Description
Communication Barring (CB) is a standardized supplementary service within the 3GPP architecture that enables the selective blocking of communication attempts. It operates by intercepting session establishment requests (e.g., for voice calls, video calls, or messaging) and applying predefined barring criteria before the request is forwarded to the intended recipient or network element. The service is typically invoked in the core network, specifically within the Call Session Control Function (CSCF) in the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) for packet-switched services or the Mobile Switching Center (MSC) for circuit-switched services. When a communication attempt is initiated, the serving network node checks the subscriber's profile, which contains active barring conditions stored in the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) or a local database. If a match is found, the request is rejected with a specific cause code, and the session is not established.
The architecture of CB involves several key components: the user equipment (UE), which may have client-side settings or indications; the serving network node (e.g., CSCF, MSC) that performs the barring check; and the subscriber data repository (e.g., HSS) that holds the barring configurations. Barring conditions can be based on various factors, including the communication type (e.g., outgoing, incoming), the destination or origin number (using prefix matching or specific numbers), the time of day, or the subscriber's location. For example, a subscriber might activate 'Barring of All Outgoing Calls' to prevent all voice call origination, or 'Barring of Incoming Calls from Anonymous Numbers' to block calls where the caller ID is hidden. The service supports both permanent and temporary activation, often managed via USSD codes, over-the-air provisioning, or a web interface.
In the network, CB plays a critical role in traffic management and subscriber control. For operators, it helps prevent fraud, manage network congestion by blocking certain call patterns, and enforce regulatory requirements (e.g., barring premium-rate numbers). For end-users, it provides tools for privacy (e.g., blocking unwanted calls), cost control (e.g., barring international calls), and focus management (e.g., barring all calls during meetings). The service is integrated with other 3GPP mechanisms like call forwarding and unconditional call barring to create complex service logic. In IMS networks, CB is implemented as part of the Telephony Application Server (TAS) or Service Centralization and Continuity Application Server (SCC AS), which executes service logic based on initial Filter Criteria (iFC) downloaded from the HSS. Performance-wise, CB checks are designed to be low-latency to avoid impacting call setup times, typically involving a simple database lookup and pattern matching.
The evolution of CB has seen it expand from basic circuit-switched barring in GSM to comprehensive IMS-based barring in LTE and 5G. In later releases, it supports barring for multimedia sessions, including video calls and messaging over IP, and integrates with presence and location services for more dynamic barring rules. The service also interfaces with Lawful Interception (LI) systems to ensure barring does not interfere with mandated surveillance. Overall, CB is a foundational service that balances user autonomy with network operational needs, implemented through a distributed, profile-driven architecture across the core network.
Purpose & Motivation
Communication Barring was created to address the need for controlled communication access in mobile networks, solving problems related to privacy, cost management, and network resource utilization. In early cellular systems like GSM, subscribers had limited ability to restrict unwanted calls or control spending, leading to issues like bill shock from unauthorized use or nuisance calls. Operators also faced challenges with fraudulent activities, such as subscription theft or premium-rate number scams, which could overload network resources. CB provided a standardized mechanism to let users selectively block communication attempts based on their preferences, while giving operators a tool to enforce policies and mitigate abuse.
Historically, before CB, similar features existed as proprietary operator services or basic switch-based functions, but they lacked interoperability and a consistent user experience across networks. The introduction of CB in 3GPP Release 99 standardized these capabilities, ensuring they worked seamlessly in multi-vendor environments and across roaming scenarios. It addressed limitations of previous ad-hoc approaches by defining clear protocols for activation, deactivation, and interrogation of barring states, integrated with the subscriber's home network profile. This allowed for features like barring all outgoing calls when a phone is lost, or blocking incoming calls during specific hours, enhancing both security and convenience.
In modern networks, CB's purpose has expanded to support IP-based communications in IMS, where it manages not just voice but also video, messaging, and other multimedia sessions. It solves problems like spam over IP telephony (SPIT) and unauthorized service usage in 5G network slices. By providing granular control—such as barring based on caller identity, session type, or time—CB helps maintain quality of service (QoS) and complies with regulatory requirements (e.g., 'do-not-call' lists). Its integration with network slicing in 5G allows operators to offer differentiated barring policies per slice, catering to enterprise or IoT use cases where communication restrictions are critical for security and operational efficiency.
Classification
Detected Changes Across Releases
from 3GPP Change RequestsSpecific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (18 CRs across 4 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.
In Release 15, the Communication Barring (CB) function was newly introduced for use within the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network subsystem. This specifically enabled the Anonymous Communication Rejection (ACR) supplementary service to operate over IMS. Furthermore, the release also introduced Malicious Communication Identification (MCID) as a new supplementary service utilizing the same IMS Core Network subsystem.
- IMS multimedia telephony communication service and supplementary services TS 24.173CR0122
- Anonymous Communication Rejection (ACR) and Communication Barring (CB) using IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem TS 24.611CR0051
- Malicious Communication Identification (MCID) using IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem TS 24.616CR0026
- Completion of Communications to Busy Subscriber (CCBS) and Completion of Communications by No Reply (CCNR) using IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem TS 24.642CR0088
In Release 16, the primary enhancement for the Communication Barring (CB) function was the introduction of barring support for Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communications (URLLC). This involved architectural enhancements to facilitate communications with packet data networks and applications, ensuring that barring mechanisms could be applied to these new, critical service types. The release also included subsequent corrections to refine these URLLC-related barring functionalities.
- Introduction of Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communications Enhancements TS 38.213CR0074
- Corrections on Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communications Enhancements TS 38.213CR0095
- Corrections on Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communications Enhancements TS 38.213CR0104
- Corrections on Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communications Enhancements TS 38.213CR0139
In Release 17, the enhancements to the Communication Barring (CB) function specifically addressed technical corrections and clarifications for Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request Acknowledgement (HARQ-ACK) codebook generation. These included fixes for Type-2 HARQ codebook generation under specific spatial and time bundling configurations and for Type1 HARQ-ACK codebook issues related to multicast and multiple Physical Downlink Shared Channels (PDSCHs) per slot. The updates also refined the conditions under which a Type-1 codebook is not provided.
- Correction on Type-2 HARQ CB generation when both of spatial bundling and time bundling are configured TS 38.213CR0349
- Correction on Type-2 HARQ CB generation when time bundling is configured but spatial bundling is not configured TS 38.213CR0350
- CR on dci-enabler for Type1 HARQ-ACK CB for multicast TS 38.213CR0409
- CR on Type1 HARQ-ACK CB issue with more than one PDSCH per slot TS 38.213CR0474
- CR on condition for not providing Type-1 CB TS 38.213CR0478
In Release 19, the updates to the Communication Barring (CB) function were specifically focused on refining the procedures for avatar communication. The changes involved updating the technical process for this service and removing a specific normative element (EN) related to it. This work aimed to clarify and streamline the implementation of avatar communication within the barring framework.
Explore further
Broader topics and technologies where CB plays a role.
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference CB, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TR 21.905 vj00 | 3GPP Technical Terms and Definitions | Rel-19 |
| TS 22.173 vk00 | IMS Multimedia Telephony Service Definition | Rel-20 |
| TS 22.273 v1700 | IMS Multimedia Telephony with PSTN/ISDN Simulation | Rel-7 |
| TS 22.401 v1800 | Videotelephony Service Requirements for NGN | Rel-8 |
| TS 24.173 vj00 | Multimedia Telephony Service and Supplementary Services in IMS | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.186 vj60 | IMS Data Channel applications | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.292 vj00 | IMS Centralized Services (ICS) Protocol | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.315 vj00 | Operator Determined Barring (ODB) for IMS | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.404 v1700 | Communication Diversion Services (CDIV) | Rel-7 |
| TS 24.411 v1830 | ACR and CB Service Protocol Specification | Rel-8 |
| TS 24.416 v1700 | Malicious Call Identification Service | Rel-7 |
| TS 24.429 v1700 | Explicit Communication Transfer (ECT) Service Specification | Rel-7 |
| TS 24.447 v800 | Advice Of Charge (AOC) Service Protocol | Rel-8 |
| TS 24.504 v8m0 | Communication Diversion Services Stage 3 | Rel-8 |
| TS 24.516 v830 | MCID Protocol Specification for NGN | Rel-8 |
| TS 24.604 vj00 | Communications Diversion (CDIV) Protocol Spec | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.611 vj00 | Anonymous Communication Rejection & Barring | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.616 vj00 | Malicious Call Identification (MCID) Protocol | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.642 vj00 | CCBS/CCNR/CCNL SIP Protocol Specification | Rel-19 |
| TS 24.647 vj00 | Advice of Charge (AOC) service protocol | Rel-19 |
| TS 29.163 vj00 | Interworking between 3GPP IM CN and CS networks | Rel-19 |
| TS 29.165 vj10 | Inter-IMS Network to Network Interface (NNI) | Rel-19 |
| TS 29.292 vj00 | IMS Centralized Services (ICS) Interworking | Rel-19 |
| TS 29.364 vj10 | IMS AS Service Data Descriptions | Rel-19 |
| TS 29.864 v801 | Application Server Service Data Definition for IMS Telephony | Rel-8 |
| TR 29.935 vj00 | HSS Reference Data Model for Ud Interface | Rel-19 |
| TS 31.111 vj30 | USIM Application Toolkit (USAT) Specification | Rel-19 |
| TS 32.275 vj00 | MMTel Charging Specification | Rel-19 |
| TS 32.850 ve00 | IMS Charging Correlation Methods Study | Rel-14 |
| TS 33.838 vb00 | Study on Protection against Unsolicited Communication for IMS | Rel-11 |
| TS 38.213 vj10 | NR Physical Layer Control Procedures | Rel-19 |
| TR 38.802 ve20 | Study on New Radio Access Technology Physical Layer Aspects | Rel-14 |
| TR 38.912 vj00 | Study on New Radio Access Technology | Rel-19 |