CSR

Certificate Signing Request

Security →
Introduced in Rel-15 Also in: Security

CSR is a standardized message format used to request a digital certificate from a Certificate Authority, containing the requester's public key and identity for secure authentication and encrypted communications.

Category
Security
Introduced
Rel-15
Where
Core Network › 5G Core
Also touches
1 segments
Specifications
4 specs
CSR Description Purpose Detected Changes Specifications

Description

A Certificate Signing Request (CSR) is a critical component of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) framework within 3GPP networks, defined across multiple security specifications. It is a structured data object, typically encoded in PKCS#10 format, that an entity (such as a network function, user equipment, or application server) generates and submits to a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) to obtain a digital certificate. The CSR contains several essential fields: the subject's distinguished name (DN) identifying the entity (e.g., Common Name, Organization, Country), the entity's public key (usually RSA or ECC), and optional attributes or extensions specifying key usage, extended key usage, or subject alternative names. The entity also signs the CSR with its corresponding private key, providing proof of possession of that private key to the CA.

The CSR generation process begins when an entity creates a public-private key pair. The entity then assembles the CSR data structure, including its identity information and public key, and computes a cryptographic hash (e.g., SHA-256) over this data. This hash is encrypted with the entity's private key to create a digital signature, which is appended to the CSR. This signature allows the CA to verify that the requester indeed controls the private key corresponding to the submitted public key, preventing impersonation attacks. The CSR is transmitted to the CA via a secure enrollment protocol, such as the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) or Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP), often over TLS-protected connections.

Upon receiving the CSR, the CA performs validation checks, including verifying the CSR's signature, authenticating the requester's identity through out-of-band means or existing credentials, and ensuring the request complies with the CA's certificate policy. If validation succeeds, the CA issues a digital certificate by signing a new data structure containing the requester's public key and identity information with the CA's private key. This certificate binds the public key to the identity, creating a trusted credential that other entities can verify using the CA's public key. In 3GPP architectures, CSRs are used for provisioning certificates to network functions in Service-Based Architectures (SBA), enabling mutual TLS authentication between NF instances, as well as for device certificates in IoT scenarios and user equipment authentication.

The role of CSR in 3GPP security is multifaceted. It enables automated certificate lifecycle management, supporting scalable deployment of certificates across massive numbers of network elements and devices. In 5G core networks, CSRs are integral to the security credential management system for network function authentication, ensuring secure service-based interfaces. The specifications detail CSR formats, processing requirements, and integration with certificate enrollment protocols to maintain interoperability across vendors and operators. Proper CSR handling is essential for maintaining the chain of trust, preventing unauthorized certificate issuance, and ensuring the overall integrity of the network's authentication framework.

Purpose & Motivation

The Certificate Signing Request exists to provide a standardized, secure mechanism for entities to request digital certificates from trusted authorities within 3GPP networks. It solves the fundamental problem of securely binding public keys to identities in a scalable, automated manner, which is essential for authentication, confidentiality, and integrity in modern telecommunications systems. Without CSRs, certificate provisioning would require manual processes prone to errors, inconsistencies, and security vulnerabilities, making large-scale deployment impractical.

Historically, earlier mobile network generations relied on simpler, pre-shared key systems or proprietary authentication methods that lacked the flexibility and scalability required for 5G's dynamic, service-based architecture. The shift to cloud-native, software-defined networks with numerous interconnected network functions created a need for automated, certificate-based mutual authentication. CSR provides the foundational request mechanism that enables this automation, allowing network functions, devices, and applications to obtain credentials without manual intervention. This addresses limitations of previous approaches that couldn't support the rapid scaling, zero-touch provisioning, and dynamic trust relationships required in 5G and beyond.

The creation of CSR specifications within 3GPP was motivated by the need for interoperable security across multi-vendor deployments and the requirement to integrate with existing PKI ecosystems. By standardizing CSR formats and processing, 3GPP ensures that different network elements from various manufacturers can securely obtain certificates from operator or third-party CAs, maintaining consistent security policies across the network. This enables features like secure service-based interfaces, IoT device authentication, and network slicing security, where different slices may require distinct certificate authorities and trust models.

Detected Changes Across Releases

from 3GPP Change Requests

Specific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (3 CRs across 3 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.

Rel-15 1 change

In Release 15, the CSR function was enhanced to support a new "Location Information Request" event triggered from the HSS in EPS. This allows the interception system to report location information requested by nodes like a GMLC or SMS Centre. The event includes details such as the requesting network identifier and requesting node type when available.

  • Stage 2 Corrections Location Information Request event from HSS in EPS TS 33.107CR0287
Rel-18 1 change

In Release 18, the CSR function was enhanced to support location information requests for both T2P (Terminal to Point) and P2T (Point to Terminal) scenarios, aligning with TS 33.128. This update standardized the reporting of location request activities from various network nodes, such as an SMS Centre or GMLC, as a defined Intercept Related Information (IRI) event. The event includes details like the requesting network identifier and node type when such location requests are made.

  • Support of location information request for both T2P and P2T requests in alignment with TS 33.128 TS 33.127CR0180
Rel-19 1 change

In Release 19, the CSR function was enhanced to support Integrated Access and Backhaul (IAB) nodes by introducing new procedures for Downlink NAS transport and the UE CONTEXT MODIFICATION REQUEST. These updates specifically provide mechanisms for delivering NAS signaling to UEs via IAB nodes and for modifying the context of IAB-MT (Mobile Termination) functions. The changes ensure that lawful interception and event reporting for IAB architectures can be properly managed within the existing framework.

  • Extra IAB information in stage 2 related to Downlink NAS transport and to UE CONTEXT MODIFICATION REQUEST TS 33.127CR0255

Explore further

Broader topics and technologies where CSR plays a role.

Defining Specifications

3GPP specifications that define or reference CSR, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.

SpecificationTitleRelease
TS 33.107 vj00 Lawful Interception Architecture & Functions Rel-19
TS 33.127 vj50 Lawful Interception Architecture and Functions Rel-19
TS 33.794 vj10 Study on Zero Trust Security Enablers for 5G Rel-19
TR 33.876 vi01 Technical Report on Certificate Management Rel-18