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Glossary term · Security

SUCI

Subscription Concealed Identifier

Security →

SUCI is a privacy-preserving, encrypted identifier used by a mobile device during initial network access to conceal the user's permanent subscription identifier and prevent tracking over the air interface.

Introduced
Rel-15
Where
Security
Specifications
14 specs
Also in
Core Network
SUCI Description Purpose What changed Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) is a fundamental security and privacy feature introduced in 5G, defined in 3GPP Release 15. It is a one-time-use identifier transmitted by the User Equipment (UE) in place of the permanent Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) during the initial registration procedure, specifically in the Registration Request message. The SUCI is generated by the UE itself using a standardized scheme called ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme) profile A. The UE encrypts the SUPI using the public key of the home network's Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function (SIDF), which is securely provisioned in the UE (e.g., in the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC)). The output is a string that includes the Home Network Public Key Identifier, the ECIES scheme identifier, the ciphertext, and the MAC tag.

Upon receiving the SUCI, the serving network (e.g., the Visited Public Land Mobile Network (VPLMN)) forwards it to the home network (HPLMN) as part of the authentication procedure. The home network's SIDF, which holds the corresponding private key, is the only entity capable of decrypting the SUCI to retrieve the plaintext SUPI. This decryption occurs within the home network's Unified Data Management (UDM) or Authentication Server Function (AUSF). The SUPI is then used for subscriber authentication and to derive the 5G Globally Unique Temporary Identifier (5G-GUTI) for subsequent signaling. Crucially, the serving network never sees the SUPI in clear text, protecting the subscriber's permanent identity from the visited operator and any passive eavesdroppers on the radio link.

The architecture for SUCI involves several network functions. The UE contains the USIM application which stores the home network public key and performs the encryption. The Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in the serving network receives the SUCI and routes it to the appropriate home network. The SIDF, typically collocated with the UDM/AUSF, performs the de-concealment. SUCI is mandatory for 5G initial registration when the UE does not have a valid 5G-GUTI, making it a cornerstone of 5G's enhanced subscriber privacy. Its use is governed by the subscriber's privacy settings, but the default and encouraged mode is to always use SUCI for initial registration, marking a significant shift from 4G where the permanent International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) was often sent in clear text during initial attach.

Purpose & Motivation

SUCI was created to solve a critical and long-standing privacy vulnerability in cellular networks: the exposure of the user's permanent subscriber identity (IMSI in 2G/3G/4G) over the radio interface. In previous generations, the IMSI was often transmitted in clear text during initial network attachment or in certain failure scenarios. This allowed passive eavesdroppers with inexpensive equipment (IMSI catchers or stingrays) to track individuals' locations and movements, conduct targeted attacks, or perform identity mapping. This vulnerability was a major privacy concern and eroded user trust.

The motivation for SUCI stemmed from regulatory pressures (e.g., GDPR), heightened societal awareness of digital privacy, and the technical opportunity presented by the clean-slate design of the 5G core network (5GC). 3GPP designed SUCI as a key component of 5G's enhanced subscriber privacy architecture. It addresses the limitation of previous temporary identifiers (like TMSI/GUTI) which could not always be used—if a UE entered a new area without a valid temporary ID, it had to fall back to sending the IMSI in clear text. SUCI eliminates this fallback vulnerability by ensuring the permanent identity is never exposed, even on the first contact.

Furthermore, SUCI supports the separation of the serving network from the home network in terms of identity knowledge. This aligns with the network slicing and service-based architecture principles of 5G, where a serving network should provide connectivity without necessarily knowing the subscriber's true identity. By solving the pervasive tracking problem, SUCI enables more secure and privacy-respecting use cases, including critical IoT and government services, where anonymity of the device is paramount until authenticated by the home domain.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define SUCI. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 23.003Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 adds clauses 31.1 to 31.7 to TS 23.003 defining identifier and information structures for Ambient IoT devices and areas, plus new normative references. It also adds SNPN support to ProSe identifiers, including an optional NID part in the PLMN ID and a revised temporary identity length.

Full comparison in TS 23.003 →
TS 23.501Rel-18 → Rel-19

Rel-19 added MPQUIC steering to multi-access PDU sessions, XR and media handling, and an Energy Information Function. It also added Local Offloading Management for edge computing, Vertical Federated Learning for AI/ML, and Ambient IoT text.

Full comparison in TS 23.501 →

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

from 3GPP Change Requests

Specific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (71 CRs across 6 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.

Rel-15 24 changes
  • SUCI encoding format and protection scheme TS 24.501CR0254
  • Modify structure of SUCI Calc EF and introduce Routing Indicator TS 31.102CR0797
  • AMF functionality clarification - to add SUCI TS 23.501CR0220
  • UDM functionality support for SUCI TS 23.501CR0225
  • SUCI encoding and support of NAI format TS 24.501CR0615
  • Transmission of SUCI in DEREGISTRATION REQUEST TS 24.501CR0690

+ 18 more changes

Rel-16 15 changes
  • SUPI and SUCI for wireline access TS 23.501CR0744
  • SUPI and SUCI for legacy wireline access TS 24.502CR0118
  • SUPI/SUCI of N5GC devices TS 24.502CR0143
  • SUCI value with SUPI format NSI TS 31.102CR0879
  • Support of SUCI for SUPI Type GLI and GCI TS 31.102CR0896
  • Avoid specifying SUPI / SUCI and PEI used for FN RG both in 23.501 and 23.316 TS 23.501CR1920

+ 9 more changes

Rel-17 17 changes

+ 11 more changes

Rel-18 10 changes
  • Key identifier in AN-parameter when anonymous SUCI is used TS 24.502CR0297
  • Clarification of NAI format for Anonymous SUCI TS 23.003CR0690
  • SUCI format TS 23.003CR0697
  • NAI format for anonymous SUCI with modified username for trusted non-3GPP access connected to 5GCN of an SNPN TS 23.003CR0699
  • Anonymous SUCI used by N5CW in SNPN TS 24.502CR0269
  • SUCI 5G NSWO context, NOTE 3 modification TS 31.102CR1018

+ 4 more changes

Rel-19 3 changes
  • SUCI calculation failure handling TS 24.501CR6335
  • Minor corrections to the SUCI context TS 31.102CR1086
  • Update of IETF RFC reference for Decorated NAI format for SUCI TS 23.003CR0741
Rel-20 2 changes
  • Clarification of invalid public key SUCI test for UDM TS 33.514CR0038
  • Correction of SUCI de-concealment test procedure TS 33.514CR0042

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference SUCI, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 23.003 vk10 Numbering, Addressing and Identification Rel-20 read
TS 23.501 vk30 5G System Architecture Rel-20 read
TS 24.501 vk10 5GS NAS Protocol Specification Rel-20 read
TS 24.502 vk00 Non-3GPP Access Network Discovery and Selection Rel-20 read
TS 29.503 vk10 UDM Service Based Interface Rel-20 read
TS 29.518 vk10 AMF Service Based Interface Rel-20 read
TS 31.102 vk00 USIM Application Specification Rel-20 read
TS 31.122 vj00 USIM UICC Conformance Test Specification Rel-19 read
TS 33.126 vj30 Lawful Interception Requirements Rel-19 read
TS 33.127 vj80 Lawful Interception Architecture Rel-19 read
TS 33.501 vk30 5G Security Architecture Rel-20 read
TS 33.514 vk20 UDM Security Assurance Specification Rel-20 read
TS 33.835 vg10 Study on authentication and key management for apps Rel-16 read
TR 33.841 vg10 Security aspects; Study on 256-bit algorithms for 5G Rel-16 read