Description
The International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) is a critical identifier in mobile telecommunications, serving as a permanent, factory-assigned serial number for a mobile station (MS). It is a 15-digit decimal number, structured into several distinct parts. The first eight digits constitute the Type Allocation Code (TAC), which identifies the device model and its manufacturer. The following six digits are the unique serial number (SNR) assigned by the manufacturer. The final digit is a Luhn algorithm-based check digit (CD), used to validate the sequence of the preceding 14 digits. The IMEI is programmed into the device's firmware or hardware during manufacturing and is not intended to be changed by the user.
From a network operations perspective, the IMEI is reported by the device to the network during initial registration and attachment procedures. The network can request the IMEI via specific signaling messages, such as the Identity Request in NAS (Non-Access Stratum) procedures. The serving network entity, typically the MME in LTE or the AMF in 5G, can then forward this IMEI to the Equipment Identity Register (EIR) or a similar network function. The EIR contains lists (white, grey, black) against which the reported IMEI is checked. This process enables the network operator to permit, monitor, or deny service based on the device's status, such as blocking service to devices reported as stolen.
The IMEI's role extends beyond simple identification. It is a cornerstone for lawful interception, fraud prevention, and device analytics. For lawful interception, authorities may use the IMEI to uniquely identify a target device for surveillance. In fraud prevention, operators use IMEI blacklists to disable stolen phones across their networks, significantly reducing the resale value of stolen property and deterring theft. Furthermore, aggregated IMEI data helps manufacturers and operators analyze device populations, model penetration, and plan for network technology support (e.g., gauging the number of 5G-capable devices on the network). Its standardized format ensures global interoperability, allowing a device's identity to be recognized and processed consistently across different operators and countries.
Purpose & Motivation
The IMEI was created to solve the fundamental problem of uniquely and permanently identifying the physical mobile equipment itself, independent of the user's subscription (which is identified by the IMSI on the SIM/USIM). Prior to its standardization, there was no reliable, global method for networks to identify device types or track individual hardware units. This limitation made it difficult to combat mobile phone theft, as a stolen phone could simply be used with a different SIM card. It also hindered accurate device analytics and made implementing device-specific policies or restrictions nearly impossible.
The introduction of the IMEI in 3GPP Release 99 provided a standardized, tamper-resistant identifier that is hard-coded into the device. This allowed for the creation of centralized Equipment Identity Registers (EIRs), where operators could share lists of stolen devices. A key motivation was to protect consumers and operators by reducing the incentive for phone theft, thereby enhancing overall network security. Furthermore, it enabled regulatory compliance for device type approval and provided a mechanism for network operators to manage device access, for instance, by barring devices that are not type-approved for their network or that pose a security risk.
Classification
Detected Changes Across Releases
from 3GPP Change RequestsSpecific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (1 CRs across 1 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.
Explore further
Broader topics and technologies where IMEI plays a role.
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference IMEI, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 21.133 v1410 | 3G Security: Threat Analysis & Requirements | Rel-5 |
| TR 21.905 vj20 | 3GPP Terminology and Definitions | Rel-19 |
| TS 22.022 vj00 | ME Personalisation Features for GSM/3G | Rel-19 |
| TR 22.944 vj00 | UE Functionality Split Scenarios and Requirements | Rel-19 |
| TS 23.171 v1390 | LCS Stage 2 for UMTS | Rel-4 |
| TS 23.271 vj00 | LCS Stage 2 Specification | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.229 vk00 | IMS Call Control Protocol based on SIP | Rel-20 |
| TS 24.259 vj00 | Personal Network Management (PNM) Protocol Details | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.484 vk00 | MCS Configuration Management Protocols | Rel-20 |
| TS 24.501 vk00 | 5G System (5GS) Non-Access Stratum (NAS) Protocol | Rel-20 |
| TS 25.331 vj01 | RRC Protocol for UE-UTRAN Radio Interface | Rel-19 |
| TS 25.413 vj00 | Radio Access Network Application Part (RANAP) | Rel-19 |
| TR 25.931 vj00 | UTRAN Signalling Procedures Examples | Rel-19 |
| TS 27.007 vj60 | AT Command Set for User Equipment | Rel-19 |
| TS 29.172 vj00 | EPC LCS Protocol (ELP) specification | Rel-19 |
| TS 29.275 vj00 | PMIPv6 Mobility & Tunnelling Protocols Stage 3 | Rel-19 |
| TS 32.240 vk00 | Charging Architecture and Principles in 3GPP | Rel-20 |
| TS 32.250 vj00 | Circuit Switched Offline Charging | Rel-19 |
| TS 32.251 vj00 | PS Domain Charging Management | Rel-19 |
| TS 32.272 vj00 | Charging for Push-to-Talk over Cellular (PoC) | Rel-19 |
| TS 32.278 vj00 | Monitoring Events Offline Charging Specification | Rel-19 |
| TS 32.293 vj00 | Proxy Function in Domestic Service Provider | Rel-19 |
| TS 32.401 vj00 | Performance Management Concept & Requirements | Rel-19 |
| TS 32.808 v1800 | Common User Profile Storage Framework | Rel-8 |
| TS 32.849 vd00 | IMS Roaming Charging Study | Rel-13 |
| TS 32.850 ve00 | IMS Charging Correlation Methods Study | Rel-14 |
| TS 33.107 vj00 | Lawful Interception Architecture & Functions | Rel-19 |
| TS 33.108 vj00 | LI Handover Interface Specification | Rel-19 |
| TS 33.401 vj20 | EPS Security Architecture | Rel-19 |
| TS 36.331 vj30 | E-UTRA RRC Protocol Specification | Rel-19 |
| TS 41.033 ve00 | GSM Lawful Interception Interface Requirements | Rel-14 |
| TS 52.402 vj00 | GSM Performance Management Measurements | Rel-19 |