Enabled state. This enables a Device with more than one baseband to use more than one Profile at the same time for providing connectivity to different networks.
The multiplexing of the APDU streams to those Profiles on a single physical interface is specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [6]. This specification uses the term "eSIM Port" for what ETSI TS 102 221 [6] calls a logical SE interface (LSI).
eSIM Ports are identified by consecutive numbers starting from zero (and will be written as eSIM Port 0, eSIM Port 1, etc.).
Each eSIM Port SHALL be assigned to at most one Enabled Profile at any point in time. Each Profile SHALL be assigned to at most one eSIM Port at any point in time.
Profile Enabling assigns a Profile to an eSIM Port. Profile Disabling releases this assignment. A Disabled Profile is not assigned to any eSIM Port.
Several options for different features are defined for MEP:
-APDU multiplexing can use any of the mechanisms defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [6], e.g.:
-eSIM Port selection via the APDU MANAGE LSI (select LSI) when the transmission protocol T=0 or T=1 is used.
-eSIM Port selection via the NAD byte when the transmission protocol T=1 is used.
-Three options are defined for the selection of the ISD-R and the assignments of eSIM Ports:
-MEP-A1: The ISD-R is selected on eSIM Port 0 only and Profiles are selected on eSIM Ports 1 and higher, with the eSIM Port being assigned by the LPA. I.e., Command Port and Target Port will always be different.
-MEP-A2: The ISD-R is selected on eSIM Port 0 only and Profiles are selected on eSIM Ports 1 and higher, with the eSIM Port being assigned by the eUICC. I.e., Command Port and Target Port will always be different.
-MEP-B: Profiles are selected on eSIM Ports 0 and higher, with the ISD-R being selectable on any of these eSIM Ports. ES10c.EnableProfile and, if CAT is initialised on the Target Port, ES10c.DisableProfile are always sent on the Target Port (i.e., Command Port and Target Port are identical). If CAT is not initialised on the Target Port, ES10c.DisableProfile can be sent on any eSIM Port. Other ES10 commands can be sent on any eSIM Port where CAT is initialised.
-As already defined in v2 of this specification, two options exist for processing a Profile switch:
-Profile switching requires a REFRESH proactive command to be issued by the eUICC.
-Profile switching is performed without such a proactive command.
This specification treats these options independently and an eUICC MAY implement any combination. Limitations for the LPA are given in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
MEP is only defined for non-removable eUICCs, where the options to be used can be pre-agreed by the OEM and the EUM. Still, an optional setup mechanism is defined in section 3.4.1, which allows Devices and eUICCs to support several modes.
2.13 Overview of Push Service
A Push Service is a service that allows an application server to send push notifications to an application on a Device. This specification allows an SM-DS and LDS to leverage a Push Service so that the LDS is informed in a timely manner when a relevant Event Record is available on the SM-DS.
Figure 8aa shows the entities required for Push Service. A Push Service is implemented by a combination of a push server and a push client on the Device. The interfaces between the push server and the push client, between the push client and the LPAd, and between the SM-DS and the push server, as well as the interactions between them, are out of scope of this specification.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 8aa: Entities for Push Service, LPA in the Device
The SM-DS and a Device MAY support one or more Push Services. The LPAd and SM-DS perform the Push Service registration so that the SM-DS can subsequently send push notifications to the LPAd, following the general sequence that follows:
The SM-DS indicates, during Common Mutual Authentication, one or more Push Service(s) that it supports. If the Device supports at least one of these Push Services, the LPAd requests the corresponding push client on the Device to allow the LPAd to use this Push Service. The push client and its related push server perform an operation to generate a Push Token dedicated to the LPAd. The LPAd then forwards its Push Token together with the EID of its associated eUICC to the SM-DS (see section 3.6.5).
Later, to inform the LPAd that an Event Record is pending for this LPAd on the SM-DS, the SM-DS requests the push server to send a push notification for this Push Token. The push server routes this notification to the push client, which forwards it to the LPAd. The LPAd MAY then perform an Event Retrieval procedure.
A Push Service MAY limit the validity of a Push Token depending on its implementation. Upon expiration of the validity, the LPAd SHOULD re-register a Push Token to the SM-DS to remain able to receive push notifications.
The SM-DS MAY also clean its database of Push Tokens to avoid keeping obsolete Push Tokens. The LPAd and Push Service may not know about when this happens. An SM-DS that enacts such a clean-up policy SHOULD instruct the LPAd of a maximum Push Token retention time. It is the responsibility of the LPAd to register a Push Token, which was previously used or is newly generated, to the SM-DS when this retention time expires.
3 Procedures
This section specifies the procedures associated with Remote SIM Provisioning and Management of the eUICC for consumer Devices.
Some call flows illustrate the case where the LPA is in the Device (LPAd). Such call flows with an LPAe would be identical except that all ES10a, ES10b and ES10c calls become internal to the eUICC and out of scope of this specification.
3.0 Common Procedures
3.0.1 Common Mutual Authentication Procedure
This section describes the common mutual authentication call flow that is used in various others places in this document.
In this section the following notations are used:
•SM-XX denotes either an SM-DP+ or an SM-DS.
•CERT.XXauth.SIG denotes either CERT.DPauth.SIG or CERT.DSauth.SIG.
•SK.XXauth.SIG denotes either SK.DPauth.SIG or SK.DSauth.SIG.
•CERT.XX.TLS denotes either CERT.DP.TLS or CERT.DS.TLS.
•SK.XX.TLS denotes either SK.DP.TLS or SK.DS.TLS.
•ESXX denotes either ES9+ when communicating with an SM-DP+ or an ES11 when communicating with an SM-DS.
•SM-XX SubCA Certificates denote one or more of CERT.CISubCA.SIG, CERT.DPSubCA.SIG, CERT.DSSubCA.SIG, or SubCA Certificates in a trust chain from CERT.XX.TLS to a public RootCA.
This procedure implies the use of CERT.XXauth.SIG. Following this common mutual authentication procedure, if any other Certificates of the SM-XX are used, e.g., the CERT.DPpb.SIG, these Certificates SHALL have a trust chain leading to the same eSIM CA RootCA Certificate as CERT.XXauth.SIG.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml
hide footbox
skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center
skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11
skinparam noteFontSize 11
skinparam monochrome true
skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>SM-XX" as DP
participant "<b>LPAd" as LPA
participant "<b>eUICC" as E
LPA -> E : [1a] [ES10b.GetEUICCInfo]
E --> LPA : [1b] [euiccInfo1]
rnote over LPA #FFFFFF
[1c] [Restrict the set of public keys in euiccInfo1
to the allowed CI PKId]
end rnote
LPA -> E : [2] ES10b.GetEUICCChallenge
rnote over E #FFFFFF : [3] Generate euiccChallenge
E --> LPA : [4] eUICCChallenge
rnote over DP, LPA #FFFFFF : [5] Establish HTTPS connection
LPA -> DP : [6] ESXX.InitiateAuthentication \n (eUICCChallenge, euiccInfo1, SM-XX Address, lpaRspCapabiliy)
rnote over DP #FFFFFF
[7]
- [Verify SM-XX Address]
- Verify euiccInfo1
Endrnote
DP --> LPA : [error]
rnote over DP #FFFFFF
[8]
- Generate TransactionID
- Generate serverChallenge
- Build serverSigned1 = {TransactionID, euiccChallenge,
serverChallenge, SM-XX Address[, sessionContext]}
- Compute serverSignature1 over serverSigned1
- [Retrieve CRL(s)]
endrnote
DP --> LPA : [9] TransactionID, serverSigned1, serverSignature1,\neuiccCiPKIdToBeUsed, CERT.XXauth.SIG [, otherCertsInChain][, crlList]
rnote over LPA #FFFFFF
[10]
- [Verify OID]
- Verify SM-XX Address
- [Verify CI restriction]
- Verify sessionContext
- Generate ctxParams1
endrnote
LPA -> E : [11] ES10b.AuthenticateServer\n(serverSigned1, serverSignature1,\n euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed, CERT.XXauth.SIG or serverCertChain, ctxParams1 [,otherCertsInChain][, crlList])
rnote over E #FFFFFF
[12]
- Verify server certificate chain
- Verify serverSignature1 over serverSigned1
- Verify serverSigned1
endrnote
E --> LPA : [error]
rnote over E #FFFFFF
[13]
- Generate euiccSigned1 = {TransactionID, serverChallenge,
euiccInfo2, ctxParams1}
- Compute euiccSignature1 over euiccSigned1
endrnote
E --> LPA : [14] euiccSigned1, euiccSignature1,\n euiccCertificate, nextCertInChain [, otherCertsInChain]
LPA -> DP : [15] ESXX.AuthenticateClient \n (euiccSigned1, euiccSignature1,\n euiccCertificate, nextCertInChain[, otherCertsInChain])
rnote over DP #FFFFFF
[16]
- Verify eUICC certificate chain
- Verify euiccSignature1 over euiccSigned1
- Verify euiccSigned1
endrnote
DP --> LPA : [error]
LPA --> E : [ES10b.CancelSession]
rnote over DP, E #FFFFFF : [17] Continue...
@enduml[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 8a: Common Mutual Authentication Procedure
Start conditions:
The SM-XX is provisioned with its Certificate(s) (CERT.XXauth.SIG), its private key(s) (SK.XXauth.SIG), the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate(s) (CERT.CI.SIG), its TLS Certificate(s) (CERT.XX.TLS), its TLS Private Key(s) (SK.XX.TLS), and the SM-XX SubCA Certificates, if any, in the trust chains of its CERT.XXauth.SIG and CERT.XX.TLS Certificates.
The eUICC is provisioned with its Certificate(s) (CERT.EUICC.SIG), its private key(s) (SK.EUICC.SIG), the EUM Certificate(s) (CERT.EUM.SIG), the eSIM CA RootCA SubCA Certificate(s), if any (CERT.CISubCA.SIG), the EUM SubCA Certificate(s), if any (CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG), and the eSIM CA RootCA Public Key(s) (PK.CI.SIG).
The invocation of this procedure conditionally includes a restriction to a single allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier.
Procedure:
1.(a) Optionally, the LPA MAY request eUICC Information euiccInfo1 from eUICC by calling the "ES10b.GetEUICCInfo" function. This is required if the LPAd hasn’t already retrieved this information.
1.(b) The eUICC returns the euiccInfo1 to the LPAd.
1.(c) If there is a restriction of the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key(s), the LPAd SHALL create a new instance of euiccInfo1 for this invocation of the procedure by removing all public key identifiers from euiccCiPKIdListForVerification that do not match the given eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier or indicator. If this process results in an empty list for euiccCiPKIdListForVerification, then the LPAd SHALL inform the End User and the procedure SHALL stop.
2.The LPAd requests an eUICC Challenge from the eUICC by calling the "ES10b. GetEUICCChallenge" function (section 5.7.7).
3.The eUICC SHALL generate an eUICC Challenge which SHALL be signed later by the SM-XX for SM-XX authentication by the eUICC.
4.The eUICC returns the eUICC Challenge to the LPAd.
5.The LPAd establishes a new HTTPS connection with the SM-XX in server authentication mode. The TLS session establishment SHALL perform a new key exchange (it SHALL NOT reuse keys from a previous session). During this step, the LPAd SHALL verify that CERT.XX.TLS is valid as described in section 4.5.2.2. If CERT.XX.TLS is invalid and all retries have been exhausted, the LPAd SHALL stop the procedure. If there is a restriction of the allowed eSIM RootCA public key(s), it SHALL NOT affect the establishment of the HTTPS connection.
NOTE 1: The TLS handshake as defined in RFC 5246 [16] doesn't allow the LPAd to indicate in the "ClientHello" message the list of eSIM CA RootCA public keys it supports for signature verification. Therefore, in a Multiple eSIM CA environment, the SM-XX cannot provide with certainty a CERT.XX.TLS that the LPAd will be able to verify, and the TLS handshake may fail. In that case the LPAd MAY retry the TLS handshake, and the SM-XX MAY select a different CERT.XX.TLS.
NOTE 2: The LPAd MAY use a non-empty session_id in the "ClientHello" as described in RFC 5246 [16].
6.The LPAd SHALL call the "ESXX.InitiateAuthentication" function (sections 5.6.1 and 5.8.1) with its input data comprising the euiccChallenge, euiccInfo1, SM-XX Address and its capability. SM-XX is the Address used by the LPAd to access the SM-XX. The way the SM-XX Address is acquired depends on the procedure where this common call flow is used.
7.The SM-XX SHALL verify that the SM-XX Address sent by the LPAd is valid. If the SM-XX Address is not valid, the SM-XX SHALL return an error.
The SM-XX SHALL verify the list of eSIM CA RootCA Public Keys that are associated to the eUICC credentials (euiccCiPKIdListForSigning and euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3 if present, as contained in euiccInfo1). If the SM-XX does not accept any of these eSIM CA RootCA Public Keys it SHALL return an error.
The SM-XX SHALL verify the received eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifier list (euiccCiPKIdListForVerification contained in the euiccInfo1). If it cannot provide a CERT.XXauth.SIG which chain can be verified by an eSIM CA RootCA Public Key supported by the eUICC:
-If the LPAd RSP capabilities indicated euiccCiUpdateSupport, the SM-XX SHOULD select its preferred CERT.XXauth.SIG.
-In all other cases, it SHALL return an error.
If the LPAd receives an error in this step, then the LPAd SHALL stop the procedure.
8.The SM-XX SHALL perform the following:
•Generate a TransactionID which is used to uniquely identify the RSP session and to correlate the multiple ESXX request messages that belong to the same RSP session.
•Generate an SM-XX Challenge (serverChallenge) which SHALL be signed later by the eUICC for the eUICC authentication.
•Select one eSIM CA RootCA Public Key among those provided within euiccCiPKIdListForSigning or euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3, that is supported by the RSP Server for signature verification and indicate it in euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed or in euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3 respectively.
•Generate a serverSigned1 data structure.
•Compute the serverSignature1 over serverSigned1 using the SK.XXauth.SIG corresponding to the CERT.XXauth.SIG determined in step 7.
•If both eUICC and LPA indicate crlStaplingV3Support, retrieve the latest CRL for each Certificate in the chain that has a cRLDistributionPoints extension set (unless it is already available).
9.The SM-XX SHALL return to the LPAd the TransactionID, serverSigned1, serverSignature1, euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed, Certificate(s) and conditionally the CRL(s).
10.The LPAd SHALL:
•If the SM-XX is an SM-DP+ and if its OID was provided earlier, verify the OID as specified in the procedure where this call flow is used.
•Verify that the SM-XX Address returned by the SM-XX matches the SM-XX Address that the LPAd has provided in step (6).
•If there is a restriction to a single allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier, verify that the Subject Key Identifier of the eSIM RootCA corresponding to CERT.XXauth.SIG matches this value.
•If the LPAd indicated euiccCiUpdateSupport, verify that the Subject Key Identifier of the Root Certificate corresponding to CERT.XXauth.SIG is included in euiccInfo1.euiccCiPKIdListForVerification. If the verification fails, the LPAd SHALL inform the End User and stop the procedure, after which it MAY perform the eUICC Root Public Key update procedure (section 3.10) indicating that Subject Key Identifier.
•(Optional) Verify that each Certificate in the chain and each CRL in the list (if present) is valid with respect to its time window, i.e., notBefore and thisUpdate are in the past, and notAfter and nextUpdate are in the future, with regard to the current time known by the Device.
•If any verification fails, the LPAd SHALL inform the End User and stop the procedure.
•Generate a data structure, ctxParams1, to be given to the eUICC to be included in signed data.
11.The LPAd SHALL call "ES10b.AuthenticateServer" function with input data comprising the serverSigned1, serverSignature1, euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed if returned by the SM-XX, CERT.XXauth.SIG, other certificates in the chain if returned by the SM-XX, ctxParams1 and conditionally the CRL(s).
12.The eUICC SHALL:
•Verify the CERT.XXauth.SIG and other certificates in the chain, if any, starting with CERT.XXauth.SIG, using the relevant PK.CI.SIG.
•Verify the serverSignature1 performed over serverSigned1.
•Verify that euiccChallenge contained in serverSigned1 matches the one generated by the eUICC during step (3).
•Verify that the eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifier indicated in either euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed or euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3 is supported and related credentials are available for signing.
•If the sessionContext indicates crlStaplingV3Used, verify the validity of each CRL, and verify that no Certificate in the chain is revoked.
If any verification fails, the eUICC SHALL return a relevant error status and the procedure SHALL stop.
If all the verifications succeed, the SM-XX is authenticated by the eUICC.
13.The eUICC SHALL:
•Generate the euiccSigned1 data structure.
•Compute the euiccSignature1 over euiccSigned1 using SK.EUICC.SIG. When generating the euiccSignature1, the eUICC SHALL use the credentials identified in the previous step.
14.The eUICC SHALL return the euiccSigned1, euiccSignature1 and the eUICC certificate chain related to the credentials used in the previous step.
15.The LPAd SHALL call the "ESXX.AuthenticateClient" function with input data comprising euiccSigned1, euiccSignature1 and the eUICC certificate chain.
16.On reception of the "ESXX.AuthenticateClient" function call, the SM-XX SHALL:
•Correlate it with the "ESXX.InitiateAuthentication" function processed in steps (7) and (8), by verifying the two TransactionIDs match.
•Verify that the Root Certificate of the eUICC certificate chain corresponds to the euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed or euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3 that the SM-XX selected when executing the "ESXX.InitiateAuthentication" function.
•Verify that the eUICC Certificate chain is valid as described in section 4.5.2.2.
•Verify the euiccSignature1 performed over euiccSigned1 using the PK.EUICC.SIG contained in the CERT.EUICC.SIG.
•Verify that serverChallenge contained in euiccSigned1 matches the one generated by the SM-XX during step (7).
•Verify that the eUICC and LPA RSP capabilities match those received in ESXX.InitiateAuthentication.
If any verification fails, the SM-XX SHALL return a relevant error status to the LPAd.
If all verification succeeds, the SM-XX SHALL return a response comprising the pending RSP operation to the LPAd depending on the procedure within which this procedure is used.
If all verifications succeed but the SM-XX has no pending RSP operation for the eUICC:
-The SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code as specified for the type of RSP operation that was requested.
-The SM-DS SHALL return the TransactionID and an empty list of Event Records in "ES11.AuthenticateClient" response.
If the LPAd receives an error status, or only the TransactionID from the SM-DP+ in this step, then the LPAd SHALL send "ES10b.CancelSession" to the eUICC with a reason sessionAborted.
17.This common call flow SHALL be followed by additional steps depending on the procedure within which it is used.
3.0.2 Common Cancel Session Procedure
This section describes the cancel session call flow that is used in various other places in this document.
This procedure can occur due to an error, End User rejection, or timeout at the following steps of the protocol:
•after the response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient"
•after the response to "ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage"
The LPAd MAY provide additional places where the End User would be offered to reject the Profile or RPM download.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml
skinparam monochrome true
skinparam ArrowColor Black
skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center
skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF
skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF
hide footbox
participant "<b>Operator" as OP
participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP
participant "<b>LPAd" as LPA
participant "<b>eUICC" as E
LPA -> E : [1] ES10b.CancelSession(TransactionID, reason)
rnote over E
[2]
- Generate euiccCancelSessionSigned = {
TransactionID, reason}
- Compute euiccCancelSessionSignature
over euiccCancelSessionSigned
endrnote
E --> LPA : [3] cancelSessionResponseOk
rnote over LPA
[Stop procedure if the reason is sessionAborted]
endrnote
rnote over DP, LPA
[4] [Establish HTTPS connection]
endrnote
LPA -> DP : [5] ES9+.CancelSession(TransactionID, cancelSessionResponseOk)
rnote over DP
[6]
- Retrieve the on-going RSP session
- Verify euiccCancelSessionSignature
- Verify the SM-DP+ OID
endrnote
DP --> LPA : [ERROR]
alt Reason is one of {postponed, timeout}
DP --> LPA : [7] OK
else Otherwise
rnote over DP
[8]
- [Set the Profile in 'Error' state]
- [Delete Event, Refer to Event Deletion section 3.6.3]
endrnote
opt
DP -> OP : [9] ES2+.HandleNotification
OP --> DP : OK
end
DP --> LPA : [10] OK
end
@enduml[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 8b: Common Cancel Session Procedure
Start Conditions:
This procedure can be used in the following cases.
General reasons in the response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient":
•The LPAd receives an error in the response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient". In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be sessionAborted.
•The LPAd receives only the TransactionID in the response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient". In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be sessionAborted.
•The End User has rejected or postponed to the download of the Profile or the execution of the RPM Command(s) (e.g., by selecting 'No' or 'Not Now'). In these cases the reason for step (1) SHALL be endUserRejection or postponed, respectively.
•The End User has not responded to the LPAd prompt for User Confirmation within an implementation-dependent timeout interval. In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be timeout.
Cancel reasons after "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" related to Profile download:
•The PPR(s) in the Profile Metadata are not allowed according to the Rules Authorisation Table, or PPR1 is present in the Profile Metadata and an Operational Profile is already installed on the eUICC. In these cases the reason code for step (1) SHALL be pprNotAllowed.
•The Profile Metadata in the response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" includes an Enterprise Configuration and the eUICC does not support Enterprise Profiles. In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be enterpriseProfilesNotSupported.
•The Profile Metadata in the response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" includes Enterprise Rule(s), and the Device is a Non-Enterprise Capable Device, or the End User disallowed the installation of Enterprise Profiles with Enterprise Rules. In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be enterpriseRulesNotAllowed.
•The Profile Metadata in the response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" contains an Enterprise Configuration and there is an installed Profile with PPR1 set. In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be enterpriseProfileNotAllowed.
•The Profile Metadata in the response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" includes an Enterprise OID that does not match the Enterprise OID of the already installed Enterprise Profile(s). In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be enterpriseOidMismatch.
•The Profile Metadata in the response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" includes at least one error in the Enterprise Rule(s). In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be enterpriseRulesError.
•The Reference Enterprise Rule prohibits the installation of non-Enterprise Profiles. In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be enterpriseProfilesOnly.
•The Profile Metadata in the response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" includes an LPR Configuration and the Device or the eUICC does not support the LPR. In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be lprNotSupported.
•The Profile Metadata in the response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" contains a serviceProviderName and/or profileName data object with an empty string. If the eUICC and the SM-DP+ both declare cancelForEmptySpnPnSupport in respectively the euiccRspCapability and the serverRspCapability, the reason for step (1) SHALL be emptyProfileOrSpName. Otherwise, the reason SHALL be undefinedReason.
Cancel reasons after "ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage":
•The Profile Metadata in the Bound Profile Package does not match the Profile Metadata received previously in the response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient". In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be metadataMismatch.
•The LPAd has encountered an error while installing a Bound Profile Package. In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be loadBppExecutionError.
Cancel reasons after "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" related to RPM:
•The response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" includes an RPM Package and the RPM operation is disabled in the LPA by the End User. In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be rpmDisabled.
•The response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" includes an RPM Package and the RPM package violates any of the limitations defined in section 2.10.1. In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be invalidRpmPackage.
•The response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" includes an RPM Command 'Contact PCMP' and the LPAd does not support the LPRd. In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be lprNotSupported.
•The response to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" includes an RPM Command 'Contact PCMP', and the only available data connection is mobile network (cellular) data, and the End User has disallowed use of mobile network data for the LPA Proxy. In this case the reason for step (1) SHALL be lprNetworkDataNotAllowed.
•The LPAd has encountered an error while transferring an RPM Package to the eUICC. In this case the reason code for step (1) SHALL be loadRpmPackageError.
Procedure:
1.The LPAd SHALL call the "ES10b.CancelSession" function with input data comprising the TransactionID and the reason.
2.The eUICC SHALL:
•Generate the euiccCancelSessionSigned data object containing the TransactionID and the reason provided by the LPAd.
•Compute the euiccCancelSessionSignature over euiccCancelSessionSigned using the SK.EUICC.SIG corresponding to the euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed as received during the common mutual authentication procedure.
3.The eUICC SHALL return the euiccCancelSessionSigned and euiccCancelSessionSignature. If the reason is sessionAborted, the LPAd SHALL ignore the response from the eUICC and stop the procedure.
NOTE: A version 3 or higher LPAd may send the reason sessionAborted, which is added in version 3, to a version 2 eUICC.
4.If the HTTPS connection to the SM-DP+ in the RSP session is no longer alive, the LPAd SHALL establish a new HTTPS connection with the SM-DP+ as described in Common Mutual Authentication procedure.
5.The LPAd SHALL call the "ES9+.CancelSession" function with input data comprising TransactionID, euiccCancelSessionSigned and euiccCancelSessionSignature.
6.On reception of the "ES9+.CancelSession" function, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Retrieve the on-going RSP session identified by the TransactionID. If the TransactionID is unknown, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a function execution status 'Failed' with relevant status code and the procedure SHALL stop.
•Verify the euiccCancelSessionSignature performed over euiccCancelSessionSigned using the PK.EUICC.SIG associated with the ongoing RSP session. If the signature is invalid, the SM-XX SHALL return a function execution status 'Failed' with relevant status code and the procedure SHALL stop.
•Verify that the received OID is the same value as the one contained in the CERT.DPauth.SIG used during the common mutual authentication procedure. If the value doesn't match, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a function execution status 'Failed' with relevant status code and the procedure SHALL stop.
7.If the reason contained in euiccCancelSessionSigned indicates 'postponed' or 'timeout', the SM-DP+ SHALL simply return a function execution status 'Executed-Success' and keep the Profile download order or RPM download order available for a further retry, and the procedure SHALL stop. If the reason contained in euiccCancelSessionSigned indicates any other condition, the SM-DP+ SHALL perform the following steps.
8.If the on-going RSP session is for Profile download order, the SM-DP+ SHALL set the Profile associated with the on-going RSP session in 'Error' state (section 3.1.6). If an SM-DS was involved in the RSP session identified by the TransactionID, the SM-DP+ SHALL delete the corresponding Event from the SM-DS.
9.Depending on the agreed behaviour with the Operator (out of scope of this specification), the SM-DP+ SHALL call the "ES2+.HandleNotification" function with the relevant notificationEvent set and a notificationEventStatus indicating 'Failed' with status code value depending on the given cancel reason. The cancel session reason mapping to status code is given in section 5.3.5.
10.The SM-DP+ SHALL return a function execution status 'Executed-Success' and the procedure SHALL stop.
3.0.3 RSP Sessions and Error Handling
Several procedures implement RSP Sessions:
-the Profile Download and Installation Procedure (section 3.1.3),
-the RPM Download Procedure together with the RPM Execution Procedure (sections 3.7.2 and 3.7.3),
-the Device Change Procedure (section 3.11.1),
-the Profile Recovery Procedure (section 3.11.2),
-the Event Retrieval Procedure (section 3.6.2), and
-the Push Service Registration Procedure (section 3.6.5).
These procedures comprise a sequence of operations between an RSP Server, the LPA, and the eUICC over a period of time. In addition to errors reported by ES9+, ES11, and ES10 functions, other conditions MAY impact the successful execution of these procedures. The LPA SHOULD indicate such failures to the user; however, the specific presentation of these errors is out of the scope of this document.
An MEP eUICC SHALL only handle one RSP session at any point in time. For MEP-A1 and MEP-A2, RSP sessions SHALL happen on eSIM Port 0. For MEP-B, the LPA MAY select any eSIM Port for an RSP session and the eUICC SHALL accept an RSP session on any eSIM Port. However, the full session SHALL use the same eSIM Port.
The LPA SHOULD NOT initiate a new RSP Session while there is an active RSP Session. However, in the event that this does occur, even on a different eSIM Port in case of MEP-B, when a new RSP session is started with "ES10b.GetEUICCChallenge" the eUICC SHALL discard its session state. Depending upon the specific procedure, this could include the generated eUICC challenge, downloaded Profile Metadata, Profile contents, RPM Package contents, Event Records, a Profile Installation Result, and/or a Load RPM Package Result. However, an unused otPK/otSK.EUICC.KA MAY be stored for future retry.
For MEP-B, in the event that the LPA changes the eSIM Port during an RSP session, the eUICC SHALL return an error and discard its session state.
The eUICC MAY discard its session state if a Profile switch occurs, even on a different eSIM Port, during an RSP Session.
If an eUICC Memory Reset or eUICC Test Memory Reset is successfully processed during a RSP Session, the eUICC SHALL discard its session state.
An RSP Session MAY fail because of a communications failure between the LPA and the RSP Server. The LPA MAY retry for a period of time. The LPA SHALL reset its own session state when all retry attempts have failed.
An RSP Session could fail while the LPA is invoking an ES10 function for reasons other than an error status reported by the eUICC. Examples of such failures include:
•In the case of a removable eUICC card, the End User could remove the card.
•The End User could switch off the power or remove the battery.
•A software fault could cause a crash of the LPA, host Device, and/or baseband processor.
The LPA SHOULD provide an appropriate error indication to the End User when possible (e.g., when power is restored). The specific presentation of such an error notification is out of scope of this document.
3.1 Remote Provisioning
3.1.1 Profile Download Initiation
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 9: Profile Download Initiation
Start Conditions:
The End User has selected the Operator with whom to sign a contract.
The End User MAY initiate the process:
•From any other Device (e.g., PC)
•Through a Customer Agent of the Operator
•Or any other convenient means provided by the Operator
Procedure:
The download initiation procedure consists of the following sub-processes:
A. Contract subscription process
B. Download preparation process
C. Contract finalization process
D. Subscription activation process (Optional)
NOTE: This section describes the case where these sub-process are performed in the described order. In this case, it is most likely that the download and installation procedure will happen right after this procedure. There also are cases where these sub-processes MAY be performed in different order like B -> A -> C [‑> D] or B -> C -> A [‑> D] (e.g., for prepaid Subscription). In these cases the download order requested from the SM-DP+ MAY remain pending for a significant amount of time.
NOTE: The following table summarizes the input data to be provided in "ES2+.DownloadOrder" and "ES2+.ConfirmOrder" functions.
ES2+ Function | Input Parameters | Profile Download Use Cases | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
Default | Activation | SM-DS | ||
DownloadOrder (Section 5.3.1) | eid | O | O | O |
iccid | O | O | O | |
profileType | C ⁽¹⁾ | C ⁽¹⁾ | C ⁽¹⁾ | |
ConfirmOrder (Section 5.3.2) | iccid | M | M | M |
eid | C ⁽²⁾ | O | C ⁽²⁾ | |
matchingId | M ⁽³⁾ | O ⁽⁴⁾ | O ⁽⁵⁾ | |
confirmationCode | O | O | O | |
smdsAddress | Not Present | Not Present | C ⁽⁶⁾ | |
rootSmdsAddress | Not Present | Not Present | C ⁽⁶⁾ | |
releaseFlag | M | M | M | |
NOTE 1: Required if iccid is not present for DownloadOrder |
Table 6a: "ES2+.DownloadOrder" and "ES2+.ConfirmOrder" input data
As the address of a Default SM-DP+ is pre-configured on the eUICC or Device, no MatchingID is required. However, in a typical deployment, an SM-DP+ is expected to handle all kinds of requests, i.e., those triggered via SM-DS or Activation Code, as well as those in the role of a Default SM-DP+. Plus an Operator MAY decide to specify the use of MatchingIDs even if the Default SM-DP+ address has been pre-configured on the Devices. To cover all such cases, this specification defines a tolerant behaviour, where the SM-DP+ will properly handle requests on ES9+ which target a Default SM-DP+ (i.e., no Matching ID is provided), even if a MatchingID has been generated for the eUICC.
3.1.1.1 Contract Subscription Process (Informative)
The contract selection process, while being out of scope of this specification, is given as it SHALL happen prior to the Profile download and installation procedure (section 3.1.3). This process description describes the information exchanged and data that are used as input data for the Profile download and installation procedure.
This process can be performed at an Operator's Point of Sale (POS), using the Operator's web portal from a Device which is not the one onto which the Profile will be downloaded (e.g., a PC) or from a web browser on the Primary Device, or even using a companion application on the Primary Device. Any other mean defined by the Operator can also be possible as far as it provides a convenient End User experience and it provides the expected output data required for the execution of the Profile download and installation procedure.
During the execution of the process of contract Subscription, the Operator acquires the necessary information, such as through acquisition of its Device Information Code. As part of this data, the EID and IMEI of the target Device MAY be provided, and related Device capabilities MAY be acquired (e.g., based on the TAC information comprised in the IMEI). Acquisition and verification of these capabilities are out of scope of this specification. The Root SM-DSs supported by the Device MAY also be acquired. Additional information such as contract details, user details, payment details and similar are also out of scope of this specification.
If the EID and the IMEI are provided, the Operator can verify if the target Device (both eUICC and Device can be relevant for this verification) is supported, and determine the Profile Type for the target Device and the offer given to the End User. If no information about the target Device is provided, this preliminary verification cannot be performed and it will be performed during the execution of the Profile download and installation procedure (section 3.1.3). For additional info see Annex F on Profile eligibility check.
If EID and IMEI are provided and the Operator cannot provide an appropriate Profile, the process fails and stops at this point.
3.1.1.2 Download Preparation Process
1.The Operator calls the "ES2+.DownloadOrder" (section 5.3.1) function of the SM‑DP+ with the relevant input data.
'EID' is optional. If an SM-DS or a Default SM-DP+ is to be used for the Profile download, then the EID SHALL be present. One of the value 'ProfileType' or 'ICCID' SHALL be provided. If ICCID is given, the SM-DP+ SHALL verify that this ICCID is available. If 'ProfileType' is given, the SM-DP+ SHALL pick one of the related ICCID in its inventory.
The SM-DP+ MAY optionally verify additional compatibility between the eUICC (if EID is provided) and the requested Profile Type. This verification is out of scope of this specification.
2.The SM-DP+ reserves the ICCID for this request. At this stage the SM-DP+ MAY simply pick the related Protected Profile Package from its inventory or generate and protect the Profile corresponding to this ICCID.
3.The SM-DP+ returns the acknowledged ICCID (SHALL be the same value as the received one, if any).
4.Optionally, the Operator MAY generate a MatchingID (section 4.1.1). If a Default SM-DP+ is to be used for the Profile download, then the Operator MAY send an empty string in the MatchingID value field.
At this stage the Operator knows the ICCID selected for this contract Subscription. If an error occurs during this step, the process fails and stops at this point.
5.to 8. The Operator MAY perform any relevant operation on its back-end (e.g., provisioning of HLR). The Operator SHALL confirm the download order by calling the "ES2+.ConfirmOrder" (section 5.3.2) function of the SM-DP+ with the ICCID and its relevant input data.
•If EID is available, the EID SHALL be included in the input data. If the EID was provided with previous "ES2+.DownloadOrder", the same EID SHALL be provided.
•If a MatchingID was generated by the Operator in Step 4 or if the Operator provides a zero-length MatchingID, it SHALL be included in the input data and then the SM-DP+ SHALL return the acknowledged value that is the same as the received one. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL generate a MatchingID and return the generated value to the Operator. The ICCID SHALL be associated to the MatchingID.
•If it is required for the End User to enter the Confirmation Code to download the Profile, the Confirmation Code SHALL be included in the input data of the "ES2+.ConfirmOrder" (section 5.3.2) function.
•The Operator MAY send one or two SM-DS addresses to the SM-DP+ as defined in section 3.6.1. If SM-DS address(es) are given, the SM-DP+ SHALL perform Event Registration to the specified SM-DS(s).
•If all necessary operations on Operator’s back-end provisioning has been completed by this point, releaseFlag SHALL be set to 'true' in the input data. Otherwise, releaseFlag SHALL be set to 'false' and additional "ES2+.ReleaseProfile" function SHALL be called later in Subscription activation process.
•The SM-DP+ SHALL store the functionRequesterIdentifier and functionCallIdentifier values of the "ES2+.ConfirmOrder" function call, which SHALL be used as notificationReceiverIdentifier and notificationIdentifier, respectively, in subsequent "ES2+.HandleNotification" calls related to this order.
The SM-DP+ MAY return an SM-DP+ address value. In this case the Operator SHALL use this value to generate the Activation Code; otherwise the Default SM-DP+ address SHALL be used.
NOTE: If no EID is given at this stage, the Operator MAY be involved later during the download and installation procedure to determine the right 'ProfileType'/'ICCID' in case the provided 'ProfileType'/'ICCID' is not compatible with the eUICC identified by the EID once it is acquired by SM‑DP+ during the download and installation procedure. See Annex F on Profile eligibility check.
3.1.1.3 Contract Finalization (Informative)
The Operator provides the End User with relevant information necessary for the Profile download.
If the Activation Code is to be used for the Profile download, the MatchingID and SM-DP+ address are provided via the Activation Code as described in section 4.1. If the optional Confirmation Code is to be used, it is provided to the End User separately from the Activation Code.
If an SM-DS or Default SM-DP+ is to be used for the Profile download, the Operator informs the End User of the condition that triggers the Profile download procedure, e.g., the very first boot-up and/or IP connection of the device.
3.1.1.4 Subscription Activation Process (Optional)
It is most likely that the Operator backend provisioning can be performed during the download preparation process. But if it cannot be performed, the Subscription activation process can be performed as a separate process to decouple the download preparation processes and Contract finalization process.
9.If all necessary operations on its back-end (e.g., provisioning of HLR) were not performed in Step 5, they SHALL be performed in this stage.
10.The Operator calls the "ES2+.ReleaseProfile" function of the SM-DP+ with ICCID to release the Profile to allow the download and installation procedure to be started by the End User. If the download and installation procedure is initiated by the End User before this function call, the download and installation procedure SHALL NOT be allowed and SHALL return a specific error code.
11.The SM-DP+ SHALL return the result.
3.1.2 Void
Figure 10: Void
3.1.3 Profile Download and Installation
This section describes the Profile download and installation procedure.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml
hide footbox
skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center
skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11
skinparam noteFontSize 11
skinparam monochrome true
skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>Operator" as OP
participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP
participant "<b>LPAd" as LPA
participant "<b>eUICC" as E
rnote over LPA #FFFFFF
[1] (a) Get SM-DP+ Address, Parse Activation Code Token, [SM-DP+ OID], [CI PK ind.] from AC, or
(b) Get SM-DP+ Address and EventID from SM-DS, or
(c) Get Default SM-DP+ Address, [CI PKID] from eUICC or Device
End rnote
rnote over DP, E #FFFFFF : [2] [Refer to Common mutual authentication procedure section 3.0.1]
rnote over DP #FFFFFF
[3]
- Look for Profile download pending order
- Eligibility Check using Device Info, euiccInfo2
endrnote
Group Opt.
DP -> OP : [4] ES2+.HandleNotification(...)
OP --> DP : OK
end
DP --> LPA : [error]
rnote over DP #FFFFFF
[5]
- Check if download retry
- Build smdpSigned2 = {TransactionID,
Confirmation Code Required Flag, [bppEuiccOtpk], [rpmPending]}
- Compute smdpSignature2 over smdpSigned2 and euiccSignature1
- Build Profile Metadata
endrnote
DP -> LPA : [6] TransactionID, Profile Metadata, smdpSigned2, smdpSignature2, CERT.DPpb.SIG
rnote over LPA #FFFFFF
[7] Check if the Profile can be installed
endrnote
Opt If required by LPAd
LPA -> E : [ES10b.GetRAT]
E --> LPA : [RAT]
LPA -> E : [ES10c.GetProfilesInfo]
E --> LPA : [ProfileInfoListOk]
end
rnote over LPA #FFFFFF
[8] [End User consent(s) with
optional Confirmation Code input]
Endrnote
alt Download rejection
rnote over OP, E #FFFFFF : [Refer to Common Cancel Session procedure section 3.0.2]
else Download confirmation
rnote over OP, E #FFFFFF : [Refer to Sub-procedure Profile Download and installation – Download confirmation]
end
@enduml[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 11: Profile Download and Installation
Start Conditions:
In addition to the start conditions required by the common mutual authentication procedure defined in section 3.0.1, this procedure requires the following start conditions depending on options in step 1:
•If this procedure uses an Activation Code (option a):
oThe End User has an Activation Code that is coded as described in the section 4.1.
oThe End User has entered the Activation Code to the LPAd. Depending on the Device capabilities, the LPAd SHALL support entry of the Activation Code by manual typing and QR code scanning.
oIf the Activation Code specifies an eSIM CA RootCA Public Key indicator, the LPAd SHALL restrict the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers to that value.
•If this procedure uses an SM-DS (option b):
oThe LPAd has retrieved an SM-DP+ Address and EventID from the SM-DS.
oIf there was a restriction of the eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier for the SM-DS procedure, the LPAd SHALL apply the same restriction for the Profile download and installation procedure.
•If this procedure uses a Default SM-DP+ (option c):
oThe LPAd has retrieved the Default SM-DP+ Address and optionally an allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier from the eUICC by calling the "ES10a.GetEuiccConfiguredData" function or from the Device in an implementation-dependent manner. If the retrieved data includes an allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier, then the LPAd SHALL restrict the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers to that value.
Further, for each Profile in Released state the SM-DP+ SHALL maintain a count of the number of attempts to download that Profile and a count of the number of attempts to enter the Confirmation Code during download of that Profile. The SM-DP+ SHALL limit the number of download attempts and the number of Confirmation Code attempts, respectively.
A Provisioning Profile MAY be enabled by the LPAd upon End User request for RSP operations as defined in SGP.21 [4], which SHALL include End User consent if an Operational Profile is to be disabled and if establishment of the connectivity using the currently Enabled Profile is not successful.
Finally, if there is already an enabled Profile with PPR1 set, the following has occurred: The End User has been advised of this condition and has given consent for download. The LPA MAY alternatively request this consent at any later point during the download procedure.
Procedure:
1.(Optionally for option (a)) The LPAd parses the Activation Code and finds the SM-DP+ address, Activation Code Token, and optional SM-DP+ OID, and optional eSIM CA RootCA Public Key identifier. If the format of the Activation Code is invalid, the procedure SHALL stop with an error message provided by the LPAd to the End User.
2.The common mutual authentication procedure defined in section 3.0.1 SHALL be executed, conditionally restricting the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers as described in the Start Conditions above. In this procedure, SM-XX is SM-DP+. CERT.XXauth.SIG, PK.XXauth.SIG and SK.XXauth.SIG are CERT.DPauth.SIG, PK.DPauth.SIG and SK.DPauth.SIG respectively. ESXX is ES9+.
During the common mutual authentication procedure at step (1), if an Activation Code is used and it includes an eSIM CA RootCA Public Key indicator, the LPAd verifies that it matches one in the list of supported eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers in eUICCInfo1, and if the verification fails, the LPAd stops the Profile download procedure. After stopping the download procedure, if LPAd and eUICC both support updating the set of eSIM CA RootCA Public Keys on the eUICC, then the LPAd MAY perform the eUICC Root Public Key update procedure (section 3.10) indicating the eSIM CA RootCA Public Key indicator in the Activation Code.
During the common mutual authentication procedure at step (10), the LPAd SHALL verify that the SM-DP+ OID contained in the CERT.DPauth.SIG is identical to the SM-DP+ OID if the LPAd has acquired it from the Activation Code at step (1). If the verification fails, the LPAd SHALL inform the End User, send "ES10b.CancelSession" to the eUICC with a reason sessionAborted, and the procedure SHALL stop.
During the common mutual authentication procedure at step (10), the LPAd SHALL build the ctxParams1 data object to provide the MatchingID, MatchingID Source, Device Info and optionally operationType (when the eUICC is version 3 or higher), to the eUICC for signature. operationType, if present, SHALL include 'profileDownload'. Only when the eUICC indicates EuiccRspCapability.serviceProviderMessageSupport, the Device Info MAY include preferred languages for End User-readable messages from the SM-XX. The value of the MatchingID and MatchingID Source SHALL be set as follows:
•If an Activation Code is used, the MatchingID value SHALL be set to Activation Code Token and the MatchingID Source value SHALL be set to 'activationCode'.
•If an SM-DS is used, the MatchingID value SHALL be set to EventID and the MatchingID Source value SHALL be set to the OID of the SM-DS that provided the EventID.
•If a Default SM-DP+ is used, the MatchingID SHALL be missing and the MatchingID Source value SHALL be set to 'none'.
3.The SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Verify that there is a related pending Profile download order for the provided MatchingID.
•If this Profile download order is already linked to an EID, verify that it matches the EID of the authenticated eUICC.
•Verify that the Profile corresponding to the pending Profile download order is in 'Released' state, or, in case of a retry due to a previous installation failure, in 'Downloaded' state (section 3.1.6).
If any of these verifications fail, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a relevant error status and the procedure SHALL stop. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Increment the count of download attempts for the identified Profile. If the maximum number of attempts has been exceeded, the SM-DP+ SHALL terminate the corresponding Profile download order and notify the Operator by calling the "ES2+.HandleNotification" function with the notificationEventStatus indicating 'Failed' with the relevant error status, and the procedure SHALL stop.
•Perform appropriate eligibility checks.
4.(Optional step) Depending on the agreed behaviour with the Operator (out of scope of this specification), the SM-DP+ SHALL notify the Operator with the outcome of the eligibility check using the function "ES2+.HandleNotification" with the notificationEvent indicating 'Eligibility an attempt limit check'.
NOTE: This notification step MAY be done asynchronously.
5.If the eligibility check fails, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Set the Profile corresponding with the pending Profile download order in 'Error' state (section 3.1.6).
•Return an error status to the LPAd and the procedure SHALL stop.
Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Determine if a Confirmation Code is required for this pending order.
•Determine whether the Profile is already bound to the EID from a previous unsuccessful download attempt. If so, the SM-DP+ MAY indicate in its response the otPK.EUICC.KA it wants to use.
•Determine if an RPM Package for the eid is also pending.
•Generate an smdpSigned2 data structure containing associated data elements.
•Compute the smdpSignature2.
•Generate the Profile Metadata of the Profile.
6.The SM-DP+ returns "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" response to the LPAd.
7.On reception of the SM-DP+ response, the LPAd SHALL check if the Profile can be installed as described hereunder. For this check, the LPAd MAY use previously fetched Rules Authorisation Table and/or list of installed Profiles. If the LPAd has not already fetched the required information, the LPAd SHALL request those from the eUICC by calling the "ES10b.GetRAT" and/or "ES10c.GetProfilesInfo" functions.
•If the Profile Metadata contains PPR(s), the LPAd SHALL check if the PPR(s) are allowed based on the Rules Authorisation Table. If one or more PPR(s) are not allowed, the LPAd SHALL perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason pprNotAllowed (See section 2.9.2.1 for PPRs allowed for an eUICC supporting MEP).
•If the Profile Metadata contains PPR1, and an Operational Profile is installed, the LPAd SHALL perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason pprNotAllowed.
•If the Profile Metadata contains an Enterprise Configuration and there is a Profile with PPR1 set, the LPAd SHOULD perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason code 'enterpriseProfileNotAllowed'.
•If the Profile Metadata contains any Enterprise Rule and the Device is a Non-Enterprise Capable Device, the LPAd SHOULD perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason enterpriseRulesNotAllowed.
•If the Profile Metadata contains any Enterprise Rule and the End User disallowed the installation of Enterprise Profile with Enterprise Rules, the LPAd SHALL perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason enterpriseRulesNotAllowed.
•If the Profile Metadata contains an Enterprise Configuration and there is a Profile with PPR1 set, the LPAd SHOULD perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason enterpriseProfileNotAllowed.
•If the Profile Metadata contains an Enterprise OID which does not match the Enterprise OID of the already installed Enterprise Profile(s) (if any), the LPAd SHOULD perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason enterpriseOidMismatch.
•If the Profile Metadata contains Enterprise Rules with the referenceEnterpriseRule bit set, the LPAd SHOULD perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason enterpriseRulesError.
NOTE: The referenceEnterpriseRule bit may be assigned to an Enterprise Profile via RPM after its installation. It may be required to first enable the Enterprise Profile in order for the Enterprise Rule update to succeed.
•For an Enterprise Capable Device, if the Reference Enterprise Rule prohibits the installation of non-Enterprise Profile and the ProfileMetadata does not contain Enterprise Configuration, the LPAd SHOULD perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason enterpriseProfilesOnly.
•If the Profile Metadata contains an LPR Configuration and the Device or the eUICC does not support the LPR, the LPAd SHOULD perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason lprNotSupported.
•If the Profile Metadata contains an empty string profileName and/or serviceProviderName, the LPAd MAY perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason emptyProfileOrSpName if cancelForEmptySpnPnSupport is supported by both the SM-DP+ and the eUICC or with reason undefinedReason otherwise.
8.If the Profile Metadata contains Profile Policy Rule(s) and/or Enterprise Rule(s) subject to End User consent, the LPAd SHOULD ask for Strong Confirmation by showing relevant information. This information (the "LPA-generated message") MAY include the consequences of the Profile Policy Rule(s) and/or the Enterprise Rule(s) to the End User, if the Profile includes PPR(s) subject to additional End User consent according to the RAT and/or the installation of the Enterprise Profile requires its immediate enabling. The LPA-generated message SHALL be formulated in a descriptive and non-discriminatory manner (e.g., for Enterprise Profile with "Non-Delete" Profile Policy Rule: "The profile that you are about to install can be deleted only under the terms you have agreed with your service provider, and it will be automatically enabled after installation. Enter your PIN to approve installation?"). If the Profile Metadata includes a Service Provider message, the LPAd MAY also display that message. The LPAd SHOULD display this information to the End User such that it can be read in full under the control of the End User. If the Profile Metadata contains neither Profile Policy Rule(s) nor Enterprise Rule(s), the LPAd SHALL ask for Simple Confirmation (e.g., simple 'Yes' or 'No' or 'Not Now') on the Profile download.
If the Confirmation Code Required Flag is set in either the Activation Code Token or in the smdpSigned2, then the LPAd SHALL ask for the End User to enter the Confirmation Code which was provided by the Operator that MAY be considered as a Strong Confirmation. If the Confirmation Code is not required, the LPAd SHALL ask for Simple Confirmation (e.g., simple 'Yes' or 'No' or 'Not Now') on the Profile download.
The LPAd SHOULD ask for the Simple Confirmation on enabling the Profile to be downloaded after its successful installation (e.g., "Do you want to automatically enable the profile after installation YES/NO?"). This request MAY be prompted at any point in time of the Profile Download and Installation procedure, or immediately afterwards.
The Confirmation Requests described above MAY:
•display ProfileName or any relevant information contained in the Profile Metadata to the End User.
•be combined, if prompted, into a single prompt with the highest Confirmation Level therefore requiring a single confirmation by the End User.
•be performed either at this step or after the BPP has been downloaded by the LPAd (see section 3.1.3.2 step (12)), since the same Profile Metadata will also be available then. However, this exception does not apply to Confirmation Code input which SHALL be obtained no later than this step.
If the End User does not agree to the download of the Profile (e.g., by selecting 'No' or 'Not Now') on the Profile download, the LPAd SHALL continue with the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason endUserRejection or postponed. If a notification is sent to the Operator, the notificationEvent SHALL be set to 'Confirmation Failure'.
If the End User does not respond to the LPAd prompt within an implementation-dependent timeout interval, the LPAd SHALL cancel the Profile download by performing the Common Cancel Session procedure with the reason timeout.
If required, the LPAd SHALL calculate the hash of the UTF-8-encoded representation of the Confirmation Code as follows:
Hashed Confirmation Code = SHA256 (SHA256 (Confirmation Code) | TransactionID), where '|' means concatenation of data.
If Profile download has not been rejected in the steps above, the procedure SHALL continue with the Sub-procedure "Profile Download and installation – Download confirmation"
3.1.3.1 Void
Figure 12: Void
3.1.3.2 Sub-procedure Profile Download and Installation – Download Confirmation
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml
hide footbox
skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center
skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11
skinparam noteFontSize 11
skinparam monochrome true
skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>Operator" as OP
participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP
participant "<b>LPAd" as LPA
participant "<b>eUICC" as E
LPA -> E : [1] ES10b.PrepareDownload \n (smdpSigned2, smdpSignature2, CERT.DPpb.SIG, [Hashed Confirmation Code])
rnote over E #FFFFFF
[2]
- Verify CERT.DPpb.SIG
- Verify CERT.DPauth.SIG and CERT.DPpb.SIG have same owner
- Verify smdpSignature2 over smdpSigned2
- Verify smdpSigned2
Endrnote
E --> LPA: [error]
rnote over E #FFFFFF
[3]
- Generate one-time KA key pair
(otPK.EUICC.KA, otSK.EUICC.KA)
unless a valid otPK.EUICC.KA was provided
- Generate euiccSigned2=
{TransactionID, otPK.EUICC.KA, [Hashed Confirmation Code]}
- Compute euiccSignature2 over euiccSigned2 and smdpSignature2
Endrnote
E -> LPA: [4] euiccSigned2, euiccSignature2
LPA -> DP : [5] ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage \n (euiccSigned2, euiccSignature2)
rnote over DP #FFFFFF
[6]
- Verify euiccSignature2 over euiccSigned2
- Determine if Confirmation Code required
Endrnote
Group Cond. Confirmation Code handling
rnote over DP #FFFFFF
[7] [Verify Hashed Confirmation Code]
Endrnote
Group Cond. On CC retry exceeded
DP -> OP : ES2+.HandleNotification
OP --> DP : OK
end
end
DP --> LPA : [8] [error]
rnote over DP #FFFFFF
[9]
- [Generate one-time KA key pair (otPK.DP.KA, otSK.DP.KA)]
- [Generate Session Keys]
- Generate Bound Profile Package
Endrnote
Group Opt.
DP -> OP : [10] ES2+.HandleNotification(...)
OP --> DP : OK
end
DP --> LPA : [11] TransactionID, Bound Profile Package
rnote over LPA #FFFFFF
[12]
- Verify Metadata
- [Prompt/Display Profile Metadata to End User]
- [End User consent]
Endnote
alt Verification failed or no End User consent
rnote over OP, E #FFFFFF : [13] [Refer to Common Cancel Session procedure section 3.0.2]
else Otherwise
rnote over OP, E #FFFFFF : [14] [Refer to Sub-procedure Profile Installation]
end
@enduml[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 13: Sub-procedure Profile Download and Installation – Download Confirmation
Start Conditions:
The End User has agreed to the download of the Profile (e.g., by selecting 'Yes').
Procedure:
1.The LPAd SHALL call the "ES10b.PrepareDownload" function optionally including the Hashed Confirmation Code.
2.The eUICC SHALL:
•Verify that CERT.DPpb.SIG is valid.
•Verify that CERT.DPauth.SIG and CERT.DPpb.SIG belong to the same entity and are certified by the same certificate.
•Verify smdpSignature2.
•Verify that the TransactionID contained in smdpSigned2 matches the TransactionID of the on-going RSP session.
If any of the verifications fail, the eUICC SHALL return a relevant error status and the procedure SHALL stop.
3.The eUICC SHALL:
•Use the one-time key pair associated with the bppEuiccOtpk if it is provided by the SM-DP+ and it is still stored in the eUICC, or generate a new one-time key pair (see section 5.7.5).
•Generate the euiccSigned2 data structure.
•Compute the euiccSignature2.
4.The eUICC SHALL return the "ES10b.PrepareDownload" response.
5.The LPAd calls the "ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage" function.
6.The SM-DP+ SHALL verify the euiccSignature2.
If a Confirmation Code is required the SM-DP+ SHALL continue with step (7). Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL continue with step (9).
7.The SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Retrieve the hashed Confirmation Code stored for this order by "ES2.+ConfirmOrder" and calculate the expected hash value as:
expected hash value = SHA256(stored hashed Confirmation Code | TransactionID)
•Verify that the received Hashed Confirmation Code matches the expected hash value.
•In case the Confirmation Code verification has failed, the SM-DP+ SHALL increment the count of incorrect Confirmation Code attempts for the Profile. If the maximum number of incorrect attempts has been exceeded, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
-set the Profile corresponding to the Profile download order in 'Error' state (section 3.1.6).
-notify the Operator by calling "ES2+.HandleNotification" with the notificationEvent indicating 'Confirmation Failure'.
8.If any verification in step 6 or 7 failed, the SM-DP+ SHALL return an error status to the LPAd and the procedure SHALL stop. Unless the maximum number of incorrect attempts for Confirmation Code entries has been exceeded, the LPAd MAY retry by restarting the Profile download and installation procedure.
9.The SM-DP+ SHALL perform the following:
•Dependent on whether a re-usable BPP is present and whether the eUICC can accept it, the SM-DP+ SHALL do one of the following:
-Reuse the BPP
-Rebind the BPP
-Return an error
-Create a new BPP
10.(Optional step) Depending on the agreed behaviour with the Operator (out of scope of this specification), the SM-DP+ SHALL notify the Operator that the Profile is downloaded using the function "ES2+.HandleNotification" with notificationEvent indicating 'BPP download'.
NOTE: This notification step MAY be done asynchronously.
11.The SM-DP+ returns "ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage" response and set the Profile corresponding to the Profile download order in 'Downloaded' state (section 3.1.6).
12.The LPAd SHALL perform additional processing using the Profile Metadata contained within the Bound Profile Package:
•If the LPAd previously used the Profile Metadata returned by "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" (i.e., in section 3.1.3 step (7) and (8)) then
•The LPAd SHALL verify that the Profile Policy Rules and the Enterprise Configuration have not changed. If this verification fails, the LPAd SHALL execute the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason pprNotAllowed or metadataMismatch.
•The LPAd SHOULD verify that all other Profile Metadata elements it used in that earlier step (such as the Profile Name, Icon, etc.) have not changed. If the verification fails, the LPAd MAY inform the End User and offer the End User to postpone or reject the Profile installation. Alternatively, the LPAd MAY stop the download by executing the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason metadataMismatch.
•If the LPAd has not previously captured the End User consent(s) related to the Profile download as defined in section 3.1.3 step (8), it SHALL do so at this point as described in that step.
13.If any of the cancel conditions given above is true, the Common Cancel Session procedure SHALL be executed. If a notification is sent to the Operator within this procedure, the notificationEvent SHALL be set to 'BPP download'.
14.Otherwise, sub-procedure Profile installation described in section hereafter SHALL be executed.
3.1.3.3 Sub-procedure Profile Installation
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid participant "<b>Operator" as OP participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant "<b>LPAd" as LPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E LPA -> E : [1] ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage x N\n(ES8+.InitialiseSecureChannel) rnote over E #FFFFFF [2] - Verify InitialiseSecureChannel data - Generate Session Keys endnote E --> LPA : Response APDU x N LPA -> E : [3] ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage x N\n(ES8+.ConfigureISDP) E --> LPA : Response APDU x N LPA -> E : [4] ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage x N\n(ES8+.StoreMetadata) E --> LPA : Response APDU x N rnote over E #FFFFFF [4a] Verify PPR(s) against RAT [4b] [Verify Enterprise Configuration] endrnote LPA -> E : [5] [ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage x N]\n(ES8+.ReplaceSessionKeys) E --> LPA : [Response APDU x N] LPA -> E : [6] ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage x N\n(ES8+.LoadProfileElements) E --> LPA : Response APDU x N \n(ProfileInstallationResult) LPA -> DP : [7] ES9+.HandleNotification(ProfileInstallationResult) DP --> LPA : OK rnote over DP #FFFFFF [8] [Terminate Download order] endrnote DP -> OP : [9] [ES2+.HandleNotification] OP --> DP : OK rnote over DP #FFFFFF [10] [Delete Event, Refer to Event Deletion section 3.6.3] endrnote LPA -> E : [11] ES10b.RemoveNotificationFromList rnote over E #FFFFFF [12] Delete Notification endrnote E --> LPA : OK rnote over DP, E #FFFFFF [13] [Next RSP session follows] endrnote @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 14: Sub-procedure Profile Installation
Start Conditions:
The BPP has been downloaded to the LPA and all verifications by the LPA were successful.
Procedure:
In this sub-procedure the LPAd generates the Segmented Bound Profile Package according to the description in section 2.5.5 and transfers it to the eUICC using a sequence of "ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage" commands. If the LPAd is unable to perform the segmentation (e.g., because of an error in the BPP structure), or if any call of "ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage" returns status words other than '90 00' or '91 XX', the LPAd SHALL perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason loadBppExecutionError. If a subsequent notification is sent to the Operator, the notificationEvent SHALL be set to 'BPP installation'.
1.The LPAd SHALL transfer the part of Bound Profile Package containing the "ES8+.InitialiseSecureChannel" function to the eUICC by repeatedly calling the "ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage" function.
2.The eUICC SHALL verify the received "ES8+.InitialiseSecureChannel". If the verification succeeds, the eUICC SHALL generate the Session Keys using the input data received in previous step and the key agreement algorithm determined according to section 2.6.5.
3.The LPAd SHALL transfer the part of Bound Profile Package containing the "ES8+.ConfigureISDP" function to the eUICC by repeatedly calling the "ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage" function.
4.The LPAd SHALL transfer the part of Bound Profile Package containing the "ES8+.StoreMetadata" function to the eUICC by repeatedly calling the "ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage" function.
4a. If the Profile Metadata contains PPR(s), the eUICC SHALL verify each PPR according to PPR verification section 2.9.3.1.
4b. If "ES8+.StoreMetadata" contains an Enterprise Configuration, the eUICC SHALL verify that this configuration is acceptable. If the Reference Enterprise Rule only allows Enterprise Profiles to be installed, the eUICC SHALL verify that the Profile to be installed is an Enterprise Profile.
5.If the Profile Protection Keys (PPK) were included in the Bound Profile Package, the LPAd SHALL transfer the part of Bound Profile Package containing the "ES8+.ReplaceSessionKeys" function to the eUICC by repeatedly calling the "ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage" function. The eUICC SHALL decrypt the Profile Protection Keys and replace the current BSP Session Keys with the decrypted Profile Protection Keys.
6.The LPAd SHALL transfer the Profile Elements included in the "ES8+.LoadProfileElements" functions by repeatedly calling the "ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage" function.
If all the Profile Elements are successfully processed and installed, with or without any warning, the last response of the "ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage" function SHALL deliver the signed Profile Installation Result as defined in section 2.5.6. Installation notifications as configured in the Profile Metadata, if any, SHALL be generated.
Otherwise, if an error occurs during the transfer and processing of the Profile Elements, or any previous ES8+ function, which does not result in error status words, the eUICC SHALL stop the procedure and SHALL report to the LPAd with a response of the "ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage" function including the Profile Installation Result.
The eUICC SHALL store the Profile Installation Result in its non-volatile memory before delivering it to the LPAd.
The eUICC SHALL erase the otSK.EUICC.KA attached to this RSP session no later than the successful completion of the BPP installation.
The LPAd MAY inform the End User of the success or error status indicated by the Profile Installation Result.
7.The LPAd calls the "ES9+.HandleNotification" function in order to deliver the Profile Installation Result to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ acknowledges the reception of the Notification to the LPAd.
8.The SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Retrieve the pending download order identified by the TransactionID. If TransactionID is unknown, the SM-DP+ SHALL terminate its processing.
•(Conditional) Terminate the pending download order and set the corresponding Profile in state 'Installed' or 'Error' (section 3.1.6) as indicated by the Profile Installation Result.
9.(Conditional) The SM-DP+ SHALL call the "ES2+.HandleNotification" with:
•notificationEvent indicating 'BPP installation';
•notificationEventStatus reflecting the value received in ES9+.HandleNotification;
•notificationReceiverIdentifier reflecting the functionRequesterIdentifier value of the associated ES2+.ConfirmOrder;
•notificationIdentifier reflecting the functionCallIdentifier value of the associated ES2+.ConfirmOrder;
10.(Conditional) If this procedure is executed in the context of option (b), the SM-DP+ SHALL execute the SM-DS event deletion procedure (section 3.6.3).
11.On reception of the acknowledgement message from the SM-DP+ the LPAd SHALL call "ES10b.RemoveNotificationFromList" with the corresponding seqNumber.
12.The eUICC SHALL delete the Profile Installation Result from its non-volatile memory.
13.(Conditional) If the LPAd has received rpmPending in the response of "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" function call, the LPAd SHOULD initiate an additional RSP Session with the SM-DP+, setting the operationType to indicate rpm. If this RSP session was triggered by an Event Record from an SM-DS, the pending RSP session with the SM-DP+ SHOULD be executed before continuing processing any remaining Event Records from that SM-DS.
3.1.4 Limitation for Profile Installation
Several profiles MAY be installed on the eUICC, subject to non-volatile memory limitations.
3.1.5 Error Handling Within the Profile Download and Installation Procedure
During Profile Installation (section 3.1.3.3), when the next segment of an SBPP is to be sent to the eUICC, the eUICC SHALL handle TLVs that are different from what is defined for the SBPP in section 2.5.5 as follows:
-The eUICC SHALL process the commands "ES10b.GetEUICCChallenge" (indicating the start of a new download session) and "ES10b.CancelSession" (indicating the termination of the current download session) as specified.
-The eUICC MAY also process other ES10 commands.
-The eUICC SHALL reject other ES10 commands it does not process and any other TLV with status words '69 85' (Conditions of use not satisfied) or '6A 88' (Reference data not found).
In the latter 2 cases, the eUICC SHALL NOT discard the download session state.
3.1.6 Profile Lifecycle at SM-DP+
The previous sections provide detailed procedures associated with Remote Provisioning. Each Profile has state information on the SM-DP+ associated with it during the provisioning into an eUICC. The Profile lifecycle state can be one of the states listed in the following table.
Additional states and additional or customised ES2+ functions MAY be agreed between the Operator and the SM‑DP+.
State Name | Description |
|---|---|
Available | The Profile is available in the inventory of the SM-DP+. |
Allocated | The Profile is reserved for downloading without being linked to an EID. |
Linked | The Profile is reserved for downloading and is linked to an EID. |
Confirmed | The Profile is reserved for downloading (linked or not linked to an EID) with Matching ID and Confirmation Code if required. |
Released | The Profile is ready for download and installation after Network Configuration by the Operator (e.g.: HLR Registration). |
Downloaded | The Bound Profile was delivered to the LPA. |
Installed | The Profile was successfully installed on the eUICC. |
Error | The Profile has not been installed because of one of the following error cases: -Confirmation Code Retry Limit exceeded -Download Retry Limit exceeded -End User Rejection -Permanent error during download and installation |
Unavailable | The Profile cannot be reused anymore by the SM-DP+. |
Table 6b: Profile State in the SM-DP+
The following additional Profile states MAY be tracked by an SM‑DP+ that receives Notifications from an eUICC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- State Name Description --------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Enabled The last Notification received from the eUICC was an enable Notification. Disabled The last Notification received from the eUICC was a disable Notification. Deleted The last Notification received from the eUICC was a delete Notification. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 6c: Notified Profile States in the SM-DP+
The following two state transition diagrams show the Profile lifecycle state on the SM-DP+ and provide the details of the actions previously performed on a Profile together with the possible next action.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml
skinparam monochrome true
State Available {
}
state Allocated {
}
state Linked {
}
state Confirmed {
}
state Released {
}
state Downloaded {
}
state Installed {
}
state Error{
}
Available --> Allocated : ES2+.DownloadOrder (ICCID) or \n ES2+.DownloadOrder (Profile Type)
Available --> Linked : ES2+.DownloadOrder (EID, ICCID) or \n ES2+.DownloadOrder (EID, Profile Type)
Allocated --> Confirmed : ES2+.ConfirmOrder (ICCID, [EID], [MatchingID], [CCode], releaseFlag=false)
Allocated --> Released : ES2+.ConfirmOrder \n(ICCID, [EID], \n [MatchingID], \n[CCode], releaseFlag=true)
Linked --> Confirmed : ES2+.ConfirmOrder \n(ICCID, [EID], [MatchingID], \n[CCode], [SM-DS address], \nreleaseFlag=false)
Linked --> Released : ES2+.ConfirmOrder \n(ICCID, [EID], [MatchingID], \n [CCode], [SM-DS address(es)], \nreleaseFlag=true)
Confirmed --> Released : ES2+.ReleaseProfile (ICCID)
Released -down--> Downloaded : ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage
Downloaded --> Installed : ES9+.HandleNotification (Success)
Installed -[dashed]-> Released : optional: ES9+.HandleNotification \n(Success - DeleteNotification)
Installed -[dashed]-> Available : optional: ES9+.HandleNotification \n(Success - DeleteNotification)
Downloaded --> Downloaded : ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage (retry) \nES9+.HandleNotification (temporary error)
Downloaded -down--> Error : ES9+.HandleNotification (Permanent error)
Downloaded --> Error : ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage (Fail) \n - Eligibility check failed \n - Exceed CCode Try Limit \n - Exceed Download Try Limit \n - End User Rejection \n – BPP not available for rebinding
Released --> Error : ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage (Fail) \n - Eligibility check failed \n - Exceed CCode Try Limit \n - Exceed Download Try Limit \n - End User Rejection
@enduml[Generated by PlantUML]
NOTE: "ES2+.HandleNotification" does not have any impact on the Profile state.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml
skinparam monochrome true
state Available {
}
state States {
state Allocated {
}
state Linked {
}
state Confirmed {
}
state Released {
}
}
state Error{
}
State Unavailable {
}
States -left--> Available : ES2+.CancelOrder (ICCID, EID, MatchingID) \n with finalProfileStatusIndicator = Available
States -right--> Unavailable : ES2+.CancelOrder (ICCID, EID, MatchingID) \n with finalProfileStatusIndicator = Unavailable
Error -up--> Available : ES2+.CancelOrder (ICCID, EID, MatchingID) \n with finalProfileStatusIndicator = Available \n or Automatic Transition
Error -up--> Unavailable: ES2+.CancelOrder (ICCID, EID, MatchingID) \n with finalProfileStatusIndicator = Unavailable \n or Automatic Transition
@enduml[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 15: Profile Instance Lifecycle State Transit Diagram at SM-DP+
3.2 Local Profile Management
The End User initiates Local Profile Management procedures using the LUI. As specified in SGP.21 [4], User Intent is required for all procedures directed to Operational Profiles, except List Profiles. For each procedure the LPA SHALL enforce the Confirmation Level that is equal to or higher than the Confirmation Level defined in this specification. The specific implementation of Confirmation Requests by the LPA is out of scope of this specification.
In all cases, if the End User refuses or does not respond to a Confirmation Request, then the associated operation SHALL stop.
Confirmation Requests MAY be combined for consecutive operations to simplify the user experience and avoid repeated input steps for the End User. For instance, when performing a Profile download with an Activation Code, the Strong Confirmation for download and Simple Confirmation for enabling the Profile MAY be combined. In the case of combined Confirmation Requests, it SHALL be clear to the End User what operations will be performed, and the highest level of confirmation SHALL be obtained.
The LUI implementation of Add Profile (section 3.2.5) and Update all Profiles (in section 3.2.7) MAY be combined. For instance, as a composite Add/Update All operation, the LPAd MAY initiate Profile downloads and RPM downloads from the Default SM-DP+(s), Root SM-DS(s), and all Polling Addresses of the installed Profiles.
Some Local Profile Management procedures provide two options: Using a REFRESH proactive command to notify the Device about a change and performing such a change without such a command. While both options are available for LPAd, the procedures SHALL always use the option with the REFRESH proactive command for the LPAe.
3.2.1 Enable Profile
This procedure is used to enable a Profile already downloaded and installed on an eUICC.
The procedure applies for SEP and MEP. The following applies for Command Port and Target Port:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command Port Target Port
---------------- ----------------------- -------------------------------
MEP-A1/A2 0 >0
MEP-B >=0 Identical to Command Port
SEP Physical interface Physical interface
------------------------------------------------------------------------For MEP-A2, the eUICC SHALL select an eSIM Port which currently has no Profile enabled, i.e., implicit disabling will never occur.
For MEP-B, the LPA SHALL set the refreshFlag.
For MEP-A2, the LPA SHALL NOT set the refreshFlag.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black hide footbox participant "End-user" as EndUser #FFFFFF participant "LUId" as LPA #FFFFFF participant "eUICC \n LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices #FFFFFF participant "Device baseband" as DevBB #FFFFFF rnote over EndUser, LPA #FFFFFF [0] End-user interactions end rnote Opt refreshFlag not set rnote over LPA, DevBB #FFFFFF [1] TP: The Device a) Runs the application session termination procedure b) Closes logical channels c) Terminate an ongoing proactive command session end rnote end opt LPA -> LPAServices: [2] CP: ES10c.Enable(ISD-P AID or ICCID, [TP], refreshFlag) rnote over LPAServices #FFFFFF [3] Verify Profile state [4a] Enforce Profile Policy Rules [4b] [Verify Reference Enterprise Rule] [5] [Perform Test Profile checks] end rnote LPAServices --> LPA: [Error] Alt REFRESH required rnote over LPAServices #FFFFFF [6a] TP: Determine if proactive session is ongoing end rnote LPAServices --> LPA: [Error: catBusy] LPAServices -> LPA: [6b] Ok LPAServices -> DevBB: [7] TP: REFRESH DevBB -> LPAServices: Terminal Response or RESET rnote over LPAServices #FFFFFF [8] TP: The Target Profile is Enabled end rnote Else REFRESH not required rnote over LPAServices #FFFFFF [9] TP: The Target Profile is Enabled end rnote LPAServices -> LPA: [10] Ok LPA -> DevBB: [11] New Enabled Profile end rnote over DevBB #FFFFFF [12] TP: Baseband executing a network attach procedure with the newly Enabled Profile end rnote rnote over LPA [13] [trigger PCM session] end rnote @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 16: Enable Profile
Start Conditions:
When the Profile to be enabled is an Operational Profile:
•User Intent is acquired as defined in SGP.21 [4].
When the Profile to be enabled is a Test Profile:
•The Device is in Device Test Mode.
When the Profile to be enabled is a Provisioning Profile:
•The currently-enabled Operational Profile, if any, is unsuitable to provide the connectivity required for an operation such as Add Profile.
Procedure:
0.The End User is presented with a user interface that displays the list of installed Profiles within the eUICC, with their current states (Enabled or Disabled). The End User selects the Profile to be enabled. The LPAd MAY check the Profile Policy Rules of the Profiles and give appropriate warnings to the End User (e.g., that due to Profile Policy Rules the Profile cannot be enabled). The enabling of a Provisioning Profile can be initiated by the LPAd itself without any End User interaction. The enabling of a Profile combined with its download can omit this step.
1.Before the LPAd calls the EnableProfile function with the refreshFlag not set, the Device has the responsibility to ensure that the relevant conditions for use are met:
For SEP, MEP-A1 and MEP-B, if a Profile currently is enabled on the Target Port:
a)The Device SHALL run the application session termination procedure in accordance with ETSI TS 102 221 [6] for every active application of the Profile currently enabled on the Target Port.
b)The Device SHALL close all logical channels that were used to select these applications.
c)The Device SHOULD take implementation-dependent action to terminate an ongoing proactive command session.
For MEP-A2, the Device MAY verify if an eSIM Port is available which has currently no Profile enabled.
Before the LPAd calls the EnableProfile function with the refreshFlag set, the Device has the responsibility to ensure that CAT is initialised on the Target Port.
2.On the Command Port, the LPAd SHALL call the "ES10c.EnableProfile" (section 5.7.16) function of the ISD-R with its relevant input data, which includes the indication if a REFRESH proactive command is needed. For MEP, the Target Port is determined as follows:
-For MEP-A1, the Target Port SHALL be indicated in the input data.
-For MEP-A2, the Target Port SHALL be selected by the eUICC in step 9.
-For MEP-B, the command SHALL be sent on the Target Port.
3.The ISD-R SHALL verify the state of the Target Profile. If the Target Profile is not in Disabled state, the ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating a failure, and the procedure SHALL stop.
4a. If the Target Profile is not a Test Profile, the ISD-R SHALL check the Profile Policy Rules of the Profile currently enabled on the Target Port (if any). If it has a Profile Policy Rule "Disabling not allowed", the ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating a failure, and the procedure SHALL stop.
4b. If the eUICC contains a Profile with a Reference Enterprise Rule, it SHALL verify the following:
-If the Target Profile is not an Enterprise Profile or a Test Profile: That the maximum number of non-Enterprise Profiles that can be Enabled is not exceeded.
-If the Reference Enterprise Rule indicates "priorityEnterpriseProfile" and the Profile with the Reference Enterprise Rule is currently disabled, that itself or a Test Profile is the Target Profile.
If any of these verifications fail, the ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating a failure, and the procedure SHALL stop.
5.If the Profile currently enabled on the Target Port is a Test Profile, the ISD-R SHALL check if the Target Profile is either another Test Profile or the Operational profile that was previously in Enable state. If this is not the case, the ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating a failure, and the procedure SHALL stop.
If the refreshFlag is set, steps 6 to 8 SHALL be executed.
6a. If a proactive session is ongoing on the Target Port, the ISD-R MAY return a catBusy error response to the LUId. If this occurs, the LPAd MAY take implementation-dependent actions to terminate the proactive command session, after which the LPAd MAY call again the "ES10c.EnableProfile” function without any further End User interaction.
6b. If the ISD-R does not stop execution due to an ongoing proactive session, then it SHALL return a response indicating result OK back to the LUId.
7.The eUICC SHALL trigger a REFRESH of the Target Port as follows:
•For SEP and MEP-B, the eUICC SHALL send a REFRESH proactive command on the Target Port.
•For MEP-A1, the eUICC SHALL send an LSI COMMAND proactive command with the action "Proactive session request" on the Command Port. This results in the Device checking for pending proactive commands on the Target Port, whereupon the eUICC sends a REFRESH proactive command on the Target Port.
8.Upon reception of the Terminal Response or after the RESET of the Target Port, the ISD-R SHALL disable the currently Enabled Profile (if any) and then enable the Target Profile on the Target Port.
If the refreshFlag is not set, steps 9 to 11 SHALL be executed.
9.For MEP-A2, the eUICC SHALL select an eSIM Port which currently has no Profile enabled as Target Port. If no eSIM Port is available, the ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating a failure, and the procedure SHALL stop. The ISD-R SHALL disable the Profile currently enabled on the Target Port (if any). The ISD-R SHALL enable the Target Profile on the Target Port.
10.The ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating result OK back to the LUId. For MEP‑A2, the response SHALL include the Target Port.
11.The Device SHALL discard any state, including the PIN state, and any cached file content including EF_(ICCID) and EF_(DIR), and any proactive command session from the previously enabled Profile, if any, on the Target Port. The LPA signals the baseband connected to the Target Port that a new Profile was enabled. The Device SHALL proceed with the UICC activation procedure including TERMINAL PROFILE, as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [6] clause 14.5.1.
12.The baseband triggers the execution of a network attach procedure with the newly Enabled Profile on the Target Port.
13.If the Device supports PCM, lprConfiguration.triggerLprOnEnableProfile is present in the Profile Metadata of the enabled Profile, and appropriate connectivity is available, then the LPRd SHALL trigger a Profile Content Management session using the optional DPI in the Profile Metadata as described in section 3.9.
If the currently Enabled Profile is not a Provisioning Profile and is not able to provide connectivity, there SHALL NOT be any fallback to the previously Enabled Profile. Further action SHALL remain under the responsibility of the End User.
3.2.2 Disable Profile
This procedure is used to disable a Profile, already downloaded and installed on an eUICC, and Enabled on the Target Port.
The procedure applies for SEP and MEP. The following applies for Command Port and Target Port:
Command Port | Target Port | |
|---|---|---|
MEP-A1/A2 | 0 | >0 |
MEP-B | >=0 | >=0 If CAT has been initialised on the Target Port, then identical to Command Port. Otherwise, MAY be different from Command Port. |
SEP | Physical interface | Physical interface |
For MEP, the Target Port is the eSIM Port where the Target Profile is currently enabled.
For MEP-B, the LPA SHALL set the refreshFlag.
For MEP-A2, the LPA SHALL NOT set the refreshFlag.
NOTE: There may be situations where a Profile is enabled on an eSIM Port which is no longer accessible by the baseband, e.g., due to switching to a physical SIM. For a Device typically using refresh mode when switching profiles, this procedure allows gracefully handling of such situations: even if the refreshFlag is set, the eUICC will skip the refresh if CAT is not initialised (see step 6), and for MEP-B, the DisableProfile function can be sent on a different eSIM Port.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black hide footbox participant "End-user" as EndUser #FFFFFF participant "LUId" as LPA #FFFFFF participant "eUICC \n LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices #FFFFFF participant "Device baseband" as DevBB #FFFFFF rnote over EndUser, LPA #FFFFFF [0] End-user interactions end rnote Opt refreshFlag not set rnote over LPA, DevBB #FFFFFF [1] TP: The Device a) Runs the application session termination procedure b) Closes logical channels c) Terminate an ongoing proactive command session end rnote end opt LPA -> LPAServices: [2] CP: ES10c.Disable(ISD-P AID or ICCID, refreshFlag) note over LPAServices #FFFFFF [3] Verify Profile state [4] Enforce Profile Policy Rules end note LPAServices --> LPA: [Error] Alt REFRESH required rnote over LPAServices #FFFFFF [5a] TP: Determine if proactive session is ongoing end rnote LPAServices --> LPA: [Error: catBusy] LPAServices -> LPA: [5b] Ok LPAServices -> DevBB: [6] TP : REFRESH DevBB -> LPAServices: Terminal Response or RESET rnote over LPAServices #FFFFFF [7] TP: The Target Profile is Disabled end rnote Alt If the Target Profile is a Test Profile, an Operational Profile was formerly Enabled \nand this Operational Profile was not deleted while a Test Profile was Enabled rnote over LPAServices #FFFFFF [8] TP: Enable formerly Enabled Operational Profile end rnote rnote over DevBB #FFFFFF TP: Baseband executing a network attach procedure with the newly Enabled Profile end rnote end Alt Else REFRESH not required rnote over LPAServices #FFFFFF [9] TP: The Target Profile is Disabled end rnote Alt If the Target Profile is a Test Profile, an Operational Profile was formerly Enabled \nand this Operational Profile was not deleted while a Test Profile was Enabled rnote over LPAServices #FFFFFF [10] TP: Enable formerly Enabled Operational Profile end rnote LPAServices -> LPA: [11] Ok rnote over LPA #FFFFFF [12] TP: The Device SHALL discard: - any state of the previously Enabled Profile - any cached file content - any proactive command session end rnote LPA -> DevBB: [13] New Enabled Profile rnote over DevBB #FFFFFF TP: Baseband executing a network attach procedure with the newly Enabled Profile end rnote else else LPAServices -> LPA: [14] Ok rnote over LPA #FFFFFF [15] TP: The Device SHALL discard: - any state of the previously Enabled Profile - any cached file content - any proactive command session end rnote LPA -> DevBB: [16] No Enabled Profile end Alt end @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 17: Disable Profile
Start Conditions:
When the Profile to be disabled is an Operational Profile:
•User Intent is acquired as defined in SGP.21 [4].
When the Profile to be disabled is a Test Profile:
•The Device is in Device Test Mode.
When the Profile to be disabled is a Provisioning Profile:
•The operation requiring connectivity from the Provisioning Profile, such as a Profile download, has completed.
Procedure:
0.The End User is presented with a user interface that displays the list of installed Profiles within the eUICC, with their current states (Enabled or Disabled), as described in "List Profiles" procedure (section 3.2.4). The End User selects the Profile to be Disabled. The disabling of a Provisioning Profile or a Test Profile can be initiated by the LPAd itself without any End User interaction. The LPAd MAY check the Profile Policy Rules of the Profile and give appropriate warnings to the End User.
1.Before the LPAd calls the DisableProfile function with the refreshFlag not set, the Device has the responsibility to ensure that the relevant conditions for use are met on the Target Port. I.e., the Device:
a)SHALL run the application session termination procedure in accordance with ETSI TS 102 221 [6] for every active application of the currently enabled Profile on the Target Port.
b)SHALL close all logical channels that were used to select these applications.
c)SHOULD take implementation-dependent action to terminate an ongoing proactive command session.
2.On the Command Port, the LPAd SHALL call the "ES10c.DisableProfile" (section 5.7.17) function of the ISD-R with its relevant input data, which includes the indication if a REFRESH proactive command is needed.
3.The ISD-R SHALL verify the state of the Target Profile. If the Target Profile is not in the Enabled state, the ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating a failure, and the procedure SHALL stop.
4.For non MEP-Capable eUICC: The ISD-R SHALL check the Profile Policy Rules of the currently Enabled Profile.
If it has a Profile Policy Rule "Disabling not allowed", the ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating a failure, and the procedure SHALL stop.
If refreshFlag is set, steps 5 to 8 SHALL be executed.
5a. If a proactive session is ongoing on the Target Port, the ISD-R MAY return a catBusy error response to the LUId. If this occurs, the LPAd MAY take implementation-dependent actions to terminate the proactive command session, after which the LPAd MAY call again the "ES10c.DisableProfile" function without any further End User interaction.
5b. If the ISD-R does not stop execution due to an ongoing proactive session, then it SHALL return a response indicating result OK back to the LUId.
6.If the Target Profile is enabled on an eSIM Port where CAT has been initialised, the eUICC SHALL trigger a REFRESH of the Target Port as follows:
•For SEP and MEP-B, the eUICC SHALL send a REFRESH proactive command on the Target Port.
•For MEP-A1, the eUICC SHALL send an LSI COMMAND proactive command with the action "Proactive session request" on the Command Port. This results in the Device checking for pending proactive commands on the Target Port, whereupon the eUICC sends a REFRESH proactive command on the Target Port.
If the Target Profile is enabled on an eSIM Port where CAT has not been initialised, the Device SHALL discard any state, including the PIN state, of the Target Profile and any cached file content including EF_(ICCID) and EF_(DIR).
7.Upon reception of the Terminal Response or after the RESET of the Target Port, or immediately if the Target Profile is enabled on an eSIM Port where CAT has not been initialised, the ISD-R SHALL disable the currently Enabled Profile on the Target Port.
8.If the Target Profile is a Test Profile, an Operational Profile was in Enabled state while the Test Profile was enabled on the Target Port and this Operational Profile was not deleted while a Test Profile was Enabled, this previous Operational Profile SHALL be enabled again on the Target Port.
If refreshFlag is not set, steps 9 to 16 SHALL be executed as specified below.
9.The ISD-R SHALL disable the Target Profile.
Check if a previous Operational Profile needs to be Enabled: If the Target Profile is a Test Profile, an Operational Profile was in Enabled state on the Target Port while the Test Profile was enabled and such Operational Profile was not deleted while a Test Profile was Enabled, the procedure SHALL end with the execution of steps 10 to 13:
10.This previous Operational Profile SHALL be enabled again on the Target Port.
11.The ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating result OK back to the LUId.
12.The Device SHALL discard any state, including the PIN state, of the previously Enabled Profile, any cached file content including EF_(ICCID) and EF_(DIR), and any proactive command session.
13.The LPA SHALL signal the baseband that a new Profile was Enabled. The baseband triggers the execution of a network attach procedure with the newly Enabled Profile.
Otherwise: if no previous Operational Profile needs to be Enabled, the procedure SHALL end with the execution of steps 14 to 16.
14.The ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating result OK back to the LUId.
15.The Device SHALL discard any state, including the PIN state, of the previously Enabled Profile, any cached file content including EF_(ICCID) and EF_(DIR), and any proactive command session.
16.The LPA SHALL signal the baseband that the Profile was disabled.
3.2.3 Delete Profile
This procedure is used to delete a Profile already downloaded and installed on an eUICC.
The conditions under which the LPAd MAY delete a Provisioning Profile are implementation-dependent and out of the scope of this specification. The eUICC implementation MAY not support deletion of a Provisioning Profile or a preloaded Test Profile.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black hide footbox participant "End-user" as EndUser #FFFFFF participant "LUId" as LPA #FFFFFF participant "eUICC \n LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices #FFFFFF participant "Device Baseband" as Baseband #FFFFFF note over EndUser, LPAServices #FFFFFF [0] End-user interactions end note group If Profile to be deleted is enabled note over LPA, Baseband #FFFFFF [1] Steps 1-9 of the Disable Profile Procedure are executed end note end LPA -> LPAServices: [2] ES10c.DeleteProfile(ICCID or ISD-P AID) alt ISD-R checks the target Profile is in Enabled state or Profile Policy Rules does not allow deletion LPAServices -> LPA : [3] ERROR else The target Profile is in a Disabled state and Profile Policy Rules allows deletion note over LPAServices #FFFFFF [4] Delete Profile end note LPAServices -> LPA : [5] OK end @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 18: Delete Profile
Start Conditions:
When the Profile to be deleted is an Operational Profile:
•User Intent is acquired as defined in SGP.21 [4].
When the Profile to be deleted is a Test Profile:
•The Device is in Device Test Mode.
•The Test Profile to be deleted is not a pre-loaded Test Profile, or the eUICC implementation permits deletion of the preloaded Test Profiles.
Procedure:
0.The End User is presented with a user interface that displays the list of installed Profiles within the eUICC, with their current states (Enabled or Disabled), as described in "List Profiles" procedure (section 3.2.4Error! Reference source not found.) The End User selects the Profile to be deleted. The LPAd SHALL ask for Strong Confirmation by presenting the consequences. The LPA MAY check the Profile Policy Rules of the Profile and give appropriate warnings to the End User (e.g., that due to Profile Policy Rules the Profile cannot be deleted). The deletion of a Provisioning Profile can be initiated by the LPAd itself without any End User interaction.
1.If the identified Profile to be deleted is Enabled on any eSIM Port then steps 1-9 of the disable profile procedure SHALL be executed as defined in section 3.2.2.
2.The LPAd SHALL call the "ES10c.DeleteProfile" function of the ISD-R with its relevant input data.
3.The ISD-R SHALL verify the state of the target Profile and check its Profile Policy Rules. If the target Profile is in the Enabled state or the Profile Policy Rules do not allow deletion, the ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating a failure, and the procedure SHALL stop.
4.The eUICC SHALL delete the Profile.
5.The ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating result OK back to the LPAd.
3.2.4 List Profiles
This procedure is used by the LPAd to list the Profiles, and their current states, pre-installed or previously downloaded and installed on an eUICC, in human readable format. The procedure is initiated by the LPAd either implicitly (e.g., at first Device boot up) or explicitly (e.g., through LUI user interface options).
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black hide footbox participant "End-user" as EndUser #FFFFFF participant "LUId" as LPA #FFFFFF participant "eUICC \n LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices #FFFFFF note over EndUser, LPA #FFFFFF [0] End-user interactions end note LPA -> LPAServices: [1] ES10c.GetProfilesInfo() LPAServices -> LPA: [2] List of Profiles LPA -> EndUser: [3] Display List @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 19: List Profiles
Start Conditions:
•None.
Procedure:
0.The LPAd is started on the Device. The user MAY be presented with the user interface options.
1.Either as part of the LPA launch procedure or through explicit user menu selection, the LPAd SHALL call "ES10c.GetProfilesInfo" to request the list of Profiles from the LPAd Services.
2.The eUICC SHALL return the Profile Metadata and status of the Profile(s) as defined in section 5.7.15.
3.The LUId SHALL display a subset of the set of installed Profiles along with their current states (Enabled or Disabled) to the End User in human readable format. This subset could be empty. The displayed subset SHALL include the Operational Profiles if the Device is not in Device Test Mode. It SHALL include the Test Profiles if the Device is in Device Test Mode. It SHALL NOT include the Provisioning Profiles.
End Conditions:
Any Profile information presented to the user SHALL always be in human readable format.
The specific presentation of Profile information to the End User is out of the scope of this document. However, it SHALL be possible for the End User to obtain the ICCID of each installed Operational Profile.
3.2.5 Add Profile
This procedure will allow the End User to add a single Profile. This procedure can further enable the downloaded Profile upon Confirmation Request, which consequently disables the currently Enabled Profile (if any). Network connectivity is assumed. The download can be initiated by the input of an Activation Code, by retrieval of a pending Profile download Event from an SM-DS, or by retrieval of a pending Profile download from a Default SM-DP+. The LPAd MAY implement a combination of these methods, as applicable, as a composite Add Profile operation.
If a Default SM-DP+ address is configured on the eUICC or Default SM-DP+ addresses are configured on the Device, the LPAd SHALL allow the End User to perform Add Profile operations using a configured Default SM-DP+ and to perform Add Profile operations using the Root SM-DS(s) that it supports. As described above, the LPAd MAY implement this as a composite Add Profile operation.
When the End User initiates the Add Profile procedure and the Profile Metadata indicates that the Profile is not an Operational Profile, the LPAd SHOULD notify the End User and stop the procedure.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black hide footbox participant "End User" as EndUser #FFFFFF participant "LUId / LPDd" as LPA #FFFFFF participant "eUICC \n LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices #FFFFFF participant "SM-DP+" as SMDP #FFFFFF participant "SM-DS" as SMDS #FFFFFF rnote over EndUser, LPA #FFFFFF (1) End User interaction end rnote alt Activation Code rnote over EndUser, LPA #FFFFFF (2a) Activation Code input end rnote else SM-DS rnote over LPA, SMDS #FFFFFF (2b) Event Retrieval Procedure, see 3.6.2 end rnote else Default SM-DP+ rnote over LPA, LPAServices #FFFFFF (2c) Default SM-DP+ address retrieval end rnote end rnote over LPA, SMDP #FFFFFF (3) Profile Download and Installation Procedure, see 3.1.3 end rnote @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 20: Add Profile
Start Conditions:
•User Intent is acquired as defined in SGP.21 [4].
Procedure:
1.The End User initiates the Add Profile operation within the LUId.
When performing subsequent Common Mutual Authentication procedure(s) with the SM-XX(s), the LPAd SHOULD set operationType, which, if present, SHALL include profileDownload.
2.The LPAd obtains the parameters for the Profile to be downloaded:
a.If an Activation Code is used, the LUId SHALL obtain the Activation Code from the End User (e.g., by manual entry or QR code scanning).
b.If an SM-DS is used, the LPAd SHALL retrieve the SM-DP+ address and EventID from that SM-DS using the Event Retrieval Procedure (section 3.6.2).
c.If a Default SM-DP+ is used, the LPAd SHALL retrieve the Default SM-DP+ address from the eUICC or from the Device.
3.The Profile is downloaded from the SM-DP+ via the Profile download and installation procedure as defined in section 3.1.3, with the Confirmation Request(s) as described therein.
End Conditions:
1.The Profile and its associated Profile Metadata have been installed on the End User’s eUICC.
3.2.6 Set/Edit Nickname
This procedure is used to add or change the Profile Nickname associated to a Profile already downloaded and installed on an eUICC.
This procedure is not applicable to Provisioning Profiles.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 12 skinparam noteFontSize 12 skinparam monochrome true participant "End User" as User participant "LUId" as LUI participant "eUICC \n LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAsvc rnote over User,LPAsvc #FFFFFF : [0] End User selects the target Profile rnote over User,LUI #FFFFFF : [1] End User edits the nickname LUI -> LPAsvc : [2] ES10c.SetNickname(ICCID, Nickname) @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 21: Set/Edit Nickname
Start Conditions:
When the Profile to be renamed is an Operational Profile:
•User Intent is acquired as defined in SGP.21 [4].
When the Profile to be renamed is a Test Profile:
•The Device is in Device Test Mode.
Procedure:
0.The End User selects the Profile to be modified. For example, the End User MAY be presented with a user interface that displays the list of installed profiles within the eUICC, as described in the "List Profiles" procedure (section 3.2.4) from which the relevant Profile can be selected.
1.Through the LUId, the End User edits the Profile Nickname.
2.The LUId calls the function "ES10c.SetNickname" with the relevant ICCID and edited Nickname.
End Conditions:
The new Profile Nickname is stored in the Profile Metadata of the relevant Profile.
3.2.7 Update Profile
This procedure is used to update Profile(s) already downloaded and installed on an eUICC via RPM Command(s). Network connectivity is assumed.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 12 skinparam noteFontSize 12 skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF hide footbox participant "End User" as User participant "LPA" as LPA participant "eUICC \n LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAsvc participant "SM-DP+" as DP participant "SM-DS" as DS rnote over User, LPAsvc : [1] End User interactions loop As many times as the number of Polling Addresses rnote over LPA, LPAsvc : [2] Retrieve the Polling Address rnote over LPA, DS : [3] [Event Retrieval Procedure, see 3.6.2] rnote over LPA, DP : [4] RPM Download and Execution (section 3.7.2) end @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 21a: Update Profile
Start Conditions:
A Polling Address is present in the Profile Metadata of the target Profile.
When the target Profile is an Operational Profile:
•User Intent is acquired as defined in SGP.21 [4].
Procedure:
1.The End User selects target Profile(s) to be updated. The implementation of selecting the Profile is Device manufacturer specific. For instance:
a)'Update a Profile': The End User is presented with a user interface that displays the list of installed Profiles within the eUICC as described in "List Profiles" procedure (section 3.2.4). The End User selects a target Profile, and confirms its update. When performing subsequent Common Mutual Authentication procedure(s) with the SM-XX(s), the LPAd SHALL set operationType to include rpm and SHALL provide the ICCID of the target Profile.
b)'Update all Profiles': The End User is presented with a user interface describing that all installed Profiles will be updated. The End User confirms the update of all Profiles. When performing subsequent the Common Mutual Authentication procedure(s) with the SM-XX(s), the LPAd SHALL set operationType to include rpm and SHOULD provide the ICCID of the target Profile.
The LPAd iterates steps (2) to (4) for all Polling Addresses as required in step (1).
2.The LPAd retrieves the Polling Address of the target Profile.
3.(Optional) If the Polling Address is an SM-DS, the LPAd performs Event Retrieval procedure as described in section 3.6.2.
4.The LPAd retrieves and executes the RPM Command(s) from the SM-DP+ as defined in section 3.7.2, with the Confirmation Request(s) as described therein.
End Conditions:
The target Profile(s) is updated by the RPM Command(s).
3.2.8 Add/Update All
This procedure will allow the End User to add (a) new Profile(s) and update all installed Profiles in a single action. Network connectivity is assumed. The LPAd MAY support this procedure, as applicable, by combining Local Profile Management operations "Add Profile" (see section 3.2.5) and "Update Profile" (see section 3.2.7). If the LPAd supports this procedure, the LPAd SHALL set operationType to include both profileDownload and rpm when performing subsequent Common Mutual Authentication procedure(s) with the SM-XX(s).
3.3 Local eUICC Management
3.3.1 Retrieve EID
The Device SHALL provide means for the End User to access the EID in the numeric text representation described hereunder. The Device SHOULD provide means for the End User to access the EID in the QR code representation described hereunder. If the EID is provided to the End User by the LPAd, it is retrieved by the LPAd over the ES10c interface using the function "ES10c.GetEID" as described in section 5.7.20. The EID MAY also be provided to the End User by any other means in any other representation.
The numeric text representation SHALL comprise 32 digits, where each digit is represented by one character in the set [0123456789]. The QR code representation SHALL also be prefixed with "EID:" and SHALL be encoded in alphanumeric mode according to ISO/IEC 18004 [15].
When included in an Octet16 ASN.1 object, the first, third, fifth… digits SHALL be put into the highest four bits of the first, second, third… bytes.
NOTE: Presentation of the EID on the package of a Device should use the same QR code format or, alternatively, a barcode format. The EID should also be printed on the package as a barcode.
3.3.2 eUICC Memory Reset
This procedure is used to delete all the Operational Profiles and their associated Profile Metadata stored on the eUICC regardless of their status. The procedure is initiated by the End User using the LUI of the LPAd.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black hide footbox participant "End User" as EndUser #FFFFFF participant "LUId" as LPA #FFFFFF participant "eUICC\n LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices #FFFFFF participant "Device Baseband" as Baseband #FFFFFF note over EndUser, LPA #FFFFFF [0] End User interactions end note LPA -> LPAServices: [1] ES10c.eUICCMemoryReset(deleteOperationalProfiles) note over LPAServices #FFFFFF [2] Delete all ISD-Ps with Operational Profiles and associated Profile Metadata, [reset Default SM-DP+ address to initial value] end note LPAServices --> LPA : [3] OK alt SEP LPAServices --> Baseband : [4] [REFRESH (UICC Reset)] else MEP LPAServices -> Baseband : [4] [LSI COMMAND (UICC Platform Reset)] end Baseband -> LPAServices: RESET @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 22: eUICC Memory Reset
Start Conditions:
•User Intent is acquired as defined in SGP.21 [4].
Procedure:
0.The End User initiates the eUICC Memory Reset. The LPAd SHALL ask for Strong Confirmation by presenting the consequences.
1.The LPAd SHALL call the "ES10c.eUICCMemoryReset" (section 5.7.19) function of the ISD-R, specifying that Operational Profiles are to be erased.
2.If a proactive session is ongoing on the Command Port:
a)The function MAY return the appropriate error code and stop its execution. If so, the LPAd MAY take implementation-dependent actions to terminate the proactive command session, and MAY call again the "ES10c.eUICCMemoryReset" function without any further End User interaction.
If the ISD-R does not stop execution due to an ongoing proactive session on the Command Port, it SHALL:
b)Delete all ISD-Ps with Operational Profiles and their associated data and Profile Metadata.
c)If required by the command: reset the Default SM-DP+ address to its initial value.
3.The ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating result OK back to the LUId.
4.If there was an Enabled Profile, the ISD-R SHALL send a proactive command to the Device to reset the eUICC. For SEP, the ISD-R SHALL send a REFRESH with mode "UICC Reset". For MEP, the ISD-R SHALL send an LSI COMMAND with "UICC Platform Reset".
NOTE: Instead of fetching the proactive command, the Device MAY reset the eUICC interface.
End Conditions:
The Operational Profiles and their associated Profile Metadata are deleted from the eUICC.
3.3.3 eUICC Test Memory Reset
This procedure is used to delete all the field-loaded (non-preloaded) Test Profiles and their associated Profile Metadata stored on the eUICC regardless of their status. The procedure is initiated by the End User using the LUI while the Device is in Test Mode.
This procedure is only required if the Device supports Test Mode.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black hide footbox participant "End User" as EndUser #FFFFFF participant "LUId" as LPA #FFFFFF participant "eUICC\n LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices #FFFFFF participant "Device Baseband" as Baseband #FFFFFF note over EndUser, LPA #FFFFFF [0] End User interactions end note LPA -> LPAServices: [1] ES10c.eUICCMemoryReset(deleteFieldLoadedTestProfiles) note over LPAServices #FFFFFF [2] Delete all the ISD-Ps with Test Profiles and associated Profile Metadata end note LPAServices --> LPA : [3] OK alt SEP LPAServices --> Baseband : [4] [REFRESH (UICC Reset)] else MEP LPAServices -> Baseband : [4] [LSI COMMAND (UICC Platform Reset)] end Baseband -> LPAServices: RESET @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 23: eUICC Test Memory Reset
Start Conditions:
•The Device is in Test Mode
•User Intent is acquired as defined in SGP.21 [4].
Procedure:
0.The End User initiates the eUICC Test Memory Reset. The LPAd SHALL ask for Simple Confirmation by presenting the consequences.
1.The LPAd SHALL call the "ES10c.eUICCMemoryReset" (section 5.7.19) function of the ISD-R as defined in section 5.7.19, specifying that field-loaded (non-preinstalled) Test Profiles are to be erased.
2.If the eUICC does not support Test Profiles then the ISD-R SHALL return an OK result to the LPA and the procedure SHALL stop. Otherwise:
a)If a proactive session is ongoing on the Command Port:
The function MAY return the appropriate error code and stop its execution. If so, the LPAd MAY take implementation-dependent actions to terminate the proactive command session, and MAY call again the "ES10c.eUICCMemoryReset" function without any further End User interaction.
b)If the ISD-R does not stop execution due to an ongoing proactive session on the Command Port, it SHALL delete all the selected ISD-Ps with their Profiles and their associated data and Profile Metadata.
3.The ISD-R SHALL return a response indicating result OK back to the LUId.
4.If there was an Enabled Profile, the ISD-R SHALL send a proactive command to the Device to reset the eUICC. For SEP, the ISD-R SHALL send a REFRESH with mode "UICC Reset". For MEP, the ISD-R SHALL send an LSI COMMAND with "UICC Platform Reset".
NOTE: Instead of fetching the proactive command, the Device MAY reset the eUICC interface.
End conditions:
The Test Profiles and their associated Profile Metadata are deleted from the eUICC.
3.3.4 Set/Edit Default SM-DP+ Address
This procedure is used to set or update the Default SM-DP+ address stored in an eUICC. The LPAd MAY also support an implementation-specific procedure to set or update a Default SM-DP+ address stored in the Device.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 12 skinparam noteFontSize 12 skinparam monochrome true participant "End User" as User participant "LUI" as LUI participant "eUICC\n LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAsvc LUI -> LPAsvc : [1] ES10a.GetEuiccConfiguredData LPAsvc --> LUI : defaultDpAddress, allowedCiPKId, CI List rnote over User,LPAsvc #FFFFFF : <b>End User interactions\n[2] End User is shown the current Default SM-DP+ address\n [and currently allowed CI]\n[3] End User enters a new Default SM-DP+ address\n [and selects CI] LUI -> LPAsvc : [4] ES10a.SetDefaultDpAddress(defaultDpAddress[, allowedCiPKId]) @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 23a: Set/Edit Default SM-DP+ Address
Start Conditions:
•User Intent is acquired as defined in SGP.21 [4].
Procedure:
1.The LUId calls the function "ES10a.GetEuiccConfiguredData" to retrieve the Default SM-DP+ address and allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key, currently set in the eUICC. Each MAY be an empty value. In addition, the function provides the list of eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers that the eUICC supports for signature verification together with eSIM CA names.
2.The End User MAY be presented with a user interface that displays the current Default SM-DP+ address. The LUId MAY also display the currently allowed eSIM CA, if any.
3.Through the LUId, the End User enters a new Default SM-DP+ address. The LUId SHALL allow setting an empty value. The LUId MAY display the list of the names of the eSIM CAs supported by the eUICC and allow the End User to select one or an empty value.
4.The LUId calls the function "ES10a.SetDefaultDpAddress" with the new Default SM-DP+ address and identifier of the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key chosen by the End User, if any.
End Conditions:
The Default SM-DP+ address is updated with the value set by the End User. If the End User selected an eSIM CA, then the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key is updated with its identifier; otherwise, no allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key is set.
3.3.5 Retrieve DEV-IC
The Device supporting the DEV-IC SHOULD provide a means for the End User to access the DEV-IC in the text and/or the QR code representation defined in section 4.X. If the Device contains multiple eUICCs and the End User has selected one of the eUICCs, the DEV-IC SHALL contain the EID of the selected eUICC in the Path field. The Device MAY also provide a means for the End User to access the DEV-IC in any other means in any other representation.
3.4 Device and eUICC Initialisation
3.4.1 eUICC Initialisation
The eUICC SHALL indicate its support of eUICC functionality in ATR Global Interface byte as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [6].
An MEP-capable eUICC SHALL indicate its support of LSIs in the ATR Global Interface byte and an MEP-Capable Device SHALL indicate in PPS2 if LSIs are to be used for the card session as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [6]. eSIM Port 0 SHALL always be implicitly selected by the eUICC at the beginning of a card session.
Unless pre-configured between the MEP-Capable Device and the MEP-Capable eUICC, and before using additional eSIM Ports, an MEP-capable Device SHALL perform the setup of the LSI configuration as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [6] with the additional TLVs defined in clause 3.4.1.1.
NOTE: It is not required to perform the LSI configuration immediately after PPS.
Upon the indication of support for eUICC in the ATR, the LPAd MAY obtain additional eUICC information, such as SVN, as described in this section below and in section 5.7.1.
If the eUICC contains an Enabled Profile on an eSIM port, the eUICC initialisation procedure SHALL follow the UICC activation procedure as defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [6].
NOTE: For SEP, the term eSIM Port is considered as the physical interface.
If the eUICC does not contain an Enabled Profile on an eSIM Port, but only the default file system as described in section 3.4.3, containing only a limited number of files, the Device SHALL be able to initialise the eUICC and send a Terminal Profile command on this eSIM Port as defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [31] indicating at least that REFRESH (UICC Reset Mode) proactive command is supported.
The Device MAY select the ISD-R to determine if there is an Enabled Profile on the eUICC during eUICC initialisation through FCI template of the ISD-R as defined in section 5.7.1. If there is no Enabled Profile on the eUICC, the Device SHALL maintain the card session between the Device and the eUICC.
If the ISD-R is selected by the Device during eUICC initialisation, the Device MAY send the information contained in the ISDRProprietaryApplicationTemplate data object to the LPA.
The Device SHALL NOT expect the ISD-R to be multi-selectable.
3.4.1.1 Additional TLVs for MANAGE LSI (Configure LSIs)
The command data of the MANAGE LSI (configure LSIs) SHALL contain the following additional TLVs:
Byte(s) | Description | Value | Length |
|---|---|---|---|
1 | Tag for MEP mode(s) of the Device | '90' | 1 |
2 | Length of next field | N | 1 |
3 to N+2 | MEP mode(s) supported by the Device in the order of priority '01': MEP-A1 '02': MEP-A2 '03': MEP-B | N = | |
N+3 | Tag for maximum number of LSIs for Enabled Profiles of the Device | '91' | 1 |
N+4 | Length of next field | 1 | 1 |
N+5 | Maximum number of LSIs supported for Enabled Profiles | 1 |
Table 6d: Configure LSIs additional command data
-The response data of the MANAGE LSI (configure LSIs) SHALL contain the following additional TLVs:
Byte(s) | Description | Value | Length |
|---|---|---|---|
1 | Tag for MEP modes | '90' | 1 |
2 | Length of next field | 1+M | 1 |
3 | Jointly supported MEP mode, see Table 6d for coding Set to '00' in case of no jointly supported MEP mode. | 1 | |
4 to M+3 | All MEP modes supported by the eUICC (including the mode given in byte 3) in arbitrary order, see Table 6d for coding | M | |
M+4 | Tag for jointly supported maximum number of LSIs for Enabled Profiles | '91' | 1 |
M+5 | Length of next field | 1 | 1 |
M+6 | Maximum number of LSIs jointly supported for Enabled Profiles | 1 |
Table 6e: Configure LSIs additional response data
If there is no jointly supported MEP mode, the eUICC SHALL set the value field of the jointly supported MEP mode to '00'. Subsequent actions for the Device (e.g., switching to SEP mode) are out of scope.
NOTE 1: This setup mechanism allows Devices and eUICCs to support several modes.
NOTE 2: As MEP is only defined for non-removable eUICCs, reconfiguration between different MEP modes, between MEP and SEP or when changing the number of eSIM Ports (e.g., assignment of Profiles to the eSIM Ports or implicit disabling of Profiles) does not need to be defined.
NOTE 3: For MEP-A1 and MEP-A2, Device and eUICC use the dedicated eSIM Port 0 for communication with the ISD-R in addition to the eSIM Ports for enabled Profiles. For MEP-B, no additional eSIM Port is used.
Examples
(The value fields of the TLVs are highlighted.)
Example 1:
Command data for a Device supporting a maximum of 3 LSIs, MEP-B (preferred) and MEP-A1, and a maximum of 2 Enabled Profiles:
'80 01 03 90 02 03 01 91 01 02'
Response data for an eUICC supporting MEP-A1 and MEP-A2, with 3 or more LSIs and 2 or more Enabled Profiles:
'80 01 03 90 03 01 02 01 91 01 02'
Jointly supported and used for the card session: 3 LSIs, MEP-A1, and a maximum of 2 Enabled Profiles.
Example 2:
Device as in example 1. Response data for an eUICC supporting MEP-A1, MEP-A2 and MEP-B, with 2 LSIs and 2 Enabled Profiles:
'80 01 02 90 04 03 01 02 03 91 01 02'
Jointly supported and used for the card session: 2 LSIs, MEP-B, and a maximum of 2 Enabled Profiles.
Example 3:
Device as in example 1. Response data for an eUICC supporting MEP-A2 only, with 3 LSIs and 2 Enabled Profiles:
'80 01 03 90 02 00 02 91 01 02'
No jointly supported MEP mode.
Example 4:
Command data for a Device supporting a maximum of 5 LSIs, MEP-A1 (preferred) and MEP-A2, with a maximum of 4 Enabled Profiles:
'80 01 05 90 02 01 02 91 01 04'
Response data for an eUICC supporting MEP-A2 and MEP-B, but only 4 LSIs and 3 Enabled Profiles:
'80 01 04 90 03 02 02 03 91 01 03'
Jointly supported and used for the card session: 4 LSIs, MEP-A2, and a maximum of 3 Enabled Profiles.
3.4.2 RSP Device Capabilities
The eUICC SHALL request the Device to send the Terminal Capability command by setting the related bit in the file control parameters of the MF.
The Device SHALL report its support of LPA functions using the Terminal Capability command data defined in ETSI TS 102 221 [6]. This command SHALL be sent before the SELECT ISD-R command defined in section 5.7.1.
Within the Terminal Capability template (tag 'A9'), the tag '83' is used for indicating the Device’s support for eUICC related functions.
The support of LPA and some Device capabilities is indicated in the first byte within the TLV object under tag '83':
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ------------------------------------------------------------ b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Meaning
-- - - - - - 1 Local User Interface in the Device (LUId) supported
-- - - - - - 0 Local User Interface in the Device (LUId) not supported
-- - - - - 1 - Local Profile Download in the Device (LPDd) supported
-- - - - - 0 - Local Profile Download in the Device (LPDd) not supported
-- - - - 1 - - Local Discovery Service in the Device (LDSd) supported
-- - - - 0 - - Local Discovery Service in the Device (LDSd) not supported
-- - - 1 - - - LUIe based on SCWS supported
-- - - 0 - - - LUIe based on SCWS not supported
-- - 1 - - - - Metadata update alerting supported
-- - 0 - - - - Metadata update alerting not supported
-- 1 - - - - - Enterprise Capable Device
-- 0 - - - - - Non-Enterprise Capable Device
-1 - - - - - - LUIe using E4E supported
-0 - - - - - - LUIe using E4E not supported
1 - - - - - - - LPR supported
0 - - - - - - - LPR not supported ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7: eUICC-related Device Capabilities byte 1
For LPAd implementations according to this version of the specification, b1, b2 and b3 SHALL either all be set to 1 or all be set to 0.
The eUICC SHALL only enable the functions of ES10c if the Device indicates support for the LUId.
The eUICC SHALL only enable the functions of ES10b if the Device indicates support for the LPDd.
The eUICC SHALL only enable the functions of ES10a if the Device indicates support for the LDSd.
The conditions for enabling the LPAe are defined in section 5.7.1.
If the Device and eUICC are MEP-Capable, the Terminal Capability sent to the eUICC SHALL be the same on all eSIM Ports.
Support for Metadata update alerting is optional for the Device. However, a Device that caches any Metadata SHOULD support it in order to get informed about Metadata updates that happen via ES6. If Metadata update alerting is supported, the Device SHALL also indicate support for REFRESH with "Application Update" mode in the Terminal Profile according to ETSI TS 102 223 [31] on each eSIM Port where the ISD-R can be selected (i.e., eSIM Port 0 for MEP-A1 and MEP-A2; each eSIM Port where a Profile is enabled for SEP and MEP-B).
For Non-Enterprise Capable Devices, the eUICC SHALL restrict the installation of Profiles with Enterprise Rules as specified in this document. For Enterprise Capable Devices, Enterprise Rules are allowed. For subsequent operation (e.g., enabling or Metadata update), this bit in the Device Capabilities is not (again) evaluated.
A device supporting LUIe using E4E SHALL NOT set bits 1 to 6 of byte 1.
Subsequent bytes are RFU.
3.4.3 eUICC File Structure
If there is no Enabled Profile on the eUICC, the eUICC SHALL ensure a default file system is available to the Device. This file system SHALL contain at least the MF and MAY contain the MF-level EFs shown below.
•EF_(ENV-CLASSES)
•EF_(UMPC)
It SHALL NOT be possible to modify either file via ES6 of a Profile.
EF_(ENV-CLASSES) SHALL never be present in any Profile Package, however if present, it SHALL be ignored by the eUICC when installing the Profile.
EF_(UMPC) MAY be present in a Profile Package. If present and EF_(UMPC) is also present in the default file system, the second byte of the default file SHALL take the content of the Profile Package into account when this Profile is enabled: it SHALL be set to the higher of both values. The eUICC SHALL ignore the content of all the other bytes of the file present in the Profile Package. If present and EF_(UMPC) is not present in the default file system, the whole file from the Profile SHALL be taken into account.
When a Profile is enabled, the eUICC SHALL present a file system comprising that Profile's file system and the EFs listed above if existing.
3.4.4 Device Setup and Power-on Profile Discovery
As part of Device setup, means SHALL exist for the End User to retrieve pending Profiles via a Default SM-DP+(s) if configured, via Root SM-DS(s), and via the Activation Code procedure. The implementation is Device manufacturer specific. Profile discovery during Device setup MAY be implemented as a special case of Device power-on Profile discovery as described hereunder. Alternatively, it MAY be implemented in some other manner; for example, by informing the End User how to retrieve the pending Profiles after Device setup is completed.
The means by which the LPA detects Device setup is out of the scope of this specification.
When appropriate for the class and usage of the device, the LPA SHALL conditionally perform Profile discovery when the Device is powered on, rebooted, or reset. In addition the LPA MAY support an End User configurable parameter that enables or disables this operation.
When it is supported, the initial value of the configuration parameter SHALL be 'Enabled', and its value SHALL be persistent across Device reset and power cycles.
The specific point at which power-on Profile discovery occurs and the means by which the LPA is launched to perform Profile discovery are Device-specific and out of the scope of this specification. It SHALL be performed if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
•Power-on Profile discovery is appropriate for the class and usage of the Device. (For example, this could be inappropriate for an open-market cellular-enabled notebook computer).
•No Operational Profile is installed on the eUICC.
•The value of the configuration parameter is 'Enabled'.
When all of these conditions are satisfied the LPA SHALL perform the following steps:
1.The LPA SHALL perform the following two sub-steps in any order:
a.If there is one or more configured Default SM-DP+ address in the eUICC or the Device, then the LPA SHALL initiate the Profile download and installation procedure with each Default SM-DP+ as defined in section 3.1.3, using the Default SM-DP+ address and a missing Matching ID.
b.If there is one or more configured SM-DS address, then the LPA SHALL initiate the event retrieval procedure with each SM-DS where events could be expected as defined in section 3.6.2, with no EventID, and process any retrieved Profile download(s).
NOTE: It is out of scope of this specification how the LPA determines from which SM-DS, if any, to expect events. This may be based e.g., on regional or deployment information.
2.If no Operational Profile was downloaded in step 1, the LPA MAY prompt the End User to add a Profile using an Activation Code (such as by manual entry or QR code scanning).
When downloading Profile(s) as part of Device setup, the LPA SHALL perform the Confirmation Request(s) as described in section 3.1.3.
3.5 Notifications
This section describes the procedure to provide a report (in the context of this procedure referred to as "Notification") to a remote entity (Recipient Address) that a Profile Management Operation was successfully performed on the eUICC or about the progress of such an operation. The remote entity receiving the Notification is the SM-DP+ or the Operator.
Several types of Notifications are defined on ES9+: Profile Installation Results, generated as an answer to the Profile installation, see section 2.5.6; Load RPM Package Result generated as an answer to RPM command execution, see section 2.10.2; and Other Notifications, generated due to the 'NotificationConfigurationInformation' data object defined in the "ES8+.StoreMetadata" function. The eUICC SHALL manage the storage of these types of Notifications separately.
A Notification on ES9+ is made up of the following fields:
•Sequence Number (generated by the eUICC)
•Profile Management Operation (i.e., the event whose occurrence SHALL be notified)
•Recipient Address (i.e., SM-DP+ address)
•ICCID, present as specified below
•Additional data in case of a Profile Installation Result, see section 2.5.6
•Additional data in case of a Load RPM Package Result, see section 2.10.2
•eUICC signature
•eUICC certificate chain in case of an Other Notification, see section 5.7.10
Sequence Number is used to protect the recipient against replay attacks. Each time a new Notification is generated by the eUICC, the Sequence Number SHALL be incremented. There SHALL be a single Sequence Number counter per eUICC, which SHALL be used across all Profiles and for all types of Notifications. Neither an eUICC Memory Reset nor a reset of the eUICC SHALL affect this Sequence Number.
The ICCID is used to identify the Profile upon which the operation, leading to the generation of the Notification, has been performed. ICCID SHALL conditionally be present as follows:
•For a Profile Installation Result, ICCID SHALL be present if known by the eUICC.
•For a Load RPM Package Result, ICCID SHALL NOT be present.
•For an Other Notification, ICCID SHALL be present.
Each Profile Metadata MAY contain Notification Configuration Information for Other Notifications, made up of the following:
•Profile Management Operation
•Recipient Address (i.e., SM-DP+ address)
When the Profile Management Operation indicated in the Notification Configuration Information is successfully performed, the eUICC SHALL generate and store a Notification.
When an eUICC Memory Reset is successfully performed, a Local Delete Notification SHALL be generated for all the deleted Profiles for which the local delete Profile operation is indicated in the Notification Configuration List.
When an Enable Profile is successfully performed and the currently enabled Operational Profile is implicitly disabled as a consequence of the enable Profile, the Notifications on both the disable Profile and enable Profile SHALL be generated, provided that each operation is indicated in the Notification Configuration List.
The LPA retrieves the pending Notifications and SHALL send the Notifications one at a time. Each Notification is sent on a best-effort basis, as described below, to the recipient when connectivity is available.
After the LPA receives the acknowledgement from the SM-DP+ that the Notification was received, it SHALL communicate to the eUICC to remove that Notification.
When the eUICC needs to store a new Other Notification and if there is not enough space, the eUICC SHALL delete one or more of the previously stored Other Notifications in order of their Sequence Number, beginning with the lowest.
The LPA SHALL sort the Notifications and group them by SM-DP+. The LPA SHALL send Notifications of a group one by one according to the sequence number, lowest number (oldest Notification) first. The next Notification of a group SHALL NOT be sent until LPA receives a success or failure response from the SM-DP+ for the previous Notification. The LPA MAY send Notifications from different groups sequentially or in parallel (i.e., there is no need to wait for the acknowledgment of a Notification from one group before sending a Notification from another group).
The SM-DP+ SHALL forward notifications as agreed with the Operator owning the Profile.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid participant "Operator " as Operator1 #FFFFFF participant "SM-DP+" as SMDP1 #FFFFFF participant "LPAd" as LPA #FFFFFF Participant "eUICC" as eUICC #FFFFFF alt Notifications are retrieved from the eUICC LPA -> eUICC : [1] [ES10b.ListNotification] eUICC -> LPA : [2] [List of pending Notification Metadata] LPA -> eUICC : [3] ES10b.Retrieve PendingNotificationsList eUICC -> LPA : [4] List of pending Notifications else Notifications are retrieved from another LPAd (e.g., in Device Change) rnote over LPA #FFFFFF [4a] LPAd receives Notification(s) from another LPAd end rnote end rnote over LPA #FFFFFF [4b] LPAd sorts the Notifications according to the SM-DP+s end rnote loop for each SM-DP+ rnote over SMDP1, LPA #FFFFFF [5] TLS session establishment end rnote loop for each Notification (sent to this SM-DP+) LPA -> SMDP1 : [6] ES9+.HandleNotification(notification) alt Notification ack failed SMDP1 --> LPA : \n[7a] Error else Notification ack successful SMDP1 -> LPA : \n[7b] Ok rnote over SMDP1 #FFFFFF [7c] Verify signature [7d] [Verify ICCID] [7e] Handle sequence number end rnote SMDP1 -> Operator1 : [8] ES2+.HandleNotification(notification) Operator1 -> SMDP1 : [9] Ok LPA -> eUICC : [10] ES10b.RemoveNotificationFromList(SeqNumber) rnote over eUICC #FFFFFF [11] eUICC removes this Notification from the storage end rnote end end end @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 24: Sending of Notifications
The figure above illustrates the sending of Notifications to two distinct SM-DP+s in a sequential manner for ease of representation. However, the LPA MAY send Notifications to SM-DP+ n and SM-DP+ m in parallel. The figure illustrates also the forwarding of Notifications to two distinct Operators.
Start Conditions:
A Profile has been Enabled, Disabled, Installed or Deleted.
Procedure:
The following steps 1 to 4 are performed if the LPAd retrieves Notification(s) from the eUICC:
1.Optionally, the LPAd queries the eUICC for the List of Pending Notifications.
2.The eUICC provides the LPAd with the List of Pending Notification Metadata.
3.The LPAd queries the eUICC for the Pending Notifications List.
4.The eUICC provides the LPAd with the Pending Notifications List.
The following step 4a is performed if the LPAd retrieves Notification(s) from another LPAd (e.g., in case of Device Change):
4a. The LPAd (e.g., the LPAd of new Device in Device Change) receives Notification(s) from another LPAd (e.g., the LPAd of old Device in Device Change).
4b. The LPAd sorts the Notifications according to the addressed SM-DP+s.
The following steps 5 to 11 are performed for each addressed SM-DP+:
5.The LPAd establishes a TLS secure channel with the SM-DP+.
The following steps 6 to 11 are performed for each Notification for this SM-DP+ in order of their sequence numbers:
6.The LPAd sends the Notification to the SM-DP+.
7a. The SM-DP+ SHOULD return one of HTTP status code 4XX or 5XX for an error preventing the PendingNotification from being processed.
7b. The SM-DP+ SHALL return HTTP status code 204 if the PendingNotification has been successfully received, even if the sequence number is lower than or equal to the highest sequence number of all valid Notifications received so far.
7c. The SM-DP+ SHALL verify the signature of the notification. Processing for Notifications failing this verification SHALL stop.
7d. If the SM-DP+ has the information which Profile was loaded onto which eUICC, it SHALL verify that EID and ICCID of the notification are matching. Actions upon a failure of these verifications are out of scope of this specification.
7e. If the sequence number is lower than or equal to the highest sequence number of all valid Notifications received so far, the SM-DP+ SHALL NOT update the Profile state and SHOULD NOT forward the notification to the Operator.
8.The SM-DP+ forwards the Notification to the Operator.
9.The Operator acknowledges Notification reception.
10.The LPAd:
-SHALL call the "ES10b.RemoveNotificationFromList" function upon receiving HTTP status code 204.
-SHALL NOT call the "ES10b.RemoveNotificationFromList" function upon receiving HTTP status code 5XX.
-MAY call the "ES10b.RemoveNotificationFromList" function upon receiving HTTP status code 4XX.
11.The eUICC removes the Notification from the Pending Notifications List.
Steps 6 – 11 SHALL be repeated per each Notification in the Pending Notifications List.
3.6 SM-DS
3.6.0 Requirements
A Root SM-DS SHALL process Event Registrations and Event Retrieval in a non-discriminatory manner.
An SM-DS SHOULD protect itself to avoid becoming a point of injection for DoS or spam attacks.
An SM-DS MAY limit the lifetime of Event Records based upon service agreements for operational reasons. If this was a cascaded registration to a Root SM-DS, the SM-DS SHALL first delete the cascaded event on that Root SM-DS.
NOTE: the lifetime of an Event Record can expire if, e.g., it is not retrieved or processed by the LPA due to any reason including filtering, or it is not properly deleted by the SM-DP+.
3.6.1 Event Registration
Profile download events and RPM events are registered to a Root SM-DS specified by the Operator, optionally cascaded through an Alternative SM-DS specified by the Operator.
If the Operator specifies an SM-DS using the string '.unspecified', the SM-DP+ SHOULD determine the SM-DS in an implementation-dependent manner. (As one example, the SM-DP+ could default to the GSMA Root SM-DS.) The SM-DP+ MAY also interpret additional strings that begin with the prefix '.x-' (e.g., '.x-example') in an implementation-dependent manner.
3.6.1.1 Event Registration without Cascade
This procedure applies when the SM-DP+ registers an event directly to a Root SM-DS.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid participant "<b>Operator" as O participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant "<b>SM-DS" as DS O -> DP : ES2+.ConfirmOrder or\nES2+.RpmOrder DP -> DS : [1] ES12.RegisterEvent\n(EID, SM-DP+ address, EventID, ForwardingIndicator=false,\nEventType, [HashedIccid(s)], [Salt], [ServiceProviderName], [OperatorId]) rnote over DS #FFFFFF [2] Store the Event Record together with SM-DP+ OID endrnote DS --> DP : [3] OK DP --> O : OK @enduml
[Table Description automatically generated with medium confidence]
Figure 25: Event Registration Procedure without Cascade
Start Conditions:
The Operator places a Profile download or RPM order to the SM-DP+ with a Root SM-DS Address, as described in section 3.6.1.
The SM-DP+ generates an EventID that is used to uniquely identify within its context either the Profile download order or RPM order.
EventIDs SHALL be unique per SM-DP+ and SHALL NOT be reused.
NOTE: This allows the LPA to keep a trace of already processed events and detect events still pending at an SM-DS that have been already processed.
The SM-DP+ and SM-DS are mutually authenticated. The SM-DP+ OID has been retrieved from the TLS certificate used for mutual authentication.
Procedure:
1.The SM-DP+ calls "ES12.RegisterEvent" function comprising of EID, RSP Server address, EventID, ForwardingIndicator set to 'false', EventType, and optionally HashedIccid(s), Salt, ServiceProviderName, and OperatorId.
2.The SM-DS stores the received Event Record, together with the SM-DP+ OID retrieved from the SM‑DP+ Certificate. The value of ForwardingIndicator SHALL be ignored by the Root SM-DS.
3.The SM-DS acknowledges the registration.
3.6.1.2 Event Registration with Cascade
This procedure applies when the SM-DP+ registers an event to an Alternative SM-DS, which in turn registers it to a Root SM-DS.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid participant "<b>Operator" as O participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant "<b>Alt SM-DS" as ADS participant "<b>Root SM-DS" as RDS O -> DP : ES2+.ConfirmOrder or\nES2+.RpmOrder DP -> ADS : [1] ES12.RegisterEvent\n(EID, SM-DP+ address, EventID1, ForwardingIndicator=true, Root SM-DS address\nEventType, [HashedIccid(s)], [Salt], [ServiceProviderName], [OperatorId]) rnote over ADS #FFFFFF [2] Generate EventID2 [3] Store the Event Record together with EventID2, SM-DP+ OID, Root SM-DS address Endrnote ADS -> RDS : [4] ES15.RegisterEvent\n(EID, Alt SM-DS address, EventID2, ForwardingIndicator=false,\nEventType, [HashedIccid(s)], [Salt], [ServiceProviderName], [OperatorId]) rnote over RDS #FFFFFF [5] Store the Event Record together with Alt SM-DS OID Endrnote RDS --> ADS : [6] OK ADS --> DP : [7] OK DP --> O : OK @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]Figure 26: Event Registration Procedure with Cascade
Start Conditions:
The Operator places a Profile download or RPM order to the SM-DP+ with an Alternative SM-DS address and/or a Root SM-DS address, as described in section 3.6.1.
The requirements for EventIDs in section 3.6.1.1 SHALL also apply to EventID1 and EventID2; the latter SHALL be unique, and not be re-used, per Alternative SM-DS.
The SM-DP+ and Alternative SM-DS are mutually authenticated. The SM-DP+ OID has been retrieved from the TLS certificate used for mutual authentication.
The Alternative SM-DS and Root SM-DS are mutually authenticated. The Alternative SM-DS OID has been retrieved from the TLS certificate used for mutual authentication.
Procedure:
1.The SM-DP+ calls "ES12.RegisterEvent" function comprising of EID, RSP Server address of SM-DP+, EventID1, ForwardingIndicator set to 'true', Root SM-DS address (FQDN), EventType, and optionally HashedIccid(s), Salt, ServiceProviderName, and OperatorId.
2.As the ForwardingIndicator indicates forwarding of the registration, the Alternative SM‑DS generates a new EventID2.
3.The Alternative SM-DS stores the received Event Record, together with EventID2, the SM-DP+ OID retrieved from the SM-DP+ Certificate, and the address of the Root SM‑DS.
4.The Alternative SM-DS calls "ES15.RegisterEvent" function of the Root SM-DS comprising EID, RSP Server address of the Alternative SM-DS, generated EventID2, ForwardingIndicator set to 'false', and EventType. This function call further comprises HashedIccid(s), Salt, ServiceProviderName, and OperatorId if these are received in step (1).
5.The Root SM-DS stores the received Event Record, together with the SM-DS OID retrieved from the Alternative SM‑DS Certificate.
6.The Root SM-DS acknowledges the registration.
7.The Alternative SM-DS acknowledges the registration.
3.6.2 Event Retrieval
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml
hide footbox
skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center
skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11
skinparam noteFontSize 11
skinparam monochrome true
skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>SM-DS" as DS
participant "<b>LPAd" as LPA
participant "<b>eUICC" as E
rnote over DS, E #FFFFFF : [1] [Refer to Common mutual authentication procedure section 3.0.1]
rnote over DS #FFFFFF
[2]
- Look for pendingEvent Record(s) for the eUICC
Endrnote
group Cond MatchingId not found.
DS --> LPA : error
group Cond. eUICC indicated signedSmdsResponseV3Support
rnote over LPA, E : Refer to Common Cancel Session procedure section 3.0.2
end
end
alt LPA and SM-DS both support signed Event Records
rnote over DS #FFFFFF
[3]
- [Build smdsSigned2 = {TransactionID, list of Event Records, [ECID], [pushServiceRefreshTime]}]
- [Compute smdsSignature2 over smdsSigned2 and euiccSignature1]
endrnote
DS --> LPA : [4] TransactionID, smdsSigned2, smdsSignature2
rnote over LPA #FFFFFF : [5] Verify SM-DS response
group Cond. signed Event Records are missing
rnote over LPA, E : Refer to Common Cancel Session procedure section 3.0.2
end
group Cond. eUICC supports signed Event Records
LPA -> E : [6] ES10a.VerifySmdsResponse
rnote over E #FFFFFF : [7] Verify smdsSignature2
E --> LPA : ok/error
end
else Otherwise
DS --> LPA : [8] TransactionID, Event Records
end alt
rnote over LPA #FFFFFF
[9] [Filter the Event Record(s)]
[10] [Process the Event Record(s) sequentially]
endrnote
opt ECID is received
rnote over LPA #FFFFFF : [11] Store and associate the ECID with the SM-DS address
end opt
@enduml[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 27: Event Retrieval Procedure
Start Conditions:
In addition to the start conditions required by the common mutual authentication procedure defined in section 3.0.1, Event(s) are registered on the SM-DS by one or more SM‑DP+(s)/SM-DS(s).
The LPAd has determined the set of configured Root SM-DS addresses. It MAY retrieve one or more Root SM-DS addresses configured on the eUICC (using ES10a.GetEuiccConfiguredData). In addition, it MAY retrieve them from where they are configured on the Device.
As a result of previous Event Retrieval(s), if the LPAd received ECID(s) for the corresponding SM-DS(s) and stored them into the Device, the LPAd SHOULD initiate the Event Checking procedure, as described in section 3.6.4, to the SM-DS prior to the Event Retrieval procedure. The LPAd SHOULD use the Root SM-DS address(es) configured on a removable eUICC.
The event retrieval procedure is used in the following cases:
a)To retrieve Events from an SM-DS (a Root SM-DS or a Profile Polling Address) when there is no EventID. This includes, but is not limited to, the following trigger conditions:
oThe End User MAY manually query for pending Event Records from the configured SM-DS(s). The LUId MAY implement this query in combination with other related operations, for example, as a composite 'Add Profile' operation.
oThe LPAd MAY query the configured SM-DS(s) as part of Device power-on Profile discovery as described in section 3.4.4.
oThe LPAd MAY query the SM-DS(s) if the received isPendingEvent was set to true as a response of the ES11.CheckEvent from the configured SM-DS(s).
oIn the case of the Profile Polling Address, if an allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier is stored in the Profile, the LPAd SHALL restrict the eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers to that value.
oThe LPAd MAY query the SM-DS(s) if the LPAd received a push notification of the SM-DS(s) from the push client hosted on the Device.
oIn the case of the Root SM-DS(s) the LPAd SHALL NOT restrict the eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers that are used for this procedure.
b)To retrieve an Event from an SM-DS with a specific EventID. This corresponds to the retrieval of a cascaded Event from the alternative SM-DS. If there was a restriction to a single eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier to obtain the EventID, then the LPAd SHALL apply the same restriction in this procedure.
Procedure:
1.The common mutual authentication procedure defined in section 3.0.1 SHALL be executed. When this procedure is used for SM-DS, SM-XX, CERT.XXauth.SIG, PK.XXauth.SIG, SK.XXauth.SIG, and ESXX are SM-DS, CERT.DSauth.SIG, PK.DSauth.SIG, SK.DSauth.SIG, and ES11, respectively.
In addition, the LPAd SHALL build the ctxParams1 data object to provide the MatchingID, the MatchingID Source, the operationType, and Device Info to the eUICC for signature. The value of the MatchingID and MatchingID Source SHALL be set as follows:
•For case a), the MatchingID SHALL be missing, and the MatchingID Source value SHALL be set to 'none'.
•For case b), the MatchingID value SHALL be set to the EventID found in the Event Record that LPAd is processing, and the MatchingID Source value SHALL be set to the OID of the Root SM-DS that provided the EventID.
2.After having successfully authenticated the eUICC at the end of the step (1), the SM‑DS SHALL ignore the matchingIdSource, and iccid (if any) parameters contained in the "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" function call, and check if there are pending Event Records matching the following criteria, where the absence of operationType SHALL be regarded as a Profile Download request:
•If MatchingID is missing: the EID and the EventType in an Event Record match the EID in the CERT.EUICC.SIG obtained during step (1) and the operationType in the function call, respectively (Case a)). The resulting list MAY be empty.
•If MatchingID has a value of non-zero-length:
-the EventID2, the EID, and the EventType in an Event Record match the EventID in the MatchingID, the EID in the CERT.EUICC.SIG obtained during step (1), and the operationType in the function call, respectively (case b)).
-If no Event Record is found, an appropriate error status SHALL be returned to the LPAd. If the eUICC indicated signedSmdsResponseV3Support, the LPAd SHALL send "ES10b.CancelSession" to the eUICC with a reason sessionAborted. The procedure SHALL stop.
If the LPAd indicated signedSmdsResponseV3Support and the SM-DS indicated eventListSigningV3Support during Common Mutual Authentication, the procedure continues with step 3; otherwise, it continues with step 8.
3.The SM-DS SHALL generate an smdsSigned2 data structure containing the TransactionID, Event Record(s) , optionally the ECID, and pushServiceRefreshTime and compute the smdsSignature2 over smdsSigned2 and euiccSignature1 using the SK.DSauth.SIG. The Event Record(s) SHALL be ordered as registered in the SM-DS.
4.The SM-DS SHALL respond to the LPAd with TransactionID, smdsSigned2, and smdsSignature2.
5.If smdsSigned2 or smdsSignature2 is missing, then the LPAd SHALL send "ES10b.CancelSession" to the eUICC with a reason sessionAborted, and the procedure SHALL stop.
If the eUICC indicated signedSmdsResponseV3Support during Common Mutual Authentication:
6.The LPAd SHALL call the "ES10a.VerifySmdsResponse" function to verify the SM-DS signature.
7.The eUICC SHALL verify smdsSignature2 and return success or an error status to the LPAd. If the eUICC returns an error the procedure SHALL stop, otherwise the procedure SHALL continue with step 9.
NOTE: If the eUICC did not indicate signedSmdsResponseV3Support, the LPAd MAY verify smdsSignature2 itself.
If either the LPAd or SM-DS does not support signed Event Records:
8.The SM-DS SHALL respond to the LPAd with TransactionID and unsigned Event Records. The Event Record(s) SHALL be ordered as registered in the SM-DS.
Finally:
9.The LPAd SHOULD filter the received Event Record(s) based upon the information contained therein and Profile Metadata of the installed Profile(s). Example of the filtering includes, but not limited to:
•The LPAd can check if the Profile that will be installed by the Event Record is already installed. If so, the LPAd can ignore the Event Record.
•The LPAd can check if the target Profile(s) of the RPM Package that will be received by the Event Record is available. If not, the LPAd can ignore the Event Record.
•The LPAd can check if the Service Provider and/or Operator is Profile Owner of the target Profile(s). If not, the LPAd can ignore the Event Record.
10.If the filtered Event Record list is not empty, the LPAd SHALL process the received Event Records in the order received, by sequentially contacting each RSP Server with the corresponding EventID with MatchingID source set to the OID of the SM-DS from which the Events were retrieved.
NOTE: The LPA MAY also process the Event Record that are filtered out in step (9).
11.If the ECID was received in the response from an SM-DS, the LPAd SHOULD store and associate the ECID with the SM-DS address.
3.6.3 Event Deletion
3.6.3.1 Event Deletion without Cascade
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant "<b>SM-DS" as DS DP -> DS : [1] ES12.DeleteEvent (EID, EventID) rnote over DS #FFFFFF [2] - Retrieve the Event Record Endrnote DS --> DP : [error] rnote over DS #FFFFFF [2a] - Delete the Event Record endrnote DS --> DP : [3] Deletion Status @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 28: Event Deletion Procedure without Cascade
Start Conditions:
An Event Record is stored in the SM-DS, which is identified by the EID, EventID and SM‑DP+ OID.
The related Registration was not cascaded.
The SM-DP+ and SM-DS are mutually authenticated. The SM-DP+ OID has been retrieved from the TLS certificate used for mutual authentication.
Procedure:
1.The SM-DP+ calls "ES12.DeleteEvent" function including the EID and EventID.
2.The SM-DS SHALL verify that there is an Event Record identified by the SM-DP+ OID and EventID. If no Event Record is found, the SM-DS SHALL return the relevant error status and the procedure SHALL stop.
2a. The SM-DS SHALL delete the Event Record identified by the SM-DP+ OID and EventID.
3.The SM-DS SHALL return the deletion status.
3.6.3.2 Event Deletion with Cascade
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant "<b>Alt SM-DS" as ADS participant "<b>Root SM-DS" as RDS DP -> ADS : [1] ES12.DeleteEvent (EID, EventID1) rnote over ADS #FFFFFF [2] - Retrieve the Event Record and associated Root SM-DS address endrnote ADS --> DP : [error] ADS -> RDS : [3] ES12.DeleteEvent\n(EID, EventID2) rnote over RDS #FFFFFF [4] - Retrieve the Event Record Endrnote RDS --> ADS : [error] rnote over RDS #FFFFFF [4a] - Delete the Event Record Endrnote RDS --> ADS : [5] Deletion Status rnote over ADS #FFFFFF [6] - [Delete the Event Record] endrnote ADS --> DP : [7] Deletion Status @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29: Event Deletion Procedure with Cascade
Start Conditions:
Start condition is same as for section 3.6.3.1 except the following:
The related Registration was cascaded. The Alternative SM-DS has stored the Root SM-DS associated with each cascaded Event Record.
Procedure:
1.The SM-DP+ calls "ES12.DeleteEvent" function including the EID and EventID1.
2.The Alternative SM-DS SHALL verify that there is a stored Event Record identified by the SM-DP+ OID and EventID1. If no Event Record is found, the SM-DS SHALL return the relevant error status and the procedure SHALL stop.
3.As EventID2 is not empty, i.e., the Alternative SM-DS previously cascaded the registration according to 3.6.1.2, the Alternative SM-DS calls "ES12.DeleteEvent" function including the EID and EventID2 which were used in the registration to the Root SM-DS whose address it stored along with the Event Record when the event was registered.
4.The Root SM-DS SHALL verifies that there is a stored Event Record identified by the SM-DS OID and EventID2. If no Event Record is found, the Root SM-DS SHALL return the relevant error status.
4a. Otherwise, the Root SM-DS SHALL delete the Event Record identified by the SM-DS OID and EventID2.
5.The Root SM-DS SHALL return the deletion status.
6.If, at the Root SM-DS, the deletion of the Event Record is successful or the Event Record is not found, the Alternative SM-DS SHALL delete the associated Event Record from its storage.
7.The Alternative SM-DS SHALL return the deletion status.
3.6.4 Event Checking
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid participant "<b>SM-DS" as DS participant "<b>LPAd" as LPA rnote over DS, LPA #FFFFFF : [1] Establish HTTPS connection LPA -> DS: [2] ES11.CheckEvent \n (ECID) rnote over DS #FFFFFF : [3] Verify the ECID alt If ECID is not valid DS --> LPA: error rnote over LPA #FFFFFF : [4] Delete the ECID else IF ECID is valid rnote over DS #FFFFFF : [5] Look for pending Event Record(s) for the ECID DS --> LPA: [6] isPendingEvent End alt group If isPendingEvent is true or ECID is not valid rnote over DS, LPA #FFFFFF : [7] Refer to Event Retrieval procedure section 3.6.2 end @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 29aa: Event Retrieval Procedure
Start Conditions:
The LPAd has determined the set of configured Root SM-DS addresses. It MAY retrieve one or more Root SM-DS addresses configured on the eUICC (using ES10a.GetEuiccConfiguredData). In addition, it MAY retrieve them from where they are configured on the Device.
As a result of previous Event Retrieval(s), the LPAd received ECID(s) for the corresponding SM-DS(s) and stored them into the Device. If the LPAd cannot determine the ECID for the corresponding SM-DS, the LPAd SHOULD initiate Event Retrieval procedure to the SM-DS as described in section 3.6.2 instead of the Event Checking procedure.
The Event Checking procedure is used to determine the presence of an Event on an SM-DS. This includes, but is not limited to, the following trigger conditions:
oThe End User MAY manually query to check the presence of pending Event Records from the configured SM-DS(s). The LUId MAY implement this query in combination with other related operations, for example, as a composite 'Add Profile' operation.
oThe LPAd MAY query the configured SM-DS(s) as part of Device power-on Profile discovery as described in section 3.4.4.
Procedure:
1.The LPAd establishes a HTTPS connection with the SM-DS as defined at step (5) of the Common Mutual Authentication procedure in section 3.0.1.
2.The LPAd SHALL call the "ES11.EventCheck" function with the ECID corresponding to the SM-DS.
3.The SM-DS SHALL verify that the received ECID is valid. If the verification fails, the SM-DS SHALL return an error status "ECID – Unknown". Otherwise, the procedure continues at step (5).
4.The LPAd SHALL delete the ECID which was used in step (2) and the procedure continues at step (7).
5.The SM-DS SHALL check if there is a pending Event Record associated with the received ECID. If there is a pending Event Record associated with the ECID, the SM-DS SHALL set isPendingEvent to true. Otherwise, the SM-DS SHALL set isPendingEvent to false.
6.The SM-DS SHALL respond to the LPAd with the isPendingEvent.
7.The LPAd SHOULD perform the event retrieval procedure as defined in section 3.6.2 if the LPAd has received isPendingEvent set to true or has received an error status "ECID – Unknown" or "ECID – Expired". Otherwise, the LPAd SHALL terminate the Event Checking procedure.
3.6.5 Push Service Registration
This procedure is used to register to the SM-DS a Push Token for a Push Service, so that the SM-DS can subsequently send push notifications to the LPAd.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml
hide footbox
skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center
skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11
skinparam noteFontSize 11
skinparam monochrome true
skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
participant "<b>SM-DS" as DS
participant "<b>LPAd" as LPA
participant "<b>eUICC" as E
rnote over DS, E #FFFFFF : [1] [Refer to Common mutual authentication procedure section 3.0.1]
LPA -> DS : ES11.AuthenticateClient request \n (ctxParamsForPushServiceRegistration)
rnote over DS #FFFFFF
[2]
- Verify the pushServiceRegistration
- Store the pushToken and associate the pushToken with the EID
endrnote
group Cond. verification fails
DS --> LPA : error
rnote over LPA, E : Refer to Common Cancel Session procedure section 3.0.2
end
rnote over DS #FFFFFF
[3]
- Build smdsSigned2 = {TransactionID, [pushServiceRefreshTime]}
- Compute smdsSignature2 over smdsSigned2 and euiccSignature1
endrnote
DS --> LPA : [4] TransactionID, smdsSigned2, smdsSignature2
rnote over LPA #FFFFFF : [5] Verify SM-DS response
group Cond. smdsSigned2 or smdsSignature2 is missing
rnote over LPA, E : Refer to Common Cancel Session procedure section 3.0.2
end
group Cond. eUICC supports signed SM-DS response
LPA -> E : [6] ES10a.VerifySmdsResponse
rnote over E #FFFFFF : [7] Verify smdsSignature2
E --> LPA : ok/error
end
rnote over LPA #FFFFFF
[8] Enable the Push Service for corresponding SM-DS
Endrnote
@enduml[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29ab: Push Service Registration Procedure
Start Conditions:
In addition to the start conditions required by the common mutual authentication procedure defined in section 3.0.1, the LPAd supports a Push Service and the eUICC supports ES10a.VerifySmdsResponse.
The LPAd has retrieved the list of configured Root SM-DS addresses. It MAY retrieve one or more Root SM-DS addresses configured on the eUICC (using ES10a.GetEuiccConfiguredData). In addition, it MAY retrieve them from where they are configured on the Device.
The LPAd SHOULD use the Root SM-DS address(es) configured on a removable eUICC.
Push Service registration MAY be used in following cases:
•To register a new Push Token to the Root SM-DS(s).
•To re-register a Push Token when:
othe LPAd detects the Push Token, which was used for the Push Service, is not valid.
othe time indicated in the pushServiceRefreshTime has been reached.
Procedure:
1.The common mutual authentication procedure defined in section 3.0.1 SHALL be executed. When this procedure is used for SM-DS, SM-XX, CERT.XXauth.SIG, PK.XXauth.SIG, SK.XXauth.SIG, and ESXX are SM-DS, CERT.DSauth.SIG, PK.DSauth.SIG, SK.DSauth.SIG, and ES11, respectively.
During the common mutual authentication procedure at step (10), if both the LPAd and the SM-DS indicated their support of a Push Service, in lpaRspCapability and serverRspCapability respectively, and the SM-DS provided supportedPushServices at step (9), the LPAd SHALL select one Push Service supported by both the LPAd and the SM-DS from the supportedPushService.
NOTE: The LPAd may perform additional operations to retrieve an appropriate Push Token for the selected Push Service, e.g., interaction with the push server, which are out of scope of this specification.
In addition, the LPAd SHALL build the ctxParams1 data object with ctxParamsForPushServiceRegistration comprising the selectedPushService and the pushToken.
2.After having successfully authenticated the eUICC at the end of the step (1), the SM‑DS SHALL verify that the selectedPushService indicated in the pushServiceRegistration is supported by the SM-DS. If supported, the SM-DS SHALL store the receivied Push Token and associate the Push Token with the EID. Otherwise, an appropriate error status SHALL be returned to the LPAd and the procedure SHALL stop.
3.The SM-DS SHALL generate an smdsSigned2 data structure containing the TransactionID and optionally pushServiceRefreshTime and compute the smdsSignature2 over smdsSigned2 and euiccSignature1 using the SK.DSauth.SIG.
4.The SM-DS SHALL respond to the LPAd with TransactionID, smdsSigned2, and smdsSignature2.
5.If smdsSigned2 or smdsSignature2 is missing, then the LPAd SHALL send "ES10b.CancelSession" to the eUICC with a reason sessionAborted, and the procedure SHALL stop.
If the eUICC indicated signedSmdsResponseV3Support during Common Mutual Authentication:
6.The LPAd SHALL call the "ES10a.VerifySmdsResponse" function to verify the SM-DS signature.
7.The eUICC SHALL verify smdsSignature2 and return success or an error status to the LPAd. If the eUICC returns an error, the procedure SHALL stop.
NOTE: If the eUICC did not indicate signedSmdsResponseV3Support, the LPAd MAY verify smdsSignature2 itself.
Finally:
8.The LPAd enables the selected Push Service for a corresponding SM-DS. If pushServiceRefreshTime was received in the response from the SM-DS, the LPA SHALL store the value.
3.7 Remote Profile Management
The Operator initiates Remote Profile Management (RPM) procedure using the ES2+ interface.
RPM is executed by a Managing SM-DP+. A Profile MAY be configured to allow RPM by several Managing SM-DP+s. This specification assumes that a Managing SM-DP+ that prepares an RPM Package has full knowledge of the state of a Profile. How this state is synchronised among multiple Managing SM-DP+s, or procedures where a Managing SM-DP+ does not have full knowledge of the state of a Profile are out of the scope of this specification.
The LPA downloads an RPM Package using the ES9+ interface as described in section 3.7.2. An RPM Package MAY contain one or more RPM Commands.
Each RPM Command SHALL require Confirmation Request enforced by the LPA as described in section 3.7.2. The specific implementation of Confirmation Request by the LPA is out of scope of this specification.
Confirmation Request on multiple RPM Commands for consecutive operations MAY be combined to simplify the user experience and avoid repeated input steps for the End User. For instance, when executing two RPM Commands in an RPM Package, the Strong Confirmation for the first RPM Command and the Simple Confirmation for the second RPM Command MAY be combined. In the case of combined Confirmation Requests, it SHALL be clear to the End User what RPM Commands will be executed, and the highest Confirmation Level SHALL be obtained.
If End User accepts the execution of the RPM Package, the LPA transfers the RPM Package to the eUICC as described in section 3.7.3. The eUICC executes the RPM Command(s) contained in the RPM Package in the received order and generates the Load RPM Package Result specified in section 2.10.2.
Upon completing the execution of an RPM Package, the Operator receives the Load RPM Package Result. Based upon the outcome, the Operator can choose to initiate additional RPM operations. For instance, if a 'Contact PCMP' command resulted in a noLprConfiguration error, the Operator could request a new RPM Package containing both an 'Update Metadata' command with pcmpAddress and a 'Contact PCMP' command.
3.7.1 RPM Initiation
This procedure is used by Operator to issue an RPM Command(s).
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF hide footbox participant "<b>Operator" as OP participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant "<b>SM-DS" as DS rnote over OP : [1] [Generate a MatchingID] OP -> DP : [2] ES2+.RpmOrder(eid, rpmScript, [MatchingID], [rootSmdsAddress [, altSmdsAddress]]) rnote left DS [3] Verify Profile Owner [4] Prepare RPM Package [5] [Generate a MatchingID] endrnote rnote over DP, DS : [6] [Event Registration] DP --> OP : [7] MatchingID @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29a: RPM Initiation
Start Condition:
-The target eUICC has already installed a Profile from the Operator.
-The SM-DP+ is a Managing SM-DP+ of the target Profile.
Procedure:
1.Optionally, the Operator MAY generate a MatchingID.
2.The Operator calls the "ES2+.RpmOrder" (section 5.3.6) function for the SM-DP+ with the relevant input data.
The Operator SHALL send the rpmScript.
The Operator MAY send the MatchingID generated in step (1). If a Default SM-DP+ is to be used for the RPM download, then the Operator MAY send an empty string in the MatchingID value field.
The Operator MAY send the address of a Root SM-DS, and optionally also the address of an Alternative SM-DS, to the SM-DP+ as defined in section 3.6.1. If the Default SM‑DP+ is to be used, then the SM-DS address SHALL NOT be present.
The SM-DP+ SHALL store the functionRequesterIdentifier and functionCallIdentifier values of the "ES2+.RpmOrder" function call, which SHALL be used as notificationReceiverIdentifier and notificationIdentifier, respectively, in subsequent "ES2+.HandleNotification" calls related to this order.
3.If an rpmScript is provided, the SM-DP+ SHALL verify that the Operator is the Profile Owner of all targeted Profiles.
4.The SM-DP+ prepares an RPM Package.
5.If the MatchingID is not provided in step (2), the SM-DP+ SHALL generate a MatchingID in this step. The RPM Package SHALL be associated to the MatchingID.
6.As an optional step, if the SM-DS address is given in step (2), then the SM-DP+ SHALL perform Event Registration to the specified SM-DS.
7.The SM-DP+ returns MatchingID to the Operator. If the Operator provided a MatchingID in step (2), then the returned MatchingID SHALL be the same.
3.7.2 RPM Download
This procedure is used by LPA to download an RPM Package and to get End User consent on RPM Execution.
The procedure applies for SEP and MEP. The following applies for Command Port:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Command Port
----------------------------- -----------------------------------------
MEP-A1/A2 0
MEP-B >=0
SEP Physical interface
-----------------------------------------------------------------------All communication between the LPA and the eUICC in the RPM Download procedure SHALL use the Command Port.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml
skinparam monochrome true
skinparam ArrowColor Black
skinparam lifelinestrategy solid
skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center
skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF
skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF
hide footbox
participant "<b>Operator" as OP
participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP
participant "<b>LPAd" as LPA
participant "<b>eUICC" as E
rnote over LPA, E
[1] (a) Get SM-DP+ Address [and CI PKid] from Polling Address, or
(b) Get SM-DP+ Address and EventID from SM-DS, or
(c) Get Default SM-DP+ Address [and CI PKID] from eUICC or Device, or
(d) Reuse SM-DP+ Address [and CI PKID] from the previous RSP session
endrnote
rnote over DP, E : [2] Refer to Common mutual authentication procedure section 3.0.1
rnote over DP
[3] Look for pending RPM Package
endrnote
DP --> LPA : [ERROR]
group Opt.
DP -> OP : [4] ES2+.HandleNotification(...)
OP --> DP : OK
end
rnote over DP
[5]
- Build smdpSigned3 = {TransactionID, RpmPackage, [rpmPending]}
- Compute smdpSignature3 over smdpSigned3 and euiccSignature1
endrnote
DP -> LPA : [6] TransactionID, smdpSigned3, smdpSignature3
opt RPM disabled, RPM Package contains unsupported command, or invalid RPM Package
rnote over OP, E : Refer to Common Cancel Session procedure section 3.0.2
end
LPA -> E : [7] [ES10c.GetProfilesInfo]
E --> LPA : [ProfileInfoListOk]
rnote over LPA
[8]
- Check RPM Package against PPR(s)
- [User Consent]
- [User Confirmation]
- [Invalidate cached Metadata]
endrnote
alt Download rejection
rnote over OP, E : Refer to Common Cancel Session procedure section 3.0.2
else Download confirmation
rnote over OP, E : Refer to Sub-procedure RPM Execution
end
@enduml[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29b: RPM Download
Start Condition:
In addition to the start conditions required by the common mutual authentication procedure defined in section 3.0.1, this procedure requires the following start conditions depending on options in step (1):
-If this procedure uses a Polling Address (option a):
oThe LPAd has retrieved the SM-DP+ Address and allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier, if any, from the Profile Metadata, if the Polling Address indicates the SM-DP+; or
oThe LPAd has retrieved the SM-DP+ Address and EventID from the SM-DS, if the Polling Address indicates the SM-DS.
oThe LPAd has retrieved the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier associated with the Polling Address, if any, from the eUICC. If the retrieved data includes an allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier, then the LPAd SHALL restrict the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers to that value.
•If this procedure uses an SM-DS (option b):
oThe LPAd has retrieved an SM-DP+ Address and EventID from the SM-DS. If there was a restriction of the eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier for the SM-DS procedure, the LPAd SHALL apply a restriction to the same eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier for the RPM download and installation procedure.
•If this procedure uses a Default SM-DP+ (option c):
oThe LPAd has retrieved the Default SM-DP+ Address and allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier, if any, from the eUICC or the Device. If the retrieved data includes an allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier, then the LPAd SHALL restrict the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers to that value.
•If this procedure is triggered by rpmPending returned in a previous RSP session (option d):
oThe LPAd SHALL reuse the SM-DP+ Address from the previous RSP session. The LPAd SHALL apply a restriction to the same eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier on the allowed CI public key identifiers.
A Provisioning Profile MAY be enabled by the LPAd upon End User request for RSP operations as defined in SGP.21 [4], which SHALL include End User consent if an Operational Profile is to be disabled and if establishment of the connectivity using the currently Enabled Profile is not successful.
Procedure:
1.The LPAd has retrieved an SM-DP+ address from either SM-DS, eUICC or Polling Address and allowed eSIM CA RootCA Public Key identifier, if any.
2.The common mutual authentication procedure defined in section 3.0.1 SHALL be executed, conditionally restricting the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers to a single allowed value as described in the Start Conditions above. In this procedure, SM-XX is SM-DP+. CERT.XXauth.SIG, PK.XXauth.SIG and SK.XXauth.SIG are CERT.DPauth.SIG, PK.DPauth.SIG and SK.DPauth.SIG respectively. ESXX is ES9+.
During the common mutual authentication procedure at step (10), the LPAd SHALL build the ctxParams1 data object to provide the MatchingID, MatchingID Source, Device Info, operationType and iccid (optional) to the eUICC for signature. The operationType SHALL include 'rpm'. If this function is called in the context of polling RPM for a specific Target Profile, the iccid of the Target Profile SHALL be present; otherwise, it SHALL NOT be present. The value of the MatchingID and MatchingID Source SHALL be set as follows:
•If a Default SM-DP+ or Polling Address (which indicates an SM-DP+) is used, the MatchingID SHALL be missing and the MatchingID Source value SHALL be set to 'none'.
•If an SM-DS is used, the MatchingID value SHALL be set to EventID and the MatchingID Source value SHALL be set to the OID of the SM-DS that provided the EventID.
•If rpmPending was received in the previous RSP session, the matchingId SHALL be missing and the matchingIdSource value SHALL be set to none.
3.The SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Verify that there is a pending RPM Package for the EID of the authenticated eUICC.
•If there is a pending RPM Package, then verify that the eUICC indicates rpmSupport in EuiccRspCapability.
•If MatchingID is provided, then verify that it matches the MatchingID bound to the pending RPM Package.
If any of these verifications fail, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a relevant error status and the procedure SHALL stop.
4.(Optional step) Depending on the agreed behaviour with the Operator (out of scope of this specification), the SM-DP+ SHALL notify the Operator using the function "ES2+.HandleNotification" with the notificationEvent indicating 'Eligibility and attempt limit check.
NOTE: This notification step MAY be done asynchronously.
5.The SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Determine if another RPM Package for the eid is pending.
•Generate an smdpSigned3 data structure containing associated data elements.
•Compute the smdpSignature3.
6.The SM-DP+ returns the "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" response to the LPAd. The LPAd SHALL check the following.
•If the RPM operation is disabled in the LPA by the End User, then the LPAd SHALL cancel the RPM download by performing the Common Cancel Session procedure with the reason rpmDisabled.
•If the RPM Package violates any of the limitations defined in section 2.10.1, then the LPAd SHOULD cancel the RPM Package download by performing the Common Cancel Session procedure hereunder with the reason invalidRpmPackage.
•If the RPM Package contains an RPM Command 'Contact PCMP':
oIf the LPAd does not support the LPRd, then the LPAd SHOULD cancel the RPM download by performing the Common Cancel Session procedure with the reason lprNotSupported.
oIf the only available data connection is mobile network (cellular) data, and if the End User has disallowed use of mobile network data for the LPA Proxy, then the LPAd SHALL cancel the RPM download by performing the Common Cancel Session procedure with the reason lprNetworkDataNotAllowed.
7.As an optional step, if the LPAd does not already have the Profile Metadata of the Target Profile(s) identified by the ICCID(s) in the RPM Package (if any), then the LPAd SHALL request the information from the eUICC by calling the "ES10c.GetProfilesInfo" function.
8.The LPAd SHALL check the Profile Metadata of the Target Profile(s). If the Profile Metadata of the Target Profile includes any PPR and/or Enterprise Rule, then the LPAd SHOULD ask for the End User consent by showing relevant information concerning the Profile and PPR(s) and/or Enterprise Rule(s). This information MAY include the consequences of the Profile Policy Rule and/or Enterprise Rule to the End User. This message SHALL be formulated in a descriptive and non-discriminatory manner (e.g., for "Non-Disable" Profile Policy Rule: "The RPM Command for Profile X that you are about to allow can be undone only under the terms you have agreed with your service provider. Approve RPM Command YES/NO?").
The LPAd MAY show relevant information to the End User if the RPM Command results in PPR(s) being unset.
The LPAd SHALL ask for Confirmation Request(s) on the execution of RPM Commands, either combined or separated, by showing any relevant information in the RPM Package and the Profile Metadata of the Target Profile(s). The Confirmation Request(s) MAY be combined with the End User consent on PPR and/or Enterprise Rule above. The Confirmation Level for each RPM Command SHALL be higher than or equal to the following:
•No User Confirmation: List Profile Info, Update Metadata (except for the case below), Contact PCMP
•Simple Confirmation: Enable Profile, Disable Profile, Update Metadata (only if the command sets the Reference Enterprise Rule)
•Strong Confirmation: Delete Profile
NOTE: For MEP-A1 and MEP-B, if there are several eSIM Ports available, the LPAd may select an eSIM Port for Profile enabling via RPM. This may include some End User interaction.
If the End User refuses the execution of any RPM Command (e.g., by selecting 'No' or 'Not Now' in combined or separate User Confirmation(s)), the LPAd SHALL continue with the Common Cancel Session procedure with the reason endUserRejection or postponed.
If the End User does not respond to the LPAd prompt within an implementation-dependent timeout interval, the LPAd SHALL cancel the RPM Package download by performing the Common Cancel Session procedure with the reason timeout.
If the RPM Package contains (an) Update Metadata command(s) and the LPAd caches such Profile Metadata objects, the LPAd SHOULD invalidate these objects.
If the execution of the RPM Command(s) has not been rejected in the steps above, the procedure SHALL continue with the sub-procedure "RPM Execution".
3.7.3 RPM Execution
This procedure is used by LPA to transfer RPM Package to eUICC. The eUICC sequentially executes the RPM Command(s) contained in the RPM Package.
The procedure applies for SEP and MEP. The following applies for Command Port and Target Port:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command Port Target Port
---------------- ------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------
MEP-A1/A2 0 >0
MEP-B As selected in the RPM Download procedure >=0, identical to or different from Command Port
SEP Physical interface Physical interface
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The Target Port is selected in the procedure depending on the presence of Disable or Enable commands.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF hide footbox participant "<b>Operator" as OP participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP participant "<b>LPAd" as LPA participant "<b>eUICC" as E participant "<b>Device baseband" as DevBB LPA -> E : [1] CP: ES10b.LoadRpmPackage\n (smdpSigned3, smdpSignature3, [targetEsimPort]) rnote over E [2] - Verify CERT.DPauth.SIG - Verify smdpSignature3 over smdpSigned3 - Verify smdpSigned3 endrnote loop Up to the number of\n transferred RPM Commands rnote over E [3] Execute an RPM Command (see sections 3.7.3.1 to 3.7.3.6) endrnote end rnote over E [3a] Generate LoadRpmPackageResult endrnote E --> LPA : Response APDU\n(LoadRpmPackageResult) opt Any marked Profile E -> DevBB: [3b] TP: REFRESH DevBB -> E: Terminal Response or RESET rnote over E [3c] The marked Profile(s) are enabled, disabled or deleted endrnote rnote over DevBB [Network attach procedure with the newly Enabled Profile] end rnote end opt LPA -> DP : [4] ES9+.HandleNotification\n (LoadRpmPackageResult) DP --> LPA : OK rnote over LPA [Trigger PCM session] endrnote rnote over DP [5] [Terminate RPM order] endrnote DP -> OP : [6] [ES2+.HandleNotification] OP --> DP : OK rnote over DP [7] [Delete Event, Refer to Event Deletion section 3.6.3] endrnote LPA -> E : [8] CP: ES10b.RemoveNotificationFromList rnote over E [9] Delete Notification endrnote E --> LPA : OK rnote over DP, E [10] [Next RSP session follows] endrnote @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29c: Sub-procedure RPM Execution
Start Conditions:
The RPM Download procedure was successfully executed.
Procedure:
If any call of "ES10b.LoadRpmPackage" in this sub-procedure returns status words other than '90 00' or '91 XX', the LPAd SHALL perform the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason code 'loadRpmPackageError'.
1.On the Command Port, the LPAd SHALL transfer smdpSigned3 and smdpSignature3, plus for MEP-A1 and MEP-B optionally targetEsimPort (the eSIM Port to be used for enabling a Profile via RPM) to the eUICC by calling the "ES10b.LoadRpmPackage" function.
2.The eUICC SHALL:
•Verify smdpSignature3.
•Verify that the TransactionID contained in smdpSigned3 matches the TransactionID of the on-going RSP session.
If any of the verifications fails, the eUICC SHALL skip to step 3a and return a relevant error status in the generated result.
3.The eUICC SHALL execute the RPM Commands contained in the RPM Package. Processing of a command MAY involve the Device Baseband. An error within one command MAY terminate processing. No RpmCommandResult is generated for the remaining commands.
3a. The eUICC SHALL generate the LoadRpmPackageResult data structure comprising the RpmCommandResult data structure(s) generated during the processing and execution of the RPM Command(s).
The eUICC SHALL store a signed Load RPM Package Result in its non-volatile memory and return it to the LPAd.
The LPAd MAY inform the End User of the success or error status(es) indicated by the LoadRpmPackageResult.
3b. If any Profile is marked as "to be disabled", "to be disabled and deleted", or "to be enabled", the eUICC SHALL trigger a REFRESH of the Target Port as follows:
•For SEP and MEP-B if the Target Port is identical to the Command Port, the eUICC SHALL send a REFRESH proactive command on the Target Port.
•For MEP-A1, MEP-A2 and MEP-B if the Target Port is not identical to the Command Port, the eUICC SHALL send an LSI COMMAND proactive command with the action "Proactive session request" on the Command Port. This results in the Device checking for pending proactive commands on the Target Port, whereupon the eUICC sends a REFRESH proactive command on the Target Port.
NOTE: Enabling or Disabling via RPM always uses REFRESH. A mode which does not require a REFRESH is only defined for Local Profile Management.
3c Upon reception of the Terminal Response or after the RESET, the ISD-R SHALL:
•If a Profile is marked "to be disabled": disable the marked Profile.
•If a Profile is marked "to be disabled and deleted": disable the marked Profile and then delete it.
•If a Profile is marked "to be enabled": enable the marked Profile.
•If any marked Profile is successfully enabled, disabled or deleted in the previous steps, generate as many Notifications as configured in each Profile Metadata (notificationConfigurationInfo) in the format of OtherSignedNotification.
•Unmark all marked Profiles.
If a Profile is now in Enabled state, the Device baseband executes the network attach procedure on the Target Port.
4.The LPAd calls the "ES9+.HandleNotification" function in order to deliver the Load RPM Package Result to the SM-DP+. The SM-DP+ SHALL acknowledge the reception of the Notification to the LPAd. If the Load RPM Package Result was not signed by the eUICC, the procedure SHALL stop.
If the Device and the eUICC support the LPA Proxy and if appropriate connectivity is available:
-If the Load RPM Package Result includes the FQDN of PCMP server, the LPRd SHALL trigger a Profile Content Management session, with the DPI in the RPM Command (if present), as described in section 3.9.
-If the Load RPM Package Result includes a successful EnableProfileResponse and lprConfiguration.triggerLprOnEnableProfile is present in the Profile Metadata of the enabled Profile, the LPAd SHALL trigger a Profile Content Management session using the DPI in the Profile Metadata (if present) as described in section 3.9.
5.The SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Retrieve the RPM order identified by the TransactionID. If TransactionID is unknown, the SM-DP+ SHALL terminate its processing.
•(Conditional) Terminate the RPM order.
6.(Conditional) The SM-DP+ SHALL call the "ES2+.HandleNotification" with:
•notificationReceiverIdentifier reflecting the functionRequesterIdentifier value of the associated "ES2+.RpmOrder";
•notificationIdentifier reflecting the functionCallIdentifier value of the associated "ES2+.RpmOrder";
•notificationEvent indicating 'RPM execution';
•notificationEventStatus reflecting the value received in "ES9+.HandleNotification";
•resultData containing the result of the execution of the RPM Package.
NOTE: The content of resultData is generated by the eUICC while processing the ES10b.LoadRpmPackage command, and before the Device Baseband processes a potential REFRESH proactive command. This implies that resultData, and accordingly, notificationEventStatus, cannot reflect any error that may occur afterwards, such as, network attachment failure.
7.(Conditional) If this procedure is executed in the context of option (b), the SM-DP+ SHALL execute the SM-DS event deletion procedure (section 3.6.3).
8.On the Command Port, the LPAd SHALL call "ES10b.RemoveNotificationFromList" with the corresponding seqNumber. For MEP-B, this function MAY use a different Command Port.
9.The eUICC SHALL delete the Load RPM Package Result from its non-volatile memory.
10.(Conditional) If the LPAd has received rpmPending in the response of "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" function call, the LPAd SHOULD initiate an additional RSP Session with the SM-DP+, setting the operationType to indicate rpm. If this RSP session was triggered by an Event Record from an SM-DS, the pending RSP session with the SM-DP+ SHOULD be executed before continuing processing any remaining Event Records from that SM-DS. For MEP-B, a subsequent RPM session MAY use a different Command Port.
3.7.3.1 Enable Profile
This procedure is used to remotely enable a Profile already downloaded and installed on an eUICC.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF hide footbox participant "<b>eUICC\n<b>LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices rnote over LPAServices [1] Find the Target Profile [2] Verify authorisation of the SM-DP+ [3] Verify Profiles type [4] Verify Profile state [5] Enforce Profile Policy Rules and Enterprise Rules [6] Verify preceding Disable or available Port [6a] [Set Target Port] end rnote rnote over LPAServices [7] Mark Target Profile "to be enabled" endrnote rnote over LPAServices [8] Generate an RpmCommandResult data structure endrnote rnote over LPAServices [9] [If required: Stop processing of the RPM Package] endrnote @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29d: Enable Profile
Start Conditions:
In addition to the start conditions described in section 3.2.1 "Enable Profile", an RPM Command 'Enable Profile' is received within an "ES10b.LoadRpmPackage".
Procedure:
1.The ISD-R SHALL find the Target Profile with the ICCID. If the Target Profile is not found, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (8) with a result indicating a failure.
2.The ISD-R SHALL verify the authorisation of the SM-DP+ for the RPM Command. If the verification fails, then the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (8) with a result indicating a failure.
3.The ISD-R SHALL verify the type of the Target Profile and the currently Enabled Profile (if any). If at least one of them is a Test Profile, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (8) with a result indicating a failure.
4.The ISD-R SHALL verify the state of the Target Profile. If the Target Profile is not in Disabled state, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (8) with a result indicating a failure.
5.The ISD-R SHALL check the Profile Policy Rules of the currently Enabled Profile (if any) and the Reference Enterprise Rule (if any). If the target Profile cannot be enabled, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (8) with a result indicating a failure.
6.For SEP, the ISD-R SHALL verify that either no Profile is currently Enabled or the currently Enabled Profile is marked "to be disabled" or "to be disabled and deleted". Otherwise, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (8) with a result indicating a failure.
6a. For MEP, if the Target Port was not already set in a previous RPM Disable command:
-The ISD-R SHALL verify that at least one eSIM Port is available (i.e., has no Enabled Profile assigned). Otherwise, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (8) with a result indicating a failure.
-For MEP-B, if the LPAd did not indicate an eSIM Port to be used in the "ES10b.LoadRpmPackage" and if the Command Port is available, the eUICC SHALL select the Command Port as Target Port.
-For MEP-A1 and MEP-B, if the LPAd indicated an eSIM Port to be used in the "ES10b.LoadRpmPackage" and if the indicated eSIM Port is available, the eUICC SHALL select this eSIM Port as Target Port.
-For other cases for MEP-A1 and MEP-B, the behaviour of the eUICC is implementation specific. (E.g., no eSIM Port or a non-available eSIM Port indicated for MEP-A1 and the eUICC selecting the eSIM Port or the eUICC generating an error.) However, it SHALL NOT result in the implicit disabling of an Enabled Profile.
-For MEP-A2, the eUICC SHALL select an available eSIM Port as Target Port.
7.The eUICC SHALL mark the Target Profile "to be enabled".
8.The eUICC SHALL generate an RpmCommandResult data structure indicating the result of the RPM Command 'Enable Profile'.
9.If the execution of this RPM Command fails and continueOnFailure is not present, the ISD-R SHALL stop the execution of the remaining RPM Command(s).
End Conditions:
The Target Profile is marked "to be enabled" and, for MEP, the Target Port is defined. An RpmCommandResult data structure containing the result of Enable Profile is stored in the eUICC.
3.7.3.2 Disable Profile
This procedure is used to remotely disable an Enabled Profile already downloaded and installed on an eUICC.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF hide footbox participant "<b>eUICC\n<b>LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices rnote over LPAServices [1] Find the Target Profile [2] Verify authorisation of the SM-DP+ [3] Verify Profile type and state [4] Enforce Profile Policy Rules end rnote rnote over LPAServices [5] Mark Target Profile "to be disabled" [5a] [Set Target Port] end rnote rnote over LPAServices [6] Generate an RpmCommandResult data structure endrnote rnote over LPAServices [7] [If required: Stop processing of the RPM Package] endrnote @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29e: Disable Profile
Start Conditions:
In addition to the start conditions described in section 3.2.2 "Disable Profile", an RPM Command 'Disable Profile' is received over "ES10b.LoadRpmPackage".
Procedure:
1.The ISD-R SHALL find the Target Profile with the ICCID. If the Target Profile is not found, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (6) with a result indicating a failure.
2.The ISD-R SHALL verify the authorization of the SM-DP+ for the RPM Command. If the verification fails, then the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (6) with a result indicating a failure.
3.The ISD-R SHALL verify the type and the state of the Target Profile. If the Target Profile is a Test Profile or if it is not in the Enabled state, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (6) with a result indicating a failure.
4.The ISD-R SHALL check the Profile Policy Rules of the currently Enabled Profile. If it has a Profile Policy Rule "Disabling not allowed", the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (6) with a result indicating a failure.
NOTE: The eUICC may check in addition if the eSIM Port of the Target Profile matches the eSIM Port indicated in the "ES10b.LoadRpmPackage". The response to a mismatch is implementation specific. It may silently be ignored or result in an error.
5.The eUICC SHALL mark the Target Profile "to be disabled" and, for MEP, set the Target Port to the eSIM Port where the Target Profile is currently Enabled.
6.The eUICC SHALL generate an RpmCommandResult data structure indicating the result of the RPM Command 'Disable Profile'.
7.If the execution of this RPM Command fails and continueOnFailure is not present, the ISD-R SHALL stop the execution of the remaining RPM Command(s).
End Conditions:
The Target Profile is marked "to be disabled" and, for MEP, the Target Port is defined. An RpmCommandResult data structure containing the result of Disable Profile is stored in the eUICC.
3.7.3.3 Delete Profile
This procedure is used to remotely delete a Profile already downloaded and installed on an eUICC.
The conditions under which the RPM Command MAY delete a Provisioning Profile are implementation-dependent and out of the scope of this specification. The eUICC implementation MAY not support deletion of a Provisioning Profile or a preloaded Test Profile.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF hide footbox participant "<b>eUICC\n<b>LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices rnote over LPAServices [1] Find the target Profile [2] Verify authorisation of the SM-DP+ [3] Enforce Profile Policy Rules end rnote alt If the Profile is in Disabled state and\n is not marked "to be enabled" rnote over LPAServices [4a] Delete the target Profile endrnote else If the Profile is marked "to be disabled" rnote over LPAServices [4b] Mark the target Profile "to be disabled and deleted" endrnote else Otherwise rnote over LPAServices [4c] Failure endrnote end rnote over LPAServices [5] Generate an RpmCommandResult data structure endrnote rnote over LPAServices [6] [If required: Stop processing of the RPM Package] endrnote @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29f: Delete Profile
Start Conditions:
In addition to the start conditions described in section 3.2.3 "Delete Profile", an RPM Command 'Delete Profile' is received over "ES10b.LoadRpmPackage".
Procedure:
1.The ISD-R SHALL find the target Profile with the ICCID. If the target Profile is not found, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (5) with a result indicating a failure.
2.The ISD-R SHALL verify the authorisation of the SM-DP+ for the RPM Command. If the verificationfails then the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (5) with a result indicating a failure.
3.The ISD-R SHALL check the Profile Policy Rules of the target Profile. If it does not allow deletion, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (5) with a result indicating a failure.
4a. If the target Profile is in Disabled state and not marked "to be enabled": The eUICC SHALL delete the Profile. If the target Profile is successfully deleted, the eUICC SHALL generate as many Notifications as configured in its Profile Metadata (notificationConfigurationInfo) in the format of OtherSignedNotification.
4b. If the Profile is in Enabled state and marked "to be disabled": The eUICC SHALL re-mark the target Profile "to be disabled and deleted".
4c. If the target Profile is in Enabled state and is not marked "to be disabled", or the target Profile is in Disabled state and is marked "to be enabled", the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (5) with a result indicating a failure.
5.The eUICC SHALL generate an RpmCommandResult data structure indicating the result of the RPM Command 'Delete Profile'.
6.If the execution of this RPM Command fails and continueOnFailure is not present, the ISD-R SHALL stop the execution of the remaining RPM Command(s).
End Conditions:
The target Profile is deleted. An RpmCommandResult data structure containing the result of Delete Profile is stored in the eUICC.
3.7.3.4 List Profile Info
This procedure is used to list information about Profiles on an eUICC.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF hide footbox participant "<b>eUICC\n<b>LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices rnote over LPAServices [1] Find the target Profile(s) [2] Verify authorisation of the SM-DP+ endrnote rnote over LPAServices [3] Generate an RpmCommandResult with the ProfileInfo of the target Profile(s) endrnote rnote over LPAServices [4] [If required: Stop processing of the RPM Package] endrnote @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29g: List Profiles Info
Start Conditions:
An RPM Command 'List Profile Info' is received over ES10b.LoadRpmPackage.
Procedure:
1.The ISD-R SHALL find the target Profile(s) with the ICCID or the Profile Owner OID. If no matching Profile is found, the ISD-R SHALL generate an empty response, and proceed to step (3).
2.For all identified Profiles, the ISD-R SHALL verify the authorisation of the SM-DP+ for the RPM Command. If the verification fails, the ISD-R SHALL remove this Profile from the list of identified Profiles.
3.The ISD-R SHALL generate an RpmCommandResult data structure for the found Profile(s).
4.If the execution of this RPM Command fails and continueOnFailure is not present, the ISD-R SHALL stop the execution of the remaining RPM Command(s).
End Conditions:
An RpmCommandResult data structure containing the ProfileInfo data object(s) that a Managing SM-DP+ is authorised to receive.
3.7.3.5 Update Metadata
This procedure is used to remotely update the Profile Metadata of a Profile already downloaded and installed on an eUICC.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF hide footbox participant "<b>eUICC\n<b>LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices rnote over LPAServices [1] Find the target Profile [2] Verify authorisation of the SM-DP+ [3] [Verify Enterprise Configuration] end rnote rnote over LPAServices [4] Update the Profile Metadata of the target Profile [5] [Remove referenceEnterpriseRule] endrnote rnote over LPAServices [6] Generate an RpmCommandResult data structure endrnote rnote over LPAServices [7] [If required: Stop processing of the RPM Package] endrnote @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29h: Update Metadata
Start Conditions:
An RPM Command 'Update Metadata' is received over "ES10b.LoadRpmPackage".
Procedure:
1.The ISD-R SHALL find the target Profile with the ICCID. If the target Profile is not found, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (6) with a result indicating a failure.
2.The ISD-R SHALL verify the authorisation of the SM-DP+ for the RPM Command.If the verification fails, then the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (6) with a result indicating a failure.
3.If an Enterprise Configuration is to be updated: The ISD-R SHALL verify that this update is permitted as defined in section 5.4.1. If the verification fails, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (6) with a result indicating a failure.
4.The ISD-R SHALL update the Profile Metadata of the target Profile by using the UpdateMetadataRequest specified in the RPM Command.
5.If the UpdateMetadataRequest contains an Enterprise Rule with the referenceEnterpriseRule bit set: the ISD-R SHALL unset the referenceEnterpriseRule bit of the Enterprise Profile for which it is currently set, if any.
6.The eUICC SHALL generate an RpmCommandResult data structure indicating the result of the RPM Command 'Update Metadata'.
7.If execution of this RPM Command fails and continueOnFailure is not present, the ISD-R SHALL stop the execution of the remaining RPM Command(s).
End Conditions:
The Profile Metadata of the target Profile is updated, and optionally the target Profile is enabled. An RpmCommandResult data structure containing the result of RPM Command 'Update Metadata' is stored in the eUICC.
3.7.3.6 Contact PCMP
The support of the RPM Command 'Contact PCMP' is optional for the eUICC.
This procedure is used to fetch the PCMP address configured in the enabled Profile.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF hide footbox participant "<b>eUICC\n<b>LPA Services (ISD-R)" as LPAServices rnote over LPAServices [0] Verify eUICC support of LPA Proxy [1] Verify ICCID [2] Verify authorisation of the SM-DP+ [3] Verify Profile state [4] Fetch PCMP Address [5] Generate an RpmCommandResult data structure endrnote @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29i: Contact PCMP
Start Conditions:
An RPM Command 'Contact PCMP' is received over "ES10b.LoadRpmPackage".
Procedure:
0.If the eUICC does not support the RPM Command 'Contact PCMP', the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (5) with a result indicating unknownOrDamagedCommand.
1.If the target Profile cannot be identified by the ICCID, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (5) with a result indicating commandError.
2.The ISD-R SHALL verify the following:
-The SM-DP+ OID specified in the RPM Command is included in the managingDpList and is authorised to perform the RPM Command. Otherwise, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (5) with a result indicating commandError.
-If the Profile Metadata specifies an allowed CI public key identifier: the Subject Key Identifier of the CI corresponding to CERT.DPauth.SIG matches that value. Otherwise, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (5) with a result indicating commandError.
3.If the target Profile is not currently enabled, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (4) with a result indicating profileNotEnabled.
4.The ISD-R SHALL fetch the LPR Configuration of the target Profile to include the PCMP Address in the RpmCommandResult. If the target Profile does not contain an LPR Configuration, the ISD-R SHALL proceed to step (5) with a result indicating noLprConfiguration.
5.The eUICC SHALL generate an RpmCommandResult data structure indicating the result of the RPM Command 'Contact PCMP'.
End Conditions:
An RpmCommandResult data structure containing the result of Contact PCMP is stored in the eUICC.
NOTE: See section 3.7.3 for triggering of a PCM session.
3.8 Remote Management by the Operator
3.8.1 Metadata Update via ES6
This procedure is used by the Profile Owner to update Metadata of an enabled Profile.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF hide footbox participant "<b>Operator" as OP participant "<b>Device" as Device participant "<b>eUICC" as eUICC OP -> eUICC: [1] ES6.UpdateMetadata(...) rnote over eUICC [2] Verify command and update Metadata endrnote Opt Metadata update alerting supported eUICC -> Device: [3] REFRESH (tag list) rnote over Device, eUICC : [4] [Invalidate or update\n cached Profile Metadata] end opt @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29j: Metadata Update
Start Condition:
The Profile owned by the Operator is enabled.
Procedure:
1.The Operator sends an UpdateMetadata via ES6 to the enabled Profile.
2.The eUICC verifies the command and updates the Metadata as defined in section 5.4.1.
Steps 3 and 4 apply for a Device that supports Metadata update alerting:
3.The eUICC alerts the Device as follows:
•For SEP and MEP-B, the eUICC sends a REFRESH proactive command on the eSIM Port of the Profile with mode "Application Update" and providing the tag list of all Metadata objects updated or deleted by the UpdateMetadata.
•For MEP-A1 and MEP-A2, the eUICC first sends an LSI COMMAND proactive command with the action "Proactive session request" for eSIM Port 0 on the eSIM Port of the Profile. This results in the Device checking for pending proactive commands on eSIM Port 0, whereupon the eUICC sends a REFRESH proactive command on eSIM Port 0 with mode "Application Update", providing the ICCID of the Profile and the tag list of all Metadata objects updated or deleted by the UpdateMetadata.
•The internal processing of the "Application Update" REFRESH command in the Device, especially how the LPA is alerted, is out of scope.
4.For Profile Metadata objects that are cached in the LPA, the Device invalidates or updates these objects.
NOTE: A Device not supporting Metadata update alerting SHOULD NOT cache Profile Metadata to avoid using outdated information after Metadata updates via ES6.
3.8.2 Pending Operation Alerting
This procedure is used by the Profile Owner to alert the LPA of pending RSP operations.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF hide footbox participant "<b>SM-DS\n<b>SM-DP+" as SM participant "<b>Operator" as OP participant "<b>Device" as Device participant "<b>LPA" as LPA participant "<b>eUICC" as eUICC participant "<b>Profile" as P OP -> P: [1] Application specific message P -> Device: [2] REFRESH (server to check) alt Default SM-DP+ rnote over SM, eUICC #FFFFFF [3] - Retrieve Default SM-DP+ address - Profile Download and Installation Procedure or RPM Download and Execution Procedure end rnote else Root SM-DS rnote over SM, eUICC #FFFFFF [4] For all configured Root SM-DSs: - Event Retrieval Procedure - Process Events end rnote else Polling Address rnote over SM, eUICC #FFFFFF [5] - Retrieve Polling Address - [Event Retrieval procedure] - Profile Download and Installation Procedure or RPM Download and Execution Procedure end rnote else explicit address rnote over SM, eUICC #FFFFFF [6] - [Event Retrieval procedure] - Profile Download and Installation Procedure or RPM Download and Execution Procedure end rnote end @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29k: Pending Operation Alerting
Start Condition:
The Profile owned by the Operator is enabled.
The Device supports pending operation alerting.
NOTE: An SM-DP+ can know from LpaRspCapability.pendingOperationAlertingSupport whether this feature is supported on the Device and can use this feature.
Procedure:
1.The Operator sends an application specific message to an application in the enabled Profile.
NOTE: For remote management, ETSI TS 102 226 [39] specifies a command 'Immediate Action' that can be used to trigger a proactive REFRESH command. However, the support of this command by the eUICC is not mandatory and error responses are not specified.
2.The application triggers the LPA by sending a REFRESH proactive command on the eSIM Port of the enabled Profile with mode "Application Update" to the Device, providing the indication of the server to be checked for pending operations. (The internal processing of this command in the Device, especially how the alert is forwarded to the LPA, is out of scope). When connecting to a Server as described below, the operation type SHALL indicate all possible operations.
3.If the command indicates the Default SM-DP+, the LPAd SHOULD retrieve the Default SM-DP+ address(es) from the eUICC and the Device to download Profile(s) or RPM package(s) from the SM-DP+ as defined in section 3.1.3 or 3.7.2.
4.If the command indicates the Root SM-DS, the LPAd SHOULD retrieve pending events from all configured SM-DSs using the Event Retrieval Procedure defined in section 3.6.2 and process the events accordingly.
5.If the command indicates the Polling Address of the Profile, the LPAd SHOULD retrieve the Polling Address of the Enabled Profile from the eUICC. If the Polling Address is an SM-DS, the LPAd performs the Event Retrieval procedure as described in section 3.6.2 and processes the events accordingly. If the Polling Address is an SM-DP+, the LPAd downloads a Profile or an RPM package from the SM-DP+ as defined in section 3.1.3 or 3.7.2.
6.If the command indicates an explicit address: if the address is an SM-DS, the LPAd performs the Event Retrieval procedure as described in section 3.6.2 and processes the events accordingly. If the address is an SM-DP+, the LPAd downloads a Profile or an RPM package from the SM-DP+ as defined in section 3.1.3 or 3.7.2.
3.9 Profile Content Management
This procedure applies when a PCM session is triggered.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF autonumber "[0]" participant "<b>Device\n<b>App" as App participant "<b>LPRd" as LPR participant "<b>PCMAA" as AA participant "<b>PCMP" as PCMP participant "<b>Profile" as P App -> LPR : [ES21.InitiateProfileContentManagement] rnote over LPR PCM trigger received Calculate initial URI end rnote LPR -> AA: Start PCM (initial URI) loop until done AA -> PCMP: HTTP request AA -> LPR : notify(HTTP request) LPR -> App : [ES21.PcmProgressInformation(HTTP request)] PCMP --> AA: HTTP response AA -> LPR : notify(HTTP response) LPR -> App : [ES21.PcmProgressInformation(HTTP response)] loop for each part of the multipart response alt progress message AA -> LPR : notify(progress message) LPR -> App : [ES21.PcmProgressInformation(progress message)] else script part loop for each APDU in the script part AA -> P : APDU header and data P --> AA : SW1,SW2 and response data end loop AA -> LPR : notify(script part delivery) LPR -> App: [ES21.PcmProgressInformation(script part delivery)] end alt end loop end loop AA -> LPR: notify(end of PCM session) LPR -> App: [ES21.PcmProgressInformation(end of PCM session)] @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29l: Profile Content Management
This section is normative with respect to the LPRd and – if applicable – its interaction with a Device Application. The behaviours of the PCMAA, PCMP, and Enabled Profile within a Profile Content Management session are specified in GP SERAM [74]; the description of their behaviours in this specification is informative.
Start Conditions:
Three methods may trigger PCM:
-A Profile is enabled which has PCM triggering enabled. The optional DPI is configured in the Profile Metadata.
-An RPM command sent from a SM-DP+ to the LPRd, which MAY contain a DPI.
-An API command sent from a Device Application to the LPRd, which MAY contain a DPI.
The LPRd SHALL calculate the initial URI by concatenating the PCMP address it retrieved from the Metadata of the enabled Profile and the DPI if provided.
Additionally, at least one of the following conditions SHALL be satisfied:
-The End User has not disallowed mobile network data (cellular data) to be used for the LPA Proxy/PCM session, and mobile network data is available; or
-Some other data connectivity is available (e.g., WiFi).
Procedure:
1.A Device Application MAY initiate the PCM session by invoking ES21.InitiateProfileContentManagement. The Device Application MAY request the LPRd to send it progress notifications during the PCM session. The PCM session MAY also be triggered by a Profile enabling or a 'Contact PCMP' RPM command.
Upon receipt of a trigger, the LPRd SHALL calculate the initial URI.
2.The LPRd SHALL request the PCMAA to start a new PCM session, passing it the initial URI.
The PCMAA repeatedly sends HTTP requests to the PCMP and processes the HTTP responses until all work within the PCM session is completed. For each iteration:
3.The PCMAA sends an HTTP request to the PCMP. Dependant on information in the previous HTTP response, this request may go to a different server.
4.The PCMAA sends a notification to the LPRd of the HTTP request it sent to the PCMP.
5.If a Device Application has requested progress notifications, the LPRd SHALL send an ES21.PcmProgressInformation notification to the Device Application, indicating an HTTP request along with the targeted URI.
6.The PCMP sends an HTTP response to the PCMAA.
7.The PCMAA sends a notification to the LPRd that it has received the HTTP response from the PCMP.
8.If a Device Application has requested progress notifications, the LPRd SHALL send an ES21.PcmProgressInformation notification to the Device Application, indicating an HTTP response was received from the PCMP along with the number of script parts it contains.
The HTTP response from the PCMAA may contain multiple HTTP parts, each of which may either contain a progress message or a script part. For each HTTP part:
If the HTTP part contains a progress message:
9.The PCMAA sends a notification to the LPRd containing the progress message.
10.If a Device Application has requested progress notifications, the LPRd SHALL send an ES21.PcmProgressInformation notification to the Device Application containing the progress message.
Otherwise (the HTTP part contains a script part):
For each APDU within the script part:
11.The PCMAA sends the APDU to the Enabled Profile.
12.The Enabled Profile returns status words and response data.
After all APDUs in the script part have been sent:
13.The PCMAA sends a notification to the LPRd containing the result of the script part.
14.If a Device Application has requested progress notifications, the LPRd SHALL send an ES21.PcmProgressInformation notification to the Device Application containing the script part number, the delivery status of the script part, and the status words of all APDUs that were processed by the Enabled Profile.
Upon completion of the PCM session:
15.The PCMAA send a notification to the LPRd that the PCM session has ended.
16.If a Device Application has requested progress notifications, the LPRd SHALL send an ES21.PcmProgressInformation notification to the Device Application indicating the termination status of the session.
If the PCM session was triggered via RPM, the LPA SHALL start any subsequent RSP session only after the PCM session ended.
3.10 eUICC Root Public Key Update
The Device and eUICC MAY provide a mechanism to update the set of eSIM CA RootCA Public Keys in the ECASD of the eUICC. The mechanism, where provided, is Device Manufacturer/EUM-specific and SHALL be secure.
A Certificate installed into the ECASD SHALL be from an eSIM CA.
This LPAd MAY start this procedure when either:
•The LPAd has determined that the eSIM CA RootCA Public Key indicator in an Activation Code is not supported by the eUICC, or
•During the Common Mutual Authentication procedure, the SM-XX has returned a CERT.XXauth.SIG that chains to a Root Certificate that is not supported by the eUICC.
If supported, the LPAd SHOULD initiate the secure update mechanism (section 2.4.2) with the eUICC indicating the requested eSIM CA RootCA Public Key indicator or identifier, which MAY include communication with an external EUM-specific server. This MAY provision additional related eSIM CA RootCA Public Keys (e.g., one for each curve supported by the requested eSIM CA). As part of this process, the Device SHALL inform the End User of the proposed update and SHALL obtain End User consent.
Upon successful completion of the credential update, the LPAd MAY retry the Profile Download procedure again.
3.11 Device Change and Profile Recovery
3.11.1 Device Change
This procedure will allow the End User having a Profile in the old Device to add a Profile related to the same Subscription in the new Device. This procedure can further enable the downloaded Profile upon End User consent, which consequently MAY disable a currently Enabled Profile of the new Device (if any). Network connectivity is assumed.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 12 skinparam noteFontSize 12 skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam boxPadding 6 hide footbox participant "End User" as EU box "Old Device" participant "LPAd" as LPA1 participant "eUICC\nLPA Services (ISD-R)" as EUICC1 end box participant "SM-DP+" as DP box "New Device" participant "LPAd" as LPA2 participant "eUICC\nLPA Services (ISD-R)" as EUICC2 end box participant "Service Provider" as SP rnote over EU, LPA1 : [1] End User interactions LPA1 -> EUICC1 : [2] ES10c.GetProfilesInfo EUICC1 --> LPA1 : Profile Metadata rnote over LPA1 : Check Device Change Configuration LPA1 -> LPA1 : [3] Identify the SM-DP+ Address opt If new Device's information is required LPA1 <- LPA2 : [4] Retrieval from new device ([EID], [TAC]) end rnote over LPA1, DP : [5] Common Mutual Authentication Procedure, see 3.0.1 LPA1 -> DP : ES9+.AuthenticateClient request (ctxParamsForDeviceChange) Opt If ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest is configured by the Service Provider DP -> SP : [6] [ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest (ICCID, [EID], [TAC])] SP --> DP : [OK (isNewProfileRequired, [Service Provider Message for Device Change], [Confirmation Code])] end alt Device Change is not supported or not allowed DP --> LPA1 : [7] Error else Otherwise - Device Change is allowed Opt If ES2+.HandleNotification is configured by the Service Provider DP -> SP : [8] [ES2+.HandleNotification (Device Change Request)] SP --> DP : [OK] end DP --> LPA1 : [9] ES9+.AuthenticateClient response \n (transactionId, smdpSigned4, smdpSignature4, [Service Provider Message for Device Change]) opt If isNewProfileRequired = TRUE or depending on a service agreement rnote over DP, SP : [10] Prepare Profile Download section 3.1.1\n (this process can be performed in parallel to steps 6 to 19) end rnote over EU, LPA1 : [11] \n – [Display Service Provider Message for Device Change] \n – Confirmation Request\n – [Confirmation Code entry] LPA1 -> EUICC1 : [12] ES10b.PrepareDeviceChange \n (smdpSigned4, smdpSignature4, Hashed Confirmation Code) EUICC1 --> LPA1 : ES10b.PrepareDeviceChange response LPA1 -> DP : [13] ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange request \n (transactionId, prepareDeviceChangeResponse) DP -> SP : [14] [ES2+.HandleNotification (Device Change Confirmation or Confirmation Failure)] SP --> DP : [OK] alt If End User confirmed opt If isNewProfileRequired=FALSE or if configured by the Service Provider rnote over DP : [15] Prepare the Profile \n identified by ICCID end Opt If ES2+.HandleNotification is configured by the Service Provider DP -> SP : [ES2+.HandleNotification (Profile preparation for Device Change)] SP --> DP : [OK] end end DP --> LPA1 : [16] ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange response rnote over LPA1, EUICC1 : [Disable the target Profile] LPA1 -> EUICC1 : ES10b.VerifyDeviceChange (deviceChangeConfirmation) EUICC1 --> LPA1 : [OK] end opt If the installed Profile has to be deleted rnote over LPA1, EUICC1 : [17] Delete the installed Profile LPA1 -> DP : [18] [ES9+.HandleNotification (Delete Notification)] opt If the SM-DP+ supports the Delete Notification for Device Change and \n the Delete Notification was not transmitted LPA1 -> LPA1 : Generate an Activation Code containing the Delete Notification for Device Change end end LPA1 -> LPA2 : [19] Provide the Activation Code (e.g., via LUI) rnote over EUICC2, DP : [20] Profile Download and Installation Procedure, see 3.1.3 @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29m: Device Change
Start Conditions:
-The Service Provider has provided to the SM-DP+ the relevant information and configuration for the Device Change (see Annex O).
-The End User has an old Device containing a Profile.
-The eUICC and the LPAd of the old Device support Device Change.
-The Profile on the old Device contains a Device Change Configuration with the information as provided by the Service Provider.
-None of the Profile Policy Rules is set for the Profile with a Device Change Configuration.
•The End User gets a new Device.
•User Intent is acquired as defined in SGP.21 [4] in the old Device.
Procedure:
1.The End User initiates the Device Change operation from the LPAd of the old Device and selects the Profile to be installed in their new Device.
2.The LPAd of the old Device retrieves the DeviceChangeConfiguration from the Profile Metadata of the selected Profile. The LPAd of the old Device SHALL check the retrieved DeviceChangeConfiguration and proceed based upon its value as follows:
•If the DeviceChangeConfiguration indicates requestToDp, the procedure continues with step (3).
•If the DeviceChangeConfiguration indicates usingStoredAc, the procedure continues with step (17).
3.The LPAd of the old Device SHALL determine the SM-DP+ address from smdpAddressForDc in DeviceChangeConfiguration of the Profile.
4.If the DeviceChangeConfiguration indicates any of the EID and/or TAC of the new Device is required, the LPAd of the old Device SHALL retrieve the required information from the new Device. The detailed interface and mechanism to retrieve the required information is out of scope of the specification.
NOTE: For instance, the LPAd of the old Device can guide the End User to use "Show EID" menu of the LPAd of the new Device, and then provide a means to scan/input the EID in a QR code format or human-readable text format.
If the DeviceChangeConfiguration indicates that any of the EID and/or TAC of the new Device is required but the LPAd of the old Device cannot retrieve the required information, the LPAd SHALL display an appropriate error state to the End User and stop the procedure.
5.The LPAd of the old Device initiates the Common Mutual Authentication procedure defined in section 3.0.1 to the retrieved SM-DP+ address. During the Common Mutual Authentication procedure, if the DeviceChangeConfiguration includes an allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier, the LPAd SHALL restrict the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers to that value.
During the Common Mutual Authentication procedure at step (10), the LPAd SHALL build the ctxParams1 data object with ctxParamsForDeviceChange comprising the ICCID of the selected Profile and, if indicated as required in DeviceChangeConfiguration, any of the EID and/or TAC of the new Device.
6.If configured by the Service Provider, the SM-DP+ SHALL call ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function comprising the ICCID and, if present in the ctxParamsForDeviceChange data object, the EID and/or TAC of the new Device. The Service Provider SHALL provide isNewProfileRequired and optionally a Service Provider Message for Device Change in the response of ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function.
If it is required for the End User to enter a Confirmation Code in order to proceed with the Device Change of the Profile, the Service Provider SHALL provide the value of the Confirmation Code in the response of ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function.
7.If the SM-DP+ does not support Device Change, the SM-DP+ SHALL return an error status "Device Change – Unsupported" and the procedure SHALL stop. If the Device Change is not allowed for the Profile identified by the ICCID, the SM-DP+ SHALL return an error status "Device Change – Not Allowed" and the procedure SHALL stop.
If the LPAd of the old Device receives any error status, the LPAd of the old Device MAY display an appropriate error state to the End User and SHALL stop the procedure.
NOTE: This provides compatibility with SM-DP+ that does not understand or cannot appropriately process the Device Change request (e.g., v3 SM-DP+ not supporting the Device Change feature or v2 SM-DP+).
NOTE: If the procedure stopped due to an error, the LPAd MAY send "ES10b.CancelSession" to the eUICC with a reason sessionAborted.
8.If configured by the Service Provider, the SM-DP+ SHALL notify the Service Provider of the Device Change request by calling ES2+.HandleNotification function.
9.If the Device Change is allowed for the Profile identified by the ICCID, the SM-DP+ returns ES9+.AuthenticateClient response comprising transactionId, smdpSigned4, smdpSignature4 and optionally Service Provider Message for Device Change.
10.If isNewProfileRequired was set to TRUE in the response to ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function and/or if there is an agreed behaviour between the Service Provider and the SM-DP+ on the Profile identified by the ICCID, the Service Provider SHALL run the Download Preparation Process, as defined in 3.1.1.2 and optionally the Subscription Activation Process, as defined in 3.1.1.4.
NOTE: This process can be performed in parallel to steps 6 to 19. The Profile identified by the ICCID has to be in 'Released' state before step 20.
11.The LPAd of the old Device SHALL ask for the Strong Confirmation on the Device Change. If Service Provider Message for Device Change was provided in the ES9+.AuthenticateClient response, it SHOULD be presented to the End User.
If ccRequiredFlag is set to TRUE in smdpSigned4, the LPAd of the old Device SHALL ask for the End User to enter the Confirmation Code which was provided by the Operator that MAY be considered as a Strong Confirmation.
The Confirmation Requests described above MAY:
•display profileName or any relevant information contained in the Profile Metadata and smdpSigned4 to the End User.
•be combined, if prompted, into a single prompt with the highest Confirmation Level therefore requiring a single confirmation by the End User.
If the End User does not confirm the Device Change of the Profile, the LPAd SHALL continue with the Common Cancel Session procedure with reason code 'endUserRejection'. If the End User does not respond to the LPAd prompt within an implementation-dependent timeout interval, the LPAd SHALL cancel the Profile download by performing the Common Cancel Session procedure with the reason 'timeout'. For both cases, the notificationEvent SHALL be set to 'Device Change confirmation failure' if a notification is sent to the Service Provider.
12.The LPA of the old Device SHALL call the "ES10b.PrepareDeviceChange" function including the smdpSigned4, smdpSignature4 and optionally the Hashed Confirmation Code. The Hashed Confirmation Code SHALL be calculated with the UTF-8-encoded representation of the Confirmation Code as follows:
Hashed Confirmation Code = SHA256 (SHA256(Confirmation Code) | TransactionID), where '|' means concatenation of data
13.The LPAd of the old Device SHALL call ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange function comprising transactionId, prepareDeviceChangeResponse.
14.If configured by the Service Provider or if isNewProfileRequired was set to TRUE in the response to ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function, the SM-DP+ SHALL notify the Service Provider of the End User's confirmation result by calling ES2+.HandleNotification function. If the End User accepted the Device Change, the procedure continues with the next step. Otherwise, the procedure continues with step (16).
15.If isNewProfileRequired was set to FALSE in the response to ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function or if configured by the Service Provider, the SM-DP+ SHALL prepare a Profile for download and the associated MatchingID. If an EID was provided in the Device Change Request in the step 5, the SM-DP+ SHALL link the prepared Profile download with the EID. The SM-DP+ SHALL determine the deletion of the Profile on the old Device as per Service Provider's configuration and SHALL generate the associated Activation Code. If the Activation Code is to be encrypted as per section 5.6.6, the SM‑DP+ SHALL use a MatchingID that has not previously been used in the Activation Code. The SM-DP+ SHALL notify the Service Provider of the Profile preparation result by calling ES2+.HandleNotification function if configured by the Service Provider.
16.If the End User accepted the Device Change, the SM-DP+ SHALL return the ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange response comprising the Device Change response. Upon receiving the response, the LPAd of the old Device SHOULD disable the installed Profile if the response contains encryptedDeviceChangeData, and SHALL call "ES10b.VerifyDeviceChange" function comprising deviceChangeConfirmation to verify the SM-DP+ signature and optionally decrypt the Device Change Response via eUICC as described in section 5.7.27. If the eUICC returns a profileNotInDisabledState error, the LPA MAY disable the installed Profile and retry the "ES10b.VerifyDeviceChange" function call. If the eUICC returns any other error or the LPA does not retry the "ES10b.VerifyDeviceChange" function call, the procedure SHALL stop.
NOTE 1: The use of an SM-DS in the context of Device Change is FFS.
NOTE 2: If the LPA does not retry the "ES10b.VerifyDeviceChange" function call, the LPA can terminate the RSP session by calling "ES10b.CancelSession" with the reason sessionAborted.
If the End User rejected the Device Change, the SM-DP+ SHALL return the ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange response without the Device Change response, and the procedure SHALL stop.
17.If the LPAd of the old Device has been instructed in the Device Change Response to delete the installed Profile or the DeviceChangeConfiguration indicates that the deletion of the installed profile is required, the LPAd of the old Device SHALL delete the installed Profile from the eUICC using ES10c.DeleteProfile and retrieve the corresponding Delete Notification from the eUICC. Additionally, if the DeviceChangeConfiguration indicates requestToDp and the SM-DP+ has indicated in the Device Change Response that it supports the recovery of the deleted Profile, the LPAd of the old Device SHOULD store the following values of the deleted Profile:
-ICCID, and
-from DeviceChangeConfiguration: the smdpAddressForDc and, if present, the allowedCiPKId.
If the deletion of the installed Profile is not required, the procedure continues with step (19).
NOTE: The LPA of the old Device should store the Profile Recovery Information until the expiration of time indicated in profileRecoveryValidityPeriod in the deviceChangeResponse or successful Profile Recovery, whichever comes first.
18.The LPAd of the old Device SHALL send the Delete Notification of the deleted Profile to the corresponding Recipient Address. For that, the LPAd MAY perform one of the following:
•The LPAd MAY call ES9+.HandleNotification function (as defined in section 3.5) and receive the acknowledgement of the Delete Notification.
•The LPAd MAY send the Delete Notification to the LPAd of the new Device via implementation-specific channel. In this case the LPAd of the new Device SHALL relay the Delete Notification by calling ES9+.HandleNotification function (as defined in section 3.5) before executing step (20).
•If the SM-DP+ has indicated that it supports the Delete Notification for Device Change of the deleted Profile in the Device Change Response, the LPAd MAY embed the Delete Notification for Device Change corresponding to the notificationAddress in the Device Change Response in an Activation Code (as defined in section 4.1 and 4.1.3).
The procedure SHALL stop if the LPAd of the old Device cannot send the Delete Notification.
NOTE1: The Recipient Address may not be the FQDN of the SM-DP+ in figure 21b. In such a case, it is out of scope of this document how the Notification receiver delivers the Delete Notification to the SM-DP+ in figure 21b.
NOTE2: The LPAd of the old Device MAY send additional Notifications to the SM-DP+(s) other than the SM-DP+ in figure 21b.
NOTE3: Execution of this step MAY require an extended period of time. For instance, if the LPAd does not presently have network connectivity, it can wait until connectivity is available in order to deliver the notification.
19.The LPAd of the old Device provides the Activation Code to the LPAd of the new Device.
•If the DeviceChangeConfiguration indicates requestToDp, the LPAd SHALL use the Activation Code in the ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange response or the Activation Code at step (18), if generated.
•If the DeviceChangeConfiguration indicates usingStoredAc, the LPAd SHALL use the Activation Code from the activationCodeForDc.
The LPAd of the old Device SHOULD provide to the new Device the state of the Profile during the procedure in order to allow the LPAd of the new Device to restore the state of the Profile of the old Device.
The LPAd of the old Device MAY present the information via the LUI. Additional means to provide the information to the LPAd of the new Device is out of scope of this specification.
20.The Profile is downloaded from the SM-DP+ to the new Device via the Profile download and installation procedure as defined in section 3.1.3, based upon the Activation Code.
-If the Activation Code, provided at step (19), contains the Delete Notification for Device Change, the LPAd of the new Device SHALL provide the Delete Notification for Device Change by calling ES9+.AuthenticateClient function comprising a deleteNotificationForDc.
-If the Activation Code, provided at step (19), indicates Confirmation Code Required Flag, the Confirmation Code that was used in this procedure has to be used at step (8) of the Profile download and installation procedure defined in section 3.1.3.
End Conditions:
The Profile and its associated Profile Metadata have been installed on the End User’s eUICC of the new Device.
3.11.1.1 Multiple Profiles Device Change
The LPA supporting Device Change SHALL be able to allow the End User to perform the Device Change procedure for one or more Profiles installed in the eUICC.
The LUId SHOULD present to the End User all applicable Profiles and allow their selection for the Device Change operation.
For each selected Profile, steps from 2 to 20 of section 3.11.1 are repeated. When multiple Profiles have been selected for Device Change, if one of these steps fails due to an error, the LPAd SHOULD continue the Device Change procedure with the other Profiles.
If more than one Profile is selected for Device Change, the LPAd of the old Device SHOULD provide all Activation Codes to the LPAd of the new Device in one step. In this case, step 19 of section 3.11.1 is put on hold until all Activation Codes are ready to be provided to the new Device.
3.11.2 Profile Recovery
This procedure will allow the End User to recover the deleted Profile on the old Device.
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 12 skinparam noteFontSize 12 skinparam monochrome true skinparam ArrowColor Black skinparam lifelinestrategy solid skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam noteBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam participantBackgroundColor #FFFFFF skinparam boxPadding 6 hide footbox participant "End User" as EU box "Old Device" participant "LPAd" as LPA1 participant "eUICC\nLPA Services (ISD-R)" as EUICC1 end box participant "SM-DP+" as DP participant "Service Provider" as SP rnote over EU, LPA1 : [1] End User interactions rnote right EU [2] Get ICCID, SM-DP+ Address, [allowedCiPkId] endrnote rnote over LPA1, DP: [3] Common Mutual Authentication Procedure, see 3.0.1 LPA1 -> DP: ES9+.AuthenticateClient request \n (ctxParamsForProfileRecovery) rnote left SP [4] Verify the Profile Installation Result of the new Device for Device Change endrnote DP --> LPA1: [error] rnote over DP, SP: [5] Prepare Profile Download and Activation Code DP --> LPA1: [6] ES9+.AuthenticateClient response \n (transactionId, smdpSigned4, smdpSignature4) Opt If eUICC supports Device Change LPA1 -> EUICC1: [7] ES10b.VerifyDeviceChange\n(profileRecoveryResponse) alt If verification fails EUICC1 --> LPA1 : error else Otherwise EUICC1 --> LPA1 : OK end end rnote over DP, LPA1 [8] Profile Download and Installation Procedure, see 3.1.3 endrnote @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 29n: Profile Recovery procedure
Start Conditions:
•The LPAd of the old Device has deleted the installed Profile as instructed by the SM-DP+ during the Device Change procedure.
•The SM-DP+ has indicated to the LPAd of the old Device the support of the recovery of the deleted Profile in the Device Change Response.
•The relevant information for the recovery of the deleted Profile has been stored and validity period of the Profile Recovery is not expired in the LPAd of the old Device.
•The Profile Installation on the eUICC of the new Device has failed due to a permanent error described in section 2.5.6.1.
•The LPAd of the new Device has delivered the Profile Installation Result to the SM-DP+ by calling the "ES9+.HandleNotification".
Procedure:
1.The End User initiates the Profile Recovery operation within the LUId of the old Device by selecting the Profile that was deleted for Device Change.
2.The LPAd of the old Device retrieves the SM-DP+ address and an optional allowed eSIM CA RootCA Public Key identifier for recovery of the selected Profile. If the LPAd of the old Device cannot retrieve the SM-DP+ address, the procedure SHALL stop.
3.The LPAd of the old Device initiates the Common Mutual Authentication procedure defined in section 3.0.1 to the retrieved SM-DP+ address. If an allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier was retrieved, the LPAd SHALL restrict the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers to that value.
During the Common Mutual Authentication procedure at step (10), the LPAd SHALL build the ctxParams1 data object with ctxParamsForProfileRecovery comprising the ICCID of the selected Profile to be recovered.
4.On reception of the "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" function call comprising ctxParamsForProfileRecovery, the SM-DP+ SHALL verify that there was a permanent error in installing the prepared Profile on the new Device for Device Change, corresponding to the ICCID therein. If verification fails, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile – Not allowed".
5.The SM-DP+ SHALL prepare a Profile for recovery and the associated Activation Code for the old Device. The SM-DP+ MAY interact with the Service Provider for the Profile preparation.
6.The SM-DP+ SHALL return the ES9+.AuthenticateClient response comprising transactionId, smdpSigned4 and smdpSignature4.
7.Upon receiving the response, if the eUICC supports Device Change, the LPAd of the old Device SHALL call "ES10b.VerifyDeviceChange" function comprising profileRecoveryResponse to verify the SM-DP+ signature via eUICC as described in section 5.7.27. If the eUICC returns an error, the procedure SHALL stop.
8.The LPAd of the old Device initiate Profile download and installation procedure, as defined in section 3.1.3, by opening a new RSP session to the SM-DP+ identified by the Activation Code contained in the smdpSigned4 (see step 6 above).
End Conditions:
The Profile for recovery and its associated Profile Metadata have been installed on the End User’s eUICC of the old Device.
4 Data Elements
4.1 Activation Code
The Activation Code SHALL be coded to be the concatenation of the strings listed in the following table:
Name | Description | MOC |
|---|---|---|
AC_Format | Format of the Activation Code. SHALL be set to "1" for this format of the Activation Code and any subsequent backward compatible format NOTE: The value "2" designates an Advanced Activation Code, as described in section 4.1a | M |
Delimiter | SHALL be set to "$" | M |
SM-DP+ Address | FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) of the SM-DP+ (e.g., SMDP.EXAMPLE.COM) restricted to the Alphanumeric mode character set defined in table 5 of ISO/IEC 18004 [15] excluding "$" | M |
Delimiter | SHALL be set to "$" | M |
AC_Token | MatchingID as described in section (0) | M |
Delimiter | SHALL be present and set to "$" if any of the following optional parameters is present | C |
SM-DP+ OID | SM-DP+ OID in the CERT.DPauth.SIG | O |
Delimiter | SHALL be present and set to "$" if any of the following optional parameters is present | C |
Confirmation Code Required Flag | SHALL be present and set to "1" if Confirmation Code is required; otherwise it SHALL be absent | O |
Delimiter | SHALL be present and set to "$" if any of the following optional parameters is present | C |
CI Public Key indicator | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# If present, it specifies an indicator of an eSIM CA RootCA public key as specified below. | O |
Delimiter | SHALL be present and set to "$" if any of the following optional parameters is present | C |
Delete Notification for Device Change | #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# If present in an Activation Code, it specifies the Delete Notification for Device Change. See section 4.1.3. | O |
Table 8: Activation Code Structure
The maximum length of an Activation Code which does not contain a Delete Notification for Device Change SHALL be 255 characters, but in practise it is recommended to consider the user experience when choosing the length. When the Activation Code contains a Delete Notification for Device Change, the length of the Activation Code MAY be longer than 255 characters.
To support extension by future versions of this specification, the Device SHALL ignore a delimiter and any further parameters following those defined in Table 8.
The Device SHALL treat an AC_Format other than "1" or "2" as invalid.
Examples of the Activation Code are as follows:
•1$SMDP.EXAMPLE.COM$04386-AGYFT-A74Y8-3F815
(if SM-DP+ OID and Confirmation Code Required Flag are not present)
•1$SMDP.EXAMPLE.COM$04386-AGYFT-A74Y8-3F815$$1
(if SM-DP+ OID is not present and Confirmation Code Required Flag is present)
•1$SMDP.EXAMPLE.COM$04386-AGYFT-A74Y8-3F815$1.3.6.1.4.1.31746$1
(if SM-DP+ OID and Confirmation Code Required flag are present)
•1$SMDP.EXAMPLE.COM$04386-AGYFT-A74Y8-3F815$1.3.6.1.4.1.31746
(If SM-DP+ OID is present and Confirmation Code Required Flag is not present)
•1$SMDP.EXAMPLE.COM$$1.3.6.1.4.1.31746
(If SM-DP+ OID is present, Activation token is left blank and Confirmation Code Required Flag is not present)
•1$SMDP.EXAMPLE.NET$KL14XA-8C7RLY$1.3.6.1.4.1.31746$$A14D8-971
(If SM-DP+ OID and CI Public Key indicator are present)
When entered manually, the Activation Code SHALL be used as defined above.
When provided in a QR code according to ISO/IEC 18004 [15], the Activation Code SHALL be prefixed with "LPA:".
4.1.1 Matching ID
The MatchingID is mandatory information (but MAY be zero-length) that SHALL be set-up between the Operator and the SM-DP+, to identify the context of a specific management order given to the SM-DP+. The MatchingID is generated during the download initiation procedure (section 3.1.1) or RPM initiation procedure (section 3.7.1).
The MatchingID included in an Activation Code is equivalent to the "Activation Code Token" as defined is SGP.21 [4].
The format and content of the MatchingID is subject to the following constraints:
The MatchingID, when not a zero-length value, SHALL be a unique identifier in the context of the Operator and the SM-DP+ to:
•Match a download order initiated by the Operator with a Profile Download or RPM request coming from an LPD.
•As a protection for the SM-DP+: the SM-DP+ SHALL only process requests containing a MatchingID known to the SM-DP+ (and therefore inherently valid).
It SHALL consist only of upper case alphanumeric characters (0-9, A-Z) and the "-" in any combination.
NOTE: This selection allows more compact alphanumeric QR code encoding and is expected to be supported for manual entry.
On ES9+ and ES11, the data object containing the MatchingID MAY also be missing completely. Whenever this specification refers to a "missing MatchingID", this refers to this data object either to be missing or to having a length of zero.
In turn, a MatchingID being present refers to the data object having a non-zero-length value.
4.1.2 eSIM CA RootCA Public Key indicator
The eSIM CA RootCA Public Key indicator is the potentially truncated hexadecimal representation of the eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier. It SHALL consist of an even number of hexadecimal characters with letters written in upper case and no inserted spaces. "-" characters MAY be inserted at any place for better readability.
NOTE: As the number of eSIM CA RootCAs is limited, a short string can be sufficient to uniquely identify one of these.
4.1.3 Delete Notification for Device Change
Delete Notification for Device Change contains a part of Delete Notification of the deleted Profile excluding EUM Certificate, Sub-EUM Certificate (if any), and eUICC Certificate therein.
DeleteNotificationForDc is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
DeleteNotificationForDc ::= SEQUENCE {
notificationMetadata NotificationMetadata,
euiccNotificationSignature EuiccSign
}
-- ASN1STOPThe notificationMetadata and euiccNotificationSignature data object SHALL contain the value of tbsOtherNotification and euiccNotificationSignature data object in the retrieved the OtherSignedNotification TLV of the deleted Profile, respectively.
When the LPA of the old Device generates an Activation Code containing a Delete Notification for Device Change, the LPA SHALL use the ASN.1 DER encoded DeleteNotificationForDc TLV in hexadecimal byte expression using the character set 0 to 9 and A to F in any combination.
4.2 Device Information
Device Information is mainly in destination of the SM-DP+ for the purpose of Device eligibility check. The SM-DP+/Operator is free to use or ignore this information at their discretion.
Device Information includes:
•TAC
•Device capabilities: The Device SHALL set all the capabilities it supports
•Radio access technologies, including release.
•Contactless: the SWP and HCI interfaces as well as the associated APIs
•RSP CRL SVN
•LPA SVN
•Card Application Toolkit support.
•eUICC form factor type
•IMEI (optional)
•Preferred languages (optional)
-Device Test Mode
-RSP functions supported:
•CRL stapling
•RSP Server certificate chain variant A, B, and C
•APDU API
•Enterprise Capable Device
•LPA Proxy (Profile Content Management)
•Signed SM-DS responses
•CI update on the eUICC
•Event Checking
•Push Service
•Pending operations alerting
Device Information
DeviceInfo is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
DeviceInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
tac Octet4,
deviceCapabilities DeviceCapabilities,
imei Octet8 OPTIONAL,
preferredLanguages SEQUENCE OF UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
deviceTestMode NULL OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported# if present the Device is operating in Device Test Mode
lpaRspCapability LpaRspCapability OPTIONAL -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
}
DeviceCapabilities ::= SEQUENCE { -- Highest fully supported release for each definition
-- The device SHALL set all the capabilities it supports
gsmSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
utranSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
cdma2000onexSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
cdma2000hrpdSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
cdma2000ehrpdSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
eutranEpcSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
contactlessSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
rspCrlSupportedVersion VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
nrEpcSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
nr5gcSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
eutran5gcSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
lpaSvn VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported# provided for information only
catSupportedClasses CatSupportedClasses OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
euiccFormFactorType EuiccFormFactorType OPTIONAL -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
}
CatSupportedClasses ::= BIT STRING {
a(0), b(1), c(2), d(3), e(4), f(5), g(6), h(7), i(8), j(9),
k(10), l(11), m(12), n(13), o(14), p(15), q(16), r(17), s(18), t(19),
u(20), v(21), w(22), x(23), y(24), z(25), aa(26), ab(27), ac(28), ad(29)
}
-- Definition of EuiccFormFactorType
EuiccFormFactorType ::= INTEGER {
removableEuicc (0), -- eUICC can be removed
nonRemovableEuicc (1) -- eUICC cannot be removed
}
-- Definition of LpaRspCapability
LpaRspCapability ::= BIT STRING {
crlStaplingV3Support (0),
certChainV3Support (1),
apduApiSupport (2),
enterpriseCapableDevice (3),
lpaProxySupport (4),
signedSmdsResponseV3Support (5),
euiccCiUpdateSupport (6),
eventCheckingSupport (7),
pushServiceSupport (8),
pendingOperationAlertingSupport (9)
}
-- ASN1STOPThe TAC and IMEI are defined in 3GPP TS 23.003 [35].
The TAC SHALL be represented as a string of 4 octets that is coded as a Telephony Binary Coded Decimal String as defined in 3GPP TS 29.002 [63].
The IMEI (including the check digit) SHALL be represented as a string of 8 octets that is coded as a Telephony Binary Coded Decimal String as defined in 3GPP TS 29.002 [63], except that the last octet contains the check digit (in low nibble) and an 'F' filler (in high nibble). The check digit SHALL be computed according to 3GPP TS 23.003 [35]. The IMEI SHOULD be present if the Device contains a non-removable eUICC.
Example: If IMEI (14 digits) is: 12345678901234, then the check digit is 7 and the value part of the imei ASN.1 object is '21 43 65 87 09 21 43 F7'. The value part of the tac ASN.1 object is '21 43 65 87'.
NOTE: The SM-DP+ and the Operator should be aware that the IMEI in version 2 of this specification defines an encoding where the order of the nibbles in the last octet is different.
The Device Information MAY include preferred languages. If provided, the preferred languages SHALL be represented as a sequence of language tags as defined by RFC 5646 [70] in decreasing order of preference.
NOTE: The method by which the Device determines the preferred languages is out of scope of this specification.
The Device SHALL indicate whether it is currently operating in Device Test Mode.
The capabilities SHALL be represented as follows:
•gsmSupportedRelease – if GSM/GERAN is supported, this SHALL be the highest 3GPP release N fully supported by the device, encoded as the octet string {N, 0, 0}. If GSM/GERAN is not supported this SHALL NOT be present.
•utranSupportedRelease – if UMTS/UTRAN is supported, this SHALL be the highest 3GPP release N fully supported by the device, encoded as the octet string {N, 0, 0}. If UMTS/UTRAN is not supported this SHALL NOT be present.
•cdma2000onexSupportedRelease – if cdma2000 1X is supported, this SHALL be encoded as the octet string {1, 0, 0}. If cdma2000 1X is not supported this SHALL NOT be present.
•cdma2000hrpdSupportedRelease – if cdma2000 HRPD is supported, this SHALL be encoded as the octet string {R, 0, 0}. If cdma2000 HRPD is not supported this SHALL NOT be present. The value R SHALL represent the EVDO revision as follows:
oRev 0 SHALL be encoded as 1
oRev A SHALL be encoded as 2
oRev B SHALL be encoded as 3
•cdma2000ehrpdSupportedRelease – if cdma2000 eHRPD, is supported this SHALL be the highest 3GPP release N fully supported by the device, encoded as the octet string {N, 0, 0}. If cdma2000 eHRPD is not supported this SHALL NOT be present.
•eutranEpcSupportedRelease – if LTE/E-UTRAN using a 4G core network (Evolved Packet Core) is supported, this SHALL be the highest 3GPP release N fully supported by the device, encoded as the octet string {N, 0, 0}. If LTE/E-UTRAN is not supported this SHALL NOT be present.
•contactlessSupportedRelease – if NFC is supported, this SHALL be the highest (version, revision) number of TS.26 [40], encoded as the octet string {version, revision, 0}. If NFC is not supported this SHALL NOT be present.
•rspCrlSupportedVersion – if load eUICC CRL as it was defined in section 5.7.12 of version 2 of this specification is supported, this SHALL be the highest SGP.22 version number supported by the Device for this function. If this function is not supported, this field SHALL NOT be present.
LPA SHOULD NOT send the following fields to the eUICC unless the eUICC indicates deviceInfoExtensibilitySupport.
NOTE: If LPA sends the following fields to an eUICC that does not indicate deviceInfoExtensibilitySupport, the eUICC may reject them (see also section 2.4a).
•nrEpcSupportedRelease – if NR (5G New Radio) using a 4G core network (Evolved Packet Core) is supported, this SHALL be the highest 3GPP release N fully supported by the device, encoded as the octet string {N, 0, 0}. If NR using a 4G core network is not supported this SHALL NOT be present.
•nr5gcSupportedRelease – if NR using a 5G core network is supported, this SHALL be the highest 3GPP release N fully supported by the device, encoded as the octet string {N, 0, 0}. If NR using a 5G core network is not supported this SHALL NOT be present.
•eutran5gcSupportedRelease – if LTE/E-UTRAN using a 5G core network is supported, this SHALL be the highest 3GPP release N fully supported by the device, encoded as the octet string {N, 0, 0}. If LTE/E-UTRAN using a 5G core network is not supported this SHALL NOT be present.
•lpaSvn – indicates the highest Specification Version Number of this specification supported by the LPA. The SVN SHALL have the same three digit number as the highest supported specification version. Example of value: '3.0.0'. A version 3, or higher, Device SHALL include this information. The lpaSvn is provided for information only (see Annex M).
•catSupportedClasses – indicates the set of supported Card Application Toolkit letter classes as defined in [31] and [76]. A version 3, or higher, Device SHALL include this information.
•euiccFormFactorType – indicates whether the eUICC is removable or non-removable. A version 3, or higher, Device SHALL include this information. If this element is omitted the form factor type of the eUICC is unspecified.
Description of LpaRspCapability:
A version 3 or higher Device SHALL include this data object in DeviceInfo. Refer to Annex M that describes how a version 3 LPA SHALL be configured.
•The crlStaplingV3Support bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the LPA supports the CRL stapling during the Common Mutual Authentication procedure.
•The certChainV3Support bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the LPA supports RSP Server certificate chain Variant A, B and C.
•The apduApiSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the Device supports the APDU API.
•The enterpriseCapableDevice bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the Device is an Enterprise Capable Device. The bit SHALL be identical to the corresponding setting in the RSP Device Capabilities.
•The lpaProxySupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the Device supports the LPA Proxy. The bit SHALL be identical to the corresponding setting in the RSP Device Capabilities.
NOTE: The LPA Proxy is usable only if the Local Proxy Configuration (section 2.4a.1.5) is also present in the Profile Metadata of the Enabled Profile.
-The signedSmdsResponseV3Support bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the LPA supports the handling of SM-DS signed Event Records.
-The euiccCiUpdateSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the Device together with the eUICC supports update of eSIM CA RootCA Public Keys on the eUICC. The method by which the Device determines its compatibility with the eUICC for update is proprietary to the Device Manufacturer and EUM.
-The eventCheckingSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the LPA supports the Event Checking procedure as defined in section 3.6.4.
-The pushServiceSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the LPA supports the Push Service.
-The pendingOperationAlertingSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the LPA supports the pending operations alerting defined in this specification. If this bit is set to '1', the Device SHALL also indicate support for REFRESH with "Application Update" mode in the Terminal Profile according to ETSI TS 102 223 [31] on each eSIM Port where a Profile is enabled.
4.3 eUICC Information
The eUICC information comprises EUICCInfo1 and EUICCInfo2. EUICCInfo1 is a subset of EUICCInfo2, designed to be sent to an RSP Server before it is authenticated. EUICCInfo2 contains the full eUICC information and is disclosed to an RSP Server only after it is authenticated.
The eUICC information SHALL be generated by the eUICC and MAY be requested by the LPA at any point in time.
The eUICC information includes:
•Profile Package Versions
•Specification Version Numbers
•Firmware version
•Available amount of non-volatile memory
•UICC capabilities
•ETSI TS 102 241 version
•GlobalPlatform version
•RSP capabilities
•Lists of supported eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers
•eUICC Category
•Forbidden PPRs
•Protection Profile version
•SAS Accreditation Number
•Certification Data Object
•TRE properties
•TRE product reference
•LPA Mode
•EUM specific information
eUICC Information
EUICCInfo1 and EUICCInfo2 are defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
EUICCInfo1 ::= [32] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF20'
lowestSvn [2] VersionType,
euiccCiPKIdListForVerification [9] SEQUENCE OF SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- List of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers supported on the eUICC for signature verification
euiccCiPKIdListForSigning [10] SEQUENCE OF SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- List of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifier supported on the eUICC for signature creation that can be verified by a certificate chain Variant O
euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3 [17] SEQUENCE OF SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# List of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers supported on the eUICC for signature creation that can be verified by a certificate chain different from Variant O.
euiccRspCapability [8] EuiccRspCapability OPTIONAL, -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
highestSvn [19] VersionType OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
EUICCInfo2 ::= [34] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF22'
baseProfilePackageVersion [1] VersionType, -- Base eUICC Profile package version supported
lowestSvn [2] VersionType,
euiccFirmwareVersion [3] VersionType, -- eUICC Firmware version
extCardResource [4] OCTET STRING, -- Extended Card Resource Information according to ETSI TS 102 226
uiccCapability [5] UICCCapability,
ts102241Version [6] VersionType OPTIONAL,
globalplatformVersion [7] VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
euiccRspCapability [8] EuiccRspCapability,
euiccCiPKIdListForVerification [9] SEQUENCE OF SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- List of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers supported on the eUICC for signature verification
euiccCiPKIdListForSigning [10] SEQUENCE OF SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- List of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifier supported on the eUICC for signature creation that can be verified by a certificate chain Variant O
euiccCategory [11] INTEGER {
other(0),
basicEuicc(1),
mediumEuicc(2),
contactlessEuicc(3)
} OPTIONAL, -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
forbiddenProfilePolicyRules [25] PprIds OPTIONAL, -- Tag '99'
ppVersion VersionType, -- Protection Profile version
sasAcreditationNumber UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)),
certificationDataObject [12] CertificationDataObject OPTIONAL, -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
treProperties [13] BIT STRING {
isDiscrete(0),
isIntegrated(1),
usesRemoteMemory(2) -- refers to the usage of remote memory protected by
-- the Remote Memory Protection Function described in SGP.21 [4]
} OPTIONAL, -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
treProductReference [14] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Platform_Label as defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA specification [57]
additionalProfilePackageVersions [15] SEQUENCE OF VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
lpaMode [16] LpaMode OPTIONAL, -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0# active LPA
euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3 [17] SEQUENCE OF SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# List of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers supported on the eUICC for signature creation that can be verified by a certificate chain different from Variant O.
additionalEuiccInfo [18] OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..32)) OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# EUM specific eUICC information
highestSvn [19] VersionType OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
-- Definition of EuiccRspCapability
EuiccRspCapability ::= BIT STRING {
additionalProfile(0), -- at least one more Profile can be installed
loadCrlSupport(1), -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0# Support for ES10b.LoadCRL
rpmSupport(2), -- Remote Profile Management
testProfileSupport (3), -- support for test profile
deviceInfoExtensibilitySupport (4), -- #SupportedFromV2.2.2# support for ASN.1 extensibility in the Device Info
serviceSpecificDataSupport (5), -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0# support for Service Specific Data in the Profile Metadata
hriServerAddressSupport (6), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for storing HRI server address
serviceProviderMessageSupport (7), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Service Provider message is allowed within Profile metadata
lpaProxySupport (8), -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0# support for LPA Proxy
enterpriseProfilesSupport (9), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# support for enterprise profiles
serviceDescriptionSupport (10), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for storing Service Description
deviceChangeSupport (11), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for Device change
encryptedDeviceChangeDataSupport (12), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for encrypted Device Change data in Device Change response
estimatedProfileSizeIndicationSupport (13), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for including estimated profile size
profileSizeInProfilesInfoSupport (14), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for profile size in GetProfilesInfo
crlStaplingV3Support (15), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for CRL stapling
certChainV3VerificationSupport (16), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for certificate chain verification Variant A, B and C
signedSmdsResponseV3Support (17), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for SM-DS signed response
euiccRspCapInInfo1 (18), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# EUICCInfo1 includes euiccRspCapability
osUpdateSupport (19), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for eUICC OS Update
cancelForEmptySpnPnSupport (20), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for cancel session reasons empty SPN and empty Profile Name
updateNotifConfigInfoSupport (21), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for updating NotificationConfigurationInfo as defined in section 5.4.1
updateMetadataV3Support (22) -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for the modified update metadata mechanism defined in section 5.4.1
}
-- Definition of CertificationDataObject
CertificationDataObject ::= SEQUENCE {
platformLabel UTF8String, -- Platform_Label as defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA specification [57]
discoveryBaseURL UTF8String -- Discovery Base URL of the SE default DLOA Registrar as defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA specification [57]
}
-- Definition of LpaMode
LpaMode ::= INTEGER {
lpad (0), -- LPAd is active
lpae (1) -- LPAe is active
}
-- ASN1STOPThe baseProfilePackageVersion field indicates:
-the lowest major version number and
-the associated highest minor version number
of the TCA eUICC Profile Package: Interoperable Format Technical Specification [5] supported by the eUICC. In order to provide backward compatibility, the major version number SHALL indicate 2 and the associated highest minor version number SHALL indicate at least 3.1 (e.g., baseProfilePackageVersion = 2.3.1).
NOTE: Backward compatibility may be removed in future version of this specification.
The additionalProfilePackageVersions field lists additional major versions including the associated highest minor version number of the TCA eUICC Profile Package: Interoperable Format Technical Specification [5] supported by the eUICC. This field SHALL be present only when the eUICC supports additional versions of [5] with the major version higher than the one indicated in baseProfilePackageVersion field. This sequence, if present, SHALL contain version 3.1 or higher and SHOULD contain version 3.2 or higher.
The lowestSvn field is deprecated and is only present for backward compatibility with the previous version of this specification. The highestSvn field indicates the highest Specification Version Number of this specification supported by the eUICC and is provided for information only. These fields SHALL be set as defined in Annex M.
NOTE: The lowestSvn field was called svn in the previous versions of the specification.
The euiccFirmwareVersion field indicates the version information of the eUICC’s platform and the OS. This value is EUM specific.
The extCardResource field is defined in ETSI TS 102 226 [39]. This field includes the current total available memory, expressed in bytes, for Profile download and installation. The "number of installed application" value field of extCardResource SHALL be set to '00'.
The uiccCapability field contains the UICC capabilities supported by the eUICC. The related type definition SHALL be imported from the following version of the TCA eUICC Profile Package: Interoperable Format Technical Specification [5]:
-for the eUICC, the highest version declared in additionalProfilePackageVersions, the minimum being version 3.2;
-for the SM-DP+, the highest version supported by this server, the minimum being version 3.2; and
-for other entities, version 3.2 or higher.
The ts102241Version field indicates the latest version of ETSI TS 102 241 [53] supported by the eUICC. This field SHALL NOT be present if the eUICC doesn't support this Java Card^(TM) API.
The globalplatformVersion field SHALL indicate the latest version of GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8] supported by the eUICC.
The euiccRspCapability field contains the optional RSP capabilities supported by the eUICC.
The euiccCiPKIdListForVerification field indicates the list of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers supported on the eUICC for RSP Server signature verification.
The euiccCiPKIdListForSigning data object contains the list of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers supported on the eUICC for signature creation that can be verified by a certificate chain Variant O. The euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3 contains the list of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers supported on the eUICC for signature creation that can be verified by a certificate chain of one of the other Variants. A version 3 or higher eUICC not supporting signature creation that can be verified by a certificate chain Variant O, SHALL include an empty euiccCiPKIdListForSigning data object. A version 3 or higher eUICC not supporting signature creation that can be verified by one of the other certificate chain Variants SHALL omit the euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3 data object. A version 3 or higher eUICC SHALL provide at least one identifier in one of the two lists.
Elements in euiccCiPKIdListForVerification, euiccCiPKIdListForSigning and euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3 SHALL be set in decreasing order of priority by the eUICC, where the first element in the list is the most preferred and the last element in the list is the least preferred.
NOTE: By indicating a Public Key identifier in the euiccCiPKIdListForVerification for supporting signature verification, the eUICC also indicates support for key agreement associated to the Public Key identifier, see section 2.6.5.
The euiccCategory field indicates the eUICC category as described below. A version 3 or higher eUICC SHALL include this data object; it was optional before version 3.
Category |
|---|
Basic eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features: •Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM): 64kB •ISO interface PPS 96 •BIP over HTTPS features |
Medium eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features: •Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM): 384kB •ISO interface PPS 97 •BIP over HTTPS features •Processor >= 25MHz •Crypto processor >= 100MHz •Memory Protection Unit |
Contactless eUICCs SHALL be compliant with at least the following features: •Memory size available when no Profiles are installed (EEPROM): 1024kB •ISO interface PPS 97 •BIP over HTTPS features •Processor >= 25MHz •Crypto processor >= 100MHz •Memory Protection Unit •In combination with an enabled Operational NFC Profile, a contactless eUICC SHALL support all requirements specified in the SGP.03 GSMA NFC UICC Requirements Specification [55] |
The forbiddenProfilePolicyRules data object SHALL contain the list of PPRs that are 'forbidden' to be set in any Profile (the PprIds type is defined in section 2.8.1.1). A PPR is 'forbidden' when there is no PPAR related to this PPR. In addition, PPR1 is 'forbidden' if an Operational Profile is currently installed on the eUICC.
The information contained in forbiddenProfilePolicyRules data object SHALL be used during the eligibility check performed by the SM-DP+: the SM-DP+ SHALL NOT deliver a Profile containing a PPR 'forbidden' by the eUICC.
The ppVersion data object indicates the version of the GSMA eUICC Protection Profile for Consumer Devices [92] against which the eUICC has been certified. ppVersion V255.255.255 indicates a Field-Test eUICC.
NOTE: An eUICC certified during the interim period, when certification against the GSMA eUICC Protection Profile for Consumer Devices [92] was not available, has a ppVersion of the form V0.X.Y.
The sasAcreditationNumber data object indicates the SAS for RSP accreditation number obtained by the EUM (according to the SAS UP specification [77]).
Description of EuiccRspCapability:
A version 3 or higher eUICC SHALL include this data object with identical content in euiccInfo1 and euiccInfo2. Refer to Annex M that describes how a version 3 eUICC SHALL be configured.
-The additionalProfile bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if at least one more Profile can be installed.
-The loadCrlSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the optional function ES10b.LoadCRL.
NOTE: Prior to version 3, this bit indicated that the eUICC implemented the ES10b.LoadCRL function which is no longer supported. Setting this bit to 0 in a eUICC version 3 prevents the LPAd, in case a removable eUICC version 3 is inserted in a Device prior to version 3, to use the ES10b.LoadCRL function.
-The rpmSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the Remote Profile Management feature.
-The testProfileSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the Test Profile feature.
-The deviceInfoExtensibilitySupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the extensibility in the DeviceInfo.
-The serviceSpecificDataSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the Service Specific Data in the Profile Metadata.
-The hriServerAddressSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the HRI server address in the Profile Metadata.
-The serviceProviderMessageSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC can accept a Service Provider message within the Profile Metadata.
-The lpaProxySupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the features for the LPA Proxy.
-The enterpriseProfilesSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the features for Enterprise Profiles.
-The serviceDescriptionSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the service description in the Profile Metadata.
-The deviceChangeSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the features defined for Device Change and Profile Recovery (tagged with #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#) except the encrypted device change data.
-The encryptedDeviceChangeDataSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the encrypted Device Change data in Device Change response.
NOTE: this bit can be set to '1' if and only if deviceChangeSupport is set to '1'.
-The estimatedProfileSizeIndicationSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC accepts an estimated Profile size in the Profile Metadata.
-The profileSizeInProfilesInfoSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC provides an estimated Profile size in ES10c.GetProfilesInfo.
-The crlStaplingV3Support bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the CRL stapling and certificate revocation status verification during the Common Mutual Authentication procedure.
-The certChainV3VerificationSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the verification of RSP Server certificate chain Variant A, B and C.
-The signedSmdsResponseV3Support bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the handling of SM-DS signed response, e.g., Event Records, i.e., implements the function ES10a.VerifySmdsResponse.
-The euiccRspCapInInfo1 bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if euiccRspCapability is present in EUICCInfo1.
-The osUpdateSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the OS Update capability.
-The cancelForEmptySpnPnSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports cancel session reason code "emptyProfileOrSpName".
-The updateNotifConfigInfoSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports updating of the NotificationConfigurationInfo as defined in section 5.4.1.
-The updateMetadataV3Support bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the eUICC supports the modified update metadata mechanism defined in section 5.4.1.
Within the CertificationDataObject, the platformLabel SHALL identify the DLOA in the DLOA Registrar. This value SHALL be coded as defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA specification [57] section 7.1.1. The discoveryBaseURL MAY be an empty string or contain a value allowing to discover alternate DLOA Registrar(s) (in complement to the well-known DLOA Registrar, see section 2.2) where the corresponding DLOA(s) MAY be retrieved. This value SHALL be coded as defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA specification [57] section 7.1.2.
The lpaMode indicates whether the LPAd or the LPAe is active.
The additionalEuiccInfo contains information about the eUICC as defined by the EUM. It MAY correlate with the additional issuer information contained in the EID.
The treProperties field describes properties of the TRE that the eUICC is based upon. It SHALL be present for an Integrated eUICC and MAY be present for a Discrete eUICC. This field SHALL contain one of the following settings:
-isDiscrete
-isIntegrated
-isIntegrated, usesRemoteMemory
The treProductReference SHALL be present for an Integrated eUICC. This value SHALL be coded as defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA specification [57] section 7.1.1 and contain an unique reference of the Integrated TRE product that the eUICC is based upon. This field SHALL NOT be modifiable.
4.3.1 eUICC identifier (EID)
The EID SHALL uniquely identify an eUICC. The owner of the EIN SHALL guarantee the uniqueness of the EID, also with respect to eUICCs produced according to previous versions of this specification and to all versions of SGP.02 [2].
This section specifies the general structure of the EID. The different parts of the EID may have different sizes depending on the EID assignment scheme.
The EID SHALL have the following general structure:
-The EID SHALL be 32 digits long
-The EID SHALL be built of
-An EUM Identification Number (EIN) of M digits.
-An EUM-Specific Identification Number (ESIN) of 30-M digits.
-A final two digits (31^(st) to 32^(nd) digits) containing check digits calculated over all 32 digits as specified below.
When stored as a byte string, the first digit SHALL be put into the highest four bits of the first byte.
The EUM SHALL construct the EIN and ESIN, according to the requirements of one of the following EID assignment schemes:
-The assignment scheme defined in SGP.29 [89]
-The E.118-based assignment scheme specified in 4.3.1.1
The two check digits are calculated as follows:
1.Replace the two check digits by two digits of 0,
2.Using the resulting 32 digits as a decimal integer, compute the remainder of that number on division by 97,
3.Subtract the remainder from 98, and use the decimal result for the two check digits,
-If the result is one digit long, its value SHALL be prefixed by one digit of 0.
Verification of the check digits of an EID is performed as follows:
-Using the 32 digits as a decimal integer, compute the remainder of that number on division by 97.
-If the remainder of the division is 1, the verification is successful; otherwise the EID is invalid.
NOTE: Examples of valid EIDs are:
-8900 1012 0123 4123 4012 3456 7890 1224
-8900 1567 01020304 0506 0708 0910 1152
-8904 4011 1122 3344 1122 3344 1122 3321
-0090 9231 2229 9992 3581 2903 6544 3008
4.3.1.1 Details of the EID structure according to the E.118-based assignment scheme
The EIN SHALL have the following structure:
-A Major Industry Identifier digit of 8 (1^(st) digit), as defined in ISO/IEC 7812 Error! Reference source not found..
-An additional digit of 9 specifying telecommunications, as defined in ISO/IEC 7812 Error! Reference source not found.,
-An additional three digits for country code (3^(rd) to 5^(th) digits).
-If the country code is one digit long, its value SHALL be prefixed by two digits of 0,
-If the country code is two digits long, its value SHALL be prefixed by one digit of 0.
-An additional three digits for issuer identifier (6^(th) to 8^(th) digits).
-If the issuer identifier is one digit long, its value SHALL be prefixed by two digits of 0,
-If the issuer identifier is two digits long, its value SHALL be prefixed by one digit of 0.
The country code and issuer identifier SHALL be assigned as specified in ITU E.118 Error! Reference source not found..
NOTE: The EIN according to this scheme was called IIN in former versions of this specification.
The ESIN SHALL have the following structure:
-Ten digits for issuer specific information (9^(th) to 18^(th) digits),
-An additional twelve digits for the individual identification number (19^(th) to 30^(th) digits).
4.4 Profile Metadata
During the Profile download and installation procedure, Profile Metadata needs to be provided to the LPAd for display and to the eUICC. Profile Metadata is generated by the SM-DP+ in plain text to be readable by the LPA. Profile Metadata is also contained protected in BPP to be loaded into the eUICC, so that the LPA will be able to access the same information any time after the Profile has been successfully loaded into the eUICC, using the "ES10c.GetProfilesInfo" function.
Profile Metadata values, like any other Profile data, are under the responsibility of, and defined by, the Profile owner. Profile Metadata is communicated to the SM-DP+ by means which are out of scope of this specification.
Profile Metadata includes:
•ICCID of the Profile
•Profile Name (corresponds to "Short description" in SGP.21 [4]) as a plain text information: content free information defined by the Operator
•Service Provider name, as a plain text information: content free information defined by the Operator/Service Provider (e.g., 'Orange', 'AT&T'…)
•End User’s Profile Nickname
•Icon
•Profile Class: indicates the sort of profile among the defined values: 'Test', 'Operational' and 'Provisioning' (section 4.4.1)
•Notification Configuration Information, defined in section 3.5 "Notifications"
•Profile owner, including MCC, MNC, GID1 and GID2 if the Profile is not PIN protected
•Profile Policy Rules (PPRs) (section 2.9.1 and 4.4.2)
•The address of the HRI Server (section 4.4.3)
•Enterprise Configuration (section 4.4.4)
•RPM Configuration (section 2.4a.1.3)
•Service Provider Message (section 2.4a.1.4)
•Local Proxy Configuration (section 2.4a.1.5)
•Service Description (section 4.4.5)
Profile Metadata is available to the LPA during Profile download to provide information to the End User about the Profile to be installed. But it is out of scope of this implementation what the LPA does exactly with this Profile Metadata, e.g., the LPA can display all or only part of this information.
4.4.1 Profile Class
A Profile can be defined as a Test Profile, an Operational Profile or a Provisioning Profile. The Profile Class is set in the Profile Metadata and indicates to the LPA and the eUICC which rules to apply.
4.4.2 Profile Policy Rules
The PPRs are provided within the ES8+.StoreMetadata function of the Bound Profile Package. The pol field of the ProfileHeader PE of the TCA Profile Package (UPP in section 2.5.2) SHALL NOT be used.
The PPRs defined in this document are coded using the ASN.1 data type PprIds, see section 2.4a.1.1. pprUpdateControl has no meaning when provided in ES8+.StoreMetadata.
4.4.3 High Resolution Icons
In addition to the (standard) icon provided directly in the Metadata, which has only limited graphical capabilities, a second mechanism is defined, which allows for better graphics.
The Metadata includes the address of an HRI Server, which together with some other parameters can be used by the LPA to retrieve an icon with higher resolution and a different shape. Such an icon SHOULD be used by the LPA instead of the standard icon. Different icons can be retrieved by the LPA for different usages: During Profile download, for Profile selection, etc.
The LPA MAY store icons it retrieved in local memory for later re-use.
See section 5.11.2 for handling by the LPAe.
4.4.4 Enterprise Configuration
The Enterprise Configuration SHALL be provided if and only if a Profile is an Enterprise Profile. The Enterprise Configuration includes the OID and name of the Enterprise, and optionally the Enterprise Rules associated with the Enterprise Profile.
4.4.5 Service Description
The Service Description MAY be provided by the Profile Owner to indicate the services offered by its associated subscription. This field is for information only and no action is specified in this document based on this field.
4.5 Keys and Certificates
4.5.1 Keys and Certificates Naming Conventions
The keys and Certificates used in this specification are named according to the conventions described in this section.
The general name structure is: <XX>.<YY>.<ZZ>
Where:
-<XX> designates the nature of the element, the following values are defined:
-PK: the public key of an asymmetric key pair
-SK: the private key of an asymmetric key pair
-CERT: a Certificate containing a public key
-otPK: a public key of an asymmetric one-time key pair
-otSK: a private key of an asymmetric one-time key pair
-<YY> designates the owner of the element, the following values are defined:
-CI: an eSIM CA
-CISubCA: an eSIM CA SubCA
-DP: an SM-DP+ when no further qualification is required
-DPauth: the Authentication function of an SM-DP+
-DPpb: the Profile Package Binding function of an SM-DP+
-DPSubCA: an SM-DP+ SubCA
-DS: an SM-DS when no further qualification is required
-DSauth: the Authentication function of an SM-DS
-DSSubCA: an SM-DS SubCA
-EUICC: an eUICC
-EUM: an EUM
-EUMSubCA: an EUM SubCA
-<ZZ> designates the usage of the element, the following values are defined:
-SIG: for a digital signature
-KA: for a key agreement
-TLS: for TLS connection establishment
Examples:
-PK.EUICC.SIG: Public key of an eUICC, used to verify an eUICC signature.
-CERT.DP.TLS: Certificate of the SM-DP+, used to establish TLS connection
-CERT.DPauth.SIG: Certificate of the SM-DP+, used to verify an SM-DP+ signature for its authentication.
Table 9: Void
4.5.2 Certificates
A Certificate Issuer issues certificates for Remote SIM Provisioning system entities and acts as a trusted root for the purpose of authentication of the entities of the system. The specification supports X.509 certificate format as defined in Section 4.5.2.1.
Certificates used in this specification all chain to an eSIM CA RootCA Certificate, except TLS Certificates that MAY chain to a Public CA Certificate.
Certificates according to v2 of this specification have the following drawbacks:
-The values used in the Certificate Policies extension are not assigned as specified in RFC 5280 [17].
-The Name Constraints extension for EUM and eUICC Certificates are not used as specified in RFC 5280 [17].
-EUM, SM-DP+ and SM-DS Certificates are directly signed by the offline eSIM CA RootCA, which is not the best practice.
For backwards compatibility, v2 Certificates are still covered as Variant O in this specification and eSIM CAs that issued v2 Certificates may still need to support them.
However, for new eSIM CAs where support of v2 Certificates is not required (e.g., if they use an SM2 Signature), it is strongly recommended to only issue Certificates according to Variants Ov3, A, B or C.
4.5.2.0a eUICC Certificate chains
The eUICC Certificate chains are described in the figure below.
[]Figure 30: eUICC Certificate Chain
-Variant O (Original) and Variant Ov3: the eUICC Certificate chains to the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate through only the EUM Certificate.
-Variant A: the eUICC Certificate chains to the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate through the EUM SubCA and EUM Certificates.
-Variant B: the eUICC Certificate chains to the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate through the EUM and eSIM CA SubCA Certificates.
-Variant C: the eUICC Certificate chains to the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate through the EUM SubCA, EUM and eSIM CA SubCA Certificates.
Variant O eUICC and EUM Certificates contain Certificate Policies and Name Constraints extensions as defined in v2 of this specification.
All Certificates of the eUICC Certificate chains of all other Variants (including Variant Ov3) contain Certificate Policies, Name Constraints and Permitted EINs extensions as defined in this version of this specification.
Variants A and C may be used, for example, to provide to the EUM the capability to split its eUICC production under different EUM SubCA Certificates while not involving the eSIM CA for that (see section 2.7). If this additional level of EUM SubCA Certificate is used, the EUM SHALL manage its revocation status.
Even though each eUICC SHALL support at least two sets of elliptic curve parameters (section 2.6.5), which can be chosen from by an RSP server for its signatures and key agreement, an eUICC SHALL have at least one CERT.EUICC.SIG.
4.5.2.0b RSP Servers certificate chains
The RSP Server certificate chains are described in the figure below.
[]Figure 30a: RSP Server Certificate Chains
-Variant O (Original): the RSP Server Certificates chain directly to the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate (no intermediate SubCA), and containing a Certificate Policies extension as defined in v2 of this specification.
-Variant A: the RSP Server Certificates chain to the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate through intermediate SubCA Certificates under the control of the RSP Server providers (CERT.DPSubCA.SIG or CERT.DSSubCA.SIG), each containing a Certificate Policies extension as defined in this version of this specification.
-Variant B: the RSP Server Certificates chain to the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate through an intermediate SubCA Certificate under the control of the eSIM CA (CERT.CISubCA.SIG), each containing a Certificate Policies extension as defined in this version of this specification.
-Variant C: the RSP Server Certificates chain to the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate through two levels of intermediate SubCA Certificates, each containing a Certificate Policies extension as defined in this version of this specification.
At least one of the variants A, B or C SHALL be supported by the eSIM CA. Variant O MAY be supported. The SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL be able to request their certificate(s) following any of the variants supported by the eSIM CA.
If the Variant A or C is used, the RSP Server MAY choose not to manage revocation status of its leaf certificates. In that case the RSP Server SHALL adopt an appropriate renewal policy in order to mitigate the risk of a compromised certificate being used (i.e., limit their validity periods).
The RSP Server TLS certificate chains are described in the figure below.
[]Figure 30b: RSP Server TLS Certificate Chains with eSIM CA
-Variant O (Original): the RSP Server TLS certificates chain directly to the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate (no intermediate SubCA), and containing a Certificate Policies extension as defined in v2 of this specification.
-Variant A: the RSP Server TLS certificates chain to the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate through intermediate SubCA certificates under the control of the RSP Servers (CERT.DPSubCA.SIG or CERT.DSSubCA.SIG), each containing a Certificate Policies extension as defined in this version of this specification.
-Variant B: the RSP Server TLS certificates chain to the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate through an intermediate SubCA certificate under the control of the eSIM CA (CERT.CISubCA.SIG), each containing a Certificate Policies extension as defined in this version of this specification.
-Variant C: the RSP Server TLS certificates chain to the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate through two levels of intermediate SubCA certificates, each containing a Certificate Policies extension as defined in this version of this specification.
[] Figure 30c: RSP Server TLS Certificate Chains with Public CA
-Variant OO: the RSP Server TLS certificates chain to a Public CA Root Certificate, with zero, one or several Public CA SubCA Certificates in the chain.
-Variant AA: the RSP Server TLS certificates chain to a Public CA Root Certificate, through an intermediate SubCA certificate under the control of the RSP Servers, and zero, one or several Public CA SubCA Certificates in the chain.
At least one of the variants A or B or C SHALL be supported by the eSIM CA. Variant O MAY be supported. The SM-DS and SM-DP+ SHALL be able to request their certificate(s) following any of the variants supported by the eSIM CA or Public CA.
If the Variant A or AA is used, the RSP Server MAY choose not to manage revocation status of its leaf certificates. In that case the RSP Server SHALL adopt an appropriate renewal policy in order to mitigate the risk of a compromised certificate being used (i.e., limit their validity periods).
The RSP Servers MAY select different variants for certificate chains for TLS and CERT.X.SIG Certificates.
The Algorithm Identifiers of all certificates of a certificate chain SHALL point to the same curve.
The SM-DP+ has 2 Certificates for digital signature (CERT.DPauth.SIG and CERT.DPpb.SIG). The CERT.DPauth.SIG is used for authentication to the eUICC, and the CERT.DPpb.SIG is used for Profile binding.
These certificates are described in the next sections.
4.5.2.1 X.509 Certificate Profile
This section describes the X.509 certificate profile. Those certificates SHALL follow RFC 5280 [17], with the specific coding given in this section.
In particular:
•'Issuer' and 'Subject' fields SHALL be limited to standard attributes defined in ITU-T X.520 [24] and RFC 4519 [28].
•Certificates SHALL contain all extensions defined in their respective profile, except if stated otherwise.
•Certificates SHALL NOT contain the freshestCRL extension (use of Delta CRL is not supported).
•The Subject Key Identifier SHOULD be computed using method 1 specified in section 4.2.1.2 in RFC 5280 [17] for all the certificates listed in section 4.5.2.1.0.
Entities SHALL perform certificate verification according to section 4.5.2.2.
NOTE: Certificates are described using table representation for easiness, but conform to the ASN.1 format given in RFC 5280 [17].
4.5.2.1.0 Certificates description
4.5.2.1.0.0 Certificates common fields
The table below describes the common fields that all certificates defined in this section SHALL contain. A certificate MAY have additional fields or a different content for a field; in that case it will be indicated in its specific description.
Certificate common fields | ||
|---|---|---|
Field | Value Description | |
tbsCertificate | Data to be signed | |
Field | Value Description | |
version | Version SHALL be 3 (value is 2) as extensions are used in all certificates defined in this specification. | |
serialNumber | Certificate serial number. | |
signature | Contains the algorithm identifier used by the issuer to compute the value of the field 'signatureValue' (section 4.5.2.1.1). NOTE: The algorithm identifier value SHALL be the same as the one of the field 'signatureAlgorithm'. | |
issuer | Distinguished Name of the entity that has signed the certificate. It SHALL match the 'subject' field of the issuing entity certificate. | |
validity | Validity period of the certificate. The validity period allowed for each certificate is defined in SGP.14 [45]. | |
subject | Distinguished Name of the entity owning the certificate. Example of eSIM CA DN: cn = GSMA Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority ou = GSMA Trust Network o= GSMA c = UK | |
subjectPublicKeyInfo | Contains the algorithm identifier, parameters and public key value. Algorithm identifier and parameters SHALL be set according to section 4.5.2.1.1. subjectPublicKeyInfo.subjectPublicKey contains the public key value and SHALL be coded as defined in RFC 5480 [27]. | |
extensions | Extension for Subject Key Identifier. (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.2). This extension SHALL be set with: extnID = id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier critical = false extnValue = <Identifier of the public key bound in the certificate> | |
signatureAlgorithm | Section 4.5.2.1.1 | |
signatureValue | Signature computed accordingly to one of the possible algorithm listed in section 4.5.2.1.1 |
Table 9a: Certificates common fields
4.5.2.1.0.1 eSIM Certificate Issuer
Field | Value Description |
|---|---|
issuer | This SHALL be identical to 'subject' field value. |
Extension for Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.3) | extnID = id-ce-keyUsage critical = true extnValue = { keyCertSign (5), cRLSign(6) } |
Extension for Certificate Policies (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.4) | extnID = id-ce-certificatePolicies critical = true extnValue = id-rspRole-ci (Annex H) To indicate the eSIM CA role. |
Extension for Basic Constraints (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.9) | extnID = id-ce-basicConstraints critical = true extnValue = { cA = true } |
Extension for subjectAltName (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.6) | extnID = id-ce-subjectAltName critical = false extnValue = { registeredID (8) = CI OID } |
Table 10: CERT.CI.SIG
NOTE: The CERT.CI.SIG is a self-signed certificate, there is no need to include the Extension for Authority Key Identifier.
The table below describes the specific fields of a CERT.CISubCA.SIG in complement of the description given in section 4.5.2.1.0.0:
Field | Value Description |
|---|---|
subject | Distinguished Name of the eSIM CA SubCA. |
Extension for Authority Key Identifier (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.1) | extnID = id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier critical = false extnValue = <Identifier of the public key to verify this certificate> |
Extension for Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.3) | extnID = id-ce-keyUsage critical = true extnValue = { keyCertSign (5), cRLSign (6)} |
Extension for Certificate Policies (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.4) | extnID = id-ce-certificatePolicies critical = true extnValue = id-rspRole-ciSubCa (Section 2.4a.1.0) To indicate that this is an eSIM CA SubCA Certificate. |
Extension for subjectAltName (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.6) | It SHALL contain the same value as for CERT.CI.SIG of that same eSIM CA. |
Extension for Basic Constraints (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.9) | extnID = id-ce-basicConstraints critical = true extnValue = { cA = true } To indicate that this certificate is a SubCA with no limit on the number of non-self-issued intermediate CA certificates that may follow. |
Extension for CRL Distribution Points (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.13) | extnID = id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints critical = false extnValue = section 4.5.2.1.2 |
Table 10a: CERT.CISubCA.SIG
4.5.2.1.0.2 eUICC
The table below describes the specific fields of a CERT.EUICC.SIG in complement of the description given in section 4.5.2.1.0.0:
Field | Value Description |
|---|---|
subject | Distinguished Name of the EUICC. It SHALL include, at least, 'organization' and 'serialNumber' attributes. Others attributes MAY be included for information. The 'organization' attribute SHALL have one of the values allowed in the nameConstraints extension of the EUM Certificate (CERT.EUM.SIG). See note 1. The 'serialNumber' attribute SHALL be the EID as a decimal PrintableString (see note 2). The EID SHALL start with one of the EINs allowed in the EUM Certificate (CERT.EUM.SIG). Example of an eUICC DN: o= ACME serialNumber = 89049032123451234512345678901235 |
Extension for Authority Key Identifier (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.1) | extnID = id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier critical = false extnValue = <Identifier of the public key to verify this certificate> |
Extension for Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.3) | extnID = id-ce-keyUsage critical = true extnValue = digitalSignature (0) |
Extension for Certificate Policies (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.4) | extnID = id-ce-certificatePolicies critical = true extnValue = id-rspRole-euicc or id-rspRole-euicc-v2 (Section 2.4a.1.0) To indicate that this is an eUICC Certificate. NOTE: id-rspRole-euicc-v2 indicates a Certificate in a chain following Variant O (see figure 30) |
NOTE 1: X.509 mandates that each Certificate in in a certification path obeys the nameConstraints extensions defined in preceding Certificates of the certification path. NOTE 2: former versions of this specification mandated a nameConstraints extension in the EUM Certificate that conflicts with the requirement that attribute 'serial number' of the Subject of the eUICC Certificate SHALL be the EID. Variant O maintains this conflict for backwards compatibility. See section 4.5.2.2 for a recommendation as to how the servers can work around this issue. |
Table 11: CERT.EUICC.SIG
4.5.2.1.0.3 EUM
The table below describes the specific fields of a CERT.EUM.SIG in complement of the description given in section 4.5.2.1.0.0:
Field | Value Description |
|---|---|
subject | Distinguished Name of the EUM. It SHALL include at least 'organization' and 'commonName' attributes. Example of EUM DN: c = US l = New York o= ACME cn = ACME Public CA |
Extension for Authority Key Identifier (RFC 5280 [17]): section 4.2.1.1) | extnID = id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier critical = false extnValue = <Identifier of the public key to verify this certificate> |
Extension for Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.3) | extnID = id-ce-keyUsage critical = true extnValue = { keyCertSign (5), cRLSign(6) --[Conditional] } cRLSign indicator SHALL be set if the EUM uses the additional EUM SubCA (see section 2.7). |
Extension for Certificate Policies (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.4) | extnID = id-ce-certificatePolicies critical = true extnValue = id-rspRole-eum or id-rspRole-eum-v2 (Section 2.4a.1.0) To indicate that this is an EUM Certificate. NOTE: id-rspRole-eum-v2 indicates a Certificate in a chain following Variant O (see figure 30) |
Extension for subjectAltName (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.6) | extnID = id-ce-subjectAltName critical = false extnValue = { registeredID (8) = EUM OID } |
Extension for Basic Constraints (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.9) | extnID = id-ce-basicConstraints critical = true extnValue = { cA = true pathLenConstraint = 1 } To indicate that this certificate is a SubCA allowed to issue another level of EUM SubCA Certificate. pathLenConstraint SHALL be set to 0 when the Certificate Policies extension is set to id-rspRole-eum-v2. |
Extension for CRL Distribution Points (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.13) | extnID = id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints critical = false extnValue = section 4.5.2.1.2 |
Extension for Name Constraints (see RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.10) (See Notes 1 and 2) | extnID = id-ce-nameConstraints critical = true extnValue NameConstraints ::= { permittedSubtrees ::= { { base directoryName : rdnSequence : { { { type { <id-at-organizationName oid> } value : <organization name> } } } minimum 0 } } } This restriction contains the organization name(s) that the EUM owning this certificate is allowed to set in the eUICC Certificates. This restriction applies on the subject name (containing the 'organization' attribute). The extension MAY contain several possible 'organization' values. Field 'minimum' has no meaning in this specification. |
Extension for permitted EINs | extnID = id-rsp-extension-permitted-eins critical = false extnValue PermittedEins ::= {<ein1>, <ein2>,… } This extension contains the EINs that the EUM owning this Certificate is allowed to use in the EID of the eUICC. The EUM SHALL add this extension for Variants other than O. |
NOTE 1: As per RFC 5280 [17], the name constraints applies to all subject names in subsequent Certificates in a certification path (i.e., EUM SubCA and EUICC certificates). NOTE 2: A former version of this specification included a restriction on the 'serialNumber' attribute in the nameConstraints extension to be one of the EUM’s IINs. Variant O certificate chains maintain such restrictions for backwards compatibility. See section 4.5.2.2 for a recommendation as to how the servers can work around this issue. |
Table 12: CERT.EUM.SIG
The table below describes the specific fields of a CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG in complement of the description given in section 4.5.2.1.0.0:
Field | Value Description |
|---|---|
subject | According to the name constraints set in CERT.EUM.SIG, the subject SHALL contain the 'organization' attribute with one of the value defined in the name constraints extension. Others attributes MAY be included for information. Example of EUM SubCA DN: o= ACME |
Extension for Authority Key Identifier (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.1) | extnID = id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier critical = false extnValue = <Identifier of the public key to verify this certificate> |
Extension for Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.3) | extnID = id-ce-keyUsage critical = true extnValue = keyCertSign (5) |
Extension for Certificate Policies (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.4) | extnID = id-ce-certificatePolicies critical = false extnValue = id-rspRole-eumSubCa (Annex H) To indicate that this is an EUM SubCA Certificate. |
Extension for subjectAltName (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.6) | extnID = id-ce-subjectAltName critical = false extnValue = { registeredID (8) = EUM OID} The OID SHALL be the same as in CERT.EUM.SIG |
Extension for Basic Constraints (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.9) | extnID = id-ce-basicConstraints critical = true extnValue = { cA = true, pathLenConstraint = 0 } To indicate that this certificate is a SubCA limited to issue only "leaf" certificate. |
Extension for CRL Distribution Points (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.13) | extnID = id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints critical = false extnValue = see section 4.5.2.1.2. |
Table 12a CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG
4.5.2.1.0.4 SM-DP+ SIG
The table below describes the specific fields of a CERT.DPSubCA.SIG in complement of the description given in section 4.5.2.1.0.0:
Field | Value Description |
|---|---|
Extension for Authority Key Identifier (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.1) | extnID = id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier critical = false extnValue = <Identifier of the public key to verify this certificate> |
Extension for Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.3) | extnID = id-ce-keyUsage critical = true extnValue = { keyCertSign (5), cRLSign (6) -- [Conditional]} cRLSign indicator SHALL be set if the SM-DP+ SubCA manages certificate revocation (see section 2.7). |
Extension for Certificate Policies (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.4) | extnID = id-ce-certificatePolicies critical = false extnValue = id-rspRole-dpSubCa (Section 2.4a.1.0) To indicate that this is an SM-DP+ SubCA Certificate. This extension MAY be absent or contain a different value when the Certificate is part of a chain following Variant AA (figure 30c). |
Extension for subjectAltName (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.6) | extnID = id-ce-subjectAltName critical = false extnValue = { registeredID (8) = SM-DP+ OID} |
Extension for Basic Constraints (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.9) | extnID = id-ce-basicConstraints critical = true extnValue = { cA = true, pathLenConstraint = 0 } To indicate that this certificate is a SubCA limited to issue only "leaf" certificate for the SM-DP+. |
Extension for CRL Distribution Points (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.13) | extnID = id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints critical = false extnValue = section 4.5.2.1.2 |
Table 12b CERT.DPSubCA.SIG
The table below describes the specific fields of a CERT.DPauth.SIG/CERT.DPpb.SIG in complement of the description given in section 4.5.2.1.0.0:
Field | Value Description |
|---|---|
subject | Distinguished Name of the SM-DP+. It SHALL include at least 'organization' and 'commonName' attributes. Example of an SM-DP+ DN for DPauth usage: c = US l =New York o= ACME cn = ACME DPauth |
Extension for Authority Key Identifier (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.1) | extnID = id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier critical = false extnValue = <Identifier of the public key to verify this certificate> |
Extension for Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.3) | extnID = id-ce-keyUsage critical = true extnValue = digitalSignature (0) |
Extension for Certificate Policies (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.4) | extnID = id-ce-certificatePolicies critical = true extnValue = id-rspRole-dp-pb or id-rspRole-dp-pb-v2 (Section 2.4a.1.0) for CERT.DPpb.SIG, or extnValue = id-rspRole-dp-auth or id-rspRole-dp-auth-v2 (Section 2.4a.1.0) for CERT.DPauth.SIG, 'extnValue' SHALL be one of the above OIDs to indicate the role of this SM-DP+ Certificate (authentication to the eUICC or Profile binding). NOTE: id-rspRole-dp-auth-v2 or id-rspRole-dp-pb-v2 indicates a Certificate in a chain following Variant O (see figure 30a). |
Extension for subjectAltName (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.6) | extnID = id-ce-subjectAltName critical = false extnValue = { registeredID (8) = SM-DP+ OID} |
Extension for CRL Distribution Points (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.13) | extnID = id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints critical = false extnValue = section 4.5.2.1.2 This extension SHALL be absent for Certificates issued by SM-DP+ SubCA not managing revocation (see section 2.7). |
Table 13: CERT.DPauth.SIG / CERT.DPpb.SIG
All the field values of the CERT.DPauth.SIG and CERT.DPpb.SIG SHALL be identical except for the following fields:
•subject
•serialNumber
•extension (extnValue=id-ce-certificatePolicies)
•subjectPublicKeyInfo
•signatureValue
•extension (extnID = id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier)
4.5.2.1.0.5 SM-DP+ TLS
The table below describes the specific fields of a CERT.DP.TLS in complement of the description given in section 4.5.2.1.0.0:
Field | Value Description |
|---|---|
subject | Refer to table defining CERT.DPauth.SIG / CERT.DPpb.SIG. Both CERT.DPauth.SIG, CERT.DPpb.SIG and CERT.DP.TLS SHALL have identical attributes except 'cn' that SHALL match one of the SM-DP+ hostname (FQDN) entries contained in the subjectAltName extension. |
Extension for Authority Key Identifier (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.1) | extnID = id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier critical = false extnValue = <Identifier of the public key to verify this certificate> |
Extension for Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.3) | extnID = id-ce-keyUsage critical = true extnValue = digitalSignature (0) |
Extension for Certificate Policies (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.4) | extnID = id-ce-certificatePolicies critical = false extnValue = id-rspRole-dp-tls or id-rspRole-dp-tls-v2 (Section 2.4a.1.0) To indicate that this is an SM-DP+ Certificate for TLS. This extension MAY be absent or contain a different value when the certificate is part of a Variant OO or AA (see figure 30c). NOTE: id-rspRole-dp-tls-v2 indicates a certificate in a chain following Variant O (see figure 30c). |
Extension for Extended Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.12) | extnID = id-ce-extKeyUsage critical = true extnValue = ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::{ { id-kp-serverAuth }, { id-kp-clientAuth } } Certificate SHALL NOT contain any other extended key usage. |
Extension for subjectAltName (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.6) | extnID = id-ce-subjectAltName critical = false extnValue = GeneralNames ::= { { dNSName '<SM-DP+ hostname (FQDN) value>' } { registeredID '<SM-DP+ OID value>' } } This extension SHALL contain at least one dNSName entry, and only one registeredID entry. A dNSName entry MAY contain the wildcard character * as allowed by RFC 2818 [67]. |
Extension for CRL Distribution Points (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.13) | extnID = id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints critical = false extnValue = section 4.5.2.1.2 This extension SHALL be absent for Certificates issued by SM-DP+ SubCA not managing revocation (see section 2.7). |
Table 14: CERT.DP.TLS
4.5.2.1.0.6 SM-DS SIG
The table below describes the specific fields of a CERT.DSSubCA.SIG in complement of the description given in section 4.5.2.1.0.0:
Field | Value Description |
|---|---|
Extension for Authority Key Identifier (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.1) | extnID = id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier critical = false extnValue = <Identifier of the public key to verify this certificate> |
Extension for Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.3) | extnID = id-ce-keyUsage critical = true extnValue = { keyCertSign (5), cRLSign (6) -- [Conditional]} cRLSign indicator SHALL be set if the if the SM-DS SubCA manages certificate revocation (see section 2.7). |
Extension for Certificate Policies (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.4) | extnID = id-ce-certificatePolicies critical = false extnValue = id-rspRole-dsSubCa (Section 2.4a.1.0) To indicate that this is an SM-DS SubCA Certificate. This extension MAY be absent or contain a different value when the Certificate is a chain following Variant AA (figure 30c). |
Extension for subjectAltName (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.6) | extnID = id-ce-subjectAltName critical = false extnValue = { registeredID (8) = SM-DS OID} |
Extension for Basic Constraints (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.9) | extnID = id-ce-basicConstraints critical = true extnValue = { cA = true, pathLenConstraint = 0 } To indicate that this certificate is a SubCA limited to issue only "leaf" certificate for the SM-DS. |
Extension for CRL Distribution Points (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.13) | extnID = id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints critical = false extnValue = section 4.5.2.1.2 |
Table 14a CERT.DSSubCA.SIG
The table below describes the specific fields of a CERT.DSauth.SIG in complement of the description given in section 4.5.2.1.0.0:
Field | Value Description |
|---|---|
subject | Distinguished Name of the SM-DS. It SHALL include at least 'organization' and 'commonName' attributes. Example of an SM-DS DN: c = US l = New York o= ACME cn = ACME SM-DS |
Extension for Authority Key Identifier (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.1) | extnID = id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier critical = false extnValue = <Identifier of the public key to verify this certificate> To identify the PK.CI.SIG that has to be used to verify this certificate. |
Extension for Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.3) | extnID = id-ce-keyUsage critical = true extnValue = digitalSignature (0) |
Extension for Certificate Policies (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.4) | extnID = id-ce-certificatePolicies critical = true extnValue = id-rspRole-ds-auth or id-rspRole-ds-auth-v2 (Section 2.4a.1.0) To indicate that this is an SM-DS SIG Certificate for authentication to the eUICC. NOTE: id-rspRole-ds-auth-v2 indicates a Certificate in a chain following Variant O (see figure 30a). |
Extension for subjectAltName (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.6) | extnID = id-ce-subjectAltName critical = false extnValue = { registeredID (8) = SM-DS OID} |
Extension for CRL Distribution Points (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.13) | extnID = id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints critical = false extnValue = section 4.5.2.1.2 This extension SHALL be absent for Certificates issued by SM-DS SubCA not managing revocation (see section 2.7). |
Table 15: CERT.DSauth.SIG
4.5.2.1.0.7 SM-DS TLS
The table below describes the specific fields of a CERT.DS.TLS in complement of the description given in section 4.5.2.1.0.0:
Field | Value Description |
|---|---|
subject | Refer to table defining CERT.DSauth.SIG. Both CERT.DSauth.SIG and CERT.DS.TLS SHALL have identical attributes except 'cn' that SHALL match one of the SM-DS hostname (FQDN) entries contained in the subjectAltName extension. |
Extension for Authority Key Identifier (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.1) | extnID = id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier critical = false extnValue = <Identifier of the public key to verify this certificate> |
Extension for Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.3) | extnID = id-ce-keyUsage critical = true extnValue = digitalSignature (0) |
Extension for Certificate Policies (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.4) | extnID = id-ce-certificatePolicies critical = false extnValue = id-rspRole-ds-tls or id-rspRole-ds-tls-v2 (Section 2.4a.1.0) To indicate that this an SM-DS TLS Certificate. This extension MAY be absent or contain a different value when the certificate is part of a Variant OO or AA (see figure 30c). NOTE: id-rspRole-ds-tls-v2 indicates a Certificate in a chain following Variant O (see figure 30c). |
Extension for Extended Key usage (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.12) | extnID = id-ce-extKeyUsage critical = true extnValue = ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::{ { id-kp-serverAuth }, { id-kp-clientAuth } } Certificate SHALL NOT contain any other extended key usage. |
Extension for subjectAltName (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.6) | extnID = id-ce-subjectAltName critical = false extnValue = GeneralNames ::= { { dNSName '<SM-DS hostname (FQDN) value>' }, { registeredID '<SM-DS OID value>' } } This extension SHALL contain at least one dNSName entry, and only one registeredID entry. A dNSName entry MAY contain the wildcard character * as allowed by RFC 2818 [67]. |
Extension for CRL Distribution Points (RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.13) | extnID = id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints critical = false extnValue = section 4.5.2.1.2 This extension SHALL be absent for Certificates issued by SM-DS SubCA not managing revocation (see section 2.7). |
Table 16: CERT.DS.TLS
4.5.2.1.1 Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters
This section provides the values to be set in 'AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm' and 'AlgorithmIdentifier.parameters' fields of the certificate for each of the algorithms used in this specification.
For section 'subjectPublicKeyInfo' the following settings SHALL apply:
'AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm' field SHALL be set to: "iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) ecPublicKey(1)" as defined in RFC 5480, or
"iso(1) standard(0) digital-signature-with-appendix(14888) part3(3) algorithm(0) sm2(14)" as defined in ISO 14888-3.
'AlgorithmIdentifier.parameters' field SHALL be set to:
•for BrainpoolP256r1: "iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) signatureAlgorithm(3) ecSign(2) ecStdCurvesAndGeneration(8) ellipticCurve(1) versionOne(1) brainpoolP256r1(7)" as defined in RFC 5639 [18]
•for NIST P-256: "iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) prime256v1(7)" as defined in RFC 5480 [27]
•For FRP256V1: "iso(1) member-body(2) fr(250) type-org(1) 223 101 256 1" as defined in ANSSI ECC [20]
•For SM2 public keys: 'AlgorithmIdentifier.parameters' field SHALL be omitted
For sections 'signature' and 'signatureAlgorithm' the following settings SHALL apply:
•'AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm' field SHALL be set as following for ECDSA with SHA256:
-"iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) ecdsa-with-SHA256(2)" as defined in RFC 5758 [25] and RFC 5759 [26].
•'AlgorithmIdentifier.parameters' field SHALL be omitted as defined in RFC 5758 [25] section 3.2.
•'AlgorithmIdentifier.algorithm' field SHALL be set as following for SM2:
•"iso(1) standard(0) digital-signature-with-appendix(14888) part3(3) algorithm(0) sm2(14)" as defined in ISO 14888-3.
•'AlgorithmIdentifier.parameters' field SHALL be omitted.
4.5.2.1.2 Extension CRL Distribution Point
A CRL Issuer (see section 2.7) SHALL include the cRLDistributionPoints extension in the Certificates they issue.
The cRLDistributionPoints extension in a certificate indicates the location(s) where a CRL can be retrieved, which lists this certificate upon its revocation.
The extension MAY contain several DistributionPoint entries. Nevertheless it is recommended to set only one entry in the Certificates part of a server certificate chain in order to limit their size, because of the eUICC constrained resources.
If an eSIM CA supports the issuance of version 2 Certificates, it SHALL also support the generation of the segmented CRL form as defined in version 2 of this specification.
A DistributionPoint entry SHALL only have the distributionPoint field set. The optional reasons field SHALL NOT be present; each revoked certificate SHALL have its own reason set. The cRLIssuer field SHALL NOT be present, because the CRL SHALL be issued by the Certificate Issuer.
The distributionPoint field MAY contain several general names, each describing a different mechanism to obtain the same CRL (the field nameRelativeToCRLIssuer is not used in this specification). But distributionPoint SHALL contain at least a general name of type URI with an HTTP scheme, indicating that the CRL can be retrieved as an HTTP resource.
4.5.2.2 Certificate Verification
Certificate verifiers SHALL only accept certificate chains defined in section 4.5.2.0a and 4.5.2.0b. They SHALL verify the Certificate according to RFC 5280 [17] with the exception given below.
The SM-DP+ and SM-DS SHALL verify that the EID in the eUICC Certificate CERT.EUICC.SIG is consistent with the EINs permitted in the EUM Certificate CERT.EUM.SIG (see section 4.5.2.0.2). For Variant O, the list of permitted EINs is given in the nameConstraints extension; for all other variants, it is given in the separate extension Permitted EINs.
For compatibility reasons, and as an exception to the verification requirements specified by RFC 5280 [17], the SM-DP+ and SM-DS SHALL NOT enforce the 'serialNumber' part of the nameConstraints extension when verifying the eUICC Certificate in Variant O.
In addition, verifiers of certificate chains for TLS establishment MAY verify restrictions to Certificate Profiles specified in section 4.5.2.1.0 for these Certificates. Restrictions to Certificate Profiles defined in section 4.5.2.1.0 for other Certificate chains SHALL be verified.
Certificate revocation status of each Certificate in the chain SHALL be verified:
oRSP Servers SHALL perform this verification as described in RFC 5280 [17], using the CRLs that they can retrieve as defined in section 4.6.4.
oThe LPAd SHALL perform this verification for TLS Certificates using a revocation mechanism supported by the certificate issuers in the trust chain (e.g., CRL validation as described in RFC 5280 [17]).
oThe eUICCs SHALL perform this verification as indicated in ES10b.AuthenticateServer, section 5.7.13.
NOTE: Verification of the revocation status of TLS Certificates by the LPAe is FFS.
If any of these verifications fail, the certificate SHALL be considered as invalid and the operation for which it was used, SHALL be rejected.
4.6 Certificate Revocation List
The CRL can be empty or contain one or several revoked certificates from among all the unexpired certificates in scope of the CRL.
The CRL SHALL follow RFC 5280 [17] with the specific coding and rules given in this section. The CRL SHALL have all the extensions described in table 17. The CRL MAY have additional extensions except deltaCRLIndicator and freshestCRL (Delta CRLs are not used).
A certificate listed in a CRL SHALL be considered as definitively revoked (i.e., the 'Hold' state is not considered).
NOTE: CRL is described using table representation for easiness, but conforms to the ASN.1 format given in RFC 5280 [17].
Field | Value Description | |
|---|---|---|
tbsCertList | Data to be signed | |
Field | Value Description | |
version | Version SHALL be 2. | |
signature | Contains the algorithm identifier and parameters used by the issuer to compute the value of the field 'signatureValue' (section 4.5.2.1.1). The algorithm identifier value and parameters values SHALL be the same as the one of the field 'signatureAlgorithm'. | |
issuer | Distinguished Name of the CRL Issuer. This DN SHALL be the same as the one used for issuing certificates (i.e., DN set in the issuer field of the Certificate). | |
thisUpdate | Time stamp of the CRL. | |
nextUpdate | Indicates the date by which the next CRL will be issued. The next CRL could be issued before the indicated date, but it will not be issued any later than the indicated date. | |
revokedCertificates | Sequence of "revocation entry" as described in table 18. | |
crlExtensions | Extension for Authority Key Identifier (RFC 5280 [17] section 5.2.1): extnID = id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier critical = true extnValue = <Identifier of the public key to verify this CRL> | |
Extension for CRL Number (RFC 5280 [17] section 5.2.3): extnID = id-ce-cRLNumber critical = false extnValue = CRL number, starting from 0. | ||
Extension for Issuing Distribution Point (RFC 5280 [17] section 5.2.5): extnID = id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint critical = true extnValue = { distributionPoint [0] -- section 4.5.2.1.2 } Fields indirectCRL and onlyContainsAttributeCerts SHALL be set to FALSE. onlySomeReasons SHALL be omitted. | ||
signatureAlgorithm | Section 4.5.2.1.1 | |
signatureValue | Signature computed accordingly to one of the possible algorithm listed in signatureAlgorithm field |
Table 17: CRL Description
Field | Value Description |
|---|---|
userCertificate | Serial number of the revoked certificate |
revocationDate | Date of revocation |
crlEntryExtensions | Extension for Reason code⁽¹⁾ (RFC 5280 [17] section 5.3.1): extnID = id-ce-cRLReasons critical = false extnValue = a reason code |
NOTE: A version 3 RSP entity SHALL ignore a Certificate Expiration Date extension, as defined in previous versions of this specification, which may be present in a CRL entry. |
Table 18: Revocation entry
4.6.1 CRL publication rules
Each CRL Issuer SHALL issue a new CRL 1) no later than the nextUpdate date indicated in the previous CRL with the same scope (even if no new revocation has occurred during the period), and 2) whenever at least one additional certificate is revoked.
NOTE: The publication periodicity is not defined in this document. This SHALL be defined in GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy [45].
The SM-DP+, SM-DS or any relying party SHALL ensure it uses the up-to-date CRL(s) required to perform the on-going transaction.
The CRL and Certificates that are in scope of the CRL SHALL be signed with the same key; that allows to limit the amount of data to be passed to the eUICC during the Common Mutual Authentication procedure (see section 3.0.1). It implicitly means that the CRL and these Certificates have the same issuer.
In order to limit the maximum size of a CRL, the CRL Issuer SHOULD limit the scope of their CRL(s). This is beneficial to the overall performance of the system where the CRL has to be provided to the eUICC. However, this specification doesn't mandate any particular method for defining the CRL scope. E.g., an eSIM CA SubCA may define a different scope for each type of Certificate it issues: one scope for CERT.DSauth.SIG, one for CERT.DS.TLS, one for CERT.DPauth.SIG; a (Sub)CA may limit the number of Certificates per scope.
The CRL base list SHALL be complete (i.e., contain all previously revoked certificates, plus the newly revoked certificates). Delta CRLs as defined in RFC 5280 [17] SHALL NOT be used.
The CRL Issuers SHALL manage the cRLNumber extension according to RFC 5280 [17]. This number SHALL be incremented by one at each new CRL publication.
4.6.2 Void
4.6.3 eUICC Considerations
The eUICC faces a general issue regarding time management and CRL. It does not have a time reference internally and can only rely on time provided from an off-card entity (with the question on reliability of this information).
This section provides the rule for the eUICC to address this concern:
•The eUICC derives a lower time reference indicating "it must be later than" from the CRLs which are signed by the eSIM CA(s). These are considered reliable and are in addition subject to consistency checks by the SM-DP+ (mandatory) and the LPA (optional), see section 3.0.1.
•The eUICC validates the time information of all certificates and CRLs: As each of these provides a time window within which they are valid, and assuming all are neither expired nor not yet valid, "now" must be in the overlap of all these time windows. Plus at least a part of this overlap must be later than the lower time reference on the eUICC.
4.6.3.1 Lower time reference on the eUICC
The eUICC SHALL maintain a lower time reference (LTR), which is used for certificate checks. An initial value SHALL be set during production. A unique value SHALL be used across all eSIM CAs.
The CRL 'tbsCertList.thisUpdate' field contains a reference for a time that has already passed and is considered to be reliable if it is signed by an eSIM CA. Both CRLs signed by an eSIM CA RootCA and those signed by an eSIM CA SubCA SHALL be taken into account. Once the signature of such a CRL has been verified by the eUICC and 'tbsCertList.thisUpdate' is higher than LTR, LTR SHALL be updated to 'tbsCertList.thisUpdate'. This SHALL be done independently of the result of the time checks specified in the next section.
An eUICC supporting OS update SHOULD also provide a secure mechanism to reset LTR.
4.6.3.2 Time checks on the eUICC
The eUICC SHALL check the validity of the time information provided by all Certificates and CRLs of one transaction by performing the following calculations:
•TWL (time window low) is set to the highest value of the 'tbsCertList.thisUpdate' values from all CRLs, the 'tbsCertificate.validity.notBefore' values from all Certificates, and LTR.
•TWH (time window high) is set to the lowest value of the 'tbsCertList.nextUpdate' values from all CRLs, and the 'tbsCertificate.validity.notAfter' values from all Certificates.
•If TWH is higher or equal to TWL, the time check is successful. Otherwise the check fails, because at least one item is either expired or not yet valid, resulting in a negative time window.
4.6.4 Retrieving a CRL
A CRL can be retrieved by navigating the URI indicated in a distribution point entry of the cRLDistributionPoints extension of any Certificate in its scope. When using the HTTP scheme the CRL SHALL be returned in the HTTP response body as a DER encoded CertificateList data object which in turn is Base64 encoded, as defined in RFC 5280 [17] section 4.2.1.13. At least one distribution point entry SHALL contain an URI with the HTTP scheme, see section 4.5.2.1.2.
4.7 Confirmation Code
A Profile download order and/or Device Change of the Profile MAY be protected by a specific Confirmation Code. The Confirmation Code is provided by the Operator to the SM-DP+ and the End User during the Profile download initiation procedure (section 3.1.1) or the Device Change procedure (section 3.11.1). The means by which the Confirmation Code is provided to the End User is out of scope of this specification.
In case of the Profile Download order, during the Profile download and installation procedure (section 3.1.3), if the Profile download order is protected by a Confirmation Code, the SM-DP+ SHALL verify that the Confirmation Code provided by the End User matches the Confirmation Code provided by the Operator.
In case of the Device Change, during the Device Change procedure (section 3.11.1), if the Device Change is protected by a Confirmation Code, the SM-DP+ SHALL verify that the Confirmation Code provided by the LPAd of the old Device matches the Confirmation Code provided by the Service Provider.
In addition, the SM-DP+ SHALL protect against excessive incorrect entries of the Confirmation Code. The maximum number of incorrect Confirmation Code attempts allowed to a Profile download order or a Device Change of the Profile is defined by the Operator and communicated to the SM-DP+ by means out of scope of this specification.
Once the maximum number of incorrect Confirmation Code attempts is exceeded for a Profile download order, the Profile download order or the Device Change of the Profile SHALL be terminated and the SM-DP+ SHALL communicate the final status to the Operator. The Operator is free to request a new Profile download order corresponding to the same Profile, with the same or a different Confirmation Code.
4.8 Device Information Code
The Device Information Code (DEV-IC) is a set of Device and eUICC-related information fields including EID, SM-DS address, etc. The DEV-IC SHALL be coded as a concatenation of the strings listed in Table X1 using a URI format as defined in RFC 3986 [72]:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Name Description MOC ------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ Scheme SHALL be set to either "eid" or "EID". M Delimiter SHALL be set to ":". M Path EID of the eUICC, the numeric text representation SHALL comprise 32 digits, where each digit is represented by one character in the set [0123456789]. M Delimiter SHALL be present and set to "?" if any of the following query components is present. C Query Additional Device-related information in the form of "key=value" pairs. O ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table X1: Device Information Code fields
Each key/value pair is defined in Table Y1, and SHALL be concatenated by using "&" as a delimiter if there are more than one key/value pair in the DEV-IC. Any of keys can appear more than once in any order. Additional proprietary information MAY be included in the DEV-IC by using a key starting with "x-".
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Key Value MOC ------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ aeid EID of an additional eUICC, the numeric text representation SHALL comprise 32 digits, where each digit is represented by one character in the set [0123456789]. O tac TAC of the Device, the numeric text representation SHALL comprise 8 digits, where each digit is represented by one character in the set [0123456789]. O imei IMEI of the Device, the numeric text representation SHALL comprise 15 digits, where each digit is represented by one character in the set [0123456789]. O ds FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) of an Root SM-DS (e.g.,MYDS.COM) stored on the eUICC indicated in the Path field of the DEV-IC or stored within the Device. O --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table Y1: Query component in DEV-IC
If the DEV-IC contains multiple EIDs, the EID value in the Path field SHALL be used for SM-DS Event Registration by using an SM-DS address(es) in the query component.
The DEV-IC SHOULD be represented in a case-sensitive text string restricted to Byte mode character set defined in table 6 of ISO/IEC 18004 [15] and the equivalent QR code. The QR code representation SHALL be encoded according to ISO/IEC 18004 [15].
Examples of the DEV-IC are as follows:
-EID:89001012012341234012345678901224
(if only one EID is present)
-EID:89001012012341234012345678901224?aeid=89001567010203040506070809101152
(if multiple EIDs are present)
-EID: 89001012012341234012345678901224?tac=35123451&tac=35123452
(if an EID and two TACs are present)
-EID:89001012012341234012345678901224?imei=351234510000011&imei=351234520000029
(if an EID and two IMEIs are present)
-EID:89001012012341234012345678901224?ds=MYDS-1.COM&ds=MYDS-2.COM
(if an EID and SM-DS addresses are present)
-EID:89001012012341234012345678901224?aeid=89001567010203040506070809101152&ds=MYDS-1.COM&ds=MYDS-2.COM
(if multiple EIDs and SM-DS addresses are present)
5 Functions
This section specifies the Functions associated with the Remote SIM Provisioning and Management of the eUICC for consumer Devices.
General rules for the function description:
•Wherever it says in the description of the steps to be taken within a function that the function provider "… SHALL return an error …", this implies that processing of the function ends at this point.
•A function provider is not mandated to perform the checks in the exact sequence of the description. This implies that different error codes may result from error situations that affect more than one verification step.
5.1 Overview of Functions per Interface
Provides the description of the interfaces and functions within the Remote SIM Provisioning and Management system involving the eUICC, including the following:
eUICC Interfaces
•ES6: The interface used by the Operator to manage the content of their Profile.
•ES8+: Provides a secure end-to-end channel between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC for the administration of the ISD-P and the associated Profile during download and installation.
•ES10a: Used by the LPAd to get the configured addresses from the eUICC for Root SM-DS(s), and optionally the Default SM-DP+.
•ES10b: Used by the LPAd to transfer a Profile Package or RPM Package to the eUICC, and to perform Device Change or Profile Recovery.
•ES10c: Used by the LPAd for local End User management of Profiles installed on the eUICC (e.g., Enable, Disable, Delete).
•ES25: Used between the UIMe and the LUIe to transfer End User related interaction.
Server to Server Interfaces
•ES2+: Interface between the Operator and the SM-DP+ used by the Operator to order Profile Package preparation and to receive notifications, and by the SM-DP+ to get a confirmation for the Device Change of the Profile from the Operator.
•ES12: Interface between the SM-DP+ and an SM-DS (Alternative SM-DS or Root SM-DS) for the Event management.
•ES15: Interface between an Alternative SM-DS and a Root SM-DS for the Event management.
LPA to Server Interfaces
•ES9+: Used to provide a secure transport between the SM-DP+ and the LPA for the delivery of the Profile Package, the delivery of the RPM package and sending the notifications.
•ES11: Interface between the LPA and an SM-DS (Alternative SM-DS or Root SM-DS) for the Event retrieval, Event Checking and Push Service registration.
•EShri: Interface between the LPA and a server providing the High Resolution Icons for a Profile.
Profile Content Management Interfaces
•ES20: Interface between the PCMP and PCMAA for managing the contents of an Enabled Profile.
•ESaa: Interface between the PCMAA and the eUICC for managing the contents of an Enabled Profile.
These correspond to the Administrative Agent interfaces defined in GP SERAM [74].
Device Internal Interfaces
•ES21: Interface between a Device Application and the LPRd for the LPR session.
ESop (interface between the End User and the Operator), ESeum (Interface between the EUM and the eUICC) and ESeu (Interface between the End User and the LUI) are out of scope of this document.
The following table presents the normative list of all the functions that are defined in this section.
Request-Response Functions:
Interface | Functions | Functionprovider role | Feature support (*) |
|---|---|---|---|
ES2+ | DownloadOrder ConfirmOrder CancelOrder ReleaseProfile | SM-DP+ | |
RpmOrder | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# | ||
HandleDeviceChangeRequest | Operator | #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# | |
ES6 | UpdateMetadata | ISD-P | |
ES8+ | InitialiseSecureChannel ReplaceSessionKeys ConfigureISDP StoreMetadata LoadProfileElements | ISD-R/ISD-P | |
ES9+ | InitiateAuthentication GetBoundProfilePackage AuthenticateClient CancelSession | SM-DP+ | |
ConfirmDeviceChange | #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# | ||
ES10a | GetEuiccConfiguredData SetDefaultDpAddress | ISD-R (LPA Services) | |
VerifySmdsResponse | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# | ||
ES10b | GetEUICCChallenge GetEUICCInfo PrepareDownload LoadBoundProfilePackage ListNotification RetrieveNotificationsList RemoveNotificationFromList AuthenticateServer CancelSession GetRAT | ISD-R (LPA Services) | |
LoadCRL | #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0# | ||
LoadRpmPackage | #SupportedForRpm# | ||
PrepareDeviceChange VerifyDeviceChange | #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# | ||
ES10c | GetProfilesInfo EnableProfile DisableProfile DeleteProfile eUICCMemoryReset GetEID SetNickname | ISD-R (LPA Services) | |
LpaAlerting | LPAd | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# | |
ES11 | InitiateAuthentication AuthenticateClient | SM-DS | |
CheckEvent | #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0# | ||
ES12 | RegisterEvent DeleteEvent | SM-DS | |
ES15 | RegisterEvent DeleteEvent | SM-DS | |
ES21 | InitiateProfileContentManagement PcmProgressInformation | LPRd | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# |
EShri | RetrieveIcon | HRI Server | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# |
Table 19: Request-Response Functions
(*) If empty, the relevant function exists since version 2.
Notification Handler Functions:
Interface | Notification handler functions | Function handler/recipient |
|---|---|---|
ES2+ | HandleNotification | Operator |
ES9+ | HandleNotification | SM-DP+ |
Table 20: Notification Handler Functions
5.2 LPA to Server and Server to Server Function Commonalities
Each function represents an entry point that is provided by a Role (function provider) and that can be called by other Roles (function requester).
5.2.1 Common Data Types
The functions provided in this section deal with management of the eUICC and Profile, so that the common data defined in this section needs to be used in most of the functions.
Type name | Description | Type definition |
|---|---|---|
Hexadecimal String | String of even length composed of characters between '0' to '9' and 'A' to 'F' or 'a' to 'f'. | |
AID | The AID (Application Identifier) of an Executable Load File, an Executable Module, a Security Domain, or an Application. | Hexadecimal string representation of 5 to 16 bytes. |
DATETIME | Any date and time used within any interface of this specification. | String format as specified by W3C: YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ssTZD Where: Ex: 2001-12-17T09:30:47Z |
EID | The EID type is for representing an eUICC-ID. An eUICC-ID is primarily used in the "Embedded UICC Remote Provisioning and Management System" to identify an eUICC. See SGP.02 [2] section 5.2.4.6 for EID description. This value SHALL NOT be modified during the lifetime of the eUICC. | String of 32 decimal characters. |
FQDN | The FQDN type is for representing a Fully Qualified Domain Name (e.g., smdp.example.com). | String, as a list of domain labels concatenated using the full stop (dot, period) character as separator between labels. Labels are restricted to the Alphanumeric mode character set defined in table 5 of ISO/IEC 18004 [15] and the lower-case equivalents of the alphabetic characters within that set. |
FQDN-Ext | The FQDN-extended type is either a FQDN or a designated alternative string as defined in this specification (e.g., '.unspecified'). | String, as defined for the FQDN type, possibly starting with a full stop character (i.e., '.') . |
ICCID | The ICCID type is for representing an ICCID (Integrated Circuit Card Identifier). The ICCID is primarily used to identify a Profile. ICCID is defined according to ITU-T recommendation E.118 [21]. However, the ICCID SHALL either consist of 19 or 20 digits. | String representation of 19 or 20 digits, where the 20^(th) digit MAY optionally be the padding character F. Ex: 8947010000123456784F A 19 digit ICCID with and without padding SHALL identify the same Profile. NOTE: In some markets, the ICCID may include hexadecimal digits and may omit the check digit. |
OID | An Object Identifier. | String representation of an OID, i.e., of integers separated with dots (e.g.: '1.2', '3.4.5'). |
VERSION | The Version type is for indicating a version of any entity used within this specification. A version is defined by its major, minor and revision number. | String representation of three integers separated with dots (e.g.: '1.15.3'). |
Table 21: Common data types
5.2.2 Request-Response Function
As defined in SGP.02 [2].
5.2.3 Notification Handler Function
As defined in SGP.02 [2].
5.2.4 Functions Input Header
As defined in SGP.02 [2] subject to the following constraints:
•The field Validity Period SHALL NOT be present in Functions Input Headers.
•The field Function Requester Identifier SHALL contain the string representation of the function requester identity. For ES12/ES15, it MAY be the OID contained in the subjectAltName field of the certificate used by the function requester for its authentication, an OID in the sub-tree of this value, or any other value. It MAY also be the identity of an entity on behalf of which the function requester operates.
This information MAY be used by the function provider for the purpose of authorisation, accounting and billing.
5.2.5 Functions Output Header
As defined in SGP.02 [2] subject to the following constraint:
•The fields Processing Start, Processing End and Acceptable Validity Period SHALL NOT be present in Functions Output Headers.
•The Executed-WithWarning and Expired values SHALL NOT be used in Function Execution Status field in Functions Output Headers.
5.2.6 Status Code
This specification relies on subject codes and reason codes as defined in SGP.02 [2]. In addition this specification defines the additional codes.
5.2.6.1 Subject codes
Hereunder are listed the subject codes used in this specification:
1.Generic (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
1.1. Function Requester (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
1.2. Function Provider (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
1.3. Protocol (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
1.3.1. Protocol Format (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
1.3.2. Protocol Version (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
1.6. Function (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
8.eUICC Remote Provisioning (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
8.1. eUICC (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
8.1.1. EID (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
8.1.2. EUM Certificate
8.1.3. eUICC Certificate
8.2. Profile (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
8.2.1. Profile ICCID (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
8.2.5. Profile Type (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
8.2.6. Matching ID
8.2.7. Confirmation Code
8.2.8. PPR
8.2.9. Profile Metadata
8.2.10. Bound Profile Package
8.2.11. Managing SM-DP+
8.2.12. Profile Owner
8.2.13. Enterprise
8.2.14. LPA Proxy
8.8. SM-DP+
8.8.1. SM-DP+ Address
8.8.2. Security configuration
8.8.3. Specification Version Number (SVN)
8.8.4. SM-DP+ Certificate
8.8.5. Download order
8.8.6. RPM Order
8.9. SM-DS
8.9.1. SM-DS Address
8.9.2. Security configuration
8.9.3. Specification Version Number (SVN)
8.9.4. SM-DS Certificate
8.9.5. Event Record
8.9.6. ECID
8.9.7. Push Service
8.10. RSP Operation
8.10.1. TransactionId
8.10.2. RPM Script
8.10.3. Device Change
8.10.4. Event Checking
8.10.6. Push Service Registration
8.11. eSIM CA
8.11.1. Public Key (PK)
8.12. LPA
5.2.6.2 Reason codes
Hereunder are listed the reason codes used in this specification:
1.Access Error (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
1.1. Unknown (Identification or Authentication) (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
1.2. Not Allowed (Authorisation) (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
2.Format Error (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
2.1. Invalid (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
2.2. Mandatory Element Missing (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
2.3. Conditional Element Missing (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
3.Conditions of Use Not Satisfied (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
3.1. Unsupported (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
3.3. Already in Use (Uniqueness) (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
3.7. Unavailable (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
3.8. Refused (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
3.9. Unknown (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
3.10. Invalid Association
3.11. Value has Changed
3.12. Invalid Match
4.Processing Error (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
4.2. Execution Error (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
4.3. Stopped on Warning (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
4.8. Insufficient Memory (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
4.10. Time to Live Expired
5.Transport Error (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
5.1. Inaccessible (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
6.Security Error (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
6.1. Verification Failed (as defined in SGP.02 [2])
6.3. Expired
6.4. Maximum number of attempts exceeded
5.2.6.3 Common Function Status Code
As defined in SGP.02 [2].
5.3 ES2+ (Operator -- SM-DP+)
The ES2+ interface is used by the Operator to order and manage RSP operations for specific eUICC(s).
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 31: ES2+
The Operator communicates with the SM-DP+ through a secure connection. The level of security requested on this interface and the level of data encryption is defined in GSMA SAS SM specification [23].
The SM-DP+ SHOULD be able to support a framework of interchange and execution prioritisation for transactions over the ES2+ interface. For the purpose of assigning priority, there SHOULD be a categorisation of transactions passing over the ES2+ interface, the Operator SHOULD be able to preset the priority, and the SM-DP+ SHOULD handle the transactions according to this prioritisation. In particular, the SM-DP+ SHOULD ensure that transactions marked with the same priority are handled on a first in first out (FIFO) basis.
On an implementation that handles queues for Notifications, the SM-DP+ SHALL be able to prioritise as required by the Profile Owner the exchanges required on the ES2+ to manage the delivery of the Profiles regarding the Notifications issued on the ES2+ interface.
A Profile Owner SHALL be able to query about:
-The current state or state history of a Profile identified by ICCID, or a not empty MatchingID.
-The current state or state history of a one of more Profiles when queried by EID or empty MatchingID.
The possible Profile states are defined in section 3.1.6.
The following sections describe a standardised set of operations between the Operator and the SM-DP+. However, for a specific implementation, both parties MAY agree on exchanging only a subset of the standardised messages. The SM-DP+ MAY also perform additional functions, which are out of scope of this specification.
5.3.1 Function: DownloadOrder
Related Procedures: Download initiation
Function Provider Entity: SM-DP+
Description:
This function is used to instruct the SM-DP+ of a new Profile download request.
The EID is optional and MAY not be known at this stage. If the EID is known, the SM-DP+, with the Operator, MAY verify if the EID is compatible with the requested Profile Type (see also Annex F). If an SM-DS or Default SM-DP+ is to be used for the Profile download, then the EID SHOULD be present; if not present, the EID SHALL be provided later in "ES2+.ConfirmOrder".
Upon reception of this function call, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Reserve an ICCID in its inventory. If the ICCID was provided as input data, the reservation SHALL use this value. Otherwise, the reservation SHALL be done corresponding to the requested Profile Type with a value available in the SM-DP+'s inventory.
•Optionally, if not already done, the SM-DP+ performs the 'Profile generation' and 'Profile protection' steps, as described in section 2.5.3, for the Profile identified by its ICCID.
•If the EID is known, the ICCID is linked to this EID and the Profile state SHALL be set to "Linked". Otherwise, the Profile state SHALL be set to "Allocated".
The SM-DP+ MAY perform additional operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that the ICCID has been reserved.
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in table 24 or a specific status code as defined in the following table.
Additional Input Data:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Input data name Description Type No. MOC ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ----- ------ eid Identification of the targeted eUICC. EID 1 O iccid Identification of the Profile to download and install in the eUICC. ICCID 1 C⁽¹⁾ profileType Identification of the Profile Type to download and install in the eUICC. String 1 C⁽¹⁾ NOTE 1: At least one of iccid and profileType SHALL be present. If only profileType is provided, the SM-DP+ SHALL select a Profile of that Profile Type from its inventory. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 22: DownloadOrder Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Output data name Description Type No. MOC ------------------ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ----- ----- iccid Identification of the Profile to download and install in the eUICC. If ICCID was provided as an input data, the returned value SHALL be the same. If not provided as an input data the returned value SHALL be one of the values available in the SM-DP+ inventory and corresponding to the Profile Type. ICCID 1 M ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 23: DownloadOrder Additional Output Data
Specific status codes
Subject Code | Subject | Reason code | Reason | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 3.9 | Unknown | Indicates that the Profile, identified by this ICCID is unknown to the SM-DP+. |
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 1.2 | Not Allowed (Authorisation) | Indicates that the function caller is not allowed to perform this function on the target Profile. |
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 3.3 | Already in Use | Indicates that the Profile identified by the provided ICCID is not available. |
8.2.5 | Profile Type | 3.9 | Unknown | Indicates that the Profile Type identified by this Profile Type is unknown to the SM-DP+. |
8.2.5 | Profile Type | 1.2 | Not Allowed (Authorisation) | Indicates that the function caller is not allowed to perform this function on the Profile Type. |
8.2.5 | Profile Type | 3.7 | Unavailable | No more Profile available for the requested Profile Type. |
8.2.5 | Profile Type | 3.8 | Refused | Indicates that the Profile Type identified by this Profile Type is not aligned with the Profile Type of Profile identified by the ICCID. |
Table 24: DownloadOrder Specific Status Codes
NOTE: If the Profile identified by the ICCID is already in state "Linked" or "Allocated" and this function would result in exactly this state when performed on an unallocated Profile, the function may return 'Executed-Success' and take no other action.
This allows graceful handling of resends in case a response on ES2+ gets lost.
5.3.2 Function: ConfirmOrder
Related Procedures: Download initiation
Function Provider Entity: SM-DP+
Description:
This function is used to confirm a previously requested download order.
If an SM-DS or Default SM-DP+ is to be used for the Profile download and the EID has not been provided within the DownloadOrder function, then the EID SHALL be present. If EID is not present, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code "EID - Mandatory Element Missing".
If the EID is present in both the DownloadOrder and ConfirmOrder functions it SHALL be the same value. If EID is different, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code "EID - Invalid Association".
On reception of this function call, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Confirm the allocation of an ICCID in its inventory.
•Generate a MatchingID (section 4.1.1) if it is not provided by the Operator.
•If the Operator has provided a non-zero-length MatchingID:
oIf its format is invalid, then the SM-DP+ SHOULD return a status code "Matching ID - Invalid".
oIf it conflicts with one already stored, then the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Matching ID - Already in Use".
•Store the MatchingID.
•Store the EID if available.
•If the Confirmation Code is provided by the Operator, calculate the hash of the UTF-8-encoded representation of the Confirmation Code and store the hash value together with the MatchingID, where the hash value is SHA256(Confirmation Code).
•If a Root SM-DS address (rootSmdsAddress) is provided with a non-empty value:
oIf the Root SM-DS address begins with a full stop character (e.g., '.unspecified'), the SM-DP+ MAY determine the applicable Root SM-DS for this Profile in an implementation-dependent manner.
oVerify that the MatchingID is not a zero-length value. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Matching ID - Invalid".
oStore the Root SM-DS address with the Profile to be used later for Event Registration and Event Deletion.
oIf an Alternative SM-DS address (smdsAddress) is also provided with a non-empty value:
•If the Alternative SM-DS address begins with a full stop character (e.g., '.unspecified'), the SM-DP+ MAY determine the applicable Alternative SM-DS for this Profile in an implementation-dependent manner.
•Store the Alternative SM-DS address with the Profile to be used later for Event Registration and Deletion.
-If the releaseFlag is set to true, perform Event Registration to the Root SM‑DS address stored with the Profile, cascaded through the Alternative SM-DS address stored with the Profile – if any, as defined in section 3.6.1. The MatchingID, SHALL be used as the EventID. If the releaseFlag is set to false, the Event Registration at this point in time is optional. If it is not done in this step, it will be done during the ReleaseProfile function.
-If a single SM-DS address (smdsAddress) is provided with a non-empty value (as in v2 of this specification):
oVerify that the MatchingID is not a zero-length value. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Matching ID - Invalid".
oThe SM-DP+ MAY determine, in an implementation-dependent manner, whether this is the address of a Root SM-DS or an Alternative SM-DS, and – if it is an Alternative SM-DS – the applicable Root SM-DS for the cascaded Event Registration.
oStore the SM-DS address with the Profile to be used later for Event Registration and Event Deletion.
oIf the releaseFlag is set to true, perform Event Registration to the SM‑DS address stored with the Profile as defined in section 3.6.1, where the MatchingID SHALL be used as the EventID. Otherwise, the Event Registration at this point in time is optional. If it is not done in this step, it will be done during the ReleaseProfile function.
The SM-DP+ MAY perform additional operations.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that the ICCID has been reserved.
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the following table.
Additional Input Data:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Input data name Description Type No. MOC ------------------ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ----- ----- iccid Identification of the Profile to download and install in the eUICC ICCID 1 M eid Identification of the targeted eUICC EID 1 O matchingId The MatchingID as defined in section (0), when generated by the Operator String 1 O confirmationCode A code used to authorise the usage of the MatchingID to confirm the download and installation of the Profile String 1 O smdsAddress The SM-DS address to be used for Event Registration. If rootSmdsAddress is also present, smdsAddress SHALL be the address of the Alternative SM-DS used for cascaded Event Registration FQDN-Ext 1 O rootSmdsAddress Root SM-DS address to be used for Event Registration FQDN-Ext 1 O releaseFlag If 'true', the Profile SHALL be immediately released for Profile download and installation Boolean 1 M ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 25: ConfirmOrder Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Output data name Description Type No. MOC ------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ----- ----- eid Identification of the targeted eUICC. EID SHALL be returned if bound to this order. EID 1 C matchingId The MatchingID as defined in section (0). String 1 M smdpAddress The SM-DP+ address to be used for this specific download order. This SHALL be a valid fully-qualified domain name that can be resolved by a public DNS server. FQDN 1 O -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 26: ConfirmOrder Additional Output Data
Specific Status Codes
Subject Code | Subject | Reason code | Reason | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 3.9 | Unknown | Indicates that the Profile, identified by this ICCID is unknown to the SM-DP+. |
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 1.2 | Not Allowed (Authorisation) | Indicates that the function caller is not allowed to perform this function on the target Profile. |
8.2.6 | Matching ID | 2.1 | Invalid | Matching ID provided by the Operator is not valid. |
8.2.6 | Matching ID | 3.3 | Already in Use (Uniqueness) | Conflicting MatchingID value. |
8.9 | SM-DS | 5.1 | Inaccessible | Indicates that the smdsAddress is invalid or not reachable. |
8.9 | SM-DS | 4.2 | Execution Error | The cascade SM-DS registration has failed. SM-DS has raised an error. |
8.1.1 | EID | 2.2 | Mandatory Element Missing | Indicates that the EID is missing in the context of this order (SM-DS address provided or MatchingID value has zero-length). |
8.1.1 | EID | 3.10 | Invalid Association | Indicates that a different EID is already associated with this ICCID. |
Table 27: ConfirmOrder Specific Status Codes
NOTE: If the Profile identified by the ICCID is already in state "Confirmed" and this function would result in exactly this state when performed on the Profile in a previous state, the function may return 'Executed-Success' and take no other action.
If the Profile identified by the ICCID is already in state "Released" or any subsequent state and this function would result in state "Released" when performed on the Profile in a previous state, the function may return 'Executed-Success' and take no other action.
This allows graceful handling of resends in case a response on ES2+ gets lost.
5.3.3 Function: CancelOrder
Related Procedures: Profile Download Initiation, RPM Initiation
Function Provider Entity: SM-DP+
Description:
This function is used to cancel a pending Profile or RPM download order request.
On reception of this function call, the SM-DP+ SHALL determine the context:
•If this function is called in the context of cancelling a Profile download order:
oConfirm that the Profile identified by the provided iccid is allocated and not yet downloaded. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile ICCID - Already in Use".
oIf there is a MatchingID provided in the cancelOrder function, then check that the provided matchingId is the one associated with the ICCID. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "MatchingID - Invalid Association".
oIf there is an EID already associated with the ICCID, then check that the provided eid is the one associated with the ICCID. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile ICCID - Invalid Association".
•If this function is called in the context of cancelling an RPM download order:
oVerify that the RPM Package identified by the provided eid and matchingId is not yet downloaded. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "RPM Package - Already in Use".
•Cancel the pending order:
oIf this function is called in the context of cancelling a Profile download order, return the ICCID to inventory or mark it as not available for future use, based on the provided final Profile status indicator.
•If the order was previously linked to an Event Registration, the SM-DP+ SHALL subsequently execute the Event deletion procedure for the SM-DS where it was registered.
The SM-DP+ MAY perform additional operations.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A functionExecutionStatus with Executed-Success indicating that the ICCID or RPM Package has been released from the MatchingID and the associated Profile or RPM Package will not be downloaded.
•A functionExecutionStatus indicating Failed with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the table here after.
Additional Input Data:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Input data name Description Type No. MOC ----------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------- ----- ----- iccid Identification of the Profile to be cancelled from previously requested download order. ICCID 1 C eid eUICC identifier. EID 1 C matchingId The MatchingID as generated in ConfirmOrder. String 1 C finalProfileStatusIndicator Indicator to determine whether the Profile will be available for future use after a download order is cancelled, as described in Table 29. String 1 C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 28: CancelOrder Additional Input Data
The iccid and finalProfileStatusIndicator SHALL be provided if and only if this function is called in the context of cancelling a Profile download order.
The eid SHALL be provided if an EID has been associated for the Profile download order to cancel.
The matchingId SHALL be provided if a MatchingID is known by the Operator for the Profile download order to cancel.
NOTE: If a response to an earlier function call was lost, then a MatchingID may have been allocated by the SM-DP+ but is not known by the Operator.
The eid and matchingId SHALL be provided in the context of cancelling an RPM download order.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Final Profile Status Indicator Description -------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Available Indicates that the download order for this Profile, identified by this ICCID will be cancelled; and the Profile is released back to the inventory and available for future use. Unavailable Indicates that the download order for this Profile, identified by this ICCID will be cancelled; and the Profile is not available for future use. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 29: Definition of Final Profile Status Indicator
Additional Output Data:
No additional output data.
Specific Status Codes
SubjectCode | Subject | Reason code | Reason | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 3.9 | Unknown | Indicates that the Profile, identified by this ICCID is unknown to the SM-DP+. |
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 1.2 | Not Allowed (Authorisation) | Indicates that the function caller is not allowed to perform this function on the target Profile. |
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 2.2 | Mandatory Element Missing | Indicates that the ICCID or the finalProfileStatusIndicator is missing in the context of cancelling a Profile download order. |
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 3.3 | Already in Use | The profile, identified by this ICCID, is already downloaded. |
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 3.10 | Invalid Association | Indicates that a different EID is associated with this ICCID. |
8.2.6 | Matching ID | 3.10 | Invalid Association | Indicates that a different MatchingID is associated with this ICCID or RPM order. |
8.1.1 | EID | 1.2 | Not Allowed (Authorisation) | Indicates that the function caller is not allowed to perform this function on the target EID. |
8.1.1 | EID | 2.2 | Mandatory Element Missing | Indicates that the EID is missing in the context of this order. |
8.1.1 | EID | 3.9 | Unknown | Indicates that the eUICC, identified by this EID is unknown to the SM-DP+. |
8.1.1 | EID | 3.10 | Invalid Association | Indicates that the RPM Package is associated with different EID. |
8.2.6 | MatchingID | 2.2 | Mandatory Element Missing | Indicates that the MatchingID is missing in the context of this order. |
8.12 | RPM Package | 3.3 | Already in Use | The RPM Package is already downloaded. |
Table 30: CancelOrder Specific Status Codes
5.3.4 Function: ReleaseProfile
Related Procedures: Download initiation
Function Provider Entity: SM-DP+
Description:
This function is used to release the Profile in order to allow the End User to start the download and installation procedure after the Operator performs any relevant operation on its back-end (e.g., provisioning of HLR).
On reception of this function call, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Verify that the Profile identified by the provided ICCID has been processed with "ES2+.DownloadOrder" and "ES2+.ConfirmOrder", but not released yet. If this verification fails, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile ICCID - Unknown" or "Profile ICCID - Invalid transition"
•Set the Profile state as 'Released' to allow the download.
•If SM-DS address(es) were stored with the Profile and if the Event Registration was not already done, perform Event Registration to the SM‑DS(s) as defined in section 3.6.1, where the MatchingID SHALL be used as the EventID. If the SM-DS if not reachable, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "SM-DS - Inaccessible". If the SM-DS returns an execution error, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "SM-DS - Execution Error".
The SM-DP+ MAY perform additional operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that the Profile identified by the provided ICCID has been released and is ready to download.
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the table here after.
Additional Input Data:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Input data name Description Type No. MOC ------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- ----- ----- iccid Identification of the Profile to be released from previously requested download order. ICCID 1 M ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 31: ReleaseProfile Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
No additional output data.
Specific Status Codes
SubjectCode | Subject | Reason code | Reason | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 3.9 | Unknown | Indicates that the Profile, identified by this ICCID, is unknown to the SM-DP+. |
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 3.5 | Invalid transition | Indicates that the target Profile cannot be released. |
8.9 | SM-DS | 5.1 | Inaccessible | Indicates that the smdsAddress is invalid or not reachable. |
8.9 | SM-DS | 4.2 | Execution Error | The cascade SM-DS registration has failed. SM-DS has raised an error. |
1.Table 32: ReleaseProfile Specific Status Codes
If a Profile has already been released this function returns 'Executed-Success' and take no other action.
5.3.5 Function: HandleNotification
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation, RPM Download and Execution, Local/Remote Profile Management
Notification Handler/Recipient: Operator
NOTE: Prior to version 3, this function was called HandleDownloadProgressInfo.
Description:
This function is used by the SM-DP+ to notify the Operator of the progress of a pending Profile download or RPM order. This function MAY be used at several points of the Profile Download and Installation or RPM Download and Execution procedure. In addition, it is used by the SM-DP+ to notify the Operator owning the Profile that a Profile Management Operation (install, enable, disable or delete) has successfully been performed on the eUICC.
Upon reception of an ES9+.HandleNotification, the SM-DP+ SHALL correlate it to a Profile download order, an RPM order or an installed Profile and notify the related Operator accordingly.
NOTE 1: The ICCID and EID are enough to identify the related Profile download order and to retrieve the information (e.g., notificationReceiverIdentifier and notificationIdentifier) to notify the Operator.
NOTE 2: The MatchingID and EID are enough to identify the related RPM order and to retrieve the information (e.g., notificationReceiverIdentifier and notificationIdentifier) to notify the Operator.
NOTE 3: In the case of other ES9+ Notifications, the ICCID and EID are enough to retrieve the information to notify the Operator.
What is performed by the Operator receiving this notification is out of scope of this specification.
Additional Input Data:
Input data name | Description | Type | No. | MOC |
|---|---|---|---|---|
eid | Identifies the targeted eUICC. This information SHALL be set if available to the SM-DP+. | EID | 1 | C |
iccid | Identifies the Profile to download to and install in the eUICC. This SHALL only be present if this function is called in the context of Profile Download and Installation and for Profile Management Operations. | ICCID | 1 | C |
matchingId | Identifies the RPM order to download to the eUICC. This SHALL only be present if this function is called in the context of RPM Download and Execution. | String | 1 | C |
notificationReceiverIdentifier | Echoes the Function Requester Identifier of the relevant Profile download order or RPM order. This SHALL be present if this function is called in the context of Profile Download and Installation or RPM Download and Execution. | String | 1 | C |
notificationIdentifier | Echoes the Function Call Identifier of the relevant Profile download order or RPM order. This SHALL be present if this function is called in the context of Profile Download and Installation or RPM Download and Execution. | String | 1 | C |
profileType | Identifies the Profile Type to download to and install in the eUICC. This SHALL only be present if this function is called in the context of Profile Download and Installation. | String | 1 | C |
timestamp | Indicates the date/time when the operation has been performed or when the notification has been received by the SM-DP+. NOTE: In the latter case, this is not the time when the notification was generated. | DATETIME | 1 | M |
notificationEvent | Indicates the step reached within the Profile Download and Installation or RPM Download procedure or the Profile Management Operation that was executed. Defined events are ⁽¹⁾: 1 -> Eligibility and attempt limit check 2 -> Confirmation Failure 3 -> BPP download or RPM download 4 -> BPP installation or RPM execution ⁽³⁾ 5 -> notificationInstall ⁽²⁾ 6 -> notificationLocalEnable ⁽²⁾ ⁽⁴⁾ 7 -> notificationLocalDisable ⁽²⁾ ⁽⁴⁾ 8 -> notificationLocalDelete ⁽²⁾ ⁽⁴⁾ 9 -> notificationRpmEnable ⁽²⁾ ⁽⁴⁾ 10 -> notificationRpmDisable ⁽²⁾ ⁽⁴⁾ 11 -> notificationRpmDelete ⁽²⁾ ⁽⁴⁾ 12 -> Device Change request 13 -> Device Change confirmation 14 -> Device Change confirmation failure 15 -> Profile preparation for Device Change | INTEGER | 1 | M |
notificationEventStatus | Indicates the status after the execution of the notification event. The ExecutionStatus type is re-used to specify the result of processing of the operation related to the notification event (Executed-Success, Failed), and optionally to provide information on any encountered problem (status code, data/object that causes the status code, and message to provide textual and human readable explanation of the status code). This field SHALL be absent for certain operations, see NOTE 3. | ExecutionStatus | 1 | C |
resultData | The finalResult data object as contained in the ProfileInstallationResult or LoadRpmPackageResult, when received from the eUICC. | Binary | 1 | C |
NOTE 1: This specification reserves values from 16 to 99 for future use. The Operator and the SM-DP+, based on agreed behaviour, MAY define additional custom notification events. In that case, values >=100 SHALL be used. NOTE 2: As on ES9+ these events are provided in a BIT STRING starting with bit 0, they have to be remapped to the given integer values. NOTE 3: when notificationEvent indicates 'RPM execution', the notificationEventStatus SHALL be: -'Executed-Success' if all RPM commands in the corresponding RPMPackage have been executed successfully. -Otherwise, 'Failed', with a Status Code as specified in Table 32c. NOTE 4: notificationEventStatus SHALL NOT be sent for notificationEvent values 6 to 11. |
Table 32a: HandleNotification Additional Input Data
The following table provides the mapping between the cancel session reason received within the ES9+.CancelSession and the status code that SHALL be set in the notificationEventStatus input data.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cancel session reason Status code
----------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------
endUserRejection(0) '8.8.5 Download Order - 3.8 Refused'
pprNotAllowed(3) '8.2.8 PPR - 1.2 Not Allowed'
metadataMismatch(4) '8.2.9 Profile Metadata - 3.11 Value has Changed'
loadBppExecutionError(5) '8.2.10 Bound Profile Package – 4.2 Execution Error'
enterpriseProfilesNotSupported(17) '8.2.13 Enterprise – 3.1 Unsupported'
enterpriseRulesNotAllowed(18) '8.2.13 Enterprise – 1.2 Not Allowed'
enterpriseProfileNotAllowed(19) '8.2.13 Enterprise – 3.8 Refused'
enterpriseOidMismatch(20) '8.2.13 Enterprise – 3.12 Invalid Match'
enterpriseRulesError(21) '8.2.13 Enterprise – 3.8 Refused'
enterpriseProfilesOnly(22) '8.2.13 Enterprise – 3.8 Refused'
lprNotSupported(23) '8.2.14. LPA Proxy – 3.1 Unsupported' or
'8.8.6 RPM Order – 3.1 Unsupported'
lprNetworkDataNotAllowed(24) '8.8.6 RPM Order – 3.8 Refused'
emptyProfileOrSpName(25) '8.2.9 Profile Metadata – 3.8 Refused'
rpmDisabled(27) '8.8.6 RPM Order – 3.8 Refused'
invalidRpmPackage(28) '8.8.6 RPM Order – 2.1 Invalid'
loadRpmPackageError(29) '8.8.6 RPM Order – 4.2 Execution Error'
undefinedReason(127) '8 eUICC Remote Provisioning - 4.2. Execution Error'
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 32b: Cancel session reason code mapping to Status code
NOTE: postponed(1), timeout(2) and sessionAborted(22) cancel session reasons do not terminate the download order, and thus do not lead to a notification to the Operator.
The following table provides additional status codes that can be set in the notificationEventStatus input data by the SM-DP+:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reason Status code ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------------------- Maximum number of attempts of Profile Download has been exceeded '8.8.5 Download Order - 6.4 Maximum number of retries exceeded' Maximum number of incorrect attempts of Confirmation Code verification has been exceeded '8.2.7 Confirmation Code – 6.4 Maximum number of retries exceeded' Execution of at least one RPM command within an RPM package has failed '8.10.2. RPM Script - 4.2. Execution Error' ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 32c: Additional Status Codes
5.3.6 Function: RpmOrder
Related Procedures: RPM Initiation
Function Provider Entity: SM-DP+
Description:
This function is used to instruct the SM-DP+ of a new RPM Package.
The rpmScript as defined in section 2.10.1 SHALL include one or more RPM Command(s) for the target EID.
On reception of this function call, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Verify that the eid is present. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "EID - Mandatory Element Missing".
•Identify the eUICC by using the eid. If it cannot be identified, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "EID - Unknown".
•Generate a MatchingID (section 4.1.1) if it is not provided by the Operator.
•If the Operator has provided the MatchingID:
oIf its format is invalid, then the SM-DP+ SHOULD return a status code "Matching ID - Invalid".
oIf it conflicts with one already stored, then the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Matching ID - Already in Use".
•Store the MatchingID and the EID.
•Prepare an RPM Package as follows.
oIf the rpmScript includes RPM Command 'Enable Profile', 'Disable Profile', 'Delete Profile', 'List Profile Info' (with ICCID), 'Contact PCMP' or 'Update Metadata' coded as defined in section 2.10.1, the SM-DP+ SHALL for each of these commands:
Identify the Profile associated with the ICCID. If the ICCID is not provided, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile ICCID - Conditional Element Missing". If the Profile cannot be identified, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile ICCID - Unknown".
Verify that the function caller is the Profile Owner of the Profile. If it is not, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile ICCID - Unknown".
Verify that the Profile is installed in the target eUICC. If it is not, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "EID - Invalid Association".
For RPM Command 'Update Metadata', validate the provided updateMetadataRequest field. If no Metadata object is present, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile Metadata - Conditional Element Missing". If it is invalid, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile Metadata - Invalid".
oIf the rpmScript includes RPM Command(s) 'List Profile Info' (with Profile Owner OID) coded as defined in section 2.10.1, for each of these commands, the SM-DP+ SHALL verify that the function caller correctly presented its Profile Owner OID in the RPM Command. If not, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile Owner - Invalid Association".
•Associate the RPM Package with the EID and MatchingID.
•If a Root SM-DS address is provided and optionally also an Alternative SM-DS address with non-empty value(s):
oVerify that the MatchingID is not a zero length value. If the MatchingID is a zero length value, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Matching ID - Invalid".
oStore the SM-DS address(es) with the RPM Package to be used later for Event Registration and Event Deletion.
•If the Root SM-DS address begins with a full stop character (e.g., '.unspecified'), the SM-DP+ MAY determine the applicable Root SM-DS for this Profile in an implementation-dependent manner.
•If the Alternative SM-DS address begins with a full stop character (e.g., '.unspecified'), the SM-DP+ MAY determine the applicable Alternative SM-DS for this Profile in an implementation-dependent manner.
oPerform Event Registration as defined in section 3.6.1, where the MatchingID SHALL be used as the EventID. If the SM-DS is not reachable, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "SM-DS - Inaccessible". If the Event Registration fails, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "SM-DS - Execution Error".
•If an Alternative SM-DS was specified, this SHALL be a cascaded registration as defined in section 3.6.1.2. Otherwise, it SHALL be a non-cascaded registration as defined in section 3.6.1.1.
The SM-DP+ MAY perform additional operations.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that the RPM Package has been created.
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the table here after.
Additional Input Data:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Input data name Description Type No. MOC ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ ----- ------ eid Identification of the target eUICC. EID 1 M rpmScript RpmPackage as defined in section 2.10.1. Binary 1 M matchingId The MatchingID as defined in section 3.7.1, when generated by the Operator. String 1 O rootSmdsAddress The Root SM-DS address to be to be used for the Event Registration. FQDN-Ext 1 O altSmdsAddress The Alternative SM-DS address to be used for cascaded Event Registration. FQDN-Ext 1 C⁽¹⁾ NOTE 1: This field MAY be provided only if rootSmdsAddress is present. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 32d: RpmOrder Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Output data name Description Type No. MOC ------------------ -------------------------------------------- ------------ ----- ----- matchingId The MatchingID as defined in section 3.7.1 String 1 M ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 32e: RpmOrder Additional Output Data
Specific status codes:
SubjectCode | Subject | Reasoncode | Reason | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
8.1.1 | EID | 2.2 | Mandatory Element Missing | Indicates that the EID is missing in the context of this order. |
8.1.1 | EID | 3.9 | Unknown | Indicates that the eUICC, identified by this EID is unknown to the SM-DP+. |
8.1.1 | EID | 3.10 | Invalid Association | Indicates that a different EID is already associated with this ICCID. |
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 2.3 | Conditional Element Missing | Indicates that the ICCID is missing in the context of the RPM Command. |
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 3.9 | Unknown | Indicates that the Profile, identified by this ICCID is unknown to the SM-DP+. |
8.2.6 | Matching ID | 2.1 | Invalid | Matching ID provided by the Operator is not valid. |
8.2.6 | Matching ID | 3.3 | Already in Use (Uniqueness) | Matching ID provided by the Operator is already in use at the SM-DP+. |
8.2.9 | Profile Metadata | 2.1 | Invalid | Indicates that the provided Profile Metadata is not valid. |
8.2.9 | Profile Metadata | 2.3 | Conditional Element Missing | Indicates that no Metadata object is provided in the context of the RPM Command. |
8.2.12 | Profile Owner | 3.10 | Invalid Association | The Operator provided incorrect Profile Owner OID. |
8.9 | SM-DS | 4.2 | Execution Error | The cascade SM-DS registration has failed. SM-DS has raised an error. |
8.9 | SM-DS | 5.1 | Inaccessible | Indicates that the smdsAddress is invalid or not reachable. |
8.10.2 | RPM Script | 2.2 | Mandatory Element Missing | Indicates that the RPM Script is missing in the context of this order. |
Table 32f: RpmOrder Specific Status Codes
NOTE: If an RPM order with exactly the same parameters in the input data already exists, the function may return 'Executed-Success' and take no other action. This allows graceful handling of resends in case a response on ES2+ gets lost.
5.3.7 Function: HandleDeviceChangeRequest
Related Procedures: Device Change
Function Provider Entity: Service Provider
Description:
The SM-DP+ supporting Device Change SHALL be able to call ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function as per Service Provider's configuration.
This function requests for Service Provider's confirmation on the Device Change of a Profile. If it was requested as per Service Provider's configuration, the SM-DP+ SHALL call this function on the reception of Device Change request for the Profile.
On reception of this function call, the Service Provider SHALL:
•Identify the Profile by ICCID. If the Profile cannot be identified, the Service Provider SHALL return an error status "ICCID – Unknown".
•Verify that the identified Profile is eligible for the Device Change. If not, the Service Provider SHALL return an error status "Device Change – Not Allowed".
•Set the isNewProfileRequired to true if a new Profile is required for the Device Change.
•If the End User requires to enter a Confirmation Code to proceed the Device Change procedure: generate a Confirmation Code.
Additionally, the Service Provider MAY:
•Generate Service Provider Message for Device Change to be confirmed by the End User.
The Service Provider MAY perform additional operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that the Service Provider has confirmed the Device Change of the Profile.
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6, or a specific status code as defined in the following table.
Additional Input Data:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Input data name Description Type No. MOC ----------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------- ----- ----- iccid Identification of the Profile installed in the eUICC of the old eUICC. ICCID 1 M eid Identification of the target eUICC in the new Device EID 1 O tac TAC value of the new Device. String 1 O ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 32g: HandleDeviceChangeRequest Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Output data name Description Type No. MOC ----------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- ----- ----- isNewProfileRequired Indicates if the new Profile is required for the Device Change. Boolean 1 M serviceProviderMessageForDc Service Provider specific message for Device Change to be confirmed by the End User. String 1 O cc A Confirmation Code to be verified for the Device Change of the Profile. String 1 O -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 32h: HandleDeviceChangeRequest Additional Output Data
Specific status codes
Subject Code | Subject | Reason code | Reason | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 3.9 | Unknown | Indicates that the installed Profile, identified by this ICCID, is unknown to the Service Provider. |
8.10.3 | Device Change | 1.2 | Not Allowed | Indicates that the installed Profile is not eligible for Device Change. |
Table 32i: HandleDeviceChangeRequest Specific Status Codes
5.4 ES6 (Operator -- eUICC)
This interface is present between the Operator and their Enabled Profile in eUICC. It allows the Operator to make modifications on their Profile in the eUICC using legacy OTA mechanisms.
The ES6 functions are addressed to the eUICC through a secure channel, as defined in ETSI TS 102 225 [38] and ETSI TS 102 226 [39], established between the Operator and the MNO-SD of the Enabled Profile. This interface is the same as the one used with UICCs.
The initial OTA Key sets are part of the Profile and are loaded by the SM-DP+ during the "Profile Download and Installation" (section 3.1.3), or loaded by the EUM before eUICC issuance.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 32: ES6
5.4.1 Function: UpdateMetadata
Related Procedures: Metadata Update
Function Provider Entity: ISD-P
Description:
This function allows updating the following Profile Metadata of the target Profile:
•Service Provider name
•Profile Name
•Icon type and Icon
•Profile Policy Rule
•Notification Configuration Info
•Service Specific Data stored in eUICC
•RPM Configuration
•Address of the HRI Server
•LPA Proxy Configuration
•Enterprise Configuration
•Device Change Configuration
All Metadata elements that can be updated by this function can also be deleted from the Metadata except Service Provider name and Profile Name.
As this function is provided by the ISD-P, the STORE DATA command message defined hereunder has to be preceded by an INSTALL [for personalisation] as defined in SGP.02 [2] section 4.1.2.1:
•The reserved AID value for Profile’s ISD-P (Annex D) SHALL be used to indicate that the Security Domain target by the INSTALL [for personalisation] command is the ISD-P of the Profile containing the MNO-SD.
•According to GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8], INSTALL [for personalisation] command can only be used on applications associated with a Security Domain. As an exception to this rule, the eUICC SHALL allow the MNO-SD to receive this command sequence with data destined to the ISD-P.
If supported by the Device, after a successful update of Metadata objects, the eUICC SHALL alert the LPA as specified in section 5.7.23.
Command Message
This function uses the command message STORE DATA as defined in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8] with the specific coding defined in this section.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- Code Value Meaning ------- -------------- ---------------------------------------------------- CLA '80' GPCS [8] section 11.11 INS 'E2' STORE DATA P1 '10' or '90' See below P2 xx Block number Lc xx Length of data field Data 'xx xx…' See below ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 33: UpdateMetadata Command Message
Parameter P1
The P1 SHALL be coded as follows:Error! Reference source not found.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Meaning ----- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- --------------------------------------------------------- 0/1 - - - - - - - More blocks / Last block - 0 0 - - - - - No general encryption information or non-encrypted data - - - 1 0 - - - BER-TLV format of the command data field - - - - - - - 0 Case 3 command as defined in GlobalPlatform Amd A [9] - - - - - X X - RFU --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 34: UpdateMetadata P1
If the provided Profile Metadata values do not fit in a single STORE DATA command, the Operator SHALL split them into several STORE DATA commands. A transfer of an intermediate command SHALL be done by indicating "More blocks". The last or only command SHALL be transferred indicating "Last block".
The command can also be sent via RPM. In this case, the eUICC SHALL perform the following before processing the command data:
•Verify that the Profile identified by the ICCID exists. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code commandError.
•Verify that the SM-DP+ that sent the RPM Command is included in the Managing SM-DP+ List of the target Profile and is authorised to update all the given Metadata objects. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code commandError.
•If the Profile Metadata of the target Profile specifies an allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier for the Managing SM-DP+: verify that the Subject Key Identifier of the eSIM CA RootCA corresponding to CERT.DPauth.SIG matches that value. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code commandError.
Data Field
The data field SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
UpdateMetadataRequest ::= [42] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF2A'
serviceProviderName [17] UTF8String (SIZE(0..32)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '91'
profileName [18] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '92'
iconType [19] IconType OPTIONAL, -- Tag '93'
icon [20] OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '94'
profilePolicyRules [25] PprIds OPTIONAL, -- Tag '99'
serviceSpecificDataStoredInEuicc [34] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0# Tag 'BF22'
notificationConfigurationInfo [22] SEQUENCE OF NotificationConfigurationInformation OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag 'B6'
tagsForDeletion [APPLICATION 28] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- for tagList #SupportedFromV3.0.0# tag '5C'
rpmConfiguration [26] RpmConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# Tag 'BA'
hriServerAddress [27] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9B'
lprConfiguration [28] LprConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0# Tag 'BC'
enterpriseConfiguration [29] EnterpriseConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# Tag 'BD'
deviceChangeConfiguration [32] DeviceChangeConfiguration OPTIONAL -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF20'
}
-- ASN1STOPEven though all objects directly contained in the UpdateMetadataRequest are optional, at least one SHALL be present. An update always applies to the whole object.
Unless defined otherwise below, the following general processing rules SHALL apply for all objects except tagsForDeletion:
-If an object is present, the eUICC SHALL update the Profile Metadata with the provided value. It the object was not present in the Metadata before, it SHALL be added to the Metadata.
-If an object is absent, the eUICC SHALL NOT update the corresponding Profile Metadata object.
-If there is an error while processing the UpdateMetadata, the Profile Metadata SHALL remain unchanged.
If present, tagsForDeletion SHALL contain a concatenated list of tags of objects to be deleted from the Metadata. An object that is to be created or updated by the function SHALL NOT also appear in the list for deletion. The eUICC SHALL delete objects as follows:
-If Service Provider name or Profile Name or any non-updateable objects are listed, the eUICC SHALL return an error code deleteNotAllowed. These objects cannot be deleted.
-If an object indicated by a tag is not present in the Metadata, the eUICC SHALL silently ignore the tag.
-For all other tags, the eUICC SHALL delete the object.
NOTE: Version 2 defined a different mechanism for the deletion of Metadata objects. An OTA server that wants to delete a Metadata object or update a Metadata object with a zero-length value should take these differences into account. An SM-DP+ can know from EuiccRspCapability.updateMetadataV3Support whether the new mechanism is supported on the eUICC and can forward this information to the OTA server.
An OTA server SHALL add or remove iconType and icon together. The eUICC is not mandated to check for both being present or both being absent as a result of a Metadata update.
For profilePolicyRules:
-This version of the specification only defines unsetting PPRs. For this operation, the pprUpdateControl bit SHALL be set to zero. In case of a value of one, the eUICC SHALL return an error code pprUpdateInvalidSetting.
-If pprUpdateControl is set to zero, the following SHALL apply: Each PPR bit of the Profile SHALL be logically ANDed with the corresponding bit of the UpdateMetadataRequest.
For notificationConfigurationInfo: Version 2 did not include this object in the list of Metadata objects that can be updated via ES6. An SM-DP+ can know from EuiccRspCapability.updateNotifConfigInfoSupport whether updating of this object is supported on the eUICC and can forward this information to the OTA server.
hriServerAddress being present in the command, even if it contains the same value as the one already stored in the Metadata on the eUICC, SHALL be taken by the LPA as indication that the icon on the server has changed.
The following processing SHALL apply if rpmConfiguration is contained in the command:
-If the object in the command contains a zero-length value, the command SHALL be rejected with error code invalidRpmConfiguration.
-If an RPM Configuration already exists in the target Profile and if the profileOwnerOid in the command does not match the Profile Owner OID in the RPM Configuration of the target Profile, the command SHALL be rejected with error code invalidRpmConfiguration.
The following processing SHALL apply if enterpriseConfiguration is contained in the command:
-If the target Profile is not an Enterprise Profile or the object in the command contains a zero-length value, the command SHALL be rejected.
-If the enterpriseOid in the command is different from the value stored in the Metadata of the target Profile, the command SHALL be rejected.
-If it contains enterpriseRules and the Metadata of the target Profile does not already contain Enterprise Rules, the command SHALL be rejected.
-If it contains enterpriseRules with the referenceEnterpriseRule bit being set, the eUICC SHALL verify the following:
-If the enterpriseRules indicate onlyEnterpriseProfilesCanBeInstalled and numberOfNonEnterpriseProfiles contains a value different from 0, the command SHALL be rejected.
-If the enterpriseRules indicate "priorityEnterpriseProfile" and the Target Profile is Disabled, the command SHALL be rejected.
-If more non-Enterprise Profiles are enabled than allowed by numberOfNonEnterpriseProfiles, the command SHALL be rejected.
-For all errors listed above, the eUICC SHALL return an error code enterpriseConfigurationNotAllowed.
-If the previous steps did not result in the rejection of the command, the enterpriseConfiguration SHALL be updated.
-If the enterpriseConfiguration contains enterpriseRules with the referenceEnterpriseRule bit being set, the eUICC SHALL unset the referenceEnterpriseRule bit of the Enterprise Profile for which it is currently set, if any.
Response data if the command is sent via RPM
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
UpdateMetadataResponse ::= [42] INTEGER { -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# Tag 'BF2A'
ok (0),
enterpriseConfigurationNotAllowed (6), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
commandError (7),
pprUpdateInvalidSetting (12),
invalidRpmConfiguration (14),
deleteNotAllowed (15),
undefinedError(127)
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Message for ES6
Data Field
The data field of the response message SHALL NOT be present.
Processing State Returned in the Response Message
See GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8] section 11.11.3.2.
The following additional status bytes are defined:
-'69 85': enterpriseConfigurationNotAllowed
-'6A 80': deleteNotAllowed
-'6A 81': pprUpdateInvalidSetting or invalidRpmConfiguration
5.5 ES8+ (SM-DP+ -- eUICC)
The ES8+ is an interface defined between the Profile Package Binding function of the SM-DP+ and the eUICC. This interface is intended to be tunnelled over the ES9+ and ES10b interfaces.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 33: ES8+
The ES8+ functions are addressed to the eUICC through a secure channel established between the Profile Package Binding function of the SM-DP+ and the eUICC.
The secure channel is established by:
•Mutual authentication of the eUICC and the SM-DP+ using SK.DPauth.SIG / CERT.DPauth.SIG and SK.EUICC.SIG/CERT.EUICC.SIG.
•Session keys agreement based on exchanged one-time public keys of both parties during mutual authentication.
The SM-DP+ authenticates the eUICC by:
•Verifying the CERT.EUICC.SIG Certificate chain.
•Verifying the signature of the eUICC computed over an SM-DP+ challenge with PK.EUICC.SIG extracted from the verified CERT.EUICC.SIG.
The eUICC authenticates the SM-DP+ by:
•Verifying the CERT.DPauth.SIG Certificate chain.
•Verifying the signature of the SM-DP+ with the PK.DPauth.SIG extracted from the verified CERT.DPauth.SIG.
The data exchanged after channel establishment are secured using the BSP as defined in section 2.6.4. The eUICC SHALL support the BSP with:
•The symmetric algorithm related to the selected signature algorithm, see section 2.6.5.
•Use of C-MAC and C-DECRYPTION.
As a result the SM-DP+ and eUICC are mutually authenticated, all data sent from the Profile Package Binding function of the SM-DP+ to the eUICC are MACed and encrypted, except the 'StoreMetadata' command which is only MACed.
Response data generated by the eUICC when processing the BPP received on ES8+ is returned protected by a signature generated by the eUICC.
5.5.1 Function: InitialiseSecureChannel
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R
Description:
This function is used by the SM-DP+ to initialise the secure channel for a Profile Download and Installation with the target eUICC. The function carries the identifier of the remote operation type to be performed by the eUICC (e.g., installation of a new Bound Profile Package) and the necessary material for key agreement with Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), allowing a secure end-to-end communication between the SM-DP+ and the eUICC:
•Transaction ID
•Description of the keys to generate
•One-time public key for key agreement generated by SM-DP+ (otPK.DP.KA)
•Signature upon material (including the previously generated otPK.EUICC.KA, also acting as an eUICC challenge) to ensure its integrity and authenticity.
The level of security is implicitly deduced from the remote operation type to execute.
The reception of the InitialiseSecureChannel function SHALL be rejected if a secure channel session is already ongoing.
On reception of this command the eUICC SHALL:
•Verify the SM-DP+ signature using the PK.DPpb.SIG; if the signature is invalid the command SHALL be rejected, an invalidSignature error SHALL be returned in the Profile Installation Result, Profile installation SHALL be aborted, and any contextual data associated to its Profile installation (like the SM-DP+ Certificate) SHALL be discarded.
•Verify that the requested Remote operation type is one of the defined types. Otherwise an unsupportedRemoteOperationType error SHALL be returned in the Profile Installation Result.
•Verify that the received transaction ID matches the transaction ID of the on-going RSP session (section 5.7.5 "ES10b.PrepareDownload" function). Otherwise an invalidTransactionId error SHALL be returned in the Profile Installation Result.
•Verify that Control Reference Template describing the keys to generate matches the values defined here under (Command message part). Otherwise an unsupportedCrtValues error SHALL be returned in the Profile Installation Result.
•Generate the session keys (S-ENC and S-MAC) and the initial MAC chaining value from received otPK.DP.KA and previously generated otSK.EUICC.KA, using the key agreement algorithm determined according to section 2.6.5.
Command Data
The command data for this function is encoded in the ASN.1 data object as described below.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
--Definition of data objects for InitialiseSecureChannel Request
InitialiseSecureChannelRequest ::= [35] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF23'
remoteOpId RemoteOpId, -- Remote Operation Type Identifier (value SHALL be set to installBoundProfilePackage)
transactionId [0] TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SM-DP+
controlRefTemplate[6] IMPLICIT ControlRefTemplate, -- Control Reference Template (Key Agreement). Current specification considers a subset of CRT specified in GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment F [13] section 6.5.2.3 for the Mutual Authentication Data Field
smdpOtpk [APPLICATION 73] OCTET STRING, ---otPK.DP.KA in accordance with GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment F [13] section 6.5.2.3 for ePK.OCE.KA, tag '5F49'
smdpSign [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- SM-DP's signature, tag '5F37'
}
ControlRefTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
keyType[0] Octet1, -- Key type according to GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8] Table 11-16, Tag '80'
keyLen[1] Octet1, --Key length in number of bytes. Tag '81'
hostId[4] OctetTo16 -- Host ID value , Tag '84'
}
-- ASN1STOPNOTE: The tag '90' for 'SCP identifiers and parameters' is not used. This specification only uses one SCP type derived from SCP11a defined in GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment F [13]. The tag '95' for 'Key Usage Qualifier' is also not used. This is determined by the 'Remote operation type identifier' (see hereunder).
The eUICC SHALL verify the values provided for key type and key length match the expected symmetric encryption algorithm according to section 2.6.5:
-When AES-128 is selected by the SM-DP+, keyType SHALL contain value '88' and keyLen SHALL contain '10'.
-When SM4 is selected by the SM-DP+, keyType SHALL contain value '89' and keyLen SHALL contain '10'.
NOTE: Key type values are assigned in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8].
SM-DP+ signature (smdpSign) is computed as described in section 2.6.9, using the SM‑DP+ private key SK.DPpb.SIG across the following concatenated data objects:
•remoteOpId
•transactionId
•controlRefTemplate
•smdpOtpk
•euiccOtpk, as provided earlier in the prepareDownloadResponse data object received in the "ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage" function.
As the signature includes the otPK.EUICC.KA, the eUICC can authenticate the SM-DP+.
When remoteOpId is installBoundProfilePackage , the implicit Key Usage Qualifier SHALL be set to MAC and ENCRYPTION.
5.5.2 Function: ConfigureISDP
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R
Description:
This function is used by the SM-DP+ to provide data to the eUICC for configuring the ISD-P. For this version of the specification, this data element only contains the optional SM-DP+ proprietary data.
NOTE: Information like the amount of assigned memory MAY be added in future versions.
On reception of this command the eUICC SHALL:
•Create the ISD-P for the Profile and assign an AID value from the range reserved for ISD-Ps in SGP.02 [2].
•If the length of the SM-DP+ proprietary data exceeds the maximum size, terminate with error 'incorrectInputValues'.
•Store the SM-DP+ proprietary data in the ISD-P.
Command data
The command data for this function is encoded in the ASN.1 data object below.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
--Definition of data objects for ConfigureISDPRequest
ConfigureISDPRequest ::= [36] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF24'
dpProprietaryData [24] DpProprietaryData OPTIONAL -- Tag 'B8'
}
DpProprietaryData ::= SEQUENCE { -- maximum size including tag and length field: 128 bytes
dpOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- OID in the tree of the SM-DP+ that created the Profile
-- additional data objects defined by the SM-DP+ MAY follow
}
-- ASN1STOP5.5.3 Function: StoreMetadata
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R
Description:
This function is used by the SM-DP+ to provide Profile Metadata of the Profile to the eUICC.
On reception of this command the eUICC SHALL verify the following:
•The Profile Class is supported. Otherwise, the reported error SHALL be unsupportedProfileClass.
•The ICCID is different than that of all other installed profiles. Otherwise, the reported error SHALL be installFailedDueToIccidAlreadyExistsOnEuicc.
•If PPRs are provided in the Profile Metadata: the Profile Owner data object is present and the PPRs are allowed for the Profile Owner. This verification SHALL be done as described section 2.9.3.1. Otherwise, the reported error SHALL be pprNotAllowed.
•If enterpriseConfiguration is provided in the Profile Metadata:
-That it supports Enterprise Profiles. Otherwise, the reported error SHALL be enterpriseProfilesNotSupported.
-If it contains enterpriseRules: that the Device is an Enterprise-Capable Device. Otherwise, the reported error SHALL be enterpriseRulesNotAllowed.
-That none of the installed Profiles has PPR1 set. Otherwise, the reported error SHALL be enterpriseProfileNotAllowed.
-If an Enterprise Profile is already installed on the eUICC: that the enterpriseOid in the command is identical to the value of an Enterprise Profile already installed on the eUICC. Otherwise, the reported error SHALL be enterpriseOidMismatch.
-If it contains enterpriseRules: that the referenceEnterpriseRule bit is not set. Otherwise, the reported error SHALL be enterpriseRulesError.
-If there is a Profile with a Reference Enterprise Rule installed on the eUICC and this rule prohibits the installation of non-Enterprise Profiles: that the Profile to be installed is an Enterprise Profile. Otherwise, the reported error SHALL be enterpriseProfilesOnly.
-If lprConfiguration is provided in the Profile Metadata: that it and the Device both support the LPA Proxy. Otherwise, the reported error SHALL be lprNotSupported.
-If an unknown TLV is encountered, the eUICC SHALL report an error unknownTlvInMetadata.
If any verification fails, the eUICC SHALL report the indicated error and stop the profile installation procedure. Otherwise, store the data elements for future use.
Command data
The command data for this function is identified by the data structure defined hereunder.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
StoreMetadataRequest ::= [37] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF25'
iccid Iccid,
serviceProviderName [17] UTF8String (SIZE(0..32)), -- Tag '91'
profileName [18] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)), -- Tag '92' (corresponds to 'Short Description' defined in SGP.21 [2])
iconType [19] IconType OPTIONAL, -- Tag '93' (JPG or PNG)
icon [20] OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '94' (Data of the icon. Size 64 x 64 pixel. This field SHALL only be present if iconType is present)
profileClass [21] ProfileClass DEFAULT operational, -- Tag '95'
notificationConfigurationInfo [22] SEQUENCE OF NotificationConfigurationInformation OPTIONAL,
profileOwner [23] OperatorId OPTIONAL, -- Tag 'B7'
profilePolicyRules [25] PprIds OPTIONAL, -- Tag '99'
serviceSpecificDataStoredInEuicc [34] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0# Tag 'BF22'
serviceSpecificDataNotStoredInEuicc [35] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0# Tag 'BF23'
rpmConfiguration [26] RpmConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# Tag 'BA'
hriServerAddress [27] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9B'
serviceProviderMessage [30] LocalisedTextMessage OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag 'BE'
lprConfiguration [28] LprConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0# Tag 'BC'
enterpriseConfiguration [29] EnterpriseConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# Tag 'BD'
serviceDescription [31] ServiceDescription OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9F1F'
deviceChangeConfiguration [32] DeviceChangeConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF20'
estimatedProfileSize [33] INTEGER OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9F21'
}
NotificationEvent ::= BIT STRING {
notificationInstall(0),
notificationLocalEnable(1),
notificationLocalDisable(2),
notificationLocalDelete(3),
notificationRpmEnable(4), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
notificationRpmDisable(5), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
notificationRpmDelete(6), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
loadRpmPackageResult(7) -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
}
NotificationConfigurationInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
profileManagementOperation NotificationEvent,
notificationAddress UTF8String -- FQDN to forward the notification
}
ServiceDescription ::= BIT STRING { -- 1: service is on, 0: service is off #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
voice (0), -- Operator-provided voice service
data (1) -- Operator-provided data service
}
-- ASN1STOPUnless specified otherwise below, the eUICC SHALL store a data object which is present in the command.
Each bit indicating a specific event MAY appear several times in the sequence of notificationConfigurationInfo data object. In that case, it specifies several recipient addresses for the same notification event. The loadRpmPackageResult has no meaning when provided in the notificationConfigurationInfo.
The data object profileOwner SHALL be present if the profilePolicyRules data object is present. In this instance the mccMnc field SHALL NOT specify any wildcard ('E') digits.
The SM-DP+ SHALL NOT specify an empty string in the data objects profileName and serviceProviderName.
The data object profilePolicyRules SHALL NOT be present for a Profile that has no PPR set. Otherwise, the profilePolicyRules SHALL identify all the PPRs set in the Profile. If the profilePolicyRules data object is not present, all PPR bits of the Profile SHALL be considered zero. The PprIds type is defined in section 2.4a.1.1.
The data object lprConfiguration SHALL be present only if the eUICC supports the LPA Proxy.
The eUICC SHALL NOT store the data object serviceSpecificDataNotStoredInEuicc if present.
The SM-DP+ SHALL not include the data objects serviceSpecificDataStoredInEuicc and/or serviceSpecificDataNotStoredInEuicc unless the eUICC indicated serviceSpecificDataSupport.
The information defined in serviceSpecificDataStoredInEuicc and serviceSpecificDataNotStoredInEuicc SHALL neither impact the functionalities and Profile Management Operations defined in this specification that are not vendor specific, nor the interoperability of the solution defined in this specification (incl. Devices, Profiles, and SM-DP+s).
The SM-DP+ SHALL include the data object rpmConfiguration only if the eUICC indicated rpmSupport.
The SM-DP+ SHALL include the data object hriServerAddress only if the eUICC indicated hriServerAddressSupport.
The SM-DP+ SHALL include the data object serviceProviderMessage only if the eUICC indicated serviceProviderMessageSupport. The eUICC SHALL NOT store this data object if present.
The SM-DP+ SHALL include the data object lprConfiguration only if the eUICC indicated lpaProxySupport.
The SM-DP+ SHALL include the data object enterpriseConfiguration if and only if the Profile is an Enterprise Profile, and only if the eUICC indicated enterpriseProfilesSupport.
The SM-DP+ SHALL include the data object serviceDescription only if the eUICC indicated serviceDescriptionSupport.
The SM-DP+ SHALL include the data object deviceChangeConfiguration if and only if the Profile supports Device Change, and only if the eUICC indicated deviceChangeSupport.
The estimatedProfileSize data object includes an estimated size of the installed Profile in the non-volatile memory, expressed in bytes. The SM-DP+ SHALL include this data object only if the eUICC indicated estimatedProfileSizeIndicationSupport. If present, it SHALL NOT be stored in the eUICC.
5.5.4 Function: ReplaceSessionKeys
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R
Description:
This function is used to replace the BSP session keys (S-ENC and S-MAC) during the loading of a Bound Profile Package by a new set of session keys (typically the PPK-ENC and PPK-CMAC (section 2.5). Note that both keys are replaced; this function doesn't allow replacement of only one of the session keys.
On reception of this function the eUICC SHALL:
•Verify that the new keys are of same length as the old keys. Otherwise the eUICC SHALL return an error, and the loading of the BPP SHALL be aborted.
•Replace the current session keys with the new set of keys.
Once the function is successfully executed, the eUICC SHALL use this new set of keys for decryption and MAC verification of subsequent BSP payload blocks of data. The key type of the new set of keys is the same as the session keys they replace.
Command data
The command message for this function is encoded in the ASN.1 data object below.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
-- Definition of request message for command ReplaceSessionKeys
ReplaceSessionKeysRequest ::= [38] SEQUENCE { -- tag 'BF26'
-- The new initial MAC chaining value
initialMacChainingValue OCTET STRING,
-- New session key value for encryption/decryption (PPK-ENC)
ppkEnc OCTET STRING,
-- New session key value of the session key C-MAC computation/verification (PPK-MAC)
ppkCmac OCTET STRING
}
-- ASN1STOP5.5.5 Function: LoadProfileElements
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R
Description:
This function is used by the SM-DP+ to provide the Profile Elements defined by eUICC Profile Package specification [5] to the eUICC.
Command messages, response messages and the processing on the eUICC are defined in eUICC Profile Package specification [5].
The eUICC SHALL ignore the ICCID value provided in the 'ProfileHeader' PE.
The eUICC SHALL verify that the following values provided in the Profile Metadata via "ES8+.StoreMetadata" are reflected in the content of EFs of the Profile:
•The ICCID provided in the Profile Metadata is identical to the value of EF_(ICCID).
•If profileOwner is provided in the Profile Metadata:
oThe mccMnc value provided in the Profile Metadata SHALL match the MCC and MNC values in EF_(IMSI).
oIf gid1 or gid2 is provided in the Profile Metadata: The corresponding EF_(GID1) or EF_(GID2) SHALL be present and contain the same value as provided in the data object and the related service in EF_(UST) SHALL indicate "available".
oIf gid1 or gid2 is not provided in the Profile Metadata: The corresponding service in EF_(UST) for EF_(GID1) or EF_(GID2) SHALL indicate "not available".
Any failure SHALL be indicated by an installFailedDueToDataMismatch error.
If the Profile is a Test Profile, the eUICC SHALL check if the key(s) for network authentication follow the requirements defined in section 2.4.5.3.
On any error during the processing of a Profile Element, the Profile installation SHALL stop and the ISD-P and all the related Profile Components SHALL be deleted.
If the Profile is successfully installed, the eUICC SHALL first generate the Profile Installation Result and then as many Notifications as configured in its metadata (notificationConfigurationInfo) in the format of OtherSignedNotification.
Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL only generate the Profile Installation Result with an error indication.
5.6 ES9+ (LPA -- SM-DP+)
ES9+ is the interface between:
•The LPA entity (more specifically the LPD endpoint)and,
•the SM-DP+ (more specifically the Profile Package Delivery endpoint, which is in charge to deliver the input data from the LPA to the Profile Package Binding function, and deliver the output data from the Profile Package Binding function to the LPA).
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 34: ES9+
The LPA SHALL communicates with the SM-DP+ secured by HTTPS in server authentication mode as described in section 2.6.6.
The format of the TLS Certificates (CERT.DP.TLS) used for TLS connections is described in section 4.5.2.1.
During TLS establishment, the LPA SHALL verify the received CERT.DP.TLS according to section 4.5.2.2. If any of these verifications fail, the TLS connection SHALL be rejected, and the on-going procedure SHALL fail.
5.6.1 Function: InitiateAuthentication
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation
Function Provider Entity: SM-DP+
Description:
This function requests the SM-DP+ authentication. This is following the "GetEUICCChallenge" between the eUICC and the LPAd, where the LPAd retrieves material from the eUICC to be provided to the SM-DP+.
On reception of this function call, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Verify that the received address matches its own SM-DP+ address, where the comparison SHALL be case-insensitive. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "SM-DP+ Address - Refused".
•If euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3 is present, verify it supports one of these eSIM CA RootCA Public Keys against which eUICC signatures can be verified, and select the eSIM CA RootCA Public Key. If the SM-DP+ does not have any other priorities defined, the SM-DP+ SHALL follow the priority order given by the eUICC in euiccCIPKIdListForSigningV3. If an eSIM CA public key is selected, then:
-the public key identifier SHALL be returned in sessionContext.euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3
-and in addition: if LPA indicates certChainV3Support, euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed SHALL be omitted, otherwise it SHALL be present with a zero-length value.
•If no eSIM CA RootCA Public Key has been selected from euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3, verify it supports one of the keys indicated by euiccCiPKIdListForSigning (again using its own defined priority or priority from the list). If not, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code (Security configuration - Unsupported). The key identifier SHALL be returned in euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed, and sessionContext.euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3 SHALL be omitted.
NOTE: A version 2 eUICC only sends euiccCiPKIdListForSigning, therefore the SM-DP+ can only select an eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifier among this list. A version 3 eUICC can send various combinations of euiccCiPKIdListForSigning and euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3 (see section 5.7.8). If the SM-DP+ selects an eSIM CA RootCA Public Key identifier in euiccCiPKIdListForSigning, the SM-DP+ has to support the verification of the certificate chain Variant O.
•Determine the set of CERT.DPauth.SIG that satisfy the following criteria:
-Part of a certificate chain ending at one of the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate, whose Public Keys is supported by the eUICC (indicated by euiccCiPKIdListForVerification).
-Using a certificate chain that the eUICC and the LPA both support:
-If the eUICC indicates certChainV3VerificationSupport and the LPA indicates certChainV3Support, then it SHALL belong to a chain following one of the Variants O, A, B or C (see section 4.5.2.0b).
-Otherwise, it SHALL belong to a chain following Variant O.
•Depending on the number of Certificates in the set, do the following:
-If there is one, selects this CERT.DPauth.SIG.
-If there are more than one, selects the CERT.DPauth.SIG preferably according to the priority provided by the eUICC for the eSIM CA RootCA Public Keys.
-If there is none, and the LPA indicated euiccCiUpdateSupport, it SHOULD selects its preferred CERT.DPauth.SIG.
-Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "SM-DP+ Certificate - Unavailable".
•If both eUICC and LPA indicate crlStaplingV3Support, verify it can provide an up-to-date CRL corresponding to each Certificate in the chain that has a cRLDistributionPoints extension set. The SM-DP+ can retrieve each of them from the Distribution Point(s) indicated in the corresponding Certificate (see section 4.6.4), or from a local repository if the CRL copy is still not outdated. If the SM-DP+ cannot provide the necessary CRL(s), it SHALL return a status code (SM-DP+ Certificate - Unavailable).
•Generate a TransactionID which is used to identify the ongoing RSP session. The TransactionID SHALL be unique within the scope and lifetime of each SM-DP+.
NOTE: TransactionIDs not being reused protects against attacks which replay CancelSession messages.
•Generate a serverChallenge for eUICC authentication attached to the ongoing RSP session.
•Generate a serverSigned1 data object as expected by the eUICC and described in section 5.7.13 "ES10b.AuthenticateServer". If and only if both eUICC and LPA indicate crlStaplingV3Support, the SM-DP+ SHALL indicate crlStaplingV3Used in sessionContext.
•Generate a signature (serverSignature1) as described in section 5.7.13 "ES10b.AuthenticateServer" using the SK related to the selected CERT.DPauth.SIG.
The SM-DP+ MAY perform additional operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success', indicating that the RSP session has been successfully initiated at the SM-DP+.
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the following table.
Additional Input Data:
Input data name | Description | Type | No. | MOC |
|---|---|---|---|---|
euiccChallenge | euiccChallenge generated by the eUICC. LPDd can retrieve the euiccChallenge from the eUICC by calling "ES10b.GetEUICCChallenge" (section 5.7.7). | Binary[16] | 1 | M |
euiccInfo1 | euiccInfo1 of the eUICC. LPDd can retrieve the euiccInfo1 by calling "ES10b.GetEUICCInfo" (section 5.7.8). | Binary⁽¹⁾ | 1 | M |
smdpAddress | The SM-DP+ Address as known and provided by the LPA. | FQDN | 1 | M |
lpaRspCapability | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# The RSP capability supported by the LPA. | Binary⁽²⁾ | 1 | C⁽³⁾ |
NOTE 1: euiccInfo1 SHALL be provided as an encoded EuiccInfo1 data object. NOTE 2: lpaRspCapability SHALL be provided as an encoded data object including the tag defined for it in the DeviceInfo data object as defined in section 4.2. NOTE 3: lpaRspCapability SHALL be provided by a version 3 or higher compliant LPA. |
Table 35: InitiateAuthentication Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
Output data name | Description | Type | No. | MOC |
|---|---|---|---|---|
transactionId | Transaction ID as generated by the SM‑DP+ (section 3.0.1). | Binary[1-16] | 1 | M |
serverSigned1 | The data object signed by the SM-DP+. | Binary⁽¹⁾ ⁽³⁾ | 1 | M |
serverSignature1 | SM-DP+ signature. | Binary⁽¹⁾ | 1 | M |
euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed | If present and not empty, indicates the Variant O certificate chain related to the Private Key that the eUICC SHALL use for signing. | Binary⁽¹⁾ ⁽⁶⁾ | 1 | C⁽⁴⁾ |
serverCertificate | SM-DP+ Certificate (CERT.DPauth.SIG). | Binary⁽¹⁾ | 1 | M |
otherCertsInChain | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# The remaining part of the CERT.DPauth.SIG Certificate chain (If any). It contains a CERT.DPSubCA.SIG, a CERT.CISubCA.SIG, or both. | Binary⁽¹⁾ | 1 | C⁽²⁾ |
crlList | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# The list of CRLs needed to verify the revocation status of each Certificate that contains a cRLDistributionPoints extension in the returned Certificate chain. | Binary⁽¹⁾ | 1 | C⁽⁵⁾ |
NOTE 1: serverSigned1, serverSignature1, euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed, serverCertificate, otherCertsInChain and crlList are data objects defined in section 5.7.13 (function "ES10b.AuthenticateServer"). They SHALL be returned as encoded data objects including the tags defined for them in the AuthenticateServerRequest data object. NOTE 2: otherCertsInChain SHALL be omitted if the CERT.DPauth.SIG is directly signed by an eSIM RootCA. If present, this list SHALL contain one or two Certificate(s) according to the Certificate chain variant used by the server (section 4.5.2.0b). This may be extended in future version of this specification. NOTE 3: sessionContext and serverRspCapability SHALL be omitted in serverSigned1 if the euiccRspCapability was not present in the input data. NOTE 4: if the eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifier has been selected from euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3, euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed SHALL either be omitted or have a zero-length value as described above. NOTE 5: crlList SHALL only be present if both eUICC and LPA indicated crlStaplingV3Support. NOTE 6: euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed is not protected by a signature. However, the SM-DP+ assures its integrity by verifying that the eUICC Certificate in the subsequent call to ES9+.AuthenticateClient chains to the root public key identified by this value. |
Table 36: InitiateAuthentication Additional Output Data
Specific Status Codes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subjectcode Subject Reasoncode Reason Description ------------- ------------------------ ------------ ------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8.8.1 SM-DP+ Address 3.8 Refused Invalid SM-DP+ Address. 8.8.2 Security configuration 3.1 Unsupported None of the proposed Public Key Identifiers is supported by the SM-DP+. 8.8.4 SM-DP+ Certificate 3.7 Unavailable The SM-DP+ has no CERT.DPauth.SIG which chains to one of the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate with a Public Key supported by the eUICC. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 37: InitiateAuthentication Specific Status codes
5.6.2 Function: GetBoundProfilePackage
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation
Function Provider Entity: SM-DP+
Description:
This function SHALL be called to request the delivery and the binding of a Profile Package for the eUICC.
This function is correlated to a previous normal execution of an "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" function through a TransactionID delivered by the SM-DP+.
On reception of this function call, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Verify that the received transactionId is known and relates to an ongoing RSP session. If not, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "TransactionId - Unknown".
•Verify the euiccSignature2 computed over euiccSigned2 and smdpSignature2 using the PK.EUICC.SIG attached to the ongoing RSP session. If the signature is invalid, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "eUICC - Verification failed".
•Check if this order requires a Confirmation Code verification; if yes, the SM-DP+ SHALL verify that the received Hashed Confirmation Code matches the value known by the SM-DP+. If the Confirmation Code is not received, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Confirmation Code - Mandatory Element Missing". If the values do not match, the SM-DP+ SHALL increment the number of incorrect Confirmation Code attempts. If the maximum number of incorrect attempts for Confirmation Code verification is not exceeded the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Confirmation Code - Refused". If it is exceeded, the corresponding Profile download order SHALL be terminated and the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Confirmation Code - Maximum number of attempts exceeded".
If the Bound Profile Package has been previously generated for this eUICC, the SM-DP+ SHALL check if the otPK.EUICC.KA provided by the eUICC is the same as the one used to generate this BPP. If so, the BPP can be re-used: only the signature for InitialiseSecureChannel needs to be recalculated.
If the Bound Profile Package has been previously generated for this eUICC, but the otPK.EUICC.KA provided by the eUICC is different than the one previously used to generate this BPP, the SM-DP+ SHALL re-bind the PPP as described below.
To bind the PPP, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Attach the otPK.EUICC.KA to the ongoing RSP session.
•Link the Profile to the EID of CERT.EUICC.SIG if the Profile is not already linked.
•Generate a one-time KA key pair (otPK.DP.KA, otSK.DP.KA) for key agreement using the parameters indicated by the subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithmIdentifier.parameters field of CERT.DPpb.SIG.
•Generate the session keys (S-ENC and S-MAC) and the initial MAC chaining value using the CRT, otPK.EUICC.KA and otSK.DP.KA.
•Generate the Profile Metadata of the Profile.
•Generate the Bound Profile Package as described in (section 2.5.4), optionally including the Profile Protection Keys (PPK).
•Erase otSK.DP.KA immediately once BPP is generated.
The SM-DP+ MAY perform additional operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that the BoundProfilePackage has been successfully built and is part of the output data.
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the following table.
Additional Input Data:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Input data name Description Type No. MOC ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- ----- ----- transactionId Transaction ID as generated by the SM-DP+ (section 3.0.1). Binary[1-16] 1 M prepareDownloadResponse PrepareDownloadResponse data object defined in section 5.7.5. Binary⁽¹⁾ 1 M NOTE 1: prepareDownloadResponse SHALL be provided as an encoded PrepareDownloadResponse data object ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 38: GetBoundProfilePackage Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Output data name Description Type No. MOC --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- ----- ----- transactionId Transaction ID as generated by the SM-DP+ (section 3.0.1). Binary[1-16] 1 M boundProfilePackage Bound Profile Package data object to be transferred to the eUICC using "ES10b.LoadBoundProfilePackage" (section 5.7.6). Binary⁽¹⁾ 1 M NOTE 1: boundProfilePackage SHALL be provided as an encoded BoundProfilePackage data object --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 39: GetBoundProfilePackage Additional Output Data
Specific Status Codes
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subjectcode Subject Reasoncode Reason Description ------------- ------------------- ------------ ------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8.1 eUICC 6.1 Verification Failed eUICC signature is invalid. 8.2 Profile 3.7 Unavailable BPP is not available for a new binding. 8.10.1 TransactionId 3.9 Unknown The RSP session identified by the TransactionID is unknown. 8.2.7 Confirmation Code 2.2 Mandatory Element Missing Confirmation Code is missing. 8.2.7 Confirmation Code 3.8 Refused Confirmation Code is refused. 8.2.7 Confirmation Code 6.4 Maximum number of attempts exceeded The maximum number of incorrect attempts for the Confirmation Code has been exceeded. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 40: GetBoundProfilePackage Specific status codes
5.6.3 Function: AuthenticateClient
Related Procedures: Common Mutual Authentication
Function Provider Entity: SM-DP+
Description:
This function SHALL be called by the LPA to request the authentication of the eUICC by the SM-DP+.
This function is correlated to a previous normal execution of an "ES9+.InitiateAuthentication" function through a Transaction ID delivered by the SM-DP+.
On reception of this function call, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Verify the validity of the eUICC certificate chain, as defined in section 4.5.2.2. If the eUICC Certificate (or any of the certificates in the chain) is invalid or expired, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "eUICC Certificate - Verification failed" or "eUICC Certificate - Expired" respectively. If any of the certificates is missing in the chain, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "eUICC Certificate - Verification failed".
•Verify that the Root Certificate of the eUICC certificate chain corresponds to the euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed or euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3 that the SM-DP+ selected when executing the "ES9+.InitiateAuthentication" function. If it doesn't correspond, or if the chain variant doesn't match, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "CI Public Key - Unknown".
•Verify the eUICC signature (euiccSignature1) using the PK.EUICC.SIG as described in section 5.7.13 "ES10b.AuthenticateServer". Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "eUICC - Verification failed".
•Verify that the transactionId is known and relates to an ongoing RSP session. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "TransactionId - Unknown".
•Verify that the serverChallenge attached to the ongoing RSP session matches the serverChallenge returned by the eUICC. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "eUICC - Verification failed".
•If the SM-DP+ determines that the related Profile download order or RPM order has expired before being downloaded, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Download order - Time to Live Expired".
•If the maximum number of attempts for Profile or RPM download has been exceeded, the corresponding Profile download order or RPM order SHALL be terminated, and the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Download order - Maximum number of attempts exceeded".
•If euiccRspCapability.euiccRspCapInInfo1 is set to '1', verify that euiccRspCapability was present in euiccInfo1 as received in ES9+.InitiateAuthentication and that euiccRspCapability in euiccInfo2 matches the value received in euiccInfo1. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "eUICC - Value has Changed".
•Verify that lpaRspCapability in deviceInfo matches the value received in ES9+.InitiateAuthentication. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "LPA - Value has Changed".
Additionally, if the expired/terminated Profile download order or RPM order was accompanied by an Event Registration, the SM-DP+ SHOULD send "ES12.DeleteEvent" to the corresponding SM-DS to delete the relevant Event Record.
In addition, the SM-DP+ SHALL perform additional verification depending on the use case where this function is involved and the received ctxParams1.
The SM-DP+ SHALL identify the type of operation requested by the LPA checking the content of ctxParams1.
•If it contains ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication, the SM-DP+ SHALL refer to the value of the operationType:
oIf operationType is not present, the SM-DP+ SHALL regard this as a Profile download request from the LPA that conforms to version 2 of this specification.
oIf profileDownload bit is set, the SM-DP+ SHALL regard this as a Profile download request.
oIf rpm bit is set, the SM-DP+ SHALL regard this as an RPM download request.
oIf all bits in the operationType are set, or more than one Profile download orders and/or RPM orders are pending, the SM-DP+ SHALL prioritize the Profile downloads and/or RPMs as per Operator's request.
•If it contains ctxParamsForDeviceChange, the SM-DP+ SHALL regard this as a Device Change request.
•If it contains ctxParamsForProfileRecovery, the SM-DP+ SHALL regard this as a Profile Recovery request.
•Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL regard this as an error and SHALL return a status code "Function – Unsupported".
NOTE 1: In the context of a Device Change, a Profile download request from the new Device MAY additionally contain a deleteNotificationForDc. The presence of this field does not indicate a separate operation.
NOTE 2: If the operationType is set to profileDownload only, the data object will be absent in the DER encoding, which makes the function call backwards compatible to how it is defined in version 2 of this specification.
Beginning of Profile Download operation
The SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Verify there is a pending Profile download order for the incoming eUICC. For that, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•If there is a pending Profile download order associated with this EID:
•If ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication contains a MatchingId then verify that it matches the MatchingID for this pending Profile download order. Otherwise:
oThe SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "MatchingID - Refused"
oIf ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication contains a matchingIdSource data object set to an SM-DS OID, the SM-DP+ SHOULD delete the Event Record from the SM-DS identified by that OID (see Note 4).
•If the MatchingID is missing in ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication, any pending Profile download order associated to this EID MAY be selected.
•If there is no pending Profile download order associated with this EID:
•If ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication contains a MatchingId, then:
overify that there is a pending Profile download order associated with this MatchingID, and the pending Profile download order is not associated with an EID. Otherwise:
-The SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "MatchingID - Refused".
-If ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication contains a matchingIdSource data object set to an SM-DS OID, the SM-DP+ SHOULD delete the Event Record from the SM-DS identified by that OID (see Note 4).
•If the MatchingID is missing in ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication, this SHALL be considered as verification failure and a status code "EID - Refused" SHALL be returned.
•In case of a Profile download related to a Device Change that requires the deletion of the installed Profile, verify that either the Delete Notification of the installed Profile has been received or the previous Device Change response included encrypted Device Change data. If so, the SM-DP+ SHALL ignore the Delete Notification for Device Change received in this function call (if any). Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
oIf the SM-DP+ supports the processing of the Delete Notification for Device Change:
•Retrieve the Delete Notification for Device Change contained in the deleteNotificationForDc. If it is not received in this function call, the SM-DP+ SHALL return an errors status "Profile – Not Allowed".
•Retrieve CERT.EUICC.SIG, CERT.EUM.SIG, CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG (if it exists), and the ICCID attached to the pending Profile download order. If any retrieval fails, the SM-DP+ SHALL return an error status "Profile – Not Allowed".
•Restore the Delete Notification by combining CERT.EUICC.SIG, CERT.EUM.SIG, and CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG (if it exists) with the Delete Notification for Device Change retrieved above.
•Validate the restored Delete Notification by verifying the eUICC signature and checking if the ICCID contained in the Delete Notification matches to the ICCID attached to the pending Profile download order. If either fails, the SM-DP+ SHALL return an error status "Profile – Not Allowed"
NOTE: The Recipient Address of the restored Delete Notification may not be the FQDN of the SM-DP+ processing this function call. In such a case, it is out of scope of this document how the SM-DP+ interacts with the Notification receiver.
oOtherwise, return an error status "Profile – Not Allowed".
•Identify the Profile corresponding to the pending Profile download order.
•Verify that the identified Profile has been released (Profile state is Released, see section 3.1.6). Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile - Not allowed".
•Increment the number of attempts for the Profile.
•Perform the following eligibility checks:
-Check if the eUICC can install one more Profile. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "eUICC - Insufficient memory".
-If the Profile is a Test Profile, the SM-DP+ SHALL check if the Device is operating in Device Test Mode. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile type - Stopped on warning".
-If the Profile is an Enterprise Profile, the SM-DP+ MAY check if the Device is an Enterprise Capable Device and if the eUICC supports Enterprise Profiles. If this check fails, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile type - Stopped on warning".
-If the Profile Owner has disallowed Profile download to Field-Test eUICCs: If the target eUICC indicates V255.255.255 in ppVersion, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile Type – Stopped on warning"
-The SM-DP+ MAY perform additional Eligibility checks as described in Annex F.
•Attach the PK.EUICC.SIG to the ongoing RSP session.
•Verify if this order requires a Confirmation Code verification. If yes, the SM-DP+ SHALL set the ccRequiredFlag data field of the smdpSigned2 data object to true.
•Determine if the Profile is already bound to the EID from a previous unsuccessful download attempt. If yes, the SM-DP+ MAY include the otPK.EUICC.KA obtained in the previous session in the smdpSigned2 data object.
•Determine if an RPM Package is pending for the eid. If yes, the SM-DP+ MAY include the rpmPending in the smdpSigned2 data object.
•Generate an smdpSigned2 data object as defined in "ES10b.PrepareDownloadRequest".
•Compute the smdpSignature2 over the concatenated data objects smdpSigned2 and euiccSignature1 using the SK.DPpb.SIG.
•Generate the Profile Metadata of the Profile. If the Profile Metadata contains Profile Policy Rules and the eUICC Info indicates EuiccRspCapability.serviceProviderMessageSupport, then the SM-DP+ MAY include a Service Provider message to be displayed to the End User. If the Device Info includes language preferences, the SM-DP+ SHOULD provide a Service Provider message using the most preferred language that it can support. The method by which the SM-DP+ receives this/these localised message(s) from the Operator/Service Provider is out of the scope of this specification.
NOTE 3: When providing messages for delivery by the SM-DP+, the Operator/Service Provider should consider challenges displaying lengthy text on a device with a limited display.
NOTE 4: Deleting the Event Record corresponding to a MatchingId that is no longer valid allows to avoid repeated attempts to download the same package. The SM-DP+ should consider whether it is appropriate to delete an Event Record corresponding to a MatchingId that it has never known.
End of Profile Download operation
Beginning of RPM operation
The SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Verify there is a pending RPM order for the incoming eUICC. For that, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•If there is a pending RPM order associated with this EID and ICCID is received:
•If ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication contains a MatchingId, then:
oVerify that it matches the MatchingID for this pending RPM order. Otherwise:
-The SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "MatchingID - Refused".
-If ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication contains a matchingIdSource data object set to an SM-DS OID, the SM-DP+ SHOULD delete the Event Record from the SM-DS identified by that OID (see Note 4 above).
oVerify that the received ICCID matches the target Profile of this pending RPM order. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "ICCID - Refused".
•If the MatchingID is missing in ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication, any pending RPM order for the target Profile associated to this EID MAY be selected.
•If there is a pending RPM order associated with this EID and ICCID is not received:
•If ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication contains a MatchingId, then:
oVerify that it matches the MatchingID for this pending RPM order. Otherwise:
-The SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "MatchingID - Refused"
-If ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication contains a matchingIdSource data object set to an SM-DS OID, the SM-DP+ SHOULD delete the Event Record from the SM-DS identified by that OID (see Note 4 above).
•If the MatchingID is missing in ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication, any pending RPM order associated to this EID MAY be selected.
•If there is no pending RPM order associated with this EID, this SHALL be considered as verification failure and a status code "EID - Refused" SHALL be returned.
•Identify the RPM Package corresponding to the pending RPM order.
•Increment the number of attempts for the Profile.
•Determine if another RPM Package is pending for the eid. If yes, the SM-DP+ MAY include rpmPending in the smdpSigned3 data object.
•Generate an smdpSigned3 data object as defined in "ES10b.LoadRpmPackage".
•Compute the smdpSignature3 over the concatenated data objects smdpSigned3 and euiccSignature1 using the SK.DPauth.SIG.
End of RPM operation
Beginning of Device Change operation
The SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Return an error status "Device Change – Unsupported" if the SM-DP+ does not support Device Change.
•Identify the Profile for Device Change by ICCID contained in the ctxParamsForDeviceChange. If the Profile cannot be identified, the SM-DP+ SHALL return an error status "ICCID – Unknown".
•Verify that the identified Profile is associated with the EID of the incoming eUICC, i.e., the eUICC of the old Device. If the Profile is not associated with the EID, the SM-DP+ SHALL return an error status "EID – Refused".
•Call ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function with the ICCID and, if present in the ctxParamsForDeviceChange data object, the EID and/or TAC of the new Device contained in the ctxParamsForDeviceChange as per Service Provider's configuration. If the SM-DP+ receives any error status, the SM-DP+ SHALL return the received error status.
•Verify that the identified Profile is eligible for Device Change. If the Profile is not eligible for Device Change, the SM-DP+ SHALL return an error status "Device Change – Not Allowed".
•Attach the EID of the new device, if present, to the ongoing RSP session.
•Attach the CERT.EUICC.SIG, CERT.EUM.SIG, and CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG (if exists) received in this function call to the ongoing RSP session.
•If a Confirmation Code verification is required for the Device Change of the identified Profile, set the ccRequiredFlag data field of the smdpSigned4 data object to true; otherwise set to false.
•Generate an smdpSigned4 data object as defined in "ES10b.PrepareDeviceChangeRequest".
•Compute the signature smdpSignature4 over the concatenated data objects smdpSigned4 and euiccSignature1 using SK.DPauth.SIG.
•Prepare Service Provider Message for Device Change if either configured as per Service Provider's configuration or received in ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest.
•Notify the Service Provider of the Device Change progress by calling "ES2+.HandleNotification" function with the identification 'Device Change request (12)' and an the notificationEventStatus indicating 'Execution-Success' if configured as per Service Provider's configuration.
End of Device Change operation
Beginning of Profile Recovery operation
The SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Identify the Profile by ICCID contained in the ctxParamsForProfileRecovery, and verify that the Profile was processed for Device Change previously. If the Profile cannot be identified or the Profile was not processed for Device Change previously, the SM-DP+ SHALL return an error status "ICCID – Unknown".
•Verify that the identified Profile is associated with the EID of the incoming eUICC, i.e., the eUICC of the old Device. If the Profile is not associated with the EID of the eUICC of the old Device, the SM-DP+ SHALL return an error status "EID – Refused".
•Verify that there was a permanent error whilst installing the prepared Profile on the new Device for Device Change, corresponding to the ICCID contained in the ctxParamsForProfileRecovery. If verification fails, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Profile – Not allowed".
•Prepare a Profile for recovery and the associated Activation Code for the old Device. The SM-DP+ MAY interact with the Service Provider for the Profile preparation.
•Generate an smdpSigned4 data object including the Activation Code for Profile Recovery as defined in "ES10b.PrepareDeviceChangeRequest".
•Compute the signature smdpSignature4 over the concatenated data objects smdpSigned4 and euiccSignature1 using SK.DPauth.SIG.
End of Profile Recovery operation
The SM-DP+ MAY perform additional operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that the eUICC has been successfully authenticated.
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the following table.
Additional Input Data:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Input data name Description Type No. MOC ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ -------------- ----- ------ transactionId Transaction ID as generated by the SM‑DP+ (section 3.0.1). Binary[1-16] 1 M authenticateServerResponse Authenticate Server Response. Binary⁽¹⁾ 1 M deleteNotificationForDc Delete Notification for Device Change Binary 1 O⁽²⁾ NOTE 1: AuthenticateServerResponse data object defined in section 5.7.13 (function "ES10b.AuthenticateServer"). ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 41: AuthenticateClient Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
Output data name | Description | Type | No. | MOC |
|---|---|---|---|---|
transactionId | Transaction ID as generated by the SM-DP+ (section 3.0.1). | Binary[1-16] | 1 | M |
profileMetadata | Profile Metadata for the purpose of display by the LPA. | Binary⁽¹⁾ | 1 | C⁽⁴⁾ |
smdpSigned2 | The data to be signed by the SM-DP+. | Binary⁽¹⁾ | 1 | C⁽⁴⁾ |
smdpSignature2 | SM-DP+ signature. | Binary⁽¹⁾ | 1 | C⁽⁴⁾ |
smdpCertificate | SM-DP+ Certificate (CERT.DPpb.SIG). | Binary⁽¹⁾ | 1 | C⁽⁴⁾ |
smdpSigned3 | The data to be signed by the SM-DP+. | Binary⁽²⁾ | 1 | C⁽⁵⁾ |
smdpSignature3 | SM-DP+ signature. | Binary⁽²⁾ | 1 | C⁽⁵⁾ |
smdpSigned4 | The data to be signed by the SM-DP+. | Binary(3) | 1 | C⁽⁶⁾ |
smdpSignature4 | SM-DP+ signature. | Binary(3) | 1 | C⁽⁶⁾ |
serviceProviderMessageForDc | Service Provider Message for the purpose of display by the LPA to provide information for Device Change as defined in Section 6.6.2.2. | Binary | 1 | O⁽⁶⁾ |
NOTE 1: profileMetadata is the data object StoreMetadataRequest defined in section 5.5.3 (function "ES8+.StoreMetadata"); smdpSigned2, smdpSignature2 and smdpCertificate are data objects defined in section 5.7.5 (function "ES10b.PrepareDownload"). They SHALL be returned as encoded data objects including the tags defined for them in the StoreMetadataRequest/PrepareDownloadRequest data object. NOTE 2: smdpSigned3 and smdpSignature3 are the data objects defined in section 5.7.25 (function "ES10b.LoadRpmPackage"); they SHALL be returned as encoded data objects including the tags defined for them in the LoadRpmPackageRequest data object. NOTE 3: smdpSigned4 and smdpSignature4 are the data objects defined in section 5.7.26 (function "ES10b.PrepareDeviceChange"); they SHALL be returned as encoded data objects including the tags defined for them in the PrepareDeviceChangeRequest data object. NOTE 4: profileMetadata, smdpSigned2, smdpSignature2 and smdpCertificate SHALL be provided when this function is called in the context of the Profile Download and Installation procedure as described in section 3.1.3. NOTE 5: smdpSigned3 and smdpSignature3 SHALL be provided when this function is called in the context of the RPM Download and Execution procedure as described in section 3.7.2. NOTE 6: smdpSigned4 and smdpSignature4 SHALL be provided when this function is called in the context of the Device Change procedure as described in section 3.11.1. and the Profile Recovery procedure as described in section 3.11.2. Additionally, serviceProviderMessageForDc MAY be provided when this function is called in the context of the Device Change procedure as described in section 3.11.1. |
Table 42: AuthenticateClient Additional Output Data
Specific Status Codes
Subjectcode | Subject | Reasoncode | Reason | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
8.1.3 | eUICC Certificate | 6.1 | Verification Failed | eUICC Certificate or any Certificate in the trust chain is invalid. |
8.1.3 | eUICC Certificate | 6.3 | Expired | eUICC Certificate or any Certificate in the trust chain has expired. |
8.1 | eUICC | 6.1 | Verification Failed | eUICC signature is invalid or serverChallenge is invalid. |
8.1 | eUICC | 4.8 | Insufficient Memory | eUICC does not have sufficient space for this Profile. |
8.11.1 | CI Public Key | 3.9 | Unknown | Unknown eSIM CA RootCA Public Key. The eSIM CA is not a trusted root for the SM-DP+, or not the root elected by the SM-DP+ in InitiateAuthentication response. |
8.2 | Profile | 1.2 | Not allowed | Profile has not yet been released. |
8.10.1 | TransactionId | 3.9 | Unknown | The RSP session identified by the TransactionID is unknown. |
8.2.6 | MatchingID | 3.8 | Refused | MatchingID (AC_Token or EventID) does not match a valid order. |
8.1.1 | EID | 3.8 | Refused | EID doesn’t match the expected value, or there is no pending RSP session for this eUICC. |
8.2.5 | Profile Type | 4.3 | Stopped on warning | No eligible Profile for this eUICC/Device. |
8.8.5 | Download order | 4.10 | Time to Live Expired | The Download order has expired. |
8.8.5 | Download order | 6.4 | Maximum number of attempts exceeded | The maximum number of attempts for the Profile download order has been exceeded. |
8.1 | eUICC | 3.11 | Value has Changed | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# eUICC RSP Capabilities have changed compared to those previously received. |
8.8.6 | RPM Order | 4.10 | Time to Live Expired | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# The RPM order has expired. |
8.8.6 | RPM Order | 6.4 | Maximum number of attempts exceeded | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# The maximum number of attempts for the RPM Package has been exceeded. |
8.12 | LPA | 3.11 | Value has Changed | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# LPA RSP Capabilities have changed compared to those previously received. |
8.10.3 | Device Change | 1.2 | Not Allowed | #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Device Change is not allowed for the identified Profile. |
8.10.3 | Device Change | 3.1 | Unsupported | #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Device Change is not supported by the SM-DP+. |
8.2.1 | Profile ICCID | 3.9 | Unknown | #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# The Profile identified by the ICCID is unknown to the SM-DP+. |
1.6 | Function | 3.1 | Unsupported | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# The requested function is not supported by the SM-DP+. |
Table 43: AuthenticateClient Specific Status Codes
5.6.4 Function: HandleNotification
Related Procedures: Notifications
Function Provider Entity: SM-DP+
Description:
This function SHALL be called by the LPA to notify the SM-DP+ that a Profile Management Operation has successfully been performed on the eUICC.
The SM-DP+ SHALL manage the Notification according to section 3.5 and acknowledge the LPA of the processing.
The SM-DP+ MAY perform additional operations which are out of scope of this specification.
Additional Input Data:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Input data name Description Type No. MOC --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ----- ----- pendingNotification PendingNotification data object as defined in section 5.7.10 Binary⁽¹⁾ 1 M NOTE 1: pendingNotification SHALL be provided as an encoded PendingNotification data object ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 44: HandleNotification Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
No additional output data.
5.6.5 Function: CancelSession
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation, Remote Profile Management
Function Provider Entity: SM-DP+
Description:
This function is to request the cancellation of an on-going RSP session upon a decision of the End User. This function MAY be used in different procedures.
This function is correlated to a previous normal execution of an "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" function through a transactionId delivered by the SM-DP+.
On reception of this function call, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Verify that the received transactionId is known and relates to an ongoing RSP session. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "TransactionId - Unknown".
•Verify the eUICC signature (euiccCancelSessionSignature) using the PK.EUICC.SIG attached to the ongoing RSP session as described in (section 5.7.14 "ES10b.CancelSession"). Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "eUICC - Verification Failed".
•Verify that the received smdpOid corresponds to the SM-DP+ (i.e., is the same value as the one contained in the CERT.DPauth.SIG used during the Common Mutual Authentication Procedure). Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "SM-DP+ - Invalid Association".
The SM-DP+ SHALL perform additional operations depending on the context and the reason received, as described hereunder.
When used within a Profile Download and Installation procedure, and if the cancel session reason contained in euiccCancelSessionSigned indicates a terminal code (see section 5.7.14), the SM-DP+ SHALL:
1.Notify the Operator using the function "ES2+.HandleNotification" function with the identification of the step reached in the on-going procedure and an operation status indicating 'Failed' with status code according to mapping given in section 5.3.5.
2.Terminate the corresponding pending download process.
3.If required, execute the SM-DS Event Deletion procedure described in section 3.6.3.
NOTE: The operations 1), 2) and 3) are described as performed in the context of this function execution. Alternatively they MAY be done asynchronously by the SM-DP+. Operation 2) and 3) MAY not be performed depending on the agreed SM-DP+ behaviour with the Operator. If the operations are not performed, the Operator has the responsibility to take care of the management of the Download Order, e.g., by calling the "ES2+.CancelOrder" on reception of the notification "ES2+.HandleNotification".
The SM-DP+ MAY perform additional operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that the RSP session has been cancelled.
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the following table.
Additional Input Data:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Input data name Description Type No. MOC ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ ---------------- ----- ----- transactionId Transaction ID as generated by the SM-DP+ (section 3.0.1). Binary[1-16] 1 M cancelSessionResponse Defined in "ES10b.CancelSession" function, section 5.7.14 Binary⁽¹⁾ 1 M NOTE 1: cancelSessionResponse SHALL be provided as an encoded CancelSessionResponse data object -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 45: CancelSession Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
No output data.
Specific Status Codes
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject Code Subject Reason code Reason Description -------------- --------------- ------------- --------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------- 8.10.1 TransactionId 3.9 Unknown The RSP session identified by the TransactionID is unknown. 8.1 eUICC 6.1 Verification Failed eUICC signature is invalid. 8.8 SM-DP+ 3.10 Invalid Association The provided SM-DP+ OID is invalid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 46: CancelSession Specific status codes
5.6.6 Function: ConfirmDeviceChange
Related Procedures: Device Change
Function Provider Entity: SM-DP+
Description:
This function is to deliver the confirmation result of the Device Change upon a decision of the End User.
This function is correlated to a previous normal execution of an "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" function in the context of the Device Change through a transactionId delivered by the SM-DP+.
On reception of this function call, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Verify that the received transactionId is known and relates to an ongoing RSP session. Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "TransactionId – Unknown".
•Verify the euiccSignature3 computed over euiccSigned3 and smdpSignature4 using the PK.EUICC.SIG attached to the ongoing RSP session. If the signature is invalid, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "eUICC – Verification failed".
•If Confirmation Code verification is required: verify that the received Hashed Confirmation Code matches the expected hash value as follows:
oIf the Hashed Confirmation Code is not received, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Confirmation Code – Mandatory Element Missing".
oThe SM-DP+ SHALL calculate the expected hash value by using the Confirmation Code value known by the SM-DP+ and TransactionId.
expected hash value = SHA256(SHA256(Confirmation Code) | TransactionId)
If the value does not match, the SM-DP+ SHALL increment the number of incorrect Confirmation Code attempts. If the maximum number of incorrect attempts for Confirmation Code verification is not exceeded, the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Confirmation Code - Refused". If it is exceeded, the corresponding Device Change procedure SHALL be terminated and the SM-DP+ SHALL return a status code "Confirmation Code - Maximum number of attempts exceeded".
1.If configured by the Service Provider or the Service Provider set the isNewProfileRequired to true in the response to ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function, notify the Service Provider using "ES2+.HandleNotification" function with the notificationEvent indicating 'Device Change confirmation (13)' and the notificationEventStatus indicating 'Executed-Success'.
2.If the Service Provider set the isNewProfileRequired to true in the response to ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function or if it is configured by the Service Provider, wait for the completion of the Download Preparation Process, as defined in 3.1.1.2 and optionally the Subscription Activation Process, as defined in 3.1.1.4.
If the Service Provider set the isNewProfileRequired to false in the response to ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function or if it is configured by the Service Provider, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
-Prepare a Profile for download with the Profile Package of the same Profile Package.
-If an EID was provided in the Device Change Request of a previous normal execution of an "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" function, link the prepared Profile download with the EID.
-Prepare the Activation Code by either generating it on behalf of the Service Provider or being provided by the Service Provider.
-Associate the Activation Code Token of the Activation Code to the Profile for Download.
3.Prepare deviceChangeData and append the Service Provider Message for Device Change if configured by the Service Provider.
•If the deletion of the installed Profile is required, the SM-DP+ SHALL include a deleteOldProfile data object in the deviceChangeData. The SM-DP+ SHALL include a deleteOldProfile data object if the same Profile Package was prepared for Profile download.
•If the SM-DP+ supports the processing of the Delete Notification for Device Change, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
oInclude a deleteNotificationForDcSupport and notificationAddress data object in the deviceChangeResponse.
oAttach the ICCID of the Profile that has to be deleted and the certificates attached to the ongoing RSP session (i.e., CERT.EUICC.SIG, CERT.EUM.SIG and CERT.EUMSubCA.SIG as described in section 5.6.3) to the prepared Profile download.
•If the SM-DP+ supports the Profile Recovery of the deleted Profile in the old Device, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
oInclude a profileRecoverySupport and profileRecoveryValidityPeriod data object in the deviceChangeResponse.
oMaintain the association of the deleted Profile and the EID of the old Device until the expiration of time indicated in profileRecoveryValidityPeriod, successful Device Change, or successful Profile Recovery, whichever comes first.
3a. If the eUICC indicates encryptedDeviceChangeDataSupport and the deletion of the installed Profile is required, the SM-DP+ SHALL:
•Generate a one-time KA key pair (otPK.DP.KA, otSK.DP.KA) for key agreement using the parameters indicated by the subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithmIdentifier.parameters field of CERT.DPauth.SIG.
•Generate the session keys (S-ENC and S-MAC) and the initial MAC chaining value using the CRT, otPK.EUICC.KA and otSK.DP.KA.
•Generate encrypted and MACed sequenceOf87 with the deviceChangeData TLVs, and erase otSK.DP.KA.
4.Generate an smdpSigned5 data object as defined in section 5.7.27, "ES10b.VerifyDeviceChange".
5.Compute the smdpSignature5 over the concatenated data objects smdpSigned5 and euiccSignature3 using the SK.DPauth.SIG.
6.If configured by the Service Provider, notify the Service Provider using "ES2+.HandleNotification" function with the notificationEvent indicating 'Profile preparation for Device Change (15)' and the notificationEventStatus indicating 'Executed-Success'.
NOTE: Depending on the agreed behaviour between the Service Provider and the SM-DP+, from step 2 to step 5 MAY be performed by the Service Provider using "ES2+.DownloadOrder", "ES2+.ConfirmOrder", and "ES2+.ReleaseProfile" functions as defined in section 3.1.1.
•Otherwise, the SM-DP+ SHALL notify the Operator using the function "ES2+.HandleNotification" function with the notificationEvent indicating ''Device Change confirmation Failure (14)' and the notificationEventStatus indicating 'Failed' with status code according to mapping given in section 5.3.5.
The SM-DP+ MAY perform additional operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that the Device Change request has been successfully processed.
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the following table.
Additional Input Data:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Input data name Description Type No. MOC -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- ----- ----- transactionId Transaction ID as generated by the SM-DP+ (section 3.0.1). Binary[1-16] 1 M prepareDeviceChangeResponse PrepareDeviceCHangeResponse data object defined in section 5.7.5. Binary⁽¹⁾ 1 M NOTE 1: prepareDeviceChangeResponse SHALL be provided as an encoded PrepareDeviceChangeResponse data object. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 46a: ConfirmDeviceChange Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Output data name Description Type No. MOC --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ ---------------- ----- ----- transactionId Transaction ID as generated by the SM-DP+ (section 3.0.1). Binary[1-16] 1 M smdpSigned5 The data to be signed by the SM-DP+ Binary⁽¹⁾ 1 C smdpSignature5 SM-DP+ signature Binary⁽¹⁾ 1 C NOTE 1: smdpSigned4 and smdpSignature4 are the data objects defined in section 5.7.26 (function "ES10b.VerifyDeviceChange"); they SHALL be returned as encoded data objects including the tags defined for them in the VerifyDeviceChangeRequest data object. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 46b: ConfirmDeviceChange Additional Output Data
Specific Status Codes
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Subject code Subject Reason code Reason Description -------------- ------------------- ------------- ------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8.10.1 TransactionId 3.9 Unknown The RSP session identified by the TransactionID is unknown. 8.1 eUICC 6.1 Verification Failed eUICC signature is invalid. 8.2.7 Confirmation Code 2.2 Mandatory Element Missing Confirmation Code is missing. 8.2.7 Confirmation Code 3.8 Refused Confirmation Code is refused. 8.2.7 Confirmation Code 3.12 Invalid Match The received hashed Confirmation Code is different from the expected value. 8.2.7 Confirmation Code 6.4 Maximum number of attempts exceeded The maximum number of incorrect attempts for the Confirmation Code has been exceeded. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 46c: ConfirmDeviceChange Specific status codes
5.7 ES10x (LPA -- eUICC)
ES10 contains 3 different interfaces described below.
The ES10a is an interface defined between the LDSd and ISD-R (LPA Services).
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 35: ES10a
The ES10b is an interface defined between the LPDd and ISD-R (LPA Services).
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 36: ES10b
The ES10c is an interface defined between the LUI and ISD-R (LPA Services).
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 37: ES10c
Even if originally specified for Local Profile Management, some of the functions specified in this section are also used for RPM. If applicable, this is indicated in the "Related Procedures" entry.
For MEP, the functions specified in this section are executed on the Command Port. The rules for the different MEP modes on which eSIM Port can be used as Command Port and which eSIM Port can be the Target Port, as well as the mapping for SEP are defined in the procedures section.
5.7.1 ISD-R Selection and LPAe Activation
Before sending any command to the eUICC, the LPAd SHALL establish a logical channel and select the ISD-R.
The opening of the logical channel and the selection of the ISD-R SHALL be done explicitly using, respectively, the MANAGE CHANNEL command and the SELECT command defined in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8]. This MANAGE CHANNEL and SELECT commands can be intrinsically used via a dedicated Device OS API (e.g., OMAPI defined by GlobalPlatform [69] if provided).
The Device SHALL ensure that only the LPAd, but no other application on the Device, is permitted to select the ISD-R, except that the ISD-R MAY also be selected during eUICC initialisation as defined in section 3.4.1.
In order to provide information about the capabilities supported by the eUICC at an early point in time, additional information is provided by the ISD-R.
On the reception of the SELECT ISD-R Command, the following data SHALL be returned within the FCI template after the objects defined in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8]:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
ISDRProprietaryApplicationTemplate ::= [PRIVATE 0] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'E0'
lowestSvn [2] VersionType,
euiccConfiguration BIT STRING {
lpaeUsingCatSupported(0), -- LPA in the eUICC using Card Application Toolkit
lpaeUsingScwsSupported(1), -- LPA in the eUICC using Smartcard Web Server
enabledProfile(2), -- eUICC contains an Enabled Profile
lpaeUsingE4ESupported(3) -- LPA in the eUICC using 'E4' ENVELOPEs
} OPTIONAL -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
}
-- ASN1STOPNOTE: eUICCs according to version 1.X of this specification will not return this data structure.
The lowestSvn field is deprecated and is only present for backward compatibility with the previous version of this specification. The LPAd SHALL determine the capabilities of the eUICC by using the ES10b.GetEUICCInfo function.
NOTE: The lowestSvn field was called svn in the previous versions of the specification.
If the Device supports the requirements for the LPAe using CAT or SCWS as defined in section 5.11 and the eUICC indicated support for that option in the ISDRProprietaryApplicationTemplate, the Device MAY activate this option by sending an LpaeActivationRequest to the ISD-R.
NOTE: The Device can deactivate LPAe by performing a reset of the eUICC.
If the Device indicates support for LUId, LPDd and LDSd and it does not send an LpaeActivationRequest, the eUICC SHALL NOT activate the LPAe.
If the Device indicates support for LPAe using E4E, the eUICC SHALL activate the LPAe using E4E.
NOTE: This requirement assumes that a device supporting LUIe using E4E will always be paired with an eUICC supporting LPAe using E4E. Otherwise, the first "E4" ENVELOPE command sent by the Device will be terminated with an error as defined in ETSI TS 102 223 [31].
In all other cases, the eUICC MAY activate the LPAe.
The LpaeActivationRequest SHALL be sent to the ISD-R using the transport mechanism defined in section 5.7.2.
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
LpaeActivationRequest ::= [66] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF42'
lpaeOption BIT STRING {
activateCatBasedLpae(0), -- LPAe with LUIe based on CAT
activateScwsBasedLpae(1) -- LPAe with LUIe based on SCWS
}
}
-- ASN1STOPThe Device SHALL set exactly one bit in lpaeOption.
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
LpaeActivationResponse ::= [66] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF42'
lpaeActivationResult INTEGER {ok(0), notSupported(1)}
}
-- ASN1STOP5.7.2 Transport Command
One generic APDU is used on the interfaces ES10a, ES10b and ES10c to transport all command request and command response data.
Command Message
All functions use the command message STORE DATA as defined in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8] with the specific coding defined below.
Code | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
CLA | '80'-'83' or 'C0'-'CF' | See GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8] section 11.1.4 |
INS | 'E2' | STORE DATA |
P1 | '11' or '91' | See below |
P2 | 'xx' | Block number |
Lc | Var. | Length of data field |
Data | 'xx xx…' | The data field SHALL be one of the data object command DER encoded defined in ES10x |
Le | '00' |
Table 47: ES10x STORE DATA command APDU
Parameter P1
The P1 SHALL be coded as defined in the following table.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Meaning ----- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- --------------------------------------------------------- 0/1 - - - - - - - More blocks/Last block - 0 0 - - - - - No general encryption information or non-encrypted data - - - 1 0 - - - BER-TLV format of the command data field - - - - - - - 1 Case 4 command as defined in GlobalPlatform Amd A [9] - - - - - X X - RFU --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 48: ES10x STORE DATA P1
This interface is defined with command functions that are mostly handled with a single APDU command and response pair. When multiple STORE DATA commands are required, it is indicated by the use of the 'more commands' bit in the P1 byte as defined in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8], and procedure bytes controlling the return of additional data (e.g., '61 XX'). In particular if the size of the response is bigger than 256 bytes, the chaining of the commands SHALL be done as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 [14]. The responses SHALL be retrieved by the Device using several GET RESPONSE commands.
Data Field
The command data field contains the command request data for each function.
Response Message
Data Field
The response data field contains the command response data for each function.
Processing State Returned in the Response Message
eUICC SHALL indicate an APDU header coding error as defined in GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8] section 11.11.3.2.
A successful execution of the APDU command SHALL be indicated by the status bytes '90 00' if no proactive command is pending and by '91 XX' if a proactive command (e.g., REFRESH) is pending. All function specific errors SHALL be indicated in the response data field.
An incorrect/invalid data field encoding (i.e., not a DER data object) SHALL be indicated by status bytes '6A 80' (Incorrect values in command data).
An unsupported or unknown command request in the data field SHALL be indicated by status bytes '6A 88' (Reference data not found).
While a Profile state change is ongoing, i.e., a command was sent to the eUICC which mandates a REFRESH, but the REFRESH was not yet successfully executed (i.e., no Terminal Response with result "command performed successfully" received or reset of the eUICC), the eUICC MAY reject any other ES10 command with the status word '69 85' (Conditions of use not satisfied).
5.7.3 Function (ES10a): GetEuiccConfiguredData
Related Procedures: SM-DS / Default SM-DP+ address Retrieval
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
NOTE: Prior to version 3, this function was called GetEuiccConfiguredAddresses.
Description:
This function retrieves the following, if configured:
•the Root SM-DS address(es)
•the Default SM-DP+ address and its allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier from the eUICC
•the list of eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers supported by the eUICC for signature verification together with a human-readable name of each eSIM CA, which MAY be used by the LUI when the End User selects an allowed eSIM CA for a new Default SM-DP+.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
EuiccConfiguredDataRequest ::= [60] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3C'
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
EuiccConfiguredDataResponse ::= [60] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3C'
defaultDpAddress UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- Default SM-DP+ address
rootDsAddress UTF8String, -- Root SM-DS address
additionalRootDsAddresses SEQUENCE OF UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
allowedCiPKId SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# PKID allowed for the Default SM-DP+
ciList SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
ciPKId SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- List of eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers supported
ciName UTF8String -- on the eUICC together with a readable name
} OPTIONAL
}
-- ASN1STOPServer addresses are coded as FQDN.
For compatibility with previous versions of this specification, the first Root SM-DS address is provided in rootDsAddress and additional Root SM-DS addresses (if any) are provided in additionalRootDsAddresses. If no Root SM-DS address is configured, then rootDsAddress SHALL contain a zero-length string.
A removable eUICC SHALL have at least one Root SM-DS address configured.
5.7.4 Function (ES10a): SetDefaultDpAddress
Related Procedures: Set/Edit Default SM-DP+ Address
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function is used to update the Default SM-DP+ address and associated allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier.
allowedCiPKId SHALL NOT be present if the version of the eUICC is lower than 3.
If allowedCiPKId is present then the eUICC SHALL verify that it supports this public key identifier for verification. If this verification fails then the eUICC SHALL return the error status unsupportedCiPKId.
If the provided UTF8 string (defaultDpAddress) is not empty, it SHALL constitute the new Default SM-DP+ address. If allowedCiPKId is present then it SHALL replace the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier list in the eUICC; otherwise, the allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier in the eUICC SHALL be removed.
If the provided UTF8 string (defaultDpAddress) is empty, an existing Default SM-DP+ address and its associated allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier SHALL be removed, irrespective of the value of allowedCiPKId.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
SetDefaultDpAddressRequest ::= [63] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3F'
defaultDpAddress UTF8String, -- Default SM-DP+ address as an FQDN
allowedCiPKId SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# PKID allowed for the Default SM-DP+
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
SetDefaultDpAddressResponse ::= [63] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3F'
setDefaultDpAddressResult INTEGER {
ok (0),
unsupportedCiPKId(8), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError (127)}
}
-- ASN1STOP5.7.5 Function (ES10b): PrepareDownload
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function initiates a Bound Profile Package download after a successful authentication of an SM-DP+.
On reception of this command, the eUICC SHALL:
•Verify that the SM-DP+ has been previously authenticated. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code noSession.
•Verify the validity of the CERT.DPpb.SIG (using the ECASD service) as defined in section 4.5.2.2. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidCertificate.
•Verify that CERT.DPauth.SIG and CERT.DPpb.SIG belong to the same entity (i.e., same OID in subjectAltName). Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidCertificate.
•Verify that CERT.DPauth.SIG of the on-going RSP session and CERT.DPpb.SIG are certified by the same certificate. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidCertificate.
•Upon any error returned in these verifications, the eUICC SHALL terminate the RSP session.
•Extract the public key of the CERT.DPpb.SIG and attach it to the RSP session.
•Verify the smdpSignature2 using the PK.DPpb.SIG. If the signature is invalid, the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidSignature.
•Verify that the received transactionId contained in the smdpSigned2 matches the one of the on-going RSP session. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidTransactionId.
•If bppEuiccOtpk is provided in smdpSigned2 and it corresponds to a stored one-time KA key pair (otPK.EUICC.KA, otSK.EUICC.KA) for this SM-DP+: use this key pair for the RSP session. Otherwise: generate a new one-time KA key pair (otSK.EUICC.KA, otPK.EUICC.KA) using the parameters indicated by the subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithmIdentifier.parameters field of the CERT.DPpb.SIG, and attach otSK.EUICC.KA to the RSP session.
•Generate euiccSigned2 data object as defined hereunder which MAY include vendor-specific additional information (e.g., as described in Annex P).
•Compute the euiccSignature2 over the concatenated data objects euiccSigned2 and smdpSignature2 using the SK.EUICC.SIG that was used in the "ES10b.AuthenticateServer response".
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
PrepareDownloadRequest ::= [33] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF21'
smdpSigned2 SmdpSigned2, -- Signed information
smdpSignature2 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, -- tag '5F37'
hashCc Octet32 OPTIONAL, -- Hash of confirmation code
smdpCertificate Certificate -- CERT.DPpb.SIG
}
SmdpSigned2 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SM‑DP+
ccRequiredFlag BOOLEAN, -- Indicates if the Confirmation Code is required
bppEuiccOtpk [APPLICATION 73] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- otPK.EUICC.KA already used for binding the BPP, tag '5F49'
rpmPending NULL OPTIONAL -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
PrepareDownloadResponse ::= [33] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF21'
downloadResponseOk PrepareDownloadResponseOk,
downloadResponseError PrepareDownloadResponseError
}
PrepareDownloadResponseOk ::= SEQUENCE {
euiccSigned2 EUICCSigned2, -- Signed information
euiccSignature2 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- tag '5F37'
}
EUICCSigned2 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
euiccOtpk [APPLICATION 73] OCTET STRING, -- otPK.EUICC.KA, tag '5F49'
hashCc Octet32 OPTIONAL, -- Hash of confirmation code
additionalInformation VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
PrepareDownloadResponseError ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
downloadErrorCode DownloadErrorCode
}
DownloadErrorCode ::= INTEGER {invalidCertificate(1), invalidSignature(2), noSession(4), invalidTransactionId(5), undefinedError(127)}
-- ASN1STOPIn case of the error invalidTransactionId, the transactionId in the PrepareDownloadResponse SHALL be set to the value from the AuthenticateServerRequest.
5.7.6 Function (ES10b): LoadBoundProfilePackage
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function transfers a Bound Profile Package to the eUICC. The transfer is done by calling repeatedly this function with blocks of 255 bytes or lower according to the structure of the Bound Profile Package, i.e., each TLV of the BPP that is up to 255 bytes is transported in one APDU. Larger TLVs are sent in blocks of 255 bytes for the first blocks and a last block that MAY be shorter.
The eUICC SHALL erase the otSK.EUICC.KA attached to this RSP session no later than the successful completion of the BPP installation.
If this function is called when there is no RSP session, or if it is called with a TLV that is not expected according to the structure of the Bound Profile Package, the eUICC SHALL return the status words '6A 88' (Reference data not found) or '69 85' (Conditions of use not satisfied) as the response of the transport command defined in section 5.7.2. See section 3.1.5 for more details on error handling.
NOTE: The LPA may respond to these errors by calling ES10b.CancelSession.
Command Data
The command data SHALL contain a block of data of the BPP. The transfer and slicing in blocks of data SHALL follow description given in section 2.5.5.
Response Data
The data presence in the response message depends on the block status:
•For an intermediate block of data of a BPP TLV, the response message SHALL NOT contain data field.
•For the last block of data of a BPP TLV, a response message containing a Profile Installation Result SHALL be present or absent as specified in section 2.5.6.
After delivering the Profile Installation Result, the eUICC SHALL end the RSP session.
5.7.7 Function (ES10b): GetEUICCChallenge
Related Procedures: Common Mutual Authentication
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function initiates a RSP session between an RSP Server and the ISD-R. The initiation of the RSP session is materialized on the eUICC by the creation of a context containing an eUICC challenge.
Only one RSP session can be managed by the ISD-R at a time. So an on-going RSP session SHALL be completed before requesting the opening of a new one.
On reception of this function, the eUICC SHALL:
•Determine if a previous session was not completed. If so, then:
•The eUICC MAY store the unused otPK.EUICC.KA and otSK.EUICC.KA, together with the SM-DP+ OID, for future retry.
•An eUICC supporting the re-use of unused one-time key pairs SHALL limit the number of sessions in which one key pair can be used.
•The eUICC SHALL discard the previous session context.
•Create a new session context and generate a new random challenge attached to this RSP session.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
GetEuiccChallengeRequest ::= [46] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF2E'
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
GetEuiccChallengeResponse ::= [46] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF2E'
euiccChallenge Octet16 -- random eUICC challenge
}
-- ASN1STOP5.7.8 Function (ES10b): GetEUICCInfo
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function gets the eUICC Information as defined in section 4.3. This function MAY be called at any time.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows to retrieve EUICCInfo1:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
GetEuiccInfo1Request ::= [32] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF20'
}
-- ASN1STOPThe command data SHALL be coded as follows to retrieve EUICCInfo2:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
GetEuiccInfo2Request ::= [34] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF22'
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
EUICCInfo1 or EUICCInfo2 SHALL be returned for GetEUICCInfo1Request or GetEUICCInfo2Request, respectively, as specified in section 4.3.
5.7.9 Function: (ES10b): ListNotification
Related Procedures: Notifications
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R
Description:
This function is used by the LPA to list all available pending notifications from an eUICC before retrieving a specific notification.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
ListNotificationRequest ::= [40] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF28'
profileManagementOperation [1] NotificationEvent OPTIONAL
}
-- ASN1STOPThe profileManagementOperation data object can be used to filter the list of notifications that the eUICC SHALL return. A bit set to 1 in the profileManagementOperation indicates that the eUICC SHALL return all the notifications corresponding to this type. The type notificationInstall SHALL include ProfileInstallationResult.
If profileManagementOperation data object is omitted, the eUICC SHALL return all stored notifications whatever their type.
If profileManagementOperation data object indicates no event (all bits set to 0), the eUICC SHALL return an empty list or undefinedError(127).
Response Data
The response data SHALL contain the 'List Notification Response' data object if available, and filtered according to profileManagementOperation data object received in the command data. The eUICC MAY provide the notifications in any order. The list SHALL be empty if there are no pending notification matching the filtering criteria.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
ListNotificationResponse ::= [40] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF28'
notificationMetadataList SEQUENCE OF NotificationMetadata,
listNotificationsResultError INTEGER {undefinedError(127)}
}
NotificationMetadata ::= [47] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF2F'
seqNumber [0] INTEGER,
profileManagementOperation [1] NotificationEvent, -- Only one bit SHALL be set to 1
notificationAddress UTF8String, -- FQDN to forward the notification
iccid Iccid OPTIONAL
}
-- ASN1STOP5.7.10 Function (ES10b): RetrieveNotificationsList
Related Procedures: Notifications
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function retrieves the list of Pending notifications for installed Profiles including their confirmation required and the related data.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
RetrieveNotificationsListRequest ::= [43] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF2B'
searchCriteria CHOICE {
seqNumber [0] INTEGER,
profileManagementOperation [1] NotificationEvent
} OPTIONAL
}
-- ASN1STOPThe searchCriteria data object can be used to filter the list of notifications that the eUICC SHALL return, filtering can be done on sequence number or notification type. A bit set to 1 in the profileManagementOperation indicates that the eUICC SHALL return all the notifications corresponding to this type. The type notificationInstall SHALL include ProfileInstallationResult.
If searchCriteria data object is omitted, the eUICC SHALL return all stored Notifications.
Response Data
The response data SHALL contain the list of PendingNotification data objects. The list SHALL be filtered according to the notification seqNumber or indicated operation type that generates notifications provided in the command data. The eUICC MAY provide the notifications in any order. The list SHALL be empty if there are no pending notifications matching the filtering criteria.
The following is the definition of the RetrieveNotificationsListResponse data object
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
RetrieveNotificationsListResponse ::= [43] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF2B'
notificationList SEQUENCE OF PendingNotification,
notificationsListResultError INTEGER { undefinedError(127)}
}
PendingNotification ::= CHOICE {
profileInstallationResult [55] ProfileInstallationResult, -- tag 'BF37'
otherSignedNotification OtherSignedNotification,
loadRpmPackageResultSigned [1] LoadRpmPackageResultSigned
}
OtherSignedNotification ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsOtherNotification NotificationMetadata,
euiccNotificationSignature EuiccSign,
euiccCertificate Certificate, -- eUICC Certificate (CERT.EUICC.SIG)
nextCertInChain Certificate, -- The certificate certifying the eUICC Certificate
otherCertsInChain [1] CertificateChain OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Other Certificates in the eUICC certificate chain, if any
}
-- ASN1STOPeuiccNotificationSignature SHALL be created using the SK.EUICC.SIG and verified using the PK.EUICC.SIG as described in section 2.6.9. euiccNotificationSignature SHALL apply on the tbsOtherNotification data object.
When generating the euiccNotificationSignature, the eUICC SHALL use credentials related to the euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed parameter received from the SM-DP+ during the Profile Download and Installation Procedure.
The nextCertInChain data object SHALL contain the Certificate certifying the CERT.EUICC.SIG.
The otherCertsInChain data object, if present, SHALL contain the remaining part of the certificate chain certifying the nextCertInChain data object. See section 4.5.2.0a.
NOTE: The nextCertInChain data object was called eumCertificate in previous versions of this specification.
5.7.11 Function (ES10b): RemoveNotificationFromList
Related Procedures: Notifications
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function informs the eUICC that a specific Notification has been sent to the recipient address.
On reception of this command, the eUICC SHALL:
-Verify that the Notification identified by its sequence number exists. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code nothingToDelete.
-Remove such Notification from the Pending Notifications List.
-Return deleteNotificationStatus with value ok.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
NotificationSentRequest ::= [48] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF30'
seqNumber [0] INTEGER
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
NotificationSentResponse ::= [48] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF30'
deleteNotificationStatus INTEGER {ok(0), nothingToDelete(1), undefinedError(127)}
}
-- ASN1STOP5.7.12 Function (ES10b): LoadCRL
Related Procedures: None
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function, that was defined prior to version 3, is no longer supported by the eUICC.
5.7.13 Function (ES10b): AuthenticateServer
Related Procedures: Common Mutual Authentication
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function performs the authentication of the RSP Server by the eUICC.
On reception of this command, the eUICC SHALL:
•Verify that a RSP session exists (i.e., "ES10b.GetUICCChallenge" function has been previously called). Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return a noSession error code.
•Verify the validity of the RSP Server Certificate chain for authentication (using the ECASD service), as described in section 4.5.2.2 using the PK.CI.SIG identified by the Authority Key Identifier contained in the last Certificate of the chain. If the PK.CI.SIG is unknown, the eUICC SHALL return a ciPKUnknown error code. If the RSP Server Certificate or the Certificate chain is invalid the eUICC SHALL return an invalidCertificate error code.
•Verify that the RSP Server Certificate is either a CERT.DPauth.SIG or a CERT.DSauth.SIG, as described in section 4.5.2.2. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an invalidOid error code.
•Verify the signature (serverSignature1) of the RSP Server created over serverSigned1 as described hereunder. If the signature is invalid the eUICC SHALL return an invalidSignature error code.
•Verify that the euiccChallenge attached to the ongoing RSP session matches the serverSigned1.euiccChallenge returned by the RSP Server. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an euiccChallengeMismatch error code.
•Verify that the eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifier indicated in either euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed or euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3 is supported and related credentials are available for signing. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an unsupportedCurve error code. If both values are empty or omitted, the eUICC SHALL also return an unsupportedCurve error code.
If RSP Server indicates crlStaplingV3Used:
-Verify that the crlList data object is present. If not, the eUICC SHALL return a missingCrl error code.
-Verify the signature of each CRL in the list, as defined in RFC 5280 [17], using the Public Key identified in its authorityKeyIdentifier extension (this Public Key may be contained in one of the received Certificate(s) or may be an eSIM CA RootCA Public Key known by the eUICC). If a CRL signature is invalid, the eUICC SHALL return an invalidCrlSignature error code.
-Update its time reference as described in section 4.6.3.1 using the received CRL from the eSIM CA RootCA, and the CRL from the eSIM CA SubCA, if any.
-Verify that no Certificate in the chain is revoked as follows:
Verify that the time information contained in all the Certificates and the CRLs is acceptable as described in section 4.6.3.2. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an invalidCertOrCrlTime error code.
For each Certificate in the chain that contains a cRLDistributionPoints extension:
Search for the CRL in the crlList input data that has the same issuer, same authority key identifier in its authorityKeyIdentifier extension, and contains a matching distribution point name in its issuingDistributionPoint (IDP) extension (i.e., search for the CRL that has the Certificate in its scope). If not present, the eUICC SHALL return a missingCrl error code.
If onlyContainsUserCerts is set in the IDP CRL extension, verify that the Certificate does not include the basicConstraints extension with cA set. If not, the eUICC SHALL return an invalidCertOrCrlConfiguration error code.
If onlyContainsCACerts is set in the IDP CRL extension, verify that the Certificate includes the basic constraints extension with cA set. If not, the eUICC SHALL return an invalidCertOrCrlConfiguration error code.
Verify that onlyContainsAttributeCerts is not set. If not, the eUICC SHALL return an invalidCertOrCrlConfiguration error code.
Verify that deltaCRLIndicator and freshestCRL extensions are not set in the CRL. If at least one is set, the eUICC SHALL return an invalidCertOrCrlConfiguration error code.
Verify that the keyUsage extension in the CRL issuer’s Certificate contains the cRLSign indicator. If not, the eUICC SHALL return an invalidCertOrCrlConfiguration error code.
Verify that the Certificate serial number is not present in the CRL. If it is present, the eUICC SHALL return a revokedCert error code.
NOTE: As the number of SubCAs is unpredictable, the eUICC is not expected to track CRL numbers.
If ctxParams1 includes ctxParamsForDeviceChange, verify that the Profile identified by the iccid is installed in the eUICC. If not, the eUICC SHALL return an invalidIccid error code.
•Upon any error returned in these verifications, the eUICC SHALL terminate the RSP session.
•Attach the received transactionId to the RSP session.
•Attach the received RSP Server Certificate to the RSP session.
•Generate euiccSigned1 data object as defined hereunder.
•Generate the euiccSignature1 as defined hereunder, with the SK.EUICC.SIG related to the CERT.EUICC.SIG as requested by the RSP Server.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
AuthenticateServerRequest ::= [56] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF38'
serverSigned1 ServerSigned1, -- Signed information
serverSignature1 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, -- tag '5F37'
euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifier to be used; MAY also have zero length
serverCertificate Certificate, -- RSP Server Certificate CERT.XXauth.SIG
ctxParams1 CtxParams1,
otherCertsInChain [1] CertificateChain OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# The remaining part of the CERT.XXauth.SIG certificate chain (if any)
crlList [2] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# as specified in RFC 5280
}
ServerSigned1 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId, -- The Transaction ID generated by the RSP Server
euiccChallenge [1] Octet16, -- The eUICC Challenge
serverAddress [3] UTF8String, -- The RSP Server address as an FQDN
serverChallenge [4] Octet16, -- The RSP Server Challenge
sessionContext [5] SessionContext OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
serverRspCapability [6] ServerRspCapability OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
CtxParams1 ::= CHOICE {
ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication[0] CtxParamsForCommonAuthentication,
ctxParamsForDeviceChange [1] CtxParamsForDeviceChange,
ctxParamsForProfileRecovery [2] CtxParamsForProfileRecovery,
ctxParamsForPushServiceRegistration [3] CtxParamsForPushServiceRegistration
-- New contextual data objects MAY be defined for extensibility.
}
CtxParamsForCommonAuthentication ::= SEQUENCE {
matchingId [0] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- The MatchingId could be the Activation code token or EventID or empty
deviceInfo [1] DeviceInfo, -- The Device information
operationType [2] OperationType DEFAULT {profileDownload}, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
iccid Iccid OPTIONAL, -- ICCID, tag '5A' #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
matchingIdSource [3] MatchingIdSource OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
vendorSpecificExtension [4] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
CtxParamsForDeviceChange ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
iccid Iccid,
deviceInfo [1] DeviceInfo,
targetEidValue [APPLICATION 26] Octet16 OPTIONAL,
targetTacValue [2] Octet4 OPTIONAL,
vendorSpecificExtension [3] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL
}
CtxParamsForProfileRecovery ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
iccid Iccid,
deviceInfo [1] DeviceInfo,
vendorSpecificExtension [2] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL
}
CtxParamsForPushServiceRegistration ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0#
selectedPushService [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
pushToken [1] UTF8String
}
MatchingIdSource ::= CHOICE {
none [0] NULL,
activationCode [1] NULL,
smdsOid [2] OBJECT IDENTIFIER
}
OperationType ::= BIT STRING {
profileDownload(0),
rpm(1)
}
-- Records information agreed along the session
SessionContext ::= SEQUENCE {
serverSvn [0] VersionType, -- RSP Server SVN (provided for information only)
crlStaplingV3Used [1] BOOLEAN, -- Indicates CRLs were attached to the RSP Server response
euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3 [2] SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
supportedPushServices [3] SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL
}
-- Definition of ServerRspCapability
ServerRspCapability ::= BIT STRING {
crlStaplingV3Support (0), -- support for CRL stapling
eventListSigningV3Support (1), -- support for Event Record signing
pushServiceV3Support (2), -- support for Push Service
cancelForEmptySpnPnSupport (3)
}
-- ASN1STOPserverSignature1 SHALL be created using the private key associated to the RSP Server Certificate for authentication, and verified by the eUICC using the contained public key as described in section 2.6.9. serverSignature1 SHALL apply on serverSigned1 data object.
serverSvn indicates the highest Specification Version Number of this specification supported by the RSP Server and is provided for information only (see Annex M).
Either euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed or euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3 SHALL contain an eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifier. euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed indicates the Variant O certificate chain related to the Private Key that the eUICC SHALL use for signing. euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3 indicates one of the other certificate chain Variants related to the Private Key that the eUICC SHALL use for signing.
If the CERT.DPauth.SIG or CERT.DSauth.SIG is in a certificate chain Variant O, otherCertsInChain SHALL be omitted. Otherwise it SHALL be present and contain the remaining part of the CERT.DPauth.SIG or CERT.DSauth.SIG certificate chain (see table 36 in section 5.6.1 and section 5.8.1).
If matchingIdSource is not present, the source is unknown.
A vendorSpecificExtension data object MAY provide additional implementation-specific information.
A supportedPushServices data object MAY be present in case of the SM-DS supporting at least one Push Service and indicates the list of supported Push Service by the SM-DS.
Description of ServerRspCapability:
Refer to Annex M that describes how a version 3 RSP Server SHALL be configured.
•The crlStaplingV3Support bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the RSP Server supports the CRL stapling during the Common Mutual Authentication procedure.
•The eventListSigningV3Support bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the SM-DS supports signing the list of Event Records in the response of ES11.AuthenticateClient.
•The pushServiceV3Support bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the SM-DS supports at least one Push Service.
•The cancelForEmptySpnPnSupport bit SHALL be set to '1' if and only if the SM-DP+ supports the cancel session reason codes defined for eSIM V3 in the command data of ES10b.CancelSession.
The eUICC SHALL neither check the values provided in ctxParams1 other than ICCID in ctxParamsForDeviceChange nor correlate them with subsequent session activities (e.g., whether OperationType.rpm was set for an RPM session).
Response Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
AuthenticateServerResponse ::= [56] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF38'
authenticateResponseOk [0] AuthenticateResponseOk,
authenticateResponseError [1] AuthenticateResponseError
}
AuthenticateResponseOk ::= SEQUENCE {
euiccSigned1 EuiccSigned1, -- Signed information
euiccSignature1 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, --EUICC_Sign1, tag 5F37
euiccCertificate Certificate, -- eUICC Certificate (CERT.EUICC.SIG)
nextCertInChain Certificate, -- The Certificate certifying the eUICC Certificate
otherCertsInChain [0] CertificateChain OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Other Certificates in the eUICC certificate chain, if any
}
EuiccSigned1 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
serverAddress [3] UTF8String, -- The RSP Server address as an FQDN
serverChallenge [4] Octet16, -- The RSP Server Challenge
euiccInfo2 [34] EUICCInfo2,
ctxParams1 CtxParams1
}
AuthenticateResponseError ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
authenticateErrorCode AuthenticateErrorCode
}
AuthenticateErrorCode ::= INTEGER {invalidCertificate(1), invalidSignature(2), unsupportedCurve(3), noSession(4), invalidOid(5), euiccChallengeMismatch(6), ciPKUnknown(7),
transactionIdError (8), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingCrl(9), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
invalidCrlSignature(10), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
revokedCert(11), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
invalidCertOrCrlTime(12), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
invalidCertOrCrlConfiguration(13), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
invalidIccid(14), -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)}
-- ASN1STOPeuiccSignature1 SHALL be created using the SK.EUICC.SIG and verified using the PK.EUICC.SIG as described in in section 2.6.9. euiccSignature1 SHALL apply on euiccSigned1 data object.
The nextCertInChain data object SHALL contain the Certificate certifying the CERT.EUICC.SIG.
The otherCertsInChain data object, if present, SHALL contain the remaining part of the certificate chain certifying the nextCertInChain data object. See section 4.5.2.0a.
NOTE: The nextCertInChain data object was called eumCertificate in previous versions of this specification.
In case of a missing or damaged Transaction ID in the command data, transactionIdError SHALL be reported in the AuthenticateServerResponse with the transactionId value being empty.
5.7.14 Function (ES10b): CancelSession
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation, Remote Profile Management, Remote eUICC Management
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function allows the LPAd to cancel an on-going RSP session on the eUICC and to get a signed data structure that is necessary for the LPAd to request the same session cancellation to the RSP Server.
On reception of this command the eUICC SHALL:
•Verify that the Transaction ID provided as input data is known and matches the one of the ongoing RSP session. Otherwise the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidTransactionId.
•Generate an euiccCancelSessionSigned data object as defined hereunder.
•Generate the euiccCancelSessionSignature, as defined hereunder, with the SK.EUICC.SIG.
•If the reason is postponed or timeout, the eUICC MAY store the unused otPK.EUICC.KA and otSK.EUICC.KA, together with the SM-DP+ identity, for future retry.
•Discard the on-going RSP session.
•Respond with cancelSessionResponseOk defined hereunder.
The eUICC MAY perform additional internal operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
CancelSessionRequest ::= [65] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF41'
transactionId TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the RSP Server
reason CancelSessionReason
}
CancelSessionReason ::= INTEGER {
endUserRejection(0),
postponed(1),
timeout(2),
pprNotAllowed(3),
metadataMismatch(4),
loadBppExecutionError(5),
sessionAborted(16), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
enterpriseProfilesNotSupported(17), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
enterpriseRulesNotAllowed(18), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseProfileNotAllowed(19), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseOidMismatch(20), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseRulesError(21), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseProfilesOnly(22), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
lprNotSupported(23), -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0#
lprNetworkDataNotAllowed(24), -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0#
emptyProfileOrSpName(25), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
rpmDisabled(27), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
invalidRpmPackage(28), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
loadRpmPackageError(29), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
undefinedReason(127)
}
-- ASN1STOPNOTE: Cancel session reason values added since v3.0.0 are aligned with the error reason values in section 2.5.6.
Response Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
CancelSessionResponse ::= [65] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF41'
cancelSessionResponseOk CancelSessionResponseOk,
cancelSessionResponseError INTEGER {invalidTransactionId(5), undefinedError(127)}
}
CancelSessionResponseOk ::= SEQUENCE {
euiccCancelSessionSigned EuiccCancelSessionSigned, -- Signed information
euiccCancelSessionSignature [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- tag '5F37'
}
EuiccCancelSessionSigned ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId TransactionId,
smdpOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- SM-DP+ OID as contained in CERT.DPauth.SIG
reason CancelSessionReason
}
-- ASN1STOPeuiccCancelSessionSignature SHALL be created using the SK.EUICC.SIG and verified using the PK.EUICC.SIG as described in section 2.6.9. euiccCancelSessionSignature SHALL apply on the data object euiccCancelSessionSigned.
5.7.15 Function (ES10c): GetProfilesInfo
Related Procedures: Local and Remote Profile Management – List Profiles
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function retrieves the list of Profile information for installed Profiles including their current state (Enabled/Disabled) and their associated Profile Metadata. This function MAY also be used to retrieve this information for a particular Profile.
If there is a Profile state change ongoing (i.e., during an enable, disable or eUICCMemoryReset command requiring a REFRESH) and the Profile state is requested, the eUICC SHALL terminate the command with the status word '69 85' (Conditions of use not satisfied) for Local Profile Management and with error profileChangeOngoing for Remote Profile Management (if the LoadRpmPackage command which contained this command was not rejected by the eUICC, see section 5.7.2).
Command Data
The command data consists of the search criteria and the tag list. For Local Profile Management, it SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
ProfileInfoListRequest ::= [45] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF2D'
searchCriteria [0] CHOICE {
isdpAid [APPLICATION 15] OctetTo16, -- AID of the ISD-P, tag '4F'
iccid Iccid, -- ICCID, tag '5A'
profileClass [21] ProfileClass -- Tag '95'
} OPTIONAL,
tagList [APPLICATION 28] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- tag '5C'
}
-- ASN1STOPFor Remote Profile Management, it SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
ListProfileInfo ::= [5] SEQUENCE {
searchCriteria [0] CHOICE {
iccid Iccid,
profileOwnerOid [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER
},
tagList [APPLICATION 28] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
-- ASN1STOPThe following SHALL apply for Local Profile Management:
-It SHALL be possible to search for all the Profiles using no search criterion.
The following SHALL apply for Remote Profile Management:
-If an ICCID is specified in the command, the eUICC SHALL identify the target Profile, and SHALL verify that:
-the SM-DP+ that sent the RPM command is included in the Managing SM-DP+ List of the target Profile. Otherwise, an empty ProfileInfoListOk SHALL be returned.
-the allowed CI public key identifier (if present) matches the Subject Key Identifier of the CI corresponding to the CERT.DPauth.SIG of the SM-DP+ that sent the RPM Command. Otherwise, an empty ProfileInfoListOk SHALL be returned.
-If a Profile Owner OID is specified in the command, the eUICC SHALL identify all Profiles where the RPM configuration fulfils all of the following conditions:
-Profile Owner matches the Profile Owner OID in the RPM Command, and
-Managing SM-DP+ List includes the SM-DP+ that sent the RPM Command, and
-allowed CI public key identifier (if present) matches the Subject Key Identifier of the CI corresponding to the CERT.DPauth.SIG of the SM-DP+ that sent the RPM Command.
For each identified Profile, the eUICC SHALL return a ProfileInfo data object in profileInfoListOk. profileInfoListOk SHALL be empty if the list of identified Profiles is empty.
The content of each ProfileInfo data object is defined by the tag list as follows:
The value field of the tag list (tag '5C') contains a concatenation of tags (without delimitation) indicating the data objects to include in the response for each Profile matching all given search criteria.
If a requested data object is not present for a matching Profile, the data object SHALL simply be omitted in the response for that Profile.
The eUICC SHALL support the following tags in the tag list:
•ICCID, tag '5A' (*)
•ISD-P AID, tag '4F' (*)
•Profile state, tag '9F70' (*)
•Profile Nickname, tag '90' (*)
•Service provider name, tag '91' (*)
•Profile name, tag '92' (*)
•Icon type, tag '93' (*)
•Icon, tag '94' (*)
•Profile Class, tag '95' (*)
•Notification Configuration Info, tag 'B6'
•Profile Owner, tag 'B7'
•SM-DP+ proprietary data, tag 'B8'
•Profile Policy Rules, tag '99'
Service Specific Data stored in eUICC, tag 'BF22'
•RPM Configuration, tag 'BA'
•HRI Server address, tag '9B'
•LPR Configuration, tag 'BC'
•Enterprise Configuration, tag 'BD'
•Service Description, tag '9F1F'
Device Change configuration, tag 'BF20'
-Enabled on eSIM Port, tag '9F24'
-Profile Size, tag '9F25'
If no tag list is present, the eUICC SHALL return the default ProfileInfo: the ProfileInfo data objects marked with (*) for each Profile matching the selection criterion.
NOTE: For RPM, the SM-DP+ SHOULD take the maximum result size supported by the eUICC into account when constructing the command.
Example of use for Local Profile Management:
•Retrieve the default ProfileInfo for all installed Profiles. The command data field SHALL be coded as 'BF2D 00'.
•Retrieve ICCID, Profile State, Profile name, Profile Class and Profile Owner of a particular Profile/ISD-P having the following AID: A0 00 00 05 59 10 10 FF FF FF FF 89 00 00 10 00. The command data field SHALL be coded as 'BF2D 1C A0 12 4F 10 A0 00 00 05 59 10 10 FF FF FF FF 89 00 00 10 00 5C 06 5A 9F70 92 95 B7'.
•Retrieve ICCID and Profile state for all installed Profiles. The command data field SHALL be coded as 'BF 2D 05 5C 03 5A 9F70'.
Response Data
The following is the definition of the ProfileInfoListResponse data object:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
-- Definition of ProfileInfoListResponse
ProfileInfoListResponse ::= [45] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF2D'
profileInfoListOk SEQUENCE OF ProfileInfo,
profileInfoListError ProfileInfoListError
}
ProfileInfo ::= [PRIVATE 3] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'E3'
iccid Iccid OPTIONAL,
isdpAid [APPLICATION 15] OctetTo16 OPTIONAL, -- AID of the ISD-P containing the Profile, tag '4F'
profileState [112] ProfileState OPTIONAL, -- Tag '9F70'
profileNickname [16] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '90'
serviceProviderName [17] UTF8String (SIZE(0..32)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '91'
profileName [18] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '92'
iconType [19] IconType OPTIONAL, -- Tag '93'
icon [20] OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '94',
profileClass [21] ProfileClass OPTIONAL, -- Tag '95'
notificationConfigurationInfo [22] SEQUENCE OF NotificationConfigurationInformation OPTIONAL, -- Tag 'B6'
profileOwner [23] OperatorId OPTIONAL, -- Tag 'B7'
dpProprietaryData [24] DpProprietaryData OPTIONAL, -- Tag 'B8'
profilePolicyRules [25] PprIds OPTIONAL, -- Tag '99'
serviceSpecificDataStoredInEuicc [34] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0# Tag 'BF22'
rpmConfiguration [26] RpmConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# Tag 'BA'
hriServerAddress [27] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9B'
lprConfiguration [28] LprConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0# Tag 'BC'
enterpriseConfiguration [29] EnterpriseConfiguration OPTIONAL,
-- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# Tag 'BD'
serviceDescription [31] ServiceDescription OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9F1F'
deviceChangeConfiguration [32] DeviceChangeConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF20'
enabledOnEsimPort [36] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForMEPV3.0.0# Tag '9F24'
profileSize [37] INTEGER OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9F25'
}
IconType ::= INTEGER {jpg(0), png(1)}
ProfileState ::= INTEGER {disabled(0), enabled(1)}
ProfileClass ::= INTEGER {test(0), provisioning(1), operational(2)}
ProfileInfoListError ::= INTEGER {
incorrectInputValues(1),
profileChangeOngoing (11), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
}
-- ASN1STOPFor SEP, RPM, MEP-A1 and MEP-A2, the profileState data object SHALL indicate the current state of the Profile. For LPM with MEP-B, the value of the data object is EUM specific.
The enabledOnEsimPort data object is applicable for LPM with MEP only and SHALL indicate on which eSIM Port a Profile is in Enabled state. It SHALL NOT be provided by the eUICC for a Profile in Disabled state, for SEP and RPM.
The profileOwner data object can only be returned if Profile Owner has been provided in Profile Metadata or if files EF_(IMSI), EF_(GID1) or EF_(GID2) are not PIN protected.
The profilePolicyRules data object SHALL contain the identifiers of all Profile Policy Rules of the Profile.
The profileSize data object contains the estimated size of the installed Profile in the non-volatile memory, expressed in bytes. The indicated size MAY be a rounded value. The way the eUICC estimates and rounds the Profile size is implementation dependent. It is optional for the eUICC to support this data object.
5.7.16 Function (ES10c): EnableProfile
Related Procedures: Local and Remote Profile Management – Enable Profile
Function Provider Entity: LPA Services
Description:
This function is used to enable a Profile on the eUICC. The function makes the Target Profile enabled, and disables implicitly the Profile currently enabled on the Target Port, if any. This SHALL be performed in an atomic way, meaning that in case of any error during the command execution, the command SHALL stop and SHALL leave the involved Profiles in their original states prior to command execution.
If this function is called by RPM, it SHALL be treated as if the refreshFlag is set.
NOTE: Before calling the EnableProfile function with the refreshFlag not being set, the Device has the responsibility to ensure that the relevant conditions for use are met, as indicated in section 3.2.1.
For SEP, MEP-A1, and MEP-B, upon reception of the EnableProfile function, if the refreshFlag is not set, the eUICC SHALL:
•Check whether there is a proactive session ongoing on the Target Port (which the Device did not terminate). If so, the eUICC SHALL do one of the following:
oterminate the EnableProfile command and return an error code catBusy.
ointernally terminate the proactive session on the Target Port and ignore any incoming TERMINAL RESPONSE from that proactive session.
•Close all logical channels on the Target Port which still have an application of the currently enabled Profile selected (which the Device did not close), without generating an error.
Regardless of the value of refreshFlag, the eUICC SHALL:
•Verify that the Profile identified by its AID or ICCID exists. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code iccidOrAidNotFound for LPM and commandError for RPM.
•If the command is sent via RPM:
oVerify that the SM-DP+ that sent the RPM Command is included in the Managing SM-DP+ List and is authorised to perform the RPM Command. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code commandError.
oIf the Profile Metadata specifies an allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier for the Managing SM-DP+: verify that the Subject Key Identifier of the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate corresponding to CERT.DPauth.SIG matches that value. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code commandError.
•Verify that the Target Profile is in the Disabled state. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code profileNotInDisabledState.
•If the command is sent via RPM:
oIf the Enable command was preceded by a Disable command in the same LoadRpmPackageRequest, the eSIM Port where the Profile was disabled is the Target Port for the Enable command. Otherwise, the Target Port SHALL be set as follows:
If no eSIM Port is available (i.e., has no Enabled Profile assigned), the eUICC SHALL return an error code noEsimPortAvailable.
For MEP-B, if targetEsimPort is not provided in the LoadRpmPackageRequest and if the Command Port is available, the eUICC SHALL select the Command Port as Target Port.
For MEP-A1 and MEP-B, if targetEsimPort is provided in the LoadRpmPackageRequest and if the indicated eSIM Port is available, the eUICC SHALL select this eSIM Port as Target Port.
For MEP-A2, the eUICC SHALL select any available eSIM Port as Target Port.
NOTE: The behaviour of the eUICC for all other combinations is implementation specific. (E.g., no eSIM Port or a non-available eSIM Port indicated for MEP-A1 and the eUICC selecting the eSIM Port or the eUICC generating an error.)
oVerify that the Target Profile is not a Test Profile. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code disallowedForRpm.
•If the Target Profile is not a Test Profile: check if the Profile Policy Rules of the Profile currently Enabled on the Target Port allow its disabling. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code disallowedByPolicy.
•If the Target Profile is not an Enterprise Profile or a Test Profile: verify that the maximum number of non-Enterprise Profiles that can be Enabled according to the Reference Enterprise Rule is not exceeded. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code disallowedByEnterpriseRule.
•If the Reference Enterprise Rule indicates priorityEnterpriseProfile and the Profile with the Reference Enterprise Rule is currently disabled: verify that the Target Profile is the correct Enterprise Profile or a Test Profile. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code disallowedByEnterpriseRule.
•If the Profile currently Enabled on the Target Port is a Test Profile: verify
othat the Target Profile is (another) Test Profile, or
oif an Operational Profile was in Enabled state before the (first) Test Profile was enabled on the Target Port, that the Target Profile is this Operational Profile.
oOtherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code wrongProfileReenabling.
If the refreshFlag is not set:
•For MEP-A2, the eUICC SHALL select an available eSIM port as Target Port. If no eSIM port is available, then the eUICC SHALL return an error code noEsimPortAvailable.
•the eUICC SHALL reset the PIN status on the Target Port
•the eUICC SHALL disable the Profile currently Enabled on the Target Port (if any), Enable the Target Profile and implicitly select the MF on the basic logical channel.
•The eUICC SHALL return OK to the LPAd
NOTE: For subsequent actions by the Device see section 3.2.1.
If the refreshFlag is set:
•If CAT is not initialised, the eUICC SHALL return an error code commandError.
•For MEP-A2, the eUICC MAY return an error code commandError.
•If there is a proactive session ongoing on the Target Port, the eUICC SHALL do one of the following:
oterminate the EnableProfile command and return an error code catBusy.
ointernally terminate the proactive session on the Target Port. If a TERMINAL RESPONSE is still outstanding, the REFRESH command according to the step below SHALL only be sent after reception of the TERMINAL RESPONSE.
NOTE: In the case of the catBusy error, the Device MAY take implementation-dependent action to terminate the proactive command session, and MAY send the Enable command again without any further End User interaction.
•The eUICC SHALL mark the currently enabled Profile (if any) as "to be disabled", mark the Target Profile as "to be enabled" on the Target eSIM Port and return a status ok to the LPAd.
•The eUICC sends a REFRESH proactive command via one of following methods:
oFor MEP-A1, the eUICC SHALL first send an LSI COMMAND proactive command with the action "Proactive session request" on the Command Port. The "Proactive session request" action includes the Target Port number where a proactive command is pending. When the Device checks for pending proactive commands on the Target Port, the eUICC SHALL send the REFRESH command with "eUICC Profile State Change" mode (if supported by the Device) or "UICC Reset" mode to the Device on the Target Port where the Target Profile SHALL be enabled.
oFor SEP and MEP-B, the eUICC SHALL send the REFRESH command with "eUICC Profile State Change" mode (if supported by the Device) or "UICC Reset" mode to the Device on the Target Port where the Target Profile SHALL be enabled.
An MEP-Capable Device SHALL reset the Target Port instead of the UICC Interface when receiving a REFRESH with mode "UICC Reset" as specified in ETSI TS 102 223 [31].
•Upon reception of the Terminal Response with result "command performed successfully" or upon reset of either the eUICC or the Target Port in case of an MEP-Capable eUICC, the eUICC SHALL disable the currently Enabled Profile (if any) and Enable the Target Profile on the Target Port.
•Upon reception of the Terminal Response with result "temporary problem with executing command" or "permanent problem with executing command", the eUICC SHALL NOT disable the currently Enabled Profile (if any) nor Enable the Target Profile. Subsequent actions are implementation specific.
NOTE: In the case the Device supports the Single Wire Protocol interface to the eUICC, the Device SHOULD take the appropriate actions regarding this interface when Profile state is changed.
The eUICC MAY start a new proactive UICC session on the Target Port only after a new TERMINAL PROFILE command is executed.
•If a previously Enabled Profile was successfully disabled, the eUICC SHALL generate as many Notifications as configured in its metadata (notificationConfigurationInfo) in the format of OtherSignedNotification.
•If the Target Profile is successfully enabled, the eUICC SHALL generate as many Notifications as configured in its metadata (notificationConfigurationInfo) in the format of OtherSignedNotification.
-However, no Notifications SHALL be generated if the Target Profile or the previously Enabled Profile is a Test Profile.
-In failure cases, the eUICC SHALL not generate any notifications.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
EnableProfileRequest ::= [49] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF31'
profileIdentifier CHOICE {
isdpAid [APPLICATION 15] OctetTo16, -- AID, tag '4F'
iccid Iccid -- ICCID, tag '5A'
},
refreshFlag BOOLEAN, -- indicating whether REFRESH is required
targetEsimPort INTEGER OPTIONAL-- #SupportedForMEPV3.0.0#
}
-- ASN1STOPThe LPA SHALL only provide targetEsimPort for MEP-A1.
Response Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
EnableProfileResponse ::= [49] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF31'
enableResult INTEGER {
ok(0),
iccidOrAidNotFound(1),
profileNotInDisabledState(2),
disallowedByPolicy(3),
wrongProfileReenabling(4),
catBusy(5),
disallowedByEnterpriseRule(6), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
commandError(7), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
disallowedForRpm(9), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
noEsimPortAvailable(10), -- #SupportedForMEPV3.0.0# and
-- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
},
targetEsimPort INTEGER OPTIONAL -- #SupportedForMEPV3.0.0#
}
-- ASN1STOPtargetEsimPort SHALL only be present in the response of a successful enabling of a Profile with LPM for MEP-A2.
Alternative Case 3 Command
In addition to the command data exchange described above, the following alternative command is defined for the function. The eUICC SHALL support this alternative if it supports only SEP. Otherwise, the usage of this alternative is out of scope of this specification.
The command data is sent to the eUICC in a Case 3 STORE DATA command:
•The STORE DATA APDU SHALL be coded as defined in section 5.7.2, with the exception of P1 which SHALL be set to '90'.
•The command data SHALL be coded as defined above, the response data SHALL NOT be present.
•The following additional status bytes are defined:
'6A 82': Profile not found '69 85': Profile not in disabled state, command not allowed by Profile Policy Rules, Enterprise Rule or for RPM, or re-enabling wrong Profile '93 00': CAT is busy. Command cannot be executed at present, further normal commands are allowed
5.7.17 Function (ES10c): DisableProfile
Related Procedures: Local and Remote Profile Management – Disable Profile
Function Provider Entity: LPA Services
Description:
This function is used to disable a Profile on the eUICC.
If this function is called by RPM, it SHALL be treated as if the refreshFlag is set.
NOTE: Before calling the DisableProfile function with the refreshFlag not being set, the Device has the responsibility to ensure that the relevant conditions for use are met, as indicated in section 3.2.2.
Upon reception of the DisableProfile function, if the refreshFlag is not set, the eUICC SHALL:
•Check whether there is a proactive session ongoing on the Target Port (which the Device did not terminate). If so, the eUICC SHALL do one of the following:
oterminate the DisableProfile function and return an error code catBusy.
ointernally terminate the proactive session on the Target Port and ignore any incoming TERMINAL RESPONSE from that proactive session.
•Close all logical channels which still have an application of the currently enabled Profile selected (which the Device did not close), without generating an error.
Regardless of the value of refreshFlag, the eUICC SHALL:
•Verify that the Profile identified by its AID or ICCID exists. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code iccidOrAidNotFound for LPM and commandError for RPM.
•If the command is sent via RPM:
oVerify that the SM-DP+ that sent the RPM Command is included in the Managing SM-DP+ List and is authorised to perform the RPM Command. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code commandError.
oIf the Profile Metadata specifies an allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier for the Managing SM-DP+: verify that the Subject Key Identifier of the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate corresponding to CERT.DPauth.SIG matches that value. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code commandError.
oVerify that the Target Profile is not a Test Profile. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code disallowedForRpm.
•Verify that the Target Profile is in the Enabled state. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code profileNotInEnabledState.
•If the currently Enabled Profile is not a Test Profile: check if the Profile Policy Rules of the Target Profile allows its disabling. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code disallowedByPolicy.
If the refreshFlag is not set:
•the eUICC SHALL reset the PIN status.
•the eUICC SHALL disable the currently Enabled Profile.
•If the Target Profile is a Test Profile and an Operational Profile was in Enabled state before the (first) Test Profile was enabled on the Target Port: enable this Operational Profile on the Target Port. If this Operational Profile was deleted while the Test Profile was enabled, no error SHALL be generated and the function execution SHALL continue.
•The eUICC SHALL implicitly select the MF on the basic logical channel.
•The eUICC SHALL return OK to the LPAd.
NOTE: For subsequent actions by the Device see section 3.2.2.
If the refreshFlag is set:
•For MEP-A2, the eUICC MAY return an error code commandError.
•If there is a proactive session ongoing, the eUICC SHALL do one of the following:
oterminate the DisableProfile function and return an error code catBusy
ointernally terminate the proactive session on the Target Port. If a TERMINAL RESPONSE is still outstanding, the REFRESH command SHALL only be sent after reception of the TERMINAL RESPONSE.
NOTE: In the case of the catBusy error, the Device MAY take implementation-dependent actions to terminate the proactive command session, and MAY send the Disable command again without any further End User interaction.
-The eUICC SHALL mark the currently enabled Profile as "to be disabled" and return a status ok to the LPAd.
-If CAT has been initialised on the Target Port, the eUICC SHALL send a REFRESH command via one of following methods:
oFor MEP-A1, the eUICC SHALL first send an LSI COMMAND proactive command with the action "Proactive session request" on the Command Port. The "Proactive session request" action includes the Target Port number where a proactive command is pending. When the Device checks for pending proactive commands on the Target Port, the eUICC SHALL send the REFRESH command with "eUICC Profile State Change" mode (if supported by the Device) or "UICC Reset" mode to the Device on the Target Port where the Target Profile SHALL be disabled.
oFor SEP and MEP-B, the eUICC SHALL send the REFRESH command with "eUICC Profile State Change" mode (if supported by the Device) or "UICC Reset" mode to the Device on the Target Port where the Target Profile SHALL be disabled.
An MEP-Capable Device SHALL reset the Target Port instead of the UICC Interface when receiving a REFRESH with mode "UICC Reset" as specified in ETSI TS 102.223 [31].
-Upon reception of the Terminal Response with result "command performed successfully" or upon reset of either the eUICC or the Target Port in case of an MEP‑Capable eUICC or immediately if CAT has not been initialised on the Target Port, the eUICC SHALL disable the currently Enabled Target Profile on the Target Port. If the Target Profile is a Test Profile, an Operational Profile was in Enabled state before the (first) Test Profile was enabled on the Target Port and this Operational Profile was not deleted while a Test Profile was Enabled: the eUICC SHALL enable this Operational Profile on the Target Port. If this Operational Profile was deleted while the Test Profile was enabled, no error SHALL be generated and the function execution SHALL continue.
-Upon reception of the Terminal Response with result "temporary problem with executing command" or "permanent problem with executing command", the eUICC SHALL NOT disable the currently Enabled Profile. Subsequent actions are implementation specific.
NOTE: In the case the Device supports the Single Wire Protocol interface to the eUICC, the Device SHOULD take the appropriate actions regarding this interface when Profile state is changed.
The eUICC MAY start a new proactive UICC session on the Target Port only after a new TERMINAL PROFILE command is executed.
•If the Target Profile is successfully disabled, the eUICC SHALL generate as many Notifications as configured in its metadata (notificationConfigurationInfo) in the format of OtherSignedNotification.
-However, no Notifications SHALL be generated if the Target Profile is a Test Profile.
-In failure cases, the eUICC SHALL not generate any notifications.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
DisableProfileRequest ::= [50] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF32'
profileIdentifier CHOICE {
isdpAid [APPLICATION 15] OctetTo16, -- AID, tag '4F'
iccid Iccid -- ICCID, tag '5A'
},
refreshFlag BOOLEAN -- indicating whether REFRESH is required
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
DisableProfileResponse ::= [50] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF32'
disableResult INTEGER {
ok(0),
iccidOrAidNotFound(1),
profileNotInEnabledState(2),
disallowedByPolicy(3),
catBusy(5),
commandError(7), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
disallowedForRpm(10), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
}
}
-- ASN1STOPAlternative Case 3 Command
In addition to the command data exchange described above, the following alternative command is defined for the function. The eUICC SHALL support this alternative if it supports only SEP. Otherwise, the usage of this alternative is out of scope of this specification.
The command data is sent to the eUICC in a Case 3 STORE DATA command:
•The STORE DATA APDU SHALL be coded as defined in section 5.7.2, with the exception of P1 which SHALL be set to '90'.
•The command data SHALL be coded as defined above, the response data SHALL NOT be present.
•The following additional status bytes are defined:
'6A 82': Profile not found. '69 85': Profile not in enabled state or command not allowed by Profile Policy Rules or for RPM. '93 00': CAT is busy. Command cannot be executed at present, further normal commands are allowed.
5.7.18 Function (ES10c): DeleteProfile
Related Procedures: Local and Remote Profile Management – Delete Profile
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function deletes a Profile from eUICC. This function can be used at any time by the LPAd. The Profile to be deleted can be identified by ISD-P AID or ICCID.
On reception of this command the eUICC SHALL:
•Verify that the target Profile identified by its AID or ICCID exists. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error iccidOrAidNotFound for LPM and commandError for RPM.
•If the command is sent via RPM:
oVerify that the SM-DP+ that sent the RPM Command is included in the Managing SM-DP+ List and is authorised to perform the RPM Command. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code commandError.
oIf the Profile Metadata specifies an allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key identifier for the Managing SM-DP+: verify that the Subject Key Identifier of the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate corresponding to CERT.DPauth.SIG matches that value. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code commandError.
•Verify that the target Profile is not in Enabled state. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error profileNotInDisabledState.
•Verify that the Profile Policy Rules allow the deletion of the target Profile. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error disallowedByPolicy.
•If the currently enabled Profile is a Test Profile and the target Profile is not a Test Profile, the eUICC SHALL return an error disallowedInTestMode.
•Delete the ISD-P containing the target Profile and its related Profile Metadata.
If the target Profile is successfully deleted, the eUICC SHALL generate as many Notifications as configured in its metadata (notificationConfigurationInfo) in the format of OtherSignedNotification and return deleteResult with status code ok.
In failure cases, the eUICC SHALL not generate any notifications.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
DeleteProfileRequest ::= [51] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF33'
isdpAid [APPLICATION 15] OctetTo16, -- AID, tag '4F'
iccid Iccid -- ICCID, tag '5A'
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
DeleteProfileResponse ::= [51] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF33'
deleteResult INTEGER {
ok(0),
iccidOrAidNotFound(1),
profileNotInDisabledState(2),
disallowedByPolicy(3),
disallowedInTestMode(4), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
commandError(7), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
}
}
-- ASN1STOPAlternative Case 3 Command
In addition to the command data exchange described above, the following alternative command is defined for the function. The eUICC SHALL support this alternative if it supports only SEP. Otherwise, the usage of this alternative is out of scope of this specification.
The command data is sent to the eUICC in a Case 3 STORE DATA command:
•The STORE DATA APDU SHALL be coded as defined in section 5.7.2, with the exception of P1 which SHALL be set to '90'.
•The command data SHALL be coded as defined above, the response data SHALL NOT be present.
•The following additional status bytes are defined:
'6A 82': Profile not found. '69 85': Profile not in disabled state or command not allowed by Profile Policy Rules or command not allowed in Test Mode.
5.7.19 Function (ES10c): eUICCMemoryReset
Related Procedures: eUICC Memory Reset
Function Provider Entity: LPA Services
Description:
This function deletes selected subsets of the Profiles stored on an eUICC regardless of their enabled status or any Profile Policy Rules. The following subsets are defined:
•Operational Profiles
•Test Profiles that were not pre-installed (i.e., Test Profiles that were "field loaded")
•Test Profiles that were pre-installed (i.e., Test Profiles that were loaded in the factory)
•Provisioning Profiles
NOTE: The identification of pre-installed Test Profiles is out of the scope of this specification.
The eUICC returns a status indicating whether any Profiles were deleted.
This function can also be used to reset the Default SM-DP+ address to its initial value.
Any combination MAY be specified.
If the eUICC does not support Test Profiles, then a request to delete them is ignored.
The eUICC Memory Reset SHALL be performed in an atomic and non-reversible way in case of external interruptions (e.g., power loss): the eUICC SHALL continue the processing of that command upon the next eUICC power on. In case of any other error during the command execution, the command SHALL stop and SHALL leave the eUICC and the involved Profiles in their original states prior to command execution.
Upon reception of the eUICCMemoryReset function and dependent on the parameters set, the eUICC SHALL do the following:
•In case there is a proactive session ongoing on the Command Port, the eUICC SHALL do one of the following:
oterminate the command and return an error code catBusy.
ointernally terminate the proactive session and send the REFRESH command(s) as the next proactive command on the Command Port. If a TERMINAL RESPONSE is still outstanding, the REFRESH command SHALL only be sent after reception of the TERMINAL RESPONSE.
NOTE: In the case of the catBusy error, the Device MAY take implementation-dependent action to terminate the proactive command session, and MAY send the eUICC Memory Reset command again without any further End User interaction.
-Delete all the selected ISD-Ps with their Profiles regardless of their enabled status or Profile Policy Rules and all related Profiles Metadata stored in the ISD-R. The ISD-R SHALL send a proactive command to the Device to reset the eUICC. For SEP, the ISD-R SHALL send a REFRESH with mode "UICC Reset". For MEP, the ISD-R SHALL send an LSI COMMAND with "UICC Platform Reset".
-Reset the Default SM-DP+ address and its associated allowed eSIM CA RootCA public key to their default values, respectively.
For each deleted Profile, the eUICC SHALL generate as many Notifications as configured in its Profile Metadata (notificationConfigurationInfo) in the format of OtherSignedNotification.
•If the command was sent while a Test Profile was in Enabled state and this Profile was deleted by the command and an Operational Profile was in Enabled state before the (first) Test Profile was enabled and this Operational Profile was not deleted by the command, then this previous Operational Profile SHALL be enabled again.
For each deleted Profile, the eUICC SHALL generate as many Notifications as configured in its Profile Metadata (notificationConfigurationInfo) in the format of OtherSignedNotification.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
EuiccMemoryResetRequest ::= [52] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF34'
resetOptions [2] BIT STRING {
deleteOperationalProfiles(0),
deleteFieldLoadedTestProfiles(1),
resetDefaultSmdpAddress(2),
deletePreLoadedTestProfiles(3), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
deleteProvisioningProfiles(4)} -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
-- setting bits 0, 1, 3 and 4 wipes all Profiles
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
EuiccMemoryResetResponse ::= [52] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF34'
resetResult INTEGER {ok(0), nothingToDelete(1), catBusy(5), undefinedError(127)}
}
-- ASN1STOP5.7.20 Function (ES10c): GetEID
Related Procedures: Profile Download Initiation
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function gets the EID from the eUICC. This function can be used at any time by the LPA, and for instance during the Profile Download Initiation when the End user MAY have to provide the EID to the contracting Service Provider/Operator, and when the EID is not available by another mean, e.g., the End User MAY have lost the physical material where it was printed on.
Command Data
The data field SHALL indicate EID data object '5C 01 5A' (tag '5A' identifies the EID).
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
GetEuiccDataRequest ::= [62] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3E'
tagList [APPLICATION 28] Octet1 -- tag '5C', the value SHALL be set to '5A'
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
GetEuiccDataResponse ::= [62] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3E'
eidValue [APPLICATION 26] Octet16 -- tag '5A'
}
-- ASN1STOPIn case the provided tagList is invalid or unsupported, the eUICC SHALL return an error status word.
5.7.21 Function (ES10c): SetNickname
Related Procedures: Set/Edit Nickname
Function Provider Entity: LPA Services
Description:
This function is used to add or update a Profile Nickname associated to one Profile present on-card.
Upon reception of the SetNickname function, the eUICC SHALL:
•Verify that the target Profile is present on the eUICC. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code iccidNotFound.
•Update the target Profile nickname with the provided data and return setNicknameResult with status code ok.
In case a Profile Nickname already exists for the indicated Profile, the Profile Nickname SHALL be updated with the new value. In case the new value is an empty string, the Profile Nickname SHALL be removed. Removing a non-existing Profile Nickname SHALL NOT be considered an error.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
-- Definition of Profile Nickname Information
SetNicknameRequest ::= [41] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF29'
iccid Iccid,
profileNickname [16] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64))
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
SetNicknameResponse ::= [41] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF29'
setNicknameResult INTEGER {ok(0), iccidNotFound (1), undefinedError(127)}
}
-- ASN1STOP5.7.22 Function (ES10b): GetRAT
Related Procedures: Profile Download and Installation
Function Provider entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function retrieves the Rules Authorisation Table (RAT) from the eUICC. It can be called at any time. The RAT is used by the LPA to determine if a Profile containing PPRs can be installed, conditionally with End User Consent, on the eUICC as defined in section 2.9.2.4.
Command data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
GetRatRequest ::= [67] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF43'
-- No input data
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
GetRatResponse ::= [67] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF43'
rat RulesAuthorisationTable
}
RulesAuthorisationTable ::= SEQUENCE OF ProfilePolicyAuthorisationRule
ProfilePolicyAuthorisationRule ::= SEQUENCE {
pprIds PprIds,
allowedOperators SEQUENCE OF OperatorId,
pprFlags BIT STRING {consentRequired(0)}
}
-- ASN1STOPThe list of ProfilePolicyAuthorisationRule data objects SHALL be returned in the same order as stored in the eUICC. This list MAY be empty.
The pprIds data object SHALL identify at least one PPR. The LPA SHALL ignore the pprUpdateControl bit.
The allowedOperators data object SHALL follow the description given in section 2.9.2.1.
The consentRequired bit set to 1 indicates that the End User consent is required.
5.7.23 Function (ES10c): LPA alerting
Related Procedures: Metadata Update, Pending operation alerting
Function Provider Entity: LPAd
Description:
This function alerts the LPAd about:
-Changes in the Metadata of a Profile after the execution of an Update Metadata function on ES6 (see section 5.4.1), which MAY require the LPAd to take an action.
-Pending events, which the LPAd is requested to retrieve.
If support for Metadata update alerting is indicated in the RSP Device Capabilities and Metadata objects are updated via ES6, the eUICC SHALL alert the LPA by sending a REFRESH proactive command to the Device with the following parameters:
•Refresh mode SHALL be set to "Application Update".
•AID SHALL contain the AID of the ISD-R.
•Refresh enforcement policy SHALL be absent.
•The value field of the application specific refresh data SHALL contain the AlertData object defined below.
An application within a Profile MAY also use this command to alert the LPAd about pending RSP operations. Support for pending operation alerting is optional for the Device. If supported, it SHALL be indicated by setting pendingOperationAlertingSupport in LpaRspCapability. This allows a Profile Owner to appropriately configure an application within a Profile.
Definition of AlertData:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
AlertData ::= [74] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF4A' #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
metadataUpdateEnabledProfile [0] MetadataUpdateEnabledProfile,
pendingOperationAlert [1] ServerWithPendingOperation
}
MetadataUpdateEnabledProfile ::= SEQUENCE {
iccid Iccid OPTIONAL,
tagList [APPLICATION 28] OCTET STRING -- tag '5C'
}
ServerWithPendingOperation ::= CHOICE {
pollingAddress [0] NULL,
rootSmds [1] NULL,
defaultSmdp [2] NULL,
explicitAddress [3] UTF8String
}
-- ASN1STOPThe iccid SHALL be provided for MEP-A1 and MEP-A2 and MAY be provided for SEP and MEP-B. If provided, it SHALL contain the ICCID of the Profile processing the ES6 command.
The tagList SHALL contain all tags of objects that were included in the UpdateMetadata function (see section 5.4.1).
If the Device supports refresh mode "Application Update" and accepts other AlertData settings (e.g., for Metadata update alerting) where the AID indicates the ISD-R, but does not support event alerting, it SHALL respond with "command data not understood by terminal" to the proactive command.
NOTE: This is the same error code that the Device will use to indicate that it does not have interest for the refresh information related to a given AID, see ETSI TS 102 223 [31].
5.7.24 Function (ES10a): VerifySmdsResponse
Related Procedures: Event Retrieval and Push Service Registration
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
#SupportedFromV3.0.0#
Description:
This function verifies the signature of smdsSigned2 returned to the LPA by the SM-DS as a response from "ES11.AuthenticateClient" function.
On reception of this command the eUICC SHALL:
-Verify that the transactionId matches the one in the ongoing RSP session. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidTransactionId.
-Verify that the SM-DS has been previously authenticated and a CERT.DSauth.SIG is attached to the ongoing RSP session. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code noSession.
-Verify that smdsSignature2 created over the concatenated data objects smdsSigned2 (as described hereunder) and euiccSignature1 is valid. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidSignature.
-Return verifySmdsResponseOk if all of these verifications succeed.
-End the RSP session in both cases (error and ok).
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
VerifySmdsResponseRequest ::= [69] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF45' #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
smdsSigned2 [1] SmdsSigned2, -- must have tag [1]
smdsSignature2 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING
}
SmdsSigned2 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
requestSpecificData CHOICE {
eventList [0] SEQUENCE {
eventEntries [1] SEQUENCE OF EventRecordV3,
ecId [2] OCTET STRING(SIZE(16..32)) OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0# Event Checking ID
pushServiceRefreshTime [3] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL -- #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0# date and time to re-register a Push Token to the SM-DS
},
pushServiceRegistrationResult [1] SEQUENCE {
pushServiceRefreshTime [3] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL -- #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0# date and time to re-register a Push Token to the SM-DS
}
}
}
EventRecordV3 ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
eventId UTF8String,
rspServerAddress UTF8String,
eventType INTEGER, -- either 1 (for Profile Download) or 2 (for RPM)
hashedIccids SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)) OPTIONAL, -- hashed ICCID(s) calculated as either SHA256(ICCID) or SHA256(ICCID|Salt)
salt OCTET STRING (SIZE(8..16)) OPTIONAL, -- optional salt to be concatenated with ICCID(s) for hashing
serviceProviderName [17] UTF8String (SIZE(0..32)) OPTIONAL,
operatorId [23] OperatorId OPTIONAL
}
-- ASN1STOPsmdsSignature2 SHALL be created by the SM-DS using the SK.DSauth.SIG and verified by the eUICC using the PK.DSauth.SIG as described in section 2.6.9. The eUICC is not required to verify the validity and format of content within smdsSigned2 other than transactionId. If the eUICC does verify other content within smdsSigned2, it SHALL ignore any unknown tags.
Response Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
VerifySmdsResponseResponse ::= [69] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF45' #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
verifySmdsResponseOk NULL,
verifySmdsResponseError INTEGER {
invalidSignature(2),
noSession(4),
invalidTransactionId(5),
undefinedError(127)
}
}
-- ASN1STOP5.7.25 Function (ES10b): LoadRpmPackage
Related Procedures: RPM Download and Execution
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function initiates execution of an RPM Package.
On reception of this command, the eUICC SHALL:
•Verify that the SM-DP+ has been previously authenticated. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an unsigned error code noSession.
•Verify smdpSignature3 created over the concatenated data objects smdpSigned3 and euiccSignature1 using the PK.DPauth.SIG contained in CERT.DPauth.SIG of the on-going RSP session. If the signature is invalid, the eUICC SHALL return an invalidSignature error code.
•Verify that the transactionId contained in the smdpSigned3 matches the one of the on-going RSP session. If it does not match, the eUICC SHALL return an invalidTransactionId error code.
•Execute the RPM Command(s) contained the RPM Package.
•Generate and return LoadRpmPackageResult containing the execution result of the RPM Package.
The eUICC SHALL end the RSP session in any case after processing this function.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
LoadRpmPackageRequest ::= [68] SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# Tag 'BF44'
smdpSigned3 SmdpSigned3,
smdpSignature3 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, -- tag '5F37'
targetEsimPort INTEGER OPTIONAL
}
SmdpSigned3 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SM-DP+
rpmPackage [1] RpmPackage,
rpmPending [2] NULL OPTIONAL
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
The LoadRpmPackageResult as specified in section 2.10.2.
5.7.26 Function (ES10b): PrepareDeviceChange
Related Procedures: Device Change
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Services)
Description:
This function initiates a Device Change or Profile Recovery after a successful authentication of an SM-DP+.
On reception of this command, the eUICC SHALL:
•Verify that the SM-DP+ has been previously authenticated. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code noSession.
•Verify the smdpSignature4 using the PK.DPauth.SIG contained in CERT.DPauth.SIG of the on-going RSP session. If the signature is invalid, the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidSignature.
•Verify that the received transactionId contained in the smdpSigned4 matches the one of the on-going RSP session. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidTransactionId.
•Upon any error returned in these verifications, the eUICC SHALL terminate the RSP session.
•If the eUICC supports the encrypted Device Change data in Device Change response: generate a new one-time KA key pair (otSK.EUICC.KA, otPK.EUICC.KA) using the parameters indicated by the subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithmIdentifier.parameters field of the CERT.DPauth.SIG, and attach otSK.EUICC.KA to the RSP session.
•Generate euiccSigned3 data object as defined hereunder which MAY include vendor-specific additional information (e.g., as described in Annex P).
•Compute the euiccSignature3 over the concatenated data objects euiccSigned3 and smdpSignature3 using the SK.EUICC.SIG that was used in the "ES10b.AuthenticateServer response".
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
PrepareDeviceChangeRequest ::= [77] SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF4D'
smdpSigned4 SmdpSigned4, -- Signed information
smdpSignature4 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, -- tag '5F37'
hashCc Octet32 OPTIONAL -- Hash of confirmation code
}
SmdpSigned4 ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
transactionId [0] TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SM‑DP+
ccRequiredFlag BOOLEAN, -- Indicates if the Confirmation Code is required
activationCodeForProfileRecovery [1] UTF8String (SIZE(0..255)) OPTIONAL -- presents only in ES9+.AuthenticateClient response for a profileRecoveryRequest
}
-- ASN1STOPResponse Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
PrepareDeviceChangeResponse ::= [77] CHOICE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF4D'
downloadResponseOk PrepareDeviceChangeResponseOk,
downloadResponseError PrepareDeviceChangeResponseError
}
PrepareDeviceChangeResponseOk ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
euiccSigned3 EUICCSigned3, -- Signed information
euiccSignature3 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- tag '5F37'
}
EUICCSigned3 ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
euiccOtpk [APPLICATION 73] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- otPK.EUICC.KA, tag '5F49'
hashCc Octet32 OPTIONAL, -- Hash of confirmation code
additionalInformation VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL
}
PrepareDeviceChangeResponseError ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
downloadErrorCode DownloadErrorCode
}
-- ASN1STOPIn case of the error invalidTransactionId, the transactionId in the PrepareDownloadResponse SHALL be set to the value from the AuthenticateServerRequest.
5.7.27 Function (ES10b): VerifyDeviceChange
Related Procedures: Device Change, Profile Recovery
Function Provider Entity: ISD-R (LPA Service)
Description:
This function is used by the LPAd to verify the smdpSignature5 returned by the SM-DP+ contained in the response of ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange during the Device Change procedure or the smdpSignature4 returned by the SM-DP+ contained in the response of ES9+.AuthenticateClient during the Profile Recovery procedure, via the eUICC.
On the reception of this command, the eUICC SHALL:
•Verify that the SM-DP+ has been previously authenticated. Otherwise, the eUICC SHALL return an error code noSession.
•Verify that the transactionId contained in the smdpSigned4 or the smdpSigned5 matches the one of the on-going RSP session. If it does not match, the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidTransactionId.
•If the LPAd provide the deviceChangeConfirmation, then:
oVerify the smdpSignature4 using the PK.DPauth.SIG attached to the ongoing RSP session. If the signature is invalid, the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidSignature.
oIf DeviceChangeResponse in smdpSigned4 contains encryptedDeviceChangeData, then:
•If the eUICC does not support encrypted Device Change data, an invalidData error SHALL be returned.
•Verify that Control Reference Template describing the keys to generate matches the values defined here under (Command message part). Otherwise, an unsupportedCrtValues error SHALL be returned.
•Generate the session keys (S-ENC and S-MAC) and the initial MAC chaining value from received otPK.DP.KA and previously generated otSK.EUICC.KA, using the key agreement algorithm determined according to section 2.6.5.
•Perform decryption and MAC verification of sequenceOf87 data object with the session key. On any failure during the processing of sequenceOf87, an invalidData error SHALL be returned.
•If the Profile identified by the ICCID is not in disabled state, a profileNotInDisabledState error SHALL be returned.
•Delete the Profile identified by the ICCID.
•Return verifyDeviceChangeData containing decrypted DeviceChangeData TLV.
oOtherwise:
•Return verifyDeviceChangeNull.
•If the LPAd provide the profileRecoveryResponse, then:
oVerify the smdpSignature2 using the PK.DPauth.SIG attached to the ongoing RSP session. If the signature is invalid, the eUICC SHALL return an error code invalidSignature.
oReturn verifyDeviceChangeNull if all the above verifications succeed.
•Discard the RSP session in both cases.
Command Data
The command data SHALL be coded as follows.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
VerifyDeviceChangeRequest ::= [75] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF4B' #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
deviceChangeConfirmation [0] SEQUENCE {
smdpSigned5 SmdpSigned5, -- Signed information
smdpSignature5 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING
},
profileRecoveryResponse [1] SEQUENCE {
smdpSigned4 SmdpSigned4, -- Signed information
smdpSignature4 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- tag '5F37'
}
}
SmdpSigned5 ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
deviceChangeResponse [1] DeviceChangeResponse OPTIONAL
}
DeviceChangeResponse ::= CHOICE {
deviceChangeData [0] DeviceChangeData,
encryptedDeviceChangeData [1] EncryptedDeviceChangeData
}
DeviceChangeData ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
iccid Iccid,
activationCodeForDc [0] UTF8String (SIZE(0..255)),
deleteOldProfile [1] NULL OPTIONAL, -- Deletion of the installed Profile required
deleteNotificationForDcSupport [2] NULL OPTIONAL, -- Delete Notification for Device Change supported
notificationAddress [3] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- FQDN that processes the Delete Notification for Device Change
profileRecoverySupport [4] NULL OPTIONAL,
profileRecoveryValidityPeriod [5] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL -- Absolute date and time for Profile Recovery
}
EncryptedDeviceChangeData ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
controlRefTemplate [6] IMPLICIT ControlRefTemplate,
smdpOtpk [APPLICATION 73] OCTET STRING, -- okPK.DP.KA
sequenceOf87 [1] SEQUENCE OF [7] OCTET STRING -- sequence of '87' TLVs
}
-- ASN1STOPsequenceOf87 data object contains protected TLV of DeviceChangeData. The concatenated TLVs are protected with session keys resulting from the key agreement (S-ENC, S-CMAC) (section 2.6.4).
The eUICC SHALL verify the values provided for key type and key length match the expected symmetric encryption algorithm according to section 2.6.5:
-When AES-128 is selected by the SM-DP+, keyType SHALL contain value '88' and keyLen SHALL contain '10'.
-When SM4 is selected by the SM-DP+, keyType SHALL contain value '89' and keyLen SHALL contain '10'.
NOTE: Key type values are assigned in the GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8].
Response Data
The response data SHALL be coded as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
VerifyDeviceChangeResponse ::= [75] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF4B' #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
verifyDeviceChangeOk CHOICE {
verifyDeviceChangeNull [0] NULL,
verifyDeviceChangeData [1] DeviceChangeData
},
verifyDeviceChangeError INTEGER {
invalidSignature(2),
noSession(4),
invalidTransactionId(5),
unsupportedCrtValues(6),
invalidData(7),
profileNotInDisabledState(8),
undefinedError(127)
}
}
-- ASN1STOPIf the eUICC indicates profileNotInDisabledState error, the LPA MAY disable the target Profile and retry ES10b.VerifyDeviceChange function call.
5.8 ES11 (LPA -- SM-DS)
ES11 is the interface between:
•The LPA entity (more specifically the LDS endpoint).
•The SM-DS.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 38: ES11
The LPA SHALL communicate with the SM-DS secured by TLS in server authentication mode as described in section 2.6.6.
The format of the TLS Certificates (CERT.DS.TLS) used for TLS connections is described in section 4.5.2.1.
During TLS establishment, LPA SHALL verify the received CERT.DS.TLS according to section 4.5.2.2. If any of these verifications fail, the TLS connection SHALL be rejected, and the on-going procedure SHALL fail.
5.8.1 Function: InitiateAuthentication
Related Procedures: Common Mutual Authentication for Event Retrieval
Function Provider Entity: SM-DS
Description:
This function is identical to "ES9+.InitiateAuthentication" where the SM-DS plays the role of SM-DP+ and where:
•The SM-DP+ SHALL be replaced by the SM-DS.
•CERT.DPauth.SIG SHALL be replaced by CERT.DSauth.SIG.
NOTE: The input data object 'smdpAddress' contains an SM-DS address in this case.
Specific Status Codes
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject Code Subject Reason code Reason Description -------------- ------------------------ ------------- -------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8.9.1 SM-DS Address 3.8 Refused Invalid SM-DS Address. 8.9.2 Security configuration 3.1 Unsupported None of the proposed Public Key Identifiers is supported by the SM-DS. 8.9.4 SM-DS Certificate 3.7 Unavailable The SM-DS has no CERT.DS.SIG which chains to one of the eSIM CA RootCA Certificate Public Key supported by the eUICC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 48a: InitiateAuthentication Specific Status codes
5.8.2 Function: AuthenticateClient
Related Procedures: Common mutual authentication for Event Retrieval or Push Service Registration
Function Provider Entity: SM-DS
Description:
This function SHALL be called by the LPA to request the authentication of the eUICC by the SM-DS.
This function is correlated to a previous normal execution of an "ES11.InitiateAuthentication" function through a Transaction ID delivered by the SM-DS.
On reception of this function call, the SM-DS SHALL:
•Verify the validity of the eUICC certificate chain, as defined in section 4.5.2.2. If the eUICC Certificate (or any of the certificates in the chain) is invalid or expired, the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "eUICC Certificate - Verification failed" or "eUICC Certificate - Expired" respectively. If any of the certificates is missing in the chain, the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "eUICC Certificate - Verification failed".
•Verify that the Root Certificate of the eUICC certificate chain corresponds to the euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed or euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3 that the SM-DS selected when executing the "ES11.InitiateAuthentication" function. If it doesn't correspond or the chain variant doesn't match, the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "CI Public Key - Unknown".
•Verify the eUICC signature (euiccSignature1) using the PK.EUICC.SIG as described in section 5.7.13 "ES10b.AuthenticateServer". Otherwise, the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "eUICC - Verification failed".
•Verify that the transactionId is known and relates to an ongoing RSP session. Otherwise, the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "TransactionId - Unknown".
•Verify that the serverChallenge attached to the ongoing RSP session matches the serverChallenge returned by the eUICC. Otherwise, the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "eUICC - Verification failed".
•If euiccRspCapability.euiccRspCapInInfo1 is set to '1', verify that euiccRspCapability was present in euiccInfo1 as received in ES11.InitiateAuthentication and that euiccRspCapability in euiccInfo2 matches the value received in euiccInfo1. Otherwise the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "eUICC - Value has Changed".
•Verify that lpaRspCapability in deviceInfo matches the value received in ES11.InitiateAuthentication. Otherwise the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "LPA - Value has Changed".
The SM-DS SHALL identify the type of operation requested by the LPA by checking the content of ctxParams1.
•If it contains ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication, the SM-DS SHALL regard this as an Event Retrieval request.
•If it contains ctxParamsForPushServiceRegistration, the SM-DS SHALL regard this as a Push Service Registration request.
•Otherwise, the SM-DS SHALL regard this as an error and SHALL return a status code "Function – Unsupported".
Beginning of Event Retrieval operation
The SM-DS SHALL:
•Ignore the iccid (if any), and retrieve the Event ID, RSP Server address, Event type, optional hashed ICCID, optional Salt, optional Service Provider name, and optional Operator ID tuple(s) for the requesting eUICC.
•Generate the list of Event Records. The list of Event Records SHALL be determined depending on the content of the received ctxParams1:
-The SM-DS SHALL retrieve the operationType value contained in ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication. If it is not present, the SM-DS SHALL use the value of "Profile Download" in the following steps.
-If ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication contains no matchingId data object or an empty value for matchingId, the SM-DS SHALL retrieve and return a list of the Event Records of which the EID and Event type match the requesting eUICC and operationType, respectively. This list MAY be empty. In addition to a list of the Event Records, if the SM-DS and the LPA use a Push Service, the SM-DS MAY return pushServiceRefreshTime.
-If ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication contains a matchingId data object with an eventId value, the SM-DS SHALL retrieve and return the Event Records of which the EID, Event ID, and Event Type match the requesting eUICC, eventId, and operationType, respectively. If no Event Record is identified:
-if ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication contains a matchingIdSource data object set to an SM-DS OID, the SM-DS SHOULD delete the Event Record from the SM-DS identified by that OID.
-the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "Event Record - Unknown".
-If the LPA indicates eventCheckingSupport and the SM-DS supports the Event Checking, generate an ECID randomly and associate the ECID with the EID in the CERT.EUICC.SIG. The ECID SHALL be unique within the scope of the SM-DS and SHALL NOT contain the EID in plaintext.
NOTE: SM-DS may implement proprietary mechanisms to detect and delete unused ECID.
•If the LPA indicates signedSmdsResponseV3Support, generate an smdsSigned2 data object containing the Transaction ID, list of Event Records, optionally the ECID and pushServiceRefreshTime, and compute the signature smdsSignature2 over the concatenated data objects smdsSigned2 and euiccSignature1 as defined in "ES10a.VerifySmdsResponse" (section 5.7.24). Otherwise, create a response comprising the Transaction ID and list of Event Records as defined in version 2 of this specification.
End of Event Retrieval operation
Beginning of Push Service Registration operation
The SM-DS SHALL:
•Return an error status "Push Service – Unsupported" if the SM-DS does not support the Push Service
•Verify that the Push Service contained in the selectedPushService field is supported by the SM-DS. If verification fails, the SM-DS SHALL return an error status "Push Service Registration – Unsupported".
•Store the received Push Token and associate the Push Token with the EID of the requesting eUICC.
NOTE: The SM-DS may perform additional operations to enable the selected Push Service e.g., interaction with the push server, which are out of scope of this specification.
•Generate an smdsSigned2 data object containing the Transaction ID and optionally pushServiceRefreshTime, and compute the signature smdsSignature2 over the concatenated data objects smdsSigned2 and euiccSignature1as defined in "ES10a.VerifySmdsResponse" (section 5.7.24).
End of Push Service Registration operation
The SM-DS MAY perform additional operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that Event Retrieval has been successfully executed.
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the following table.
Additional Input Data:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Input data name Description Type No. MOC ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------- -------------- ----- ----- -- transactionId Transaction ID as generated by the SM‑DS (section 3.0.1). Binary[1-16] 1 M authenticateServerResponse Authenticate Server Response. Binary ⁽¹⁾ 1 M NOTE 1: AuthenticateServerResponse data object defined in section 5.7.13 (function "ES10b.AuthenticateServer"). -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 49: AuthenticateClient Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
Output data name | Description | Type | No. | MOC |
|---|---|---|---|---|
transactionId | Transaction ID as generated by the SM-DS (section 3.0.1). | Binary[1-16] | 1 | M |
eventEntries | The list of Event Records (Event ID and RSP Server address pair(s)) for the EID. | EVENT_RECORD | 0..N | C⁽²⁾ |
smdsSigned2 | Either Event Record(s) for the EID or Push Service Registration result. | Binary⁽¹⁾ | 1 | C⁽²⁾ |
smdsSignature2 | SM-DS signature | Binary⁽¹⁾ | 1 | C⁽²⁾ |
NOTE 1: smdsSigned2 and smdsSignature2 are the data objects defined in section 5.7.24 (function "ES10a.VerifySmdsResponse"). They SHALL be returned as encoded data objects including the tags defined for them in the VerifySmdsResponseRequest data object. NOTE 2: In case of an Event Retrieval request, when the LPA indicates signedSmdsResponseV3Support, the SM-DS SHALL return smdsSigned2 and smdsSignature2 data objects, otherwise it SHALL return an eventEntries data object. |
Table 50: AuthenticateClient Additional Output Data
The EVENT_RECORD type is used only when the LPA does not support signed SM-DS event records. It is defined by the following data structure:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Data name Description Type No. MOC ------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ ----- ----- eventId Identification of the Event. String 1 M rspServerAddress RSP Server address where the operation corresponding to the Event can be processed. FQDN 1 M ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 51: EVENT_RECORD
Specific Status Codes
Subject Code | Subject | Reason code | Reason | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
8.1.3 | eUICC Certificate | 6.1 | Verification Failed | eUICC Certificate or any certificate in the trust chain is invalid. |
8.1.3 | eUICC Certificate | 6.3 | Expired | eUICC Certificate or any certificate in the trust chain has expired. |
8.1 | eUICC | 6.1 | Verification Failed | eUICC signature is invalid or serverChallenge is invalid. |
8.10.1 | TransactionId | 3.9 | Unknown | The RSP session identified by the TransactionID is unknown. |
8.11.1 | CI Public Key | 3.9 | Unknown | Unknown eSIM CA RootCA Public Key. The eSIM CA is not a trusted root for the SM-DS, or not the root elected by the SM-DS in InitiateAuthentication response. |
8.9.5 | Event Record | 3.9 | Unknown | No Event identified by the Event ID for the EID exists. |
8.1 | eUICC | 3.11 | Value has Changed | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# eUICC RSP Capabilities have changed compared to those previously received. |
8.12 | LPA | 3.11 | Value has Changed | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# LPA RSP Capabilities have changed compared to those previously received. |
8.9.x | Push Service | 3.1 | Unsupported | #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0# Push Service is not supported by the SM-DS. |
8.10.x | Push Service Registration | 3.1 | Unsupported | #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0# Selected Push Service is not supported by the SM-DS |
8.10.x | Push Service Registration | 3.12 | Invalid Match | #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0# The Selected Push Service and/or Push Token contained in Push Service Registration is different from those contained in MatchingID |
1.6 | Function | 3.1 | Unsupported | #SupportedFromV3.0.0# The requested function is not supported by the SM-DS. |
Table 52: AuthenticateClient specific Status Codes
5.8.3 Function: CheckEvent
Related Procedures: Event Checking
Function Provider Entity: SM-DS
Description:
This function SHALL be called by the LPA to check the presence of pending Event Record(s) for the eUICC.
On reception of this function call, the SM-DS SHALL:
•Return an error status "Event Checking – Unsupported" if the SM-DS does not support Event Checking.
•Verify that the received address matches its own SM-DS address, where the comparison SHALL be case-insensitive. Otherwise, the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "SM-DS Address - Refused".
•Verify that the received ECID is valid. If the received ECID is known by the SM-DS but has been expired, the SM-DS SHALL return an error status "ECID – Expired". If the received ECID is unknown by the SM-DS, the SM-DS SHALL return an error status "ECID – Unknown".
NOTE: the lifetime of an ECID and its history is SM-DS implementation specific.
•Check if there exist any Event Record(s) corresponding to the received ECID.
•Set isPendingEvent to true if at least one Event Record corresponding to the received ECID exists. Otherwise, the SM-DS SHALL set it to false.
The SM-DS MAY perform additional operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that the Event Checking has been successfully processed.
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the following table.
Additional Input Data:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Input data name Description Type No. MOC ----------------- ----------------------------------------------------- --------------- ----- ----- ecId EventCheckingID for the SM-DS Binary[16-32] 1 M smdsAddress The SM-DS Address as known and provided by the LPA. FQDN 1 M ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 52a: CheckEvent Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Output data name Description Type No. MOC ------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ----- ----- isPendingEvent Indicates if an Event Record corresponding to the received ECID is pending Boolean 1 M -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 52b: CheckEvent Additional Output Data
Specific Status Codes
Subject code | Subject | Reason code | Reason | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
8.10.5. | Event Checking | 3.1 | Unsupported | #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0# Event Checking is not supported by the SM-DS. |
8.9.6 | ECID | 6.4 | Expired | #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0# Expired ECID |
8.9.6 | ECID | 3.9 | Unknown | #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0# Unknown ECID |
8.9.1 | SM-DS Address | 3.8 | Refused | Invalid SM-DS Address. |
Table 52c: CheckEvent specific Status Codes
5.9 ES12 (SM-DP+ -- SM-DS)
The ES12 is used by the SM-DP+ to manage Event registration.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 39: ES12
The SM-DP+ communicates with the SM-DS through a secure connection, by establishing a TLS connection with mutual authentication using CERT.DP.TLS and CERT.DS.TLS. Service level authorisation is required between SM-DS and SM-DP+. This is out of scope of this specification. Additional details about security requested on this interface and the level of data encryption are defined in section 2.6 and GSMA SAS SM specification [23].
5.9.1 Function: RegisterEvent
Related Procedures: Event Registration
Function Provider Entity: SM-DS (Alternative SM-DS or Root SM-DS)
Description:
This function registers an Event Record in the SM-DS (an Alternative SM-DS or a Root SM-DS).
The function caller MAY provide Hashed ICCID(s) and Salt in the input data. This information can be used by the LPA to identify the target Profile(s) of the Event Record. Hashed ICCID(s) SHALL be generated as follows, where a 19-digit ICCID SHALL be followed by the padding character 'F' for hashing, and the ICCID and Salt are encoded as UTF-8 strings.
•If Salt is not provided: SHA256(ICCID) for each target Profile.
•If Salt is provided: SHA256(ICCID|Salt) for each target Profile, where '|' means concatenation of data and Salt is randomly generated per function call. The same Salt SHALL be used to generate multiple hashes in one event.
The function caller MAY provide Service Provider Name and Operator ID in the input data. This information can be used by the LPA to identify the Service Provider and/or Operator of the Event Record.
The function caller MAY require that the Event registration is cascaded to a Root SM-DS using the input data 'forwardingIndicator'. If cascaded registration is requested, the function caller MAY also specify the Root SM-DS using the input data 'rootSmdsAddress'. If cascading is requested but the function caller did not specify the Root SM-DS, then the Root SM-DS used by the function provider is implementation-dependent.
A Root SM-DS SHALL ignore 'forwardingIndicator' and 'rootSmdsAddress'.
On reception of this function call, the SM-DS SHALL:
•Verify that the EventID is not already used by the function caller. Otherwise, the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "Event Record - Already in Use".
•Store the received Event Record, consisting of the EID, the RSP Server address, the EventID, the EventType, the HashedIccids (optional), the Salt (optional) the ServiceProviderName (optional), and the OperatorId (optional), all provided as function input data, together with the function caller identity (either an SM-DP+ or an SM-DS OID) received in the TLS Certificate. Additionally:
oIf EventType is not provided by the function caller, the SM-DS SHALL regard this as a function call from a version 2 SM-DP+ and SHALL use the value denoting 'Profile Download' in the Event Record.
•If required (forwardingIndicator input data set to 'true'), and if the function provider is an Alternative SM-DS
•store the FQDN of the Root SM-DS with the Event Record for later use during Event Deletion.
•cascade the Event registration to the Root-SM-DS by calling the "ES15.RegisterEvent" with the relevant input data:
oSame EID value.
oIts own SM-DS address to be used for Event retrieval.
oIts own generated Event ID corresponding to this incoming registration Event.
oSame EventType value.
oSame HashedIccids, Salt, ServiceProviderName, and OperatorId values (if any).
oforwardingIndicator input data set to 'false'
•If registration cascading fails the SM-DS SHALL delete the locally stored Event Record and return a status code "SM-DS - Inaccessible" or "SM-DS - Execution error".
The SM-DS MAY perform additional verifications and operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that the Event has been registered (and cascaded if required).
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the following table.
Additional Input Data:
Input data name | Description | Type | No. | MOC |
|---|---|---|---|---|
eid | Identification of the targeted eUICC. | EID | 1 | M |
rspServerAddress | RSP Server address where the operation corresponding to the registered Event can be executed. | FQDN | 1 | M |
eventId | Identification of the Event. The EventID SHALL be unique in the context of the function caller. | String | 1 | M |
forwardingIndicator | Indicates if the registration has to be made to the Root SM-DS. The Root SM-DS SHALL ignore this input data. | Boolean | 1 | M |
rootSmdsAddress | Indicates the Root SM-DS to be used when forwardingIndicator is TRUE. | FQDN | 1 | C⁽⁴⁾ |
eventType | Type of the RSP Operation associated with the Event. This SHALL be one of the following values: 1 -> Profile Download 2 -> RPM | INTEGER | 1 | C⁽¹⁾ |
hashedIccids | Identification of the target Profile(s). | Binary[32] | 1..N | O |
salt | Random string to be concatenated with ICCID(s) for hashing. | Binary[8-16] | 1 | C⁽²⁾ |
serviceProviderName | Name of the Service Provider that requested the RSP Operation. | String | 1 | O |
operatorId | Identification of the Operator that requested the RSP Operation. | Binary⁽³⁾ | 1 | O |
NOTE 1: This field SHALL be provided if SM-DP+ is v3. NOTE 2: This field MAY be provided if and only if hashedIccids is present. NOTE 3: This field SHALL use the ASN.1 format defined in section 2.4a.1.2. NOTE 4: This field MAY be provided if and only if forwardingIndicator is TRUE. |
Table 53: RegisterEvent Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
No additional output data.
Specific Status Codes
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Subject Code Subject Reason code Reason Description -------------- -------------- ------------- ----------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8.9.5 Event record 3.3 Already in use The Event Record already exist in the SM-DS (EventID duplicated). 8.9 SM-DS 5.1 Inaccessible The cascade SM-DS registration has failed. Root SM-DS was unavailable. 8.9 SM-DS 4.2 Execution error The cascade SM-DS registration has failed. Root SM-DS has raised an error. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 54: RegisterEvent specific status codes
5.9.2 Function: DeleteEvent
Related Procedures: Event Deletion
Function Provider Entity: SM-DS
Description:
This function deletes an Event Record in the SM-DS (an Alternative SM-DS or a Root SM-DS).
On reception of this function call, the SM-DS SHALL:
•Retrieve the Event Record corresponding to the provided Event ID and the function caller identity (SM-DP+ or SM-DS OID) received in the TLS Certificate. If the Event Record doesn't exist the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "Event Record - Unknown".
•Determine if the Event Record registration has been cascaded to Root SM-DS(s).
•If the Event Record registration was not cascaded, then the SM-DS SHALL delete the retrieved Event Record.
•If the Event Record registration was cascaded, then
othe SM-DS SHALL retrieve the FQDN of the Root SM-DS that was stored with the Event Record.
othe SM-DS SHALL cascade the deletion of the Event Record to the Root SM-DS by calling the "ES15.DeleteEvent" with the Event ID value generated by the SM-DS during Event Record registration.
oIf deletion at the Root SM-DS fails:
-Because the Event record was not found (the ES15.DeleteEvent call has returned a status code "Event Record - Unknown"), the SM-DS SHALL ignore this error case and consider the deletion at the Root SM-DS has succeeded.
-For any other reason, the SM-DS SHALL return a status code "SM-DS - Inaccessible" or "SM-DS - Execution error".
oIf deletion at the Root SM-DS has succeeded, the SM-DS SHALL delete the retrieved Event Record.
The SM-DS MAY perform additional verifications and operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL return one of the following:
•A 'Function execution status' with 'Executed-Success' indicating that the Event has been deleted (and cascaded if required).
•A 'Function execution status' indicating 'Failed' with a status code as defined in section 5.2.6 or a specific status code as defined in the following table.
Additional Input Data:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Input data name Description Type No. MOC ----------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ----- ----- eid Identification of the targeted eUICC. EID 1 M eventId Identification of the Event. The EventID SHALL be unique in the context of the function caller. String 1 M -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 55: DeleteEvent Additional Input Data
Additional Output Data:
No additional output data
Specific Status Codes
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject Code Subject Reason code Reason Description -------------- -------------- ------------- ----------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8.9.5 Event Record 3.9 Unknown The targeted Event Record doesn’t exist. 8.9 SM-DS 5.1 Inaccessible The cascade SM-DS deletion has failed. Root SM-DS was unavailable. 8.9 SM-DS 4.2 Execution error The cascade SM-DS deletion has failed. Root SM-DS has raised an error. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 56: DeleteEvent specific Status Codes
5.10 ES15 (SM-DS -- SM-DS)
This interface is a particular case of the ES12 interface where an Alternative SM-DS is communicating to the Root SM-DS to manage the cascading of Events. This interface is functionally identical to ES12.[]
Figure 40: ES15
The Alternative SM-DS and the Root SM-DS communicate through a secure connection, by establishing a TLS connection with mutual authentication using their CERT.DS.TLS. Service level authorisation is required between both SM-DSs. This is out of scope of this specification. Additional details about security requested on this interface and the level of data encryption are defined in section 2.6 and GSMA SAS SM specification [23].
5.10.1 Function: RegisterEvent
Related Procedures: Event Registration
Function Provider Entity: (Root) SM-DS
Description:
This function is identical to "ES12.RegisterEvent".
5.10.2 Function: DeleteEvent
Related Procedures: Event Deletion
Function Provider Entity: (Root) SM-DS
Description:
This function is identical to "ES12.DeleteEvent".
5.11 ES25 (UIMe -- LUIe)
The implementation of the LUIe uses ES25 between the LPAe and the User Interface Module for the LPAe (UIMe) in the device.
For LUIe using CAT, the UIMe is the CAT interpreter, which is not RSP specific.
For LUIe using SCWS, the UIMe is the browser with its interface to the SCWS, which is not RSP specific.
For LUIe using E4E (ENVELOPE commands with tag 'E4'), the UIMe is implementation specific. It SHALL implement all requirements for the LPA related to the user interface.
A Device supporting LUIe SHALL support at least one of the mechanisms defined in this section.
NOTE 1: DeviceCapabilities MAY be empty if provided by the LPAe.
NOTE 2: Support of MEP on ES25 is FFS.
5.11.1 LUIe using CAT
In order to support this option, the Device SHALL support at least the CAT mechanisms defined in Annex C.4.
5.11.2 LUIe using SCWS
In order to support this option, the Device SHALL support at least the CAT mechanisms defined in Annex C.4.
In addition, the eUICC and the Device SHALL support the Smartcard Web Server as defined in [7].
When using High Resolution Icons, it is recommended to embed the URLs to retrieve the HRIs from the HRI server (see section 5.12.1) into the web pages created by the SCWS. This avoids passing the (large) HRI data through the eUICC.
5.11.3 LUIe using E4E
In order to support this option, the Device SHALL support at least the CAT mechanisms defined in Annex C.4.
The following data structure SHALL be sent by the device to the eUICC in an ENVELOPE command:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
E4ERequest ::= [PRIVATE 4] CHOICE { -- Tag 'E4'
startDownload [0] SEQUENCE {
activationCode [0] UTF8String (SIZE(0..255))
}, -- Start Download
confirmDownload [1] SEQUENCE {
enable [0] NULL OPTIONAL, -- enable Profile after download
confirmationCode [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- confirmation code
pinCode [2] UTF8String (SIZE(4..8)) OPTIONAL -- LPAe PIN if used
}, -- Confirm Download
listProfiles [2] NULL, -- List Profiles
enableProfile [3] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid}, -- Enable Profile
disableProfile [4] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid}, -- Disable Profile
deleteProfile [5] SEQUENCE {
iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid,
pinCode [1] UTF8String (SIZE(4..8)) OPTIONAL -- LPAe PIN if used
}, -- Delete Profile
euiccMemReset [6] SEQUENCE {
pinCode [0] UTF8String (SIZE(4..8)) OPTIONAL -- LPAe PIN if used
}, -- eUICC Memory Reset
changeConfirmationPin [7] UTF8String (SIZE(9..17)), -- Change confirmation PIN
setRpmAllow [8] BOOLEAN, -- Turn on/off Remote Profile Management
pollRpmPackage [9] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid OPTIONAL},
-- Check for RPM packages for profile with iccid. No iccid means 'Update All'
confirmRpmPackage [10] SEQUENCE {
pinCode [0] UTF8String (SIZE(4..8)) OPTIONAL
-- LPAe PIN, if used, with Strong Confirmation
}, -- Confirms the pending RpmPackage
cancelSession[11] NULL
-- Cancels the pending profile download or RpmPackage execution
}
-- ASN1STOPFor startDownload, the UTF8 string, if non-zero length, SHALL contain the Activation Code as defined in section 4.1. A UTF8 string of zero length SHALL indicate to the eUICC to check for a new Profile at the Default SM-DP+ (if configured) and the SM-DS.
Even though the ASN.1 definition would allow larger data, each request and response SHALL be limited so that it can be included in a single APDU.
For changeConfirmationPin, the UTF8 string SHALL contain the old PIN followed by the new PIN, separated by a semicolon (which is not allowed as PIN character).
Operation pollRpmPackage starts the 'Update Profile' procedure as defined in section 3.2.7. The value of pollRpmPackage makes LPAe to behave as follows:
-'Update' single Profile if the value includes the ICCID of the Profile. Error errorProfileDoesNotExist is returned if there is not an installed Profile with that ICCID.
-'Update All' Profiles, if no ICCID is provided.
Operation cancelSession instructs the LPAe to perform the Common Cancel Procedure as defined in section 3.0.2, with the reason 'endUserRejection'.
NOTE: ENVELOPE commands with tag 'E4' (which is reserved by ETSI for GSMA) are also used in SGP.02 [2], starting from version 4.0. However, the first byte of the value part of the TLV is limited to '00' to '03', allowing easy discrimination from the values defined here.
Depending on the function contained in the ENVELOPE command, the UIMe SHALL return a response structure to the UIMe, either directly in the response to the ENVELOPE command, or via a subsequent REFRESH proactive command to the Device with the following parameters:
•Refresh mode SHALL be set to "Application Update".
•AID SHALL contain the AID of the ISD-R.
•Refresh enforcement policy SHALL be absent.
•The value field of the application specific refresh data SHALL contain the E4EResponse object defined below.
In case of the REFRESH command in "Application Update" mode is not supported by the Device, the E4EResponse object is stored in a EF_(AS-RD) (Application Specific – Response Data) located in the DF_(GSMA) (which resides under the MF and has file ID '7F26' as specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [6]), and a REFRESH proactive command is sent to the Device with the following parameters:
•Refresh mode SHALL be set to "NAA File Change Notification".
•AID SHALL contain the AID of the ISD-R.
•Refresh enforcement policy SHALL be absent.
•The value field of the file list SHALL contain a reference to EF_(AS-RD).
In the case of a profile state change after the E4E Response, a REFRESH in "UICC Reset" or "eUICC Profile State Change" mode is sent.
Table 56a below defines the correspondence between the functions and related responses, and how the responses SHALL be conveyed to the UIMe. Figure 40aa below specifies the flow visible from the UIMe for a Profile download.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Function contained in the ENVELOPE command Data in the response to the ENVELOPE command Response data sent in a subsequent proactive command -------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------ startDownload None startDownloadResponse confirmDownload None confirmDownloadResponse listProfiles None listProfilesResponse enableProfile None None disableProfile None None deleteProfile None None euiccMemReset None None changeConfirmationPin None None setRpmAllow None None pollRpmPackage None pollRpmPackageResponse confirmRpmPackage None None cancelSession None None --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 56a: Functions and their responses for E4E
Responses startDownloadResponse and pollRpmPackageResponse requires the User to confirm them using confirmDownload and confirmRpmPackage, respectively.
The structure of the response data is defined below:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
E4EResponse ::= [PRIVATE 4] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'E4'
resultCode [0] E4EResultCode,
resultData [1] CHOICE {
startDownloadResponse [0] SEQUENCE {
serviceProviderName [17] UTF8String (SIZE(0..32)), -- Tag '91'
profileName [18] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)), -- Tag '92'
ccRequired [0] NULL OPTIONAL -- confirmation code required
},
listProfilesResponse [3] SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid, -- Profile ICCID
profileState [112] ProfileState, -- Tag '9F70'
serviceProviderName [17] UTF8String (SIZE(0..32)), -- Tag '91'
profileName [18] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)) -- Tag '92'
-- the eUICC MAY truncate these names so that the response fits
-- into one APDU
},
pollRpmPackageResponse [4] SEQUENCE {
rpmPackage [0] RpmPackage, -- RPM Package to be confirmed by user
rpmPending [1] NULL OPTIONAL -- There are pending RPM Packages after this
},
confirmDownloadResponse [5] SEQUENCE {
iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid -- Profile ICCID
}
} OPTIONAL
}
E4EResultCode ::= INTEGER {
success (0),
errorBusy (1), -- CAT not available due to another operation
errorComm (2), -- Communication error with server
errorAuth (3), -- Mutual Authentication Error
errorNoProfile (4), -- No Profile available for download at SM-DP+
errorEligibility (5), -- SM-DP+ rejected download due to Eligibility Check
errorInstall (6), -- Error during Profile installation
errorPin (7), -- Invalid PIN
errorProfileRef (8), -- Referenced Profile does not exist
errorAlreadyEnabled (9), -- Referenced Profile is already enabled
errorAlreadyDisabled (10), -- Referenced Profile is already disabled
errorConfirmationCode (11), -- Invalid Confirmation Code,
errorRpmDisabled (12), -- Cannot pollRpmPackage, RPM is disabled
errorProfileDoesNotExist (13), -- There is no profile with provided ICCID
undefinedError (127)
}
-- ASN1STOPNOTE: If there is no pending RPM command, rpmPackage data element in pollRpmPackageResponse is a zero-length sequence.
The flow for a profile download is defined below:
Diagram source (PlantUML)
@startuml hide footbox skinparam sequenceMessageAlign center skinparam sequenceArrowFontSize 11 skinparam noteFontSize 11 skinparam monochrome true skinparam lifelinestrategy solid participant "<b>End-User" as U participant "<b>LPAe" as LPA participant "<b>Device" as D participant "<b>SM-DP+" as DP U-->D: [Trigger addition of Profile] D-->LPA: E4E with startDownload rnote over LPA #FFFFFF (a) Get SM-DP+ Address, Parse Activation Code Token, [SM-DP+ OID], [CI PK ind.] from AC, or (b) Get SM-DP+ Address and EventID from SM-DS, or (c) Get Default SM-DP+ Address, [CI PKID] from eUICC, or End rnote LPA-->D: Acnowledge E4E LPA-->D: Open BIP Channel LPA-->DP: [Contact server, Common Mutual Authenitcation, retrieve Profile metadata] LPA-->D: Alerting with startDownloadResponse D-->U: [Present content to user] U-->D: [Optional confirmation code and/or LPAe PIN] D-->LPA: E4E with confirmDownload LPA-->D: Acnowledge E4E LPA-->DP: [Retrieve BPP] LPA-->LPA: [install Profile] LPA-->D: Alerting with confirmDownloadResponse D-->U: [Present result to user] alt enable profile LPA-->D: REFRESH "UICC Reset" or "eUICC Status Change" end @enduml
[Generated by PlantUML]
Figure 40aa: Profile download using E4E
After a startDownload, the eUICC SHALL return the serviceProviderName and the profileName from the Metadata of the Profile to download. Thereafter, the eUICC SHALL be informed with confirmDownload if the End User accepts the download. After Bound Profile Package download and install process is performed, the eUICC SHALL inform the status of the download with confirmDownloadResponse.
The listProfilesResponse SHALL contain a list of all Profiles on the eUICC. enableProfile, disableProfile, and deleteProfile SHALL reference a Profile using its ICCID as returned by listProfilesResponse.
5.12 Other functions
5.12.1 Function: RetrieveIcon
Related Procedures: may be used in different procedures.
Function Provider Entity: HRI Server
Description:
This function is used to retrieve an icon related to the Profile from the HRI Server. This function MAY be used in different procedures.
The HRI Server MAY be operated by any entity, e.g., the SM-DP+, the Operator or any other party. If it is operated by the SM-DP+, the server infrastructure of the SM-DP+ SHALL allow the same TLS connection that is established for any other RSP procedure to be used for retrieving one or several icons.
On reception of this function call, the HRI Server SHALL:
•If required, customise the icon data (resize, crop, etc.) so that the resulting icon matches the request parameters.
•In the response send the icon to the LPA.
The HRI Server MAY perform additional operations, which are out of scope of this specification.
This function SHALL use an HTTP GET request instead of the function binding defined in sections 6.5 and 6.6.
The URL of the request SHALL be formatted as follows:
https://<iconLocation>?w=<width>&h=<height>&f=<format>
<iconLocation> is the string provided in the Metadata of the Profile. The other parameters SHALL be added by the LPA.
<width> is the width of the icon in pixels. Permitted range: 64 to 1024.
<height> is the height of the icon in pixels. Permitted range: 64 to 1536.
Permitted range of aspects ratios (height / width): 1.5 to 0.25.
<format> is the icon format. Permitted values: "jpg", "png".
Example for a valid request:
https://server.domain.com/mno-icon?w=320&h=240&f=jpg
The HRI Server SHALL return an icon in the requested format in the HTTP response.
See section 5.11.2 for handling by the LPAe.
5.13 ES22 (Device Application -- LPDd)
The ES22 is an interface defined between the Device Application and the LPDd.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 40a: ES22
The access to the LPDd via the ES22 interface SHALL be authorised by a Device manufacturer implementation-specific access control mechanism.
The coding and function binding of ES22 functions are Device manufacturer implementation-specific.
5.14 ES21 (Device Application -- LPRd)
ES21 is an interface defined between the Device Application and the LPRd, which initiates Profile Content Management sessions and optionally relays progress information from the PCMAA.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 40b: ES21
The Device SHALL provide an implementation-specific mechanism by which the Device Application can determine whether the LPA Proxy feature is supported on the Device and the eUICC.
The specific function binding for the Command, Response, and Notification Data on the ES21 interface is Device manufacturer-specific.
5.14.1 Function: InitiateProfileContentManagement
Related Procedures: Profile Content Management
Function Provider Entity: LPRd
Description:
This function is used by the Device Application to trigger a Profile Content Management session, optionally with a specified DPI parameter, and to request progress information from the PCM session.
On reception of this command, the LPRd SHALL:
•Verify that there is an enabled Profile; otherwise, return the error noEnabledProfile.
•Retrieve the Profile Metadata for the currently enabled Profile by calling the "ES10c.GetProfilesInfo" function.
•Verify that the Device Application is authorised to trigger a PCM session on the enabled Profile; otherwise, return the error deviceApplicationNotAuthorised. The mechanism by which this authorisation is performed is Device manufacturer-specific.
•Verify that the Profile Metadata contains an lprConfiguration with a non-empty PCMP address; otherwise, return the error noLprConfiguration.
•Verify that either the End User has not disallowed mobile network data to be used for the LPA Proxy/PCM session and mobile network data is available, or that some other data connectivity is available. If data connectivity is unavailable, return the error dataConnectivityNotAvailable.
•If the Device Application has requested progress information, initialise the Device manufacturer-specific mechanism by which it is delivered. (For example, this could register a callback function, create a message channel, etc.).
•Calculate the initial URI by concatenating the PCMP address from the Metadata of the enabled Profile, and the DPI provided by the Device Application, if available.
•Trigger the PCMAA with the initial URI.
•Return ok (success) to the Device Application.
Command Data
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Input data name Description Type No. MOC ----------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------- ----- ----- dpi Delegated Platform Identifier to be used for the PCM session. UTF-8 String 1 O progressRequest Indicates that the Device application wishes to receive PCM progress information. Boolean 1 O --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response Data
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Output data name Description Type No. MOC ------------------ ----------------------------------- ----------- ----- ----- status Status of the requested operation Integer 1 M ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Status Values
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Status Description -------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ok Success (PCM session was triggered) noEnabledProfile No Profile is enabled deviceApplicationNotAuthorised Device Application is not authorised to trigger PCM on the enabled Profile noLprConfiguration No LprConfiguration or empty PCMP address in the Metadata of the enabled Profile dataConnectivityNotAvailable The PCM session cannot be triggered because there is no data connection -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.14.2 Notification: PcmProgressInformation
Related Procedures: Profile Content Management
Function Provider Entity: LPRd
Description:
A Device Application that triggers a Profile Content Management session MAY request progress information from that session. The method by which this information is delivered is Device manufacturer-specific. There are several notification types:
-A progress message delivered from the Profile Content Management Platform (server), containing binary data whose format and content is Profile Owner-specific.
-An indication of a script part delivery to the UICC, optionally along with the set of UICC status words for each processed APDU.
-An indication that an HTTP request has been sent to the PCMP, including the targeted URI and conditionally the ending status of a delegated PCM dialog.
-An indication that the PCM session has ended and its ending status.
The progress information MAY include additional content that is Device manufacturer-specific.
Notification Data
The progress information SHALL indicate the notification type and contain at least the following information based upon the type, as described hereunder. It MAY include additional content that is Device manufacturer-specific.
Progress Message:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Data name Description Type No. MOC ----------------- -------------------------------------------- ----------- ----- ----- progressMessage Progress information message from the PCMP Binary 1 M --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Script Part Delivery:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Data name Description Type No. MOC ----------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ----- ----- partIndex Index of the executed script part INTEGER 1 M scriptStatus The status of the script delivery to the eUICC, containing one of the values defined for X-Admin-Script-Status in [74] section 4.3.5.7 String 1 M apduStatus The status words from each processed APDU in a script part. This MAY not be present if there are no status words (e.g., if an error prevented the script from being processed). Binary 1 C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HTTP Request to PCMP:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Data name Description Type No. MOC -------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ----- ----- uri Targeted URI String 1 M dialogEndingStatus The last dialog status, containing one of the values defined for X-Admin-Dialog-Status in [74] section 4.3.5.11. This is provided when the HTTP request immediately follows the end of a dialog with each PCMP. String 1 C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HTTP Response From PCMP:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Data name Description Type No. MOC -------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ----- ----- partsCount The number of script parts received from the PCMP in the HTTP response. INTEGER 1 M dialogEndingStatus The ending status of the dialog with the PCMP, containing one of the values defined for X-Admin-Dialog-Status in [74] section 4.3.5.11. This is provided for the final HTTP response in a PCMP dialog. String 1 C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
End of PCM Session:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Data name Description Type No. MOC -------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ----- ----- dialogEndingStatus The ending status of the PCM session, containing one of the values defined for X-Admin-Dialog-Status in [74] section 4.3.5.11. String 1 M -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 Interface binding over HTTP
This section defines how to use HTTP/1.1, defined in RFCs 7230 [81] and 7231 [82], and TLS, defined in RFC 5246 [16], as the transport layer to exchange ES2+, ES9+, ES11, ES12, and ES15 function requests and responses.
On ES9+ and ES11, the LPA always acts as an HTTP client and is in charge of managing the connection establishment to the RSP Server. The LPA SHALL use either JSON binding defined in section 6.5 or ASN.1 binding defined in section 6.6. The LPAe SHALL exchange the HTTPS POST requests and responses defined in this section using BIP over TCP.
On ES2+, ES12, and ES15 any RSP Server MAY act as an HTTP client or an HTTP server. JSON binding defined in section 6.5 SHALL be used.
In case of communication failure, the HTTP client is responsible for retry and reconnection management.
6.1 TLS Security
Transport Layer Security (TLS) secures the messages exchanged between a function requester and function provider. Refer to section 2.6.6 for TLS version and security details that the HTTP Client and the HTTP Server SHALL follow.
In case a procedure defined in section 3 is restarted, a new TLS session SHALL be established. In case of failure within a procedure, the TLS session MAY be resumed or re-established.
6.1.1 Identification/Authentication/Authorisation
If applicable on the interface, authentication of the sending party of a JSON message SHALL rely on the Transport layer security (using TLS Certificate of the sending party).
6.1.2 Integrity
The integrity of the message SHALL exclusively rely on the Transport Layer Security (TLS).
6.1.3 Confidentiality
The confidentiality of the message SHALL exclusively rely on the Transport Layer Security (TLS).
6.2 HTTP request and response
An HTTP POST request SHALL be used to transport a single function execution request. The corresponding function execution response SHALL be returned as defined in SGP.02 [02] depending on the used Message eXchange Pattern (MXP).
This specification uses the following MXPs:
•Synchronous Request-Response: the request payload SHALL be sent in the HTTP POST request, and the function execution response SHALL be returned in the HTTP POST response.
•Notification: the notification payload SHALL be sent in the HTTP POST request and the HTTP POST response body SHALL be empty.
NOTE: Following common practice in the Internet, Devices typically convert the FQDN contained in the Activation Code to lowercase when providing it in the SNI (Server Name Indication) extension of TLS and in the "Host" header field of the HTTP POST request. However, the Devices are not mandated to perform this conversion. Therefore, an issue may occur if the SM-DP+ or SM-DS does not perform a case-insensitive comparison.
HTTP POST request for ES9+ and ES11 SHALL contain a "User-Agent" header field defined according to RFC 7231 [82] as either of the following:
User-Agent: <product>
User-Agent: <product> (<comment>)
where <product> is either gsma-rsp-lpad or gsma-rsp-lpae. Additional information MAY be included in a comment delimited by parentheses as defined by RFC 7230 [81].
Alternatively, the "User-Agent" field MAY contain additional information after a semicolon, as defined in version 2 of this specification. An SM-XX compliant to this version of this specification SHALL accept this format. However, the LPA SHOULD NOT use this format; instead it SHOULD provide any additional information within an RFC 7230 [81] compliant comment.
NOTE: The use of a semicolon to indicate additional information is not compliant with RFC 7231 [82] and its support may be removed in a future version of this specification.
HTTP POST request and response SHALL contain an "X-Admin-Protocol" header field as defined hereunder:
X-Admin-Protocol: gsma/rsp/v<x.y.z>
Where:
<x.y.z> indicates a SVN of SGP.22 [This document].
On ES2+, ES12 and ES15, this indicates the highest SVN supported by the RSP Server acting as the function requester. The RSP Server acting as the function provider SHALL return an HTTP response as defined in the SGP.22 [This document] version corresponding to the lower of the function requester SVN and the function provider SVN.
On ES9+ and ES11, this field is deprecated and SHALL be set to v2.1.0 in both HTTP request and HTTP response.
NOTE: this value is required for interoperability with version 2 of this specification.
HTTP POST request and response SHALL contain a "Content-type" header field to indicate the nature of the binding. A JSON binding SHALL be indicated by the value "application/json;charset=UTF-8", which also mandates UTF-8 encoding. An ASN-1 binding SHALL be indicated by the value "application/x-gsma-rsp-asn1". The "Content-type" header field of an HTTP response SHOULD NOT be set when the body is empty (e.g., case of notification function response). If present, it SHALL be ignored.
NOTE: In version 2, the JSON encoding was not specified (see also Annex N).
HTTP POST request and response MAY contain additional header fields. Their use is out of scope of this specification.
6.3 HTTP response status codes
Standard HTTP status codes SHALL apply to this section.
Status codes '1xx' (Information), '3xx' (Redirection), '4xx' (HTTP client error) and '5xx' (HTTP server error) MAY be used by the RSP Server (i.e., the HTTP server).
The retry policy for HTTP request answered with status codes '4xx' and '5xx' is out of scope of this specification.
A normal request-response function execution status (MXP Synchronous request-response) SHALL be indicated by the HTTP status code '200' (OK) in the HTTP response, regardless whether the function response is an error or a success, as defined in SGP.02 [02].
A normal notification function execution status (MXP Notification) SHALL be indicated by the HTTP status code '204' (No Content) with an empty HTTP response body as defined in SGP.02 [02].
Other status codes '2xx' SHALL NOT be used by the RSP Server.
6.4 Secure Channel Set-Up on ES2+
The process of setting up secure channel is out of scope of this document. This process includes the exchange of the following information:
•Function requester and Function provider OIDs and identity SHALL be registered to GSMA Policy Authority and respective values have been communicated to each party.
•Function requester and Function provider URL SHALL have been communicated to each party.
•Function requester and Function provider parties’ trust SHALL have been established on an X-509 certificate chain basis.
6.5 Function Binding in JSON
JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) is a lightweight data-interchange format. It is based on a subset of the JavaScript Programming Language. JSON is a text format that is completely language independent.
Only the characters that are mandatory to escape (Quotation mark, reverse solidus, and the control characters) SHALL be escaped in a JSON string value as specified in RFC 7159 [68] section 7. Other characters SHALL NOT be escaped.
6.5.1 JSON message definition
The Function Requester and the Function Provider SHALL exchange the JSON objects in HTTP messages as follows.
•HTTP Request SHALL have the following format.
HTTP POST <HTTP Path> HTTP/1.1
Host: <Server Address>
User-Agent: <User Agent>
X-Admin-Protocol: gsma/rsp/v<x.y.z>
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: <Length of the JSON requestMessage>
<JSON requestMessage>
The <HTTP Path> is used to indicate which function execution is requested by the HTTP client. The list of defined <HTTP Path> are described in section 6.5.2.
•HTTP Response SHALL have the following format.
HTTP/1.1 <HTTP Status Code>
X-Admin-Protocol: gsma/rsp/v<x.y.z>
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: <Length of the JSON responseMessage>
<JSON responseMessage>
6.5.1.1 Definition of <JSON requestMessage>
<JSON requestMessage> is the combination of:
•<JSON requestHeader>
•<JSON body> which depends on the function called
HTTP messages for ES9+ and ES11 SHALL NOT contain the <JSON requestHeader>.
6.5.1.2 Definition of <JSON responseMessage>
<JSON responseMessage> is the combination of:
•<JSON responseHeader>
•<JSON body> which depends on the function called
The HTTP POST response body SHALL be empty for MXP notification message (see section 6.3).
6.5.1.3 Definition of <JSON requestHeader>
The <JSON requestHeader> maps the function input header.
{
"header": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"functionRequesterIdentifier": {
"type": "string",
"description": "identification of the function requester, or the entity on behalf of which the function requester operates"
},
"functionCallIdentifier": {
"type": "string",
"description": "identification of the function call"
}
},
"required": ["functionRequesterIdentifier", "functionCallIdentifier"]
}
}
6.5.1.4 Definition of <JSON responseHeader>
The <JSON responseHeader> maps the function output header.
{
"header": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"functionExecutionStatus": {
"type": "object",
"description": "Whether the function has been processed correctly or not",
"properties": {
"status": {
"type": "string",
"description": " Executed-Success, Failed"
},
"statusCodeData": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"subjectCode": {
"type": "string",
"description": "OID of the subject code"
},
"reasonCode": {
"type": "string",
"description": "OID of the reason code"
},
"subjectIdentifier": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Identifier of the subject "
},
"message": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Textual and human readable explanation"
}
},
"required": ["subjectCode", "reasonCode"]
}
},
"required": ["status"]
}
},
"required": ["functionExecutionStatus"]
}
}
6.5.1.5 Details on JSON types
"format": "base64": unless specified otherwise below, the value of a JSON field of this format SHALL contain the base64 coding defined in RFC 4648 [71] of the DER encoded ASN.1 data object (including its tag and length fields), referenced in "description".
NOTE In most of the cases, the ASN.1 data object is defined in ES10x request/responses. Otherwise, the 'description' of the base64 field references the section where the ASN.1 type is specified.
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{n,m}$": specifies the hexadecimal representation of the data referred to in "description".
6.5.2 List of functions
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Function Path MXP
------ --------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- --------------
ES2+ DownloadOrder /gsma/rsp2/es2plus/downloadOrder Synchronous
ConfirmOrder /gsma/rsp2/es2plus/confirmOrder Synchronous
CancelOrder /gsma/rsp2/es2plus/cancelOrder Synchronous
ReleaseProfile /gsma/rsp2/es2plus/releaseProfile Synchronous
RpmOrder /gsma/rsp3/es2plus/rpmOrder Synchronous
ConfirmDeviceChange /gsma/rsp3/es2plus/confirmDeviceChange Synchronous
HandleNotification /gsma/rsp3/es2plus/handleNotification Notification
ES9+ InitiateAuthentication /gsma/rsp2/es9plus/initiateAuthentication Synchronous
AuthenticateClient /gsma/rsp2/es9plus/authenticateClient Synchronous
GetBoundProfilePackage /gsma/rsp2/es9plus/getBoundProfilePackage Synchronous
HandleNotification /gsma/rsp2/es9plus/handleNotification Notification
HandleDeviceChangeRequest /gsma/rsp3/es9plus/handleDeviceChangeRequest Synchronous
CancelSession /gsma/rsp2/es9plus/cancelSession Synchronous
ES11 InitiateAuthentication [As ES9+] [As ES9+]
AuthenticateClient [As ES9+] [As ES9+]
ES11 InitiateAuthentication [As ES9+] [As ES9+]
ES12 RegisterEvent /gsma/rsp2/es12/registerEvent Synchronous
DeleteEvent /gsma/rsp2/es12/deleteEvent Synchronous
ES15 RegisterEvent [As ES12] [As ES12]
DeleteEvent [As ES12] [As ES12]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 57: List of Functions
6.5.2.1 "ES2+.DownloadOrder" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES2+.DownloadOrder" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"eid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{32}$",
"description": "EID as desc in SGP.02"
},
"iccid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{19}[0-9F]?$",
"description": "ICCID as described in section 5.2.1"
},
"profileType": {
"type": "string",
"description": "content free information defined by the Operator"
}
}
}
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage> corresponding to the "ES2+.DownloadOrder" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"iccid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{19}[0-9F]?$",
"description": "ICCID as described in section 5.2.1"
}
},
"required": ["iccid"]
}
6.5.2.2 "ES2+.ConfirmOrder" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES2+.ConfirmOrder" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"iccid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{19}[0-9F]?$",
"description": "ICCID as described in section 5.2.1"
},
"eid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{32}$",
"description": "EID as described in section 4.3.1"
},
"matchingId": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section {5.3.2}"
},
"confirmationCode": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section {5.3.2}"
},
"smdsAddress": {
"type": "string",
"description": "SM-DS to register the event as defined in section {5.3.2}"
},
"rootSmdsAddress": {
"type": "string",
"description": "#SupportedFromV3.0.0# Root SM-DS addresses as defined in section 5.3.2"
},
"releaseFlag": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": "as defined in section {5.3.2}"
}
},
"required": ["iccid", "releaseFlag"]
}
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage> corresponding to the "ES2+.ConfirmOrder" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"eid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{32}$",
"description": "EID as desc in SGP.02"
},
"matchingId": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section {5.3.2}"
},
"smdpAddress": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section {5.3.2}"
}
},
"required": []
}
6.5.2.3 "ES2+.CancelOrder" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES2+.CancelOrder" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"iccid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{19}[0-9F]?$",
"description": "ICCID as described in section 5.2.1"
},
"eid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{32}$",
"description": "EID as desc in SGP.02"
},
"matchingId": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section {5.3.2}"
},
"finalProfileStatusIndicator": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section {5.3.4}"
}
}
}
6.5.2.4 "ES2+.ReleaseProfile" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES2+.ReleaseProfile" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"iccid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{19}[0-9F]?$",
"description": "ICCID as described in section 5.2.1"
},
"required": ["iccid"]
}
}
6.5.2.5 "ES2+.HandleNotification" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES2+.HandleNotification" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"eid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{32}$",
"description": "EID as described in SGP.02"
},
"iccid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{19}[0-9F]?$",
"description": "ICCID as described in section 5.2.1"
},
"matchingId": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section 5.3.5"
},
"notificationReceiverIdentifier": {
"type": "string",
"description": "#SupportedFromV3.0.0# as defined in section 5.3.5"
},
"notificationIdentifier": {
"type": "string",
"description": "#SupportedFromV3.0.0# as defined in section 5.3.5"
},
"profileType": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Content free information defined by the Operator (e.g.'P9054-2')"
},
"timestamp": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}T[0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2}(Z|([+\\-][0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2}))$",
"description": "String format as specified by W3C: YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ssTZD (E.g., 2001-12-17T09:30:47Z)"
},
"notificationEvent": {
"type": "integer",
"description": "Identification of the step reached in the procedure or the forwarded event"
},
"notificationEventStatus": {
"type": "object",
"description": "ExecutionStatus Common Data Type",
"properties": {
"status": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Executed-Success, Failed"
},
"statusCodeData": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"subjectCode": {
"type": "string",
"description": "OID of the subject code"
},
"reasonCode": {
"type": "string",
"description": "OID of the reason code"
},
"subjectIdentifier": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Identifier of the subject"
},
"message": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Textual and human readable explanation"
}
},
"required": ["subjectCode", "reasonCode"]
}
},
"required": ["status"]
},
"resultData": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "finalResult data object contained in the ProfileInstallationResult or LoadRpmPackageResult"
}
},
"required": ["timestamp", "notificationEvent"]
}
6.5.2.6 "ES9+.InitiateAuthentication" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES9+.InitiateAuthentication" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"euiccChallenge": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "base64 encoding of the value field of the eUICC Challenge defined in Section 5.6.1 (without tag and length fields)"
},
"euiccInfo1": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "euiccinfo1 defined in Section 5.6.1"
},
"smdpAddress": {
"type": "string",
"description": "SM-DP+ Address as defined in Section 5.6.1"
},
"lpaRspCapability": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "#SupportedFromV3.0.0# lpaRspCapability defined in Section 5.6.1"
}
},
"required": ["euiccChallenge", "euiccInfo1", "smdpAddress"]
}
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage> corresponding to the "ES9+.InitiateAuthentication" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"transactionId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{2,32}$",
"description": "TransactionID defined in Section 5.6.1"
},
"serverSigned1": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "The data object as required by ES10b.AuthenticateServer"
},
"serverSignature1": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "The signature as required by ES10b.AuthenticateServer"
},
"euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "The CI Public Key to be used as required by ES10b.AuthenticateServer"
},
"serverCertificate": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "The server Certificate as required by ES10b.AuthenticateServer"
},
"otherCertsInChain": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "#SupportedFromV3.0.0# The remaining part of the server Certificate chain as described in 5.6.1"
},
"crlList": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "#SupportedFromV3.0.0# The CRL list as described in ES10b.AuthenticateServer"
}
},
"required": ["transactionId", "serverSigned1", "serverSignature1", "serverCertificate"]
}
NOTE: LPA is in charge of transcoding the transactionId.
6.5.2.7 "ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"transactionId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{2,32}$",
"description": "TransactionID defined in Section 5.6.2"
},
"prepareDownloadResponse": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "PrepareDownloadResponse defined in Section 5.6.2"
}
},
"required": ["transactionId", "prepareDownloadResponse"]
}
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage> corresponding to the "ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"transactionId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{2,32}$",
"description": "TransactionID defined in Section 5.6.2"
},
"boundProfilePackage": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "Bound Profile Package defined in Section 5.6.2"
}
},
"required": ["transactionId", "boundProfilePackage"]
}
6.5.2.8 "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"transactionId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{2,32}$",
"description": "TransactionID defined in Section 5.6.3"
},
"authenticateServerResponse": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "AuthenticateServerResponse defined in Section 5.6.3"
},
"deleteNotificationForDc": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "#SupportedForDcV3.0.0# containing deleteNotificationForDc TLV, see section 6.6.2.2"
},
},
"required": ["transactionId", "authenticateServerResponse"]
}
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage> corresponding to the "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"transactionId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{2,32}$",
"description": "TransactionID defined in Section 5.6.3"
}
},
"required": ["transactionId"],
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"profileMetadata": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "StoreMetadataRequest defined in section 5.5.3"
},
"smdpSigned2": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "SmdpSigned2 encoded data object"
},
"smdpSignature2": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "SM-DP+ signature as defined in ES10b.PrepareDownload"
},
"smdpCertificate": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "The Certificate as required by ES10b.PrepareDownload"
}
},
"required": ["profileMetadata","smdpSigned2","smdpSignature2","smdpCertificate"]
},{
"properties": {
"smdpSigned3": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "SmdpSigned3 encoded data object"
},
"smdpSignature3": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "SM-DP+ signature as defined in ES10b.LoadRpmPackage"
}
},
"required": ["smdpSigned3","smdpSignature3"]
},{
"properties": {
"smdpSigned4": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "SmdpSigned4 encoded data object"
},
"smdpSignature4": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "SM-DP+ signature as defined in ES10b.PrepareDeviceChange"
},
"serviceProviderMessageForDc": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "#SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Service Provider Message For Device Change defined in section 6.6.2.2."
}
},
"required": ["smdpSigned4","smdpSignature4"]
}
]
}
Depending on the targeted RSP Server (SM-DP+ or SM-DS) the response MAY be a <JSON body> corresponding to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" or "ES11.AuthenticateClient" function.
6.5.2.9 "ES9+.HandleNotification" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES9+.HandleNotification" function.
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"pendingNotification": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "PendingNotification defined in section 5.7.10"
}
},
"required": ["pendingNotification"]
}
6.5.2.10 "ES9+.CancelSession" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES9+.CancelSession" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"transactionId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{2,32}$",
"description": "TransactionID defined in Section 5.6.5"
},
"cancelSessionResponse": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "CancelSessionResponse data object defined in Section 5.7.14"
}
},
"required": ["transactionId", "cancelSessionResponse"]
}
The "ES9+.CancelSession" function has no <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage>.
6.5.2.11 "ES11.InitiateAuthentication" Function
The <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> and <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage> corresponding to the "ES11.InitiateAuthentication" function is identical to the one defined for the "ES9+.InitiateAuthentication" function.
6.5.2.12 "ES11.AuthenticateClient" Function
The <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES11.AuthenticateClient" function is identical to the one defined for the "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" function. Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage> corresponding to the "ES11.AuthenticateClient" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"transactionId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{2,32}$",
"description": "TransactionID, see Section 5.8.2"
},
},
"required": ["transactionId"],
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"eventEntries": {
"type": "array",
"description": "#SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#",
"items": {
"type": "object",
"description": "data containing EVENT_RECORD, see section 5.8.2",
"properties": {
"eventId": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Identification of the event"
},
"rspServerAddress": {
"type": "string",
"description": "RSP Server address where the event can be found"
}
},
"required": ["eventId", "rspServerAddress"]
}
}
},
"required": ["eventEntries"]
},{
"properties": {
"smdsSigned2": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "#SupportedFromV3.0.0# SM-DS response as defined in ES10a.VerifySmdsResponse"
},
"smdsSignature2": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "#SupportedFromV3.0.0# SM-DS signature as defined in ES10a.VerifySmdsResponse"
},
},
"required": ["smdsSigned2", "smdsSignature2"]
}
]
}
Depending on the targeted RSP Server (SM-DP+ or SM-DS) the response MAY be a <JSON body> corresponding to "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" or "ES11.AuthenticateClient" function.
6.5.2.13 "ES12.RegisterEvent" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES12.RegisterEvent" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"eid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{32}$",
"description": "EID as desc in SGP.02"
},
"rspServerAddress": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section 5.9.1"
},
"eventId": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section 5.9.1"
},
"forwardingIndicator": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": "indicates whether the event is cascaded to a Root SM-DS"
},
"rootSmdsAddress": {
"type": "string",
"description": "the FQDN of the Root SM-DS for cascaded registration"
},
"eventType": {
"type": "integer",
"description": "denotes the RSP Operation of this Event Record, see Section 5.9.1"
},
"hashedIccids": {
"type": "array",
"description": "identification of the target Profile(s), each calculated as SHA256(ICCID) or SHA256(ICCID|Salt)",
"items": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{64}$"
}
},
"salt": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{16,32}$",
"description": "random value to calculate hashedIccids"
},
"serviceProviderName": {
"type": "string",
"description": "name of the Service Provider that requested the RSP Operation of this Event Record"
},
"operatorId": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "identification of the Operator that requested the RSP Operation of this Event Record, see Section 5.9.1"
}
},
"required": ["eid", "rspServerAddress", "eventId", "forwardingIndicator"],
"dependencies": {
"salt": {
"$comment": "salt can be present only if hashedIccids is present",
"required": [ "hashedIccids" ]
},
"rootSmdsAddress": {
"$comment": "smdsAddress can be present only if forwardingIndicator is true",
"properties": {
"forwardingIndicator": { "const": true }
}
}
}
}
This function has no <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage>.
6.5.2.14 "ES12.DeleteEvent" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES12.DeleteEvent" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"eid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{32}$",
"description": "EID as desc in SGP.02"
},
"eventId": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section 5.9.2"
}
},
"required": ["eid", "eventId"]
}
This function has no <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage>.
6.5.2.15 "ES2+.RpmOrder" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES2+.RpmOrder" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"eid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{32}$",
"description": "EID as described in SGP.02"
},
"rpmScript": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "RpmPackage defined in section 2.10.1"
},
"matchingId": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section 5.3.6"
},
"rootSmdsAddress": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section 5.3.6"
},
"altSmdsAddress": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section 5.3.6"
}
},
"required": ["eid","rpmScript"],
"dependencies": { "altSmdsAddress": [ "rootSmdsAddress" ] }
}
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage> corresponding to the "ES2+.RpmOrder" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"matchingId": {
"type": "string",
"description": "as defined in section {5.3.6}"
}
},
"required": ["matchingId"]
}
6.5.2.16 "ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"iccid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{19}[0-9F]?$",
"description": "ICCID as described in section 5.2.1"
},
"eid": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{32}$",
"description": "EID as described in SGP.02"
},
"tac": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9]{8}$",
"description": "TAC as described in section 4.2"
}
},
"required": ["iccid"]
}
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage> corresponding to the "ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"isNewProfileRequired": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": "as defined in section 5.3.7"
},
"serviceProviderMessageForDc": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "Service Provider Message For Device Change defined in section 6.6.2.2."
},
"cc" : {
"type" : "string",
"description" : "as defined in section 5.3.7"
}
},
"required": ["isNewProfileRequired"]
}
6.5.2.17 "ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"transactionId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{2,32}$",
"description": "TransactionID defined in Section 5.6.5"
},
"prepareDeviceChangeResponse": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "PrepareDeviceCHangeResponse defined in Section 5.7.26"
}
},
"required": ["transactionId","prepareDeviceChangeResponse"]
}
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage> corresponding to the " ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"transactionId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{2,32}$",
"description": "TransactionID defined in Section 5.6.5"
},
"smdpSigned5": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "SmdpSigned5 encoded data object as defined in ES10b.VerifyDeviceChangeConfirmation"
},
"smdpSignature5": {
"type": "string",
"format": "base64",
"description": "SM-DP+ signature as defined in "ES10b.VerifyDeviceChangeConfirmation"
}
},
"required": ["transactionId"],
"$comment": "smdpSigned5 and smdpSignature5 are either both present or both absent",
"dependencies": {
"smdpsigned5" : ["smdpSignature5"],
"smdpSignature5": ["smdpSigned5"]
}
}
6.5.2.18 "ES11.CheckEvent" Function
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON requestMessage> corresponding to the "ES11.CheckEvent" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"ecId": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[0-9,A-F]{32,64}$",
"description": "Event Checking Identifier"
},
"smdsAddress": {
"type": "string",
"description": "SM-DS Address"
}
},
"required": ["ecId", "smdsAddress"]
}
Hereunder is the definition of the JSON schema for the <JSON body> part of the <JSON responseMessage> corresponding to the "ES11.CheckEvent" function:
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"isPendingEvent": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": "Indicates if an Event Record corresponding to the received ECID is pending"
}
},
"required": ["isPendingEvent"]
}
6.6 Function Binding in ASN.1
6.6.1 ASN.1 message definition
The Function requester and the Function Provider SHALL exchange the DER encoded ASN.1 objects in HTTP messages as follows.
•HTTP Request SHALL have the following format.
HTTP POST gsma/rsp2/asn1 HTTP/1.1
Host: <Server Address>
User-Agent: <User Agent>
X-Admin-Protocol: gsma/rsp/v<x.y.z>
Content-Type: application/x-gsma-rsp-asn1
Content-Length: <Length of the ASN.1 RemoteProfileProvisioningRequest>
<ASN.1 RemoteProfileProvisioningRequest>
Any function execution request using ASN.1 binding SHALL be sent to the generic HTTP path 'gsma/rsp2/asn1'.
The body part of the HTTP POST request SHALL contain one Remote Profile Provisioning Request objects defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
RemoteProfileProvisioningRequest ::= [2] CHOICE { -- Tag 'A2'
initiateAuthenticationRequest [57] InitiateAuthenticationRequest, -- Tag 'BF39'
authenticateClientRequest [59] AuthenticateClientRequest, -- Tag 'BF3B'
getBoundProfilePackageRequest [58] GetBoundProfilePackageRequest, -- Tag 'BF3A'
cancelSessionRequestEs9 [65] CancelSessionRequestEs9, -- Tag 'BF41'
handleNotification [61] HandleNotification, -- tag 'BF3D'
confirmDeviceChangeRequest [76] ConfirmDeviceChangeRequest, -- Tag 'BF4C'
checkEventRequest [70] CheckEventRequest -- Tag 'BF46'
}
-- ASN1STOPHTTP Response SHALL have the following format:
HTTP/1.1 <HTTP Status Code>
X-Admin-Protocol: gsma/rsp/v<x.y.z>
Content-Type: application/x-gsma-rsp-asn1
Content-Length: <Length of the ASN.1 RemoteProfileProvisioningResponse>
<ASN.1 RemoteProfileProvisioningResponse>
The body part of the HTTP POST response SHALL contain one Remote Profile Provisioning Response object defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
RemoteProfileProvisioningResponse ::= [2] CHOICE { -- Tag 'A2'
initiateAuthenticationResponse [57] InitiateAuthenticationResponse, -- Tag 'BF39'
authenticateClientResponseEs9 [59] AuthenticateClientResponseEs9, -- Tag 'BF3B'
getBoundProfilePackageResponse [58] GetBoundProfilePackageResponse, -- Tag 'BF3A'
cancelSessionResponseEs9 [65] CancelSessionResponseEs9, -- Tag 'BF41'
authenticateClientResponseEs11 [64] AuthenticateClientResponseEs11, -- Tag 'BF40'
confirmDeviceChangeResponse [76] ConfirmDeviceChangeResponse, -- Tag 'BF4C'
checkEventResponse [70] CheckEventResponse -- Tag 'BF46'
}
-- ASN1STOP6.6.1.1 Common status codes
The following values map the common status codes defined in section 5.2.6.3 that can be returned by any function.
invalidInputData(124) -- maps status code "Function-Invalid"
missingInputData(125) -- maps status code "Function - Mandatory Element Missing" and "Function - Conditional Element Missing"
functionProviderBusy(126) -- maps status code "Function provider - Busy"
undefinedError(127) -- maps status code "Function provider - Execution Error"
NOTE: Status codes "Function requester - Unknown (Identification or Authentication)", "Function requester - Not allowed (authorisation)" and "Validity period - Refused" are not relevant for ES9+ and ES11 interfaces.
6.6.2 List of functions
6.6.2.1 "ES9+.InitiateAuthentication" Function
The "ES9+.InitiateAuthentication" request function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
InitiateAuthenticationRequest ::= [57] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF39'
euiccChallenge [1] Octet16, -- random eUICC challenge
smdpAddress [3] UTF8String,
euiccInfo1 EUICCInfo1,
lpaRspCapability LpaRspCapability OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
-- ASN1STOPThe "ES9+.InitiateAuthentication" response function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
InitiateAuthenticationResponse ::= [57] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF39'
initiateAuthenticationOk InitiateAuthenticationOkEs9,
initiateAuthenticationError INTEGER {
invalidDpAddress(1),
euiccVersionNotSupportedByDp(2), -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
ciPKIdNotSupported(3),
invalidInputData(124), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingInputData(125), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
functionProviderBusy(126), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127) -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
}
InitiateAuthenticationOkEs9 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0]TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SM-DP+
serverSigned1 ServerSigned1, -- Signed information
serverSignature1 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, -- Server Sign1, tag '5F37'
euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- The CI Public Key to be used as required by ES10b.AuthenticateServer
serverCertificate Certificate,
otherCertsInChain [1] CertificateChain OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
crlList [2] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# From RFC 5280
}
-- ASN1STOP6.6.2.2 "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" Function
The "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" request function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
AuthenticateClientRequest ::= [59] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3B'
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
authenticateServerResponse [56] AuthenticateServerResponse, -- This is the response from ES10b.AuthenticateServer
deleteNotificationForDc [1] DeleteNotificationForDc -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Delete Notification for Device Change, see section 4.1.3
}
-- ASN1STOPThe "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" response function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
AuthenticateClientResponseEs9 ::= [59] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF3B'
authenticateClientOk AuthenticateClientOk,
authenticateClientError INTEGER {
eumCertificateInvalid(1),
eumCertificateExpired(2),
euiccCertificateInvalid(3),
euiccCertificateExpired(4),
euiccSignatureInvalid(5),
matchingIdRefused(6),
eidMismatch(7),
noEligibleProfile(8),
ciPKUnknown(9),
invalidTransactionId(10),
insufficientMemory(11),
ciPKMismatch(12), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
euiccRspCapabilityHasChanged(13), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
lpaRspCapabilityHasChanged(14), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
deviceChangeNotSupported(15), -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
deviceChangeNotAllowed(16), -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
iccidUnkwon(17), -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
invalidInputData(124), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingInputData(125), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
functionProviderBusy(126), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
},
authenticateClientOkRpm AuthenticateClientOkRpm, -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
authenticateClientOkDeviceChange AuthenticateClientOkDeviceChange -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
}
AuthenticateClientOk ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
profileMetadata [37] StoreMetadataRequest OPTIONAL,
smdpSigned2 [1] SmdpSigned2 OPTIONAL, -- Signed information
smdpSignature2 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- tag '5F37'
smdpCertificate Certificate -- CERT.DPpb.SIG
}
AuthenticateClientOkRpm ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
smdpSigned3 [3] SmdpSigned3,
smdpSignature3 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING
}
AuthenticateClientOkDeviceChange ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
smdpSigned4 [1] SmdpSigned4, -- Signed information
smdpSignature4 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, -- tag '5F37'
serviceProviderMessageForDc [1] LocalisedTextMessage OPTIONAL -- Service Provider Message For Device Change
}
-- ASN1STOP6.6.2.3 "ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage" Function
The "ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage" request function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
GetBoundProfilePackageRequest ::= [58] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3A'
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
prepareDownloadResponse [33] PrepareDownloadResponse
}
-- ASN1STOPThe "ES9+.GetBoundProfilePackage" response function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
GetBoundProfilePackageResponse ::= [58] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF3A'
getBoundProfilePackageOk GetBoundProfilePackageOk,
getBoundProfilePackageError INTEGER {
euiccSignatureInvalid(1),
confirmationCodeMissing(2),
confirmationCodeRefused(3),
confirmationCodeRetriesExceeded(4),
bppRebindingRefused(5),
downloadOrderExpired(6),
invalidTransactionId(95),
invalidInputData(124), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingInputData(125), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
functionProviderBusy(126), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
}
}
GetBoundProfilePackageOk ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
boundProfilePackage [54] BoundProfilePackage
}
-- ASN1STOPNOTE: The eUICC MAY start processing of the BPP before having received the full package and having been able to check for a correct TLV structure.
6.6.2.4 "ES9+.HandleNotification" Function
The "ES9+.HandleNotification" request function SHALL consist of the data structure defined for PendingNotification in section 5.7.10. The function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
HandleNotification ::= [61] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3D'
pendingNotification PendingNotification
}
-- ASN1STOPThe function has no response.
6.6.2.5 "ES9+.CancelSession" Function
The "ES9+.CancelSession" request function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
CancelSessionRequestEs9 ::= [65] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF41'
transactionId TransactionId,
cancelSessionResponse CancelSessionResponse -- data structure defined for ES10b.CancelSession function
}
-- ASN1STOPThe "ES9+.CancelSession" response function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
CancelSessionResponseEs9 ::= [65] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF41'
cancelSessionOk CancelSessionOk,
cancelSessionError INTEGER {
invalidTransactionId(1),
euiccSignatureInvalid(2),
invalidInputData(124), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingInputData(125), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
functionProviderBusy(126), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
}
}
CancelSessionOk ::= SEQUENCE { -- This function has no output data
}
-- ASN1STOP6.6.2.6 "ES11.InitiateAuthentication" Function
The InitiateAuthenticationRequest and InitiateAuthenticationResponse for the binding of the "ES11.InitiateAuthentication" function are identical to the ones defined for the "ES9+.InitiateAuthentication" function.
6.6.2.7 "ES11.AuthenticateClient" Function
The AuthenticateClientRequest for the binding of the "ES11.AuthenticateClient" function is identical to the one defined for the "ES9+.AuthenticateClient" function.
The "ES11.AuthenticateClient" response data object is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
AuthenticateClientResponseEs11 ::= [64] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF40'
authenticateClientOk AuthenticateClientOkEs11V2, -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
authenticateClientError INTEGER {
eumCertificateInvalid(1),
eumCertificateExpired(2),
euiccCertificateInvalid(3),
euiccCertificateExpired(4),
euiccSignatureInvalid(5),
eventIdUnknown(6),
invalidTransactionId(7),
ciPKUnknown(8), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
ciPKMismatch(9), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
euiccRspCapabilityHasChanged(10), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
lpaRspCapabilityHasChanged(11), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
pushServiceNotSupport(12), -- #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0#
pushServiceRegistrationNotSupported(13), -- #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0#
invalidInputData(124), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingInputData(125), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
functionProviderBusy(126), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
},
authenticateClientOkV3 AuthenticateClientOkEs11V3 -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
AuthenticateClientOkEs11V2 ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
eventEntries [1] SEQUENCE OF EventRecord
}
EventRecord ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
eventId UTF8String,
rspServerAddress UTF8String
}
AuthenticateClientOkEs11V3 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
smdsSigned2 [1] SmdsSigned2,
smdsSignature2 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- tag '5F37'
}
-- ASN1STOP6.6.2.8 "ES11.CheckEvent" Function
The "ES11.CheckEvent" request function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
CheckEventRequest ::= [70] SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0# Tag 'BF46'
ecId [0] OCTET STRING(SIZE(16..32)), -- Event Checking Identifier
smdsAddress [1] UTF8String
}
-- ASN1STOPThe "ES11.CheckEvent" response function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
CheckEventResponse ::= [70] CHOICE { -- #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0# Tag 'BF46'
checkEventOk CheckEventOk,
checkEventError INTEGER {
invalidDsAddress(1),
eventCheckingNotSupported(2), -- #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0#
expiredEcid(3), -- #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0#
unknownEcid(4), -- #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0#
invalidInputData(124), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingInputData(125), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
functionProviderBusy(126), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127) -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
}
CheckEventOk ::= SEQUENCE {
isPendingEvent [0] BOOLEAN -- Indicates if an Event Record corresponding to the received ECID exists
}
-- ASN1STOP6.6.2.9 "ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange" Function
The "ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange" request function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
ConfirmDeviceChangeRequest ::= [76] SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF4C'
transactionId TransactionId,
prepareDownloadResponse [33] PrepareDownloadResponse
}
-- ASN1STOPThe "ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange" response function is defined as follows:
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START
ConfirmDeviceChangeResponse ::= [76] CHOICE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF4C'
confirmDeviceChangeOk ConfirmDeviceChangeOk,
confirmDeviceChangeError INTEGER {
invalidTransactionId(1),
euiccSignatureInvalid(2),
confirmationCodeMissing(3),
confirmationCodeRefused(4),
confirmationCodeInvalidMatch(5),
confirmationCodeRetriesExceeded(6),
invalidInputData(124),
missingInputData(125),
functionProviderBusy(126),
undefinedError(127)
}
}
ConfirmDeviceChangeOk ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
smdpSigned5 SmdpSigned5,
smdpSignature5 OCTET STRING
}
-- ASN1STOPThe following ASN.1 definition shall stay at the end of any ASN.1 definitions.
ASN.1 definitions
-- ASN1START END -- ASN1STOP
A Use of GlobalPlatform Privileges (Normative)
The eUICC architecture defined in this specification relies on the ISD-R, ISD-P, MNO-SD and ECASD Security Domains defined in SGP.02 [2].
The GlobalPlatform privileges allocation defined in SGP.02 [2] SHALL be applicable for the ISD‑R, ISD-P, MNO-SD and ECASD Security Domains as well as Applications inside a Profile.
B Data Definitions (Normative)
•Coding of the IMEI
The value of the IMEI SHALL be coded as defined in section 4.2.
C Device Requirements (Normative)
C.1 Functional Device Requirements
Functional Device Requirements No. | Requirement |
DEV1 | For connectivity the Device SHALL support at least one of the network access technologies defined by 3GPP or 3GPP2: •UDP over IP as defined in RFC 768 [34] (subject to the right support of access network technology) •TCP over IP as defined in RFC 793 [19]. |
DEV2 | For Network connection control the Device SHALL support: •RPLMN details (LAC/TAC, NMR). •QoS (failures, duration, power, location). •New network selection after SIM/USIM update. |
DEV3 | The Device SHALL contain a unique IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) value compliant with the format defined in 3GPP TS 23.003 [35] and/or a unique MEID as defined in 3GPP2 S.R0048-A [36]. |
DEV4 | The Device SHALL support, as a minimum, the following set of proactive commands: •PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION (location information, IMEI, NMR, date and time, access technology, at least). •POLL INTERVAL, POLLING OFF, TIMER MANAGEMENT [at least one timer], ENVELOPE (TIMER EXPIRATION). •SET UP EVENT LIST and ENVELOPE (EVENT DOWNLOAD). •REFRESH Command (At least mode 4 - "UICC reset") |
DEV5 | The Device SHALL comply with the IMEI security requirements defined in the GSMA-EICTA document "Security Principles Related to Handset Theft" [22]. |
DEV6 | A Device SHALL be able to handle an eUICC without any installed Profiles. |
DEV7 | If a Companion Device does not have the capability itself to communicate directly with the SM-DP+, it SHALL use a Primary Device as a conduit, allowing it to communicate with the SM-DP+. |
DEV8 | At least one of the Primary or Companion Device SHALL have a UI that allows the secure capture of User Intent. |
DEV9 | At least one of the Primary or Companion Device SHALL have a UI that allows the user to initiate a Profile Download or Local Profile Management. |
DEV10 | The Device SHALL conform to the terminal requirements within ETSI TS 102 221 [6]. |
DEV11 | A Device implementation of personalisation ("SIM lock") as defined by 3GPP TS 22.022 SHALL operate the same with an enabled eUICC Profile as with a legacy UICC. |
DEV12 | (Deprecated in this formulation, currently expanded into Annex C.5). |
DEV13 | Void |
DEV14 | The Device SHALL operate with an eUICC comprising a default file system (i.e., with no Enabled Profile) as described in section 3.4.1. In particular, neither the modem nor the eUICC SHALL be shut down. |
DEV15 | It SHALL be possible for the End User to perform a Device Reset without affecting the status of the eUICC. (The Device MAY also allow the End User to perform a combined Device Reset and eUICC Memory Reset.) |
Table 58: Device requirements
C.2 Requirements for Companion Device Scenarios
Interface between the Primary Device and the Companion Device
The implementation of the interface between the Primary Device and the Companion Device is optional and Device Manufacturer specific. The OCF Easy Setup specification [i2] provide a potential implementation of this interface, for which the following SHOULD be considered:
-The Primary Device and the Companion Device defined in this document act as the Mediator and the Enrollee, respectively, defined in [i2].
-The JSON binding of the interface defined in [i2] limits the maximum size of the data objects as follows. If a Remote SIM Provisioning procedure over this interface uses a data object that exceeds the defined limits, the interface MAY reject relaying the data object:
-euiccInfo2 (eUICC Information in [i2])
-deviceInfo (Device Information for RSP in [i2])
-Activation Code (Activation Code in [i2])
-Profile Metadata (eSIM Profile Metadata in [i2])
-Confirmation Code (Confirmation Code in [i2])
NOTE: OCF provides an open source implementation for the OCF Easy Setup specification [i2]: https://gitlab.iotivity.org/iotivity/iotivity-lite/-/tree/easysetup
Secure interaction between the Primary Device and the Companion Device
The LPAd of the Companion Device SHALL support secure capture of the User Intent for the purpose of RSP operations through the Primary Device when the Companion Device has to rely on the Primary Device for UI function. This SHALL further include a secure pairing and secured communication between the Primary and Companion Device. The End User MAY request RSP operations towards the eUICC in the Companion Device using the Primary Device.
A secure point to point proximity link at transport level between the Primary Device and the Companion Device SHALL either be implemented by the Primary and Companion Devices’ Device manufacturer(s), or it SHALL be established as follows:
1.The End User connects the Companion Device to a router (e.g., the Primary Device which shares the network) which will assign an address for the Companion Device.
NOTE: This step MAY be performed at any time prior to step 2.
2.The End User uses the LPAd on the Companion Device to generate a HTTPS URL which includes the Companion Device address (e.g., private local IP address) and security information (i.e., 128-bit random secret key).
In order to achieve the interoperability between different Device manufacturer Devices, the HTTPS URL SHALL be specified as https://hpath/LPA_access_token, where "hpath" is the Companion Device address and "LPA_access_token" is the security information.
3.The LPAd on the Companion Device indicates the HTTPS URL including the Companion Device address and the security information to the Primary Device using one of following non-exhaustive example means:
•The Companion Device transfers the HTTPS URL to the Primary Device, e.g., using NFC.
•The Companion Device displays the HTTPS URL which could be input by the End User to the Primary Device.
•The Companion Device transforms the HTTPS URL into a QR code or bar code so that the Primary Device can scan the code to obtain the HTTPS URL.
•The Companion Device transfers the HTTPS URL through a wired connection, such as a USB link to the Primary Device.
4.Using the Companion Device address and the security information obtained from the HTTPS URL, a software component (e.g., LPAd) on the Primary Device establishes a HTTPS session with the LPAd on the Companion Device:
•Firstly, the software component uses the LPA_access_token in step 2 as the PSK to initiate the PSK-TLS connection as defined in RFC 4279 [47] with the LPAd on the Companion Device. During the TLS handshake, the software component in the Primary Device performs mutual authentication with the LPAd on the Companion Device and negotiates the session key.
•After the TLS connection is established, the software component on the Primary Device sends an HTTP request over the TLS session to the Companion Device to retrieve the UI presentation of the LUId. Upon receiving the HTTP request, the LPAd on the Companion Device sends the HTTP response containing the UI presentation to the Primary Device.
5.The End User uses the UI provided by the software component on the Primary Device to access the LUI on the Companion Device via the HTTPS session to perform the Local Profile Management Operations towards the eUICC in the Companion Device. The LUI on the Companion Device MAY restrict the actions that can be performed from the Primary Device. For example:
•It MAY not offer the eUICC Memory Reset.
•It MAY only expose the 'enable' and 'disable' operations.
•It MAY expose a Profile for enabling only if no Profile is already enabled on the Companion Device.
C.3 General LPA Requirements
LPA functions
There SHALL be at most one instance of the LPAd per active eUICC.
The LPA SHALL support all the functions related to Profile download and Installation via the LPA’s Local Profile Download (LPD) functions as defined in section 3.1.3.
The LPA SHALL support Notifications as defined in sections 3.1.3, 3.5, 5.6.4, 5.7.9, 5.7.10, 5.7.11.
The LPA SHALL support the following Local Profile Management Operations and Remote Profile Management Operations via the LPA’s Local User Interface (LUI) function:
•Initiate an RSP session for Profile Download as defined in section 3.2.5 and 3.2.8.
•Initiate an RSP session for RPM download as defined in section 3.2.7 and section 3.2.8.
•Enable a Disabled Profile locally as defined in section 3.2.1 and remotely as defined in section 3.7.3.1.
•Disable an Enabled Profile locally as defined in section 3.2.2 and remotely as defined in section 3.7.3.2.
•Delete a Profile locally as defined in section 3.2.3 and remotely as defined in section 3.7.3.3.
•Query the Profile Metadata and states of Profiles installed on the eUICC locally as defined in section 3.2.4 and remotely as defined in section 3.7.3.4.
•Update the Profile Metadata of Profiles installed on the eUICC as defined in section 3.7.3.5.
•Perform eUICC Memory Reset, as defined in section 3.3.2.
•Perform eUICC Test Memory Reset, as defined in section 3.3.3, if the Device supports Device Test Mode as described hereunder.
The LPA SHOULD support the following Local Profile Management Operation via the LPA’s Local User Interface (LUI) function:
•Set/Edit Profile Nicknames associated with installed Profiles as defined in section 3.2.6. If the LPA does not support Set/Edit Nickname, alternative Device-specific methods to distinguish Profiles on the LUI SHOULD be provided by the LPA.
•Set/Edit Default SM-DP+ Address as defined in section 3.3.4. If the LPA does not support Set/Edit Default SM-DP+ Address, alternative Device-specific methods to edit the Default SM-DP+ address(es) SHALL be provided to the End User.
The LPA SHALL allow the End User to enable or disable the Remote Profile Management Operations of the LPA. This SHOULD be enabled by default.
For an Enterprise Capable Device without any Enterprise Profile with Enterprise Rules installed, the LPA SHALL permit the End User to allow or disallow the installation of Enterprise Profiles with Enterprise Rules. The default setting SHOULD be disallowed.
The LPA SHALL support retrieval of eUICC Information as defined in section 4.3.
The LPA SHALL support retrieval of Event Records as defined in section 3.6.2.
The LPA MAY support implementation-specific storage, retrieval and update (set/edit) of one or more Default SM-DP+ addresses stored on the Device.
The LPAd SHOULD advise the End User when it determines that an RSP operation would fail (or has failed) because network connectivity is not available, or an error occurs. The LPA MAY retry the RSP operation for a period of time as appropriate. The specific means by which the connectivity failure is detected, and the manner in which it is communicated to the End User, are out of scope of this specification.
If the LPAd supports the LPA Proxy, it MAY be possible for the End User to prevent the use of mobile network data for that purpose. The use of mobile network data for this purpose SHALL be allowed by default.
LPAd Functions and Security Protection
The specific mechanisms for securing the operation of the LPAd, ensuring its integrity, and ensuring the privacy and integrity of the data it handles are out of scope of this specification. As appropriate for the class of Device, the proper security level associated with LPAd functions SHOULD be ensured based on industry-proven implementations of:
•A secure boot OS.
•An implementation-dependent software/hardware secure execution environment for capturing, storing and verifying the passcode or biometric input.
•Verification of proper Device manufacturer signature of LPAd related software components.
•Application-level secure pairing and un-pairing methods between Primary and Companion Devices. This MAY be independent of pairing technologies and associated link layer security (e.g., Bluetooth or Wi-Fi).
The Device specific security implementation SHALL:
•Verify the integrity of the LPAd and authorise it to be used.
•Provide access to the trusted LUId user interface only for the authorised LPAd.
•Provide access to the ISD-R of the eUICC only for the authorised LPAd. This restriction to the LPAd SHALL be enforced regardless of any rule stored in the Profile according to GlobalPlatform SEAC [56] which may allow it.
•Restrict access to the LPAd to only those applications and services that are provided by the Device manufacturer to enable the services and functions of the LPAd.
•Protect the LPAd and the data it handles from unauthorised access and modification. Such data includes, but is not limited to, the EID, Activation Code, Confirmation Code, End User credentials for Strong Confirmation, Profile Metadata, Profile Download and Notification payloads, and Event Records.
Depending on the device class, Devices SHALL implement protection mechanisms as shown in the table below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Device class Description Example of Devices --------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------- Advanced Devices with an open operating system where mechanisms such as secure boot and platform signing of applications are available and used to protect the LPA. Smartphones, Tablets, Laptops, Advanced Wearables Basic Devices without possibility to install applications. The attack surface of the LPA is minimal due to the locked down nature of these Devices. Simple mechanisms to ensure that the LPA is not compromised SHALL be taken. Connected sensors, Simple Wearables, Single use case devices ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 58a: Device Classes
Where technically feasible, the Device SHALL implement a mechanism allowing the End User to protect the access to the Device and its Profile Management Operations with personal data. Implementation is Device specific. If such a mechanism is implemented:
•The Device SHOULD enforce the mechanism by default, and
•The End User SHOULD be able to enable/disable the mechanism, and
•The End User SHALL be able to configure the personal data.
The Device SHALL provide mechanisms to obtain Strong Confirmation and Simple Confirmation in a Device specific implementation.
As examples, the recommended Strong Confirmation could include:
•Repeating Simple Confirmations, or
•Biometric (e.g., fingerprint) verification, or
•Device passcode verification
Device Test Mode
The Device and LPAd MAY support Device Test Mode. The method of entering Device Test Mode, exiting Device Test Mode, and Device testing functionality that is not related to Remote SIM Provisioning are implementation-specific and out of the scope of this specification.
The LPAd SHALL only provide access to Test Profiles when the Device is operating in Device Test Mode.
When the Device exits Device Test Mode, the LPAd SHALL disable any enabled Test Profile as defined in section 3.2.2 or 3.2.1.
Enterprise
A Device MAY support Enterprise Rules. The support (or non-support) of Enterprise Rules SHALL NOT change during the lifetime of the Device.
The Device SHALL identify itself as an Enterprise-Capable Device in both the TERMINAL CAPABILITY (section 3.4.2) and the DeviceInfo (section 4.2) if and only if it supports the installation and enforcement of Enterprise Rules as described in this specification.
C.4 Support for CAT Mechanisms
Dependent on the deployment, the Devices SHALL support at least the CAT mechanisms (ETSI TS 102 223 [31]) indicated in the table below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CAT mechanism LPAd LPAe with LUIe based on CAT LPAe with LUIe based on SCWS LPAe with LUI based on E4E ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------- ----------------------------- ------------------------------ ---------------------------- TERMINAL PROFILE X X X X SETUP MENU X ENVELOPE (MENU SELECTION) DISPLAY TEXT GET INKEY GET INPUT PLAY TONE SELECT ITEM EVENT DOWNLOAD - User activity EVENT DOWNLOAD - Idle screen available SET UP EVENT LIST X X X X REFRESH with "UICC Reset" or "eUICC Profile State Change" X X X X PROVIDE LOCAL INFORMATION X X X (IMEI) SEND SHORT MESSAGE X X X X ENVELOPE (SMS-PP DOWNLOAD) TIMER MANAGEMENT X X X ENVELOPE (TIMER EXPIRATION) OPEN CHANNEL related to packet data service bearer X X X ⁽¹⁾ X OPEN CHANNEL related to UICC Server Mode X ⁽¹⁾ CLOSE CHANNEL X X X X RECEIVE DATA SEND DATA GET CHANNEL STATUS EVENT DOWNLOAD - Data available EVENT DOWNLOAD - Channel status ENVELOPE with tag 'E4' X REFRESH with "Application Update" or "File Change Notification" X NOTE 1: The Device SHALL support running these 2 BIP channels in parallel. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 59: CAT Mechanisms
NOTE: The table also includes requirements for ES6.
In addition, the following CAT mechanisms SHALL be supported by a Device supporting MEP:
CAT mechanism | LPAd | LPAe with LUIe based on CAT | LPAe with LUIe based on SCWS | LPAe with LUI based on E4E |
|---|---|---|---|---|
REFRESH with "eUICC Profile State Change" | X⁽¹⁾ | X | X | X |
REFRESH with "Application Update" | X | |||
LSI COMMAND with Proactive session request | X⁽¹⁾ ⁽²⁾ | X | X | X |
LSI COMMAND with Platform Reset | X | X | X | X |
NOTE 1: This CAT mechanism is optional for MEP-A2 without RPM NOTE 2: This CAT mechanism is optional for MEP-B |
Table 59a: Additional CAT Mechanisms for MEP support
C.5 APDU Access Interface
An NFC Device SHALL support an APDU access interface as described in this section. A Device that is not an NFC Device SHOULD support this interface.
The APDU access interface MAY be provided by a Device component external to the LPA provided that when it is used with an eUICC it satisfies the following requirements. (As an example, the Device may implement the interface using the GlobalPlatform Open Mobile API transport layer [69].)
The APDU access interface SHALL permit authorised Device Applications to send APDUs to the Enabled Profile and receive the responses. Authorised Device Applications SHALL only be able to access the file system, applications, and security domains within the hierarchy of the MNO-SD.
If the APDU access interface is supported in an MEP-Capable Device, the interface of Open Mobile API [69] handling multiple readers SHOULD be implemented to provide simultaneous access to multiple Enabled Profiles.
The Device MAY implement the GlobalPlatform SEAC specification [56]. If so, the Device SHALL authorise Device Applications by retrieving and enforcing Access Rules as specified in the GlobalPlatform SEAC specification [56]. The Access Rules for the Enabled Profile SHALL be stored as part of the Profile. The Device SHALL NOT enforce Access Rules stored in a Disabled Profile.
The APDU access SHALL be implemented using logical channels on the eUICC. When used in an NFC Device, the APDU access interface SHALL NOT provide access to the eUICC basic channel (channel 0).
D Coding of the AIDs for 'Remote SIM Provisioning' (Normative)
The Coding of the AID for ISD-R, ISD-P and ECASD SHALL be as defined in SGP.02 [2].
E List of Identifiers (Informative)
OIDs
The following identifiers for remote provisioning are created under a dedicated OID tree under ISO branch:
•ASN.1 notation: {ISO(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4) enterprise(1)}
•dot notation: 1.3.6.1.4.1
•IOD-IRI notation: /ISO/Identified-Organization/6/1/4/1
The private enterprise numbers may be found under the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority: http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers/enterprise-numbers
EUM Identifiers
Identifier | Uniqueness | Registration Entity |
|---|---|---|
EUM OID | within eSIM the ecosystem | ISO 1.3.6.1.4.1 |
EIN | within eSIM the ecosystem | GSMA as per SGP.29 [89] or ITU-T as per E.118 [21], depending on the EID assignment scheme (see section 4.3.1) |
Table 60: EUM Identifiers
Identifiers on the eUICC
Identifier | Uniqueness | Registration Entity |
|---|---|---|
EID | within the eSIM ecosystem | See Table 60 for EIN EUM for ESIN |
ECASD AID | within the eUICC | GSMA ESIM Technical Specification SGP.02 [2] |
ISD-R AID | within the eUICC | GSMA ESIM Technical Specification SGP.02 [2] |
ISD-P AID | within the eUICC | eUICC within a range defined in GSMA ESIM Technical Specification SGP.02 [2] |
ICCID | Global | ITU-T E.118 [21] |
ISD-R TAR | within the eUICC | GSMA ESIM Technical Specification SGP.02 [2] |
MNO-SD AID | Within the Profile | ETSI TS 101 220 [33] |
MNO-SD TAR | Within the Profile | ETSI TS 101 220 (ISD TAR) [33] |
Table 61: Identifiers on the eUICC
SM-DP+ Identifier
Identifier | Uniqueness | Registration Entity |
|---|---|---|
SM-DP+ OID | within the eSIM ecosystem | ISO 1.3.6.1.4.1 |
Table 62: SM-DP+ Identifier
SM-DS Identifier
Identifier | Uniqueness | Registration Entity |
|---|---|---|
SM-DS OID | within the eSIM ecosystem | ISO 1.3.6.1.4.1 |
Table 63: SM-DS Identifier
MNO Identifiers
Identifier | Uniqueness | Registration Entity |
|---|---|---|
MNO OID | within the eSIM ecosystem | ISO 1.3.6.1.4.1 |
MCC+MNC (IMSI) | Global | ITU-T for MCC and National Regulators for MNC |
Table 64: MNO Identifiers
F Profile Eligibility Check (Informative)
Prior to any Profile download, the Operator or the SM-DP+ verifies if the selected Profile Type is compatible with the targeted Device.
Two types of checking are possible:
•Static eligibility check (SEC): a check based on the static capabilities of the Device and / or the eUICC. These capabilities could be retrieved based on the knowledge of the EID and the TAC. These eUICC capabilities MAY be acquired by various means: information contained in the EID itself, additional tables locally handled by the Operator or communication with an external entity like the EUM. Device capabilities can be retrieved by the Operator based on the TAC. This Static eligibility check is under the responsibility of the Operator; it MAY be done by the SM-DP+ on behalf of the Operator. The means to establish the compatibility of the Profile Type with a Device type and eUICC type is out of scope of this specification.
•Dynamic eligibility check (DEC): a check based on the eUICC Info and / or the Device capabilities signed by the eUICC during Profile Download and Installation procedure. This Dynamic eligibility check is under the responsibility of the SM-DP+ on behalf of the Operator.
The following figure Figure 41: Eligibility Check" describes the global eligibility process depending on the knowledge of the target Device.
[Figure not reproduced — see the original document]
Figure 41: Eligibility Check
G Void
H ASN.1 Definitions (Normative)
RSPDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) gsma(146) rsp(1) spec-version(1) version-three(3)}
DEFINITIONS
AUTOMATIC TAGS
EXTENSIBILITY IMPLIED ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS Certificate, CertificateList, Time FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18)}
SubjectKeyIdentifier FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19)}
UICCCapability FROM PEDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) tca(143) euicc-profile(1) spec-version(1) version-three(3)};
-- The UICCCapability import module version is defined in section 4.3
id-rsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) gsma(146) rsp(1)}
-- Basic types, for size constraints
Octet1 ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1))
Octet4 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(4))
Octet8 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))
Octet16 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
OctetTo16 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..16))
Octet32 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(32))
VersionType ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(3)) -- major/minor/revision version are coded as binary value on byte 1/2/3, e.g., '02 00 0C' for v2.0.12.
-- If revision is not used (e.g., v2.1), byte 3 SHALL be set to '00'.
Iccid ::= [APPLICATION 26] OCTET STRING (SIZE(10)) -- ICCID as coded in EFiccid, corresponding tag is '5A'
RemoteOpId ::= [2] INTEGER {installBoundProfilePackage(1)}
TransactionId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..16))
-- Definition of OIDs
id-rsp-cert-objects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rsp 2}
-- value 0 in id-rsp-cert-objects was assigned in SGP.22 v2.x
-- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
id-rspRole OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rsp-cert-objects 1}
-- Definition of OIDs for role identification in certificates
id-rspRole-ci OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 0}
id-rspRole-ciSubCa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-ci 0}
id-rspRole-eum OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-ciSubCa 0}
id-rspRole-eumSubCa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-eum 0}
id-rspRole-euicc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-eumSubCa 0}
id-rspRole-dpSubCa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-ciSubCa 1}
id-rspRole-dp-tls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dpSubCa 0}
id-rspRole-dp-auth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dpSubCa 1}
id-rspRole-dp-pb OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dpSubCa 2}
id-rspRole-dsSubCa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-ciSubCa 2}
id-rspRole-ds-tls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dsSubCa 0}
id-rspRole-ds-auth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole-dsSubCa 1}
-- The following OIDs are used in Variant O and OO Certificates
id-rspRole-euicc-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 1}
id-rspRole-eum-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 2}
id-rspRole-dp-tls-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 3}
id-rspRole-dp-auth-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 4}
id-rspRole-dp-pb-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 5}
id-rspRole-ds-tls-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 6}
id-rspRole-ds-auth-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rspRole 7}
-- Definition of OIDs for RSP-specific extensions in Certificates
-- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
id-rsp-extensions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-rsp-cert-objects 2}
id-rsp-extension-permitted-eins OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-rsp-extensions 0}
-- The extnValue field of the id-rsp-extension-permitted-eins extension SHALL be of type PermittedEins:
PermittedEins ::= SEQUENCE OF PrintableString
PprIds ::= BIT STRING {-- Definition of Profile Policy Rules identifiers
pprUpdateControl(0), -- defines how to update PPRs via ES6
ppr1(1), -- Indicator for PPR1 'Disabling of this Profile is not allowed'
ppr2(2) -- Indicator for PPR2 'Deletion of this Profile is not allowed'
}
OperatorId ::= SEQUENCE {
mccMnc OCTET STRING (SIZE(3)), -- MCC&MNC coded as 3GPP TS 24.008
gid1 OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- referring to content of EF GID1 (file identifier '6F3E') in 3GPP TS 31.102 [54]
gid2 OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- referring to content of EF GID2 (file identifier '6F3F') in 3GPP TS 31.102 [54]
}
RpmConfiguration ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
managingDpList [0] SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
managingDpOid [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- Managing SM-DP+ OID
rpmType [1] RpmType OPTIONAL,
tagList [APPLICATION 28] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
},
pollingAddress [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- Tag '81'
allowedCiPKId [2] SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- eSIM CA RootCA PKID that is allowed for managing SM-DP+s
profileOwnerOid [3] OBJECT IDENTIFIER
}
RpmType ::= BIT STRING{
enable(0), disable(1), delete(2), listProfileInfo(3), contactPcmp(4)
}
LocalisedTextMessage ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
languageTag UTF8String DEFAULT "en", -- language tag as defined by RFC 5646
message UTF8String
}
LprConfiguration ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0#
pcmpAddress [0] UTF8String,
dpiEnable [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL,
triggerLprOnEnableProfile [2] NULL OPTIONAL
}
CertificateChain ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
EnterpriseConfiguration ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseOid [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
enterpriseName [1] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)),
enterpriseRules [2] SEQUENCE {
enterpriseRuleBits [0] BIT STRING {
referenceEnterpriseRule (0),
priorityEnterpriseProfile (1),
onlyEnterpriseProfilesCanBeInstalled (2)
},
numberOfNonEnterpriseProfiles [1] INTEGER -- that can be Enabled
} OPTIONAL
}
OPENTYPE ::= CLASS {
&typeId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
&Type
}
VendorSpecificExtension ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0#
vendorOid [0] OPENTYPE.&typeId, -- OID of the vendor who defined this specific extension
vendorSpecificData [1] OPENTYPE.&Type
}
DeviceChangeConfiguration ::= CHOICE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
requestToDp [0] SEQUENCE {
smdpAddressForDc UTF8String, -- SM-DP+ address that processes the Device Change
allowedCiPKId SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- PKID allowed for the SM-DP+ address that processes the Device Change
eidRequired NULL OPTIONAL, -- the EID of the new Device is required
tacRequired NULL OPTIONAL -- the TAC of the new Device is required
},
usingStoredAc [1] SEQUENCE {
activationCodeForDc UTF8String (SIZE(0..255)), -- Activation Code for Device Change of this Profile
deleteOldProfile NULL OPTIONAL -- deletion of this Profile is required before providing the Activation code to the new Device
}
}
BoundProfilePackage ::= [54] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF36'
initialiseSecureChannelRequest [35] InitialiseSecureChannelRequest, -- Tag 'BF23'
firstSequenceOf87 [0] SEQUENCE OF [7] OCTET STRING, -- sequence of '87' TLVs
sequenceOf88 [1] SEQUENCE OF [8] OCTET STRING, -- sequence of '88' TLVs
secondSequenceOf87 [2] SEQUENCE OF [7] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- sequence of '87' TLVs
sequenceOf86 [3] SEQUENCE OF [6] OCTET STRING -- sequence of '86' TLVs
}
-- Definition of Profile Installation Result
ProfileInstallationResult ::= [55] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF37'
profileInstallationResultData [39] ProfileInstallationResultData,
euiccSignPIR EuiccSign
}
ProfileInstallationResultData ::= [39] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF27'
transactionId[0] TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SM-DP+
notificationMetadata[47] NotificationMetadata,
smdpOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- SM-DP+ OID (value from CERT.DPpb.SIG)
finalResult [2] CHOICE {
successResult SuccessResult,
errorResult ErrorResult
}
}
EuiccSign ::= [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- Tag '5F37', eUICCs signature
SuccessResult ::= SEQUENCE {
aid [APPLICATION 15] OCTET STRING (SIZE (5..16)), -- AID of ISD-P
ppiResponse OCTET STRING -- contains (multiple) 'EUICCResponse' of the Profile Package Interpreter as defined in [5]
}
ErrorResult ::= SEQUENCE {
bppCommandId BppCommandId,
errorReason ErrorReason,
ppiResponse OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- contains (multiple) 'EUICCResponse' of the Profile Package Interpreter as defined in [5]
}
BppCommandId ::= INTEGER {
initialiseSecureChannel(0),
configureISDP(1),
storeMetadata(2),
storeMetadata2(3),
replaceSessionKeys(4),
loadProfileElements(5)
}
ErrorReason ::= INTEGER {
incorrectInputValues(1),
invalidSignature(2),
invalidTransactionId(3),
unsupportedCrtValues(4),
unsupportedRemoteOperationType(5),
unsupportedProfileClass(6),
bspStructureError(7),
bspSecurityError(8),
installFailedDueToIccidAlreadyExistsOnEuicc(9),
installFailedDueToInsufficientMemoryForProfile(10),
installFailedDueToInterruption(11),
installFailedDueToPEProcessingError (12),
installFailedDueToDataMismatch(13),
testProfileInstallFailedDueToInvalidNaaKey(14),
pprNotAllowed(15),
enterpriseProfilesNotSupported(17), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseRulesNotAllowed(18), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseProfileNotAllowed(19), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseOidMismatch(20), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseRulesError(21), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseProfilesOnly(22), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
lprNotSupported(23), -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0#
unknownTlvInMetadata(26), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
installFailedDueToUnknownError(127)
}
RpmPackage ::= SEQUENCE OF RpmCommand -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
RpmCommand ::= SEQUENCE {
continueOnFailure [0] NULL OPTIONAL,
rpmCommandDetails CHOICE {
enable [1] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid},
disable [2] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid},
delete [3] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid},
listProfileInfo [4] ListProfileInfo,
updateMetadata [5] SEQUENCE {
iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid,
updateMetadataRequest UpdateMetadataRequest
},
contactPcmp [6] SEQUENCE {
iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid,
dpiRpm UTF8String OPTIONAL
}
}
}
LoadRpmPackageResult ::= [68] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF44' #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
loadRpmPackageResultSigned LoadRpmPackageResultSigned,
loadRpmPackageResultNotSigned LoadRpmPackageResultNotSigned
}
LoadRpmPackageResultSigned ::= SEQUENCE {
loadRpmPackageResultDataSigned LoadRpmPackageResultDataSigned,
euiccSignRPR EuiccSign
}
LoadRpmPackageResultDataSigned ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
notificationMetadata[47] NotificationMetadata,
smdpOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- SM-DP+ OID (value from CERT.DPauth.SIG)
finalResult [2] CHOICE {
rpmPackageExecutionResult SEQUENCE OF RpmCommandResult,
loadRpmPackageErrorCodeSigned LoadRpmPackageErrorCodeSigned
}
}
RpmCommandResult ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid OPTIONAL, -- SHALL be present, except for listProfileInfoResult and rpmProcessingTerminated
rpmCommandResultData CHOICE {
enableResult [49] EnableProfileResponse, -- ES10c.EnableProfile
disableResult [50] DisableProfileResponse, -- ES10c.DisableProfile
deleteResult [51] DeleteProfileResponse, -- ES10c.DeleteProfile
listProfileInfoResult [45] ProfileInfoListResponse, -- ES10c.GetProfilesInfo
updateMetadataResult [42] UpdateMetadataResponse, -- ES6.UpdateMetadata
contactPcmpResult [0] ContactPcmpResponse,
rpmProcessingTerminated INTEGER {
resultSizeOverflow (1),
unknownOrDamagedCommand (2),
interruption (3),
commandsWithRefreshExceeded (4),
commandAfterContactPcmp (5),
commandPackageTooLarge (6)
}
}
}
ContactPcmpResponse ::= CHOICE {
contactPcmpResponseOk SEQUENCE {
pcmpAddress UTF8String
},
contactPcmpResponseError INTEGER {
profileNotEnabled(2),
commandError(7),
noLprConfiguration(13),
undefinedError(127)}
}
LoadRpmPackageResultNotSigned ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
loadRpmPackageErrorCodeNotSigned LoadRpmPackageErrorCodeNotSigned
}
LoadRpmPackageErrorCodeSigned ::= INTEGER { invalidSignature(2), invalidTransactionId(5), undefinedError(127)}
LoadRpmPackageErrorCodeNotSigned ::= INTEGER { noSession(4), undefinedError(127)}
DeleteNotificationForDc ::= SEQUENCE {
notificationMetadata NotificationMetadata,
euiccNotificationSignature EuiccSign
}
DeviceInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
tac Octet4,
deviceCapabilities DeviceCapabilities,
imei Octet8 OPTIONAL,
preferredLanguages SEQUENCE OF UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
deviceTestMode NULL OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported# if present the Device is operating in Device Test Mode
lpaRspCapability LpaRspCapability OPTIONAL -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
}
DeviceCapabilities ::= SEQUENCE { -- Highest fully supported release for each definition
-- The device SHALL set all the capabilities it supports
gsmSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
utranSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
cdma2000onexSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
cdma2000hrpdSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
cdma2000ehrpdSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
eutranEpcSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
contactlessSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL,
rspCrlSupportedVersion VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
nrEpcSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
nr5gcSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
eutran5gcSupportedRelease VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
lpaSvn VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported# provided for information only
catSupportedClasses CatSupportedClasses OPTIONAL, -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
euiccFormFactorType EuiccFormFactorType OPTIONAL -- #DeviceInfoExtensibilitySupported#
}
CatSupportedClasses ::= BIT STRING {
a(0), b(1), c(2), d(3), e(4), f(5), g(6), h(7), i(8), j(9),
k(10), l(11), m(12), n(13), o(14), p(15), q(16), r(17), s(18), t(19),
u(20), v(21), w(22), x(23), y(24), z(25), aa(26), ab(27), ac(28), ad(29)
}
-- Definition of EuiccFormFactorType
EuiccFormFactorType ::= INTEGER {
removableEuicc (0), -- eUICC can be removed
nonRemovableEuicc (1) -- eUICC cannot be removed
}
-- Definition of LpaRspCapability
LpaRspCapability ::= BIT STRING {
crlStaplingV3Support (0),
certChainV3Support (1),
apduApiSupport (2),
enterpriseCapableDevice (3),
lpaProxySupport (4),
signedSmdsResponseV3Support (5),
euiccCiUpdateSupport (6),
eventCheckingSupport (7),
pushServiceSupport (8),
pendingOperationAlertingSupport (9)
}
EUICCInfo1 ::= [32] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF20'
lowestSvn [2] VersionType,
euiccCiPKIdListForVerification [9] SEQUENCE OF SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- List of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers supported on the eUICC for signature verification
euiccCiPKIdListForSigning [10] SEQUENCE OF SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- List of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifier supported on the eUICC for signature creation that can be verified by a certificate chain Variant O
euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3 [17] SEQUENCE OF SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# List of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers supported on the eUICC for signature creation that can be verified by a certificate chain different from Variant O.
euiccRspCapability [8] EuiccRspCapability OPTIONAL, -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
highestSvn [19] VersionType OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
EUICCInfo2 ::= [34] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF22'
baseProfilePackageVersion [1] VersionType, -- Base eUICC Profile package version supported
lowestSvn [2] VersionType,
euiccFirmwareVersion [3] VersionType, -- eUICC Firmware version
extCardResource [4] OCTET STRING, -- Extended Card Resource Information according to ETSI TS 102 226
uiccCapability [5] UICCCapability,
ts102241Version [6] VersionType OPTIONAL,
globalplatformVersion [7] VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
euiccRspCapability [8] EuiccRspCapability,
euiccCiPKIdListForVerification [9] SEQUENCE OF SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- List of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers supported on the eUICC for signature verification
euiccCiPKIdListForSigning [10] SEQUENCE OF SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- List of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifier supported on the eUICC for signature creation that can be verified by a certificate chain Variant O
euiccCategory [11] INTEGER {
other(0),
basicEuicc(1),
mediumEuicc(2),
contactlessEuicc(3)
} OPTIONAL, -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
forbiddenProfilePolicyRules [25] PprIds OPTIONAL, -- Tag '99'
ppVersion VersionType, -- Protection Profile version
sasAcreditationNumber UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)),
certificationDataObject [12] CertificationDataObject OPTIONAL, -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
treProperties [13] BIT STRING {
isDiscrete(0),
isIntegrated(1),
usesRemoteMemory(2) -- refers to the usage of remote memory protected by
-- the Remote Memory Protection Function described in SGP.21 [4]
} OPTIONAL, -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
treProductReference [14] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Platform_Label as defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA specification [57]
additionalProfilePackageVersions [15] SEQUENCE OF VersionType OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
lpaMode [16] LpaMode OPTIONAL, -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0# active LPA
euiccCiPKIdListForSigningV3 [17] SEQUENCE OF SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# List of eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifiers supported on the eUICC for signature creation that can be verified by a certificate chain different from Variant O.
additionalEuiccInfo [18] OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..32)) OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# EUM specific eUICC information
highestSvn [19] VersionType OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
-- Definition of EuiccRspCapability
EuiccRspCapability ::= BIT STRING {
additionalProfile(0), -- at least one more Profile can be installed
loadCrlSupport(1), -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0# Support for ES10b.LoadCRL
rpmSupport(2), -- Remote Profile Management
testProfileSupport (3), -- support for test profile
deviceInfoExtensibilitySupport (4), -- #SupportedFromV2.2.2# support for ASN.1 extensibility in the Device Info
serviceSpecificDataSupport (5), -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0# support for Service Specific Data in the Profile Metadata
hriServerAddressSupport (6), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for storing HRI server address
serviceProviderMessageSupport (7), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Service Provider message is allowed within Profile metadata
lpaProxySupport (8), -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0# support for LPA Proxy
enterpriseProfilesSupport (9), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# support for enterprise profiles
serviceDescriptionSupport (10), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for storing Service Description
deviceChangeSupport (11), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for Device change
encryptedDeviceChangeDataSupport (12), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for encrypted Device Change data in Device Change response
estimatedProfileSizeIndicationSupport (13), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for including estimated profile size
profileSizeInProfilesInfoSupport (14), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for profile size in GetProfilesInfo
crlStaplingV3Support (15), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for CRL stapling
certChainV3VerificationSupport (16), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for certificate chain verification Variant A, B and C
signedSmdsResponseV3Support (17), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for SM-DS signed response
euiccRspCapInInfo1 (18), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# EUICCInfo1 includes euiccRspCapability
osUpdateSupport (19), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for eUICC OS Update
cancelForEmptySpnPnSupport (20), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for cancel session reasons empty SPN and empty Profile Name
updateNotifConfigInfoSupport (21), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for updating NotificationConfigurationInfo as defined in section 5.4.1
updateMetadataV3Support (22) -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# support for the modified update metadata mechanism defined in section 5.4.1
}
-- Definition of CertificationDataObject
CertificationDataObject ::= SEQUENCE {
platformLabel UTF8String, -- Platform_Label as defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA specification [57]
discoveryBaseURL UTF8String -- Discovery Base URL of the SE default DLOA Registrar as defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA specification [57]
}
-- Definition of LpaMode
LpaMode ::= INTEGER {
lpad (0), -- LPAd is active
lpae (1) -- LPAe is active
}
UpdateMetadataRequest ::= [42] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF2A'
serviceProviderName [17] UTF8String (SIZE(0..32)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '91'
profileName [18] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '92'
iconType [19] IconType OPTIONAL, -- Tag '93'
icon [20] OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '94'
profilePolicyRules [25] PprIds OPTIONAL, -- Tag '99'
serviceSpecificDataStoredInEuicc [34] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0# Tag 'BF22'
notificationConfigurationInfo [22] SEQUENCE OF NotificationConfigurationInformation OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag 'B6'
tagsForDeletion [APPLICATION 28] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- for tagList #SupportedFromV3.0.0# tag '5C'
rpmConfiguration [26] RpmConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# Tag 'BA'
hriServerAddress [27] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9B'
lprConfiguration [28] LprConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0# Tag 'BC'
enterpriseConfiguration [29] EnterpriseConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# Tag 'BD'
deviceChangeConfiguration [32] DeviceChangeConfiguration OPTIONAL -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF20'
}
UpdateMetadataResponse ::= [42] INTEGER { -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# Tag 'BF2A'
ok (0),
enterpriseConfigurationNotAllowed (6), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
commandError (7),
pprUpdateInvalidSetting (12),
invalidRpmConfiguration (14),
deleteNotAllowed (15),
undefinedError(127)
}
--Definition of data objects for InitialiseSecureChannel Request
InitialiseSecureChannelRequest ::= [35] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF23'
remoteOpId RemoteOpId, -- Remote Operation Type Identifier (value SHALL be set to installBoundProfilePackage)
transactionId [0] TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SM-DP+
controlRefTemplate[6] IMPLICIT ControlRefTemplate, -- Control Reference Template (Key Agreement). Current specification considers a subset of CRT specified in GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment F [13] section 6.5.2.3 for the Mutual Authentication Data Field
smdpOtpk [APPLICATION 73] OCTET STRING, ---otPK.DP.KA in accordance with GlobalPlatform Card Specification Amendment F [13] section 6.5.2.3 for ePK.OCE.KA, tag '5F49'
smdpSign [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- SM-DP's signature, tag '5F37'
}
ControlRefTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
keyType[0] Octet1, -- Key type according to GlobalPlatform Card Specification [8] Table 11-16, Tag '80'
keyLen[1] Octet1, --Key length in number of bytes. Tag '81'
hostId[4] OctetTo16 -- Host ID value , Tag '84'
}
--Definition of data objects for ConfigureISDPRequest
ConfigureISDPRequest ::= [36] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF24'
dpProprietaryData [24] DpProprietaryData OPTIONAL -- Tag 'B8'
}
DpProprietaryData ::= SEQUENCE { -- maximum size including tag and length field: 128 bytes
dpOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- OID in the tree of the SM-DP+ that created the Profile
-- additional data objects defined by the SM-DP+ MAY follow
}
StoreMetadataRequest ::= [37] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF25'
iccid Iccid,
serviceProviderName [17] UTF8String (SIZE(0..32)), -- Tag '91'
profileName [18] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)), -- Tag '92' (corresponds to 'Short Description' defined in SGP.21 [2])
iconType [19] IconType OPTIONAL, -- Tag '93' (JPG or PNG)
icon [20] OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '94' (Data of the icon. Size 64 x 64 pixel. This field SHALL only be present if iconType is present)
profileClass [21] ProfileClass DEFAULT operational, -- Tag '95'
notificationConfigurationInfo [22] SEQUENCE OF NotificationConfigurationInformation OPTIONAL,
profileOwner [23] OperatorId OPTIONAL, -- Tag 'B7'
profilePolicyRules [25] PprIds OPTIONAL, -- Tag '99'
serviceSpecificDataStoredInEuicc [34] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0# Tag 'BF22'
serviceSpecificDataNotStoredInEuicc [35] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0# Tag 'BF23'
rpmConfiguration [26] RpmConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# Tag 'BA'
hriServerAddress [27] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9B'
serviceProviderMessage [30] LocalisedTextMessage OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag 'BE'
lprConfiguration [28] LprConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0# Tag 'BC'
enterpriseConfiguration [29] EnterpriseConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# Tag 'BD'
serviceDescription [31] ServiceDescription OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9F1F'
deviceChangeConfiguration [32] DeviceChangeConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF20'
estimatedProfileSize [33] INTEGER OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9F21'
}
NotificationEvent ::= BIT STRING {
notificationInstall(0),
notificationLocalEnable(1),
notificationLocalDisable(2),
notificationLocalDelete(3),
notificationRpmEnable(4), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
notificationRpmDisable(5), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
notificationRpmDelete(6), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
loadRpmPackageResult(7) -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
}
NotificationConfigurationInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
profileManagementOperation NotificationEvent,
notificationAddress UTF8String -- FQDN to forward the notification
}
ServiceDescription ::= BIT STRING { -- 1: service is on, 0: service is off #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
voice (0), -- Operator-provided voice service
data (1) -- Operator-provided data service
}
-- Definition of request message for command ReplaceSessionKeys
ReplaceSessionKeysRequest ::= [38] SEQUENCE { -- tag 'BF26'
-- The new initial MAC chaining value
initialMacChainingValue OCTET STRING,
-- New session key value for encryption/decryption (PPK-ENC)
ppkEnc OCTET STRING,
-- New session key value of the session key C-MAC computation/verification (PPK-MAC)
ppkCmac OCTET STRING
}
ISDRProprietaryApplicationTemplate ::= [PRIVATE 0] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'E0'
lowestSvn [2] VersionType,
euiccConfiguration BIT STRING {
lpaeUsingCatSupported(0), -- LPA in the eUICC using Card Application Toolkit
lpaeUsingScwsSupported(1), -- LPA in the eUICC using Smartcard Web Server
enabledProfile(2), -- eUICC contains an Enabled Profile
lpaeUsingE4ESupported(3) -- LPA in the eUICC using 'E4' ENVELOPEs
} OPTIONAL -- #MandatoryFromV3.0.0#
}
LpaeActivationRequest ::= [66] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF42'
lpaeOption BIT STRING {
activateCatBasedLpae(0), -- LPAe with LUIe based on CAT
activateScwsBasedLpae(1) -- LPAe with LUIe based on SCWS
}
}
LpaeActivationResponse ::= [66] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF42'
lpaeActivationResult INTEGER {ok(0), notSupported(1)}
}
EuiccConfiguredDataRequest ::= [60] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3C'
}
EuiccConfiguredDataResponse ::= [60] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3C'
defaultDpAddress UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- Default SM-DP+ address
rootDsAddress UTF8String, -- Root SM-DS address
additionalRootDsAddresses SEQUENCE OF UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
allowedCiPKId SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# PKID allowed for the Default SM-DP+
ciList SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
ciPKId SubjectKeyIdentifier, -- List of eSIM CA RootCA public key identifiers supported
ciName UTF8String -- on the eUICC together with a readable name
} OPTIONAL
}
SetDefaultDpAddressRequest ::= [63] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3F'
defaultDpAddress UTF8String, -- Default SM-DP+ address as an FQDN
allowedCiPKId SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# PKID allowed for the Default SM-DP+
}
SetDefaultDpAddressResponse ::= [63] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3F'
setDefaultDpAddressResult INTEGER {
ok (0),
unsupportedCiPKId(8), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError (127)}
}
PrepareDownloadRequest ::= [33] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF21'
smdpSigned2 SmdpSigned2, -- Signed information
smdpSignature2 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, -- tag '5F37'
hashCc Octet32 OPTIONAL, -- Hash of confirmation code
smdpCertificate Certificate -- CERT.DPpb.SIG
}
SmdpSigned2 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SMDP+
ccRequiredFlag BOOLEAN, -- Indicates if the Confirmation Code is required
bppEuiccOtpk [APPLICATION 73] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- otPK.EUICC.KA already used for binding the BPP, tag '5F49'
rpmPending NULL OPTIONAL -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
}
PrepareDownloadResponse ::= [33] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF21'
downloadResponseOk PrepareDownloadResponseOk,
downloadResponseError PrepareDownloadResponseError
}
PrepareDownloadResponseOk ::= SEQUENCE {
euiccSigned2 EUICCSigned2, -- Signed information
euiccSignature2 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- tag '5F37'
}
EUICCSigned2 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
euiccOtpk [APPLICATION 73] OCTET STRING, -- otPK.EUICC.KA, tag '5F49'
hashCc Octet32 OPTIONAL, -- Hash of confirmation code
additionalInformation VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
PrepareDownloadResponseError ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
downloadErrorCode DownloadErrorCode
}
DownloadErrorCode ::= INTEGER {invalidCertificate(1), invalidSignature(2), noSession(4), invalidTransactionId(5), undefinedError(127)}
GetEuiccChallengeRequest ::= [46] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF2E'
}
GetEuiccChallengeResponse ::= [46] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF2E'
euiccChallenge Octet16 -- random eUICC challenge
}
GetEuiccInfo1Request ::= [32] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF20'
}
GetEuiccInfo2Request ::= [34] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF22'
}
ListNotificationRequest ::= [40] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF28'
profileManagementOperation [1] NotificationEvent OPTIONAL
}
ListNotificationResponse ::= [40] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF28'
notificationMetadataList SEQUENCE OF NotificationMetadata,
listNotificationsResultError INTEGER {undefinedError(127)}
}
NotificationMetadata ::= [47] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF2F'
seqNumber [0] INTEGER,
profileManagementOperation [1] NotificationEvent, -- Only one bit SHALL be set to 1
notificationAddress UTF8String, -- FQDN to forward the notification
iccid Iccid OPTIONAL
}
RetrieveNotificationsListRequest ::= [43] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF2B'
searchCriteria CHOICE {
seqNumber [0] INTEGER,
profileManagementOperation [1] NotificationEvent
} OPTIONAL
}
RetrieveNotificationsListResponse ::= [43] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF2B'
notificationList SEQUENCE OF PendingNotification,
notificationsListResultError INTEGER { undefinedError(127)}
}
PendingNotification ::= CHOICE {
profileInstallationResult [55] ProfileInstallationResult, -- tag 'BF37'
otherSignedNotification OtherSignedNotification,
loadRpmPackageResultSigned [1] LoadRpmPackageResultSigned
}
OtherSignedNotification ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsOtherNotification NotificationMetadata,
euiccNotificationSignature EuiccSign,
euiccCertificate Certificate, -- eUICC Certificate (CERT.EUICC.SIG)
nextCertInChain Certificate, -- The certificate certifying the eUICC Certificate
otherCertsInChain [1] CertificateChain OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Other Certificates in the eUICC certificate chain, if any
}
NotificationSentRequest ::= [48] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF30'
seqNumber [0] INTEGER
}
NotificationSentResponse ::= [48] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF30'
deleteNotificationStatus INTEGER {ok(0), nothingToDelete(1), undefinedError(127)}
}
AuthenticateServerRequest ::= [56] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF38'
serverSigned1 ServerSigned1, -- Signed information
serverSignature1 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, -- tag '5F37'
euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- eSIM CA RootCA Public Key Identifier to be used; MAY also have zero length
serverCertificate Certificate, -- RSP Server Certificate CERT.XXauth.SIG
ctxParams1 CtxParams1,
otherCertsInChain [1] CertificateChain OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# The remaining part of the CERT.XXauth.SIG certificate chain (if any)
crlList [2] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# as specified in RFC 5280
}
ServerSigned1 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId, -- The Transaction ID generated by the RSP Server
euiccChallenge [1] Octet16, -- The eUICC Challenge
serverAddress [3] UTF8String, -- The RSP Server address as an FQDN
serverChallenge [4] Octet16, -- The RSP Server Challenge
sessionContext [5] SessionContext OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
serverRspCapability [6] ServerRspCapability OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
CtxParams1 ::= CHOICE {
ctxParamsForCommonAuthentication[0] CtxParamsForCommonAuthentication,
ctxParamsForDeviceChange [1] CtxParamsForDeviceChange,
ctxParamsForProfileRecovery [2] CtxParamsForProfileRecovery,
ctxParamsForPushServiceRegistration [3] CtxParamsForPushServiceRegistration
-- New contextual data objects MAY be defined for extensibility.
}
CtxParamsForCommonAuthentication ::= SEQUENCE {
matchingId [0] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- The MatchingId could be the Activation code token or EventID or empty
deviceInfo [1] DeviceInfo, -- The Device information
operationType [2] OperationType DEFAULT {profileDownload}, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
iccid Iccid OPTIONAL, -- ICCID, tag '5A' #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
matchingIdSource [3] MatchingIdSource OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
vendorSpecificExtension [4] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
CtxParamsForDeviceChange ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
iccid Iccid,
deviceInfo [1] DeviceInfo,
targetEidValue [APPLICATION 26] Octet16 OPTIONAL,
targetTacValue [2] Octet4 OPTIONAL,
vendorSpecificExtension [3] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL
}
CtxParamsForProfileRecovery ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
iccid Iccid,
deviceInfo [1] DeviceInfo,
vendorSpecificExtension [2] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL
}
CtxParamsForPushServiceRegistration ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0#
selectedPushService [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
pushToken [1] UTF8String
}
MatchingIdSource ::= CHOICE {
none [0] NULL,
activationCode [1] NULL,
smdsOid [2] OBJECT IDENTIFIER
}
OperationType ::= BIT STRING {
profileDownload(0),
rpm(1)
}
-- Records information agreed along the session
SessionContext ::= SEQUENCE {
serverSvn [0] VersionType, -- RSP Server SVN (provided for information only)
crlStaplingV3Used [1] BOOLEAN, -- Indicates CRLs were attached to the RSP Server response
euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3 [2] SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
supportedPushServices [3] SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL
}
-- Definition of ServerRspCapability
ServerRspCapability ::= BIT STRING {
crlStaplingV3Support (0), -- support for CRL stapling
eventListSigningV3Support (1), -- support for Event Record signing
pushServiceV3Support (2), -- support for Push Service
cancelForEmptySpnPnSupport (3)
}
AuthenticateServerResponse ::= [56] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF38'
authenticateResponseOk [0] AuthenticateResponseOk,
authenticateResponseError [1] AuthenticateResponseError
}
AuthenticateResponseOk ::= SEQUENCE {
euiccSigned1 EuiccSigned1, -- Signed information
euiccSignature1 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, --EUICC_Sign1, tag 5F37
euiccCertificate Certificate, -- eUICC Certificate (CERT.EUICC.SIG)
nextCertInChain Certificate, -- The Certificate certifying the eUICC Certificate
otherCertsInChain [0] CertificateChain OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Other Certificates in the eUICC certificate chain, if any
}
EuiccSigned1 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
serverAddress [3] UTF8String, -- The RSP Server address as an FQDN
serverChallenge [4] Octet16, -- The RSP Server Challenge
euiccInfo2 [34] EUICCInfo2,
ctxParams1 CtxParams1
}
AuthenticateResponseError ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
authenticateErrorCode AuthenticateErrorCode
}
AuthenticateErrorCode ::= INTEGER {invalidCertificate(1), invalidSignature(2), unsupportedCurve(3), noSession(4), invalidOid(5), euiccChallengeMismatch(6), ciPKUnknown(7),
transactionIdError (8), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingCrl(9), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
invalidCrlSignature(10), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
revokedCert(11), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
invalidCertOrCrlTime(12), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
invalidCertOrCrlConfiguration(13), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
invalidIccid(14), -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)}
CancelSessionRequest ::= [65] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF41'
transactionId TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the RSP Server
reason CancelSessionReason
}
CancelSessionReason ::= INTEGER {
endUserRejection(0),
postponed(1),
timeout(2),
pprNotAllowed(3),
metadataMismatch(4),
loadBppExecutionError(5),
sessionAborted(16), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
enterpriseProfilesNotSupported(17), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
enterpriseRulesNotAllowed(18), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseProfileNotAllowed(19), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseOidMismatch(20), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseRulesError(21), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
enterpriseProfilesOnly(22), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
lprNotSupported(23), -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0#
lprNetworkDataNotAllowed(24), -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0#
emptyProfileOrSpName(25), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
rpmDisabled(27), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
invalidRpmPackage(28), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
loadRpmPackageError(29), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
undefinedReason(127)
}
CancelSessionResponse ::= [65] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF41'
cancelSessionResponseOk CancelSessionResponseOk,
cancelSessionResponseError INTEGER {invalidTransactionId(5), undefinedError(127)}
}
CancelSessionResponseOk ::= SEQUENCE {
euiccCancelSessionSigned EuiccCancelSessionSigned, -- Signed information
euiccCancelSessionSignature [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- tag '5F37'
}
EuiccCancelSessionSigned ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId TransactionId,
smdpOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- SM-DP+ OID as contained in CERT.DPauth.SIG
reason CancelSessionReason
}
ProfileInfoListRequest ::= [45] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF2D'
searchCriteria [0] CHOICE {
isdpAid [APPLICATION 15] OctetTo16, -- AID of the ISD-P, tag '4F'
iccid Iccid, -- ICCID, tag '5A'
profileClass [21] ProfileClass -- Tag '95'
} OPTIONAL,
tagList [APPLICATION 28] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- tag '5C'
}
ListProfileInfo ::= [5] SEQUENCE {
searchCriteria [0] CHOICE {
iccid Iccid,
profileOwnerOid [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER
},
tagList [APPLICATION 28] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
-- Definition of ProfileInfoListResponse
ProfileInfoListResponse ::= [45] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF2D'
profileInfoListOk SEQUENCE OF ProfileInfo,
profileInfoListError ProfileInfoListError
}
ProfileInfo ::= [PRIVATE 3] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'E3'
iccid Iccid OPTIONAL,
isdpAid [APPLICATION 15] OctetTo16 OPTIONAL, -- AID of the ISD-P containing the Profile, tag '4F'
profileState [112] ProfileState OPTIONAL, -- Tag '9F70'
profileNickname [16] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '90'
serviceProviderName [17] UTF8String (SIZE(0..32)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '91'
profileName [18] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '92'
iconType [19] IconType OPTIONAL, -- Tag '93'
icon [20] OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024)) OPTIONAL, -- Tag '94',
profileClass [21] ProfileClass OPTIONAL, -- Tag '95'
notificationConfigurationInfo [22] SEQUENCE OF NotificationConfigurationInformation OPTIONAL, -- Tag 'B6'
profileOwner [23] OperatorId OPTIONAL, -- Tag 'B7'
dpProprietaryData [24] DpProprietaryData OPTIONAL, -- Tag 'B8'
profilePolicyRules [25] PprIds OPTIONAL, -- Tag '99'
serviceSpecificDataStoredInEuicc [34] VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV2.4.0# Tag 'BF22'
rpmConfiguration [26] RpmConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# Tag 'BA'
hriServerAddress [27] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9B'
lprConfiguration [28] LprConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForLpaProxyV3.0.0# Tag 'BC'
enterpriseConfiguration [29] EnterpriseConfiguration OPTIONAL,
-- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0# Tag 'BD'
serviceDescription [31] ServiceDescription OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9F1F'
deviceChangeConfiguration [32] DeviceChangeConfiguration OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF20'
enabledOnEsimPort [36] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForMEPV3.0.0# Tag '9F24'
profileSize [37] INTEGER OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# Tag '9F25'
}
IconType ::= INTEGER {jpg(0), png(1)}
ProfileState ::= INTEGER {disabled(0), enabled(1)}
ProfileClass ::= INTEGER {test(0), provisioning(1), operational(2)}
ProfileInfoListError ::= INTEGER {
incorrectInputValues(1),
profileChangeOngoing (11), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
}
EnableProfileRequest ::= [49] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF31'
profileIdentifier CHOICE {
isdpAid [APPLICATION 15] OctetTo16, -- AID, tag '4F'
iccid Iccid -- ICCID, tag '5A'
},
refreshFlag BOOLEAN, -- indicating whether REFRESH is required
targetEsimPort INTEGER OPTIONAL-- #SupportedForMEPV3.0.0#
}
EnableProfileResponse ::= [49] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF31'
enableResult INTEGER {
ok(0),
iccidOrAidNotFound(1),
profileNotInDisabledState(2),
disallowedByPolicy(3),
wrongProfileReenabling(4),
catBusy(5),
disallowedByEnterpriseRule(6), -- #SupportedForEnterpriseV3.0.0#
commandError(7), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
disallowedForRpm(9), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
noEsimPortAvailable(10), -- #SupportedForMEPV3.0.0# and
-- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
},
targetEsimPort INTEGER OPTIONAL -- #SupportedForMEPV3.0.0#
}
DisableProfileRequest ::= [50] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF32'
profileIdentifier CHOICE {
isdpAid [APPLICATION 15] OctetTo16, -- AID, tag '4F'
iccid Iccid -- ICCID, tag '5A'
},
refreshFlag BOOLEAN -- indicating whether REFRESH is required
}
DisableProfileResponse ::= [50] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF32'
disableResult INTEGER {
ok(0),
iccidOrAidNotFound(1),
profileNotInEnabledState(2),
disallowedByPolicy(3),
catBusy(5),
commandError(7), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
disallowedForRpm(10), -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
}
}
DeleteProfileRequest ::= [51] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF33'
isdpAid [APPLICATION 15] OctetTo16, -- AID, tag '4F'
iccid Iccid -- ICCID, tag '5A'
}
DeleteProfileResponse ::= [51] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF33'
deleteResult INTEGER {
ok(0),
iccidOrAidNotFound(1),
profileNotInDisabledState(2),
disallowedByPolicy(3),
disallowedInTestMode(4), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
commandError(7), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
}
}
EuiccMemoryResetRequest ::= [52] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF34'
resetOptions [2] BIT STRING {
deleteOperationalProfiles(0),
deleteFieldLoadedTestProfiles(1),
resetDefaultSmdpAddress(2),
deletePreLoadedTestProfiles(3), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
deleteProvisioningProfiles(4)} -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
-- setting bits 0, 1, 3 and 4 wipes all Profiles
}
EuiccMemoryResetResponse ::= [52] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF34'
resetResult INTEGER {ok(0), nothingToDelete(1), catBusy(5), undefinedError(127)}
}
GetEuiccDataRequest ::= [62] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3E'
tagList [APPLICATION 28] Octet1 -- tag '5C', the value SHALL be set to '5A'
}
GetEuiccDataResponse ::= [62] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3E'
eidValue [APPLICATION 26] Octet16 -- tag '5A'
}
-- Definition of Profile Nickname Information
SetNicknameRequest ::= [41] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF29'
iccid Iccid,
profileNickname [16] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64))
}
SetNicknameResponse ::= [41] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF29'
setNicknameResult INTEGER {ok(0), iccidNotFound (1), undefinedError(127)}
}
GetRatRequest ::= [67] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF43'
-- No input data
}
GetRatResponse ::= [67] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF43'
rat RulesAuthorisationTable
}
RulesAuthorisationTable ::= SEQUENCE OF ProfilePolicyAuthorisationRule
ProfilePolicyAuthorisationRule ::= SEQUENCE {
pprIds PprIds,
allowedOperators SEQUENCE OF OperatorId,
pprFlags BIT STRING {consentRequired(0)}
}
AlertData ::= [74] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF4A' #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
metadataUpdateEnabledProfile [0] MetadataUpdateEnabledProfile,
pendingOperationAlert [1] ServerWithPendingOperation
}
MetadataUpdateEnabledProfile ::= SEQUENCE {
iccid Iccid OPTIONAL,
tagList [APPLICATION 28] OCTET STRING -- tag '5C'
}
ServerWithPendingOperation ::= CHOICE {
pollingAddress [0] NULL,
rootSmds [1] NULL,
defaultSmdp [2] NULL,
explicitAddress [3] UTF8String
}
VerifySmdsResponseRequest ::= [69] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF45' #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
smdsSigned2 [1] SmdsSigned2, -- must have tag [1]
smdsSignature2 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING
}
SmdsSigned2 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
requestSpecificData CHOICE {
eventList [0] SEQUENCE {
eventEntries [1] SEQUENCE OF EventRecordV3,
ecId [2] OCTET STRING(SIZE(16..32)) OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0# Event Checking ID
pushServiceRefreshTime [3] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL -- #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0# date and time to re-register a Push Token to the SM-DS
},
pushServiceRegistrationResult [1] SEQUENCE {
pushServiceRefreshTime [3] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL -- #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0# date and time to re-register a Push Token to the SM-DS
}
}
}
EventRecordV3 ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
eventId UTF8String,
rspServerAddress UTF8String,
eventType INTEGER, -- either 1 (for Profile Download) or 2 (for RPM)
hashedIccids SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)) OPTIONAL, -- hashed ICCID(s) calculated as either SHA256(ICCID) or SHA256(ICCID|Salt)
salt OCTET STRING (SIZE(8..16)) OPTIONAL, -- optional salt to be concatenated with ICCID(s) for hashing
serviceProviderName [17] UTF8String (SIZE(0..32)) OPTIONAL,
operatorId [23] OperatorId OPTIONAL
}
VerifySmdsResponseResponse ::= [69] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF45' #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
verifySmdsResponseOk NULL,
verifySmdsResponseError INTEGER {
invalidSignature(2),
noSession(4),
invalidTransactionId(5),
undefinedError(127)
}
}
LoadRpmPackageRequest ::= [68] SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0# Tag 'BF44'
smdpSigned3 SmdpSigned3,
smdpSignature3 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, -- tag '5F37'
targetEsimPort INTEGER OPTIONAL
}
SmdpSigned3 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SM-DP+
rpmPackage [1] RpmPackage,
rpmPending [2] NULL OPTIONAL
}
PrepareDeviceChangeRequest ::= [77] SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF4D'
smdpSigned4 SmdpSigned4, -- Signed information
smdpSignature4 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, -- tag '5F37'
hashCc Octet32 OPTIONAL -- Hash of confirmation code
}
SmdpSigned4 ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
transactionId [0] TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SMDP+
ccRequiredFlag BOOLEAN, -- Indicates if the Confirmation Code is required
activationCodeForProfileRecovery [1] UTF8String (SIZE(0..255)) OPTIONAL -- presents only in ES9+.AuthenticateClient response for a profileRecoveryRequest
}
PrepareDeviceChangeResponse ::= [77] CHOICE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF4D'
downloadResponseOk PrepareDeviceChangeResponseOk,
downloadResponseError PrepareDeviceChangeResponseError
}
PrepareDeviceChangeResponseOk ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
euiccSigned3 EUICCSigned3, -- Signed information
euiccSignature3 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- tag '5F37'
}
EUICCSigned3 ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
euiccOtpk [APPLICATION 73] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- otPK.EUICC.KA, tag '5F49'
hashCc Octet32 OPTIONAL, -- Hash of confirmation code
additionalInformation VendorSpecificExtension OPTIONAL
}
PrepareDeviceChangeResponseError ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
downloadErrorCode DownloadErrorCode
}
VerifyDeviceChangeRequest ::= [75] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF4B' #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
deviceChangeConfirmation [0] SEQUENCE {
smdpSigned5 SmdpSigned5, -- Signed information
smdpSignature5 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING
},
profileRecoveryResponse [1] SEQUENCE {
smdpSigned4 SmdpSigned4, -- Signed information
smdpSignature4 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- tag '5F37'
}
}
SmdpSigned5 ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
deviceChangeResponse [1] DeviceChangeResponse OPTIONAL
}
DeviceChangeResponse ::= CHOICE {
deviceChangeData [0] DeviceChangeData,
encryptedDeviceChangeData [1] EncryptedDeviceChangeData
}
DeviceChangeData ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
iccid Iccid,
activationCodeForDc [0] UTF8String (SIZE(0..255)),
deleteOldProfile [1] NULL OPTIONAL, -- Deletion of the installed Profile required
deleteNotificationForDcSupport [2] NULL OPTIONAL, -- Delete Notification for Device Change supported
notificationAddress [3] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- FQDN that processes the Delete Notification for Device Change
profileRecoverySupport [4] NULL OPTIONAL,
profileRecoveryValidityPeriod [5] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL -- Absolute date and time for Profile Recovery
}
EncryptedDeviceChangeData ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
controlRefTemplate [6] IMPLICIT ControlRefTemplate,
smdpOtpk [APPLICATION 73] OCTET STRING, -- okPK.DP.KA
sequenceOf87 [1] SEQUENCE OF [7] OCTET STRING -- sequence of '87' TLVs
}
VerifyDeviceChangeResponse ::= [75] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF4B' #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
verifyDeviceChangeOk CHOICE {
verifyDeviceChangeNull [0] NULL,
verifyDeviceChangeData [1] DeviceChangeData
},
verifyDeviceChangeError INTEGER {
invalidSignature(2),
noSession(4),
invalidTransactionId(5),
unsupportedCrtValues(6),
invalidData(7),
profileNotInDisabledState(8),
undefinedError(127)
}
}
E4ERequest ::= [PRIVATE 4] CHOICE { -- Tag 'E4'
startDownload [0] SEQUENCE {
activationCode [0] UTF8String (SIZE(0..255))
}, -- Start Download
confirmDownload [1] SEQUENCE {
enable [0] NULL OPTIONAL, -- enable Profile after download
confirmationCode [1] UTF8String OPTIONAL, -- confirmation code
pinCode [2] UTF8String (SIZE(4..8)) OPTIONAL -- LPAe PIN if used
}, -- Confirm Download
listProfiles [2] NULL, -- List Profiles
enableProfile [3] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid}, -- Enable Profile
disableProfile [4] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid}, -- Disable Profile
deleteProfile [5] SEQUENCE {
iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid,
pinCode [1] UTF8String (SIZE(4..8)) OPTIONAL -- LPAe PIN if used
}, -- Delete Profile
euiccMemReset [6] SEQUENCE {
pinCode [0] UTF8String (SIZE(4..8)) OPTIONAL -- LPAe PIN if used
}, -- eUICC Memory Reset
changeConfirmationPin [7] UTF8String (SIZE(9..17)), -- Change confirmation PIN
setRpmAllow [8] BOOLEAN, -- Turn on/off Remote Profile Management
pollRpmPackage [9] SEQUENCE {iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid OPTIONAL},
-- Check for RPM packages for profile with iccid. No iccid means 'Update All'
confirmRpmPackage [10] SEQUENCE {
pinCode [0] UTF8String (SIZE(4..8)) OPTIONAL
-- LPAe PIN, if used, with Strong Confirmation
}, -- Confirms the pending RpmPackage
cancelSession[11] NULL
-- Cancels the pending profile download or RpmPackage execution
}
E4EResponse ::= [PRIVATE 4] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'E4'
resultCode [0] E4EResultCode,
resultData [1] CHOICE {
startDownloadResponse [0] SEQUENCE {
serviceProviderName [17] UTF8String (SIZE(0..32)), -- Tag '91'
profileName [18] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)), -- Tag '92'
ccRequired [0] NULL OPTIONAL -- confirmation code required
},
listProfilesResponse [3] SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid, -- Profile ICCID
profileState [112] ProfileState, -- Tag '9F70'
serviceProviderName [17] UTF8String (SIZE(0..32)), -- Tag '91'
profileName [18] UTF8String (SIZE(0..64)) -- Tag '92'
-- the eUICC MAY truncate these names so that the response fits
-- into one APDU
},
pollRpmPackageResponse [4] SEQUENCE {
rpmPackage [0] RpmPackage, -- RPM Package to be confirmed by user
rpmPending [1] NULL OPTIONAL -- There are pending RPM Packages after this
},
confirmDownloadResponse [5] SEQUENCE {
iccid [APPLICATION 26] Iccid -- Profile ICCID
}
} OPTIONAL
}
E4EResultCode ::= INTEGER {
success (0),
errorBusy (1), -- CAT not available due to another operation
errorComm (2), -- Communication error with server
errorAuth (3), -- Mutual Authentication Error
errorNoProfile (4), -- No Profile available for download at SM-DP+
errorEligibility (5), -- SM-DP+ rejected download due to Eligibility Check
errorInstall (6), -- Error during Profile installation
errorPin (7), -- Invalid PIN
errorProfileRef (8), -- Referenced Profile does not exist
errorAlreadyEnabled (9), -- Referenced Profile is already enabled
errorAlreadyDisabled (10), -- Referenced Profile is already disabled
errorConfirmationCode (11), -- Invalid Confirmation Code,
errorRpmDisabled (12), -- Cannot pollRpmPackage, RPM is disabled
errorProfileDoesNotExist (13), -- There is no profile with provided ICCID
undefinedError (127)
}
RemoteProfileProvisioningRequest ::= [2] CHOICE { -- Tag 'A2'
initiateAuthenticationRequest [57] InitiateAuthenticationRequest, -- Tag 'BF39'
authenticateClientRequest [59] AuthenticateClientRequest, -- Tag 'BF3B'
getBoundProfilePackageRequest [58] GetBoundProfilePackageRequest, -- Tag 'BF3A'
cancelSessionRequestEs9 [65] CancelSessionRequestEs9, -- Tag 'BF41'
handleNotification [61] HandleNotification, -- tag 'BF3D'
confirmDeviceChangeRequest [76] ConfirmDeviceChangeRequest, -- Tag 'BF4C'
checkEventRequest [70] CheckEventRequest -- Tag 'BF46'
}
RemoteProfileProvisioningResponse ::= [2] CHOICE { -- Tag 'A2'
initiateAuthenticationResponse [57] InitiateAuthenticationResponse, -- Tag 'BF39'
authenticateClientResponseEs9 [59] AuthenticateClientResponseEs9, -- Tag 'BF3B'
getBoundProfilePackageResponse [58] GetBoundProfilePackageResponse, -- Tag 'BF3A'
cancelSessionResponseEs9 [65] CancelSessionResponseEs9, -- Tag 'BF41'
authenticateClientResponseEs11 [64] AuthenticateClientResponseEs11, -- Tag 'BF40'
confirmDeviceChangeResponse [76] ConfirmDeviceChangeResponse, -- Tag 'BF4C'
checkEventResponse [70] CheckEventResponse -- Tag 'BF46'
}
InitiateAuthenticationRequest ::= [57] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF39'
euiccChallenge [1] Octet16, -- random eUICC challenge
smdpAddress [3] UTF8String,
euiccInfo1 EUICCInfo1,
lpaRspCapability LpaRspCapability OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
InitiateAuthenticationResponse ::= [57] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF39'
initiateAuthenticationOk InitiateAuthenticationOkEs9,
initiateAuthenticationError INTEGER {
invalidDpAddress(1),
euiccVersionNotSupportedByDp(2), -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
ciPKIdNotSupported(3),
invalidInputData(124), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingInputData(125), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
functionProviderBusy(126), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127) -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
}
InitiateAuthenticationOkEs9 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0]TransactionId, -- The TransactionID generated by the SM-DP+
serverSigned1 ServerSigned1, -- Signed information
serverSignature1 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, -- Server Sign1, tag '5F37'
euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed SubjectKeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, -- The CI Public Key to be used as required by ES10b.AuthenticateServer
serverCertificate Certificate,
otherCertsInChain [1] CertificateChain OPTIONAL, -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
crlList [2] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList OPTIONAL -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0# From RFC 5280
}
AuthenticateClientRequest ::= [59] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3B'
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
authenticateServerResponse [56] AuthenticateServerResponse, -- This is the response from ES10b.AuthenticateServer
deleteNotificationForDc [1] DeleteNotificationForDc -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Delete Notification for Device Change, see section 4.1.3
}
AuthenticateClientResponseEs9 ::= [59] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF3B'
authenticateClientOk AuthenticateClientOk,
authenticateClientError INTEGER {
eumCertificateInvalid(1),
eumCertificateExpired(2),
euiccCertificateInvalid(3),
euiccCertificateExpired(4),
euiccSignatureInvalid(5),
matchingIdRefused(6),
eidMismatch(7),
noEligibleProfile(8),
ciPKUnknown(9),
invalidTransactionId(10),
insufficientMemory(11),
ciPKMismatch(12), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
euiccRspCapabilityHasChanged(13), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
lpaRspCapabilityHasChanged(14), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
deviceChangeNotSupported(15), -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
deviceChangeNotAllowed(16), -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
iccidUnkwon(17), -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
invalidInputData(124), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingInputData(125), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
functionProviderBusy(126), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
},
authenticateClientOkRpm AuthenticateClientOkRpm, -- #SupportedForRpmV3.0.0#
authenticateClientOkDeviceChange AuthenticateClientOkDeviceChange -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0#
}
AuthenticateClientOk ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
profileMetadata [37] StoreMetadataRequest OPTIONAL,
smdpSigned2 [1] SmdpSigned2 OPTIONAL, -- Signed information
smdpSignature2 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, -- tag '5F37'
smdpCertificate Certificate -- CERT.DPpb.SIG
}
AuthenticateClientOkRpm ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
smdpSigned3 [3] SmdpSigned3,
smdpSignature3 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING
}
AuthenticateClientOkDeviceChange ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
smdpSigned4 [1] SmdpSigned4, -- Signed information
smdpSignature4 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING, -- tag '5F37'
serviceProviderMessageForDc [1] LocalisedTextMessage OPTIONAL -- Service Provider Message For Device Change
}
GetBoundProfilePackageRequest ::= [58] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3A'
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
prepareDownloadResponse [33] PrepareDownloadResponse
}
GetBoundProfilePackageResponse ::= [58] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF3A'
getBoundProfilePackageOk GetBoundProfilePackageOk,
getBoundProfilePackageError INTEGER {
euiccSignatureInvalid(1),
confirmationCodeMissing(2),
confirmationCodeRefused(3),
confirmationCodeRetriesExceeded(4),
bppRebindingRefused(5),
downloadOrderExpired(6),
invalidTransactionId(95),
invalidInputData(124), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingInputData(125), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
functionProviderBusy(126), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
}
}
GetBoundProfilePackageOk ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
boundProfilePackage [54] BoundProfilePackage
}
HandleNotification ::= [61] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF3D'
pendingNotification PendingNotification
}
CancelSessionRequestEs9 ::= [65] SEQUENCE { -- Tag 'BF41'
transactionId TransactionId,
cancelSessionResponse CancelSessionResponse -- data structure defined for ES10b.CancelSession function
}
CancelSessionResponseEs9 ::= [65] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF41'
cancelSessionOk CancelSessionOk,
cancelSessionError INTEGER {
invalidTransactionId(1),
euiccSignatureInvalid(2),
invalidInputData(124), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingInputData(125), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
functionProviderBusy(126), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
}
}
CancelSessionOk ::= SEQUENCE { -- This function has no output data
}
AuthenticateClientResponseEs11 ::= [64] CHOICE { -- Tag 'BF40'
authenticateClientOk AuthenticateClientOkEs11V2, -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
authenticateClientError INTEGER {
eumCertificateInvalid(1),
eumCertificateExpired(2),
euiccCertificateInvalid(3),
euiccCertificateExpired(4),
euiccSignatureInvalid(5),
eventIdUnknown(6),
invalidTransactionId(7),
ciPKUnknown(8), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
ciPKMismatch(9), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
euiccRspCapabilityHasChanged(10), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
lpaRspCapabilityHasChanged(11), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
pushServiceNotSupport(12), -- #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0#
pushServiceRegistrationNotSupported(13), -- #SupportedForPushServiceV3.0.0#
invalidInputData(124), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingInputData(125), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
functionProviderBusy(126), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127)
},
authenticateClientOkV3 AuthenticateClientOkEs11V3 -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
AuthenticateClientOkEs11V2 ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
eventEntries [1] SEQUENCE OF EventRecord
}
EventRecord ::= SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedOnlyBeforeV3.0.0#
eventId UTF8String,
rspServerAddress UTF8String
}
AuthenticateClientOkEs11V3 ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
smdsSigned2 [1] SmdsSigned2,
smdsSignature2 [APPLICATION 55] OCTET STRING -- tag '5F37'
}
CheckEventRequest ::= [70] SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0# Tag 'BF46'
ecId [0] OCTET STRING(SIZE(16..32)), -- Event Checking Identifier
smdsAddress [1] UTF8String
}
CheckEventResponse ::= [70] CHOICE { -- #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0# Tag 'BF46'
checkEventOk CheckEventOk,
checkEventError INTEGER {
invalidDsAddress(1),
eventCheckingNotSupported(2), -- #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0#
expiredEcid(3), -- #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0#
unknownEcid(4), -- #SupportedForEventCheckingV3.0.0#
invalidInputData(124), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
missingInputData(125), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
functionProviderBusy(126), -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
undefinedError(127) -- #SupportedFromV3.0.0#
}
}
CheckEventOk ::= SEQUENCE {
isPendingEvent [0] BOOLEAN -- Indicates if an Event Record corresponding to the received ECID exists
}
ConfirmDeviceChangeRequest ::= [76] SEQUENCE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF4C'
transactionId TransactionId,
prepareDownloadResponse [33] PrepareDownloadResponse
}
ConfirmDeviceChangeResponse ::= [76] CHOICE { -- #SupportedForDcV3.0.0# Tag 'BF4C'
confirmDeviceChangeOk ConfirmDeviceChangeOk,
confirmDeviceChangeError INTEGER {
invalidTransactionId(1),
euiccSignatureInvalid(2),
confirmationCodeMissing(3),
confirmationCodeRefused(4),
confirmationCodeInvalidMatch(5),
confirmationCodeRetriesExceeded(6),
invalidInputData(124),
missingInputData(125),
functionProviderBusy(126),
undefinedError(127)
}
}
ConfirmDeviceChangeOk ::= SEQUENCE {
transactionId [0] TransactionId,
smdpSigned5 SmdpSigned5,
smdpSignature5 OCTET STRING
}
END
I JSON Request Response Examples (Informative)
An example for the "ES9+.InitiateAuthentication" function is shown below:
•HTTP Request (from LPA to SM-DP+):
The following example is in the case where the SM-DP+ supports the v3-specific FQDN as described in section 2.6.6.2.
HTTP POST /gsma/rsp2/es9plus/initiateAuthentication HTTP/1.1
Host: rsp3-smdp.example.com
User-Agent: gsma-rsp-lpad
X-Admin-Protocol: gsma/rsp/v2.1.0
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: XXX
{
"euiccChallenge": "ZVVpY2NDaGFsbGVuZ2VFeGFtcGxlQmFzZTY0oUFZuQnNZVE5D",
"euiccInfo1": "RmVHRnRjR3hsUW1GelpUWTBvVUZadVFuTlpWRTU",
"smdpAddress": "smdp.example.com",
"lpaRspCapability": "ODAwMjAzRjg="
}
•HTTP Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
X-Admin-Protocol: gsma/rsp/v2.1.0
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: XXX
{
"header": {
"functionExecutionStatus": {
"status": "Executed-Success"
}
},
"transactionId": "0123456789ABCDEF",
"serverSigned1": "VGhpcyBpcyBub3QgYSByZWFsIHZhbHVl",
"serverSignature1": "RKNFZsbFVUa05qUm14e",
"euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed": " BBQAAQIDBAUGBwgJCgsMDQ4PEBESEw==",
"serverCertificate": "RUU2NTQ0ODQ5NDA0RlpSRUZERA==...",
"otherCertsInChain": ["q83vASM..."]
}
An example for the "ES2+.DownloadOrder" function is shown as follows.
•HTTP Request (from Operator to SM-DP+):
HTTP POST /gsma/rsp2/es2plus/downloadOrder HTTP/1.1
Host: smdp.example.com
X-Admin-Protocol: gsma/rsp/v3.0.0
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: XXX
{
"header": {
"functionRequesterIdentifier": "RequesterID",
"functionCallIdentifier": "TX-567"
}
"eid": "89001567010203040506070809101152",
"iccid": "8947010000123456784F",
"profileType": "myProfileType"
}
•HTTP Response for a successful execution:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
X-Admin-Protocol: gsma/rsp/v3.0.0
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: XXX
{
"header": {
"functionExecutionStatus": {
"status": "Executed-Success"
}
},
"iccid": "8947010000123456784F"
}
•HTTP Response for a failed execution:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
X-Admin-Protocol: gsma/rsp/v3.0.0
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: XXX
{
"header": {
"functionExecutionStatus": {
"status": "Failed",
"statusCodeData": {
"subjectCode": "8.2.5",
"reasonCode": "3.7",
"message": "No more Profile"
}
}
}
}
An example for the "ES2+.HandleNotification" function is shown as follows:
•HTTP Request (from SM-DP+ to Operator):
HTTP POST /gsma/rsp3/es2plus/handleNotification HTTP/1.1
Host: smdp.example.com
X-Admin-Protocol: gsma/rsp/v3.0.0
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: XXX
{
"header": {
"functionRequesterIdentifier": "RequesterID",
},
"eid": "89001567010203040506070809101152",
"iccid": "8947010000123456784F",
"profileType": "myProfileType",
"timeStamp": "2015-12-16T09:30:47Z",
"notificationEvent": 4,
"notificationEventStatus": {
"status": "Executed-Success"
}
}
•HTTP Response for a successful execution:
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
X-Admin-Protocol: gsma/rsp/v3.0.0
J Tag allocation (Normative)
This annex lists the tags allocated to data objects that SHALL be used for the definition of the eUICC functions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tag Data name Value -------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------- 'BF20' GetEuiccInfo1Request or EUICCInfo1 32 'BF21' PrepareDownloadRequest or PrepareDownloadResponse 33 'BF22' GetEuiccInfo2Request or EUICCInfo2 34 'BF23' InitialiseSecureChannelRequest 35 'BF24' ConfigureISDPRequest 36 'BF25' StoreMetadataRequest 37 'BF26' ReplaceSessionKeysRequest 38 'BF27' Reserved 39 'BF28' ListNotificationRequest or ListNotificationResponse 40 'BF29' SetNicknameRequest or SetNicknameResponse 41 'BF2A' UpdateMetadataRequest or UpdateMetadataResponse 42 'BF2B' RetrieveNotificationsListRequest or RetrieveNotificationsListResponse 43 'BF2D' ProfileInfoListRequest or ProfileInfoListResponse 45 'BF2E' GetEuiccChallengeRequest or GetEuiccChallengeResponse 46 'BF2F' NotificationMetadata 47 'BF30' NotificationSentRequest or NotificationSentResponse 48 'BF31' EnableProfileRequest or EnableProfileResponse 49 'BF32' DisableProfileRequest or DisableProfileResponse 50 'BF33' DeleteProfileRequest or DeleteProfileResponse 51 'BF34' EuiccMemoryResetRequest or EuiccMemoryResetResponse 52 'BF35' Reserved 53 'BF36' BoundProfilePackage 54 'BF37' ProfileInstallationResult 55 'BF38' AuthenticateServerRequest or AuthenticateServerResponse 56 'BF39' InitiateAuthenticationRequest or InitiateAuthenticationResponse 57 'BF3A' GetBoundProfilePackageRequest or GetBoundProfilePackageResponse 58 'BF3B' AuthenticateClientRequest or AuthenticateClientResponseES9 59 'BF3C' EuiccConfiguredDataRequest or EuiccConfiguredDataResponse 60 'BF3D' handleNotification 61 'BF3E' GetEuiccDataRequest or GetEuiccDataResponse 62 'BF3F' SetDefaultDpAddressRequest or SetDefaultDpAddressResponse 63 'BF40' AuthenticateClientResponseEs11 64 'BF41' CancelSessionRequest or CancelSessionResponse or cancelSessionRequestEs9 or cancelSessionResponseEs9 65 'BF42' LpaeActivationRequest or LpaeActivationResponse 66 'BF43' GetRatRequest or GetRatResponse 67 'BF44' LoadRpmPackageRequest or LoadRpmPackageResult 68 'BF45' VerifySmdsRespnseRequest or VerifySmdsResponseResponse 69 'BF46' CheckEventRequest or CheckEventResponse 70 'BF4A' AlertData 74 'BF4B' VerifyDeviceChangeRequest or VerifyDeviceChangeResponse 75 'BF4C' ConfirmDeviceChangeRequest or ConfirmDeviceChangeResponse 76 'BF4D' PrepareDeviceChangeRequest or PrepareDeviceChangeResponse 77 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 66: Tag Allocation
K OID allocation (Informative)
This annex provides some background on the schema of the OID allocation used in this document.
For the purpose of assigning OIDs, a root OID for GSMA was registered within the RSP project.
The value of this root OID is:
joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) gsma(146)
For the purpose of this project, a first node was allocated under this node:
rsp(1)
All OIDs allocated in this version and in version 1.X of this specification belong to the rsp node. OIDs not defined in the ASN.1 (Annex H) are out of scope of this specification, and allocated by their respective owners.
At the time of writing of this specification, Mr. Gary Waite (GSMA) was responsible for the allocation of additional OIDs under the gsma node, i.e., acting as Registration Authority.
Other GSMA projects should use a similar approach: register a project specific node under the gsma node and then define sub-nodes in the project specific documentation.
Within the rsp node, the following schema is used:
rsp(1) – root for the RSP project
spec-version(1) – root for identifying the ASN.1 module of the different versions
version-one(1) – ASN.1 module of version 1.X
version-two(2) – ASN.1 module of version 2.X
version-three(3) – ASN.1 module of version 3.X
… - future ASN.1 modules SHOULD use additional sub-nodes here
cert-objects(2) – root for nodes identifying objects and roles
used in certificates
id-rspExt(0) – root for certificate extensions defined in version 2.x of this specification
id-rspRole(1) – root for roles used in certificates
(see section 2.4a.1.0 for further details)
L DLOA document (Normative)
The DLOA is an XML document as defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA [57].
The following table describes the specific coding and rules of the Platform_DLOA used in this specification to represent the certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, or validation granted to an eUICC platform.
Field | Description |
|---|---|
Authority_Label | This field SHALL contain the DLOA Authority OID in doted notation: '2.23.146.1' (GSMA RSP node). |
LOA_Identifier | This field SHALL contain the identifier of the LOA assigned by the DLOA Authority. |
LOA_Scope | This field SHALL contain a string indicating the scope of the certification, evaluation, approval, qualification, or validation covered by the LOA. The string SHALL contain the following: "RSP SGP.22 v<version>/<compliance level>" -<version> SHALL identify the version of specification against which the eUICC platform has been certified. Value SHALL be coded as a string of major/minor/revision values (each on possibly several digits) separated by '. '. If revision is not used, it SHALL be omitted. E.g., "RSP SGP.22 v2.0.12", "RSP SGP.22 v1.0". -<compliance level> value SHALL be "Basic" for this version of specification. |
Platform_Label | This field SHALL contain a string as the concatenation of the OID of the platform manufacturer and the Unique Identifier of the platform, separated by a '/': "<OID platform manufacturer>/<Unique Identifier of the platform>" -<OID platform manufacturer > = OID in doted notation of the entity being the manufacturer of the eUICC platform. E.g., "1.2.3.4" -<Unique Identifier of the platform> = a value defined by the platform manufacturer (out of scope), but SHALL follow rules defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA [57]. |
Issuance_Date | This field SHALL contain the date of issuance of the related LOA. |
Expiration_Date | The Expiration_Date SHALL be set with the value defined by the applied compliance process. |
LOA_Url | This field SHALL contain the URL where the original LOA as issued by the DLOA Authority can be retrieved. |
Signature | The signature SHALL be done as defined in GlobalPlatform DLOA [57]. In order to limit the cryptographic requirements on Management System side, this specification limits to the signature algorithm 'http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256', with one of the curves defined in 2.6.5. |
NOTE: The OID of the platform manufacturer and the EIN part of the EID represent the same entity. Both values could be used interchangeably to identify the entity. |
Table 67: Platform_DLOA description
NOTE: The implementation details for Platform_DLOA will be indicated in SGP.24 [64] when the DLOA service becomes active. The Application_DLOA is not used in this specification.
M Configuration for RSP Server, LPA and EUICC (Normative)
EUICC
An eUICC stating conformance to this version of this specification SHALL:
-Set the EuiccRspCapability.loadCrlSupport bit to '0'.
-Set the EuiccRspCapability.deviceInfoExtensibilitySupport bit to '1'.
-Set the EuiccRspCapability.serviceProviderMessageSupport bit to '1'.
-Set the EuiccRspCapability.crlStaplingV3Support bit to '1'.
-Set the EuiccRspCapability.certChainV3VerificationSupport bit to '1'.
-Set the EuiccRspCapability.signedSmdsResponseV3Support bit to '1'.
-Set the EuiccRspCapability.euiccRspCapInInfo1 bit to '1'.
-Set the EuiccRspCapability.cancelForEmptySpnPnSupport bit to '1'.
-Set the EuiccRspCapability.updateNotifConfigInfoSupport bit to '1'.
-Set the EuiccRspCapability.updateMetadataV3Support bit to '1'.
-Include euiccCategory in EuiccInfo2.
-Set the lpaMode in EUICCInfo2 corresponding to the active LPA (LPAd or LPAe).
-Set the EuiccInfo1.lowestSvn, EuiccInfo2.lowestSvn, and ISDRProprietaryApplicationTemplate.lowestSvn to v2.1.0.
NOTE: this value is required for interoperability with version 2 RSP servers.
-Set the EuiccInfo1.highestSvn and EuiccInfo2.highestSvn to v3.0.0.
NOTE: this value is provided for information only.
-Set the EuiccInfo2.baseProfilePackageVersion to lowest major and highest minor version of the eUICC Profile Package Specification [5] supported by the eUICC.
NOTE: this value is required for interoperability with version 2 RSP servers.
-Set the EuiccInfo2.additionalProfilePackageVersions with the list of additional eUICC Profile Package Specification [5] supported by the eUICC, if any (e.g., 3.2.0, 4.1.0).
An integrated eUICC stating conformance to this version of this specification SHALL:
-Include treProperties in EuiccInfo2.
-Include treProductReference in EuiccInfo2.
LPA
An LPA stating conformance to this version of this specification SHALL:
-Set the LpaRspCapability.crlStaplingV3Support bit to '1'.
-Set the LpaRspCapability.certChainV3Support bit to '1'.
-Set the LpaRspCapability.signedSmdsResponseV3Support bit to '1' if there is any SM-DS address configured in the Device or eUICC.
-Set the DeviceInfo.lpaSvn to v3.0.0.
-Set the euiccFormFactorType in DeviceInfo.
-Indicate the followings in Terminal Capability:
-Metadata update alerting support
-Enterprise Capable Device
SM-DP+
An SM-DP+ stating conformance to this version of this specification SHALL:
-Set the SessionContext.serverSvn to v3.0.0.
-Set the ServerRspCapability.crlStaplingV3Support bit to '1'.
-Set the ServerRspCapability.cancelForEmptySpnPnSupport bit to '1'.
SM-DS
An SM-DS stating conformance to this version of this specification SHALL:
-Set the SessionContext.serverSvn to v3.0.0.
-Set the ServerRspCapability.crlStaplingV3Support bit to '1'.
-Set the ServerRspCapability.eventListSigningV3Support bit to '1'.
-Support Event Registration and Event Retrieval with HashedIccid(s), Salt, ServiceProviderName, and OperatorId.
N Version Interoperability (Informative)
There is no need to indicate that an eUICC no longer supports version 2 certificate verification because such eUICC would be configured with only a version 3 certificate itself. The version 2 server will see an empty list of euiccCiPKIdListForSigning that will cause ESXX.InitiateAuthentication to fail.
Assumption that should be verified on LPA version 2:
-When an eUICC version 3 is configured with version 3 certificate chain and is inserted in a device with LPA version 2, an RSP Server version 3 will generate ESXX.InitiateAuthentication response with an empty euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed. The LPA version 2 should accept that empty value.
An SM-DP+ (and the Operator) may see IMEIs with differently coded last octets coming from LPAs implementing version 2 or version 3 of this specification.
For HTTP layer:
-Version 3 RSP Server or LPA should be ready to handle an HTTP request or response with a Content-type having no character set encoding information coming from a version 2 peer. In turn a version 2 RSP server or LPA is expected to accept a character set encoding being present.
O Device Change (Informative)
The Service Provider is expected to provide to the SM-DP+ a configuration for the Device Change procedure.
This configuration informs about behaviour requested by the Service Provider upon Device Change requests.
This configuration includes, but is not limited to, the following indications:
-If the SM-DP+ is requested, upon reception of a Common Mutual Authentication with a Device Change request (i.e., ES9+.AuthenticateClient with ctxParamsForDeviceChange), to:
-call the ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function, including the ICCID of the Profile with the EID and/or TAC of the new Device (if requested by the DeviceChangeConfiguration of the profile),
-notify the Service Provider with the ES2+.HandleNotification functionafter Common Mutual Authentication if the Device Change request is accepted,
-If the SM-DP+ is requested, upon reception of ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange with indication of the End User’s confirmation result (e.g., accepted, rejected, no response) to notify the Service Provider with the ES2+.HandleNotification function.
If the SM-DP+ is not requested to call the ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest function, the configuration could include, but is not limited to, information to be provided to the LPAd in the different steps of the Device Change procedure:
-For ES9+.AuthenticateClient response:
-The Service Provider Message for Device Change, if it has to be delivered by the SM-DP+ to the old Device (i.e., serviceProviderMessageForDc in ES9+.AuthenticateClient response),
-If the SM-DP+ is requested to ask to the End User to enter a Confirmation Code, (i.e., ccRequiredFlag set to TRUE in smdpSigned2) and the related Confirmation Code to allow the SM-DP+ to verify it,
-For ES9+.ConfirmDeviceChange response:
-If SM-DP+ has to deliver to the new Device a new Profile or the same Profile as the one currently installed in the old Device (i.e., deleteOldProfile in DeviceChangeResponse).
The means for the Service Provider to provide a configuration for the Device Change procedure to the SM-DP+ is out of scope of this specification.
P Use of VendorSpecificExtension (informative)
This annex provides examples of ASN.1 type definitions that can be referenced by VendorSpecificExtension.
A data object with the following type can be included in VendorSpecificExtension that is carried within euiccSigned3 for Device Change:
SecureUserIntent ::= SEQUENCE {
secureUserIntentCaptured BOOLEAN,
additionalData OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
Q Document Management (Informative)
Q.1 Document History
Version | Date | CR N° | Brief Description of Change | Approval Authority | Editor / Company | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
V1.0 | 13 January 2016 | New PRD Publication | PSMC | Duncan Macadam GSMA | ||
V.1.1 | 14 April 2016 | Minor Change to fix bugs Phase one | PSMC | Yolanda Sanz GSMA | ||
V2.0 | July 2016 | Major Change to include new features | PSMC | Yolanda Sanz GSMA | ||
V2.1 | Jan 2017 | Minor Change to fix bugs and maintenance changes | PSM | Yolanda Sanz GSMA | ||
V2.2 | 31 Aug 2017 | CR2455R02 | Clarification about mutual authentication | RSPLEN | Yolanda Sanz GSMA | |
CR2456R01 | Align ASN.1 for BPP not available for new binding | |||||
CR2457R01 | Clarification on the OID allocation | |||||
CR2458R00 | Definition of certificates validity period | |||||
CR2460R03 | Update on CRL following RSPTFTEC#23 | |||||
CR2461R00 | Fix EID format in eUICC certificate | |||||
CR2462R01 | DLOA introduction | |||||
CR2463R01 | Clarify ECC support requirements | |||||
CR2464R01 | Fix version on JASON Binding | |||||
CR2465R00 | Clarification on Get Default SM-DP+ address | |||||
CR2466R01 | Bug fix on ES11.InitiateAuthentication | |||||
CR2467R02 | Clarify removal of icon via ES6.UpdateMetadata | |||||
CR2468R01 | Remove Le for STORE DATA on ES6 | |||||
CR2469R00 | ESci alignement with SGP.14 | |||||
CR2470R01 | Align initial device setup to SGP.21 v2.2 | |||||
CR2471R00 | Adding UI to Abbreviations | |||||
CR2472R01 | Change Symantec by GSMA in Certificates description | |||||
CR2473R03 | Verifying Profile state for download retry | |||||
CR2475R01 | SM-XX Verification | |||||
CR2476R02 | Fix JSON pattern for timestamp field | |||||
CR2477R00 | Fix error code in ES12.DeleteEvent | |||||
CR2479R01 | Access to the ISD-R vs. SEAC | |||||
CR2480R02 | Provide more indication on Multi CI support for TLS | |||||
CR2481R02 | ECC reference in TLS | |||||
CR2482R00 | Align ES9+ and ES11.AuthenticateClient errors | |||||
CR2483R00 | Clarification of SIMalliance error code mapping | |||||
CR2484R01 | Clarification of UpdateMetadata operation for PPR | |||||
CR2487R01 | Clarification on ES8+ interface | |||||
CR2488R00 | Fix profileClass in GetProfilesInfo | |||||
CR2451R02 | Update of Profile Package specification reference | |||||
CR2459R05 | Update of Certificates following RSPTFTEC#23 | |||||
CR2485R00 | Editorial correction in Sub-procedure Profile Installation | |||||
CR2489R00 | Clarification on ES9+ interface | |||||
CR2490R01 | Clarification on the ES9+ AuthenticateClient | |||||
CR2491R01 | JSON string escaping clarification | |||||
CR2493R01 | DLOA: LOA_Scope and Expiration date definition | |||||
NA | Various improvements following TF review | |||||
CR2494R01 | Clarification of Profile Owner checking | |||||
CR2495R00 | Editorial correction to terminal capability | |||||
CR2496R00 | TF comments | |||||
CR2497R01 | Gender neutrality | |||||
V2.2.1 | 29th Nov 2018 | Minor minor change to fix minor changes | RSPPLEN | Yolanda Sanz GSMA | ||
V2.2.2 | 05th June 2020 | Minor minor change to fix minor changes | ISAG | Yolanda Sanz GSMA | ||
SGP.22 v2.3 | 30 June 2021 | CR2701R01 | Simplified End User confirmation | ISAG | Yolanda Sanz GSMA | |
CR2702R00 | Removal of mandatory RAT configuration | |||||
CR2705R00 | Clarifications on v2.2.2 Application Notes | |||||
CR2703R01 | Optional Edit Default SM-DP+ Address funtions | |||||
CR2706R01 | SGP.22 Mirror CR for integrated eUICC | |||||
CR2704R00 | Allowing LPA to accept TLS Certificate chain to Public CA | |||||
CR2710R00 | Update for changes in LPA45 | |||||
CR2709R00 | Alignment of Discrete eUICC definition with SGP.21 v2.3 | |||||
CR2711R01 | treProperties mandatory for integrated | |||||
CR2708R03 | More changes related to SGP.29 | |||||
CR2712R03 | References updated | |||||
CR2714R01 | Profile download retry upon temporary errors (mirror to CR3486) | |||||
CR2715R02 | Optional LPAd support for Profile Download with PPRs on Removable eUICCs | |||||
CR2717R05 | Editorial Clarification on disabling a Test Profile | |||||
CR2718R00 | Update version numbers in HTTP headers | |||||
CR2719R02 | References cleanup | |||||
CR2722R00 | More SIMAlliance clean up | |||||
CR2721R00 | Optional support of Brainpool and FRP for TLS | |||||
CR2724R00 | ASN.1 corrections | |||||
CR2725R00 | Allow multiple eUICC Profile Package versions | |||||
V2.4 | 28 October 2021 | CR2801R02 | Field-test eUICC | ISAG | Yolanda Sanz GSMA | |
CR2802R02 | Clarification on outdate ppVersion during oudate interm period | |||||
CR2803R02 | Add Profile Metadata Extensibility | |||||
SGP.22 v3.0 | 19 October 2022 | CR3001R01 | eUICC Memory Reset for Provisioning and pre-loaded Test Profiles | ISAG | Denis Praca, Thales | |
CR3003R02 | eUICC initialization without enabled profile | |||||
CR3004R03 | Alignment of ISD-R selection | |||||
CR3005R02 | Optimization during eUICC initialization | |||||
CR3006R04 | High Resolution Icon | |||||
CR3007R06 | RPM Procedures | |||||
CR3009R02 | SMXX check for incorrect signing CI | |||||
CR3012R00 | High Resolution Icon on ES10c | |||||
CR3014R02 | Unsetting of Policy Rules via Update Metadata | |||||
CR3015R03 | Adding OperationType in ES9+.AuthenticateClient Request | |||||
CR3016R06 | RPM functions | |||||
CR3017R01 | RPM Package | |||||
CR3018R01 | Setting OperationType and ICCID in ctxParams1 | |||||
CR3011R01 | Removal of icon via ES6.UpdateMetadata | |||||
CR3020R01 | Version negotiation during device initialisation | |||||
CR3022R01 | APDU access API | |||||
CR3023R01 | Service provider message during Profile download | |||||
CR3019R01 | Introduce server version number in common mutual authentication procedure | |||||
CR3025R01 | Clean some yellow highlighted content in RPM related sections | |||||
CR3013R07 | LPA alerting of Metadata updates | |||||
CR3026R07 | Multi-CI Security | |||||
CR3027R01 | ES2+ and SMDP new Requirements | |||||
CR3028R02 | OS Update Requirements | |||||
CR3029R01 | OS Update capability ELG16 | |||||
CR3030R01 | Metadata Update procedure | |||||
CR3033R00 | Update reference for application update refresh | |||||
CR3038R01 | General compliance checking rules | |||||
CR3042R00 | Network attachment in Local Profile Management | |||||
CR3045R00 | Shall be stopped fixed | |||||
CR3052R01 | Add minor comments from Plenary in SGP.22 v2.2 | |||||
CR3044R00 | Add missing error codes in ES2+.releaseProfile function | |||||
CR3031R02 | ES2+.RpmOrder | |||||
CR3032R04 | RPM clean up | |||||
CR3034R01 | RSP version numbers (editorial) | |||||
CR3035R06 | RPM Command 'Contact PCMP' | |||||
CR3039R05 | ES10b.CancelSession | |||||
CR3010R13 | Add SubCAs | |||||
CR3041R04 | Enterprise | |||||
CR3043R02 | Add missing error codes binding in asn1 | |||||
CR3046R00 | CancelSession reason codes serverAddressMismatch and serverOidMismatch | |||||
CR3047R01 | Clarify calculation of confirmation code hash | |||||
CR3049R01 | Clarify download attempt limits | |||||
CR3050R03 | Clarification of the usage of the Function Requester Identifier field | |||||
CR3051R01 | Clarification of HTTP client retry and reconnection management | |||||
CR3053R06 | Common Cancel Session | |||||
CR3055R05 | Clarification on common mutual authentication, profile download procedure, subject key identifier and minor reference correction | |||||
CR3056R01 | STORE DATA block number count | |||||
CR3057R01 | CancelOrder JSON fix | |||||
CR3058R04 | Unified Notifications | |||||
CR3060R02 | Make catBusy optional | |||||
CR3062R01 | Editorial corrections | |||||
CR3063R00 | Apply CERTPK12 restriction only to server PKIds | |||||
CR3064R01 | Align ES9+ and ES11 AuthenticateClient | |||||
CR3065R01 | TF Comments on SGP.22 v3.0 | |||||
CR3066R04 | LPA API | |||||
CR3067R01 | finalProfileStatusIndicator rewording | |||||
CR3074R00 | Fix ASN.1 in RpmPackageResult | |||||
CR3075R01 | Remove Cert in RPM Package Download | |||||
CR3080R01 | No use case to store serviceProviderMessage on eUICC | |||||
CR3070R02 | LPA API support for companion devices | |||||
CR3061R01 | Change RPM type to CHOICE | |||||
CR3088R01 | RPM type twice in Annex H and other fixes | |||||
Allocation of missing tag values | ||||||
CR3048R02 | Download Test Profile only in Device Test Mode | |||||
CR3059R03 | Reference to Sub-procedure Cancel Session | |||||
CR3071R03 | Adding notificationReason in Phase 3 Notifications | |||||
CR3082R00 | Clarify Service Provider vs. Operator | |||||
CR3083R00 | Clarify that RPM always uses refresh | |||||
CR3084R02 | Event alerting mechanism | |||||
CR3085R00 | LPA API PlantUML update | |||||
CR3086R02 | Adding matchingIdSource in ctxParams1 | |||||
CR3087R01 | SM-DS operation when no pending Event during CMA | |||||
CR3089R01 | Remove Cert in ES9+.AuthenticateClient for RPM | |||||
CR3090R02 | Restructure RPM package and add RPM notifications | |||||
CR3091R02 | Rename rpmPackageResult to loadRpmPackageResult | |||||
CR3095R01 | Allow option to postpone download with PPRs | |||||
CR3097R00 | Fix references to non-existent section | |||||
CR3102R02 | Correction to GlobalPlatform reference | |||||
CR3069R04 | Integrity protection of SM-DS response | |||||
CR3076R02 | Limit RpmPackage size | |||||
CR3077R04 | Limit RpmPackageResult size | |||||
CR3081R03 | Clear cached data upon RPM Update Metadata | |||||
CR3092R02 | rpmConfiguration in UpdateMetadata, StoreMetadata, and GetProfilesInfo | |||||
CR3096R01 | JSON and ASN.1 binding of ES9+.AuthenticateClient | |||||
CR3099R02 | LPA PCMP Address configuration | |||||
CR3106R00 | End User access to ICCID of Operational Profiles | |||||
CR3068R05 | Advanced activation code | |||||
CR3094R03 | CI public key and credential update for eUICC | |||||
CR3098R02 | Verifying MatchingID of Command Code | |||||
CR3100R05 | Validation of Device Application | |||||
CR3104R03 | Public CA for TLS | |||||
CR3107R02 | Simplify description of RPM package processing | |||||
CR3108R02 | Limit RPM to one command with REFRESH | |||||
CR3109R03 | End User consent on enabling a Profile after its installation | |||||
CR3110R00 | ES2+ HandleNotification renaming | |||||
CR3111R02 | Alignment of SGP22 with SGP21 on eUICC category which is a mandatory information to be shared | |||||
CR3112R01 | Cleanup of description of UpdateMetadata | |||||
CR3113R01 | Removal of implicit enabling of Enterprise Profiles | |||||
CR3114R01 | Editorial cleanup of function binding for ES22 | |||||
CR3117R01 | LPA API procedure update with ES2+ interworking | |||||
CR3119R01 | Rewording of notificationPointId and notificationPointStatus | |||||
CR3120R01 | OperationType for Profile Download and Installation | |||||
CR3121R01 | Local Profile Management operation Add-Update All | |||||
CR3125R00 | TLS certificate for HRI server | |||||
CR3127R00 | Addition of missing error codes for RPM | |||||
CR3101R07 | Removing unknown Event from SM-DS | |||||
CR3122R01 | eUICC capability for v3 | |||||
CR3126R04 | RPM and ReM clarification as per TF comment | |||||
CR3128R01 | Notification alignment between ES9+ and ES2+ | |||||
CR3129R01 | Removal of implicit enabling of Enterprise Profiles in section 3.1 | |||||
CR3132R01 | Resolve three Verizon review issues | |||||
CR3103R09 | Rework version negotiation | |||||
CR3130R03 | Start conditions for RPM regarding v2 interoperability | |||||
CR3131R03 | LPA API error codes regarding v2 interoperability | |||||
CR3133R01 | Forward compatibility of activation code | |||||
CR3134R01 | Backward compatibility with v2 certificates | |||||
CR3138R01 | Optional Operation Type for Command Code | |||||
CR3139R02 | Various backward+forward compatibility fixes | |||||
CR3140R01 | RPM Execution reference fix | |||||
CR3141R01 | Editorial clean-up of StoreMetadata | |||||
CR3142R02 | ES10b.CancelSession reason codes | |||||
CR3143R01 | REFRESH correction in RPM procedure | |||||
CR3144R01 | Align UICCCapability with SIMa v2.1 | |||||
CR3145R01 | Clarify RSP session | |||||
CR3146R00 | Editorial corrections | |||||
CR3147R01 | Revising Function Input Header of ES2+.HandleNotification | |||||
CR3150R01 | RSP session definition | |||||
CR3151R01 | Remove overlap in 3.1.5 | |||||
CR3152R01 | Clean up VendorSpecificExtension | |||||
CR3154R01 | Protected Profile clarification | |||||
CR3157R01 | JSON binding of ES2+.SignCommandCode | |||||
CR3158R01 | HRI and LPAe | |||||
CR3159R01 | Clarification in DS event deletion | |||||
CR3163R00 | Cancel session related procedures | |||||
CR3036R04 | LPA Proxy based on GP SERAM – 1st CR | |||||
CR3135R02 | Backward compatibility with v2 certificates | |||||
CR3136R04 | Server Certificate revocation | |||||
CR3148R02 | Adding MatchingID in ES2+.HandleNotification regarding TF input | |||||
CR3149R02 | Returning a rpmPending flag in ES9+.AuthenticateClient response | |||||
CR3153R01 | ELG15 Implementation | |||||
CR3155R05 | Certificate chain support negotiation | |||||
CR3160R02 | No notifications when switching with test profiles | |||||
CR3162R01 | Enterprise profiles cleanup | |||||
CR3165R00 | Fixing a reference in LPA API procedure | |||||
CR3168R01 | otherSignedNotification clarification | |||||
CR3169R05 | Test mode restrictions | |||||
CR3170R03 | Clarify Enterprise Owned Device | |||||
CR3172R01 | Add LPA API to architecture summary | |||||
CR3173R02 | Remove reference to ASCII | |||||
CR3174R01 | security note regarding euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed | |||||
CR3176R01 | Grouping of Enterprise Features | |||||
CR3177R01 | LPAe and BIP | |||||
CR3178R01 | Deprecating X-Admin-Protocol in ES9+ and ES11 | |||||
CR3181R00 | Add missing User Agent indication in ES11 | |||||
CR3182R01 | Fix compilation issue in ES9+.AuthenticateClient binding | |||||
CR3183R00 | Fix issues in ES11.AuthenticateClient binding | |||||
CR3184R00 | Fix in OtherNotification definition | |||||
CR3185R00 | Simplify RpmConfiguration | |||||
CR3187R00 | Remove unused reference | |||||
CR3190R01 | Revising wrong section numberings | |||||
CR3192R00 | Remove Context from noSessionContext | |||||
CR3193R01 | General description on RPM procedures | |||||
CR3194R01 | Change Profile Download and Local Profile Management to RSP Operation in Annex C.2 | |||||
CR3199R00 | Removing two Editors Notes on combining Profile Download and RPM | |||||
CR3164R01 | Time checks on the eUICC | |||||
CR3166R02 | Review description of all functions (RSPTEC343.AP02) | |||||
CR3180R01 | Simplify eUICC implementation of Update Metadata | |||||
CR3191R02 | Adding description on Command Code for RPM and Event Retrieval | |||||
CR3196R01 | Clarifying contextual operation | |||||
CR3197R05 | Improve AC coding | |||||
CR3198R02 | Fix in VerifyCommandCommand error codes | |||||
CR3200R01 | Missing No columns | |||||
CR3201R01 | Clarify updateMetata in RPM order | |||||
CR3202R00 | Enterprise Profile and Enterprise Configuration | |||||
CR3204R01 | eUICC handling of CtxParamsForCommonAuthentication | |||||
CR3209R00 | Clarify LPA handling of failed Profile installation | |||||
CR3212R01 | Add CAT letter classes to device information | |||||
CR3207R03 | Clarify RPM errors | |||||
NA | To remove the CR3148R02 MatchingID in ES2+.HandleNotification regarding TF input | |||||
CR3118R04 | Replace RSP by eSIM | |||||
CR3167R04 | Load RPM Package Result clarification | |||||
CR3179R02 | ES10x interoperability description in section 2.4.14 (overview on SVN negotiation) | |||||
CR3189R05 | PCM procedure | |||||
CR3195R07 | Framework for RspCapability exchange | |||||
CR3203R00 | SAS-UP Reference | |||||
CR3206R01 | Clarification on ECKA and euiccCiPKIdListForVerification | |||||
CR3208R04 | Allow empty MatchingID in download procedure | |||||
CR3211R01 | Pending operation alerting procedure | |||||
CR3215R01 | CR3136 cleanup | |||||
CR3216R02 | Remove superfluous profile owner checks for RPM | |||||
CR3217R00 | Remove variant Ov3 for server | |||||
CR3218R00 | Truncated CI Public Key Identifier | |||||
CR3219R01 | Add certificate chains variant for flexibility | |||||
CR3220R01 | eUICC session termination | |||||
CR3221R01 | New functions defined in V3 | |||||
CR3222R02 | Security Overview: adding paragraph regarding Notifications | |||||
CR3223R01 | Switching RPM Enabled and Disabled in LPA by End User | |||||
CR3224R02 | Clarification for keys profile binding and random key clarification | |||||
CR3225R01 | OSUpdate Clarifications | |||||
CR3226R01 | SGP.22 Phase 1 backward compatibility | |||||
CR3227R01 | Cleanup of wording in 5.7.14a | |||||
CR3228R01 | Invalid Transaction ID error cases | |||||
CR3229R06 | Make SVN negotiation obsolete | |||||
CR3230R01 | ES2+ cover SMDP43-44-45-46-47-48 | |||||
CR3231R02 | Remove CERT.DPauth.ECDSA from ES10b.LoadRpmPackage | |||||
CR3232R01 | End user control over LPA proxy network usage | |||||
CR3234R01 | Remove cancelSessionEmptyResponse | |||||
CR3235R02 | Service Indication in Profile Metadata | |||||
CR3236R02 | Simplifying procedure descriptions in 3.1.3.3 | |||||
CR3237R02 | Editorial changes from TF on Draft 9 | |||||
CR3238R00 | Consecutive user confirmations | |||||
CR3240R01 | Limit the number of ot key re-use (RSPTEC243.AP08) | |||||
CR3241R01 | Explicitly state the rebinding error (RSPTEC35_AP07) | |||||
CR3242R02 | User friendly way for setting the allowedCiPKId for the default DP (RSPTEC31.4_AP01) | |||||
CR3243R04 | LPA Proxy API | |||||
CR3244R01 | Device capabilities for LPA API, LPA proxy, and APDU API | |||||
CR3245R01 | TLS certificate revocation | |||||
CR3246R01 | Changing Root CI to GSMA Root CI (RSPTEC36.1_AP01) | |||||
CR3247R00 | Correcting attemps to attempts | |||||
CR3248R01 | SetNickname is optional for the LPA | |||||
CR3250R03 | Fix loss of backward compatibility around euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed | |||||
CR3253R04 | Clearly define notificationEvent values | |||||
CR3254R01 | Clean up description of enable, disable and eUICC memory reset | |||||
CR3255R03 | Eliminate references to enterprise owned device | |||||
CR3188R04 | Fix error handling in RPM execution | |||||
CR3251R02 | Simplifying procedure descriptions in section 3.1 | |||||
CR3256R02 | New error code rejecting Reference Enterprise Rules | |||||
CR3257R02 | Clean up enterprise checks on the eUICC | |||||
CR3259R01 | Update description of LPA Services | |||||
CR3260R00 | Clarify AAC procedure and AAC Browser | |||||
CR3261R00 | Align wording for root certificates | |||||
CR3262R01 | Clarify LPA API usage as per Telenor comment | |||||
CR3263R02 | eUICC capability for service provider message | |||||
CR3264R00 | Add optional AAC to initial device setup | |||||
CR3265R03 | Encode AAC as a version 2 AC | |||||
CR3267R01 | OperationType in Add Profile and Update Profile | |||||
CR3268R01 | Clarify definition of ES12 | |||||
CR3269R01 | Removing Editor's Notes on RPM Package and LPA API | |||||
CR3270R01 | ASN.1 Restructuring | |||||
CR3271R06 | Description on the elements in euiccInfo | |||||
CR3273R02 | TLS optional in ES2+ | |||||
CR3274R01 | Intro comments from TF on Draft 11 | |||||
CR3275R01 | Clarification about options numbering in RPM | |||||
CR3276R01 | Clarification about the 'allowedCiPKId' | |||||
CR3277R01 | Additional clean-up around svn | |||||
CR3278R02 | Remove dependency on svn for EventList signing | |||||
CR3279R01 | Add a capability on eUICC for VerifyCommandCode | |||||
CR3280R00 | LoadRpmPackageREsultData missing references | |||||
CR3281R01 | Processing for an eUICC not supporting enterprise | |||||
CR3283R03 | LPAe always uses REFRESH | |||||
CR3284R01 | Move ASN.1 for update metadata response to 5.4.1 | |||||
CR3286R00 | Clarify LPA behaviour for enabling a Provisioning Profile | |||||
CR3290R01 | ICCID and EID clarifications | |||||
CR3291R01 | Editorial changes in Device Info | |||||
CR3292R01 | New error codes for ASN.1 binding of ESXX.AuthenticateClient | |||||
CR3293R01 | Certificates comments from TF on Draft 11 | |||||
CR3205R09 | CI public key and credential update for eUICC | |||||
CR3239R01 | Definitions and Abbreviations comments from TF on Draft 9 | |||||
CR3252R01 | Simplifying procedure descriptions in section 3.7 | |||||
CR3258R01 | Clarify catBusy in local profile management procedures | |||||
CR3285R01 | Extend error handling in 3.1.5 to include RPM | |||||
CR3288R03 | AAC Comments | |||||
CR3289R04 | eUICC removable or not | |||||
CR3294R01 | Restrict Profile Owner update via RPM | |||||
CR3297R00 | Error code alignment | |||||
CR3298R04 | ES12 TLS requirements | |||||
CR3299R02 | Interoperability between v2.x LPA and v3 eUICC | |||||
CR3300R03 | Clarify CommandCode signing | |||||
CR3301R00 | Update GP CS Amd. F to v1.1 | |||||
CR3302R01 | Add event alerting in the starting conditions of affected procedures | |||||
CR3303R01 | Removal of one Editor's Note on RPM | |||||
CR3304R02 | User Confirmation for RPM Update Metadata | |||||
CR3305R01 | Removal of one Editor's Note on RPM (RSPTEC38_AP12) | |||||
CR3307R01 | Add AES keys description (RSPTEC38_AP16) | |||||
CR3309R01 | Remove limitation on validity period for SubCA issued Certificate | |||||
CR3310R03 | Mark a Profile 'to be deleted' on RPM Delete Profile (RSPTEC38_AP13) | |||||
CR3313R00 | Consistently refer to CI PK indicator | |||||
CR3315R02 | TF comment (TFTEC38_Doc019) on RPM | |||||
CR3319R00 | Definition of Enterprise Rule | |||||
CR3320R01 | LPA behaviour on ASN.1 size limit of UTF-8 string | |||||
CR3306R03 | Add cancelSession in Event Retrieval procedure | |||||
CR3308R00 | Fix in ES11.AuthenticateClient binding | |||||
CR3312R00 | Remove constraint on certs to have same subject name | |||||
CR3314R01 | Add missing data objects for ASN1 generation | |||||
CR3316R02 | Additional eUICC info | |||||
CR3317R01 | Cleanup description of RPM ListProfileInfo | |||||
CR3318R02 | Extension of the sequence of 88 TLVs for Profile metadata | |||||
CR3322R00 | Clarifying RPM Contact PCMP error codes | |||||
CR3323R01 | Modify EF UMPC handling | |||||
CR3324R04 | Revising implicit disable in RPM Enable Profile | |||||
CR3325R00 | Remove UI specifics from SetNickname procedure | |||||
CR3326R00 | Bug fix in ES2+.HandleNotification example | |||||
CR3327R01 | Editorial corrections to section 2 | |||||
CR3328R00 | Fix specification of LPA46 condition | |||||
CR3329R02 | Align User-Agent header to RFC7231 | |||||
CR3330R00 | Action RSPTEC392_AP02&03 | |||||
CR3332R03 | Mandatory from version 3.0.0 acronym for feature support | |||||
CR3334R01 | Clarify ES2+.SignCommandCode error | |||||
CR3335R00 | Clarify use of server_name extension for TLS | |||||
CR3336R00 | Clarify use of subCAs in common mutual authentication start conditions | |||||
CR3337R00 | No CI public key restriction for TLS | |||||
CR3338R00 | Allow Variant C in ES9+.InitiateAuthentication response | |||||
CR3339R03 | Fix IMEI encoding definition | |||||
CR3340R00 | Discovery of non-released Profiles | |||||
CR3341R01 | Rework section for Cert verification (RSPTEC40.2_AP02) | |||||
CR3344R01 | Enterprise Capable Devices optionally rejecting Enterprise Rules | |||||
CR3345R01 | Revise ReM operation | |||||
CR3347R01 | GetProfilesInfo example retrieving all tags | |||||
CR3350R01 | Support of minimal file system eSIMs | |||||
CR3354R01 | lpaMode in EUICCInfo2 should be OPTIONAL | |||||
CR3357R00 | Revert to v2 serialNumber description (RSPTEC41_AP09) | |||||
CR3359R01 | Editorial correction to Annex P | |||||
CR3362R01 | DLOA support mandatory | |||||
CR3311R05 | Version interoperability in Annex O and eUICC SVN | |||||
CR3321R04 | Deprecating LPA SVN and Server SVN in the specification | |||||
CR3333R00 | edit Default SM-DP+ is optional for the LPA | |||||
CR3355R08 | Providing new HTTP status codes for HandleNotification response | |||||
CR3356R05 | Clarify MatchingID usage on ES2+ | |||||
CR3358R01 | Clarifying mention of default file system | |||||
CR3360R01 | Clarifying Managing SM-DP+ check in ES10c function calls via RPM | |||||
CR3363R02 | Consistent use of GSMA CI RootCA and GSMA CI terms | |||||
CR3364R01 | Rewording 'Phase 3' | |||||
CR3365R00 | Abbreviation of API | |||||
CR3366R01 | euiccRspCapability and LPA API | |||||
CR3367R02 | Revising implicit disable in RPM Enable Profile | |||||
CR3368R01 | Clarifying ES22 functions | |||||
CR3369R01 | Clarification about NotificationEvent coding | |||||
CR3371R00 | Profile Installation Result upon interruption | |||||
CR3374R01 | Clarify GetProfilesInfo response | |||||
CR3375R00 | Store only signed Load RPM Package Results in eUICC | |||||
CR3376R00 | Fix UML in Event Retrieval | |||||
CR3377R01 | Clarifications around Metadata update | |||||
CR3379R01 | Make DP certs subject name unique | |||||
CR3380R00 | ASN.1 comment style | |||||
CC3381R01 | Revise description on RPM Execution procedures | |||||
CR3382R07 | Cryptographic negotiation description | |||||
CR3383R01 | Cleanup related to TF draft 15 comments | |||||
CR3384R01 | Align ES21 to GP SERAM | |||||
CR3385R01 | Editorial in PrepareDownload for curve designation | |||||
CR3387R01 | Activation Code example | |||||
CR3388R02 | Editorial guidelines for capitalisation and ASN.1 comments | |||||
CR3389R03 | HTTP header for JSON | |||||
CR3390R02 | ASN.1 tag fixes | |||||
CR3391R01 | Editorial change in triggering PCM via RPM | |||||
CR3392R01 | Remove obsoleted HTTP RFC | |||||
CR3394R01 | Correct interface description in section 5.1 | |||||
CR3397R01 | Remove duplication of GP SERAM details | |||||
CR3398R00 | Remove ed note on RSA | |||||
CR3400R00 | Version reference in section 2.6.6.2 | |||||
CR3401R00 | Fix eUICC hardware characteristics | |||||
CR3393R07 | eUICC support for LPA Proxy | |||||
CR3399R00 | Remove ed note on rebind error | |||||
CR3404R00 | Change Auditing eUICC to Audit eUICC | |||||
CR3405R00 | Maximum size of RPM packages | |||||
CR3406R02 | PCM Script definition (RSPTEC44_AP08) | |||||
CR3407R01 | Correction of Open Mobile API Specification | |||||
CR3409R01 | Cleanup of tags for RPM packages | |||||
CR3410R01 | Cleanup of OIDs | |||||
CR3412R01 | Informative reference to Generic Test Profile | |||||
CR3413R02 | Clarify meaning of LPA Proxy | |||||
CR3414R00 | Fix references to ETSI TS 102 221 | |||||
CR3416R01 | Clarify ICCID in notification metadata | |||||
CR3418R01 | RPM rejection by LPAd during RPM download | |||||
CR3422R00 | EnterpriseProfilesNotSupported error code revised | |||||
CR3403R03 | Revising FunctionExecutionStatus and NotificationEventStatus | |||||
CR3402R09 | BPP Security Protocol | |||||
CR3408R04 | Privacy of RPM Commands | |||||
CR3411R08 | Adding Status Code to ES9+ Authentication Client | |||||
CR3415R04 | Adding Status Code to ES2+ Cancel Order | |||||
CR3419R00 | Removing "Normal Case" from Procedures | |||||
CR3420R01 | Fulfilling action RSPTEC392_AP05 | |||||
CR3421R01 | Fulfilling action RSPTEC392_AP04 | |||||
CR3423R02 | Add 5G RAT to DeviceInfo | |||||
CR3424R01 | Deactivating LPAe | |||||
CR3425R01 | ES2+ Download Order clarification | |||||
CR3426R00 | Clean up naming of Event Records | |||||
CR3428R00 | Remove trusted-ca-keys | |||||
CR3430R01 | Update EID definition | |||||
CR3429R06 | Editor’s note for backwards compatibility | |||||
CR3433R01 | Clarify (former) TF comments on Draft 15 | |||||
CR3436R01 | TLS handshake with a non-empty session_id | |||||
CR3437R00 | X-Admin-Protocol values in Annex I example | |||||
CR3438R00 | Multiple editorial changes | |||||
CR3440R01 | Fix HTTP path for ES9 ASN.1 binding | |||||
CR3443R00 | Fulfilling voided AC6 requirement | |||||
CR3444R01 | Fulfilling revised Device requirements on EID | |||||
CR3446R01 | Remove discovery ordering between SM-DS and Default SM-DP+ | |||||
CR3447R00 | Device reset without eUICC Memory Reset | |||||
CR3451R01 | Clarify that JavaCard is mandatory | |||||
CR3417R03 | Addition of 5G related UICC capability | |||||
CR3445R05 | LPAe using E4 ENVELOPEs | |||||
CR3448R09 | Clean nameConstraints definition in EUM Certificate | |||||
CR3450R06 | Add integrated euicc in eligibility check | |||||
CR3455R03 | Simplified End User confirmation | |||||
CR3456R00 | Clarification in section 5.1 | |||||
CR3457R00 | simaResponse is conditional | |||||
CR3458R01 | Allow ES2 resends | |||||
CR3459R02 | SAIP supported versions indication | |||||
CR3460R00 | Clarify LPAe activation | |||||
CR3463R02 | Case-insensitive SM-DP+ FQDN verification | |||||
CR3466R04 | Update the ordering of v3 capabilities in deviceInfo | |||||
CR3470R01 | Reference to GSMA TSG TS.43 as example protocol specification for ESapp Ineterface | |||||
CR3471R00 | Change gsma.com by example.com | |||||
CR3472R01 | HTTP header correction | |||||
CR3473R00 | AC Format clarification | |||||
CR3476R01 | Allow cancel order with ICCID only | |||||
CR3477R01 | Allow more than one Root SM-DS | |||||
CR3478R00 | Cleanup of CR3450 | |||||
CR3479R01 | Integrated eUICC REQ ID01 | |||||
CR3480R01 | Reference to OCF Easy Setup | |||||
CR3481R00 | Align CR3479 with M2M CR4104R01 | |||||
CR3482R02 | Reference SGP.29 EID assignment scheme | |||||
CR3487R01 | Adding a section for Device Change | |||||
CR3486R00 | Profile download retry upon temporary errors | |||||
CR3488R11 | Device Change terms and definitions, and procedure details | |||||
CR3489R08 | Device Change procedure to support v2 eUICC | |||||
CR3490R07 | Function description and function bindings for Device Change | |||||
CR3491R06 | Use of an elementary file for Device Change to support v2 eUICC | |||||
CR3504R02 | MEP - Reserve MEP abbreviation for Multiple Enabled Profiles | |||||
CR3505R06 | Adding estimated profile size in Profile Metadata | |||||
CR3507R01 | Updated Device requirements | |||||
CR3508R00 | Update for removal of LPA45 | |||||
CR3509R00 | DS stands for Discovery Service | |||||
CR3510R07 | ES12 enhancement | |||||
CR3511R00 | Rewording "Device-specific" in Annex C | |||||
CR3512R00 | Removal of mandatory RAT configuration | |||||
CR3513R01 | Policy rule updates for WG1 CR0080r2 | |||||
CR3523R02 | Reference update to OCF Easy Setup | |||||
CR3148R06 | Add identifiers in ES2+.HandleNotification | |||||
CR3442R07 | Clarify profile metadata field extensibility | |||||
CR3492R06 | Profile Recovery for Device Change | |||||
CR3518R17 | Add MEP support in Procedures section of SGP.22 | |||||
CR3519R11 | Add MEP support in Functions section of SGP.22 | |||||
CR3525R01 | Presence of OperationType parameter in ES9+.AuthenticateClient | |||||
CR3526R01 | Mirror to V3.0 of CR2711R01 (treProperties mandatory for integrated) | |||||
CR3528R01 | Add informative reference section | |||||
CR3531R00 | Replace deprecated ASN.1 ANY type by an open type | |||||
CR3533R01 | Removing Command Code | |||||
CR3534R02 | Get Profile Size from GetProfilesInfo | |||||
CR3536R01 | Correction of explanation of EstimatedProfileSize | |||||
CR3543R01 | Field-test eUICC | |||||
CR3544R01 | Clarification on outdated ppVersion during interim period | |||||
CR3494R06 | Delivery of the Delete Notification for Device Change | |||||
CR3506R09 | Device Information Code | |||||
CR3515R13 | TLS Security requirement update proposal | |||||
CR3527R03 | Clarification on ICCID in Enhanced ES12 | |||||
CR3529R03 | Editorial Clarification on disabling a Test Profile | |||||
CR3530R03 | Device Change Configuration description annex R | |||||
CR3535R05 | Enhanced Discovery Service – Event Checking | |||||
CR3538R06 | MEP: General Description | |||||
CR3540R07 | Enhanced Discovery Service - Push Service | |||||
CR3541R01 | MEP - Fix enable response for eUICC assigned port | |||||
CR3542R00 | MEP - Fix disable response in procedure | |||||
CR3546R00 | Editorial fix for DPpb keys | |||||
CR3547R03 | MEP: Case 3 commands out of scope | |||||
CR3548R02 | Fix profile size description | |||||
CR3549R01 | Update Annex O - RPM optional | |||||
CR3550R01 | Fix ICCID and EID examples | |||||
CR3555R01 | MEP – Clean-up related to Command/Target Port/Profile | |||||
CR3556R00 | Command Code clean up | |||||
CR3557R00 | DEV-IC_fix EID example | |||||
CR3558R01 | Adding DeviceChangeConfig in UpdateMetadata | |||||
CR3559R00 | MEP - Forbidden Policy Rules | |||||
CR3564R03 | MEP – Clarify Command/Target Port in Enable/Disable Procedures | |||||
CR3565R01 | Java Card section update | |||||
CR3566R00 | Remove advanced activation code | |||||
CR3568R02 | Device Change using a stored Activation Code | |||||
CR3569R02 | Function description and function bindings of ES2+ functions for Device Change | |||||
CR3571R02 | Clarifying smdsSigned3 | |||||
CR3573R03 | MEP - refresh handling for enabling a Profile | |||||
CR3575R03 | MEP – Clean-up of port selection for Enable procedure | |||||
CR3577R00 | Resolving MEP EN in Clause 3.4 | |||||
CR3578R00 | Resolving EN in Clause 3.4.1 | |||||
CR3579R01 | Resolving EN in Clause 5.7.1 | |||||
CR3570R01 | Clarification on the length of Activation Code for Device Change | |||||
CR3574R02 | MEP – Mode setup | |||||
CR3580R05 | Clause 7.5.16 – MEP-A2 error code addition | |||||
CR3581R03 | MEP – CAT mechanism in C.4 | |||||
CR3583R00 | Clean up pushServiceRegistrationResult in Push Service Registration procedure | |||||
CR3584R00 | MEP – Remove isdrIsMepSelectable bit | |||||
CR3585R04 | MEP – enterprise requirements | |||||
CR3586R03 | MEP - Mode setup examples | |||||
CR3587R02 | MEP - Mode setup error response | |||||
CR3588R00 | Add a reference to SGP.25 | |||||
CR3590R02 | Rename to priorityEnterpriseProfile | |||||
CR3592R01 | Clause 5.7.16 – MEP-A2 with (no) refreshFlag | |||||
CR3469R07 | RPM support in LPAe using E4 ENVELOPEs | |||||
CR3517R09 | Add MEP Definitions in SGP.22 | |||||
CR3567R08 | Server support for multiple Root SM-DSs | |||||
CR3589R07 | Clause 2.12 – Clarify profile assignment to eSIM Port. | |||||
CR3593R03 | MEP – refresh handling for disabling a Profile | |||||
CR3596R04 | Update of TCA Profile Package specification version | |||||
CR3597R05 | RPM with MEP - procedures | |||||
CR3599R01 | New Error code for expired ECID | |||||
CR3600R02 | MEP - simplify memory reset procedure | |||||
CR3602R00 | MEP - align test memory reset procedure | |||||
CR3603R02 | MEP - align memory reset function | |||||
CR3604R02 | Clarify handling of euiccRspCapability in ESXX.AuthenticateClient | |||||
CR3605R02 | Align ASN.1 tags with v2 | |||||
CR3606R06 | Common JSON and ASN.1 request binding for ESXX.AuthenticateClient | |||||
CR3607R06 | UICC Capability in TCA Profile Package specification | |||||
CR3609R00 | Clause 2.12 – Add Requirements for profile assignment to eSIM Port - Alt to CR3608 | |||||
CR3612R01 | Format of lpaRspCapabilities in JSON | |||||
CR3614R02 | MEP - align test memory reset procedure | |||||
CR3615R02 | Fix reference to section 4.5.2.1.2 | |||||
CR3620R02 | APDU Access Interface comments | |||||
CR3622R05 | Algorithm related comments | |||||
CR3624R01 | Removing solved ED in Enable Profile Procedure | |||||
CR3626R01 | JSON base64 + hex cleanup | |||||
CR3627R01 | MEP - outdated ed note on mem reset | |||||
CR3629R03 | MEP - Cleanup of port selection for Enable function | |||||
CR3468R05 | Independent CI – Definition and clarification | |||||
CR3532R09 | Ensure SPN and Profile Name metadata are never empty | |||||
CR3595R04 | Device Change – Notification and profile lifecycle clarification | |||||
CR3617R05 | RPM with MEP - eSIM Port indication by LPA | |||||
CR3625R01 | MEP - reconfiguration of number of ePorts out of scope | |||||
CR3628R01 | Other Notifications Generation Clarification | |||||
CR3630R01 | RPM with MEP - eSIM Port selection during RPM download | |||||
CR3631R03 | Some push service cleanup | |||||
CR3632R00 | Removal of obsolete ed notes in enable procedure | |||||
CR3633R05 | eUICC initialisation section clean-up | |||||
CR3634R05 | RSP sessions and MEP | |||||
CR3635R00 | Fixing RSP Device Capabilities | |||||
CR3636R02 | Update of operation alerting | |||||
CR3637R00 | Removal of ed note in ES2.CancelOrder | |||||
CR3639R03 | MEP - Clarify content of profileState | |||||
CR3641R01 | RPM – Clean-up Get Profiles Info Procedure | |||||
CR3647R01 | EN resolution on Event Checking | |||||
CR3648R04 | ES25 E4E API download result message | |||||
CR3649R02 | EN resolution on Device Change procedure | |||||
CR3654R00 | RPM with MEP - no implicit disabling | |||||
CR3655R03 | MEP - update of enable and disable functions | |||||
CR3660R00 | Fixing step 7 in the notification procedure | |||||
CR3661R02 | Editorial: FQDN extended type | |||||
CR3662R01 | TIMESTAMP correction | |||||
CR3663R03 | Editorial: MEP Removal EN in Disable procedure | |||||
CR3665R02 | MEP – Remove ENs regarding to list APDU multiplexing in the 2.12 | |||||
CR3666R04 | MEP – Proposed way-forward for EP on an UP | |||||
CR3667R01 | Clarify location of euiccCiPKIdToBeUsedV3 | |||||
CR3485R08 | eUICC OS update security | |||||
CR3640R02 | Signed Event Record is optional for LPA without SM-DS Address | |||||
CR3643R03 | PKI – Support of Variant O | |||||
CR3658R00 | Reorder misplaced sections | |||||
CR3659R00 | Fix optionality in common mutual authentication procedure | |||||
CR3670R05 | Generalization of VerifySmdsResponse | |||||
CR3672R00 | Removal of last EN in RPM execution | |||||
CR3673R00 | Cleanup of delete function | |||||
CR3674R01 | Clarify CRL distribution point | |||||
CR3675R03 | Fixing if statements in ES9+.AuthenticateClient | |||||
CR3676R00 | Cleanup of section 5.7.1 | |||||
CR3677R01 | Fix wording on disable in section 2.12 | |||||
CR3678R00 | Remove ed note on renaming MEP modes | |||||
CR3679R02 | Combinations of MEP options | |||||
CR3681R03 | PPR2 handling for Device Change | |||||
CR3684R00 | Remove reference to ITU-T X.509 | |||||
CR3685R01 | Update reference to GP SERAM | |||||
CR3686R00 | Remove obsolete editor's notes | |||||
CR3689R00 | Clarify disabling with CAT not initialised | |||||
CR3611R09 | eUICC capability on Device Change | |||||
CR3671R01 | Removal of last EN in enable function | |||||
CR3680R06 | Confirmation Code for Device Change | |||||
CR3687R04 | Fix RPM object deletion | |||||
CR3688R04 | MEP and test profiles | |||||
CR3692R01 | Cleanup related to metadata extensibility | |||||
CR3693R02 | Consistently apply euiccRspCapability | |||||
CR3694R03 | Add notification configuration to RPM | |||||
CR3695R02 | Fix signature wording | |||||
CR3696R00 | Fix errors in JSON bindings | |||||
CR3697R02 | Recommend certificate variant usage | |||||
CR3698R00 | Remove ed notes on SMx crpyto | |||||
CR3699R00 | Remove ed note on double errors | |||||
CR3700R00 | Add EID example | |||||
CR3701R00 | Remove ed note on TLS security level | |||||
CR3702R00 | Fix format of hashedIccid | |||||
CR3704R01 | Remove ed note on filtered event record | |||||
CR3708R00 | Fix missing change from CR3148R06 | |||||
CR3709R00 | Remove yellow for CC definition | |||||
CR3710R00 | Remove note on ETSI TS 102 223 | |||||
CR3711R00 | Resolve yellow in section 3.4.2 | |||||
CR3638R01 | Some Device Change clarifications | |||||
CR3644R01 | Clarify content of ES2+.handleNotification/resultData | |||||
CR3657R06 | Reworking ES9+.AuthClient | |||||
CR3683R06 | Clarifying pre-configured Activation Code for Device Change | |||||
CR3703R04 | Resolve ed note in cancel session | |||||
CR3705R01 | Replace SIMalliance wording | |||||
CR3706R01 | Fixes related to enterprise | |||||
CR3707R01 | SM-DS support for hashedIccid | |||||
CR3712R01 | Event retrieval at Device setup | |||||
CR3713R02 | TLS - Removing ED about deprecating AES CBC cipher | |||||
CR3714R00 | Update ETSI references for MEP | |||||
CR3715R01 | Resolve 2 ed notes in GetProfilesInfo | |||||
CR3716R00 | Resolve ed note on SM4 key type | |||||
CR3717R00 | Resolve ed note on unsigned RPM errors | |||||
CR3718R02 | Resolve ed note on Notification within Device Change | |||||
CR3719R00 | Resolve miscellaneous ed notes | |||||
CR3725R00 | Fix references to ES10b.VerifyDeviceChange | |||||
CR3726R01 | Missing functions in RemoteProfileProvisioningRequest | |||||
CR3727R00 | Fix PCM section reference | |||||
CR3728R02 | Annex R Removal of Editor’s note | |||||
CR3732R00 | Sort new sub-sections in function binding section | |||||
CR3664R10 | Device Change – Multiple Profiles transfer | |||||
CR3721R03 | Remove LPA API sections | |||||
CR3724R00 | Consistency statement for LPR | |||||
CR3582R01 | Support Device storage of Default SM-DP+ addresses | |||||
CR3645R04 | Clarify content of ES2+.handleNotification/notificationEventStatus for RPM | |||||
CR3722R04 | Clarify tags for base64 JSON fields | |||||
CR3738R01 | Clarify ES9+.AuthClient for Profile download related with Device Change | |||||
CR3720R04 | Always return smdsSigned2 to a v3 LPA discovery request | |||||
CR3729R04 | Device Change Clean up | |||||
CR3733R00 | Correct ES10b.GetProfilesInfo | |||||
CR3735R00 | Fix updateNotificationConfigurationInfoSupport | |||||
CR3737R00 | Fix bullet list in Device Info | |||||
CR3739R01 | Remove customised rpmScript format | |||||
CR3740R03 | Remove dependency on asynchronous Download Preparation Process during Device Change Procedure | |||||
CR3741R02 | Clarify ES12 deletion of stale Event Records | |||||
CR3743R02 | Fix clause numbering | |||||
CR3744R02 | Editorial clean up | |||||
CR3746R00 | Enterprise clean up | |||||
CR3749R03 | Changing DPpb to DPauth in Device Change and Profile Recovery | |||||
CR3753R00 | Fix pending operations alerting | |||||
CR3730R04 | Encrypted Activation Code for Device Change | |||||
CR3734R01 | Various fixes in AuthenticateClient | |||||
CR3742R01 | Clarify the meaning of 'empty' euiccCiPKIdToBeUsed | |||||
CR3745R01 | Remove ReM | |||||
CR3751R01 | No tag-length for eUICCChallenge before base64 encoding | |||||
CR3752R00 | Add MEP in 1.9 feature support | |||||
CR3754R02 | Fix metadata update alerting | |||||
CR3757R02 | Clarifying additional Profile Package versions in euiccInfo2 | |||||
CR3758R00 | Clarifying GlobalPlatform version in euiccInfo2 | |||||
CR3760R02 | Consider LPA certChainV3Support when selecting cert chain variant | |||||
CR3761R00 | Change INTEGER to NULL for LPA alerting | |||||
CR3762R03 | Common command to trigger LPA pending operation alerting | |||||
CR3763R03 | Rename ES2+.ConfirmDeviceChange to ES2+.HandleDeviceChangeRequest | |||||
CR3764R00 | Resolving yellows in ES10b.PrepareDeviceChange | |||||
CR3766R00 | Enterprise Profiles clarification | |||||
CR3767R00 | Resolving yellowed text in Device Change procedure | |||||
NA | Correction of SmdpSigned5 definition | |||||
NA | Correction of SmdpSigned5 definition in Annex H |
Q.2 Other Information
----------------------------------------------------------------------- Type Description ------------------------ ---------------------------------------------- Document Owner Yolanda Sanz / GSMA Editor / Company Denis Praca / Thales -----------------------------------------------------------------------
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