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Glossary term · Security

Entity authentication

Entity authentication

Security →

Entity authentication is the provision of assurance of the claimed identity of an entity, ensuring that communicating parties in a 3GPP network are who they claim to be.

Introduced
Rel-8
Where
Security
Specifications
7 specs
Entity authentication Description Purpose What changed Neighbours Specifications

Description

Entity authentication is a core security service in 3GPP networks, defined as 'the provision of assurance of the claimed identity of an entity.' It is the process by which one party (the verifier) gains confidence in the identity of another party (the claimant). In the context of 3GPP, entity authentication is typically mutual, meaning both the UE and the network authenticate each other. This is essential to prevent unauthorized access, impersonation attacks, and to ensure that only legitimate users and network nodes can participate in communication.

The 3GPP security architecture specifies entity authentication for various entities, including the User Equipment (UE), the network (e.g., MME, AMF), and network elements. For UE authentication, 3GPP defines the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol, which is used in 3G, 4G, and 5G networks. In 5G, the primary authentication is performed using 5G-AKA or EAP-AKA', as specified in TS 33.501. The authentication process involves the UE and the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) in the home network, with the help of the Security Anchor Function (SEAF) in the serving network. The AKA protocol uses a long-term secret key stored in the UE's Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) and in the home network's Unified Data Management (UDM) to generate authentication vectors and session keys.

Entity authentication in 3GPP is not limited to UE authentication. It also covers authentication between network functions (e.g., NFs in the 5G core), between network elements in the management plane, and between the UE and non-3GPP access networks. For example, in the 5G Service-Based Architecture (SBA), network functions authenticate each other using OAuth 2.0 or TLS client certificates, as specified in TS 33.501. This ensures that only authorized NFs can access services provided by other NFs. Similarly, in the management plane, entity authentication is used to verify the identity of management systems and network elements, as described in TS 33.210 and TS 33.310.

The authentication process typically involves the exchange of credentials and the verification of those credentials. For UE authentication, the UE sends its identity (e.g., SUCI or 5G-GUTI) to the network, which retrieves the corresponding subscription data and generates an authentication challenge. The UE responds with a response that proves knowledge of the secret key. If the response is valid, the network authenticates the UE and both parties derive session keys for subsequent secure communication. The authentication can be one-way (network authenticates UE) or mutual (UE also authenticates network). In 3GPP, mutual authentication is standard for UE-network authentication.

Entity authentication is closely linked to other security services such as confidentiality, integrity, and key management. It is a prerequisite for establishing secure channels and for authorizing access to services. Without entity authentication, networks would be vulnerable to spoofing, man-in-the-middle attacks, and unauthorized access. Therefore, 3GPP has continuously enhanced authentication mechanisms across releases, introducing stronger algorithms, improved privacy protection (e.g., SUCI), and support for new entities like IoT devices and non-3GPP access. The definition of entity authentication has remained stable since Rel-8, reflecting its fundamental and unchanging nature in security architecture.

Purpose & Motivation

Entity authentication exists to provide assurance that an entity is indeed who it claims to be. In mobile networks, this is critical because the radio interface is inherently broadcast and vulnerable to eavesdropping and impersonation. Without authentication, anyone could impersonate a legitimate user or network node, leading to fraud, service theft, and privacy breaches. The purpose of entity authentication is to establish trust between communicating parties before any sensitive data is exchanged.

Historically, 2G networks used one-way authentication (network authenticates UE) with weak algorithms, which made them susceptible to attacks like false base stations. 3G introduced mutual authentication with stronger algorithms (MILENAGE, etc.) and improved key management. 4G LTE further enhanced security with hierarchical key derivation and interworking with non-3GPP access. 5G introduced a more flexible authentication framework, supporting 5G-AKA, EAP-AKA', and EAP-TLS for different use cases, including IoT and private networks.

The motivation for entity authentication is to protect both users and operators. For users, it ensures that their communications are not intercepted or manipulated by fake base stations. For operators, it prevents unauthorized access to network resources and ensures that only legitimate users are billed. It also enables lawful interception and emergency services by providing reliable identity information. As networks evolve towards 5G-Advanced and 6G, entity authentication will continue to be a cornerstone of security, adapting to new threats and technologies such as quantum computing and AI-driven attacks.

What changed in its specifications

The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define Entity authentication. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.

TS 33.102Rel-8 → Rel-9

Added 128-bit encryption for GSM and GPRS with Kc128 derived from CK and IK. Added IMS emergency call support over GPRS and EPS.

Full comparison in TS 33.102 →
TS 33.105Rel-5 → Rel-6

Rel-6 brings only minor changes to TS 33.105: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.

Full comparison in TS 33.105 →

Release Timeline

Evolution Across Releases

An overview written from the defining specifications, not a verified change history. For the exact text, open the specifications listed below.

Rel-8 Initial

Initial definition: 'The provision of assurance of the claimed identity of an entity.' This established the fundamental security service for LTE and beyond.

Definition unchanged from Rel-8. The concept remained stable as LTE security evolved.

Definition unchanged. Rel-10 introduced LTE-Advanced but did not alter the definition of entity authentication.

Definition unchanged. The term continued to be used consistently in security specifications.

Definition unchanged. Rel-12 brought new features like LTE-WLAN aggregation, but entity authentication definition remained the same.

Definition unchanged. The introduction of NB-IoT and eMTC did not change the definition, though new authentication considerations arose for IoT.

Definition unchanged. Rel-14 continued to use the same definition for entity authentication.

Definition unchanged. This release marked the first 5G specifications, but the definition of entity authentication remained identical.

Definition unchanged. The term was used in 5G security specifications with the same meaning.

Definition text was reformatted (line break removed) but the meaning is identical: 'The provision of assurance of the claimed identity of an entity.' No functional change.

Definition unchanged from Rel-17. The concept remained stable.

Definition reverted to the original multi-line format, but the content is identical. No change in meaning.

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference Entity authentication, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 33.102 vj10 3G Security Architecture Specification Rel-19 read
TS 33.105 vj00 3G Security: Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements Rel-19 read
TS 33.141 vj00 Security for Presence Service (Ut reference point) Rel-19 read
TS 33.203 vk00 IMS Security Features and Mechanisms Rel-20 read
TS 33.204 vj00 TCAP Security (TCAPsec) Stage 2 Specification Rel-19 read
TS 33.210 vk00 Network Domain Security for IP Networks Rel-20 read
TS 33.234 vj00 3GPP-WLAN Interworking Security Rel-19 read