Description
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) is a mandatory component of the IP Security (IPsec) protocol suite, extensively adopted within 3GPP specifications to secure IP-based traffic between network functions and user equipment. As defined by IETF RFC 4303 and referenced in 3GPP specs, ESP operates in either transport mode or tunnel mode. In transport mode, ESP protects the payload of an IP packet (e.g., TCP/UDP data) by inserting an ESP header between the original IP header and the payload; this mode is typically used for end-to-end security between hosts. In tunnel mode, ESP encapsulates the entire original IP packet (header and payload) within a new IP packet with an ESP header, creating a secure tunnel; this is commonly used for gateway-to-gateway security, such as securing the N3 interface between a gNB and the UPF in 5G. The ESP protocol provides several security services: confidentiality through encryption of the payload (using algorithms like AES-GCM), data integrity and origin authentication via an Integrity Check Value (ICV) computed over the ESP packet (excluding the IP header), and anti-replay protection through a sequence number. Its operation involves Security Associations (SAs) managed by Internet Key Exchange (IKE), which define the cryptographic algorithms, keys, and parameters for the secure session. Within 3GPP, ESP is mandated for protecting control plane and user plane traffic on many reference points, ensuring that signaling and data traversing untrusted networks (e.g., between a gNB and the 5G Core over a transport network) remain protected from eavesdropping and tampering.
Purpose & Motivation
ESP exists to provide a standardized, robust method for securing IP communications, which became critically important as 3GPP networks evolved from predominantly circuit-switched to all-IP architectures (starting with GPRS and IMS). The problem it solves is the inherent lack of security in the base IP protocol, which transmits data in clear text, vulnerable to interception, modification, and replay attacks. The creation and adoption of ESP within 3GPP were motivated by the need to protect sensitive user data and network signaling as traffic began to traverse public or shared transport networks (like backhaul links). Historically, earlier mobile generations had limited cryptographic protection confined to the radio interface; ESP extended this security end-to-end across the IP network. It addresses the limitations of previous, often proprietary, link-layer security solutions by providing a network-layer security standard that is interoperable, scalable, and independent of the underlying link technology. Its use in 3GPP enables secure network slicing, trusted interconnection between operators, and protection of NFs in a virtualized, cloud-native environment.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define ESP. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Rel-19 brings only minor changes to TS 23.060: 0 clauses changed, with no change attributed to a release feature.
Full comparison in TS 23.060 →Formalization of WLAN files adds optional WLAN parameter storage and new direct access conditions to HPLMN, affecting selection procedures.
Full comparison in TS 24.234 →Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
from 3GPP Change RequestsSpecific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (2 CRs across 2 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference ESP, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TS 23.060 vj00 | GPRS Stage 2 Service Description | Rel-19 read |
| TS 24.234 vc20 | 3GPP-WLAN Interworking Network Selection | Rel-12 read |
| TS 24.302 vj00 | Access to EPC via non-3GPP networks; Stage 3 | Rel-19 read |
| TS 24.327 vc00 | Mobility between I-WLAN and GPRS | Rel-12 read |
| TS 24.502 vk00 | Non-3GPP Access Network Discovery and Selection | Rel-20 read |
| TR 26.975 vj00 | AMR Speech Codec Performance Background | Rel-19 read |
| TR 26.978 vj00 | AMR Noise Suppression Selection Phase Technical Report | Rel-19 read |
| TS 29.368 vj00 | Tsp Reference Point Stage 3 Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 29.468 vj00 | MB2 Reference Point Protocol Definition | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.141 vj00 | Security for Presence Service (Ut reference point) | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.203 vk00 | IMS Security Features and Mechanisms | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.210 vk00 | Network Domain Security for IP Networks | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.320 vj00 | H(e)NB Subsystem Security Architecture | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.402 vj00 | Security for non-3GPP access to EPS | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.513 vk20 | UPF Security Assurance Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.820 v830 | H(e)NB Security Threats and Countermeasures | Rel-8 read |
| TS 33.938 vj30 | 5G Standalone Cryptographic Inventory | Rel-19 read |
| TR 43.901 vj00 | Generic Access to A/Gb Interface Feasibility Study | Rel-19 read |
| TS 44.065 vj00 | GPRS SNDCP Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 44.318 vj00 | Generic Access Network (GAN) Interface Procedures | Rel-19 read |
| TS 46.055 vj00 | GSM Enhanced Full Rate Speech Codec Performance | Rel-19 read |