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Glossary term · Security

SIM

Subscriber Identity Module

Security →

SIM is a secure, removable smart card or embedded chip that stores a subscriber's unique identity and authentication keys to enable secure network access and user identification in mobile networks.

Introduced
R99
Where
Services › IMS
Specifications
49 specs
Also in
User Equipment, Radio Access Network, Security
SIM Description Purpose What changed Neighbours Detected Changes Specifications

Description

The Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) is a pivotal security component in 3GPP networks, functioning as a tamper-resistant hardware security module. Physically, it has evolved from a full-size card (1FF) to the now-standard nano-SIM (4FF) and the embedded SIM (eSIM). Logically, it contains a microprocessor and persistent memory running a dedicated operating system. Its primary secure storage includes the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), which uniquely identifies the subscriber globally, and a long-term secret key (Ki). These two elements are central to the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol.

The SIM works in conjunction with the mobile device (ME) and the network's Authentication Centre (AuC/UDM). When a device attempts to attach to a network, it presents the IMSI from the SIM to the network. The network operator's AuC/UDM, which also holds the IMSI and corresponding Ki, uses this to generate a challenge (RAND) and an expected response (XRES) using cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MILENAGE for 5G AKA). The RAND is sent to the device. The SIM card receives this RAND via the device, uses its stored Ki and the same algorithm to compute a response (RES) and ciphering/integrity keys (CK, IK). The device sends the RES back to the network. If the RES matches the XRES, authentication is successful, and the session keys are established for securing the air interface. The SIM performs the critical cryptographic computations internally; the Ki never leaves the secure boundary of the SIM chip, providing a high level of security against software attacks on the device.

Beyond core authentication, the SIM stores other vital data. This includes the Integrated Circuit Card Identifier (ICCID), which uniquely identifies the SIM card itself, the Abbreviated Dialing Numbers (phonebook), Short Message Service (SMS) messages, and network-specific settings like the Preferred PLMN list. In modern iterations like the eSIM, the SIM functionality is soldered onto the device's circuit board but remains a logically separate, secure element. The eSIM enables remote SIM provisioning (RSP), allowing operators to download and activate subscription profiles over-the-air (OTA), revolutionizing logistics and enabling new connectivity models for IoT and consumer devices. The SIM, therefore, is not just an identity token but a secure, programmable platform that anchors trust in the entire mobile ecosystem.

Purpose & Motivation

The SIM was created to solve critical problems of security, mobility, and service portability in the emerging digital GSM network in the early 1990s. Prior to GSM, analog cellular systems like AMPS relied on a factory-programmed Electronic Serial Number (ESN) in the phone, tightly coupling the subscriber identity to the hardware. This made changing phones cumbersome and offered weak authentication, making the systems vulnerable to cloning fraud.

The SIM's primary purpose was to separate subscriber identity and subscription from the mobile device hardware. This solved several problems: 1) Security: By storing the secret key (Ki) in a secure, removable element, it provided strong mutual authentication between subscriber and network, drastically reducing fraud. 2) Mobility and Convenience: A subscriber could move their subscription to any compatible phone simply by moving the SIM card, enabling true personal mobility. 3) Service Portability: It allowed operators to pre-configure network settings and services on the card. The evolution from physical SIM to eSIM was motivated by the need for greater flexibility in an increasingly connected world. For IoT devices deployed in hard-to-reach locations, physically swapping SIMs is impractical. For consumers, eSIMs allow easy switching between operators and enable dual-SIM functionality without multiple card slots. The eSIM and remote provisioning standards address the logistical challenges of SIM distribution and the desire for more dynamic, user-centric subscription management, while maintaining and even enhancing the foundational security role of the original SIM concept.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define SIM. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TR 21.905Rel-17 → Rel-18

Rel-18 brings only minor changes to TS 21.905: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.

Full comparison in TR 21.905 →
TS 22.038Rel-4 → Rel-5

Rel-5 added USAT definitions, proactive key press indication, ISIM reference, and removed network-specific bearer and communication control restrictions.

Full comparison in TS 22.038 →

Release Timeline

Detected Changes Across Releases

from 3GPP Change Requests

Specific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (1 CRs across 1 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.

Rel-19 1 change
  • New AT Command for Logging and Buffering SIM APDU +CLOGBUFFSIMAPDU TS 27.007CR0904

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference SIM, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 21.111 vj00 USIM and UICC Requirements for 3G Rel-19 read
TS 21.133 v410 3G Security: Threat Analysis & Requirements Rel-4 read
TR 21.905 vj20 3GPP Terminology and Definitions Rel-19 read
TS 22.022 vj00 ME Personalisation Features for GSM/3G Rel-19 read
TS 22.038 vj00 USIM Application Toolkit (USAT) Stage 1 Rel-19 read
TS 22.057 vj00 Mobile Execution Environment (MExE) Stage 1 Rel-19 read
TS 22.066 vj00 Mobile Number Portability Stage 1 Rel-19 read
TS 22.100 v370 UMTS Service Requirements for Release '99 R99 read
TS 22.101 vl00 3GPP Service Principles for PLMNs Rel-21 read
TS 22.121 v531 Virtual Home Environment Service Requirements Rel-5 read
TS 22.226 vj00 Global Text Telephony (GTT) Stage 1 Rel-19 read
TS 22.234 vd10 3GPP-WLAN Interworking Index Specification Rel-13 read
TR 22.907 v313 UMTS IC Card and Terminal Concepts R99 read
TR 22.944 vj00 UE Functionality Split Scenarios and Requirements Rel-19 read
TR 22.967 vj00 eCall Emergency Data Transmission Rel-19 read
TR 22.980 vj00 Network Composition Feasibility Study Rel-19 read
TS 23.048 v590 Secured Packets Structure for SMS and UICC Management Rel-5 read
TS 23.050 3GPP TS 23.050 R99 read
TS 23.057 vj00 Mobile Execution Environment (MExE) Specification Rel-19 read
TS 23.067 vj00 Enhanced Multi-Level Precedence and Pre-emption Service Rel-19 read
TS 23.110 vj00 Access Stratum Services Specification Rel-19 read
TS 23.127 v610 Virtual Home Environment Stage 2 Specification Rel-6 read
TS 23.171 v390 LCS Stage 2 for UMTS R99 read
TS 23.228 vk10 IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem Rel-20 read
TS 23.234 vd10 3GPP-WLAN Interworking Index Rel-13 read
TS 23.271 vj00 LCS Stage 2 Specification Rel-19 read
TR 23.758 vh00 Study on Edge Application Architecture Rel-17 read
TS 23.804 v710 SMS/MMS over IP Access Networks Rel-7 read
TS 24.234 vc20 3GPP-WLAN Interworking Network Selection Rel-12 read
TS 25.305 vj00 UTRAN UE Positioning Stage 2 Rel-19 read
TS 26.804 vk10 5G Media Delivery Architecture Extensions Rel-20 read
TR 26.967 vj00 eCall via CTM Suitability Analysis Rel-19 read
TS 27.007 vk00 AT Command Interface for Mobile Terminals Rel-20 read
TS 29.198 v340 OSA R99 API Stage 3 Specification R99 read
TS 31.115 vj00 Secured Packet Structure for UICC Applications Rel-19 read
TS 31.131 vj00 C Language Binding for (U)SIM API Rel-19 read
TR 31.900 vj00 3GPP TS 31.900: Security Interworking Guidance Rel-19 read
TS 32.102 vj00 Telecom Management Physical Architecture Framework Rel-19 read
TS 32.240 vk10 3GPP Charging Architecture and Principles Rel-20 read
TS 32.272 vj00 Charging for Push-to-Talk over Cellular (PoC) Rel-19 read
TS 32.277 vj20 Charging Management for Proximity Services (ProSe) Rel-19 read
TS 33.401 vj20 EPS Security Architecture Rel-19 read
TS 34.131 vj00 SIM API C Language Test Specification Rel-19 read
TR 35.934 vj00 Tuak algorithm set for 3GPP auth & key gen Rel-19 read
TS 36.896 ve00 Study on Flexible eNB-ID and Cell-ID in E-UTRAN Rel-14 read
TS 43.318 vj00 Generic Access Network (GAN) Stage 2 Rel-19 read
TR 43.901 vj00 Generic Access to A/Gb Interface Feasibility Study Rel-19 read
TR 43.902 vj00 GAN Enhancements Feasibility Study Rel-19 read
TS 51.013 vj00 SIM API for Java Card Test Specification Rel-19 read