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Glossary term · Security

TLS

Transport Layer Security

Security →

TLS is a cryptographic protocol used in 3GPP systems to provide secure, authenticated communication with integrity and confidentiality for signaling and user plane traffic between network functions and user equipment.

Introduced
Rel-4
Where
Services › Codecs
Specifications
54 specs
Also in
Security, Core Network, Management
TLS Description Purpose What changed Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a fundamental security protocol adopted by 3GPP to protect data in transit across various network interfaces. It operates above the transport layer (typically TCP), creating a secure tunnel between two endpoints before the application layer protocol (e.g., HTTP, SIP, Diameter) exchanges any sensitive data. The protocol establishes this secure channel through a handshake procedure, where the endpoints negotiate cryptographic algorithms, authenticate each other (often using X.509 digital certificates), and derive shared session keys used for encryption and integrity protection.

The TLS architecture within a 3GPP network is pervasive. It secures web-based interfaces like the T8 reference point used by the Service Capability Exposure Function (SCEF) for IoT services, protecting northbound APIs. It secures Diameter connections between core network elements, such as between the Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) and the Packet Data Network Gateway (PGW). In the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), TLS protects the Mw, Mg, and Mx interfaces carrying SIP signaling. For user equipment, TLS is crucial for securing HTTPS connections to application servers, including those used for device management, authentication (e.g., for EAP-TLS), and accessing IMS services via the Ut reference point.

How TLS works involves distinct phases. The Handshake Protocol manages authentication and key establishment. The client and server exchange 'ClientHello' and 'ServerHello' messages to agree on a TLS version and cipher suite. The server then typically sends its certificate for authentication. For mutual TLS (mTLS), as required in many 3GPP service-based interfaces (SBI) in the 5G Core, the client also presents a certificate. Following authentication, a 'Premaster Secret' is exchanged and used, along with random values, to generate the 'Master Secret' from which symmetric encryption and Message Authentication Code (MAC) keys are derived. Once the handshake completes, the Record Protocol takes over, using the agreed keys to encrypt application data, provide message integrity via MACs (or authenticated encryption like AES-GCM), and optionally compress data.

TLS's role is to mitigate threats like eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. By ensuring confidentiality, it prevents attackers from reading sensitive information like user identities, location data, or charging records. Integrity protection ensures that commands or data cannot be altered in transit without detection. Authentication, especially mutual authentication with certificates, is critical in 5G's cloud-native, service-based architecture to prevent unauthorized network functions from interacting with each other. TLS is often combined with underlying IPsec, providing a defense-in-depth strategy, or used independently where IPsec is not feasible, such as for traffic traversing the public internet between an operator's network and a third-party application server.

Purpose & Motivation

TLS was integrated into 3GPP standards to address the critical need for securing packet-based signaling and data traffic as networks evolved from circuit-switched to all-IP architectures. Early mobile networks relied on network-level security within the radio access and core network perimeter. However, with the introduction of IMS in Release 5 and the increasing use of IP-based services, traffic began traversing less-trusted paths, including connections to external application servers and between data centers. This exposed sensitive control plane signaling (e.g., SIP, Diameter) and user data to interception and manipulation.

The protocol solves the problem of providing robust, standards-based security for application-layer protocols that lack native protection. Before its widespread adoption, proprietary or weaker security mechanisms were sometimes used, creating vulnerabilities and interoperability challenges. TLS provides a well-vetted, industry-standard solution for authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. Its creation and evolution (from its predecessor, SSL) were motivated by the broader Internet's security needs, which 3GPP leveraged to secure its own ecosystem.

In later releases, especially with 5G, the purpose of TLS expanded further. The shift to a Service-Based Architecture (SBA) with HTTP/2 APIs (e.g., Nnrf, Nausf) required a transport-agnostic security mechanism that could work efficiently in cloud environments. Mutual TLS (mTLS) became mandatory for many service-based interfaces, solving the problem of machine-to-machine authentication in a dynamic, microservices-based core network where network functions are ephemeral. TLS 1.3, mandated in later 5G releases, addresses limitations of older versions by providing stronger cryptographic algorithms, faster handshakes through 1-RTT and 0-RTT modes, and improved resistance to downgrade attacks, aligning with modern security best practices and performance requirements.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define TLS. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TR 21.905Rel-17 → Rel-18

Rel-18 brings only minor changes to TS 21.905: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.

Full comparison in TR 21.905 →
TS 23.057Rel-4 → Rel-5

Rel-5 added MExE Classmark 4 for CLI Compact Profile devices, covering architecture, security, charging, and capability negotiation.

Full comparison in TS 23.057 →

Protocol Stack

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

from 3GPP Change Requests

Specific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (18 CRs across 4 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.

Rel-16 3 changes
  • Usage of TLS profiles for CAPIF TS 33.122CR0027
  • TLS security with the 3gpp-Sbi-Target-apiRoot header on N32f TS 29.573CR0041
  • Aligning TLS in 33.222 with the current 3GPP TLS profile TS 33.222
Rel-17 9 changes
  • Alignment with SA3 supported TLS profiles TS 23.333CR0144
  • Alignment with SA3 supported TLS profiles TS 23.334CR0176
  • Adding profiles of TLS to use AKMA keys TS 24.109CR0070
  • GBA-based shared secret with PSK authentication in TLS 1.3 TS 24.109CR0071
  • Adding AKMA based profile for TLS 1.3 TS 24.109CR0072
  • Alignment with SA3 supported TLS profiles TS 29.334CR0146

+ 3 more changes

Rel-18 4 changes
  • User plane connection release due to lost of PDU session or TLS failure TS 24.572CR0030
  • N32-f interface with TLS security TS 29.573CR0151
  • N32-f context not found for TLS connection TS 29.573CR0158
  • Update N32-f for TLS related sub-clauses TS 29.573CR0161
Rel-19 2 changes
  • TLS connection termination TS 24.572CR0074
  • Keepalive of TLS Session for N32-f TS 29.573CR0218

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference TLS, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TR 21.905 vj20 3GPP Terminology and Definitions Rel-19 read
TS 23.057 vj00 Mobile Execution Environment (MExE) Specification Rel-19 read
TS 23.179 vd50 MCPTT Functional Architecture Rel-13 read
TS 23.280 vk51 Mission Critical Services Architecture Rel-20 read
TS 23.333 vj00 MRFC-MRFP Mp Interface Requirements Rel-19 read
TS 23.334 vj00 IMS-ALG to IMS-AGW Interface (Iq) Stage 2 Rel-19 read
TS 23.379 vk40 Mission Critical Push-to-Talk Architecture Rel-20 read
TS 23.701 vc00 WebRTC Access to IMS Architecture Study Rel-12 read
TS 23.722 vf10 Common API Framework (CAPIF) for 3GPP Northbound APIs Rel-15 read
TS 24.109 vj00 HTTP Digest AKA & GAA Stage 3 Rel-19 read
TS 24.141 vj00 Presence Service Protocol Details Rel-19 read
TS 24.147 vj00 IMS Conferencing Protocol Details Rel-19 read
TS 24.229 vk10 IMS SIP/SDP Call Control Protocol Rel-20 read
TS 24.259 vj00 Personal Network Management (PNM) Protocol Details Rel-19 read
TS 24.322 vj00 IMS Tunneling over Restrictive Networks Rel-19 read
TS 24.423 v850 PSTN/ISDN Simulation Services XCAP Protocol Rel-8 read
TS 24.482 vj10 MCS Identity Management & Authentication Rel-19 read
TS 24.572 vk00 5G LCS User Plane Protocol Rel-20 read
TS 24.623 vj00 XCAP Protocol for Supplementary Services Rel-19 read
TS 26.247 vj10 Transparent End-to-End Packet-switched Streaming Rel-19 read
TS 26.348 vj00 xMB Interface Specification Rel-19 read
TS 26.512 vj30 5G Media Streaming Protocols and APIs Rel-19 read
TS 26.804 vk10 5G Media Delivery Architecture Extensions Rel-20 read
TR 26.998 vj00 5G AR/MR Glasses Integration Study Rel-19 read
TS 29.116 vj00 REST-based protocol for xMB reference point Rel-19 read
TS 29.162 vj00 IMS-IP Network Interworking Rel-19 read
TS 29.333 vj00 MRFC-MRFP Mp Interface Protocol Rel-19 read
TS 29.334 vj00 IMS-ALG to IMS-AGW Interface Protocol Rel-19 read
TS 29.368 vj00 Tsp Reference Point Stage 3 Specification Rel-19 read
TS 29.573 vk10 5G PLMN Interconnection Interface Rel-20 read
TS 29.819 vd00 Diameter Base Protocol Update Analysis Rel-13 read
TS 29.890 vg00 CT3 5G System Technical Report Rel-16 read
TR 29.893 vi00 Technical Report on QUIC for 5GC SBI Rel-18 read
TS 32.501 vj00 Self-Configuration of Network Elements Concepts Rel-19 read
TS 32.583 vj00 HNB OAM&P Procedure Flows for Type 1 Interface Rel-19 read
TS 32.593 vj00 HeNB OAM&P Procedure Flows for Type 1 Interface Rel-19 read
TS 33.107 vj00 Lawful Interception Architecture & Functions Rel-19 read
TS 33.108 vj00 LI Handover Interface Specification Rel-19 read
TS 33.122 vj40 CAPIF Security Architecture Specification Rel-19 read
TS 33.127 vj80 Lawful Interception Architecture Rel-19 read
TS 33.141 vj00 Security for Presence Service (Ut reference point) Rel-19 read
TS 33.203 vk00 IMS Security Features and Mechanisms Rel-20 read
TS 33.222 vj00 Secure HTTP Access in GAA Rel-19 read
TS 33.320 vj00 H(e)NB Subsystem Security Architecture Rel-19 read
TS 33.328 vk10 IMS Media Plane Security Rel-20 read
TS 33.501 vk30 5G Security Architecture Rel-20 read
TR 33.739 vi10 Study on security enhancement of support for Rel-18 read
TS 33.823 vc20 GBA Web Browser Integration Study Rel-12 read
TR 33.841 vg10 Security aspects; Study on 256-bit algorithms for 5G Rel-16 read
TR 33.848 vi00 Technical Report on Virtualisation Security Rel-18 read
TS 33.863 ve20 Security for Battery-Efficient IoT Device to Enterprise Rel-14 read
TR 33.876 vi01 Technical Report on Certificate Management Rel-18 read
TS 33.938 vj30 5G Standalone Cryptographic Inventory Rel-19 read
TR 33.969 vj00 Security for Public Warning System (PWS) Rel-19 read