ECIES

Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme

Security →
Introduced in Rel-14

ECIES is a hybrid encryption scheme that uses elliptic curve cryptography for key agreement and symmetric encryption for data confidentiality, employed in 3GPP to secure protocols like 5G NAS transport.

Category
Security
Introduced
Rel-14
Where
Security
Specifications
4 specs
ECIES Description Purpose Related Classification Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) is a public-key encryption scheme standardized by multiple bodies, including SECG and ISO, and adopted by 3GPP for specific security functions. It is a hybrid cryptosystem, meaning it efficiently combines asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic techniques. The scheme uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for the key encapsulation part, deriving a shared secret, and then uses symmetric algorithms for the actual data encryption and integrity protection. Within 3GPP, ECIES is specified as a cryptographic algorithm suite for certain protection mechanisms, notably for encrypting and integrity-protecting NAS transport messages carrying UE policy data from the policy control function to the UE.

The scheme operates in several distinct stages. First, the key generation stage involves an entity (e.g., a network function) generating an elliptic curve key pair: a private key and a corresponding public key. The encryption process, performed by the sender (e.g., the PCF), involves generating an ephemeral elliptic curve key pair, using the recipient's (UE's) public key and its own ephemeral private key to compute a shared secret via Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). This shared secret is then passed through a Key Derivation Function (KDF) to generate symmetric keys for encryption and Message Authentication Code (MAC) generation. The actual plaintext is encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm (like AES). Finally, a MAC is computed over the ciphertext and other parameters. The transmitted message consists of the ephemeral public key, the ciphertext, and the MAC.

On the decryption side, the recipient (UE) uses its own static private key and the received ephemeral public key to compute the same shared secret, derive the same symmetric keys, verify the MAC, and then decrypt the ciphertext. Its role in the 3GPP network is highly specialized. It is primarily employed in the 5G core network for the secure delivery of UE policies (URSP, ANDSP) from the Policy Control Function (PCF) to the UE via the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) using NAS transport procedures. This ensures that sensitive policy rules, which dictate how the UE should route traffic, are delivered confidentially and with integrity, preventing tampering or eavesdropping.

Purpose & Motivation

ECIES was adopted by 3GPP to address the need for an efficient, standardized public-key encryption scheme suitable for constrained environments and specific use cases within the 5G security architecture. The primary problem it solves is the secure point-to-point delivery of sensitive configuration data (UE policies) from the network to the device. Previous methods might have relied on security established at lower layers (like AS and NAS ciphering) or simpler schemes, but the delivery of management policies required a dedicated, end-to-end cryptographic protection mechanism that is independent of the access stratum security context.

The motivation for choosing ECIES over other public-key schemes like RSA lies in the advantages of Elliptic Curve Cryptography. ECC provides equivalent security to RSA with significantly smaller key sizes (e.g., a 256-bit ECC key offers security comparable to a 3072-bit RSA key). This results in smaller message overhead (smaller public keys to transmit), reduced computational burden (faster operations), and lower power consumption—all critical factors for battery-powered UEs. By integrating the key agreement, encryption, and MAC into one standardized scheme, ECIES provides a compact and cryptographically sound solution. Its introduction in Release 14 for this specific purpose filled a gap in the policy provisioning mechanism, ensuring that network-originated control plane commands that directly influence UE behavior are protected with strong, modern cryptography.

Classification

Part ofAES

Detected Changes Across Releases

from 3GPP Change Requests

Specific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (5 CRs across 3 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.

Studied in Rel-14, normative work from Rel-15.

Rel-15 2 changes

In Release 15, the ECIES scheme was introduced as a protection scheme for generating a SUCI, specifically defining "ECIES scheme profile A" and "ECIES scheme profile B" as alternatives to the null scheme. This was part of the new SUCI encoding format and protection scheme specifications. The introduction also involved defining that when ECIES is used, the Scheme output field is coded as hexadecimal digits, unlike the null scheme's BCD coding.

  • SUCI encoding format and protection scheme TS 24.501CR0254
  • Removal of Editor's note on home network public key and home network public key identifier update and removal of protection scheme identifier TS 24.501CR0845
Rel-16 2 changes

In Release 16, the specification introduced new conditions for when a Wireless Access Gateway Function (W-AGF) or a 5G Residential Gateway (5G-RG) acting on behalf of specific devices must apply the "null-scheme" for SUCI generation, as detailed in a dedicated Change Request. This update provided explicit procedural rules for using this unprotected scheme in scenarios involving Fixed Network Residential Gateways (FN-RG) and N5GC or AUN3 devices, clarifying its application within the broader ECIES scheme framework.

  • Conditions to apply the "null-scheme" to generate the SUCI TS 24.501CR1220
  • Clarification on Public Network Integrated NPN in TS 24.501 TS 24.501CR1945
Rel-18 1 change

In Release 18, a specific condition was introduced for applying the "null scheme" when generating a SUCI. The change mandates that a Wireless Access Gateway Function (W-AGF) acting on behalf of an FN-RG or an N5GC device, as well as a 5G-RG acting on behalf of an AUN3 device without a SUCI, must use this null scheme. This update provides explicit clarification on the use of the null protection scheme in these particular network scenarios.

  • Use the null scheme if USIM is valid TS 24.501CR5663

Explore further

Broader topics and technologies where ECIES plays a role.

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference ECIES, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 24.501 vj50 5G NAS Protocols Specification Rel-19
TR 33.841 vg10 Security aspects; Study on 256-bit algorithms for 5G Rel-16
TS 33.885 ve10 Security Study for V2X Services Rel-14
TR 33.938 vj10 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory for 5G Rel-19