Description
Remote UE Access via Relay UE (REAR) is a security and architectural concept introduced in 3GPP Release 15 within the Proximity Services (ProSe) framework, specified in TR 33.843 and TR 33.847. It addresses the scenario in which a User Equipment (the remote UE) cannot reach the 5G core network directly — for example because it is out of coverage, behind an obstruction, or operating in a power-constrained mode — and instead connects to the network through a second UE acting as a relay (the relay UE). REAR defines how that relayed connection is secured, how the remote UE is authenticated, and how keys are established and distributed between the two UEs and the network.
The architecture involves three principal actors: the remote UE, the relay UE, and the network functions that authorize and secure the relay service. In the 5G System, these include the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF), the Session Management Function (SMF), the Unified Data Management (UDM), the Policy Control Function (PCF), and the ProSe-related functions such as the 5G Direct Discovery Name Management Function and the Network Exposure Function (NEF) used for ProSe authorization. The relay UE itself is authenticated to the network in the normal way; the remote UE then performs a relay-specific authentication and key agreement procedure so that it obtains its own security context rather than simply borrowing the relay UE's credentials. This separation of security contexts is a core principle of REAR: the relay UE must not be able to read or tamper with the remote UE's user-plane traffic, and the remote UE must be independently authenticated by the network.
The key hierarchy is central to how REAR works. A root key for the relay service is derived at the network side and at the remote UE, typically anchored in the authentication credentials of the remote UE (for example derived from KAUSF or from a ProSe-specific key). From this root key, further keys are derived to protect the PC5 link between the remote UE and the relay UE, and to protect the relayed traffic as it traverses the relay UE toward the network. Because the relay UE forwards traffic it cannot decrypt, REAR provides end-to-end confidentiality and integrity between the remote UE and the network over the relay hop. The specifications also define how keys are refreshed, how relay authorization is checked against subscription data, and how the network detects and mitigates relay misuse.
REAR also covers the discovery and authorization phases. Before a relay association is established, the remote UE must discover candidate relay UEs, and both UEs must be authorized by the network to participate in relay service. Authorization is based on subscription information held in the UDM and policy from the PCF, and can be enforced via the ProSe authorization procedures. Once authorized, the UEs establish a PC5 connection (using the PC5-S signalling protocol) over which the relay security association is negotiated. The relay UE then acts as an IP or Layer-2 forwarder between the remote UE and the network, with the remote UE's traffic carried inside the relay UE's connection to the RAN and core.
In Release 17, the work was extended as part of the broader 5G ProSe enhancements, which expanded UE-to-network relaying to the 5G New Radio and 5G Core context and refined the security procedures for relay selection, authorization, and key management. REAR therefore matters because it enables coverage extension and connectivity for devices that would otherwise be unreachable, while preserving the security guarantees — mutual authentication, key separation, confidentiality, and integrity — that operators require before allowing one subscriber's device to carry another subscriber's traffic.
Purpose & Motivation
REAR exists to solve a fundamental coverage and connectivity problem: not every UE can reach a base station directly. Devices may be in a coverage hole, inside a building, at a cell edge, or in a disaster area where infrastructure is degraded. Relay-based connectivity lets one UE with good coverage serve as a bridge for another UE, extending effective network reach without deploying new infrastructure. However, relaying creates serious security questions — who authenticates the remote UE, how are keys kept separate from the relay UE, and how is the relay UE prevented from eavesdropping or manipulating the relayed traffic? REAR was created to answer these questions in a standardized, interoperable way.
Before REAR, ProSe relaying in LTE (Release 12/13) had a less complete security architecture, and early relay designs risked either trusting the relay UE too much or requiring the remote UE to share credentials with the relay. REAR establishes the principle that the remote UE is independently authenticated by the network and holds its own security context, with end-to-end protection over the relay hop. This makes relay service acceptable to operators from a security standpoint and enables new use cases such as wearable devices, public-safety communications, and IoT devices with limited radio capability.
The motivation was reinforced in Release 17, when 5G ProSe relaying was standardized for NR and the 5G core. As 5G networks target massive IoT and extended coverage, relay access becomes a practical tool for reaching devices that cannot sustain a direct link. REAR provides the security foundation that makes this commercially and regulatorily viable.
Release Timeline
Evolution Across Releases
An overview written from the defining specifications, not a verified change history. For the exact text, open the specifications listed below.
Initial introduction of Remote UE Access via Relay UE security architecture in TR 33.843 and TR 33.847, defining the remote UE, relay UE, and network roles, the relay-specific authentication and key agreement procedures, the key hierarchy, and the authorization framework for UE-to-network relaying.
Extended as part of the 5G ProSe enhancements, adapting relay security to 5G NR and the 5G Core, and refining relay selection, authorization, and key management procedures. The definition wording itself is unchanged from Rel-15; the release reflects contextual expansion of the feature.
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference REAR, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 33.843 vf10 | Security Study for ProSe UE-to-Network Relay | Rel-15 read |
| TR 33.847 vh10 | 5G Proximity Services Security Study | Rel-17 read |