Description
The Authentication Vector (AV) is a core security data structure in 3GPP networks, primarily generated by the Authentication Centre (AuC) within the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) for UMTS, LTE, and 5G systems. It is used in the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure to verify the identity of a User Equipment (UE) and to derive session keys for encrypting and integrity-protecting communications. An AV is requested by the serving network's Mobility Management Entity (MME) in LTE or the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) in 5G Core when a UE attempts to attach or register.
An AV typically consists of several components: a random challenge (RAND), an expected response (XRES), a cipher key (CK), an integrity key (IK), and an authentication token (AUTN). The AUTN itself contains further sub-components like the Sequence Number (SQN) and the Message Authentication Code (MAC), which allow the UE to authenticate the network, providing mutual authentication. The AuC generates the AV using the subscriber's long-term secret key (K) and a sequence number. The serving network node sends the RAND and AUTN to the UE, which uses its own secret key and the received parameters to compute a response (RES) and verify the AUTN. If verification succeeds, the UE sends RES back; the network compares it with the XRES for final authentication.
The successful AKA procedure results in the UE and network both possessing the same CK and IK, which are then used by lower-layer protocols to derive the necessary encryption and integrity protection keys for the user plane and control plane. The AV is a one-time-use element; a batch of AVs may be sent from the HSS to the serving node to avoid frequent signaling to the home network. Its design ensures freshness through the sequence number, preventing replay attacks, and enables secure key establishment without transmitting the long-term secret over the air. The AV is thus the foundational cryptographic material enabling trusted access in 3GPP networks.
Purpose & Motivation
The Authentication Vector exists to provide a robust, standardized mechanism for mutual authentication and key establishment between a mobile subscriber and the network. Before its formalization in 3G (UMTS) and evolution through later generations, GSM authentication was one-way (network authenticating the subscriber only) and used weaker cryptographic algorithms. The need for stronger security, including mutual authentication and enhanced key lengths, drove the creation of the AKA procedure for which the AV is the central data package.
It solves the critical problems of verifying subscriber identity, preventing unauthorized network access, and ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of communications. By packaging all necessary cryptographic parameters (challenge, expected response, keys, and network authentication token) into a single vector, it simplifies the protocol exchange between the home network (AuC/HSS) and the serving network node. This design allows the serving network to perform authentication locally after receiving one or more AVs, improving efficiency and reducing latency compared to a model requiring real-time interaction with the home network for every authentication attempt. The AV mechanism directly addresses threats like impersonation and eavesdropping inherent in wireless communication.
What changed in its specifications
The latest release-to-release comparison of specifications that define AV. Each summary describes the whole specification, not only this term.
Standalone security aspects update HTTP references and specify authentication algorithm values. AKMA adds TLS usage over Ua* with new definitions, and GBA updates authentication algorithm and TLS version details for 5GC bootstrapping.
Full comparison in TS 24.109 →Added 128-bit encryption for GSM and GPRS with Kc128 derived from CK and IK. Added IMS emergency call support over GPRS and EPS.
Full comparison in TS 33.102 →Release Timeline
Detected Changes Across Releases
from 3GPP Change RequestsSpecific changes extracted from the „Change history“ tables of 3GPP specifications (1 CRs across 1 releases). Complements the general historical overview above with the evidence-based evolution of this function.
Defining Specifications
3GPP specifications that define or reference AV, with the latest known release. Sourced from the 3GPP document catalog — see methodology.
| Specification | Title | Release |
|---|---|---|
| TR 22.827 vh10 | Study on Audio-Visual Service Production Stage 1 | Rel-17 read |
| TS 24.109 vj00 | HTTP Digest AKA & GAA Stage 3 | Rel-19 read |
| TR 26.922 vj00 | Video Telephony Robustness Improvements Study | Rel-19 read |
| TR 26.923 vj00 | Study on IMS-based Telepresence Media Handling | Rel-19 read |
| TS 29.866 vj00 | IMS Disaster Prevention & Restoration Enhancement | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.102 vj10 | 3G Security Architecture Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.203 vk00 | IMS Security Features and Mechanisms | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.401 vj20 | EPS Security Architecture | Rel-19 read |
| TS 33.501 vk30 | 5G Security Architecture | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.503 vk00 | 5G ProSe Security Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.514 vk20 | UDM Security Assurance Specification | Rel-20 read |
| TS 33.812 v920 | M2M Remote Subscription Management Security | Rel-9 read |
| TS 33.835 vg10 | Study on authentication and key management for apps | Rel-16 read |
| TS 33.859 vb10 | UTRAN Key Hierarchy Enhancement Study | Rel-11 read |
| TR 33.924 vj00 | GBA-OpenID Interworking Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TS 35.234 vj00 | MILENAGE-256 Algorithm Set Specification | Rel-19 read |
| TR 35.937 vj00 | MILENAGE-256 Algorithm Set Specification | Rel-19 read |