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Glossary term · Security

PCK

Personalisation Control Key

Security →

PCK is a secret key used in a UICC or USIM to lock a mobile device to a specific network, brand, or service provider, enforcing commercial agreements.

Introduced
Rel-4
Where
Services
Specifications
12 specs
Also in
Security
PCK Description Purpose What changed Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The Personalisation Control Key (PCK) is a security feature defined within the 3GPP UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card) and USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module) application toolkit. It is a secret cryptographic key, typically 128 bits long, stored securely in a protected file (EF_PCK) on the UICC. The primary function of the PCK is to facilitate network, service provider, or corporate personalisation of the Mobile Equipment (ME). Personalisation refers to the ability to restrict the ME's operation to work only with a specific UICC, network, or set of services. The mechanism is invoked via the "PERSONALISE" command from the UICC to the ME, which includes a challenge-response authentication protocol using the PCK.

The technical process works as follows: When a personalised ME is powered on with a UICC, the ME reads the personalisation data from the UICC. If personalisation is active, the ME sends a random challenge (RAND) to the UICC. The UICC uses the stored PCK and a cryptographic algorithm (like MILENAGE) to compute a response (RES) and an expected response (XRES). The RES is sent back to the ME. The ME, which also possesses the PCK (programmed into its non-volatile memory during the personalisation process), independently computes the XRES using the same RAND and algorithm. If RES matches XRES, the personalisation check passes, and the ME operates normally. If the check fails, the ME may deny service, restrict functionality, or display a message, depending on the personalisation category (e.g., network, service provider, corporate).

The architecture involves several components: the ME's personalisation framework, the UICC's USIM application with the PCK file, and the over-the-air (OTA) platform used to provision or update the PCK on the UICC. The PCK is distinct from the authentication keys (Ki/K) used for network access; it is solely for device locking. Its role is critical for enforcing commercial policies. For example, a subsidised phone sold by Operator A is personalised with Operator A's PCK, preventing its use with a competitor's SIM until unlocked. The specifications detail multiple personalisation categories (Network, Network Subset, Service Provider, Corporate) each potentially with its own PCK, allowing for granular control. Management commands allow for disabling personalisation (unlocking) if the correct PCK is provided.

Purpose & Motivation

The PCK was introduced to address the commercial need for network operators and handset manufacturers to control the usage environment of mobile devices, particularly in markets where handsets are heavily subsidised. Without such a mechanism, a subsidised device could be immediately used with a competitor's SIM card, undermining the business model of recouping subsidy costs through service revenue. Prior to standardised personalisation, proprietary locking solutions existed, leading to fragmentation and interoperability issues. The PCK, standardised from Release 4 onwards, provided a universal, secure method for personalisation across all 3GPP-compliant devices and UICCs. It solves the problem of device locking in a cryptographically secure manner, preventing easy circumvention. Its creation was motivated by the desire to protect operator investments, manage device fleets for corporate customers, and enable branded service offerings, while maintaining a standardised security framework that is interoperable between different ME and UICC vendors.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define PCK. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TR 21.905Rel-17 → Rel-18

Rel-18 brings only minor changes to TS 21.905: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.

Full comparison in TR 21.905 →
TS 24.380Rel-17 → Rel-18

Rel-18 adds media plane multiplexing via mc_floor_ssrc fmtp and Audio SSRC in floor control. It adds an MBS subchannel control protocol. It also adds invited user identity, group call setup, and floor control SSRC/SDP fields.

Full comparison in TS 24.380 →

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

from 3GPP Change Requests

Specific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (1 CRs across 1 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.

Rel-16 1 change
  • [33.180] R16 Establishment of PCK for MCData TS 33.180CR0112

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference PCK, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TR 21.905 vj20 3GPP Terminology and Definitions Rel-19 read
TS 22.022 vj00 ME Personalisation Features for GSM/3G Rel-19 read
TS 24.380 vk10 MCPTT Media Plane Control Protocols Rel-20 read
TS 24.581 vj30 MCVideo Media Plane Control Rel-19 read
TS 24.582 vj00 MCData Media Plane Control Protocols Rel-19 read
TS 29.380 vj00 MCPTT-LMR Interworking Media Plane Control Rel-19 read
TS 29.582 vj00 MCData Interworking with LMR Systems Rel-19 read
TS 33.179 vdc0 MCPTT Security Architecture and Procedures Rel-13 read
TS 33.180 vk10 Security of the Mission Critical Service (MCX) Rel-20 read
TS 33.879 vd10 MCPTT Security Study Rel-13 read
TS 33.880 vf10 Security Study for Enhanced Mission Critical Services Rel-15 read
TS 33.938 vj30 5G Standalone Cryptographic Inventory Rel-19 read